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The Psychological Record, 2012, 62, 447–462
This research was partially supported with I+D+i funds from Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia,
Spain (SEJ058 45), and Junta de Andalucía, Spain (Research Group HUM -1093).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Francisco J. Ruiz, Departamento
de Personalidad, Evaluación y Tratamiento Psicológico, 0 4120, Universidad de Almería, Almería, Spain.
E-mail: frj939@ual.es
IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL- LEVEL CHESS PLAYERS’
PERFORMANCE WITH AN ACCEPTANCE- BASED PROTOCOL:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
Francisco J. Ruiz and Carmen Luciano
Universidad de Almería
This study compared an individual, 4-hr intervention based on acceptance and
commitment therapy (ACT) versus a no- contact control condition in improv-
ing the performance of international- level chess players. Five participants
received the brief ACT protocol, with each matched to another chess player
with similar characteristics in the control condition. Experimental partici-
pants showed significant reductions in the believability and interference of
general, unpleasant private events during competitions as well as reductions
in the frequency of the treated counterproductive reactions to private events
(FCR). Also, as indicated by an objective chess performance measure (ELO
performance), all participants in the experimental condition improved their
performance during the 7 months after the ACT protocol in comparison to the
7 months prior; however, none of the control participants improved their chess
performance. Pretreatment levels and initial changes in FCR and believability
significantly predicted the effect sizes on chess performance in the experimen-
tal condition.
Key words: acceptance and commitment therapy, chess performance
enhancement, experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion
Chess is widely considered to be the sport with the most intellectual content, with
decision making being the main aspect of chess play. In addition, competitive chess is
demanding, with standard tournaments consisting of 9 or 10 games with 4- to 6-hr
playing sessions and often two sessions per day. Chess players have to make their moves
within a limited time without the possibility of moving back. Because just one mistake
can cause a quick defeat, chess is often considered to be
mental boxing
. Accordingly, it is
not surprising that chess players’ cardiovascular activity and other physiological indexes
are similar to those indexes shown by people who practice sports involving more
physical activity (e.g., Kríz, Vokál, & Krízová, 1990; Pfleger, Stocker, Pabst, &
Haralambie, 1980).
Psychological skills training (PST), the mainstream approach in the eld of sports
performance enhancement, emphasizes that negative thoughts and emotions obstruct the
person from achieving his or her optimal performance (e.g., Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996;
448
RUIZ AND LUCIANO
Whelan, Mahoney, & Meyers, 1991). PST proposes that those thoughts and emotions must
be reduced to perform optimally and promotes using control- based techniques (e.g.,
imagery, self- talk modication, arousal control). However, no evidence about the efcacy
of these techniques for improving chess performance has been published. Moreover, the
empirical status of PST techniques is unclear considering that none of them can be
considered an empirically validated procedure to enhance sport performance (see Gardner,
2009; Gardner & Moore, 2006, 2007).
An alternative to PST has recently emerged from work conducted involving
acceptance- based therapies. Specically, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT;
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) is a psychological intervention, based on a contextual
approach to human language and cognition (Hayes, Barnes- Holmes, & Roche, 2001), that
has been adapted for enhancing sports performance (see Gardner & Moore, 2007, for the
description of a protocol largely based on the ACT model). ACT emphasizes the role of
cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance in limiting people from living the life they
want.
Cognitive fusion
refers to the tendency to act according to the content of private
events, such as thoughts, memories, sensations, and the like. Cognitive fusion is relevant
because it often leads to experiential avoidance when a person does not have the skills to
distance him- or herself from the aversive/unwanted private events (Barnes- Holmes,
Hayes, & Dymond, 2001; Luciano, Rodríguez, & Gutiérrez, 2004).
Experiential avoidance
refers to following a rule to avoid and/or escape aversive private events, like unwanted
thoughts, memories, sensations, and so forth. Experiential avoidance has been largely
suggested as a core strategy in most psychological disorders and has led to an increase in
health problems (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford,
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996; Luciano & Hayes, 2001; Ruiz, 2010).
In the eld of sports and intellectual performance, experiential avoidance can become
problematic because the feared private events are typically extended in the long term, and
most important, the performer may attempt to escape from them instead of doing what the
actual situation requires. Recent research supports this idea. Bond and Flaxman (2006)
found that participants’ levels of experiential avoidance predicted their performances in
learning a new software program, as well as their general mental health and work
performance. Zettle, Petersen, Hocker, and Provines (2007) showed that participants with
high levels of experiential avoidance evaluated the induced sensations of a task that
simulated the effects of alcohol intoxication as more uncomfortable and performed worse
on a challenging perceptual–motor task. Gooding and Gardner (2009) found that level of
mindfulness, which in some ways can be seen as the opposite of experiential avoidance,
signicantly predicted game free- throw percentage in basketball players. Finally, López
et al. (2010) have shown that participants with high and low levels of experiential
avoidance had a similar performance on a high cognitive demand task after viewing a
neutral lm; however, participants with high avoidance performed signicantly worse
after viewing a discomforting lm. The mediation analysis conducted by López et al.
revealed that experiential avoidance had an impact on the performance by decreasing
participants’ reported concentration on the task.
