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Kritik der reinen Vernunft
... A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy. 6 The emphasis on the a priori of knowledge indicates that the subject is directed towards the forms of intuition and concepts of understanding that exist a priori in the subject itself. However, since Kant's transcendental philosophy is basically a philosophy of synthesis -with binding knowledge -the a priori forms of space and time as well as the concepts in the cognitive process are applied to or synthesized with the objects given in sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) -indeed in the context of a synthetic unity of apperception. ...
... In this most frequently cited example of the Copernican Revolution, Kant refers to the historical reversal of the epistemological relationship between the subject and the 6 object, i.e., the object to be cognized. Like the Copernican turn or reversal, in which Ptolemy's geocentric cosmos, which had prevailed for almost fifteen centuries, was replaced by a heliocentric cosmos, in the transcendental turn of modern epistemology objects should be oriented towards the subject that is now placed at the center: ...
As widely acknowledged, the epistemological turn of early modernity was based on the Cartesian method of doubt and negation, which primarily relates to the world of objects. The methodological negation and separation of sensible qualities and subjective attributes of objects left behind residual entities, which, from the Cartesian res extensa to the Kantian thing-initself, explicates an important basic feature of a historically unfolding transcendentalism: the reduction of objects to a mere givenness and the directional conditionality of epistemology that presupposes it. The following paper examines how and to what extent modern epistemology tacitly assumes an epistemic directionality, and accordingly reduces the world of objects to its mere givenness by subordinating the objects to a hierarchical structure of cognition. The investigation is carried out both in a theoretical-philosophical as well as in a historical framework.
... Kant is resigned to maintaining this correlation within the phenomenal world, leaving God out of the equation. The deduction of his categories of understanding concludes that a priori synthetic judgments are the scientific objects themselves (Kant, 1974(Kant, /1999. B197/A158). ...
... Kant is resigned to maintaining this correlation within the phenomenal world, leaving God out of the equation. The deduction of his categories of understanding concludes that a priori synthetic judgments are the scientific objects themselves (Kant, 1974(Kant, /1999. B197/A158). ...
Husserl envisages transcendental phenomenology as a radically founding science that lays bare the higher-order experiences whereby logic and a theory of science become constituted. On the other hand, according to a usual presentation of Hegel’s philosophy, phenomenology is “logic’s precondition,” and science presents itself as its “result.” This alleged precedence of Hegel’s phenomenology (with its experiential and historical horizons) regarding logic may be a motif behind the current affinities recently traced between Hegelian and Husserlian notions of phenomenology that highlight their views on experience, history, and the lifeworld. This paper offers instead a reconsideration of aspects of their philosophies mostly challenged or dismissed since the rise of positivism: a reappraisal of their views on the relationship between phenomenology, logic, and philosophy as an “absolute” system of sciences. The argument is made that the irreconcilable difference between their projects ultimately stands on the radical contrast between Hegel’s speculative-conceptual method and system of sciences and Husserl’s foundational science and method as experiential-phenomenological all the way through. Despite this methodological abyss, this paper vindicates their affinities in their refusal to segregate science from life, and their attempts to overcome modernity’s inherited fragmentation of culture by providing an all-unifying approach to philosophy.
... The dual-aspect analysis is analogous to Immanuel Kant's view of subjectivity, which distinguishes the transcendental subject from the empirical subject. For Kant, the transcendental self is inferred from and serves to unify itself with the existence of the empirical self (Kant, 1787(Kant, [1929). One cannot be conscious of the transcendental self, which is only revealed through Husserl's (1960, p. 37) transcendental-phenomenological epoché (suspending assumptions and beliefs). ...
This study explores the development of a cross-cultural primary ontological model that can help self-cultivation practitioners illuminate their path and help researchers identify the complex implications, context, and progression of self-cultivation in diverse cultures, especially those associated with Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Integrating self-cultivation traditions into social
science research from the perspective of subject-object dichotomy is difficult. However, the assimilation of the mutual implication of subject and object in the Avataṃsaka worldview helps resolve this issue. This study employs the Buddhist tetralemmic dialectic (catuṣ koṭ i), which goes beyond the limitations of dualistic and reductionist logic, to construct the Dialectical Mandala Model of Self-cultivation as the first of a two-step epistemological strategy. The model provides a universal framework for the multifaceted and systemic analysis of self-cultivation traditions so that future research can further
develop additional culturally specific ontologies and psychological models in the second step of the strategy. As in a research map, this model could help researchers make ontological commitments, understand self-cultivation more comprehensively, and determine whether they have overlooked any research domain.
