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Emotion
Emotion Regulation in Asperger's Syndrome and
High-Functioning Autism
Andrea C. Samson, Oswald Huber, and James J. Gross
Online First Publication, May 28, 2012. doi: 10.1037/a0027975
CITATION
Samson, A. C., Huber, O., & Gross, J. J. (2012, May 28). Emotion Regulation in Asperger's
Syndrome and High-Functioning Autism. Emotion. Advance online publication. doi:
10.1037/a0027975
Emotion Regulation in Asperger’s Syndrome and High-Functioning Autism
Andrea C. Samson
Stanford University
Oswald Huber
University of Fribourg
James J. Gross
Stanford University
It is generally thought that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA)
have deficits in Theory of Mind. These deficits have been previously linked to problems with social
cognition. However, we reasoned that AS/HFA individuals’ Theory of Mind deficits also might lead to
problems with emotion regulation. To assess emotional functioning in AS/HFA, 27 AS/HFA adults (16
women) and 27 age-, gender-, and education-matched typically developing (TD) participants completed
a battery of measures of emotion experience, labeling, and regulation. With respect to emotion experi-
ence, individuals with AS/HFA reported higher levels of negative emotions, but similar levels of positive
emotions, compared with TD individuals. With respect to emotion labeling, individuals with AS/HFA
had greater difficulties identifying and describing their emotions, with approximately two-thirds exceed-
ing the cutoff for alexithymia. With respect to emotion regulation, individuals with AS/HFA used
reappraisal less frequently than TD individuals and reported lower levels of reappraisal self-efficacy.
Although AS/HFA individuals used suppression more frequently than TD individuals, no difference in
suppression self-efficacy was found. It is important to note that these differences in emotion regulation
were evident even when controlling for emotion experience and labeling. Implications of these deficits
are discussed, and future research directions are proposed.
Keywords: emotional reactivity, emotion regulation, autism, autism spectrum disorder, Asperger’s
syndrome
One of the key deficits in individuals with Asperger’s syndrome
and high-functioning autism (AS/HFA) is thought to center around
impairments in their cognitive and affective Theory of Mind and
related perspective taking processes (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer,
Berger, Goldsher, & Aharon-Peretz, 2005). In particular, individ-
uals with AS/HFA often show an impaired comprehension of other
people’s mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, and intentions
(e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith & Happe´, 1994). These deficien-
cies in Theory of Mind previously have been linked to deficits in
social communication such as diminished facial expressivity, low
levels of joint attention, and diminished sharing of emotions
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Mar-
tin, & Clubley, 2001). We propose that deficits in Theory of Mind
also may help to explain clinical and initial empirical reports that
individuals with AS/HFA have difficulties regulating their emo-
tions (e.g., Laurent & Rubin, 2004; Rieffe et al., 2011).
Theory of Mind and Affective Functioning:
Theoretical Expectations
Although Theory of Mind is typically seen as referring to the
ability to assess other people’s mental states, there is strong evi-
dence that the processes of assessing one’s own and other’s mental
states are closely related (Frith, 1989; Frith & Frith, 2003). This
suggests that Theory of Mind deficits might also lead to difficulties
assessing one’s own mental states (e.g., Moriguchi et al., 2006). It
is important to note that this may not only hold for cognitive states,
but also for emotional states. If this is correct, Theory of Mind
deficits should be related to difficulties reading and labeling one’s
own emotions, as well as those of other people. If AS/HFA
children express little emotion (e.g., Yirmiya, Kasari, Sigman, &
Mundy, 1989) these difficulties might be exacerbated by the fact
that caretakers of these children would have difficulty mirroring
their children’s emotions and teaching them adequate emotional
responses.
What implications might such deficits have for emotion regu-
lation? It has been suggested that the ability to accurately label
one’s emotional states is an important prerequisite for successful
emotion regulation (Barrett, Gross, Conner, & Benvenuto, 2001).
This observation generates the prediction that individuals with
AS/HFA might have difficulties with emotion regulation. In par-
ticular, Theory of Mind deficits might compromise emotion reg-
ulation strategies that rely on cognitive processes related to per-
spective change. One example of such a cognitive emotion
regulation process is reappraisal, an adaptive emotion regulation
Andrea C. Samson and James J. Gross, Department of Psychology,
Stanford University; Oswald Huber, Department of Psychology, University
of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland.
We thank Ilona Papousek, Heribert Freudenthaler, and Janka Bryjova
for their help in recruiting participants for the comparison group, and
Rebecca Podell for comments on the manuscript.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Andrea C.
Samson, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall,
Building 420, Stanford, CA 94305. E-mail: andrea.samson@stanford.edu
Emotion © 2012 American Psychological Association
2012, Vol. ●●, No. ●, 000– 000 1528-3542/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0027975
1
strategy that is strongly related to cognitive change (Gross & John,
2003). This line of reasoning suggests that individuals with AS/
HFA would be less likely to use reappraisal than typically devel-
oping (TD) individuals.
Emotion Experience, Labeling, and Regulation:
Empirical Findings
Consistent with these expectations, prior research indicates that
the emotional responses of individuals with AS/HFA are less
differentiated, more negative, and less positive than those of con-
trols (e.g., Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, &
Sigman, 1993; Joseph & Tager-Flusber, 1997; Kasari & Sigman,
1997; Samson, Huber, & Ruch, 2011a). In addition, individuals
with AS/HFA experience significant difficulties adequately assess-
ing and labeling their own emotions (i.e., alexithymia; see Berthoz
& Hill, 2005; Fitzgerald & Bellgrove, 2006; Fitzgerald & Moly-
neux, 2004; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004; Szatmari et al., 2008;
Tani et al., 2004).
Recent studies have also provided initial evidence for emotion
regulation deficits among AS/HFA populations. For example,
Konstantareas and Stewart (2006) showed that children diagnosed
with ASD employ fewer adaptive coping strategies in mildly
frustrating situations. Immature patterns of behavior that might be
related to emotion regulation, such as chewing on clothing or
carrying around unusual objects, have also been observed among
AS/HFA individuals (Geller, 2005; Laurent & Rubin, 2004;
Myles, 2003; Volkmar & Klin, 2003). However, so far no study
has focused on specific, well-defined emotion regulation strategies
such as reappraisal and suppression.
The Present Study
The goal of the present study was to examine emotion regulation
in individuals with AS/HFA, as well as TD individuals. Using an
online survey methodology, adults with and without AS/HFA were
asked to complete a battery of measures concerned with emotional
experience, emotion labeling, and emotion regulation. Under the
assumption that individuals with AS/HFA have more Theory of
Mind deficits, we expected that compared with TD adults, indi-
viduals with AS/HFA would (a) experience more negative and less
positive emotions, (b) have more difficulties labeling their own
emotions, and (c) have more difficulties with emotion regulation,
particularly with strategies associated with cognitive reappraisal.
We expected differences in emotion labeling and regulation to
persist even when statistically controlling for emotion experience,
and differences in emotion regulation to persist even when con-
trolling for expected differences in emotion experience and label-
ing.
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven individuals with AS/HFA and 27 TD control
participants matched on gender, age, and educational level com-
pleted the questionnaires online. Male participants made up 41%
(N⫽11) of both groups. There was no age difference between the
TD (M⫽35.22, SD ⫽12.82, range ⫽18 – 64 years) and the
AS/HFA group (M⫽33.56, SD ⫽12.82, range ⫽18 –53 years);
F(1, 53) ⫽.28, nonsignificant (ns). The two groups did not differ
in their educational level,
2
(1) ⫽.77, ns: 63% of individuals with
AS/HFA and 74.1% of the TD group were in college, or already
had a college degree. The other participants were in high school or
had a high school degree.
As expected, individuals with AS/HFA scored higher (M⫽
25.44, SD ⫽4.53) than the controls (M⫽8.19, SD ⫽4.51) on the
short German version (AQ-k; Freitag et al., 2007) of the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient (AQ, original long version by Baron-Cohen et
al., 2001), F(1, 53) ⫽196.77, p⬍.001, ⫽.89. A score of 17 is
seen as the cutoff for a diagnosis with autism. One individual with
AS had an AQ-k score of 16 and was therefore excluded from
further analysis. Therefore, all AS/HFA participants (and none of
the TD participants) had scores greater than this cutoff. It is
important to note that the AQ-k is not a formal diagnostic instru-
ment. The reliability was very good in the present sample (Cron-
bach’s alpha ⫽.76 for the TD group, .83 for the AS/HFA group).
