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Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate the Bias Blind Spot
Abstract
The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition.
... Bias can lead to poor judgments and decisions in domains such as intelligence analysis (Dhami et al., 2019;Morewedge et al., 2015), medicine (Arkes, 2013;Bornstein & Emler, 2001) and forensics (Kassim et al., 2013) to name a few. This is compounded by the fact that individuals, including children (Elashi & Mills, 2015;Hagá et al., 2018), often report that they are less susceptible to biases than others-a phenomenon known as the bias blind spot (BBS; Pronin et al., 2002;Pronin & Kugler, 2007;Scopelliti et al., 2015;West et al., 2012). ...
... One hypothesis we explore is that variation in the BBS reflects corresponding differences in actual cognitive performance, namely, people who show stronger bias blind spots may actually be less biased than others. This cognitive sophistication hypothesis receives some support from West et al. (2012), who examined the relation between the bias blind spot and measures of cognitive sophistication including self-reported scholastic aptitude test (SAT) scores, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo et al., 1996), and the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 1997. Interestingly, the various measures of cognitive sophistication were all positively correlated with the BBS. ...
... That is, supporting the cognitive sophistication hypothesis, individuals who scored higher on measures of cognitive sophistication had larger bias blind spots. However, contrary to the cognitive sophistication hypothesis, West et al. (2012) found that performance on actual measures of cognitive bias were generally unrelated to cognitive sophistication, an overall measure of their BBS, or to the specific BBS measures associated with the actual biases (e.g., the relation between the anchoring bias blind spot and the actual anchoring bias). The positive relation between the BBS and cognitive sophistication also has not been consistently observed. ...
Individuals often assess themselves as being less susceptible to common biases compared to others. This bias blind spot (BBS) is thought to represent a metacognitive error. In this research, we tested three explanations for the effect: The cognitive sophistication hypothesis posits that individuals who display the BBS more strongly are actually less biased than others. The introspection bias hypothesis posits that the BBS occurs because people rely on introspection more when assessing themselves compared to others. The conversational processes hypothesis posits that the effect is largely a consequence of the pragmatic aspects of the experimental situation rather than true metacognitive error. In two experiments (N = 1057) examining 18 social/motivational and cognitive biases, there was strong evidence of the BBS. Among the three hypotheses examined, the conversational processes hypothesis attracted the greatest support, thus raising questions about the extent to which the BBB is a metacognitive effect.
... It is currently unclear whether HR employees are fully aware of these potential risks in their decision-making, and, therefore, whether they can recognize their potential susceptibility to a bias blind spot. Research on the bias blind spot (Ehrlinger et al., 2005;Pronin and Kugler, 2007;Pronin et al., 2004;Scopelliti et al., 2015;West et al., 2012) remains scarce and mainly focuses on investigating the phenomenon in everyday situations involving, for example, college students or airport passengers. However, an existence of the bias blind spot in a business setting, such as choosing the best candidate for a managerial role, could have many, longer-lasting consequences. ...
... Several researchers have investigated the antecedents of the bias blind spot and suggest that possible causes are cognitive ability, self-esteem and self-awareness, and introspection illusion and naïve realism. For example, West et al. (2012) found that people with higher cognitive ability showed a higher susceptibility toward a bias blind spot. Scopelliti et al. (2015) reported that individuals with higher self-esteem are more likely to see themselves as immune from bias and, therefore, be more susceptible to a bias blind spot. ...
... So far, research on the bias blind spot is limited and has only been conducted in the field of psychology. Studies have usually compared groups such as students versus the average American, students versus fellow students, or airline passengers versus other travelers (Ehrlinger et al., 2005;Pronin et al., 2002Pronin et al., , 2004Scopelliti et al., 2015;West et al., 2012). Most studies found significant differences among these groups. ...
Research on human resources (HR) indicates that many biases (e.g., halo effect, confirmation bias, stereotyping bias) affect decisions taken by HR employees. However, it remains unclear whether HR employees are aware of their susceptibility to bias. To improve understanding, this study examines the "bias blind spot" phenomenon, the tendency of individuals to believe they are less likely to be biased than their peers. This quantitative survey among 234 HR employees in Switzerland measured the bias blind spot on seven interview biases in recruitment decision-making. The study shows that participants rated the average HR colleague as more susceptible to bias than themselves. Furthermore, male HR employees partly showed a greater bias blind spot than female HR employees. These findings contribute to behavioral research in HR and offer practical insights.
... Other researchers have theorized that bias blind spots are somewhat driven by naïve realism, the belief that one's perceptions represent the true state of the world (Scopelliti et al., 2015). Additionally, blind spot biases may not be sufficiently attenuated by higher levels of cognitive sophistication (West et al., 2012). Thus, even those who are highly intelligent and analytically-minded are not immune to bias blind spots. ...
... This may help to explain the finding of low performers on the CRT overreporting that they were "dispositionally analytic" thinkers (Pennycook et al., 2017). Moreover, even individuals with greater levels of relevant knowledge and cognitive sophistication can commit errors in reasoning which leave them more vulnerable to various types of biases (Stahl & Prooijen, 2018;Stanovich, 2018;West et al., 2012). This suggests that models which attribute susceptibility to misleading information primarily to a lack of cognitive reflection may be insufficient, as they do not account for the critical roles that smart intuition and error-prone rationalization may play in bullshit detection. ...
The growing prevalence of misleading information (i.e., bullshit) in society carries with it an increased need to understand the processes underlying many people's susceptibility to falling for it. Here we report two studies (N = 412) examining the associations between one's ability to detect pseudo-profound bullshit, confidence in one's bullshit detection abilities, and the metacognitive experience of evaluating potentially misleading information. We find that people with the lowest (highest) bullshit detection performance overestimate (underestimate) their detection abilities and overplace (underplace) those abilities when compared to others. Additionally, people reported using both intuitive and reflective thinking processes when evaluating misleading information. Taken together, these results show that both highly bullshit-receptive and highly bullshit-resistant people are largely unaware of the extent to which they can detect bullshit and that traditional miserly processing explanations of receptivity to misleading information may be insufficient to fully account for these effects.
... However, there is also considerable evidence indicating that the tendency to interpret information in favor of preexisting beliefs and attitudes is no more or less likely among individuals with greater cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2000;Stanovich & West, 2007;Stanovich & West, 2008b;Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). For example, college entrance exam scores, which are associated with both numeracy and intelligence test scores, have been found to be unassociated with many cognitive biases (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2013;West, Meserve & Stanovich, 2012;Stanovich & West, 2008a;2008b). Thus, even the most intelligent among us may be biased by preexisting beliefs and are capable of making sub-optimal judgments that are not exclusively based upon the available evidence. ...
... Although numerical skill was associated with increased accuracy, numeracy did not moderate the expression of partisan-consistent responses. This result is consistent with previous research demonstrating the lack of an association between cognitive biases and cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 2008a;West, Meserve & Stanovich, 2012). In this study, the correct answers were often able to be derived through heuristic responses strategies (especially for the easiest problems). ...
People who possess greater mathematical skills (i.e., numeracy) are generally more accurate in interpreting numerical data than less numerate people. However, recent evidence has suggested that more numerate people may use their numerical skills to interpret data only if their initial interpretation conflicts with their worldview. That is, if an initial, intuitive (but incorrect) interpretation of data appears to disconfirm one’s beliefs, then numerical skills are used to further process the data and reach the correct interpretation, whereas numerical skills are not used in situations where an initial incorrect interpretation of the data appears to confirm one’s beliefs (i.e., motivated numeracy). In the present study, participants were presented with several data problems, some with correct answers confirming their political views and other disconfirming their views. The difficulty of these problems was manipulated to examine how numeracy would influence the rate of correct responses on easier vs. more difficult problems. Results indicated that participants were more likely to answer problems correctly if the correct answer confirmed rather than disconfirmed their political views, and this response pattern did not depend on problem difficulty or numerical skill. Although more numerate participants were more accurate overall, this was true both for problems in which the correct answer confirmed and disconfirmed participants’ political views.
... With the other part of the sample, the CFA [70] was carried out to verify what the EFA yielded: two factors, for the items of "Knowledge/Capacity" and "Attitude" of the different areas of digital competence. As can be seen (Table 9), all the values obtained in the goodness adjustments for each area were very positive [71,72]. Factor loadings for problem solving ranged from 0.39 to 0.99, which is considered acceptable and significant ( Figure 2). ...
... Regarding reliability, results considered acceptable (0.841) were obtained for the total test, approaching that obtained in the original test validated for Spain (0.89) [33]. However, when reviewing the reliability index of some studies focused on some of the competence areas, it is highlighted that the Cronbach's alpha index for the "Knowledge/Ability" factor is not acceptable (<0.70) [67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75], which is because the Cronbach's alpha statistic is not recommended to calculate reliability on a scale of less than five categories [77,78], which can be verified in the present study with the reliability index of the "Knowledge/Capacity" component where reliability indices lower than 0.70 were obtained, although they were close. In the "Attitude" component, the reliability index is quite acceptable for both statistics, like that obtained in studies focused on competence areas. ...
Education in the 21st century faces the challenge of digitalization; therefore, the acquisition
and development of digital skills in students is indispensable, not only for their learning processes
but also for their lives. This study aims to validate the test “ECODIES”, which was used to assess the
level of development of digital competence in students in a public high school in Bogotá (Colombia).