... The dual-aspect analysis is analogous to Immanuel Kant's view of subjectivity, which distinguishes the transcendental subject from the empirical subject. For Kant, the transcendental self is inferred from and serves to unify itself with the existence of the empirical self (Kant, 1787(Kant, [1929). One cannot be conscious of the transcendental self, which is only revealed through Husserl's (1960, p. 37) transcendental-phenomenological epoché (suspending assumptions and beliefs). ...
Professor Kwang-Kuo Hwang, my mentor, and I organized this current Research
Topic. It is an extended issue of the previous issue titled “Eastern Philosophies and
Psychology: Toward Psychology of self-cultivation” (Hwang et al., 2017). However, sadly, he passed away peacefully in his sleep on July 30, 2023. The sudden passing of my mentor is genuinely unacceptable and heartbreaking. He often remarked that the research orientation of “logical positivism” is not the biggest obstacle to developing and publishing indigenous social science (Hwang, 2019). He further emphasized that many Chinese scholars unquestioningly adopted Western social science theories without critical thinking, engaging in research that merely mimics existing academic work and neglects Chinese culture. Furthermore, he pointed out that there needs to be more understanding of the essence of Western science, which is scientific philosophy. The biggest misconception is that Western scientific philosophy is confined to logical positivism only.
By providing a thorough scientific interpretation of Chinese traditions and
revolutionizing “WEIRD” psychology and social science (Hwang, 2012; Shiah, 2016, 2021, 2023; Kuo et al., 2022; Xu et al., 2022), we can pave the way for a transformative movement. For the sake of establishing an autonomous academic tradition of social science in transformative Confucian culture, we established the Chinese Indigenous Social Science Association in 2018 in Taiwan to promote this movement, and I am the current president of the association. We encourage our colleagues to construct their theoretical models for conducting empirical research in Chinese societies, which is also the primary reason for establishing the current Research Topic. We decided to increase the visibility of Chinese culture and psychology by publishing our works in an international journal of high reputation, and Frontiers in Psychology became our first choice. We called for papers on Philosophical and Theoretical Psychology from the international academic community and obtained a total submission of 87 articles. Eventually, 11 articles were accepted for publication after a strict review procedure by FIP standards.
... William James's [18] distinction between "empirical thinking" and "true reasoning" is even more evidently relevant. Going back even earlier, Immanuel Kant's [20] dictum was: "Thoughts without intuition are empty, intuition without concepts is blind". "Intuition and concepts constitute... the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge" (Kant [20]). ...
This position paper discusses relationships among hybrid neural-symbolic models, dual-process theories, and cognitive architectures. It provides some historical backgrounds and argues that dual-process (implicit versus explicit) theories have significant implications for developing neural-symbolic (neurosymbolic) models. Furthermore, computational cognitive architectures can help to disentangle issues concerning dual-process theories and thus help the development of neural-symbolic models (in this way as well as in other ways).
... The metric framework (Fig 1c) is considerably better suited to explain environments with a Euclidean geometric structure, and, based on the Kantian notion of an a priori assumption of absolute external space [14], it has often been argued that the cognitive map must likewise follow the laws of the Euclidean metric to capture these properties [6,7,10,15]. This theory is supported by the existence of grid cells in the entorhinal cortex, which are believed to encode metric path integration information [15][16][17]. ...
The structure of the internal representation of surrounding space, the so-called cognitive map, has long been debated. A Euclidean metric map is the most straight-forward hypothesis, but human navigation has been shown to systematically deviate from the Euclidean ground truth. Vector navigation based on non-metric models can better explain the observed behavior, but also discards useful geometric properties such as fast shortcut estimation and cue integration.
Here, we propose another alternative, a Euclidean metric map that is systematically distorted to account for the observed behavior. The map is found by embedding the non-metric model, a labeled graph, into 2D Euclidean coordinates. We compared these two models using data from a human behavioral study where participants had to learn and navigate a non-Euclidean maze (i.e., with wormholes) and perform direct shortcuts between different locations. Even though the Euclidean embedding cannot correctly represent the non-Euclidean environment, both models predicted the data equally well. We argue that the embedding naturally arises from integrating the local position information into a metric framework, which makes the model more powerful and robust than the non-metric alternative. It may therefore be a better model for the human cognitive map.
... The 4D speed of everything is 4D = . Newton's physics 77 [13] once inspired Kant [14]. Will ER revolutionize both physics and philosophy? ...