In contrast to PST, the ACT model considers that it is the counterproductive reaction
to private events during competitions, and not the unwanted private events by themselves,
that causes a reduction in sports performance. Accordingly, ACT proposes changes in the
functions of private events, rather than in their content, by accepting unwanted private
events as they surface while the person is focusing on the relevant cues of the task. The
evidence concerning the efcacy of acceptance- based strategies in enhancing sports
performance is growing. To date, they have been effective in three small controlled studies
involving canoeing (Fernández, Secades, Terrados, García, & García, 2004), chess playing
(Ruiz & Luciano, 2009), and golng (Bernier, Thienot, Codron, & Fournier, 2009), and in
case studies targeting swimming, weightlifting (Gardner & Moore, 2004), and springboard
(Schwanhausser, 2009), as well as playing basketball (Gardner & Moore, 2007), lacrosse
(Lutkenhouse, 2007), and chess (Ruiz, 2006).
449
ACT AND CHESS PLAYERS’ PERFORMANCE
In the context of chess performance, the aim of the ACT studies conducted to date was
to improve performance by teaching players to be present with the thoughts and emotions
that surfaced while playing and to choose to remain as value oriented as possible in every
step of the game. Ruiz (2006) found that after the implementation of four ACT sessions with
an international- level chess player, the reported interference and believability of unwanted
private events in decision making was reduced, and the player noticeably improved his
performance according to an objective chess performance measure (ELO points). Ruiz and
Luciano (2009) compared the efficacy of a group ACT intervention, applied over 5
consecutive days, given to seven promising young chess players, versus a no- contact control
condition. The ACT condition showed that there was a statistically signicant improvement
in results during the 9 months of follow- up, compared to the 9 previous months, with a
signicant improvement in chess performance in ve out of seven chess players. Pretreatment
levels of chess- related experiential avoidance predicted the effect of the intervention: The
more avoidant participants were, the greater effect the intervention had.
Although a detailed explanation of the ACT intervention is out of the scope of the
present work (see Hayes & Strosahl, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999; Wilson & Luciano, 2002), a
very brief description of this approach in chess will be presented. For example, imagine
that during a competition chess players think, “I am winning,” or “This tournament will be
great,” when the actual chessboard position is favorable for them. Chess players will often
fuse with these thoughts (i.e., take them literally), without acknowledging that they are
only thoughts and not facts. Consequently, chess players may play in accordance with the
thought, “I am winning,” instead of paying attention to the game position. An ACT
intervention would promote defusion by allowing chess players to differentiate between
themselves and their thoughts and, thus, to bring themselves back to the actual task (i.e., to
pay attention to the actual chessboard position).
Another example of the role of cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance in chess is
wasting time because of indecision during competition. For instance, chess players may
delay their next move because of uncertain thoughts about what will be the best move.
Although spending more time to think seems logical, the problem is that this subtracts
more time from their moves later in the game, which may prove to be more crucial.
Consequently, when uncertainty shows up, thinking too much is paid off in the short term
by avoiding the consequences of a particular choice. However, in the next phase of the
game, the decrease in time increases the likelihood of mistakes. In other words, chess
players are fused with the literal content of their uncertainties, and their actions are more
directed toward short- term escape or avoidance of such thoughts rather than a strategic
long- term focus on the game. An ACT intervention would promote participants’ realization
of both the short- and the long- term consequences of avoiding such uncertain thoughts and
would promote defusing from them in order to allow chess players to make better choices
in every moment of the game.
The current study advances over the previous chess study of Ruiz and Luciano (2009),
which compared an acceptance intervention applied to promising young chess players in
6 hr, by evaluating the effect of a brief, intensive, individual ACT protocol applied in 4 hr
(over 2–3 sessions) to adult, international- level chess players versus a no- contact control
condition. Five participants in the experimental condition received the brief ACT protocol.
Each participant was matched to a chess player with similar characteristics. These matched
participants were only followed in their chess performance and constituted the no- contact
control condition.