The test is based on the DigCom model and was administered to a sample of 777 students aged
between 11 and 18. The results obtained in the exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), and reliability analysis show the quality of the test. Therefore, in this study it is
concluded that “ECODIES” is a test with the reliability and validity to assess digital competence in
the Colombian context; in this way, we hope to gain enough research about this topic to contribute to
the development of digital competence in Colombian students. We conducted an instrumental study
for the analysis of the psychometric properties of the questionnaire.
... With the other part of the sample, the CFA [70] was carried out to verify what the EFA yielded: two factors, for the items of "Knowledge/Capacity" and "Attitude" of the different areas of digital competence. As can be seen (Table 9), all the values obtained in the goodness adjustments for each area were very positive [71,72]. Factor loadings for problem solving ranged from 0.39 to 0.99, which is considered acceptable and significant ( Figure 2). ...
... Regarding reliability, results considered acceptable (0.841) were obtained for the total test, approaching that obtained in the original test validated for Spain (0.89) [33]. However, when reviewing the reliability index of some studies focused on some of the competence areas, it is highlighted that the Cronbach's alpha index for the "Knowledge/Ability" factor is not acceptable (<0.70) [67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75], which is because the Cronbach's alpha statistic is not recommended to calculate reliability on a scale of less than five categories [77,78], which can be verified in the present study with the reliability index of the "Knowledge/Capacity" component where reliability indices lower than 0.70 were obtained, although they were close. In the "Attitude" component, the reliability index is quite acceptable for both statistics, like that obtained in studies focused on competence areas. ...
Education in the 21st century faces the challenge of digitalization; therefore, the acquisition and development of digital skills in students is indispensable, not only for their learning processes but also for their lives. This study aims to validate the test “ECODIES”, which was used to assess the level of development of digital competence in students in a public high school in Bogotá (Colombia). The test is based on the DigCom model and was administered to a sample of 777 students aged between 11 and 18. The results obtained in the exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and reliability analysis show the quality of the test. Therefore, in this study it is concluded that “ECODIES” is a test with the reliability and validity to assess digital competence in the Colombian context; in this way, we hope to gain enough research about this topic to contribute to the development of digital competence in Colombian students. We conducted an instrumental study for the analysis of the psychometric properties of the questionnaire.
... Further, blind spot bias suggests that people report that cognitive biases are more prevalent among their peers compared to themselves (West et al., 2012). Individuals with higher blind spot bias were more likely to have poor health literacy, make less than adequate medical choices, and fail to critically evaluate health information obtained from providers, advertisements, and the internet (West et al., 2012). ...
... Further, blind spot bias suggests that people report that cognitive biases are more prevalent among their peers compared to themselves (West et al., 2012). Individuals with higher blind spot bias were more likely to have poor health literacy, make less than adequate medical choices, and fail to critically evaluate health information obtained from providers, advertisements, and the internet (West et al., 2012). Due to emerging research addressing the nuances of health literacy, Martensson and Hensing (2012) have proposed a second, more comprehensive approach to understanding this construct that encompasses the importance of utilizing critical thinking skills to accurately digest health information that translates into health behaviors. ...
Health literacy is often low within the general population. The Dunning–Kruger effect (DKE) suggests that individuals may experience a cognitive bias in which they overestimate their own knowledge base. This study examines the DKE regarding health literacy and health behaviors. A community sample (n = 504) completed questionnaires measuring objective health literacy, confidence in health knowledge, and health behaviors and medical conditions. Results support the presence of a DKE for health literacy; individuals with low health literacy reported equal or greater confidence in health knowledge than individuals with higher health literacy. Individuals with lower health literacy reported more problematic engagement in health behaviors. Low health literacy can impact engagement in health behavior and effect health outcomes, but individuals may not realize this deficit. Implications for clinical intervention include the need to address cognitive bias and enhance motivation to participate in health literacy interventions.
... Blindness to one's own bias is a widespread problem. Children as young as 7 say they are less biased than other children (Elashi & Mills, 2015), and even highly intelligent people show a bias blind spot (West et al., 2012). In fact, more intelligent people may actually have a larger bias blind spot because, although they are accustomed to performing better on cognitive tasks, their cognitive sophistication does not protect them from implicit biases that arise outside of conscious awareness (West et al., 2012). ...
... Children as young as 7 say they are less biased than other children (Elashi & Mills, 2015), and even highly intelligent people show a bias blind spot (West et al., 2012). In fact, more intelligent people may actually have a larger bias blind spot because, although they are accustomed to performing better on cognitive tasks, their cognitive sophistication does not protect them from implicit biases that arise outside of conscious awareness (West et al., 2012). Expertise also fails to shield people from the bias blind spot. ...
This chapter concerns the divergent processes by which people come to know themselves and other people and the resulting consequences. People come to know themselves (or come to gain intrapersonal knowledge ) primarily by looking inward to internal thoughts, feelings, and motives (i.e., by introspecting ). They come to know others (or come to gain interpersonal knowledge ) primarily by looking outward to observable behaviors (i.e., by extrospecting ). These different processes for gaining knowledge lead to important differences in what people believe about themselves versus others. Importantly, the divergent routes of introspection and extrospection lead people to see others as biased and themselves as “right”—especially when the self and other disagree in their perceptions and beliefs. This bias blind spot gives rise to intellectual arrogance and escalates interpersonal conflict. The differing epistemological routes of introspection and extrospection do not always lead people to feel better about themselves than others, however. For example, people may view themselves as uniquely prone to worry, uniquely motivated by fear of embarrassment, and uniquely subject to deviant thoughts—all as a result of their reliance on introspection for assessing themselves but extrospection for assessing others.
... Other researchers have theorized that bias blind spots are somewhat driven by naïve realism, the belief that one's perceptions represent the true state of the world (Scopelliti et al., 2015). Additionally, blind spot biases may not be sufficiently attenuated by higher levels of cognitive sophistication (West et al., 2012). Thus, even those who are highly intelligent and analytically-minded are not immune to bias blind spots. ...
... This may help to explain the finding of low performers on the CRT overreporting that they were "dispositionally analytic" thinkers (Pennycook et al., 2017). Moreover, even individuals with greater levels of relevant knowledge and cognitive sophistication can commit errors in reasoning which leave them more vulnerable to various types of biases (Stahl & Prooijen, 2018;Stanovich, 2018;West et al., 2012). This suggests that models which attribute susceptibility to misleading information primarily to a lack of cognitive reflection may be insufficient, as they do not account for the critical roles that smart intuition and error-prone rationalization may play in bullshit detection. ...
The growing prevalence of misinformation (i.e., bullshit) in society carries with it an increased need to understand the processes underlying many people’s susceptibility to falling for it. Herewe report two studies (N = 412) examining the associations between one’s ability to detect pseudo-profound bullshit, confidence in one’s bullshit detection abilities, and the metacognitive experience of evaluating potentially misleading information. We find that people with the lowest (highest) bullshit detection performance overestimate (underestimate) their detection abilities and overplace (underplace) those abilities when compared to others. Additionally, people reported using both intuitive and reflective thinking processes when evaluating misleadinginformation. Taken together, these results show that both highly bullshit-receptive and highly bullshit-resistant people are largely unaware of the extent to which they can detect bullshit and that traditional miserly processing explanations of receptivity to misleading information may beinsufficient to fully account for these effects.
... Normally, it is preferred that the null hypothesis is not rejected; however, it was rejected in all models, probably because of the sample size [56]. All indicators were found to be good except the chi-square test [57][58][59]. ...
Many educational institutions demand the development of creativity. However, it is still insufficient for encouraging creative work or thinking. One reason is the lack of simple tools to measure creativity in schools. This study focused on Fermi problems to solve the reason for this issue. Fermi problems have been suggested to be deeply related to creativity. However, few empirical studies have been conducted on their relationship. Therefore, this study conducted a survey and analyzed them by structural equation modeling. The results showed a moderate correlation between creativity in Fermi problems and creativity in psychology (r = 0.47, p < 0.01). Additionally, it was shown that there is a strong correlation between creativity in Fermi problems and mathematical creativity (r = 0.76, p < 0.01). Furthermore, regression analysis showed that creativity in Fermi problems is an important factor for measuring creativity in psychology and mathematical creativity.
... The value of CFI for the default model is close to 1 which is considered an excellent fit for the model [66] (Table 6). ...
E-learning is evolving as the paradigm of modern-day education. Globally, e-learning has seen a rise; however, failures happen. There is a dearth of studies that discuss why a lot of learners quit e-learning after a preliminary experience. Preceding research studies carried out under diverse task settings have proposed an assortment of factors impacting learners’ satisfaction with e-Learning. This study developed an integrated conceptual model with the instructor, course, and learners’ dimensions and then empirically validates it. The technology acceptance model (TAM) has been employed for testing the acceptance of various technologies and software within an e-learning context. This study intends to examine the salient factors of effective e-learning acceptance by learners. A survey investigates the critical factors using a self-administered questionnaire influencing the satisfaction of learners in the e-Learning system/platform. The study uses quantitative methodology and data were collected from 348 learners. On performing the structured equation modeling for testing the hypothesized model, outcomes reveal the significant factors influencing learners’ perceived satisfaction studied in three dimensions of the instructor, course, and learner. It will facilitate educational institutes and provide directions on improving learners’ satisfaction and additionally improve e-Learning implementation.
... In fact, these subjects presented an important "meta-bias" called "bias blind spot". For example, West et al. (2012) registered positive correlations between the subjects' level of cognitive sophistication and the likely to commit a bias blind spot. In other words, subjects believed that various motivational biases were far more persistent in others than in themselves. ...
