A Dual-Motive Model of Scapegoating: Displacing Blame to Reduce Guilt or Increase Control

Abstract

The authors present a model that specifies 2 psychological motives underlying scapegoating, defined as attributing inordinate blame for a negative outcome to a target individual or group, (a) maintaining perceived personal moral value by minimizing feelings of guilt over one's responsibility for a negative outcome and (b) maintaining perceived personal control by obtaining a clear explanation for a negative outcome that otherwise seems inexplicable. Three studies supported hypotheses derived from this dual-motive model. Framing a negative outcome (environmental destruction or climate change) as caused by one's own harmful actions (value threat) or unknown sources (control threat) both increased scapegoating, and these effects occurred indirectly through feelings of guilt and perceived personal control, respectively (Study 1), and were differentially moderated by affirmations of moral value and personal control (Study 2). Also, scapegoating in response to value threat versus control threat produced divergent, theoretically specified effects on self-perceptions and behavioral intentions (Study 3).

Full text

A Dual-Motive Model of Scapegoating:
Displacing Blame to Reduce Guilt or Increase Control
Zachary K. Rothschild, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Lucas A. Keefer
University of Kansas
The authors present a model that specifies 2 psychological motives underlying scapegoating, defined as
attributing inordinate blame for a negative outcome to a target individual or group, (a) maintaining
perceived personal moral value by minimizing feelings of guilt over one’s responsibility for a negative
outcome and (b) maintaining perceived personal control by obtaining a clear explanation for a negative
outcome that otherwise seems inexplicable. Three studies supported hypotheses derived from this
dual-motive model. Framing a negative outcome (environmental destruction or climate change) as caused
by one’s own harmful actions (value threat) or unknown sources (control threat) both increased
scapegoating, and these effects occurred indirectly through feelings of guilt and perceived personal
control, respectively (Study 1), and were differentially moderated by affirmations of moral value and
personal control (Study 2). Also, scapegoating in response to value threat versus control threat produced
divergent, theoretically specified effects on self-perceptions and behavioral intentions (Study 3).
Keywords: dual-motive model, scapegoating, guilt, personal control, climate change
Scapegoating is the act of blaming and often punishing a person
or a group for a negative outcome that is due, at least in large part,
to other causes. Infamous historical examples of scapegoating
include the witch trials that occurred in Europe and North America
from the 14th to the 18th century, when members of Christian
institutions accused thousands of people (mostly women) of cor-
rupting society’s moral integrity by practicing witchcraft, and the
Nazis’ attempted extermination of Jews and other minority groups
for their alleged responsibility for Germany’s economic collapse.
Capetown, Bosnia, and Rwanda give additional testimony to the
violent conflict that can result when one group is designated as the
chief cause of major misfortunes.
Scapegoating continues to occur today in various forms.
Whether it is politicians blaming China for the worldwide eco-
nomic recession (Chen, 2010), Americans blaming Muslims for all
incidents of terrorism (Foley, 2011), or religious fundamentalists
blaming homosexual individuals for the decline of traditional
American values (Eckholm, 2011), people seem all too eager to
heap blame onto others for major misfortunes. It is therefore
surprising that, after receiving a flurry of theoretical and empirical
attention during the 1940s and 1950s (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1948, 1954/1979; Dollard,
Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Hovland & Sears, 1940),
the topic of scapegoating has largely receded from focus in con-
temporary social psychology.
To fill this gap, we present a “dual-motive” model that attempts
to provide an integrative and generative empirical framework for
understanding when people are most likely to scapegoat and what
psychological motives underlie this behavior at the level of the
individual. We describe our model in more detail below, but
briefly stated, it posits that scapegoating can serve two meaning-
fully distinct motives: (a) maintaining perceived personal moral
value by minimizing feelings of guilt over one’s responsibility for
a negative outcome and (b) maintaining perceived personal control
by obtaining a clear explanation for a seemingly inexplicable
negative outcome that is otherwise difficult to explain or control.
We assess this dual-motive model in three studies that test
whether activating each motive influences scapegoating as a func-
tion of theoretically specified predictors, mediating variables, and
moderating variables. We also test whether the effect of activating
each motive on scapegoating produces distinct downstream effects
on self-perceptions and behavioral intentions. These studies test
model—derived hypotheses in the context of people’s attitudes
toward environmental destruction and global climate change—
topics of contemporary societal concern.
In the following two sections, we bring into relief two influential
theoretical accounts of the motives behind scapegoating: one fo-
cused on the motive to perceive the self as morally valuable, the
other focused on the motive to perceive the self as having control
over one’s environment. We then describe how our dual-motive
model integrates both accounts in a way that permits the derivation
of novel, testable hypotheses about the causes and consequences of
scapegoating.
Scapegoating to Maintain Moral Value
Gordon Allport (1948, 1954/1979) observed that the term scape-
goat derives from the Biblical story of the goat that ancient
Israelites used to carry their sins into the desert. Interpreting this
This article was published Online First April 30, 2012.
Zachary K. Rothschild, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Lucas A.
Keefer, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Zachary
K. Rothschild, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, 1415
Jayhawk Boulevard, Room 426, Lawrence, KS 66045-7556. E-mail:
zachary.rothschild@gmail.com
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2012 American Psychological Association
2012, Vol. 102, No. 6, 1148–1163 0022-3514/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0027413
1148

