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Climate Change, Social Justice and Development

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Abstract

Terry Barker, Şerban Scrieciu and David Taylor discuss the implications of climate change for social justice and the prospects for more sustainable development pathways. They state that the analysis and discussions surrounding the climate change problem, particularly those drawing on the traditional economics literature, have relied on a crude economic utilitarianism that no moral philosopher would endorse. Such arguments have typically ignored the concept of justice itself and wider ethical considerations. The authors argue that climate change is inherently inequitable and inevitably raises ethical issues. Climate change policy should therefore be informed by moral philosophy relating to scientific findings with respect to climate change impacts, rather than just informed by economics in isolation. Climate stabilization policies should be designed by international negotiation to support development and they should not jeopardize the prospects for the well-being of the poor.
Thematic Section
Climate Change, Social Justice and Development
TERRY BARKER,
S¸ERBAN SCRIECIU
AND DAVID TAYLOR
ABSTRACT Terry Barker, S¸erban Scrieciu and David Taylor discuss the
implications of climate change for social justice and the prospects for
more sustainable development pathways. They state that the analysis
and discussions surrounding the climate change problem, particularly
those drawing on the traditional economics literature, have relied on
a crude economic utilitarianism that no moral philosopher would
endorse. Such arguments have typically ignored the concept of
justice itself and wider ethical considerations. The authors argue that
climate change is inherently inequitable and inevitably raises ethical
issues. Climate change policy should therefore be informed by moral
philosophy relating to scientific findings with respect to climate
change impacts, rather than just informed by economics in isolation.
Climate stabilization policies should be designed by international
negotiation to support development and they should not jeopardize
the prospects for the well-being of the poor.
KEYWORDS Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; future
generations; equity; development; ethics; moral philosophy
Introduction
Since the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report appeared in
1990, it has been internationally recognized that one consequence of human economic
activity has been the accumulation of greenhouse gases and that this is leading to
climate change. The Fourth Report (IPCC, 2007) is unequivocal in stating that such
change is already adversely affecting development in poor countries, which are most
vulnerable to climate variability, and threatening to undo decades of international, na-
tional and local developmental efforts. If unchecked, it will threaten future generations,
particularly the poor, with unknown but potentially catastrophic climate events. The
danger largely arises from economic factors (although geo-politics also plays a crucial
role), through the desire for ‘modern’ l ifestyles and the ava ilability of coal and unc onven-
tional oil at prices lower than those of carbon-free alternatives. Concentrations of green-
house gases, already the highest for 650,000 years, may be raised to levels not seen for
millions of years.
1
The problem of equity (across social groups living today and across generations)
raised by climate change, and the need for urgent and deep mitigation, are ethical
problems, and should be informed by moral philosophy (drawing on scientific findings
Development, 2008,51, (317–324)
r2008 Society for International Development 1011-6370/08
www.sidint.org/development
Development (2008) 51, 317–324. doi:10.1057/dev.2008.33
with respect to climate change impacts) and not
just by economics in isolation. Nelson (2008)
points out the aversion of traditional economists
to questions of ethics, and explains it as deriving
from ‘a romantic belief in the possibility of
connection-free knowledge from an outside-
of-nature, perspective-free viewpoint’ (Nelson,
2008: 8). In effect, traditional economists adopt a
utilitarianism of a particularly crude kind that
no moral philosopher would be likely to endorse.
2
There is a highly questionable selection and
application of rates for discounting the future,
drawing on an economic ideology that assumes
material consumption to be the sole determinant
of human wellbeing. The philosophical literature,
and indeed the concept of justice itself have
been largely ignored. Whereas Nelson interprets
this literature from a feminist viewpoint, we are
seeking to supplement her analysis with an
alternative treatment of the unacknowledged
ethical dimension as it relates specifically to
development.
Climate change is inherently inequitable and
therefore unjust, because affluent individuals
and groups may avoid much of the consequent
harm by relocation and by other means of private
protection. Moreover, climate change will particu-
larly affect developing countries and regions
located in highly climate sensitive areas and their
inhabitants (IPCC, 2007; UNDP, 2007), most of
them relying on subsistence farming or very low-
income activities with little scope for diversifica-
tion. Climate change will target systematically
and mercilessly the vulnerable, the poor and the
extremely poor. Mitigation of climate change
needs urgent action with a view to alleviating
and not exacerbating intragenerational equity
(within the existi ng generation). C limate stabiliza-
tion policies should be designed by international
negotiation intended to support development; at
least they should not jeopardize the development
process of particularly poor nations.
3
Contrary to
traditional economic thinking, climate policies (if
well-designed) can increase economic growth
measured conventionally by GDP growth,
through accelerating technological change and
utilizing under-employed resources, globally and
nationally (Barker et al., 2008).
Ethics, equity and the economics of
climate change
The implications for new economic thinking
about climate change, justice and development
are often unclear, provisional and tentative com-
pared with the alleged certainties of cherished
traditional, mainstream economic theory (Barker,
2008). Economics is relevant because it helps ex-
plain why human behaviour might lead to climate
change (by ec onomic choices a nd the use of the at-
mosphere for free waste disposal) and it provides
systematic methods for assessing (and monetiz-
ing) the costs and benefits of different activities
and policies. Stern (2007) concludes that ‘the
benefits of strong early action far outweigh
the e conomic c osts of not act ing’and ‘even at mod-
erate levels of warming, all the evidence yshows
that climate change will have serious impacts on
world output, on human life and on the environ-
ment’ (Stern, 2007: xv and xvi). Stern (2007) as-
serts that the economics of climate change are
more appropriately concerned with risk rather
than ret urn, and wit h the development of technol-
ogies for mitigation, both features of the problem
that have been evident from the early 1990s, when
the scientific assessments began in earnest. This
realization itself implies that the economic
problem is one of achieving political targets with
the lowest costs compatible with equity and effec-
tiveness, rather t han with the pol itical and s cienti-
fic problem of choosing the targets themselves.
Ethics considers issues of intergenerational
equity, when climate damages are uncertain and
far in the future. Intrinsic values (non-monetized)
of human suffering and damage to nature, and
risks and uncertainties should be taken into
account as criteria for social choice. Ethics is also
concerned with current intragenerational equity
issues and would advocate that the brunt of miti-
gation action be undertaken by those that have
been historically responsible for the emission and
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere, that is, mainly the developed economies.
The position of developing countries in climate
change mitigation talks has focused on ethics as
a redistributive social justice issue (as opposed
to the developed-country perspective wishing to
Development 51(3): Thematic Section
318
engage developing countries in order to minimize
their own compliance costs). The developing
countries view the atmosphere as a ‘global com-
mons’ public good to which al l a re equa lly e ntitled
and advocate a per capita emission rights-based
solution (Richards, 2003). Nevertheless, though
developed countries need to take the lead in miti-
gation, as they are foremost morally responsible
for creating the problem, developing countries
also need to play an active role in avoiding danger-
ous climate change.
4
Yet again, ethical considera-
tions indicate that the action should not occur at
the expense of development prospects. The strong
implication is that there is a requirement for sys-
tematic and well-targeted human, financial and
technical policies and measures to lead to sustain-
able low-GHG (green house gas) societies that can
reasonably be considered as having higher well-
being than business-as-usual development, for
example by achieving a given target growth
rate, but with lower GHG emissions and improved
urban and domestic air quality, among other
benefits.
Climate cha nge may appear to some to be a rela-
tively insignificant threat or at least a problem dif-
ficult to engage with due to the uncertainty, the
subtlety of interactions between natural systems,
and the very long-term nature of future damages.
However, the scientif icconsensus is that, if left un-
checked, potential damages are very likely to be
catastrophic for our civilization, and particularly
for poor societies less able to adapt, and that the
effects of a changing climate are already being
observed (IPCC, 2007). Climate change is seen
by some leading scientists as the greatest threat
of our days, more serious than that of terrorism
(King, 2004). Nonetheless, even if one may find it
difficult to engage with global challenges affect-
ing future generations or people that have not
been born yet, there is still the more fundamental
problem of what economists refer to as negative
externalities (adverse impacts of economic activ-
ities for which the respective economic agents
are not held accountable) that apply to various
aspects of the complex system of interactions
between economic growth and natural resources.
Within this context, greenhouse gas emissions
are also usually accompanied by local air pollu-
tion with numerous and immediate adverse
effects on ecosystems, human health and well-
being. The necessary climate-change mitigation
will prov ide a major additional b enefit of improved
air quality and enhanced human health. Further-
more, climate change with its potential cata-
strophes may occur more quickly than expected
(WWF, 2008), affecting members of the current
generation to whom we may relate in a more per-
sonal manner, such as our children and grand-
children.
An ethical approach to climate change:
The market view
Before proceeding, let us get rid of some dust that
is thrown in the eyes of anyone inclined to
adopt an ethical approach to climate change.
We are told by conventional, traditional economic
theorists that in effect we should not adopt such
an approach, and should just leave decision-mak-
ing to the market. (This itself is an ethical ap-
proach, although it is a remarkably shallow one.)
We should discount concern for future genera-
tions on the basis of market-interest rates, which
show us how much we actually discount our
money on deposit over a given period of time. If
we do not discount future generations in this way,
and disregard the ‘revealed preferences’ apparent
in present financial markets, then we are flouting
the consumer preferences of our fellow citizens,
showing a lack of respect for democracy, and
adopting a ‘paternalistic view’ (Weitzman, 2007:
707). For instance, Nordhaus (2007) argues that
the choice of discount rates should follow market
data, dismissing the adoption of a near-zero social
discount rate based on ethical reasoning (as in
the Stern review), on the grounds that Stern, for
example,‘takes the lofty vantage point of the world
social planner, perhaps stoking the dying embers
of the Br itish emp ire (Nordhaus, 2007: 691).
Now let us wipe away this dust from our eyes,
which merely serves the purposes of a free-market
ideology, a nd feel free to be paternalistic in our atti-
tude. Men should be paternalistic and women
should be maternalistic toward their children and
grandchildren, just as all of us should be caring
towards other people, including the young and
Barker et al: Climate Change and Social Justice
319
future generations. And if we care about our
grandchildren, for example, then we shall care, if
we are thoughtful parents, about the feelings that
they will experience and suffer, in their own time,
about their own grandchildren. And so on. Of
course, even the most devoted parent probably
does not care much about distant descendants.
And we cannot add up the feelings of individual
parents to produce a concern for society as a
whole, now or in the future. Nevertheless, we do
care about our families more than about the rate
of interest on our deposit account. Indeed, parents
often care more about their families than about
themselves. Such social facts as these are as real
as anything emphasiz ed in conventional econom-
ic theory. And what about our own generational
status? For each of us is necessarily the child of a
network of thousands of parents. Our uncertainty
is only whether the human race has a future, not
whether it has a past. Would it have been accepta-
ble for our own past, in the form of earlier genera-
tions, to have adopted the kind of casual attitude
to us that traditional economists such as
Nordhaus seem to think that we should adopt to-
ward our own future? A thoughtful parent, like a
thoughtful economist, will care about the kind of
world in which grand children wil l find t hemselves
living. It is not just a matter of t he more immediate
effects of climate change. There is also the matter
of how our grandch ildren wil l be regarde d by their
contemporaries in poorer regions of the world.
The present appalling contrast between developed
and less-developed (particularly least-developed)
countries will only get worse because of climate
change.
An ethical approach to climate change
based on social justice
Moral philosophers have long debated the relative
weighting to be given to the well-being of social
groups living at different times. The Stern Review
commissioned a review of the ethics of climate
change from Broome (2006), who had written ear-
lier on the issue (1992). He argues that economics
is not ethics-free, that basing economics on the
ethics of individuals assumed to be entirely self-
interested can go badly wrong, and that ‘willing-
ness to pay’ is invalid as a means of valuation
(Broome, forthcoming). This directly contradicts
the analysis of Pearce et al. (1996: 196^ 197 ), w h e n
they contrast prescriptive with descriptive valua-
tions of human life. In considering the ethics of
climate change, Broome positions justice centre
stage, arguing that those who cause climate
change should desist from doing so because it is
unjust, and if they think that they cannot desist,
then they should compensate those who suffer.
Justice has always attracted as much serious
attention as utility in the theory of ethics. Rawls
(1971) deserves serious attention in the debate on
climate-change analysis, although he does not
discuss such change in itself. Let us adapt his
theory to this issue. Consider two population
groups: a well-off urban majority, burning fossil
fuels, and a subsistence rural minority, in
danger of losing access to food and water if the
climate changes. Assume that the rural minority
do not share in average global growth; they can
be said, in Rawls’ words, to be the ‘least advan-
taged group’. In his concept of a better society, the
standard of living of the most advantaged would
be justified only if their privileges maximized
the welfare of the least advantaged group, for
example through the general economic effect of
incentives. Let us assume that society is not
influenced by such a Rawlsian concept of justice
^ perhaps it is dominated by neo-classical econo-
mists. We are then left with a triple injustice in
the scenario described:
The rural minority have not been responsible
for the greenhouse gas concentrations causing
climate change, and nor have they benefited
from the comfort and power provided by the
fossil energy services.
The rural minority will suffer the most from cli-
mate change because of droughts and floods,
and cannot buy their way out of the problem.
When traditional approaches to climate policy
ignore the distributional aspect of the harm
caused, global consumption affected by the
harm (including mortality) is discounted by an
average figure dominated by the well-off
majority’s income growth, so the minority’s
future subsistence income counts for less in the
Development 51(3): Thematic Section
320
traditional cost-benefit analysis informing
global climate-change policy.
Since global inequalities over the last century
have b een inc reasing (Mad dison, 2001) a nd a sub -
sistence minority of countries (and social groups
within countries) may continue into the far
future, these assumptions may be more realistic
than those of the traditional model. Rawlsian
ethics would focus social policy on preventing the
climate change and caring for the subsistence
minority in this scenario, instead of the tradi-
tional pol icies, which would have almost t he oppo-
site effect.
The limits to utilitarianism
Broome (2006) also considers expected-utility
theory alongside justice as a guide to social policy.
Importantly, he distinguishes ‘value from ‘utility’
and allows for intrinsic value in human life and
in nature. He considers the debased version of
utilitarianism applied to climate change, arguing
first, that lives should not be valued by the method
of willingness-to-pay, which makes the value of
people’s lives depend on how much they ca n afford
to spend on prolonging it, and second, that future
lives should not be discounted in value relative to
present lives of similar quality.
5
The argu ment that because people in the future
are expected to be better off in real money terms,
so that we can then ascribe to their lives or their
health a discounted monetary value, runs into
serious logical and moral problems, which are not
solved by recourse to the term ‘statistical lives’.
Those who rely on the market to provide an esti-
mate of the social discount rate are assuming that
the relevant preferences are fixed, but their proce-
dure is not empirically valid and short-circuits
the political process, in which for example elected
politicians try to lead and change preferences.
They are also assuming that the preferences take
a particular form, in which no ethical preferences
are allowed, although in fact people might prefer
that natural resources be preserved as a matter of
principle, even though they attach no utility to
these resources in themselves. Finally, they are
assuming that natural and man-made assets can
be substituted for each other, that is, that they all
have monetary values and can therefore be
exchanged. Irreversible changes, for example a
warming of the oceans leading to loss of coral
reefs for the indefinite future, mean that such
monetary exchanges are impossible.
There are ethical, aesthetic and other values,
and it seems that all forms of life should not be
simply converted into money, with the exchange-
ability that money permits (Ackerman and Hein-
zerling, 2004; Gowdy, 2005). The use of the
discount rate to account for time preference and
risk should be re-thought to allow for subjective
time preference and a risk analysis independent
of the return (Price, 2005). The distribution of
rights consistent with sustainable development
should be conside red (Padilla, 2004). The anti-uti-
litarian moral philosopher Bernard Williams has
criticized the reductionism of ‘utilitarian thought’
and ‘the device of regarding all interests, ideas, as-
pirations and desires as on the same level, and all
representable as preferences of different degrees
of intensity, perhaps, but otherwise to be treated
alike’ (William s, 1985: 86). He does not b elieve that
someone’s immediate gratification is to be given
the same weight as that same person’s life plan
and hopes for his children, although traditional
economists, with a reverence for market-driven
consume rism, may see William s’ att itude as t ypi-
cal paternalism.
Policy implications
Social choice regarding climate policy involves so-
cial groups, that is,stakeholders’, such as govern-
ment, industry, NGOs, civil society and political
parties, in a process of consensus (Ostrom, 1990).
But it also requires information and the force of
law (Heinzerling and Ackerman, 2007). A real
choice requires the equal and simultaneous pre-
sentation of feasible alternatives.When a policy is
the subject of political debate and possible imple-
mentation by government, pol icy advisors consid-
er the benefit that such implementation would
produce in each of various mutually exclusive
possible futures that might follow it, the good
being considered for each group affected over
space and time.
Barker et al: Climate Change and Social Justice
321
The process of developing such information for
the global community for climate change has
been impres sive but erratic and c ontroversial. The
approach to establishing at least the information
base to develop international climate policy is
embodied by the UNFCCC (United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change) and the
IPCC. These bodies have arisen out of the interna-
tional political process, and in their nature they
are in keeping with the need for decentralized
and varied political structures. This process has
brought questions of equity to the fore as wit-
nessed by the crisis in the IPCC’s adoption of the
Second Assessment Report in 1995, which
brought out the neo-classical economists’ insis-
tence on valuing human life on an insurance ba-
sis. The use of values of ‘statistical lives’came into
conflict with a perception that human life at pre-
sent and in the future should be valued equally,
irrespective of income or circumstance, for the
purpose of agreeing international policy. The gov-
ernments of the developing countries arguing
their case for equality prevailed over the expert
economists advising them. It is perfectly feasible
that a consensus approach in international nego-
tiation can help to establish social values in diffi-
cult and controversial areas, such as abatement
of climate change, where the interests of future
generations are to be taken into account. For ex-
ample, the IPCC’s summaries for policymakers
are agreed by all governments explicitly at inter-
national meetings. Nevertheless, a consensus ap-
proach needs to be reached not only through
negotiations at the government level but also
through an iterative process of discussions and
feedbacks between civil society representatives
and policymakers to ensure that the concerns
of the wider society regarding the climate
problem are adequately factored in. The increas-
ing importance of side events’ at UNFCCC
meetings represents progress in this direction.
Social justice, ethics and care for current and
future generations represent fundamental values
that need to be fully accounted for when dealing
with the climate change problem and formulating
mitigation and adaptation policies and measures.
Addressing the climate change challenge, not
only efficiently in an economic sense but also in
an environmentally effective and socially equita-
ble manner, may provide a crucial impetus for
solving deep development inequities and imbal-
ances. New economic thinking, allowing for
induced technological change and observed mar-
ket conditions (under-utilized resources, lack of
information, barriers to action and institutional
inertia), holds out the prospect of replacing
growth strategies at odds with finite world
resources with negotiated international actions
recognizing the need for justice in social develop-
ment and human well-being.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Diana Liverman and Julie Nelson for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Notes
1 http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/co2_data_mlo.html.
2 We adopt a‘new’approach to economics (Boulding,1992), which places more emphasis on social choice and devel-
opment (see Barker,2008, for a discussion).‘Economics is the study of social activity undertaken with its primary
purpose the expectation of reward, which usually involves money, the motivations of such activity and its conse-
quences, both good and bad’ (Barker, 2008: footnote 5). In contrast, the neoclassical economist Robbins (1932: 16)
defined economics as ‘the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses’, asserting that economics is a value-free science.
3 However, climate mitigation implies dealing with conf licting interests, since businesses and economies dependent
on fossil fuels may suffer as emissions are drastically curbed for the sake of future generations. Many of these fu-
ture people will be poor and vulnerable, but many others will be more affluent than the present generation, which
is the one we are asking to make sacrifices. In other words, when interests conflict, the message in ethics is likely
to be mixed (Broome, 2008).
Development 51(3): Thematic Section
322
4 The nort h^south develope d^developing dichotomy has lost some of its sign ificance for c limate change pol icy nego-
tiation with the emergence of affluent social groups within the developing countries. Internationally, the poorest
and most vulnerable countries with low emis sions are applying pressure to large, developing, fast-growing econo-
mies, such as China, India and Braz il, to curb their soaring emissions.
5 The value of the pure rate of time preference can make an order-of-magnitude difference to the monetized costs
of climate change, with high rates of 1.5^3 percent a year as advocated by Nordhaus (2007) reducing far-ahead
damage costs to negligible present values. Broome’s view of the pure rate of time preference (considering only the
futurity of later generations) is supported by the utilitarian philosophers Henry Sidgwick and R.M. Hare and by
the a nt i-ut ilitarian John Rawls. Al l of t hem argue that a rate above z ero cannot be justif ied ethica lly (Rawls,1971:
259^262; Hare,1981: 100^101; Sidgwick,1906).
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... Climate change represents a global collective action problem with causes and effects unevenly distributed geographically and across generations. This implies differentiated responsibilities for action and a central role for ethics and social justice in determining responses (Barker et al., 2008). This chapter seeks to examine social justice as a critical component of low carbon development across scales. ...
... There is also potential to implement low carbon development that specifically tackles poverty, inequality and equity, such as health benefits gained from widening access to clean energy or providing payments to incentivize forest protection among indigenous peoples (Haines et al., 2007; Kok et al., 2008; Angelsen et al., 2012). Second, there are moral and ethical issues around developing a low carbon development approach that seeks to impose greenhouse gas mitigation on developing countries that have historically done little to cause the climate change problem (Najam, 2005; Page, 2006; Barker et al., 2008; Roberts and Parks, 2006). This is particularly the case for low income countries that not only have a legacy of low emissions but are also unlikely to make a major contribution to global emissions rises in the near future (UNDP, 2007). ...
... Developing a common normative framework for balancing low carbon objectives with those of development objectives, equality and fairness remains a key challenge. A process of deliberation and negotiation among stakeholders on a common vision for socially just, low carbon development is therefore itself an important goal (Barker et al., 2008). Social justice considerations are crucial for low carbon development both because of: @BULLET The instrumental rationale of promoting sustainability and climate stability in order to make progress on improving human welfare. ...
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Chapter available at: https://books.google.ca/books?id=_Ci-0HlKVjcC&pg=PT68&dq=info:kHdGADcunoIJ:scholar.google.com&lr=&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false The shift to low carbon development implies winners and losers. This chapter explores some of the different dimensions and interpretations of equity and social justice in the context of climate change and development. It initially examines the dominant application of social justice through the lens of equity within global mitigation agreements. Using examples drawn from Ghana’s low carbon development planning processes, the chapter then demonstrates how greater attention is required to the consideration of social justice in decision making and implementation of low carbon development at national level.
... Climate change impacts are not spread equally across societies but rather hurt the vulnerable and the poor disproportionately, since affluent individuals and groups can adapt to the changing climate more easily (Barker et al., 2008; Comim, 2008). Since carbon trading is ineffective in addressing climate change, it necessarily follows that it aggravates climate injustices. ...
Thesis
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Carbon trading, as a market-based climate policy that allows polluters to comply with emissions reductions commitments with tradable pollution rights, is presented by its proponents as the most cost-efficient alternative for climate change mitigation, while critics counter that the cost-efficiency argument ignores the harms that result from commodifying carbon. This thesis contributes to this debate, which is fundamental for the future of environmental policies, by exposing the social costs of carbon trading and making the case against its inclusion in the climate policy-mix. The argument developed here draws from theoretical contributions on the social costs of private activities and on value conflicts, as well as critical perspectives on the neoliberalization of nature and the limits of the market. Emissions trading was firstly proposed as an alternative to efficiency-maximizing or pigouvian environmental taxation. Based on the property rights approach to social costs, emissions trading would allow regulators to escape the impossible task of calculating the optimal level of pollution and offer instead a cost-efficient way to achieve an exogenously determined level of pollution. This theoretical shift would allow economics to be centred on discussing the best means to achieve given ends and relived it of discussing ends. The ends-means dichotomy, however, does not hold outside textbook economics, as well as the description of emissions trading as a simple and efficient alternative to direct regulation. As the US experience with emissions trading shows, creating markets for tradable pollution rights requires government investment in a regulatory apparatus that is no less complex than what is required for direct regulation or taxation. This experience also illustrates how the purported efficiency of emissions trading systems is a flip side of their weak environmental performance and their disregard for social justice and democratic participation. Carbon trading schemes created under the Kyoto Protocol raise additional problems. Compared to “cap and trade” schemes based on a single pollutant and a restricted number of sources, schemes like the EU Emissions Trading System are more complex and require further government intervention. Furthermore, flexibility instruments like the Clean Development Mechanism allow industrialized countries to pollute beyond their emissions commitments and raise issues with the disputable integrity of methodologies that account for emissions reductions from offset projects relative to an arbitrary baseline. The dismal performance of these schemes is illustrated by their inability to provide an incentive to decarbonization, while distributing rents to polluters and creating new sources of corruption. These issues are not reducible to discussions on accounting procedures and other technicalities. Opening the “black box” of carbon quantification and commensuration reveals that its calculations sideline relevant uncertainties and assume a degree of accuracy that scientific knowledge and technology cannot deliver in the present. Yet, since accounting for emissions increases or reductions requires political decisions on what is to be accounted for, what is the relevant metric and what is an acceptable degree of uncertainty, further scientific and technological developments are not enough to make it possible to produce the unambiguous numbers that carbon trading requires. Going further on the discussion of the implications of carbon commensuration and abstraction, this thesis presents an argument against the inclusion of carbon trading in the climate policy-mix based on four normative critiques. With the support of critical literature, it is argued that carbon trading is ineffective, undemocratic, unjust and unethical and that, for these reasons, it can only be considered as a cost-effective policy when its social costs are ignored. An argument against carbon trading reformism is then presented by illustrating how trying to mitigate the negative effects of carbon markets by imposing restrictions on trading leads to the erosion of these markets. A better alternative is claimed to be supporting climate policies that foster a plurality of values and deliver social benefits. The thesis concludes by advocating a shift in the climate policy debate to a discussion on the values that are fostered or hindered by each policy. A general framework is proposed that respects value pluralism and acknowledges conflicts between incommensurable values, which is not compatible with market-based policies.
... In fact, it is even worse: the articles here suggest that attempts at governing climate change actually add insult to injury by not involving the most vulnerable, by not solving their issues, and thereby potentially increasing differences in society while increasing vulnerability. We join the call of others (see, e.g., Paavola and Adger 2006, Barker et al. 2008, Pelling 2011) for greater insight in methods of concretely remedying this situation. For example, best practices could be studied about methods for effective involvement and empowerment of the most vulnerable groups. ...
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The governance of climate adaptation involves the collective efforts of multiple societal actors to address problems, or to reap the benefits, associated with impacts of climate change. Governing involves the creation of institutions, rules and organizations, and the selection of normative principles to guide problem solution and institution building. We argue that actors involved in governing climate change adaptation, as climate change governance regimes evolve, inevitably must engage in making choices, for instance on problem definitions, jurisdictional levels, on modes of governance and policy instruments, and on the timing of interventions. Yet little is known about how and why these choices are made in practice, and how such choices affect the outcomes of our efforts to govern adaptation. In this introduction we review the current state of evidence and the specific contribution of the articles published in this Special Feature, which are aimed at bringing greater clarity in these matters, and thereby informing both governance theory and practice. Collectively, the contributing papers suggest that the way issues are defined has important consequences for the support for governance interventions, and their effectiveness. The articles suggest that currently the emphasis in adaptation governance is on the local and regional levels, while underscoring the benefits of interventions and governance at higher jurisdictional levels in terms of visioning and scaling-up effective approaches. The articles suggest that there is a central role of government agencies in leading governance interventions to address spillover effects, to provide public goods, and to promote the long-term perspectives for planning. They highlight the issue of justice in the governance of adaptation showing how governance measures have wide distributional consequences, including the potential to amplify existing inequalities, access to resources, or generating new injustices through distribution of risks. For several of these findings, future research directions are suggested.
... Equity and ethics are at the core of climate change; any policy action must be informed by moral philosophy. So far, both scientists and economists have revealed a remarkable aversion towards responding to ethical questions related to climate change (Barker et al. 2008). In general, the poor also have less voice in shaping climate negotiations, although climate change itself is likely to accentuate the gaps between the rich and the poor, globally, regionally and nationally. ...
... Consumer theory needs to acknowledge: Finally, when a strong sustainable consumption perspective is accepted, the required changes in lifestyles and values can be achieved only by abandoning utilitarianism as the sole moral theory underpinning economic and political actions. Utilitarianism, and in particular preference utilitarianism, does not help address the main ethical issues raised by sustainability concerns (Barker et al., 2008): equity, across social groups living today and across generations; moral accountability in case of uncertainty and risk (for example in the case of controversial forecasts on the effects of global warming), as assumed instead by the precautionary principle endorsed by Jonas' imperative of responsibility; the upholding of human rights; the recognition of the intrinsic value of human life and nature; the recognition of the rights of nature; choice problems in case of trade-offs between different policy options and redistributive problems. Given these shortcomings of utilitarianism innovative policies for the promotion of sustainability need to be based on different ethical foundations, such as deontological and virtue-based theories. ...
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Responsible food consumption may play an important role in the broad framework of policies aimed at improving food system sustainability. The paper introduces to the concept of sustainable food consumption, analysing factors hindering responsible consumer behaviours and suggesting corrective policies. Three main obstacles to sustainable food consumption were identified: the rebound effect; the Knowledge-to-action gap; the Behaviour-impact-gap problem; the "double dividend", i.e. the opposition between weak and strong sustainable consumption. In order to remove such obstacles public policies should include a balanced mix between command-and-control, market-based instruments, and education and information campaigns. Moreover, a change in the ethical principles currently shaping economic theory and consumer behaviour should take place, substituting utilitarianism with deontological and intrinsic-value based moral theories.
Article
Southeast Asian governments have maintained “energy self‐reliance” and “energy security” as essential rationales of their macroeconomic policy. Since the availability of energy remains necessary for unabated domestic growth and development, the pursuit for “alternative” sources of energy and the resolve to build sustainable energy systems are constant priorities. Informed by the literature on policy discourse, this article draws attention to the analytical use and significance of policy discourse as a means to examine sustainable energy policies in Southeast Asia, which dominantly adopted an economic lens for “energy supply security.” Policy documents were examined to show the congruence and variation of policy discourses that prompted the governments of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore to institutionalize sustainable energy development from 2000 to 2016—a critical period for the institutionalization of sustainable energy in the region, when domestic renewable energy sectors and systems were simultaneously being established by these governments.
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This paper has exhibits that super urban areas in India are stood up to by immense ecological difficulties concerning waste, vitality utilization, water contamination and access and environmental change is adding new instabilities to existing difficulties. Taking environmental change and its going with instabilities could offer a probability to rethink Indian urban fates in a way that is more feasible. There is additionally an uncontested conviction that 'urbanization is what's to come'. Such a conviction is utilized to legitimize all types of natural modernization, relocations and changing area use designs. It likewise prompts suppositions which make nature subservient to mechanical issues. In the Indian connection, calls the blind aping of the thought that 'urban is great' bolstered by free market monetary thoughts. This paper is an investigation of environmental exchange communication in urban India. It proposes that the processes being enunciated to manipulate atmosphere issues are prefaced on incremental modifications instead of radical re-arranging of Indian urban areas. The paper tries to ask with recognize to what clarifies this incremental methodology. Is the threat of environmental trade essentially including similarly measurements to existing urban worries or does it offer a technique to re-evaluate recurring methodologies in the direction of coping with urban ecological emergencies and within the technique increase new preparations of improvements, flair, energy development furthermore standardizing remainders and needs? How are environmental change challenges stimulated by means of issues, as an instance, legislative problems, political economic system, magnificence and imbalance? The paper first blueprints the national putting around the scenery of world patterns. It then spotlights on unique environmental alternate talks in Delhi and Mumbai before swinging to take a gander at particular areas such a car, vitality, waste, water and calamities. It finally ends up with precise mirrored image and a future examination plan. The experience of most recent two decades plainly demonstrates that India is quickly moving towards more prominent urbanization. Present developing type of urbanization is getting so weaved with the idea of monetary development that social and biological inquiries and difficulties are step by step getting decoupled in India's approach needs. Managing environmental change challenges requires deliberate endeavours at all levels, natural, social, financial, institutional and political.
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Global climate change and its consequences have led to a wide-ranging re-evaluation process in political and business circles. Two prominent reports––the Stern Review from 2006 and the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007)––underscore the fact that the impact of global warming can no longer be contained at an acceptable level unless emissions are reduced dramatically. Hence, the pressure to act is quite high: comprehensive technical, political and societal innovations have to be implemented within a very short timeframe at global, regional and local levels. But this can only happen if a fundamental re-orientation also takes place within society. At the same time, and due to recent economic crises, sustainable forms of entrepreneurship have returned to the public agenda. One promising form of sustainable social and economic organisation is the cooperative (Genossenschaft): for their members, cooperatives represent an opportunity to shape their local communities and environments while sharing resources, knowledge and economic power to their benefit. With a rising number of new cooperatives in the sectors of energy/water, housing/construction, consumption and mobility explicitly referring to climate protection, climate-related activities, in turn, have the potential to inject new life into the cooperative movement and to provide innovative, collective approaches to local climate governance. This following article analyses and discusses the current and potential future roles of cooperatives in the development of local, climate-friendly governance strategies. After a short description of the concept of local climate governance and an introductory definition of cooperatives, the authors will outline research gaps in both fields, and finish with some thoughts on the future role of cooperatives. In addition, the authors aim to make a substantial contribution to discussions about the importance of the role of bottom-up strategies in the transition towards a climate-friendly society.