Method
Participants
Ten international title chess players took part in this study. Possible volunteers to
receive the experimental protocol were recruited through an e- mail that explained the
450
RUIZ AND LUCIANO
research aims. Five chess players volunteered to receive the protocol and form part of the
experimental condition. Inclusion criteria for participants in this condition were the
following: (a) participants must have received the International Master or International
Grand Master title; (b) participants must have failed to improve more than 40 ELO points
during the last 2 years (ELO points are the measure used by the International Chess
Federation, FIDE, to establish the international ranking, and they are calculated by
applying mathematical formulas as indicated in the next section); and (c) participants
must have been committed to training and competing in the upcoming year for the same
amount of time as they had in previous years. Three participants were Latin Americans,
and the remaining two were Spaniards; all of them were men who ranged from 23 to
50 years of age. All the participants were top- ranked players in their respective countries.
With the purpose of forming the control condition, five chess players who had
characteristics similar to those shown by each of the participants in the experimental
condition were selected from FIDE’s database. The criteria that established the similarity
between participants in both conditions were as follows: (a) same gender, (b) age difference
of no more than 2 years, (c) same International Title, (d) difference in ELO punctuation of
no more than 30 points (this ensured that both players were at roughly the same level; i.e.,
if both players play 100 games, the higher rated player should theoretically win no more
than 55 games, with the lower rated player winning no fewer than the remaining 45 games),
(e) equivalent frequency in playing competitions during the last 12 months, and (f) similar
geographic zone (e.g., tournaments in the south of Spain). Only one chess player was
matched to every experimental participant because the precise specications of the criteria
made it difcult to match all experimental participants to more than one person.
Measures
The ELO performance rating was used as an outcome measure. The ELO performance
rating is a theoretical index (Elo, 1978) largely used by FIDE to establish chess skill level
through consecutive games. Reliability and validity of this mathematical index noticeably
increases as a function of increasing the number of games. The ELO performance rating was
obtained for each participant by analyzing the data from competitions, provided by FIDE’s
database, in which participants played at least four games. An overall ELO performance
rating was calculated for the 7 months before and after the intervention. The criterion for
pre–post change was established to be a difference of more than 40 ELO performance points
because such a difference would allow participants to obtain half a point more in standard
nine- games tournaments, which usually raises them to signicantly better classications.
Also, several chess players and qualied chess trainers agreed that achieving mastery
ensures a signicant increase in tournament positions (Ruiz & Luciano, 2009).
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire–II (AAQ–II). The AAQ–II (Bond et al.,
2011) is a seven- item general measure of experiential avoidance and psychological
inexibility. An initial 10-item version of this questionnaire, which has psychometric
properties that are very similar to those in the nal version, was used in this study. Each
item was rated on a 7-point Likert- type scale ranging from 1 (
never true
) to 7 (
always
true
), with higher scores indicating greater levels of experiential avoidance. The Spanish
translation of the AAQ–II has good internal consistency and a one- factor structure (Ruiz,
Langer, Luciano, Cangas, & Beltrán, 2011). The mean scores were 32.23 (
SD
= 9.85) for
the nonclinical sample and 46.22 (
SD
= 12.21) for the clinical sample. Based on
accumulated experience using this questionnaire, the within- subject criterion for pre–post
change was set as a 15% reduction in AAQ–II scores.
Chess Counterproductive Reactions Questionnaire (CCRQ). This questionnaire
was designed for this study to detect experiential avoidance in chess (Ruiz & Luciano,
2009). Fifteen items were created based on barriers detected during chess playing (e.g.,
Krogius, 1972; Nunn, 1998; Rowson, 2000). Items were either a sentence describing a
psychological barrier (e.g., “I am too nervous for performing optimally in the most
451
ACT AND CHESS PLAYERS’ PERFORMANCE
important games of the tournaments”) or a sentence describing avoidance behaviors in
the presence of such barriers (e.g., “I feel afraid and begin to play defensively or to offer
a draw”). Each item was rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (
never
) to 9
(
always
). Higher scores indicate a higher frequency of counterproductive reactions
during competition. CCRQ scores were used to select the five most frequent
counterproductive reactions for each participant, and these were specically addressed
in the protocol implementation. The average frequency of the treated counterproductive
reactions to problematic private events (FCR) was then used for process analysis. The
validity of the CCRQ was explored with a preliminary sample of 18 high- level chess
players. Despite the small size of the sample, results showed a strong positive correlation
between the CCRQ and the AAQ–II (
r
= .614,
p
= .004, one- tailed) and a negative
correlation between the CCRQ and ELO rating (
r
= −.443,
p
= .037, one- tailed). Based on
accumulated experience using this questionnaire, the within- subject criterion for pre–
post change was set as a 25% reduction in the FCR scores.
Private events’ interference and believability. Participants rated the interference
and believability of private events during normal and difcult moments of competitions on
a 10-cm visual assessment scale with “not at all” and “completely” in the left and right
extremes, respectively. Interference questions asked participants to rate the degree to
which thoughts, feelings, memories, and so forth, impeded them from doing their best
during the difcult and normal moments of competitions. Believability questions asked to
what degree participants believed those thoughts, feeling, memories, and so forth, during
both moments of competitions. The scores of the interference and believability questions
were averaged for both normal and difcult moments. As with the FCR scores, the within-
subject criterion for pre–post change was set as a 25% reduction in the average interference
and believability scores.
Acceptance- Based Protocol
The experimental protocol was similar to the one used in Ruiz and Luciano (2009),
which is also described in detail in Luciano, Valdivia- Salas, Gutiérrez- Martínez, Ruiz,
and Páez- Blarrina (2009), and was based on Hayes et al. (1999) and Wilson and Luciano
(2002). It was designed to (a) promote the experience of creative hopelessness in the
context of a valued trajectory
and (b) practice
acceptance in such a context by means of
cognitive defusion. Both components were applied to each of the ve most frequent
counterproductive reactions, as assessed by the CCRQ for each participant. Creative
hopelessness exercises involved several interactions in which the protocol looked for the
participants to realize the consequences of their reactions to unwanted private events in
both the short and the long term. Defusion exercises involved teaching participants to
differentiate between the person who is having the unwanted private events and the very
private events as they emerge. Defusion was promoted through multiple- exemplar training
with multiple thoughts and sensations. The interactions involved in creative hopelessness
and cognitive defusion components will be illustrated with the most frequent and
counterproductive reaction found in this study: “spending too much time guring out the
best move because of uncertainty.” This process was similarly repeated with the other
remaining counterproductive reactions.
Functional analysis of the chess problems and creative hopelessness in the
context of a valued trajectory. The psychologist asked several questions in order for
participants to experience in that moment the consequences of the counterproductive
reactions. A typical sequence of questions and answers follows: (a) What are the sensations
or thoughts you do not like while playing in competitions? (The participant said,
“Uncertain thoughts or having fear of making mistakes”); (b) What do you do when these
thoughts show up? (The participant said, “Think too much and not move”); (c) What are
the reasons for thinking too long? (The participants said, “To avoid mistakes”); (d) How
do you feel when doing that? Do you have the feeling of reducing uncertainty?
452
RUIZ AND LUCIANO
(The participant said, “Mostly in such a moment, but it comes back”); (e) Do you feel as if
you are experiencing uncertainty more frequently while playing chess? (The participant
said, “Yes, I am really worried about this”); and (f) You know what it is like to play well.
Would you describe your playing in that way? (The participant said, “Not really. It could
be much better”). All participants thought that what they were doing was the best strategy;
however, they recognized that they played with acceptable quality during the rst phases
of the game but with poor quality in later ones.
Subsequently, the experimenter proceeded by introducing the “man in the hole”
metaphor (Hayes et al., 1999; Wilson & Luciano, 2002) as an analogy for the paradoxical
rules the participants were following when dealing with uncertain thoughts. The aim of
this metaphor was to help the chess player realize the consequences of overanalyzing chess
moves by establishing a physical relation between trying to dig himself out of a hole,
making the hole deeper and putting himself even further away from getting out. The
participants connected that with what they were doing (e.g., one of the participants put it
this way: “Yes, although thinking too much is something I like because it makes me feel
secure, and it seems like a good idea, the fact is that it makes my hole bigger.…Yes,
uncertain thoughts return many times during the game and I am wasting time. I am being
rushed and playing poorly.…What can I do?”).
The swamp metaphor (Gutiérrez, Luciano, Rodríguez, & Fink, 2004; Hayes et al.,
1999) was then introduced to promote the acceptance of uncertainty within the context of
trying to obtain an optimal performance. Participants were told that sometimes playing is
like crossing a swamp in order to achieve what you value and that sometimes it is necessary
to be willing to walk through a humid, dirty swamp full of insects, mud, and disgusting
smells. In other words, pragmatic chess playing sometimes involves fully experiencing
uncertain thoughts while moving within a prudent amount of time.
Participants were then told that according to what they were experiencing, the
sensations of uncertainty would continue to appear whenever they chose to play chess.
Consequently, two options would be available: (a) being willing to play while having
doubts or (b) trying to control the doubts. Participants were asked what they wanted to
choose. All participants chose the rst option. The defusion component of the protocol was
then implemented, to help participants move while having doubts.
Practicing defusion through multiple exercises. The aim of this practice was to
promote the ability to experience the
self as a context
for all private events: to learn to
differentiate between the person who is having the thought or sensation and the thought or
sensation itself, and as these private events emerge, to learn to bring themselves back to the
relevant actual task.
To undertake this goal, a physical metaphor and an experiential exercise were used.
The physical metaphor was implemented as follows. The participant was told that making
a good use of time is like choosing to walk a certain route, for example, moving toward the
room exit. Then, when the participant began to walk, the psychologist stood in his way and
said the thoughts that the chess player had typically derived during the games (e.g., “You
have to gure out the best move, if not you are going to lose”). The participant then tried to
dodge the psychologist, but the psychologist stood again in his way. The exercise nished
when the participant took the psychologist’s hand (as if it the psychologist would be his
uncertainty, his fear of making a mistake or overthinking the play) and continued on his
path as if he were making a move with his uncertain thoughts.
The “leaves on a stream” exercise was then introduced (Hayes et al., 1999) by inviting
the participant to differentiate the thoughts from the person who was having them. Each
participant was invited to recall particular moments in which he had experienced
uncertainty, doubts, wasted time, and so forth. He was asked to fully concentrate on one of
these thoughts; notice who was having the thought; and imagine that he put the thought on
a leaf in a tree, that the weight of the thought caused the leaf to fall into the river, and that
the river swept the leaf away with its current. Finally, the participant was asked to bring
himself back to the actual task by noticing another thought.
453
ACT AND CHESS PLAYERS’ PERFORMANCE
The same exercise was repeated with at least ve other problematic thoughts. At the
end, the participant was asked to notice that he was more than his thoughts and that he was
in charge of responding to the game position and not to his thoughts. Finally, each
participant was invited to practice noticing any thought that might show up and bringing
himself back to the relevant task during future games and tournaments. The protocol was
nished once creative hopelessness and defusion exercises were implemented with the ve
counterproductive reactions.
Procedure
Figure 1 shows an overview of the procedure. A between- conditions design was used
with ve participants in each condition. First, ve participants were recruited to participate
in the experimental condition. Another ve chess players were then selected for the no-
contact control condition (see the Participants section for selection criteria). The ELO
performances obtained from FIDE’s database from the last 7 months were calculated. No
interventions and no questionnaires were given to no- contact control participants, but their
performance was assessed during the study.
Figure 1. Overview of the procedure.
The acceptance- based protocol was delivered by the rst author. He is an experienced
chess player and was previously trained and supervised in ACT by the second author.
454
RUIZ AND LUCIANO
The protocol was implemented during a tournament in two to three sessions (one session
per day), depending on the tournament’s characteristics. If the player’s tournament had two
games per day, there were three sessions lasting around 75 min each, and if the player’s
tournament had one game per day, there were two 2-hr sessions. Although the number of
sessions varied, all protocols lasted 4 hr in total.
The tournaments’ organizers introduced the psychologist to each experimental
participant when they arrived to their respective tournaments. The psychologist then
explained that the aim of the intervention was to determine and help to resolve the
problems that typically emerge during chess games. All experimental participants
conrmed their participation in the study. They were then asked to complete the two
questionnaires (rst the AAQ–II and then the CCRQ) and the interference and believability
questions with the purpose of selecting individual intervention targets. Finally, the
psychologist and each participant set up an appointment for the rst session in order to
implement the protocol.
Each chess player and the therapist selected the ve most frequent counterproductive
reactions and the thoughts/sensations preceding these reactions using the participant’s
CCRQ results. These ve reactions were the focus of the treatment. The most frequent
counterproductive and common reactions across all participants were the following (from
most to least frequent): (a) not moving because of doubts, (b) not being focused on the
game because of negative thoughts (e.g., “This tournament will be a disaster”), (c) not
concentrating and playing in an unfocused manner because of “feeling anxious” about a
lack of time, (d) relaxing and not concentrating due to thinking that “the game is won,” (e)
losing concentration because of “being worried” about other non- chess problems, and (f)
changing playing style to avoid “losing as in other games.”
Upon nishing the protocol implementation, experimental participants were told that
they would receive some questionnaires by electronic mail. The AAQ–II and CCRQ
questionnaires, as well as the interference and believability questions, were sent at 1, 3,
and 6 months after the last session. All participants returned the questionnaires. The chess
results of the participants in both the experimental and the no- contact control condition
were followed during the 7 months after the intervention.
Integrity of the Protocol Implementation
All intervention sessions were audio- recorded and rated by two trained raters for
adherence to the treatment protocol, including the specic questions for the functional
analysis and the number of counterproductive reactions and the exercises and metaphors
for generating creative hopelessness and defusion. Raters were doctoral students with
formal training in ACT. An interobserver agreement of 100% was obtained for all sessions
with regard to the main characteristics of the protocol.
Results
Outcome Measures
Table 1 shows that participants in both conditions did not differ in their average
7-month pretreatment ELO performances in tournaments (control and experimental means
were, respectively,
M
= 2,461.6,
SD
= 67.79, and
M
= 2,431,
SD
= 48.6, with no signicant
differences according to the independent sample
t
test,
p
= .44). However, average 7-month
follow- up ELO performances in tournaments were statistically different, favoring the
experimental condition (
p
= .03; control:
M
= 2,451.4,
SD
= 73.91; experimental:
M
= 2,501.4,
SD
= 50.36). Regarding within- group comparisons, only the experimental
condition showed statistically signicant results between pretreatment and follow- up
(
p
< .01). The effect sizes of the experimental condition were relevant for both within
conditions (
d
= 1.42) and between conditions (
d
= .79).
455
ACT AND CHESS PLAYERS’ PERFORMANCE
Table 1
Chess Performance Evolution From Pretreatment to Follow-Up and Individual Effect Sizes
Experimental participants Control participants
7-Month ELO performance 7-Month ELO performance
Participant Pretreatment Follow-up Effect size Participant Pretreatment Follow-up Effect size
P1 2,480 2,547 1.28 P6 2,492 2,485 −.0 6
P2 2,385 2,485 1.04 P7 2,439 2,440 .01
P3 2,393 2,448 .50 P8 2,380 2,375 −.0 6
P4 2,493 2,560 .60 P9 2,560 2,560 .00
P5 2,412 2,465 1.13 P10 2,437 2,397 −.69
M2,431 2,501 1.42 M2,461.6 2,451.4 −.14
Descriptive within- subject analysis indicated that all experimental participants
improved their performance during the 7 months of follow- up with respect to the
corresponding same number of games played during the 7 months before the intervention
(number of games for P1 to P5, respectively: 47, 45, 79, 45, and 29; see Figure 2). The
increased progress in ELO performance exceeded the criterion for pre–post change (i.e., an
increase greater than 40 ELO performance points) in all the participants, with a range of
individual effect sizes from
d
= .5 to
d
= 1.24 (see Table 1). There were no relevant
improvements in the average ELO performance in the no- contact condition (number of
games for P1 to P5, respectively: 47, 36, 37, 43, and 54). Moreover, one of the participants
(P10) showed a significant decline in his performance. No statistically significant
differences were found in the number of games played during the 7-month follow- up
(experimental condition:
M
= 49,
SD
= 18.28; control condition:
M
= 43.4,
SD
= 7.4 4;
U
= 10.5,
p
= .33, one- tailed).
100
80
60
40
20
0
−20
−40
Differential ELO Performance
Performance
Experimental Participants Control Participants
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Figure 2. Differential ELO performance ratings between 7-month pretreatment versus 7-month
follow-up. The horizontal dashed line represents the mastery criterion change.
Process Measures
Pretreatment AAQ–II scores for all participants except one were low (for P1, P2, P3,
P4, and P5, respectively, 26, 23, 19, 22, and 48). Table 2 shows that only the participant
with a high score at pretreatment (P5) exceeded the criterion for pre–post change at the
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RUIZ AND LUCIANO
6-month follow- up (i.e., at least a 15% reduction; participant decreased from 48 to 24),
whereas P4 showed an increase of more than 15%. All experimental participants
progressively met the FCR criterion for pre–post change (see Table 2). For P1 to P5, the
pretreatment to 6-month follow- up FCR changes were, respectively, from 7 to 3.8, from 6.6
to 4, from 4.8 to 2, from 4.8 to 3.6, and from 7.4 to 5.2. Differences between pretreatment
and the 6-month follow- up were statistically signicant (
z
= −2.02,
p
= .02, one- tailed), and
the effect size was very large (
d
= 2.02).
Table 2
AAQ–II Scores, Mean Frequency of Counterproductive Reactions to Problematic
Private Events, Interference, and Believability of Private Events During Competitions
General experiential
avoidancea
Frequency of
counterproductive
reactionsb
Interference of
private events during
competitionsc
Believability of
private events during
competitionsc
Participant
Pre 1 mo 3 mo 6 mo Pre 1 mo 3 mo 6 mo Pre 1 mo 3 mo 6 mo Pre 1 mo 3 mo 6 mo
P1 26 26 27 26 7.0 6.2 5.2 3.8 69 69 57 38 75 63 50 19
P2 23 23 22 23 6.6 6.6 4.6 4.0 48 48 22 17 44 32 23 11
P3 19 19 24 19 4.8 2.4 5.2 2.0 47 41 30 27 45 21 20 19
P4 22 22 23 34 4.8 4.4 4.4 3.6 14 11 28 26 12 19 28 27
P5 48 28 28 24 7.4 6.8 4.8 5.2 57 49 38 45 66 27 20 33
M27. 6 23.6 24.8 25.2 6.1 5.3 4.8 3.8 47 43 35 30 48 32 28 22
aMeasured by AAQ –II score (10–70). bMeasured on a scale of 1 (never) to 9 (always). c0–100.