In special (SR) and general relativity (GR), coordinate space x1, x2, x3 and coordinate time t span “coordinate spacetime”. Here I disclose two issues in SR/GR: (1) No device measures xi or t. Rulers and clocks measure proper distance di and proper time τ. Rather than being physical quantities, xi and t are mathematical constructs. One observer sets his di and τ equal to xi and t. (2) As in the geocentric model, there is no holistic view. Reality is always described from just one perspective. The analogy holds despite the covariance of SR/GR. In any transformed coordinates, there is again just one perspective. In Euclidean relativity (ER), d1, d2, d3, d4 span “proper spacetime” (d4=cτ). All energy is moving through a 4D Euclidean space (ES) at the speed c. Each observer’s reality is created by projecting ES orthogonally to his proper space d1, d2, d3 and to his proper time τ=d4/c. These four axes are set equal to x1, x2, x3, t in SR/GR and reassembled to a non-Euclidean spacetime. Thus, the symmetry of spacetime in SR/GR does not match the group SO(4) of ES. This mismatch is not an issue if we apply SR/GR to an observer’s reality (coordinate spacetime) and ER to what I call “master reality” (proper spacetime). Different realities do require different theories! What matters is that each observer’s reality can be retrieved from the master reality. ER boosts physics by solving the mysteries of time, the c2 in mc2, the Hubble tension, dark energy, the wave–particle duality, and entanglement. I conclude: Only in proper coordinates does nature disclose her secrets.
... Hierzu jedoch auch wieder eine klärende Anmerkung: Dass das metaphysische "sein" bei Aristoteles durch und durch kopulativ ist, bedeutet nicht, dass es rein kopulativ sei, als bringe es lediglich das logische Verhältnis zwischen zwei Begriffen zum Ausdruck. In diesem Sinne unterscheidet der Stagirit sich ganz wesentlich von Kant, für den der Kopulativsatz: "Gott ist allmächtig" bloß hypothetische Aussagekraft besitzt: Indem er nur anzeige, dass der Gottesbegriff den Allmächtigkeitsbegriff impliziert, sage er nicht mehr als dass, wenn ein Gott ist, er dann allmächtig sei 144 . Dass der aristotelische Kopulativsatz dagegen im Normalfall zugleich eine existenziale Aussagekraft besitzt, findet heute unter den Forschern immer klarere Anerkennung. ...
This article aims at further understanding the meaning and function of the verb “to be” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: does it express mainly or even exclusively existence or is it used as a copula, linking a subject and predicate? Since the birth of Greek literature, the copula-use has been by far the more common, and so it is also with Aristotle. He even provides us with the nucleus of a theory of the copula, which is not the case with existence in the strict philosophical sense. Analyzing Met. V, 7, VI, 4 and VIII, 2, I conclude that wherever Aristotle tries to determine, what, for being as being, it means “to be”, he refers not to existence, but to some concrete being-such, where the verb “being” functions as a copula. So while metaphysical being does also consistently carry an existential force, regarding its syntactic function it is nonetheless copulative through and through.
... The dual-aspect analysis is analogous to Immanuel Kant's view of subjectivity, which distinguishes the transcendental subject from the empirical subject. For Kant, the transcendental self is inferred from and serves to unify itself with the existence of the empirical self (Kant, 1787(Kant, [1929). One cannot be conscious of the transcendental self, which is only revealed through Husserl's (1960, p. 37) transcendental-phenomenological epoché (suspending assumptions and beliefs). ...
This study explores the development of a cross-cultural primary ontological model that can help self-cultivation practitioners illuminate their path and help researchers identify the complex implications, context, and progression of self-cultivation in diverse cultures, especially those associated with Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Integrating self-cultivation traditions into social science research from the perspective of subject-object dichotomy is difficult. However, the assimilation of the mutual implication of subject and object in the Avataṃsaka worldview helps resolve this issue. This study employs the Buddhist tetralemmic dialectic (catuṣkoṭi), which goes beyond the limitations of dualistic and reductionist logic, to construct the Dialectical Mandala Model of Self-cultivation as the first of a two-step epistemological strategy. The model provides a universal framework for the multifaceted and systemic analysis of self-cultivation traditions so that future research can further develop additional culturally specific ontologies and psychological models in the second step of the strategy. As in a research map, this model could help researchers make ontological commitments, understand self-cultivation more comprehensively, and determine whether they have overlooked any research domain.
O presente artigo procura mostrar que a teoria husserliana sobre as determinações exercidas pelo eu idêntico revela, gradativamente, conforme avança a investigação fenomenológica, novas propriedades da vida subjetiva, fazendo com que o eu polo das vivências intencionais seja também “substrato do habitus”, determinando ainda o eu como “pessoa”. O artigo mostra que tais determinações permitem descrever, na esfera transcendental, o fenômeno objetivo “eu, como este homem”, destacando a especificidade do corpo somático face aos demais corpos e mostrando que é por intermédio desse corpo que a vida subjetiva se conecta ao mundo na forma da espacialidade.