Procedure
An invitation e-mail with the link to the online survey was sent
to 50 German-speaking individuals who had participated in previ-
ous studies (e.g., Samson, Huber & Ruch, 2011b). All had a
diagnosis of AS (ICD-10: F84.5) or HFA, confirmed by a referring
psychotherapist or psychiatrist. In total, 26 individuals with AS
and 2 individuals with HFA filled out the questionnaires com-
pletely (however, one individual with AS was excluded because of
an AQ-k score of 16). The same invitation e-mail was sent to
approximately 150 control individuals who had previously taken
part in online experiments or were currently on a mailing list at a
German-speaking university. Seventy-six individuals filled out the
questionnaires completely, of whom we selected 27 control par-
ticipants who matched the AS/HFA individuals on gender, age,
and education level. In the online survey, participants received
general instructions regarding the study and were assured that their
data would be handled confidentially. They were then asked for
demographic information. Prior to each of the questionnaires,
participants received specific instructions explaining the answer
formats. In the end, they were thanked for participating in the
online survey.
Measures
Emotion experience. The Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) is a 20-item self-report measure of positive
and negative affect developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen
(1988). The German version was used (Krohne, Eggloff, Kohl-
mann, & Tausch, 1996) in the present study. Positive Affect (PA)
reflects the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active, and
alert. Negative Affect (NA) reflects the extent to which a person
feels negative affective states, such as being nervous and upset.
The scale ranged from 1 (very slightly or not at all)to5(very
much). In the current study the time frame for responses regarding
emotional experience was “during the past weeks.” Cronbach’s
alpha’s were satisfactorily high for PA (.93 for AS/HFA, .82 for
TD) and NA (.70 for AS/HFA, .79 for TD).
Emotion labeling. The 20-item Toronto-Alexithymia-Scale
(TAS-20; Parker, Bagby, & Taylor, 1993; German version: Bach,
2SAMSON, HUBER, AND GROSS
Bach, de Zwaan, Serim, & Böhmer, 1996) is a 20-item measure
that assesses alexithymia on a 5-point scale from 1 to 5, resulting
in a sum score ranging from 20 to 100. The cutoff of ⱖ61
describes high alexithymics (see Franz et al., 2008). The reliability
for both groups was very good for the subscales “difficulty iden-
tifying feelings” (Cronbach’s alpha ⫽.76 for AS/HFA, .87 for
TD), “difficulty describing feelings” (.81 for AS/HFA, .73 for
TD), and the total score (.84 for AS/HFA, .87 for TD), but
reliability for “external-oriented thinking” was only moderate (.65
for both groups).
Emotion regulation. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
(ERQ; Gross & John, 2003; German version: Abler & Kessler,
2009) measures the frequency of use of two types of emotion
regulation: reappraisal, defined as trying to change the meaning of
a situation in order to change its emotional impact (6 items), and
suppression, defined as trying to inhibit emotion-related behaviors
(4 items). In addition, we administered a parallel set of items that
measure emotion regulation self-efficacy for reappraisal (6 items)
and suppression (4 items; Goldin, Manber-Ball, Werner, Heim-
berg, & Gross, 2009). Reliabilities were adequate to good for
reappraisal frequency (Cronbach’s alpha ⫽.86 for both groups),
reappraisal self-efficacy (.93 for AS/HFA, .92 for TD), and sup-
pression self-efficacy (.85 for AS/HFA, .98 for TD). However, the
reliabilty for suppression frequency was .60 in the TD group and
.52 in the AS/HFA group. Therefore, the results related to sup-
pression frequency should be interpreted with caution.
Statistical Analyses
In primary analyses, differences between the AS/HFA and TD
individuals were assessed using one-way analyses of variance. The
pvalues were Bonferroni-adjusted within the domains of emo-
tional experience and emotion regulation to control for Type I
error. In secondary analyses, we computed two sets of analyses of
covariance (ANCOVAs); first, labeling and regulation measures
were outcomes and the experience measures were covariates, and
second, regulation measures were outcomes and the experience
and labeling measures were covariates.
Results
Emotional Reactivity
The group comparisons on the PANAS revealed that individuals
with AS/HFA reported higher levels of negative emotion (M⫽
25.30, SD ⫽5.67) than TD individuals (M⫽18.33, SD ⫽4.70),
F(1, 53) ⫽24.15, p⬍.001, ⫽.56, but did not differ from
controls regarding positive emotion (AS/HFA: M⫽33.55, SD ⫽
6.05, TD: M⫽31.30, SD ⫽9.26), F(1, 53) ⫽1.13, ns.
Emotion Labeling
Individuals with AS/HFA had more difficulty identifying (M⫽
23.63, SD ⫽4.76) and describing (M⫽18.19, SD ⫽4.24) their
emotions than the control group (identifying: M⫽14.52, SD ⫽
5.15), F(1, 53) ⫽45.63, p⬍.001, ⫽.68; (describing: M⫽
11.22, SD ⫽3.66), F(1, 53) ⫽41.67, p⬍.001, ⫽.66. No
significant differences were found in external-oriented thinking in
individuals with AS/HFA (M⫽19.59, SD ⫽4.67) and TD
individuals (M⫽16.96, SD ⫽3.95), F(1, 53) ⫽4.99, ns. The total
score of the TAS-20, indicating alexithymia, was significantly
higher in AS/HFA (M⫽61.41, SD ⫽10.85) than in TD individ-
uals (M⫽42.70, SD ⫽10.35), F(1, 53) ⫽42.02, p⬍.001, ⫽
.66. Sixty-three percent of the individuals with AS/HFA group
exceeded the cutoff score for alexithymia, whereas none of the TD
individuals exceeded the cutoff score of 61.
Emotion Regulation
As expected, individuals with AS/HFA reported using less re-
appraisal, F(1, 53) ⫽9.12, p⬍.05, ⫽.39, and indicated less
reappraisal self-efficacy, F(1, 53) ⫽9.65, p⬍.05, ⫽.39.
Furthermore, individuals with AS/HFA reported using more sup-
pression, F(1, 53) ⫽11.08, p⬍.01, ⫽.42, than the control
group. However, because frequency of suppression yielded very
low Cronbach’s alpha, this scale has to be interpreted with caution.
It is interesting to note that no differences in suppression self-
efficacy were found between the two groups, F(1, 53) ⫽0.00, ns
(Figure 1).
Secondary Analyses
ANCOVAs of the labeling and regulation measures were per-
formed in which positive and negative emotions were entered as
covariates. Even when positive and negative emotions were entered as
covariates, the groups differed in alexithymia, F(3, 50) ⫽16.65, p⬍
.001, ⫽.71; reappraisal frequency, F(3, 50) ⫽8.50, p⬍.001, ⫽
.58; reappraisal self-efficacy, F(3, 50) ⫽9.47, p⬍.001, ⫽.60; and
suppression frequency, F(3, 50) ⫽7.51, p⬍.001, ⫽.56.
ANCOVAs of each of the emotion regulation measures were also
conducted in which emotion experience (positive emotion, negative
emotion) and labeling (alexithymia) were entered as covariates. Re-
sults indicated that the groups still differed on reappraisal frequency,
F(4, 49) ⫽7.13, p⬍.001, ⫽.61; reappraisal self-efficacy, F(4,
49) ⫽7.78, p⬍.001, ⫽.62; and suppression frequency, F(4, 49) ⫽
7.10, p⬍.001, ⫽.61.
Figure 1. Emotion regulation profiles (means and standard errors) in
individuals with Asperger’s syndrome and high-functioning autism (AS/
HFA) versus typically developing (TD) individuals.
ⴱ
p⬍.05.
ⴱⴱ
p⬍.01.
3
EMOTION REGULATION IN AUTISM
Discussion
Motivated by our analysis of the implications of Theory of
Mind deficits for affective functioning, we examined patterns of
emotion experience, emotion labeling, and emotion regulation
in a sample of individuals with AS/HFA as well as TD indi-
viduals. Our findings suggest that compared with TD partici-
pants, individuals with AS/HFA had greater levels of negative
affect, more difficulty identifying and describing their emo-
tions, lower levels of reappraisal use and self-efficacy, and
greater levels of suppression. These differences between groups
persisted even when differences in emotion experience and
labeling were controlled for.
Emotion Experience and Labeling
Our finding of elevated negative emotion in AS/HFA is
consistent with prior findings (Capps et al., 1993; Joseph &
Tager-Flusbert, 1997; Kasari & Sigman, 1997). Inconsistent
with our expectations, we found comparable levels of positive
emotions in the two groups. One reason for this finding could
be that most of the studies investigating positive emotions in
ASD did so by focusing on emotions in social contexts (see also
Dawson, Hill, Spencer, Galpert, & Watson, 1990; Kasari, Sig-
man, Mundy, & Yirmiya, 1990), whereas the PANAS is context
free. Therefore, other sources might have been taken into ac-
count while the participants responded to the items of the
PANAS, such as concrete emotion-eliciting events, which lead
to more positive emotions in high-functioning adults with au-
tism than social interactions do (Jaedicke, Storoschuk, & Lord,
1994).
As expected, we also found that individuals with AS/HFA have
more difficulty identifying and describing their emotions than TD
individuals do, with approximately two-thirds of the AS/HFA
individuals exceeding the cutoff for alexithymia. This difference
persists even when controlling for emotion experience. This find-
ing suggests that differences in emotion labeling cannot be ex-
plained by differences in emotion experience.
Emotion Regulation
In the domain of emotion regulation, adults with AS/HFA
reported using less cognitive reappraisal than TD individuals. They
also expressed less self-efficacy in reappraising their emotions.
However, they had comparable self-efficacy scores in using sup-
pression, a less adaptive emotion regulation strategy. In addition,
individuals with AS/HFA used more suppression than TD individ-
uals. This suggests a less adaptive emotion regulation profile in
individuals with AS/HFA compared to TD individuals (see
Geraerts, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, 2006; Gross & John,
2003; Richards & Gross, 1999).
These emotion regulation effects persisted even when con-
trolling for differences in emotion experience and in the ability
to describe and identify emotions. This is important because
emotion experience, labeling, and regulation influence and af-
fect one other (e.g., Bailey & Henry, 2007; Berthoz & Hill,
2005; Gross, 1999; Sifne´os, 1973; Swart, Kortekaas, & Aleman
2009) and yet, in this case, regulation difficulties cannot be
solely explained by labeling difficulties. It is important to note
that reappraisal, that is, the process of taking another mental
perspective on a stimulus or situation in order to reinterpret its
meaning, is most strongly affected in individuals with AS/HFA.
One potential explanation for this is that reappraisal relies on
abilities linked, or similar, to perspective taking processes and
Theory of Mind, while other strategies, such as suppression, are
distinct from perspective taking processes and therefore less
affected in AS/HFA.
Implications for Assessment and Intervention
The present findings suggest several implications for assess-
ment and intervention. The present findings suggest the value of
assessments that differentiate among multiple types of emotion
regulation including cognitive reappraisal and expressive sup-
pression. With respect to intervention, several strategies might
improve affective functioning in individuals with AS/HFA.
These include techniques that enhance the ability of individuals
with AS/HFA to attend to and discriminate emotions (emotional
attention and clarity), as well as strategies that aim to increase
the ability to respond flexibly to one’s own emotions. Given
that individuals with AS/HFA report that they experience
greater difficulty reappraising stressful and negative life events
or situations as neutral or positive, interventions concerned with
emotional functioning should encourage the development of
cognitive processes associated with reappraisal. For example,
interventions could enhance cognitive flexibility, which seems
to be positively related to emotion regulation success (see, e.g.,
Gyurak, Ayduk, & Gross, 2010), or interventions could focus
more directly on the reappraisal process by teaching and train-
ing reappraisal strategies.