... Evidence of socially adaptive belief formation with respect to P furnishes at least a partial debunker for one's belief that P. Now, it is notoriously difficult to investigate our own biases. Even highly intelligent people are prone to have a "bias blind spot" (Pronin & Kugler, 2007;West et al., 2012), so that the propositions which form the contents of biased, prejudiced, or otherwise irrational beliefs nonetheless present themselves as true and supported by the evidence we have. However, it is plausible that socially adaptive beliefs are likely to occur when three conditions are present: (i) the costs to the individual of being wrong are negligible, (ii) the beliefs fall under sufficiently intense social scrutiny, and (iii) the evidential landscape relevant to the beliefs is sufficiently complex so as to make easy verification difficult to come by. ...
Following Anthony Downs’s classic economic analysis of democracy, it has been widely noted that most voters lack the incentive to be well-informed. Recent empirical work, however, suggests further that political partisans can display selectively lazy or biased reasoning. Unfortunately, political knowledge seems to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, these tendencies. In this paper, I build on these observations to construct a more general skeptical challenge which affects what I call creedal beliefs. Such beliefs share three features: (i) the costs to the individual of being wrong are negligible, (ii) the beliefs are subject to social scrutiny, and (iii) the evidential landscape relevant to the beliefs is sufficiently complex so as to make easy verification difficult. Some philosophers and social scientists have recently argued that under such conditions, beliefs are likely to play a signaling, as opposed to a navigational role, and that our ability to hold beliefs in this way is adaptive. However, if this is right, I argue there is at least a partial debunker for such beliefs. Moreover, this offers, I suggest, one way to develop the skeptical challenge based on etiological explanation that John Stuart Mill presents in On Liberty when he claims that the same causes which lead someone to be a devout Christian in London would have made them a Confucian in Peking. Finally, I contend that this skeptical challenge is appropriately circumscribed so that it does not over-extend in an implausible way.
... That said, we propose evidence-based suggestions to improve these interventions. Currently, a significant portion of the UBJ video is allotted to self-identification/ awareness of a juror's unconscious bias, however individuals are not well adept at identifying their own biases (bias blind spot) and such awareness does not translate into avoiding bias (West et al., 2012). A greater focus on enabling jurors to take a more active role could more effectively combat implicit biases (Devine et al., 2012), whether that comes from real-time feedback (Morewedge et al., 2015) or perspective taking (Salmanowitz, 2018). ...
Two studies examined the effectiveness of the Unconscious Bias Juror (UBJ) video and instructions at reducing racial bias in Black and White mock-jurors’ decisions, perceptions, and counterfactual endorsement in a murder (Study 1; N = 554) and battery (Study 2; N = 539) trial. Participants viewed the UBJ video or not, then read pretrial instructions (general or UBJ), a trial summary, and posttrial instructions (general or UBJ). In Study 1, juror race moderated the effect of defendant race on verdicts, culpability, and credibility. White, but not Black, jurors demonstrated greater leniency toward Black defendants for verdicts, culpability, and credibility. The UBJ video moderated the effect of defendant race on murder counterfactual endorsement. Only when the video was absent was jurors’ counterfactual endorsement higher for the White versus Black defendant, which mediated the effect of defendant race on White jurors’ verdicts. In Study 2, White jurors were more lenient regardless of defendant race. Instructions and juror race moderated the video’s effect on credibility ratings. The video only influenced Black jurors’ credibility ratings. In conclusion, the debiasing interventions were ineffective in reducing racial bias in jurors’ verdicts. However, they do impact aspects of juror attribution and may be effective with modification.
... Third, reading between Singer's lines makes it clear that he thinks being intelligent and having superior cognitive abilities are necessary for being a moral expert. Yet research suggests that individuals with higher cognitive abilities are prone to larger bias blind spots than average (West, Meserve & Stanovich, 2012). These last two points are especially threatening to the idea that philosophical training protects moral philosophers from unconscious biases in morality. ...
In this dissertation, I make the broad case against overestimating the moral epistemic capacities of adult moral agents, and the demands placed upon them to figure things out for themselves, morally speaking. This work is split into three chapters. In Chapter 1, ‘Moral Expertise & Experience’, I argue that moral expertise in some moral sub-domain, or one’s competence at forming moral knowledge in response to morally relevant features within that moral sub-domain, is typically generated through experience with the concrete world. I reject the claim that moral philosophers are the best candidates for being moral experts, and that imagination provides us an equally good path towards moral expertise as experiences does. In Chapter 2, 'Moral Expertise on Oppression', I argue that oppressed group members are often in a better position to become a moral expert with respect to the type of oppression experienced by that group. For instance, women are in a better position to become moral experts with respect to the moral sub-domain of sexism, as opposed to men. In Chapter 3, ‘Virtuous & Worthy Moral Deference’, I vindicate the practice of deference to second-hand moral testimony, and agents who defer, in the face of what I call the ‘reasons unresponsiveness observation’. This is because in certain contexts, it’s important for them to be motivated by a concern for doing the right thing in itself. Pure moral deference, practiced in the right way, can allow us to exercise virtues, and act with moral worth.
... Secondly, the model is considered good if the CFI is more excellent than .95 (West et al. 2012). In other words, all models were concluded to be good models. ...
Recently, creativity in mathematical modelling has been studied. These studies have found a relationship between mathematical modelling and creativity. However, few correlational analyses of those associations have been conducted using quantitative measures. The present study, using Fermi problems, regarded as a type of mathematical modelling, examined whether there are correlations between creativity in the Fermi problem and general creativity in psychology and mathematical creativity by Structural Equation Modeling. The results of a survey of junior high school students (n = 364) in Japan showed a strong correlation (r = .711, p < .01 in the acceptable model between creativity in Fermi problems and mathematical creativity. A moderate correlation (r = .429, p < .01 in the acceptable model was also found between creativity in Fermi problems and general creativity in psychology. In addition, these correlations were shown to vary depending on the content and format of the Fermi problem.
... The value of interest here is CFI for the default model. A CFI value of ≥ 0.95 is considered an excellent fit for the model [84]. An Incremental Fit Index (IFI) where values are close to 1 indicates a very good fit, while 1 indicates a perfect fit. ...
Smartphone addiction has become a major problem for everyone. According to recent studies, a considerable number of children and adolescents are more attracted to smartphones and exhibit addictive behavioral indicators, which are emerging as serious social problems. The main goal of this study is to identify the determinants that influence children's smartphone addiction and social isolation among children and adolescents in Jordan. The theoretical foundation of this study model is based on constructs adopted from the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (i.e., perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness), with social influence and trust adopted from the TAM extended model along with perceived enjoyment. In terms of methodology, the study uses data from 511 parents who responded via convenient sampling, and the data was collected via a survey questionnaire and used to evaluate the research model. To test the study hypotheses, the empirical validity of the research model was set up, and the data were analyzed with SPSS version 21.0 and AMOS 26 software. Structural equation modeling (SEM), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and machine learning (ML) methods were used to test the study hypotheses and validate the properties of the instrument items. The ML methods used are support vector machine (SMO), the bagging reduced error pruning tree (REPTree), artificial neural network (ANN), and random forest. Several major findings were indicated by the results: perceived usefulness, trust, and social influence were significant antecedent behavioral intentions to use the smartphone. Also, findings prove that be-havioral intention is statistically supported to have a significant influence on smartphone addiction. Furthermore, the findings confirm that smartphone addiction positively influences social isolation among Jordanian children and adolescents. Yet, perceived ease of use and perceived enjoyment did not have a significant effect on behavioral intention to use the smartphone among Jordanian children and adolescents. The research contributes to the body of knowledge and literature by empirically examining and theorizing the implications of smartphone addiction on social isolation. Further details of the study contribution, as well as research future directions and limitations, are presented in the discussion section.
... This, however, is not true-empirical work suggests that cognitive sophistication does not yield a greater ability to recognize one's own blind spots. 18 In addition, the manner in which political beliefs correlate among partisans is epistemically suspicious. Political partisans in the modern U.S. context, for example, have predictable opinions on complex policy issues ranging from abortion to minimum wages to immigration to crime and policing. ...
... Firstly, the Chi-Square Test shows a significant difference in Models 1 and 2, which was considered unsatisfactory for the model (Joreskog & Surbom, 1996). Secondly, the model is considered good if the CFI is greater than 0.95 (West et al. 2012). In other words, only model 3 was concluded to be a good model. ...
Many methods of measuring creativity have been studied-mainly in psychology. In recent years, there have been attempts to incorporate such creativity into mathematical modelling, a topic handled in mathematics education. Accordingly, some studies have been trying to assess creativity in it. However, there have been no clear criteria or formulas that can be used for any problem, since a rubric has been created for each problem and evaluated individually. In the present study, to measure creativity in the Fermi problem, a type of mathematical modelling, a formula that applies information theory used in information science is proposed and examined using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). A survey of Japanese junior high school students (n = 364) was conducted and analyzed, and the results show that the model using the formula proposed in the present study is a good fit. In addition, a moderate positive correlation (r = .41, p < .01) is found between creativity in the Fermi problem and creativity in psychology measured by the Test for Creative Thinking-Drawing Production (TCT-DP).
... Fortunately, even though we are somewhat able to recognize erroneous thinking in others, we are often blind to our own vulnerabilities. (West, et al., 2012). ...