Several problems, tensions, and contradictions arise from Rosa’s conception of resonance, notably in relation to the following issues: (1) the relationship between the inherent uncontrollability of resonance and the fundamental controllability of things; (2) the conditions of possibility for resonance as ideal-typical constructions; (3) resonance as a bilateral movement vs. resonance as a multilateral movement; (4) milestones of resonance and milestones of alienation; (5) the relative (in)determinacy of resonance; (6) the interdependence of resonance and alienation; (7) a sociology of our relationship to the noumenal and phenomenal world; (8) the resonance of Heimat and the Heimat of resonance; (9) resonance and the ambivalence of the self; (10) resonance and the taken-for-grantedness of the world; (11) resonance as unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral transformation; (12) (un)controllable sources of resonance; (13) grey zones of resonance and alienation; (14) resonance between ‘positive thinking’ and ‘negative thinking’; (15) resonance as a product of positions and dispositions; (16) the struggle for resonance through various conflicts of modernity; (17) the conditioning of resonance by symmetrical or asymmetrical relationships; (18) the possibility of engineering resonance.
While Rosa rightly insists on the essentially anti-instrumentalist nature of resonance, his justification is fraught with difficulties. (1) There may be a noteworthy discrepancy between first-person and third-person accounts of resonance. (2) The pursuit of controllability via the mastering of certain techniques is not always antithetical but often conducive to the emergence of resonant experiences. (3) Some forms of adaptive transformation may make our relationship to the world less, rather than more, resonant and more, rather than less, alienating. (4) Arguably, it is possible to experience what may be described as ‘negative’ resonance.
Rosa’s inquiry into the constitution of control as an institutional necessity is based on the assumption that, paradoxically, a society driven by the principle of dynamic stabilization both rejects and requires uncontrollability. Some matters arising from this proposition need to be carefully examined, notably the following: (1) the extent to which existential tensions can be regarded as sources of human self-fulfilment; (2) the extent to which humans need to exert a certain amount of control over the objective, normative, and subjective conditions of their existence; (3) the extent to which the pursuit of power can be considered a quest for Verfügbarkeit; (4) the extent to which the obsession with controllability in teleological ideologies has resulted in numerous historical tragedies; (5) the extent to which the demand for transparency and documentation is a central feature of all forms of modernity; (6) the extent to which resonance can, or cannot, be commodified; (7) the extent to which modern pathologies govern our lives in a dialectical fashion; (8) the extent to which the fact that entering into a resonant relationship with human, sentient, and/or living entities is fundamentally different from entering into a resonant relationship with nonhuman, non-sentient, and/or non-living entities can be explained by reference to different axes of resonance; (9) the extent to which actors are capable of experiencing the full phenomenological complexity of reality; (10) the extent to which Rosa’s sociology of our relationship to the world would benefit from drawing a distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal realms of our existence.
We experience resonance with human or nonhuman entities and/or with material or nonmaterial states of affairs on condition that they be only semicontrollable, thereby moving in an interstitial space between controllability and uncontrollability. Resonance requires some, but not too much and not too little, controllability; at the same time, resonance requires some, but not too much and not too little, uncontrollability. On an existential level, we are required to cope with the fundamental tension between our daily efforts to render the world controllable and our desire to experience it as a source of resonance.
I argue for a transformative revival or actualization of the very core of an integrative, methodologically secured form of intellect‑mystical asceticism. This approach draws on traditionalsources that are re‑examined from a systematic—synthetic and transcultural—philosophical perspective and in light of the multi‑civilizational global environment of the 21st century. The main traditional points of reference in this paper are provided by Nicolaus de Cusa and Ibn Sīnā, and I refer to a few others, such as Attar of Nishapur, in passing. I begin by developing a basic concept of intellect‑mystical asceticism. It is distinguished from mystification, science, scientism, and modes of every‑day communication and cognition. Then, I make the case for an updated, transcultural approach to intellect‑mysticism that can foster the internal (social) and external (environmental) reintegration of the human noosphere and technosphere in future planetary development. In this context, a modern intellect‑mystical philosophical notion of “knowing non‑knowing” (wissendes Nichtwissen, docta ignorantia) is developed. It is inspired by Nicolaus de Cusa and contextualized from a systematic transcultural angle at the same time. Finally, I discuss the problem of the practical, or rather ascetic, realization of the related possibilities of intellect‑mystical self‑enfolding. Here, the preceding steps of the reflection are mapped onto an outline regarding distinct developmental stages of such a trans‑formative intellect‑mystical practice in Ibn Sīnā’s Remarks and Admonitions (al‑Ishārāt wat‑Tanbīhāt).