story and the psychology of blame displacement through the lens
of psychoanalytic theory, Allport argued that scapegoating can
occur as a special case of defensive projection, that is, attributing
to somebody else a thought or an impulse that is feared in oneself.
In scapegoating, the individual or group seeks to symbolically
purge their own (largely implicit) feelings of inferiority, guilt, and
self-hatred by perceiving a target individual or an outgroup as
immoral or dangerous, and by expelling, isolating, or otherwise
punishing that scapegoated target.
Allport stressed that scapegoating is a flexible strategy for
maintaining the perceived moral value of oneself or one’s group,
by which he meant that people can relieve their negative self-views
by projecting superficially unrelated negative characteristics onto
scapegoats (e.g., suppressing the threatening awareness of one’s
own sexual impulses by projecting greediness onto an outgroup).
Adorno et al. (1950) similarly proposed that people’s occasional
desire to punish others who violate societal norms is driven by
repressed hostility tracing back to superficially unrelated child-
hood conflicts. However, this conception of scapegoating as a
flexible strategy to maintain perceived moral value failed to garner
empirical support (e.g., Gollwitzer, 2004), and it fell into disfavor
as psychoanalytic theory receded from the mainstream in the social
sciences (Glick, 2005).
More recent theoretical accounts in this vein (e.g., T. Douglas,
1995) posit that scapegoating is better understood as a strategy that
people use to minimize feelings of guilt over their responsibility
for a specific negative outcome by transferring blame for that
outcome to another individual or group. Consistent with this re-
vised view is research showing that people externalize blame for
negative outcomes that would otherwise incriminate themselves or
their group, even when self-presentation concerns are minimized
(Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Kelly & Michela, 1980; Mezulis,
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2007; Sheppard, Malone, & Sweeny,
2008). However, to our knowledge, prior research has not provided
a direct empirical test of whether people attribute inordinate blame
for a negative outcome they experience to a target outgroup in
order to minimize feelings of guilt connected to their potential
responsibility for that outcome. One goal of the present research
was to directly test this possibility.
Although an account of scapegoating emphasizing people’s
motive to maintain perceived personal moral value offers a pro-
vocative explanation for many instances of scapegoating, it would
seem to have difficulty explaining those instances in which indi-
viduals are unlikely to perceive themselves as responsible for the
relevant negative outcome. For example, in 2001, television evan-
gelist Pat Robertson infamously declared that civil liberties orga-
nizations, feminists, and other politically left-leaning groups were
largely to blame for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
the United States, and yet it is unlikely that Robertson felt implicit
or explicit guilt over his personal responsibility for those attacks.
Such instances may be better explained by another theoretical
account of scapegoating, described next.
Scapegoating to Maintain Perceived Personal Control
Classic (e.g., Bandura, 1977) and contemporary (Kay, Whitson,
Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009) perspectives converge on the notion
that people are fundamentally motivated to maintain the perception
that they have effective control over their environment. People’s
perceived personal control can be threatened when they encounter
a significant negative outcome, such as a disease epidemic or an
economic recession, that appears to be due to unknown or chaotic
factors. Focalizing responsibility for the negative outcome onto a
scapegoat may serve as a strategy for restoring perceived control
because scapegoats, in contrast to chaotic and impersonal forces,
can be clearly identified, counteracted, and (at least) understood.
Note that this account of scapegoating is distinct from the previ-
ously discussed account emphasizing moral value maintenance. If
people are confronted with a hazardous or an otherwise threatening
event or circumstance that lacks an easily comprehensible and
controllable cause, they may be motivated to explain it in a way
that restores perceived control even if they do not feel significant
guilt over their responsibility for that negative outcome.
Theoretical support for this control-maintenance account comes
from Allport (1948), who proposed that scapegoating can help the
individual maintain the perception that the external world is or-
derly, stable, and predictable (rather than chaotic and dangerous).
Staub (1989) similarly proposed that genocide is largely fueled by
the perpetrator group’s desire to find a scapegoat that can be seen
as responsible for large-scale threatening outcomes that are other-
wise difficult to explain. Most recently, Glick (2002, 2005) pro-
posed that individuals are attracted to ideologies that attribute
widespread negative outcomes without clear causes to the actions
of a target group because such ideologies provide a simple, cul-
turally sanctioned explanation for why bad things happen, as well
as a ready-made solution for restoring perceived control over the
environment: punishing or eliminating the scapegoat.
In addition to highlighting the control-restorative function of
scapegoat ideologies, Glick (2005) noted that whether or not
scapegoating is an effective means of restoring perceived control
following exposure to a seemingly inexplicable outcome depends
on the scapegoated target’s perceived “viability.” A viable scape-
goat is perceived as possessing both the ability and the malicious
intent necessary to deliberately cause the threatening outcome that
needs to be explained. In contrast, if a person or group appears
patently incapable of having caused the outcome—for instance, if
they appear too weak to have exerted the amount of influence
necessary—then they will likely be perceived as a nonviable
scapegoat and will therefore not restore perceived personal control.
Glick supports this analysis by pointing out that groups stereo-
typed as competent and malicious, rather than as weak and vul-
nerable, are most likely to be designated as scapegoats. For exam-
ple, the Nazis blamed the “worldwide Jewish conspiracy” for
causing Germany’s collapse, citing the relative success of the
Jewish people in banking, industry, the media, and government. In
support of this notion, Bilwicz and Krziminski (2010) found that
perceptions of Jewish control appeared to partially mediate the
effect of deprivation on anti-Semitism in a Polish sample.
Although it might be expected that encountering powerful,
malicious outgroups would reduce perceived control compared
with weaker targets, it is possible that people prefer seeing viable
scapegoats as responsible for a seemingly random negative out-
come to leaving that outcome unexplained. Even the most power-
ful scapegoat target permits relatively greater control by presenting
the individual or group with a clear agent against which to focus
their efforts in coping with the negative outcome.
Glick’s (2002) analysis focuses on expressions of scapegoating
at the level of group relations and ideologies, and therefore does
1149
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

not emphasize the potential role of control motivation in driving
scapegoating behavior at the individual level. Recently, however,
Sullivan, