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Thematic Section
Climate Change, Social Justice and Development
TERRY BARKER,
S¸ERBAN SCRIECIU
AND DAVID TAYLOR
ABSTRACT Terry Barker, S¸erban Scrieciu and David Taylor discuss the
implications of climate change for social justice and the prospects for
more sustainable development pathways. They state that the analysis
and discussions surrounding the climate change problem, particularly
those drawing on the traditional economics literature, have relied on
a crude economic utilitarianism that no moral philosopher would
endorse. Such arguments have typically ignored the concept of
justice itself and wider ethical considerations. The authors argue that
climate change is inherently inequitable and inevitably raises ethical
issues. Climate change policy should therefore be informed by moral
philosophy relating to scientific findings with respect to climate
change impacts, rather than just informed by economics in isolation.
Climate stabilization policies should be designed by international
negotiation to support development and they should not jeopardize
the prospects for the well-being of the poor.
KEYWORDS Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; future
generations; equity; development; ethics; moral philosophy
Introduction
Since the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report appeared in
1990, it has been internationally recognized that one consequence of human economic
activity has been the accumulation of greenhouse gases and that this is leading to
climate change. The Fourth Report (IPCC, 2007) is unequivocal in stating that such
change is already adversely affecting development in poor countries, which are most
vulnerable to climate variability, and threatening to undo decades of international, na-
tional and local developmental efforts. If unchecked, it will threaten future generations,
particularly the poor, with unknown but potentially catastrophic climate events. The
danger largely arises from economic factors (although geo-politics also plays a crucial
role), through the desire for ‘modern’ l ifestyles and the ava ilability of coal and unc onven-
tional oil at prices lower than those of carbon-free alternatives. Concentrations of green-
house gases, already the highest for 650,000 years, may be raised to levels not seen for
millions of years.
1
The problem of equity (across social groups living today and across generations)
raised by climate change, and the need for urgent and deep mitigation, are ethical
problems, and should be informed by moral philosophy (drawing on scientific findings
Development, 2008,51, (317–324)
r2008 Society for International Development 1011-6370/08
www.sidint.org/development
Development (2008) 51, 317–324. doi:10.1057/dev.2008.33
with respect to climate change impacts) and not
just by economics in isolation. Nelson (2008)
points out the aversion of traditional economists
to questions of ethics, and explains it as deriving
from ‘a romantic belief in the possibility of
connection-free knowledge from an outside-
of-nature, perspective-free viewpoint’ (Nelson,
2008: 8). In effect, traditional economists adopt a
utilitarianism of a particularly crude kind that
no moral philosopher would be likely to endorse.
2
There is a highly questionable selection and
application of rates for discounting the future,
drawing on an economic ideology that assumes
material consumption to be the sole determinant
of human wellbeing. The philosophical literature,
and indeed the concept of justice itself have
been largely ignored. Whereas Nelson interprets
this literature from a feminist viewpoint, we are
seeking to supplement her analysis with an
alternative treatment of the unacknowledged
ethical dimension as it relates specifically to
development.
Climate change is inherently inequitable and
therefore unjust, because affluent individuals
and groups may avoid much of the consequent
harm by relocation and by other means of private
protection. Moreover, climate change will particu-
larly affect developing countries and regions
located in highly climate sensitive areas and their
inhabitants (IPCC, 2007; UNDP, 2007), most of
them relying on subsistence farming or very low-
income activities with little scope for diversifica-
tion. Climate change will target systematically
and mercilessly the vulnerable, the poor and the
extremely poor. Mitigation of climate change
needs urgent action with a view to alleviating
and not exacerbating intragenerational equity
(within the existi ng generation). C limate stabiliza-
tion policies should be designed by international
negotiation intended to support development; at
least they should not jeopardize the development
process of particularly poor nations.
3
Contrary to
traditional economic thinking, climate policies (if
well-designed) can increase economic growth
measured conventionally by GDP growth,
through accelerating technological change and
utilizing under-employed resources, globally and
nationally (Barker et al., 2008).