Table 2 also shows that three of the ve participants reached the criterion for pre–post
change in interference of private events during competitions at the 6-month follow- up (P1:
from 69 to 38; P2: from 48 to 17; P3: from 47 to 27). P5 showed a decrease from 57 to 45
points and P4 an increase from 14 to 26. Differences between pretreatment and 6-month
follow- up were signicant (pretreatment:
M
= 41.8,
SD
= 23.39; 6-month follow- up:
M
= 26.1,
SD
= 15.62;
z
= −1.76,
p
= .04, one- tailed). Four of the ve participants showed
the criterion for pre–post change in believability of private events at the 6-month follow- up
(P1: from 75 to 19; P2: from 44 to 11; P3: from 45 to 19; P5: from 66 to 33; see Table 2). P4
showed an increase from 12 to 27 points. Differences were also statistically signicant
from pretreatment to the 6-month follow- up (pretreatment:
M
= 43.3,
SD
= 27.52; 6-month
follow- up:
M
= 18.8,
SD
= 11.47;
z
= −1.75 ,
p
= .04, one- tailed). The effect sizes were large
in both interference (
d
= .79) and believability (
d
= 1.16).
Exploratory Process Analyses
According to the characteristics of the current study (e.g., small sample, no- contact
control condition), only simple linear regression analyses with one independent variable
were conducted to explore possible processes of change. We analyzed whether both
pretreatment measures and early changes at the 3-month follow- up predicted the effect
sizes of the intervention. Changes at the 1-month follow- up were not taken into account
because some chess players (P1, P2, and P5) did not play any new tournaments during
that period (about 80% of games were played between the third and seventh months);
therefore, these participants’ scores in chess- related measures were not expected
to signicantly change. According to a previous study (Ruiz & Luciano, 2009), it
was expected that the intervention would show higher effects in participants with
high scores in FCR, believability, and interference of private events. Likewise, early
decreases in those measures were expected to predict the individual effect sizes of the
intervention.
Pretreatment scores in FCR, interference, and believability of private events
signicantly predicted the individual effect sizes of the intervention (FCR:
β
= .96,
p
= .005, one- tailed; interference:
β
= .97,
p
= .003, one- tailed; believability:
β
= .96,
p
= .005, one- tailed); however, AAQ–II scores did not (
β
= .54,
p
= .18, one- tailed). Both
457
ACT AND CHESS PLAYERS’ PERFORMANCE
FCR and believability decreases at the 3-month follow- up signicantly predicted the
individual effects of the intervention (FCR:
β
= .91,
p
= .016, one- tailed; believability:
β
= .81,
p
= .048, one- tailed). Interference and AAQ–II decreases did not reach statistically
signicant levels of prediction (interference:
β
= .78,
p
= .061, one- tailed; AAQ–II:
β
= .56,
p
= .16, one- tailed).
Discussion
Practical Significance of the Results
The main and objective variable used to analyze the impact of the experimental
protocol is ELO performance. Accordingly, the data obtained during the 7 months before
the intervention showed that participants in both conditions performed at roughly the same
level. However, all experimental chess players improved their performance up to 40 ELO
performance points (the criterion for pre–post change) during the 7 months after the
implementation of the acceptance- based protocol. Consequently, all of these participants
obtained better classications in tournaments during follow- up. On the contrary, this effect
did not occur in any of the no- contact matched participants, who only showed the typical
small uctuations in ELO performance that are the norm in chess players’ careers after
they reach a certain level of play (Elo, 1978; Rowson, 2000). Based on this nding, we can
assume that the change achieved in the experimental participants might be evaluated as
relevant in the chess context.
However, it might be argued that the change in the experimental participants’ ELO
performance was the result of an experimental artifact instead of the protocol. This might
be due to the fact that the no- contact participants did not have any interaction with the
experimenter and did not respond to the questionnaires that the experimental participants
were given. Additionally, there might be motivational differences between participants in
both conditions because of the different means of recruitment. Although this is a clear
limitation of this study, given the literature about enhancement of sports performance, we
do not believe that the unusual and relevant change in ELO performance would have
occurred simply because these participants responded to the questionnaires or interacted
with the experimenter. In spite of this, further research with better control conditions is
needed to isolate the effects of the acceptance- based protocol.