Ausgehend von Zeit als Konstruktion aufgrund von Wahrnehmung wird ein Bogen gespannt, wie Entwicklung von Kindern und Jugendlichen in der Zeit geschieht, sich aus entwicklungspsychologischer Perspektive Zeitbegriff und Zeitsinn entwickeln sowie der Frage nachgegangen, wie sich die Zeit in der Psyche entwickelt und welche Zeitpathologien bei psychischen Störungen zutage treten. Weiters wird beleuchtet, wie sich der Umgang mit Zeit als Sozialisationsbedingung verändert hat, welche Konsequenzen dies nach sich zieht und welche Auswirkungen sich im Rahmen der Behandlung von Kindern und Jugendlichen abzeichnen.
The third chapter deals with a question that is usually considered philosophical; however, it is crucial for everyday life and the social determinations involving economics and politics. Among most schools of thought, the study of the being—ontology—has been widely regarded as a branch of metaphysics. Both the critique of political economy and the study of the social being have revealed that existence must not be considered from a metaphysical standpoint—thus rigid, abstract, eternal—but as a movement, a process, a constant transformation. Following this method, knowledge production must be understood as a product of two interchangeable movements. The first unveils the historical emergence of knowledge; the second exposes the existing contemporary conditions for its production and reproduction.
In Chap. 2, the common association of intellectual property and the abstract right is challenged. When considered from the material perspective of knowledge production, metaphysics no longer appears to be a suitable means to understand intellectual appropriation. Unlike mainstream theory based on neoclassical economics, the dialectical materialist method contextualises the heterogeneous existences of intellectual property in different and antagonistic social property relations. What is at stake is the control over the appropriation of social surplus labour, which in capitalism gains the specific form of surplus-value. While for most part of history control of intellectual means occurred simultaneously with the control of material production, the destruction of the value of knowledge production created a new compulsion to control intellectual appropriation directly.
(Publiceret i Psyke & Logos, 1982, i et temanummer om refleksivitet)
Ovaj rad bavi se mestima u kojima Hegel koristi metaforičku figuru Mnemosine kojom označava kompleksni karakter zajedničkog pamćenja. U Hegelovom opusu postoje tri značajna mesta na kojima se ova metafora koristi na sličan način, a kojima se ovaj rad podrobnije bavi: 1) Poglavlje o predstavi u Predavanjima iz filozofije subjektivnog duha (1827/28), 2) Odeljak o epici iz Fenomenologije duha (1807), 3) Uvodi za Predavanja iz filozofije svetske istorije (1822/23, 1828/29, 1830/31). Na osnovu čitanja navedenih odeljaka može se zaključiti kako Hegel koristi metaforu Mnemosine kako bi opisao delatnost putem koje nastaje pamćenje zajednice kroz dinamiku posredovanja između pounutrašnjivanja (Erinnerung) predstava i njihovog ospoljavanja u objektima zajedničkog pamćenja (Gedächtnis). Razumevanje ove dinamike od odlučujućeg je značaja za Hegelovo razumevanje istoriografije kao prakse zajedničkog pamćenja, kao i za mapiranje odnosa koji postoje između različitih praksi kojima biva artikulisano pamćenje zajednice.
Are statistics extracted from old printed compendia, manual compilations of even older figures, and data coded to feed today’s electronic calculations all of the same nature? The most recent state of digital technology suggests that they are. But this is a retrospective illusion. It is easily dispelled if we seriously consider the production, use, and circulation of these three types of corpus. The distinction immediately leads to the question of the method for studying them. By focusing on the historical periods that are specific to them – the seventeenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries – and on the apprenticeships that have given them meaning, we have the means to grasp the know-how and presuppositions that have been characteristic of each of these genres, and to identify how some of these presuppositions have endured to the present day.
Este estudio pretende reflexionar críticamente sobre la posibilidad de un enfoque dataficado, hiperconectado y algoritmizado de clarificación, fundamentación y aplicación de lo moral: la hiperética artificial. Para ello, se mostrará la ética como un saber práctico que, preocupado por la racionalización de los comportamientos libres, ha encontrado en el diálogo entre afectados el criterio de moralidad desde el cual poder criticar tanto el conocimiento como el comportamiento. Posteriormente, se profundizará en la etificación, el intento de establecer procesos de transformación de la realidad social y moral en datos y metadatos computables en línea. Después, se expondrá cómo los modelos matemáticos artificialmente inteligentes están colonizando progresiva e implacablemente los procesos de racionalización con arreglo a sentido, produciendo falta de sentido, anomia y psicopatologías en las democracias maduras. Finalmente, se reflexionará críticamente sobre el diseño, aplicación y uso de algoritmos de inteligencia artificial como instrumento para establecer qué es justo y felicitante para una sociedad digitalmente hiperconectada
The aim of this chapter is to examine the defining characteristics of and challenges posed by the advent of a datafied, hyperconnected and algorithmic approach to the clarification, substantiation and application of morality: hyperethics. For this purpose, ethics will be addressed as practical knowledge concerned with the rationalization of free modes of behaviour, and which locates its criterion of morality within the dialogue between those concerned by an ethical issue. Attention will then be turned to an in-depth analysis of ethification, the current trend towards establishing processes for transforming social and moral reality into computable online data. It will then show how artificially intelligent mathematical models are progressively and relentlessly colonizing meaning-based rationalization processes, giving rise to meaninglessness, anomie and psychopathologies in mature democracies. Finally, we offer a critical reflection on the ethical and democratic challenges underlying the use of Artificial intelligence as a tool to establish what is fair and pleasing for a digitally hyperconnected society.
First Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Main Pedagogical Institute and then also St. Petersburg University, Carpatho-Rusyn P. D. Lodij spent a quarter of a century teaching philosophy and law in the Russian Empire in the first third of the 19th century. His knowledge of Kant’s philosophy and his attitude to Kant’s criticism are estimated diametrically opposed in the research literature. An analysis of his main philosophical work, “Logical Precepts which Lead to Cognition and the Distinction of the True from the False” (1815), convincingly proves that Lodij was an excellent scholar of Kant’s philosophy. In Russia, he was the first thinker who spoke about the differences between the first and second editions of the “Critique of Pure Reason”. Lodij also was the first who noted both the revolutionary role of Kant’s Copernican turn, and the importance of Humeʼs causality problem for the formation of critical philosophy. In Russia, Lodij was the first who proposed a detailed description of Kant’s transcendental idealism. At the same time, Lodij’s general attitude to Kant was rather skeptical. In his own logic, he does not follow Kant’s division of logic into pure and applied, but he returns to pre-Kant’s split into theoretical and practical logics. Lodij disputes with the basic conclusions about the space derived from the transcendental aesthetic, denies synthetic judgments a priori and the rooting of the cognizing reason in illusions. Despite his unequivocal claims regarding Kant’s philosophy, “Logical Precepts” and its author were persecuted during the so-called “professorsʼ affair” of the 1820s. As a result, Lodij was suspended from teaching philosophy, and his logic textbook was withdrawn from teaching for both “disgrace” and imaginary Kantianism.
Dealing with existential questions is a constitutive part of palliative care. Interestingly, if we admit that borderline situations at the end-of life give rise to clearly philosophical questions, in the contexts of practice, these questions are perceived (nearly) without any reference to explicit philosophical traditions or to Philosophical Practice. Philosophical Practice is a modern movement for a non-elitist philosophy. It aims to enable people—in the Socratic tradition—to reflect on their experiences in a philosophical way in everyday life. In the recently launched research project Philosophical Practice in Palliative Care and Hospice Work, we are investigating the opportunities and limits of Philosophical Practice for the development of death literacy. Building on previous theoretical work, we analyse, discuss, and illustrate concrete models of Philosophical Practice in this chapter. Our conclusions refer to practical indications for relating Philosophical Practice productively to relevant contexts of death literacy development, such as caring communities, Last Aid courses, and everyday ethics.
Knowledge sharing is a key to successful collaboration (online or in presence), and since collaboration is changing due to the increasingly emerging so-called “New Collaboration,” knowledge sharing should adjust accordingly: we call this New Knowledge Sharing. Organizations wishing to exploit the potential of New Collaboration need to understand how the new knowledge sharing and collaboration are related and, in particular, how they proceed, the very steps of their interwoven process. During our previous work, the concept of a Joint Knowledge Base (abbreviated to J.K.B.) emerged and became increasingly prominent as a key to knowledge sharing. Thus, in this paper, we will first revise and elaborate our concept of a J.K.B. in more detail. We will see how, on the one hand, when working on a shared task, each collaborator contributes to its construction and how, on the other, the J.K.B. functions as an interaction bridge, which is why it is a key to knowledge sharing. Secondly, we will describe different opportunities for partners in an interaction (team meeting, workshop, creative session, etc.) to contribute to the creation of a J.K.B. using so-called “Distributed Contribution Tools” (D.C.T.), which are standardized artifact-mediated interaction methods developed by E. Obeng. In particular, this second part will present 6 such D.C.T.s and explain how they contribute to the J.K.B. by means of a socially distributed production.
Angesichts der Frage nach Bildern und Bildpraxen analysiert der Beitrag von Wolfgang Wein aus der Perspektive eines rationalistischen Neukantianismus die Rolle und Funktion von visuellen Begriffen wie Einbildung, Anschauung oder Vorstellung. Dabei geht es vor allem darum, gegen jede Widerspiegelungstheorie die aktive Seite des Sehens herauszuarbeiten, um auch aus Sicht der Evolutionstheorie zu betonen, dass im Sinne des visual turn von der Primordialität des Visuellen auch angesichts von Begriffen auszugehen ist. Insgesamt geht es dabei im Rückgriff auf Kant um eine Grammatik des Sehens.
Today’s physics describes nature from the perspective of one observer at a time. In special (SR) and general relativity (GR), his proper space d1, d2, d3 and his proper time τ are set equal to coordinate space x1, x2, x3 and coordinate time t, respectively. These x1, x2, x3, t span “coordinate spacetime”. Here I show: There is a physical issue in SR/GR, and there is a more powerful concept of spacetime. (1) Rulers and clocks measure di and τ. They are not aware of an observer’s constructs xi and t. Thus, they cannot display xi' and t', which are calculated in SR/GR. (2) SR/GR work well in many respects, but we can describe nature also from the perspective of each observed object. Its d1, d2, d3 and τ span “proper spacetime”, which is equal to 4D Euclidean space (ES) if we interpret cτ as d4. In Euclidean relativity (ER), all energy is moving through ES at the speed of light c. Each observer’s reality is created by projecting ES orthogonally to his proper space d1, d2, d3 and to his proper time τ=d4/c. These four axes are set equal to x1, x2, x3, t in SR/GR and reassembled to a non-Euclidean spacetime. However, the SO(4) symmetry of ES is not compatible with the formation of waves. This is not an issue because waves are a special feature of coordinate spacetime. Only the SO(4) symmetry tells us: What I deem wave, deems itself matter. ER solves 15 fundamental mysteries, such as time’s arrow, the Hubble tension, dark energy, the wave–particle duality, and non-locality. I conclude that proper spacetime improves our understanding of cosmology and quantum mechanics.
The main problem of Plato᾿s Republic and of contemporary Russia is the fusion of the state power and philosophy in order to improve both the state and the individual. The article deals with the problem of widening the logic causing the defacement of sciences and endangering the existence of the state. There is a hidden agenda, a hidden problem: The prepositive widened attribute destroying the “philosophical (logical) syntax” of the Vienna Circle. The article raises the problem of the metaphysics as the spiritual foundation of the European civilization and considers its repudiation by the logical positivists as a knotty problem. The great problem is the evil influence of the logical positivism on the American politics wich is applying the syncretic method of the Vienna Circle. At present, philosophy is not even mentioned among the related disciplines of politics in the sense of state theory (history, state law, international law, sociology, political economy, psychology, ethics). Today there is a necessity that makes philosophers anxious about the state, and the state will have to obey them if it does not want to perish. Philosophy is the valiant guardian of the state, a guarantee of its preservation. It was the absence of this guard that led to the death of the Soviet Union.
In der Wissenschaft sind Erkenntnisziele, aber auch ein spezieller Weltaufschluss angelegt. Diesen zu vermitteln, ist Aufgabe der Wissenschaftsdidaktik. Was aber bedeutet es, Wissenschaft institutionell zu einem Gegenstand des Lehrens und Lernens zu machen? Die Beitragenden des Bandes liefern disziplinenübergreifende Antworten auf diese Frage und beleuchten Wissenschaftsdidaktik aus empirischer, theoretischer, konzeptioneller sowie praktisch-reflexiver Perspektive. Hochschullehrende sowie praktisch und forschend tätige Personen finden hier Zugang zur Wissenschaftsdidaktik und ihren innovativen Erkenntnispotentialen.