Ethics, equity and the economics of
climate change
The implications for new economic thinking
about climate change, justice and development
are often unclear, provisional and tentative com-
pared with the alleged certainties of cherished
traditional, mainstream economic theory (Barker,
2008). Economics is relevant because it helps ex-
plain why human behaviour might lead to climate
change (by ec onomic choices a nd the use of the at-
mosphere for free waste disposal) and it provides
systematic methods for assessing (and monetiz-
ing) the costs and benefits of different activities
and policies. Stern (2007) concludes that ‘the
benefits of strong early action far outweigh
the e conomic c osts of not act ing’and ‘even at mod-
erate levels of warming, all the evidence yshows
that climate change will have serious impacts on
world output, on human life and on the environ-
ment’ (Stern, 2007: xv and xvi). Stern (2007) as-
serts that the economics of climate change are
more appropriately concerned with risk rather
than ret urn, and wit h the development of technol-
ogies for mitigation, both features of the problem
that have been evident from the early 1990s, when
the scientific assessments began in earnest. This
realization itself implies that the economic
problem is one of achieving political targets with
the lowest costs compatible with equity and effec-
tiveness, rather t han with the pol itical and s cienti-
fic problem of choosing the targets themselves.
Ethics considers issues of intergenerational
equity, when climate damages are uncertain and
far in the future. Intrinsic values (non-monetized)
of human suffering and damage to nature, and
risks and uncertainties should be taken into
account as criteria for social choice. Ethics is also
concerned with current intragenerational equity
issues and would advocate that the brunt of miti-
gation action be undertaken by those that have
been historically responsible for the emission and
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere, that is, mainly the developed economies.
The position of developing countries in climate
change mitigation talks has focused on ethics as
a redistributive social justice issue (as opposed
to the developed-country perspective wishing to
Development 51(3): Thematic Section
318
engage developing countries in order to minimize
their own compliance costs). The developing
countries view the atmosphere as a ‘global com-
mons’ public good to which al l a re equa lly e ntitled
and advocate a per capita emission rights-based
solution (Richards, 2003). Nevertheless, though
developed countries need to take the lead in miti-
gation, as they are foremost morally responsible
for creating the problem, developing countries
also need to play an active role in avoiding danger-
ous climate change.
4
Yet again, ethical considera-
tions indicate that the action should not occur at
the expense of development prospects. The strong
implication is that there is a requirement for sys-
tematic and well-targeted human, financial and
technical policies and measures to lead to sustain-
able low-GHG (green house gas) societies that can
reasonably be considered as having higher well-
being than business-as-usual development, for
example by achieving a given target growth
rate, but with lower GHG emissions and improved
urban and domestic air quality, among other
benefits.
Climate cha nge may appear to some to be a rela-
tively insignificant threat or at least a problem dif-
ficult to engage with due to the uncertainty, the
subtlety of interactions between natural systems,
and the very long-term nature of future damages.
However, the scientif icconsensus is that, if left un-
checked, potential damages are very likely to be
catastrophic for our civilization, and particularly
for poor societies less able to adapt, and that the
effects of a changing climate are already being
observed (IPCC, 2007). Climate change is seen
by some leading scientists as the greatest threat
of our days, more serious than that of terrorism
(King, 2004). Nonetheless, even if one may find it
difficult to engage with global challenges affect-
ing future generations or people that have not
been born yet, there is still the more fundamental
problem of what economists refer to as negative
externalities (adverse impacts of economic activ-
ities for which the respective economic agents
are not held accountable) that apply to various
aspects of the complex system of interactions
between economic growth and natural resources.
Within this context, greenhouse gas emissions
are also usually accompanied by local air pollu-
tion with numerous and immediate adverse
effects on ecosystems, human health and well-
being. The necessary climate-change mitigation
will prov ide a major additional b enefit of improved
air quality and enhanced human health. Further-
more, climate change with its potential cata-
strophes may occur more quickly than expected
(WWF, 2008), affecting members of the current
generation to whom we may relate in a more per-
sonal manner, such as our children and grand-
children.
An ethical approach to climate change:
The market view
Before proceeding, let us get rid of some dust that
is thrown in the eyes of anyone inclined to
adopt an ethical approach to climate change.
We are told by conventional, traditional economic
theorists that in effect we should not adopt such
an approach, and should just leave decision-mak-
ing to the market. (This itself is an ethical ap-
proach, although it is a remarkably shallow one.)
We should discount concern for future genera-
tions on the basis of market-interest rates, which
show us how much we actually discount our
money on deposit over a given period of time. If
we do not discount future generations in this way,
and disregard the ‘revealed preferences’ apparent
in present financial markets, then we are flouting
the consumer preferences of our fellow citizens,
showing a lack of respect for democracy, and
adopting a ‘paternalistic view’ (Weitzman, 2007:
707). For instance, Nordhaus (2007) argues that
the choice of discount rates should follow market
data, dismissing the adoption of a near-zero social
discount rate based on ethical reasoning (as in
the Stern review), on the grounds that Stern, for
example,‘takes the lofty vantage point of the world
social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers
of the Br itish emp ire’ (Nordhaus, 2007: 691).
Now let us wipe away this dust from our eyes,
which merely serves the purposes of a free-market
ideology, a nd feel free to be paternalistic in our atti-
tude. Men should be paternalistic and women
should be maternalistic toward their children and
grandchildren, just as all of us should be caring
towards other people, including the young and
Barker et al: Climate Change and Social Justice
319
future generations. And if we care about our
grandchildren, for example, then we shall care, if
we are thoughtful parents, about the feelings that
they will experience and suffer, in their own time,
about their own grandchildren. And so on. Of
course, even the most devoted parent probably
does not care much about distant descendants.
And we cannot add up the feelings of individual
parents to produce a concern for society as a
whole, now or in the future. Nevertheless, we do
care about our families more than about the rate
of interest on our deposit account. Indeed, parents
often care more about their families than about
themselves. Such social facts as these are as real
as anything emphasiz ed in conventional econom-
ic theory. And what about our own generational
status? For each of us is necessarily the child of a
network of thousands of parents. Our uncertainty
is only whether the human race has a future, not
whether it has a past. Would it have been accepta-
ble for our own past, in the form of earlier genera-
tions, to have adopted the kind of casual attitude
to us that traditional economists such as
Nordhaus seem to think that we should adopt to-
ward our own future? A thoughtful parent, like a
thoughtful economist, will care about the kind of
world in which grand children wil l find t hemselves
living. It is not just a matter of t he more immediate
effects of climate change. There is also the matter
of how our grandch ildren wil l be regarde d by their
contemporaries in poorer regions of the world.
The present appalling contrast between developed
and less-developed (particularly least-developed)
countries will only get worse because of climate
change.
An ethical approach to climate change
based on social justice
Moral philosophers have long debated the relative
weighting to be given to the well-being of social
groups living at different times. The Stern Review
commissioned a review of the ethics of climate
change from Broome (2006), who had written ear-
lier on the issue (1992). He argues that economics
is not ethics-free, that basing economics on the
ethics of individuals assumed to be entirely self-
interested can go badly wrong, and that ‘willing-
ness to pay’ is invalid as a means of valuation
(Broome, forthcoming). This directly contradicts
the analysis of Pearce et al. (1996: 196^ 197 ), w h e n
they contrast prescriptive with descriptive valua-
tions of human life. In considering the ethics of
climate change, Broome positions justice centre
stage, arguing that those who cause climate
change should desist from doing so because it is
unjust, and if they think that they cannot desist,
then they should compensate those who suffer.
Justice has always attracted as much serious
attention as utility in the theory of ethics. Rawls
(1971) deserves serious attention in the debate on
climate-change analysis, although he does not
discuss such change in itself. Let us adapt his
theory to this issue. Consider two population
groups: a well-off urban majority, burning fossil
fuels, and a subsistence rural minority, in
danger of losing access to food and water if the
climate changes. Assume that the rural minority
do not share in average global growth; they can
be said, in Rawls’ words, to be the ‘least advan-
taged group’. In his concept of a better society, the
standard of living of the most advantaged would
be justified only if their privileges maximized
the welfare of the least advantaged group, for
example through the general economic effect of
incentives. Let us assume that society is not
influenced by such a Rawlsian concept of justice
^ perhaps it is dominated by neo-classical econo-
mists. We are then left with a triple injustice in
the scenario described:
The rural minority have not been responsible
for the greenhouse gas concentrations causing
climate change, and nor have they benefited
from the comfort and power provided by the
fossil energy services.