Efforts have been made to develop techniques and strategies for
individuals with ASD that address stress management (Myles,
2003), anger management (Sofronoff, Attwood, Hinton, & Levin,
2007) and emotion regulation (e.g., Prizant, Wetherby, Rubin, &
Lauret, 2003; Scarpa & Reyes, 2011), and suggest the promise of
this research direction. While cognitive-linguistic strategies to
enhance self-regulation (Prizant et al., 2003) and “thinking tools”
as part of the intervention program described by Scarpa and Reyes
(2003) have been described, the findings of the present study
provide an impetus to design an emotional intervention treatment
that specifically aims to teach and ameliorate reappraisal strate-
gies, focusing on improving the perspective changing abilities in
the AS/HFA population.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the present study adds to our growing understand-
ing of emotion regulation in AS/HFA, it has several limitations.
First, although online studies have been shown to be as reliable
and valid as paper-pencil based assessments (e.g., Gosling,
Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004), and previous studies have
shown that individuals with AS/HFA are able to respond to
self-report questionnaires adequately (e.g., Berthoz & Hill,
2005), the format limited our assessment. Future research
should include performance measures for emotion regulation
and Theory of Mind. Although the ERQ correlates with perfor-
mance-based assessments (Fladung, Baron, Gunst, & Kiefer,
2010; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012), future studies
4SAMSON, HUBER, AND GROSS
should test other emotion regulation strategies including dis-
traction, situation modification, and avoidance to fully under-
stand the nuances and complexities of emotion regulation in
AS/HFA. Moreover, although the Autism Quotient is related to
Theory of Mind, an important step in future research is to
empirically assess Theory of Mind and perspective taking abil-
ities, and their relation to emotion regulation.
A second limitation concerns the generalizability of the results
found in the present study. Usually, the prevalence of alexithymia
ranges between 5% to 15% in normal populations (Kokkonen et
al., 2001; Salminen, Saarija¨rvi, äa¨rela¨, Toikka, & Kauhanen,
1999). However, in our TD group, no one exceeded the cutoff for
alexithymia. The exceptionally low alexithymia scores in our TD
group suggest the importance of investigating whether our findings
extend to other samples. Furthermore, although we have no avail-
able information on IQ scores, we can assume that we had a high
functioning clinical sample, on the basis of the educational level.
Our findings are therefore not necessarily representative of lower
functioning individuals with AS/HFA, for whom additional diffi-
culties with language and IQ might interfere with regulating emo-
tions. Emotional reactivity and regulation in low functioning au-
tism must be explored in future studies. Usually, more males than
females are diagnosed with AS/HFA. This means that females are
overrepresented in the current sample relative to the larger popu-
lation. At the same time this overrepresentation is a strength of the
present study, since information about females with AS/HFA is
limited in the literature. For future work with larger samples, it will
be important to assess the possibility of gender-specific findings
related to emotion regulation.
Finally, as previous studies on emotion regulation difficulties in
ASD have mainly concentrated on children, our study shows that
emotion regulation difficulties are also present in adulthood. It
would be interesting to investigate the developmental trajectories
of emotion regulation in individuals with AS/HFA in more detail.
Our findings suggest that individuals with AS/HFA learn to use
certain specific regulation strategies to manage their emotions, but
not others. In the present study, we found that they use suppression
as well as TD individuals, but are less able to employ reappraisal.
A study investigating developmental aspects and various emotion
regulation strategies would be enlightening for the understanding
of emotion regulation in AS/HFA individuals.
Concluding Comment
Although emotional problems are not usually seen as part of the
core features of ASD, recent findings have shown that there is an
overlap between core diagnostic features and emotional/behavioral
problems in ASD (Georgiades et al., 2011). Our study helps us to
better characterize emotional difficulties in AS/HFA that we sug-
gest may flow from deficits in Theory of Mind and perspective
taking. Our results show that emotion regulation difficulties, most
pronounced in reappraisal, cannot be explained by differences in
the emotion experience or emotion labeling. Moreover, difficulties
in reappraisal, one of the most adaptive emotion regulation strat-
egies, might be specifically associated with deficits in perspective
taking abilities related to Theory of Mind. However, further re-
search is needed to better understand emotion regulation in AS/
HFA and its links to core symptoms of the disorder.
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Received April 23, 2011
Revision received February 15, 2012
Accepted February 16, 2012 䡲
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EMOTION REGULATION IN AUTISM
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