This paper presents a concept for utilising falsified documents and disinformation as a security measure by diminishing the utility of the stolen information for the attacker. Classical definition of tarpitting honeypots is to create virtual servers attractive to worms and other malware that answer their connection attempts in such a way that the machine on the other end becomes stuck. A common extension to the OSI model is to refer the user as the layer 8 on top of the application layer. By generating attractive looking but falsified documents and datasets within our secured network along with the real information, we could be able to force the malicious user on the other end similarly to be 'stuck' as they need to dig through and verify all the information they have managed to steal. This in effect slows down the opponents' decision making speed, can make their activity in the network more visible and possibly even mislead them. The concept has similarities to the Canary trap or Barium Meal type of tests, and using Honey tokens to help identify who might be the leaker or from which database the data was stolen. However, the amount of falsified data or fake entries in databases in our concept is significantly larger and the main purpose is to diminish the utility of the stolen data or otherwise leaked information. The requirement to verify the information and scan through piles of documents trying to found the real information among them can give more time to the defender to react if the attack was noticed. It will also reduce the value of the information if it is just dumped in the open, as its contents and authenticity can be more easily questioned. AI powered methods such as the GPT-3 that can generate massive amounts very realistic looking text which is hard to differentiate from human generated texts could make this type of concept more feasible to the defender to utilise. The shortcoming of this concept is the risk that legitimate end-users could also confuse the real and falsified information together if that is not prevented somehow.
... Considerations about the indispensibility of motivated reasoning for survival, fitness, and other vital matters (Becker, 1973;Kahan, 2013;Mercier & Sperber, 2011;Rank, 1936;Trivers, 2000) might bear on its moral complexion. Relevant for the jurisdiction of the blamer, the reach and impact of motivated reasoning may be profound, even basic to human cognition (Mandelbaum, 2019), and no less so for "cognitive sophisticates" (Stanovich, 2021;Stanovich et al., 2013;West et al., 2012). 15 ...
In recent years, motivated reasoning has received significant attention across numerous areas of philosophy, including political philosophy, social philosophy, epistemology, moral psychology, philosophy of science, even metaphysics. At the heart of much of this interest is the idea that motivated reasoning (e.g., rationalization, wishful thinking, and self‐deception) is problematic, that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity, or is otherwise irrational. Is motivated reasoning epistemically problematic? Is it always? When it is, what is the nature of the violation? Philosophical projects on motivated reasoning require informed positions on these questions, demanding explicit engagement with fundamental issues about epistemic normativity and the ethics of belief. But attention to this has been limited, thwarting progress on a variety of critical questions. In this paper, I distinguish some of the key issues at play and discuss their interactions. At the end, I offer three methodological recommendations for future research on motivated reasoning.
... When people are asked to rate the extent to which specific biases (e.g., confirmation bias, impact bias) occur in the decision-making of themselves and others, most people estimate that they are less prone to biases than others (Pronin, 2007). Although one's bias blind spot is not necessarily indicative of the extent to which someone actually demonstrates biases (West et al., 2012), having a bias blind spot can negatively influence the quality of decisionmaking. Prior research among workers has shown that people who believe that others are more prone to biases than themselves are more likely to ignore the advice of others and to overestimate their own capabilities (Scopelliti et al., 2015). ...
... And indeed, individuals with greater science literacy and scientific training tend to have more polarized beliefs about controversial science topics (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). In particular, Kahan et al. observed that increased science literacy and numeracy led people to more polarized views about climate change (Braman et al., 2005;Kahan, 2012;Kahan et al., 2012;West et al., 2012). ...
A circular economy leads to challenges for the system of corporate taxation. However, there exist already a legal rationale for the levy of corporate tax in a circular economy. Such a rationale, a convincing raison d’être for corporate taxation in a circular economy, contributes to the legitimacy for a green corporate tax. I explore some new measures in corporate taxation that are consistent with a circular economy.
... And indeed, individuals with greater science literacy and scientific training tend to have more polarized beliefs about controversial science topics (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). In particular, Kahan et al. observed that increased science literacy and numeracy led people to more polarized views about climate change (Braman et al., 2005;Kahan, 2012;Kahan et al., 2012;West et al., 2012). ...
This Open Access book presents a multidisciplinary perspective to increase our understanding of climate policies that are rooted in the natural moral inclinations of people, families and firms. Which policies prevent a widening gap between higher and lower educated people? Which policy instruments are there, and how could they be used? What is the role of free entrepreneurship?
In this book, academics from different fields have brought together their knowledge and expertise to reflect on the following three questions:
• How are the polarised positions on climate change of different groups related to their moral outlook, world view, tradition, cultural norms and values?
• What is a good distribution of responsibilities between firms, households and the government relating to climate change?
• What are possible avenues where the climate policies are a natural extension of moral inclinations of families and firms, such as the stewardship for the natural environment and the climate?
This book will be of interest to policy and decision-makers, students of social and behavioural sciences, and those interested climate change policies and how this effects our lives
... And indeed, individuals with greater science literacy and scientific training tend to have more polarized beliefs about controversial science topics (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). In particular, Kahan et al. observed that increased science literacy and numeracy led people to more polarized views about climate change (Braman et al., 2005;Kahan, 2012;Kahan et al., 2012;West et al., 2012). ...
Central banks should not be excluded from the list of responsible institutions to address climate change. They already have a bias in their balance sheets toward polluting industries, which should be reduced. Next, the government should design green policies that do not overburden middle class households.
... And indeed, individuals with greater science literacy and scientific training tend to have more polarized beliefs about controversial science topics (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). In particular, Kahan et al. observed that increased science literacy and numeracy led people to more polarized views about climate change (Braman et al., 2005;Kahan, 2012;Kahan et al., 2012;West et al., 2012). ...
Climate change is a most serious challenge. Committing the needed resources requires that a clear majority of citizens approves the appropriate policies, since committing resources necessarily involve a trade-off with other expenses. However, there are distinct groups of people who remain in denial about the realities of climatic change. This chapter presents a range of psychological and social phenomena that together explain the phenomena that lead to denial.
... That said, we propose evidence-based suggestions to improve these interventions. Currently, a significant portion of the UBJ video is allotted to self-identification/ awareness of a juror's unconscious bias, however individuals are not well adept at identifying their own biases (bias blind spot) and such awareness does not translate into avoiding bias (West et al., 2012). A greater focus on enabling jurors to take a more active role could more effectively combat implicit biases (Devine et al., 2012), whether that comes from real-time feedback (Morewedge et al., 2015) or perspective taking (Salmanowitz, 2018). ...
Two studies examined the effectiveness of two implicit bias remedies at reducing racial bias in Black and White mock-jurors’ decisions. Participants were recruited through a Qualtrics Panel Project. Study 1 (murder trial; N = 554): Mage = 46.53; 49.1% female; 50% Black; 50.0% White. Study 2 (battery trial; N = 539): Mage = 46.46; 50.5% female; 49.5% Black; 50.5% White. Half of the participants viewed the UBJ video. Then participants read pretrial instructions (general or UBJ), trial summary, posttrial instructions (general or UBJ), and completed measures. Mock-juror race was expected to moderate the effect of defendant race (Black vs. White) on verdicts, sentences, culpability, and credibility, with jurors being more lenient toward same-race defendants. This interaction would be moderated by the unconscious bias juror (UBJ) video and instructions, reducing bias for White jurors only. Mock-jurors’ counterfactual endorsements would mediate race effects on verdicts. In Study 1, juror race moderated the effect of defendant race on verdicts, culpability, and credibility—White, but not Black, jurors demonstrated greater leniency for Black versus White defendants. The UBJ video moderated the effect of defendant race on murder counterfactual endorsement—when the video was present defendant race did not significantly affect endorsement. This endorsement mediated the effect of defendant race on White jurors’ verdicts. In Study 2, juror race influenced verdicts and sentences—White jurors were more lenient regardless of defendant race. The effect of juror race on sentence was qualified by the UBJ video—when present the effect of race was no longer significant. The UBJ remedies increased all mock jurors’ defendant credibility ratings. In conclusion, the debiasing interventions were ineffective in reducing racial bias in jurors’ verdicts. However, they do impact aspects of juror attribution and may be effective with modification.
... Kahan, 2012). To be sure, researchers have long reported that although professional scientists may in general be better able than non-scientists to put distance between their beliefs and evidence and reasoning rationally, they are nevertheless not immune to biased or non-optimal reasoning (Druckman & McGrath, 2019;Evans, 2002;Feist, 2006;Gorman, 1992;Koslowski, 1996;Mercier & Heintz, 2014;Thagard, 2004;Tversky & Kahneman, 1971;Tweney, 1998;West et al., 2012). As Evans (2002) argues, however, prior belief, as in Bayesian inference and statistics, is in fact a necessary component to hypothesis testing and scientific reasoning. ...
Motivated reasoning occurs when we reason differently about evidence that supports our prior beliefs than when it contradicts those beliefs. Adult participants (N = 377) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system completed written responses critically evaluating strengths and weaknesses in a vignette on the topic of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). The vignette had two fictional scientists present prototypical arguments for and against anthropogenic climate change that were constructed with equally flawed and conflicting reasoning. The current study tested and found support for three main hypotheses: cognitive style, personality, and ideology would predict both motivated reasoning and endorsement of human caused climate change; those who accept human-caused climate change will be less likely to engage in biased reasoning and more likely to engage in objective reasoning about climate change than those who deny human activity as a cause of climate change. (144 words)
... As such, studies like ours could usefully form the basis for training and development activities which aim to make people aware of their own design behaviors, including those that have limiting or negative effects. People often exhibit an 'optimistic bias', underestimating their own susceptibility to risk (Weinstein, 1980(Weinstein, , 1989, or a 'bias blind spot', believing themselves to be less biased than others (Pronin et al., 2002;West et al., 2012). Because of this, when people learn about their weaknesses from first-hand experience this is usually more powerful in motivating future behavior change than when they learn more generally about the weaknesses of the population that they belong to (e.g., see Helweg-Larsen, 1999;Norris et al., 1999;Velde, F. W. van der et al., 1992). ...