The rural minority will suffer the most from cli-
mate change because of droughts and floods,
and cannot buy their way out of the problem.
When traditional approaches to climate policy
ignore the distributional aspect of the harm
caused, global consumption affected by the
harm (including mortality) is discounted by an
average figure dominated by the well-off
majority’s income growth, so the minority’s
future subsistence income counts for less in the
Development 51(3): Thematic Section
320
traditional cost-benefit analysis informing
global climate-change policy.
Since global inequalities over the last century
have b een inc reasing (Mad dison, 2001) a nd a sub -
sistence minority of countries (and social groups
within countries) may continue into the far
future, these assumptions may be more realistic
than those of the traditional model. Rawlsian
ethics would focus social policy on preventing the
climate change and caring for the subsistence
minority in this scenario, instead of the tradi-
tional pol icies, which would have almost t he oppo-
site effect.
The limits to utilitarianism
Broome (2006) also considers expected-utility
theory alongside justice as a guide to social policy.
Importantly, he distinguishes ‘value’ from ‘utility’
and allows for intrinsic value in human life and
in nature. He considers the debased version of
utilitarianism applied to climate change, arguing
first, that lives should not be valued by the method
of willingness-to-pay, which makes the value of
people’s lives depend on how much they ca n afford
to spend on prolonging it, and second, that future
lives should not be discounted in value relative to
present lives of similar quality.
5
The argu ment that because people in the future
are expected to be better off in real money terms,
so that we can then ascribe to their lives or their
health a discounted monetary value, runs into
serious logical and moral problems, which are not
solved by recourse to the term ‘statistical lives’.
Those who rely on the market to provide an esti-
mate of the social discount rate are assuming that
the relevant preferences are fixed, but their proce-
dure is not empirically valid and short-circuits
the political process, in which for example elected
politicians try to lead and change preferences.
They are also assuming that the preferences take
a particular form, in which no ethical preferences
are allowed, although in fact people might prefer
that natural resources be preserved as a matter of
principle, even though they attach no utility to
these resources in themselves. Finally, they are
assuming that natural and man-made assets can
be substituted for each other, that is, that they all
have monetary values and can therefore be
exchanged. Irreversible changes, for example a
warming of the oceans leading to loss of coral
reefs for the indefinite future, mean that such
monetary exchanges are impossible.
There are ethical, aesthetic and other values,
and it seems that all forms of life should not be
simply converted into money, with the exchange-
ability that money permits (Ackerman and Hein-
zerling, 2004; Gowdy, 2005). The use of the
discount rate to account for time preference and
risk should be re-thought to allow for subjective
time preference and a risk analysis independent
of the return (Price, 2005). The distribution of
rights consistent with sustainable development
should be conside red (Padilla, 2004). The anti-uti-
litarian moral philosopher Bernard Williams has
criticized the reductionism of ‘utilitarian thought’
and ‘the device of regarding all interests, ideas, as-
pirations and desires as on the same level, and all
representable as preferences of different degrees
of intensity, perhaps, but otherwise to be treated
alike’ (William s, 1985: 86). He does not b elieve that
someone’s immediate gratification is to be given
the same weight as that same person’s life plan
and hopes for his children, although traditional
economists, with a reverence for market-driven
consume rism, may see William s’ att itude as t ypi-
cal paternalism.
Policy implications
Social choice regarding climate policy involves so-
cial groups, that is,‘stakeholders’, such as govern-
ment, industry, NGOs, civil society and political
parties, in a process of consensus (Ostrom, 1990).
But it also requires information and the force of
law (Heinzerling and Ackerman, 2007). A real
choice requires the equal and simultaneous pre-
sentation of feasible alternatives.When a policy is
the subject of political debate and possible imple-
mentation by government, pol icy advisors consid-
er the benefit that such implementation would
produce in each of various mutually exclusive
possible futures that might follow it, the good
being considered for each group affected over
space and time.