The purpose of the study is to improve the concept of the subject of forensic economic examination on the basis of epistemological and empirical approaches in the direction of prevention and detection of economic fraud, taking into account the genesis of its regulatory regulation. It has been proven that the subject of forensic economic examination is the integration of tasks of an investigator or a judge regarding the study of physical evidence and other materials in order to establish factual data and circumstances that are important for pre-trial investigation and court. It is substantiated that it is expedient to consider the subject of forensic economic examination both from the standpoint of the epistemological developments of philosophical science and taking into account the interrelationship of the elements of the process of appointing and conducting a forensic economic examination. A model of understanding the essence of the subject of forensic economic expertise is proposed, which takes into account the processes of its implementation and is aimed at increasing the efficiency of the organization of forensic expertise. To build this model, the epistemological basis laid out by philosophers in the form of a combination of phenomena from the point of view of being and their determination in the perception of the entire process of performing a forensic economic examination was used. This model combines two subject areas: the area of detection of deviations, falsifications, fraud and the area that includes the scope of the performed forensic examination. The scientific value of this research lies in the development of a conceptual model of the subject area of forensic economic expertise, which covers the processes of appointment, organization and methods of conducting a detailed investigation in accordance with the tasks. The practical results of the theorization of the subject of forensic economic examination in the form of a model are the possibility of its application in the structure of the organization of the examination process in order to ensure the unity of the decisions made, including regarding planning, methodology of appointment of procedures for establishing the circumstances of the case on the subject of proof, subject of expert opinion. Awareness of the factors that determine the subject of the examination will make it possible to increase its effectiveness in cases of economic crimes.
Rationality and reason are often used as synonyms, although they are very different concepts. In this article we argue that rationality is the concept of reason that has been stripped of its human elements. Ancient and medieval philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas stressed that the concept of reason is composed of sensitive, discursive, and moral elements. Post-Enlightenment thinkers instead, building on the works of René Descartes and Isaac Newton, took these out and claimed that rationality must be based on an external logic devoid of value-concepts such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim (Koyré in From the closed world to the infinite universe, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1957). The purpose of this essay is to highlight this shift in Western thought and its consequences for management theories. While explaining the ancient concept of reason in contrast with modern rationalism (Klein in: Williamson RB, Zuckerman E (eds) Jacob Klein—lectures and essays, St. John’s College Press, Annapolis, 1985), we aim at raising awareness of the differences between building a research programme (especially in business sciences like economics and management) on rationality or on reason.
How is philosophical knowledge related to the world in which it is produced – and how should it be related? In the article, “world” refers to the whole of historically established, politically contested and materially constituted practices. Three ideal-type relationships are distinguished: affirmatively in the world , negatively against the world , and with the world . The article argues for the latter because it combines the two decisive insights of the first two relationships: the insight into philosophy’s facticity, i. e., it being bound to the world, and the insight into philosophy’s freedom, i. e., that it can, nevertheless, turn against that world. Political epistemology is needed to explicate any philosophy with the world because it holds together, in a productive tension, minimal materialism as the core of the insight into philosophy’s facticity and the irreducibility of thought as the core of the insight into philosophy’s freedom.
Tugendhat’s remarks on religion and mysticism are explored in section 5 and 6 of this paper. To this end I outline, in section 1, the role that the criticism of religion has played from its beginnings in philosophy’s self-understanding and its focus on reasoning, which philosophers opposed to the non-reasoning justification of religion. In section 2, I consider philosophy’s relation to empirical statements and to the empirical sciences; in section 3, I discuss Tugendhat’s substitution of anthropology for metaphysics; and in section 4, his moral theory.
By providing symbolic (operates by means of signs) and intuitive (operates without signs) types of cognition, G.W. Leibniz in the “Reasoning about cognition, truth and ideas” laid the foundation for the problem of visibility discussions in 18th century. Proceeding from Leibniz’s ideas, Chr. Wolff in the “German metaphysics” built a detailed doctrine about figurative and contemplating cognition, giving priority in the field of application and the degree of clarity to the first type. Wolff’s doctrine almost immediately became classic and found a lot of supporters. J.G. Darjes and G.F. Meier moved the metaphysical distinction of cognition distinctions to logic. A.G. Baumgarten in the “Metaphysics” offered a new criterion of symbolic and intuitive cognition distinction. J.N. Tetens scrutinized the opposition of symbolic and contemplating cognition from the point of a priori and a posteriori opposition. J.H. Lambert in the “New Organon” brings the interest back to the figurative cognition.
La hermenéutica contemporánea, en general, ha sostenido una autonomía del texto y se le ha reprochado a Schleiermacher el tener una perspectiva psicologizante. No obstante, en este artículo se pretende mostrar que el fundamento de la prioridad de la "parte psicológica", como la llama Schleiermacher, estriba en que éste concibe la interpretación como una forma de diálogo, en la medida que, desde su perspectiva en todo texto alguien le dice algo a alguien, independientemente de que el intérprete sea o no el destinatario original del texto.
The essay explores in four steps the question of whether the world needs an explanation and how it is to be explained in the case of its need for explanation. The first step argues that the principle of sufficient reason is valid and may be applied to the world as a whole. The three following steps examine different possibilities of explaining the world. It is shown that neither an immanent nor an axiogenetic explanation is possible, but that only an ontotheological explanation has a chance of success.
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