Increasing the range of methods available for researching design cognition provides new opportunities for studying the phenomena of interest. Here we propose an approach for observing design activities, using Virtual Reality (VR) design-build-test games with built-in physics simulation. To illustrate this, we report on two exploratory design workshops where two groups of participants worked to solve a technical design problem using such a platform. Participants were asked to sketch ideas to solve the problem, and then to design, test and iterate some of their developed design concepts in a VR game. Researchers were able to obtain continuous and multifaceted recordings of participants’ behavior during the various design activities. This included on-screen design activities, verbal utterances, physical gestures, digital models of design outputs, and records of the test outcomes. Our experiences with the workshops are discussed with respect to the opportunities that similar VR game platforms offer for design cognition research, both in general and specifically in terms of ideation, prototyping, problem reframing, intrinsic motivation and demonstrated vulnerability. VR game platforms not only offer a valuable addition to existing research options, but additionally offer a basis for developing training interventions in design education and practice.
Due to globalization, business education has evolved into a corresponding educational system to produce macrobiotic entrepreneurs with a high degree of independence. Besides that, some people object to business education, which surprisingly increases unemployment. Therefore, the present study was carried out to examine the impact of skill acquisition on entrepreneurship development. The quantitative research method, survey questionnaire, and convenient sampling technique were used in this study. A questionnaire-based survey was conducted among management students in the Birendranagar Municipality, Surkhet. By applying the formula prescribed by Almeda et al. (2010), 407 students were taken as the sample size. In the case of the questionnaire, two types of questions were formulated to collect demographic and variable-related responses from respondents. In this study, the researcher found that conceptual skills and technical skills have a positive and significant (CS: P-value 0.000 < 0.05; TS: P-value 0.000 < 0.05) impact on entrepreneurial development. Thus, the designed alternative hypotheses H1 and H3 were accepted. Similarly, the study found that human skills have no significant impact on entrepreneurship development (HS: P-value 0.144 > 0.05), which means that the designed alternative hypothesis H2 was rejected in this study. In addition, the present study offers valuable insights to consider on conceptual and technical skills development instruments to the students rather than human skills that foster entrepreneurial capabilities. More specifically, students, faculty members, researchers, and government agencies will benefit from the results of this study.
In her account of scientific objectivity, feminist philosopher of science Helen Longino shows how scientific objectivity is not so much of individual practice, but rather a social commitment practiced by a scientific community, provided by the necessary accommodations for critical discourse. However, is this conception of scientific objectivity truly capable of living up to the social realities of critical discourse and deliberation within a scientific community? Drawing from Dutilh Novaes’ social epistemological account of argumentation, this paper highlights the challenges Longino’s scientific objectivity faces on a prescriptive and descriptive level, specifically in overcoming the various epistemic injustices Longino’s proposed structural accommodations for objectivity are still sensitive to. Dutilh Novaes’ social epistemological model of argumentation illustrates how the realities of critical debate too often don’t consist of true epistemic or knowledge exchange, even though such exchanges are essential to achieve Longino’s primary goal when redefining scientific objectivity: to wield out and address idiosyncratic background assumptions and individual bigotry that possibly influence a researcher’s scientific conduct.
In this chapter, we distill a large corpus of literature that Scott O. Lilienfeld produced with his colleagues on science vs. pseudoscience, distinguishing myths and misconceptions and fact and fiction in psychology, the virtues of evidence-based clinical practice, and adopting a scientific mindset and teaching scientific thinking skills in undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate education. Scientific thinking is a safeguard against errors in clinical judgment and essential in shaping the perspective and activities of clinical psychological scientists. We review the principles of critical thinking: mental heuristics, logical fallacies, and prominent biases that impact the ability to evaluate claims and distinguish a scientific from a pseudoscientific approach. We draw attention to warning signs in identifying pseudoscience and the costs of potentially harmful psychotherapies and conclude with prescriptive remedies and suggestions that are critical to fostering evidence-based practice and becoming an active clinical psychological scientist and an informed citizen in an increasingly media-driven and technological society rife with fake news and bogus information.
Individuals often assess themselves as being less susceptible to common biases compared to others. This bias blind spot (BBS) is thought to represent a metacognitive error. In this research, we tested three explanations for the effect: The cognitive sophistication hypothesis posits that individuals who display the BBS more strongly are actually less biased than others. The introspection bias hypothesis posits that the BBS occurs because people rely on introspection more when assessing themselves compared to others. The conversational processes hypothesis posits that the effect is largely a consequence of the pragmatic aspects of the experimental situation rather than true metacognitive error. In two experiments (N = 1057) examining 18 social/motivational and cognitive biases, there was strong evidence of the BBS. Among the three hypotheses examined, the conversational processes hypothesis attracted the greatest support, thus raising questions about the extent to which the BBB is a metacognitive effect.
Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.
Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.
The majority of attempts to reconstruct the evolutionary history of the hominin clade proceed as if the hominin fossil record is a precise, accurate, and comprehensive record of human evolutionary history. In this contribution we review the various ways in which the apparent scarcity of early hominins on the landscape means that the existing hominin fossil record almost certainly falls short of this assumption, especially with respect to taxic diversity, as well as the spatial and temporal distribution of known taxa. We also suggest that interpretations of the hominin fossil record are particularly affected by practices that likely violate the principles of reproducibility, as well as by confirmation bias. The hominin fossil record should be seen for what it is; an incomplete record of human evolutionary history that limits what should be said about it. Generated narratives should be treated as heuristic devices, not as accurate and comprehensive descriptions of past events.
In this paper we argue that questions about which mathematical ideas mathematicians are exposed to and choose to pay attention to are epistemologically relevant and entangled with power dynamics and social justice concerns. There is a considerable body of literature that discusses the dissemination and uptake of ideas as social justice issues. We argue that these insights are also relevant for the epistemology of mathematics. We make this visible by a journalistic exploration of relevant cases and embed our insights into the larger question how mathematical ideas are taken up in mathematical practices. We argue that epistemologies of mathematics ought to account for questions of exposure to and choice of attention to mathematical ideas, and remark on the political relevance of such epistemologies.
In the past decades, a multitude of behavioral biases with regard to financial decision-making have been found. We show that nine common judgment and decision biases can be reduced to three main latent factors that are related to belief-updating, self-judgment, and valuation. The three-factor solution can be replicated in both Taiwanese and German samples. We find some tentative evidence that cognitive reflection decreases the propensity for belief-updating biases, whereas affect, especially negative affect, increases self-judgment biases.
The philosophical school of Evidentialism holds that people should form, amend, and relinquish a belief wholly in accordance with the available evidence for that belief. This paper reviews the extent to which believers in paranormal phenomena respect Evidentialism’s so-called “ethics of belief.” The analysis focuses on several common violations of evidentialist principles, namely, those pertaining to belief formation as a moral issue, belief inflexibility, belief inconsistency, confirmation bias, and disconfirmation effects. Despite some gaps and methodological shortcomings in the available data, the empirical literature documents an association between paranormal beliefs and a broad lack of sympathy with evidentialist ethics, although the effect sizes of these relations typically are small. The possible basis of this characteristic is briefly explored.
Diagnostic errors harm patients. While the underlying causes of diagnostic error and the settings in which they occur are diverse, the use of a cognitive forcing function in the form of a diagnostic time-out can mitigate the risk of diagnostic error. Barriers to the implementation of diagnostic time-outs remain. In our survey of neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) providers, perceived time constraints were universally cited as a barrier. Attending neonatologists and neonatology nurse practitioners reported decreased perception of the risk of diagnostic error impacting patient outcomes, relative to the perception among neonatology fellowship trainees. Future directions include addressing concerns over the perceived time investment required for a diagnostic time-out and increasing provider appreciation of the nature and impact of diagnostic error on patient outcomes.
Critically ill patients with undiagnosed and rare diseases are at high risk for cognitive diagnostic errors as well as delays in diagnosis that are the result of impaired diagnostic access. Local evaluation teams dedicated to undiagnosed and rare diseases can address both the risk and actuality of diagnostic error, as well as shortfalls in diagnostic access, particularly for patients whose diminished access is a result of critical illness. Features of successful teams are discussed.
The aim of this chapter is to strengthen the case against the appeal to personal information as an effective strategy for resolving disagreements by considering a wide range of experimental research on overconfidence, the bias blind spot, introspection, and confabulation. Reviewing the results of that research will cause the unsettling feeling that we seem to know much less about ourselves than we think. An appendix examines whether the ancient Pyrrhonists were aware that one may be mistaken about one’s own current phenomenology or rather took for granted that one has knowledge of the way one is appeared to.KeywordsBias blind spotConfabulationConfirmation biasIntrospectionDunning-Kruger effectMemoryOverconfidenceRustic PyrrhonismExpertise defense
This paper presents a series of psychometric meta-analysis on the relationship between cognitive reflection (CR) and several cognitive abilities (i.e., cognitive intelligence, numerical ability, verbal ability, mechanical-spatial ability, and working memory), and skills (i.e., numeracy skills). Also, the paper presents a bifactor analysis carried out to determine whether CR is a related but independent factor or a second-stratum factor in a hierarchical model of cognitive intelligence. Finally, the study also tested a path meta-analytic model of the CR-cognitive ability relationships. The results showed that CR correlated substantially with all the cognitive abilities and skills (K ranged from 3 to 44 and N ranged from 624 to 20,307). The bifactor analysis showed that CR variance was mainly accounted for by a general factor of cognitive intelligence plus a second-stratum factor of numerical ability. The results of the bifactor analysis were similar for numerical-CRT and verbal-CRT. It was not found evidence supporting the existence of a cognitive reflection factor. Finally, the path meta-analytic model showed that the combination of cognitive intelligence and numerical ability accounted for 69% of CR variance. The path model showed that cognitive intelligence and numerical ability have direct and indirect (through numeracy skills) effects on CR. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed, and future research is suggested.
Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals form beliefs following Bayes' Rule with one exception: when assessing the credibility of experts, they double-dip the data and use already-updated beliefs instead of their priors. This “pre-screening” mechanism explains why individuals jointly disagree about states of the world and the credibility of experts, why the ordering of signals and experts affects final beliefs, and when individuals over- or underreact to new information. In a trading game, pre-screening generates excessive speculation, bubbles, and crashes. Our theory provides a micro-foundation for why individuals disagree about how to interpret the same data.
Following significant intelligence failures, the United States intelligence community adopted Intelligence Community Directive 203 (ICD203) to promote analytic rigor. We developed two psychometric scales to examine how strongly intelligence professionals (N=108) endorsed the analytic standards comprising ICD203 and how strongly they believed their organizations complied with these standards. All ICD203 facets were highly endorsed and clustered into three principal components, and perceived organizational compliance was high. Facets reflecting intelligence aims were endorsed more strongly than those reflecting means. ICD203 endorsement was positively related to conscientious and actively open-minded thinking, whereas perceived organizational compliance was positively correlated with conscientiousness, job satisfaction, and affective and normative commitment.
Health Promotion: A Practical Guide to Effective Communication introduces students to the fundamental principles of health promotion in Australian and international public health contexts. Combining the core principles and theories of health promotion with those of effective communication, the text guides readers through the practical steps of planning, implementing and evaluating programs that empower health consumers and facilitate improved health outcomes for individuals and communities. The chapters consolidate and extend readers' understanding of key topics through case-study scenarios, problem-based learning activities, revision questions and recommendations for further reading. The 'Elsewhere in the World' sections link the text to health promotion programs globally. The final chapter brings together key concepts and highlights initiatives in action through a selection of eight extended international case studies. This essential resource will equip students with the knowledge and tools to prepare them for practice across a range of health and policy settings.
Bias Blind Spot
(BBS) is the phenomenon that people tend to perceive themselves as less
susceptible to biases than others. In three pre-registered experiments (overall
N = 969), we replicated two experiments of the first demonstration of the
phenomenon by Pronin et al. (2002). We found support of the BBS hypotheses,
with effects in line with findings in the original study: Participants rated
themselves as less susceptible to biases than others (d = -1.00 [-1.33,
-0.67]). Deviating from the original, we found an unexpected effect that
participants rated themselves as having fewer shortcomings (d = -0.34 [-0.46,
-0.23]), though there was support for the target's main premise that BBS was
stronger for biases than for shortcomings (d = -0.43 [-0.56, -0.29]). Extending
the replications, we found that beliefs in own free will were positively
associated with BBS (r ~ 0.17–0.22) and that beliefs in both own and general
free will were positively associated with self-other asymmetry related to
personal shortcomings (r ~ 0.16–0.24). Materials, datasets, and code are
available on https://osf.io/3df5s/.
In diesem Kapitel wird erläutert, warum die Leistungsfähigkeit von Emotionen überschätzt wird. Ein Blick auf die Ratgeberliteratur lässt einen staunend zurück: Da wird mit dem Bauch gedacht, entschieden und die Welt wäre besser, wenn wir immer auf unsere Emotionen hören würden. Wenn es nur so wäre. Emotionen haben ihren zentralen Platz im menschlichen Verhalten und Erleben, aber sie können Denken nicht ersetzen. Emotionen sind alte Standardprogramme, die zu vielen schwierigen Situationen nicht passen, denen wir heutzutage ausgesetzt sind.
Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.
© The Author(s) 2013.
Metacognitive knowledge of the dual-processing basis of judgment is critical to resolving conflict between analytic and experiential processing responses [Klaczynski, P. A. (2004). A dual-process model of adolescent development: Implications for decision making, reasoning, and identity. In R. V. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior, Vol. 31 (pp. 73–123). San Diego, CA: Academic Press]. Such conflict is ubiquitous when reasoning scientifically. Three studies explored the nature, development, and stability of this metacognitive knowledge. In each study, participants completed the ratio-bias judgment task, which assessed their tendency to make analytically based responses, and the ratio-bias evaluation task, which assessed their metacognitive knowledge of the processing basis of judgments on the task (Metacognitive Status). In Study 1, college students’ judgment performance was related to metacognitive status but not to general cognitive ability. In Study 2, metacognitive status was related to age and mathematics-related changes. Metacognitive status again predicted participants’ tendency to make analytically based judgments. In Study 3, college students’ judgments, but not metacognitive status, were affected by task conditions. The evidence suggests that assessing metacognitive knowledge is important for understanding how conflict between analytically and experientially based judgments is resolved.
Natural myside bias is the tendency to evaluate propositions from within one's own perspective when given no instructions or cues (such as within-participants conditions) to avoid doing so. We defined the participant's perspective as their previously existing status on four variables: their sex, whether they smoked, their alcohol consumption, and the strength of their religious beliefs. Participants then evaluated a contentious but ultimately factual proposition relevant to each of these demographic factors. Myside bias is defined between-participants as the mean difference in the evaluation of the proposition between groups with differing prior status on the variable. Whether an individual difference variable (such as cognitive ability) is related to the magnitude of the myside bias is indicated by whether the individual difference variable interacts with the between-participants status variable. In two experiments involving a total of over 1400 university students (n = 1484) and eight different comparisons, we found very little evidence that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less natural myside bias. The degree of myside bias was also relatively independent of individual differences in thinking dispositions. We speculate that ideas from memetic theory and dual-process theory might help to explain why natural myside bias is quite dissociated from individual difference variables.
Self-reported grades are heavily used in research and applied settings because of the importance of grades and the convenience of obtaining self-reports. This study reviews and meta-analytically summarizes the literature on the accuracy of self-reported grades, class ranks, and test scores. Results based on a pairwise sample of 60,926 subjects indicate that self-reported grades are less construct valid than many scholars believe. Furthermore, self-reported grade validity was strongly moderated by actual levels of school performance and cognitive ability. These findings suggest that self-reported grades should be used with caution. Situations in which self-reported grades can be employed more safely are identified, and suggestions for their use in research are discussed.
For the past 30 years, philosophers have debated whether zombies could exist (Kirk, 1974a). Far from being a detour into the world of horror films, this debate asks a serious question: Could an individual act and speak just like other individuals with- out having any internal conscious experience? Belief in the possibility of these so-called philosophical zombies serves as a litmus test for whether someone believes in some form of mind-body dualism or materialism. Here, I would like to focus on a related hypothesis that is emerging within psychology which I will refer to as the psy- chological zombie hypothesis (zombie will be used to distinguish the psychological variant for the remainder of the chapter). This hypothesis suggests that our behaviors and judgments are produced by an 'inner-zombie' whose mental work does not depend on conscious awareness and that those mental operations that are typically accompanied by conscious awareness do not rely on awareness to generate the opera- tions and their outputs. In fact, this hypothesis suggests, mental operations that are typically accompanied by conscious awareness can be produced in the absence of con-
This individual differences study examined the relationships between three executive functions (updating, shifting, and inhibition), measured as latent variables, and performance on two cognitively demanding subtests of the Adult Decision Making Competence battery: Applying Decision Rules and Consistency in Risk Perception. Structural equation modelling showed that executive functions contribute differentially to performance in these two tasks, with Applying Decision Rules being mainly related to inhibition and Consistency in Risk Perception mainly associated to shifting. The results suggest that the successful application of decision rules requires the capacity to selectively focus attention and inhibit irrelevant (or no more relevant) stimuli. They also suggest that consistency in risk perception depends on the ability to shift between judgement contexts.
Need for cognition in contemporary literature refers to an individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors. Individual differences in need for cognition have been the focus of investigation in over 100 empirical studies. This literature is reviewed, covering the theory and history of this variable, measures of interindividual variations in it, and empirical relationships between it and personality variables, as well as individuals' tendencies to seek and engage in effortful cognitive activity and enjoy cognitively effortful circumstances. The article concludes with discussions of an elaborated theory of the variable, including antecedent conditions; interindividual variations in it related to the manner information is acquired or processed to guide perceptions, judgments, and behavior; and the relationship between it and the 5-factor model of personality structure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
In this article, the authors argue that there are a range of effects usually studied within cognitive psychology that are legitimately thought of as aspects of critical thinking: the cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature. In a study of 793 student participants, the authors found that the ability to avoid these biases was moderately correlated with a more traditional laboratory measure of critical thinking--the ability to reason logically when logic conflicts with prior belief. The correlation between these two classes of critical thinking skills was not due to a joint connection with general cognitive ability because it remained statistically significant after the variance due to cognitive ability was partialed out. Measures of thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition) predicted unique variance in both classes of critical thinking skills after general cognitive ability had been controlled. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This study investigated the roles of the executive functions of inhibition and switching, and of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities, in insight and non-insight tasks. A total of 18 insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks, and measures of individual differences in working memory capacities, switching, and inhibition were administered to 120 participants. Performance on insight problems was not linked with executive functions of inhibition or switching but was linked positively to measures of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. Non-insight task performance was positively linked to the executive function of switching (but not to inhibition) and to verbal and visuo-spatial working memory capacities. These patterns regarding executive functions were maintained when the insight and non-insight composites were split into verbal and spatial insight and non-insight composite scores. The results are discussed in relation to dual processing accounts of thinking.