Article
The paper investigates the causes of the lack of interest of food policy towards the issue of climate change. In the first section, food policy is scrutinized stemming from some recent contributions of the two related strains of literature on food regime and on private food governance. It is shown that over the last twenty years food policy has been dictated more by neoliberal ideology and corporate power than by ethical concerns over human societies and environmental well-being. The second section analyzes the main obstacles which hinder the implementation of food policies able to contrast climate change. The main conclusion of the paper is that in order to have a climate-friendly food policy it is necessary not only to oppose the economic and political power of corporations but also to challenge neoliberalism on theoretical ground.
Article
Supporting adaptation to climate change in poor vulnerable countries is an ethical and legal obligation that arises from the very uneven distribution of responsibility for and vulnerability to climate change. A fair global regime for adaptation funding is needed where contributions are determined by the economic capability of countries and by their responsibility for climate change. Payments from the fund would depend on the biophysical and socio-economic vulnerability of countries, and developing countries would need to have a strong voice in all decisions. Recent estimates of the adaptation needs of developing countries are in the range of US $70–100 billion per year for the public sector. Adaptation funding needs to be additional to the current and promised level of official development assistance. Because of the strong links between adaptation and general development co-operation, a broad definition of eligible adaptation measures should initially be used. Co-funding of measures with large co-benefits independent of climate change appears justified in the case of recipient countries with sufficient capability. Climate-sensitive sectors where adaptation is particularly urgent include water supply, agriculture, coastal protection, and disaster risk management. Where adaptation in situ is not effectively possible, support needs to be provided for the managed relocation of affected populations. Industrialised countries need to quickly provide substantial financial resources for adaptation in poor countries to support urgently needed adaptation measures and to rebuild trust in the international climate negotiations.
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The problem of avoiding dangerous climate change requires analysis from many disciplines. Mainstream economic thinking about the problem has shifted after the Stern Review from a single-discipline focus on cost-benefit analysis to a more inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary risk analysis, already evident in the IPCC?s Assessment Reports. This shift is more evidence of the failure of the traditional, equilibrium approach in general to provide an adequate understanding of observed behaviour, either at the micro or macro scale. The economics of the Stern Review has been accepted by governments and the public as mainstream economic thinking on climate change, when in some critical respects it represents a radical departure from the traditional treatment. The conclusions regarding economic policy for climate change have shifted from ?do little, later? to ?take strong action urgently, before it is too late?. This chapter sets out four issues of critical importance to the new conclusions about avoiding dangerous climate change, each of which have been either ignored by the traditional literature or treated in a misleading way that discounts the insights from other disciplines: the complexity of the global energy-economy system (including the poverty and sustainability aspects of development), the ethics of intergenerational equity, the understanding from engineering and history about path dependence and induced technological change, and finally the politics of climate policy.
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This article assesses the feasibility of a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050 using a large-scale Post Keynesian simulation model of the global energy-environment-economy system. The main policy to achieve the target is a carbon price rising to 100/tCO2 by 2050, attained through auctioned CO2 permits for the energy sector, and carbon taxes for the rest of the economy. This policy induces technological change. However, this price is insufficient, and global CO2 would be only about 15% below 2000 levels by 2050. In order to achieve the target, additional policies have been modelled in a portfolio, with the auction and tax revenues partly recycled to support investment in low-GHG technologies in energy, manufacturing and transportation, and `no-regrets' options for buildings. This direct support supplements the effects of the increases in carbon prices, so that the accelerated adoption of new technologies leads to lower unit costs. In addition the 100/tCO2 price is reached earlier, by 2030, strengthening the price signal. In a low-carbon society, as modelled, GDP is slightly above the baseline as a consequence of more rapid development induced by more investment and increased technological change.
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Junk Economics is a review of Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling's book, Priceless. Priceless argues that cost-benefit analysis has been distorted for political reasons, especially during the current Bush Administration. The review describes the authors' argument and elaborates on the political implications of the continued use of cost-benefit analysis.
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One of the most influential of the Victorian philosophers, Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) also made important contributions to fields such as economics, political theory, and classics. An active promoter of higher education for women, he founded Cambridge's Newnham College in 1871. He attended Rugby School and then Trinity College, Cambridge, where he remained his whole career. In 1859 he took up a lectureship in classics, and held this post for ten years. In 1869, he moved to a lectureship in moral philosophy, the subject where he left arguably his greatest mark when he produced this work, regarded as his masterpiece. Published in 1874, the book argues the utilitarian approach to ethics, and a systematic and historically sensitive approach to ethical research that influenced utilitarian philosophers well into the twentieth century. It remains a valuable introduction to the philosophy, practice and history of ethics. This reissue includes the 1877 supplement.
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The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.