Barker et al: Climate Change and Social Justice
321
The process of developing such information for
the global community for climate change has
been impres sive but erratic and c ontroversial. The
approach to establishing at least the information
base to develop international climate policy is
embodied by the UNFCCC (United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change) and the
IPCC. These bodies have arisen out of the interna-
tional political process, and in their nature they
are in keeping with the need for decentralized
and varied political structures. This process has
brought questions of equity to the fore as wit-
nessed by the crisis in the IPCC’s adoption of the
Second Assessment Report in 1995, which
brought out the neo-classical economists’ insis-
tence on valuing human life on an insurance ba-
sis. The use of values of ‘statistical lives’came into
conflict with a perception that human life at pre-
sent and in the future should be valued equally,
irrespective of income or circumstance, for the
purpose of agreeing international policy. The gov-
ernments of the developing countries arguing
their case for equality prevailed over the expert
economists advising them. It is perfectly feasible
that a consensus approach in international nego-
tiation can help to establish social values in diffi-
cult and controversial areas, such as abatement
of climate change, where the interests of future
generations are to be taken into account. For ex-
ample, the IPCC’s summaries for policymakers
are agreed by all governments explicitly at inter-
national meetings. Nevertheless, a consensus ap-
proach needs to be reached not only through
negotiations at the government level but also
through an iterative process of discussions and
feedbacks between civil society representatives
and policymakers to ensure that the concerns
of the wider society regarding the climate
problem are adequately factored in. The increas-
ing importance of ‘side events’ at UNFCCC
meetings represents progress in this direction.
Social justice, ethics and care for current and
future generations represent fundamental values
that need to be fully accounted for when dealing
with the climate change problem and formulating
mitigation and adaptation policies and measures.
Addressing the climate change challenge, not
only efficiently in an economic sense but also in
an environmentally effective and socially equita-
ble manner, may provide a crucial impetus for
solving deep development inequities and imbal-
ances. New economic thinking, allowing for
induced technological change and observed mar-
ket conditions (under-utilized resources, lack of
information, barriers to action and institutional
inertia), holds out the prospect of replacing
growth strategies at odds with finite world
resources with negotiated international actions
recognizing the need for justice in social develop-
ment and human well-being.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Diana Liverman and Julie Nelson for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Notes
1 http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/co2_data_mlo.html.
2 We adopt a‘new’approach to economics (Boulding,1992), which places more emphasis on social choice and devel-
opment (see Barker,2008, for a discussion).‘Economics is the study of social activity undertaken with its primary
purpose the expectation of reward, which usually involves money, the motivations of such activity and its conse-
quences, both good and bad’ (Barker, 2008: footnote 5). In contrast, the neoclassical economist Robbins (1932: 16)
defined economics as ‘the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses’, asserting that economics is a value-free science.
3 However, climate mitigation implies dealing with conf licting interests, since businesses and economies dependent
on fossil fuels may suffer as emissions are drastically curbed for the sake of future generations. Many of these fu-
ture people will be poor and vulnerable, but many others will be more affluent than the present generation, which
is the one we are asking to make sacrifices. In other words, when interests conflict, the message in ethics is likely
to be mixed (Broome, 2008).
Development 51(3): Thematic Section
322
4 The nort h^south develope d^developing dichotomy has lost some of its sign ificance for c limate change pol icy nego-
tiation with the emergence of affluent social groups within the developing countries. Internationally, the poorest
and most vulnerable countries with low emis sions are applying pressure to large, developing, fast-growing econo-
mies, such as China, India and Braz il, to curb their soaring emissions.
5 The value of the pure rate of time preference can make an order-of-magnitude difference to the monetized costs
of climate change, with high rates of 1.5^3 percent a year as advocated by Nordhaus (2007) reducing far-ahead
damage costs to negligible present values. Broome’s view of the pure rate of time preference (considering only the
futurity of later generations) is supported by the utilitarian philosophers Henry Sidgwick and R.M. Hare and by
the a nt i-ut ilitarian John Rawls. Al l of t hem argue that a rate above z ero cannot be justif ied ethica lly (Rawls,1971:
259^262; Hare,1981: 100^101; Sidgwick,1906).
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