Two critical thinking skills—the tendency to avoid myside bias and to avoid one-sided thinking—were examined in three different experiments involving over 1200 participants and across two different paradigms. Robust indications of myside bias were observed in all three experiments. Participants gave higher evaluations to arguments that supported their opinions than those that refuted their prior positions. Likewise, substantial one-side bias was observed— participants were more likely to prefer a one-sided to a balanced argument. There was substantial variation in both types of bias, but we failed to find that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less myside bias or less one-side bias. Although cognitive ability failed to associate with the magnitude of the myside bias, the strength and content of the prior opinion did predict the degree of myside bias shown. Our results indicate that cognitive ability—as defined by traditional psychometric indicators—turns out to be surprisingly independent of two of the most important critical thinking tendencies discussed in the literature.
The primary purpose of this paper is to review recent research examining the beneficial effects of optimism on psychological and physical well-being. The review focuses on research that is longitudinal or prospective in design. Potential mechanisms are also identified whereby the beneficial effects of optimism are produced, focusing in particular on how optimism may lead a person to cope more adaptively with stress. The paper closes with a brief consideration of the similarities and differences between our own theoretical approach and several related approaches that have been taken by others.
In three experiments involving over 1,500 university students (n=1,557) and two different probabilistic choice tasks, we found that the utility-maximizing strategy of choosing the most probable
alternative was not the majority response. In a story problem version of a probabilistic choice task in which participants
chose from among five different strategies, the maximizing response and the probabilitymatching response were each selected
by a similar number of students (roughly 35% of the sample selected each). In a more continuous, or trial-by-trial, task,
the utility-maximizing response was chosen by only one half as many students as the probability-matching response. More important,
in both versions of the task, the participants preferring the utility-maximizing response were significantly higher in cognitive
ability than were the participants showing a probability-matching tendency. Critiques of the traditional interpretation of
probability matching as nonoptimal may well help explain why some humans are drawn to the nonmaximizing behavior of probability
matching, but the traditional heuristics and biases interpretation can most easily accommodate the finding that participants
high in computational ability are more likely to carry out the rule-based cognitive procedures that lead to maximizing behavior.
In recent decades it has become increasingly clear that a substantial amount of cognitive work goes on independent of consciousness. The research has been carried out largely under two rubrics, implicit learning and implicit memory. The former has been concerned primarily with the acquisition of knowledge independent of awareness and the latter with the manner in which memories not readily available to conscious recall or recognition play a role in behavior; collectively these operations comprise the essential functions of the cognitive unconscious. This paper reviews the recent history of work on these issues, identifies some of the problems confronting researchers, and introduces a theoretical framework based on principles of evolutionary biology within which to view them. The argument is that the cognitive unconscious, despite its apparent sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and antedates conscious cognitive systems by a considerable amount of time. Various entailments of this evolutionary perspective are explored including such issues as phylogeny and ontogeny of implicit processes, the robustness of the implicit functions as displayed by the capacity to resist disruptions from psychological and neurological disorders, the relationship between implicit cognition and intelligence, and individual differences in implicit cognitive abilities.
Everybody knows that overconfidence can be foolhardy. But a study reveals that having an overly positive self-image might confer an evolutionary advantage if the rewards outweigh the risks. See Letter p.317
This book explores the idea that we have two minds - one being automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years, there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning: an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast; and a more recent, distinctively human system which is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. The book brings together researchers on dual processes to summarize the latest research, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture, and by psychologists specializing in traditionally distinct and isolated fields.
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying "mindreading," the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others' minds and reading one's own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the "Possible World Box," which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don't fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms. © Shaun Nichols and Stephen P. Stich, 2003. All rights reserved.
This chapter examines social psychological implications of human subjectivity—implications of the fact, and perhaps more importantly the insight, that people are governed not by the passive reception and recognition of some invariant objective reality, but by their own subjective representations and constructions of the events that unfold around them. The history of the subjective-objective distinction, first in some traditional theoretical and methodological concerns of social psychology, and then human motivation are discussed in this chapter. Social cognition, a research area that has held center stage in the field for most of the past two decades is expalined. The particular focus will be the problem of situational construal and its contribution to the difficulties of predicting social actions and making inferences or attributions about social actors. Construal processes are variable and uncertain, and they contribute heavily to the variability and unpredictability of a wide range of social responses. The second and less familiar thesis, social perceivers, fail to recognize, or at least fail to make adequate inferential allowance for, these “vagaries” of construal. People characteristically make attributions and other social judgments, and decisions predicated on a kind of naive realism. The process of subjective construal is fundamental to psychological inquiry at all levels of analysis.
Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in the syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and on false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict individual differences in performance of these tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
A sample of 349 college students completed an argument evaluation test (AET) in which they evaluated arguments concerning real-life situations. A separate regression analysis was conducted for each student predicting his or her evaluations of argument quality from an objective indicator of argument quality and the strength of his or her prior beliefs about the target propositions. The beta weight for objective argument quality was interpreted in this analysis as an indicator of the ability to evaluate objective argument quality independent of prior belief. Individual differences in this index were reliably linked to individual differences in cognitive ability and actively open-minded thinking dispositions. Further, actively openminded thinking predicted variance in AET performance even after individual differences in cognitive ability had been partialled out. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This study aimed to investigate whether a range of tasks that have been generally classed as requiring insight form an empirically separable group of tasks distinct from tasks generally classed as non-insight. In this study, 24 insight tasks, 10 non-insight tasks, and tests of individual differences in cognitive abilities and working memory were administered to 60 participants. Cluster analysis of the problem-solving tasks indicated that the presumed insight problems did tend to cluster with other presumed insight problems, and similarly the presumed non-insight problems tended to cluster with other presumed non-insight tasks. Performance on presumed insight problems was particularly linked to measures of ideational flexibility with a different pattern of results for the non-insight tasks. Spatial insight problems were linked to spatial flexibility and verbal insight tasks were linked to vocabulary scores. The results are discussed in relation to recent developments of dual process theories of thinking.
- Presents an interdisciplinary exploration of dual-process theories, drawing together work from cognitive and social psychology, as well as philosophy - Written and edited by leading figures from across the cognitive sciences - Encourages a dialogue between psychologists and philosophers about dual process theories that has hitherto been missing - A state-of-the-art review of a hot topic in the cognitive sciences This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual processes to summarize the state-of-the-art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.
The domain specificity and generality of an important critical thinking skill was examined by administering 9 reasoning and decision-making tasks to 125 adults. Optimal performance on all of the tasks required that disjunctive processing strategies--strategies requiring the exhaustive consideration of all of the possible states of the world--be adopted. Performance across these disjunctive reasoning tasks displayed considerable domain specificity, but 5 of the tasks displayed moderate convergence. Cognitive ability was associated with performance on only 3 of 9 tasks. Six of the 9 tasks displayed associations with 1 of 2 cognitive styles that were examined in the multivariate task battery (need for cognition and reflectivity). Performance on the 5 tasks that displayed some domain generality was also more associated with thinking styles than with cognitive ability in several regression analyses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)(journal abstract)
Problems are a central part of human life. The Psychology of Problem Solving organizes in one volume much of what psychologists know about problem solving and the factors that contribute to its success or failure. There are chapters by leading experts in this field, including Miriam Bassok, Randall Engle, Anders Ericsson, Arthur Graesser, Keith Stanovich, Norbert Schwarz, and Barry Zimmerman, among others. The Psychology of Problem Solving is divided into four parts. Following an introduction that reviews the nature of problems and the history and methods of the field, Part II focuses on individual differences in, and the influence of, the abilities and skills that humans bring to problem situations. Part III examines motivational and emotional states and cognitive strategies that influence problem solving performance, while Part IV summarizes and integrates the various views of problem solving proposed in the preceding chapters.
Our research examined the effects of hands-free cell-phone conversations on simulated driving. We found that even when participants looked directly at objects in the driving environment, they were less likely to create a durable memory of those objects if they were conversing on a cell phone. This pattern was obtained for objects of both high and low relevance, suggesting that very little semantic analysis of the objects occurs outside the restricted focus of attention. Moreover, in-vehicle conversations do not interfere with driving as much as cell-phone conversations do, because drivers are better able to synchronize the processing demands of driving with in-vehicle conversations than with cell-phone conversations. Together, these data support an inattention-blindness interpretation wherein the disruptive effects of cell-phone conversations on driving are due in large part to the diversion of attention from driving to the phone conversation.
In a study of ninety college seniors, measures of exposure to print predicted individual differences in vocabulary and cultural literacy after differences in general ability (SAT scores) had been statistically controlled, but did not predict differences in grade point average or knowledge of the field of major (psychology). Measures of exposure to nonprint media (television and films) predicted variance in cultural literacy, but not in vocabulary, after cognitive ability had been controlled. The data challenge the view that knowledge acquisition is determined only by the efficiency of cognitive components that encode and store information. Instead, the results indicate that differences in exposure to information are a significant independent contributor to differences in knowledge across individuals. The investigation further demonstrated the convergent validity of two briefly administered indicators of individual differences in exposure to print.
Three studies suggest that individuals see the existence and operation of cognitive and motivational biases much more in others than in themselves. Study 1 provides evidence from three surveys that people rate themselves as less subject to various biases than the “average American,” classmates in a seminar, and fellow airport travelers. Data from the third survey further suggest that such claims arise from the interplay among availability biases and self-enhancement motives. Participants in one follow-up study who showed the better-than-average bias insisted that their self-assessments were accurate and objective even after reading a description of how they could have been affected by the relevant bias. Participants in a final study reported their peer’s self-serving attributions regarding test performance to be biased but their own similarly self-serving attributions to be free of bias. The relevance of these phenomena to naïve realism and to conflict, misunderstanding, and dispute resolution is discussed.
Past research has demonstrated that people more readily recognize bias in others' perceptions than they do in their own. The current research demonstrates the tenacity of this effect in the context of interpersonal conflicts. In Study 1, participants assumed their own construals of conflict were fair and uninfluenced by affective preferences, whereas those disagreeing with them were seen as unfair and biased. In Study 2, participants were induced to exhibit a liking bias, yet still reported themselves uninfluenced by liking. In Study 3, participants received an explanation of the liking bias and were asked to correct for it. Despite heavy demand characteristics, they failed to do so. Together, these studies suggest that social perceivers are particularly blind to their own biases in conflict situations.
A question that has plagued self-enhancement research is whether participants truly believe the overly positive self-assessments they report, or whether better-than-average effects reflect mere hopes or self-presentation. In a test of people’s belief in the accuracy of their self-enhancing trait ratings, participants made a series of bets, each time choosing between betting that they had scored at least as high on a personality test as a random other participant, or betting on a random drawing in which the probability of success was matched to their self-assigned percentile rank on the test. They also reported the point at which they would switch their bet from their self-rating to the drawing, or vice versa. Participants were indifferent between betting on themselves or on the drawing, and it took only a slight change in the drawing’s probability for them to switch their bet, indicating that people truly believe their self-enhancing self-assessments.
This paper is an attempt to put the work of the past several decades on the problems of implicit learning and unconscious cognition into an evolutionary context. Implicit learning is an inductive process whereby knowledge of a complex environment is acquired and used largely independently of awareness of either the process of acquisition or the nature of that which has been learned. Characterized this way, implicit learning theory can be viewed as an attempt to come to grips with the classic epistemological issues of knowledge acquisition, representation and use. The argument is made that the process, despite its seeming cognitive sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and that it antedates awareness and the capacity for conscious control of mentation. Various classic heuristics from evolutionary biology are used to substantiate this claim and several specific entailments of this line of argument are outlined.
In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.
Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction,
P(A&B), cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents,
P(A) and
P(B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative that one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts, including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between- and within-Ss comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed, and attempts to combat it are explored. (48 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Discusses 2 areas--the assessment of human potential and conflict about the Vietnam war--in which the belief that human cognition is sacrosanct and that dysfunction must be explained in noncognitive (i.e., motivational) terms may have led to misunderstanding and counterproductive work. Limitations of ascribing conflicts to motivational rather than cognitive factors are analyzed, and the inadequacy of "conscious judgment" for explaining inter- and intrapersonal problems is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
controversies have focused on the thesis that perceptual and linguistic decoding processes are modular, much more than on the alleged nonmodularity of thought / defend the view that thought processes might be modular too / articulate a modular view of human thought with the naturalistic view of human culture that [the author has] been developing under the label "epidemiology of representations" / show how, contrary to the received view, organisms endowed with truly modular minds might engender truly diverse cultures (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.
The ability to make advantageous decisions in the face of uncertainty is an essential human skill, yet the development of such abilities over the lifespan is still not well understood. In the current study, from childhood through older adulthood, we tracked the developmental trajectory of risk taking for gains and losses, and expected value (EV) sensitivity in risky choices. In the gain domain, risk-taking decreased consistently across the lifespan. In the loss domain, risk-taking was relatively constant across ages, a result we attribute to the pervasiveness of loss aversion. EV sensitivity showed an inverted-U-shaped function, increasing from childhood to adulthood but then decreasing for the elderly, which occurred for both risky gains and risky losses. This finding is consistent with neuropsychological and neuroanatomical evidence concerning the role of the frontal lobe in decision making, which is relatively late to develop during childhood but may degrade earlier in the later years. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Numerous studies have found that by late childhood individuals recognize conventional norms as social contrivances that are arbitrary, relative, and changeable. However, this conclusion conflicts with other evidence that children and adults “reify” social formations by apprehending them as something other than social products. For example, it is difficult to reconcile the phenomenon of ethnocentrism with the image of people who perceive their social worlds as arbitrary and relative. Most of the studies have questioned respondents about comparatively “transparent” rules, that is, those whose arbitrary human origins are evident. Moreover, the customary questions used to measure perceived conventionality are often simplistic indicators of a complex phenomenon. The result is an exaggerated portrayal of children's and adults' awareness of the conventionality of the social world.
Although previous studies investigated the relationship between general cognitive abilities and decision making, few have characterized specific cognitive abilities underlying decision-making competence. In this paper, we focus on executive functions—control processes involved in the regulation of cognition. Specifically, we report on an individual-differences study that investigated the relationship of executive functioning (EF) and general cognitive abilities (fluid intelligence and numeracy) with different aspects of decision-making competence. Individual differences in EF components explained aspects of decision-making competence even after controlling for fluid intelligence and numeracy. However, different aspects of decision-making competence varied in the extent to which they relied on different executive functions. In particular, resistance to framing effects, the ability to apply decision rules, and successful engagement in cognitive reflection partially depend on individual differences on the monitoring/inhibition dimension of EF. The ability to provide consistent judgments in risk perception is related to the shifting aspect of EF. The ability to recognize social norms and resistance to sunk costs were not significantly related to EF, thus supporting the idea that executive control is not a major determinant of these aspects of decision-making competence. Finally, substantial variance in some of the decision-making tasks remained unexplained, suggesting that other cognitive or non-cognitive abilities need to be considered in future studies. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
One hundred and twelve undergraduate university students completed an informal reasoning task in which they were asked to generate arguments both for and against the position they endorsed on three separate issues. Performance on this task was evaluated by comparing the number of arguments they generated which endorsed (myside arguments) and which refuted (otherside arguments) their own position on that issue. Participants generated more myside arguments than otherside arguments on all three issues, thus consistently showing a myside bias effect on each issue. Differences in cognitive ability were not associated with individual differences in myside bias. However, year in university was a significant predictor of myside bias. The degree of myside bias decreased systematically with year in university. Year in university remained a significant predictor of myside bias even when both cognitive ability and age were statistically partialled out. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether established behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics and finance are related to cognitive abilities. We find that higher test scores on the cognitive reflection test of Frederick [Frederick, S., 2005. Cognitive reflection and decision-making. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 25-42] indeed are correlated with lower incidences of the conjunction fallacy and conservatism in updating probabilities. Test scores are also significantly related to subjects' time and risk preferences. Test scores have no influence on the amount of anchoring, although there is evidence of anchoring among all subjects. Even if incidences of most biases are lower for people with higher cognitive abilities, they still remain substantial.
People see themselves as less susceptible to bias than others. We show that a source of this bias blind spot involves the value that people place, and believe they should place, on introspective information (relative to behavioral information) when assessing bias in themselves versus others. Participants considered introspective information more than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves, but not others. This divergence did not arise simply from differences in introspective access. The blind spot persisted when observers had access to the introspections of the actor whose bias they judged. And, participants claimed that they, but not their peers, should rely on introspections when making self-assessments of bias. Only after being educated about the importance of nonconscious processes in guiding judgment and action—and thereby about the fallibility of introspection—did participants cease denying their relative susceptibility to bias.
The domain specificity and generality of an important critical thinking skill was examined by administering 9 reasoning and decision-making tasks to 125 adults. Optimal performance on all of the tasks required that disjunctive processing strategies-strategies requiring the exhaustive consideration of all of the possible states of the world-be adopted. Performance across these disjunctive reasoning tasks displayed considerable domain specificity, but 5 of the tasks displayed moderate convergence. Cognitive ability was associated with performance on only 3 of 9 tasks. Six of the 9 tasks displayed associations with 1 of 2 cognitive styles that were examined in the multivariate task battery (need for cognition and reflectivity). Performance on the 5 tasks that displayed some domain generality was also more associated with thinking styles than with cognitive ability in several regression analyses.
Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students (N = 871). The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by representativeness, and Ss erroneously predicted rare events and extreme values if these happened to be representative. The experience of unjustified confidence in predictions and the prevalence of fallacious intuitions concerning statistical regression are traced to the representativeness heuristic.
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness,
which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process
B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a
class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical
prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead
to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could
improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
Confidence is an essential ingredient of success in a wide range of domains ranging from job performance and mental health to sports, business and combat. Some authors have suggested that not just confidence but overconfidence--believing you are better than you are in reality--is advantageous because it serves to increase ambition, morale, resolve, persistence or the credibility of bluffing, generating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which exaggerated confidence actually increases the probability of success. However, overconfidence also leads to faulty assessments, unrealistic expectations and hazardous decisions, so it remains a puzzle how such a false belief could evolve or remain stable in a population of competing strategies that include accurate, unbiased beliefs. Here we present an evolutionary model showing that, counterintuitively, overconfidence maximizes individual fitness and populations tend to become overconfident, as long as benefits from contested resources are sufficiently large compared with the cost of competition. In contrast, unbiased strategies are only stable under limited conditions. The fact that overconfident populations are evolutionarily stable in a wide range of environments may help to explain why overconfidence remains prevalent today, even if it contributes to hubris, market bubbles, financial collapses, policy failures, disasters and costly wars.