Process Analysis
The general experiential avoidance scores, as measured by the AAQ–II, remained
relatively the same after the intervention. Two interrelated reasons might be relevant here.
One is that the AAQ–II is a general questionnaire that has proved its utility in measuring
processes of change in the clinical arena (see Hayes et al., 2006; Ruiz, 2010). However, the
AAQ–II might not be sufficiently sensitive when experiential avoidance is not a
generalized strategy but is instead centered on specic areas of one’s life, as is the case for
most chess players. A second reason is that the participants’ AAQ–II scores in this study
were low at preintervention. In support to this last possibility, it is worth noting that only
the participant who had a high AAQ–II score at pretreatment (P5) showed a signicant
reduction in this score. Because the other four participants showed low AAQ–II scores at
pretreatment, a oor effect could explain why their scores remained at roughly the same
level. Accordingly, it seems that future research should incorporate an adaptation of the
AAQ that is more sensitive to specic private barriers such as the ones analyzed in this
study, instead of a general questionnaire such as the AAQ–II. This strategy has been
followed in other areas where versions of the AAQ that have been adapted to address
specic problems have been used (e.g., in tobacco addiction [Gifford et al., 2004], diabetes
[Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes, & Glenn- Lawson, 2007], and pain [McCracken, Vowles, &
Eccleston, 2004]).
458
RUIZ AND LUCIANO
When looking to chess- related measures, we found signicant reductions in the FCR,
interference, and believability scores. We also found that higher pretreatment scores for all
of these measures signicantly predicted the individual effect sizes of the experimental
condition. This might suggest that previous levels of chess- related experiential avoidance
and cognitive fusion could be moderators in the ACT intervention. In addition, initial
changes in FCR and believability scores also predicted the effect sizes of the experimental
condition. This suggests that reductions in FCR and believability scores could be the
process of change involved in the ACT condition. However, although both suggestions are
consistent with the ACT model, they should be considered as preliminary and somewhat
speculative because formal mediation and moderator analyses cannot be carried out with
the design used in this study.
With respect to the individual results, all participants except P4 showed consistent
changes in the process measures with the ACT model. Although P4 showed an
improvement in chess performance and a reduction in FCR scores, he also increased his
interference, believability, and AAQ–II scores. This might be related to the fact that his
scores in these measures were very low at pretreatment.
Strengths and Limitations
The main limitations of the current study are that the number of participants was
small and that the participants were not randomly assigned into the two conditions. In
addition, the condition used to contrast the effect of the acceptance- based protocol was a
no- contact condition. These limitations might be relevant to the study for a number of
reasons. First, positive expectations and higher motivation by subjects in the ACT
condition, if present, could have led some subjects in that condition to improve performance
for reasons beyond their exposure to ACT. Second, we did not know what effect the
presence of the psychologist acting as experimenter or the administration of the
questionnaires had on the participants’ performances. Finally, some of the measures
(CCRQ and the interference and believability questions) have no established validity and
reliability, and thus observed changes on these measures could occur for reasons other
than the ACT intervention.
To balance these limitations, this study was conducted considering most of the
relevant features recommended in sport psychology research (e.g., Martin, Vause, &
Schwarzman, 2005). For example, participants competed on a regular and organized
basis, performance was measured directly with a reliable and valid chess performance
measure, participants were international- level chess players, and the follow- up was
relatively long.
Conclusion
In spite of the aforementioned limitations, the current study extends and advances the
results obtained by Ruiz and Luciano (2009) with promising young chess players. The
present results show that a brief 4-hr ACT intervention can be sufcient for reducing
counterproductive reactions during chess competitions and for improving international-
level chess players’ performance. Considering the results of this study and other recent
ones in sports performance enhancement (e.g., Bernier et al., 2009; Fernández et al., 2004;
Gardner & Moore, 2004, 2007; Lutkenhouse, 2007; Schwanhausser, 2009), we can suggest
that brief acceptance- based interventions could be useful for improving human
performance when experiential avoidance, in a context of cognitive fusion, is present
during performance. Therefore, ACT emerges as a potential alternative to PST
interventions. Contrary to PST, ACT adopts a functional- analytical approach to cognition.
Accordingly, ACT does not look for changes in the content of private events but in the
discriminative functions of thoughts and sensations in a way that allows the participants to
respond more effectively to task demands. Future studies are recommended to compare the
differential efcacy of ACT versus PST interventions in sport psychology.
459
ACT AND CHESS PLAYERS’ PERFORMANCE
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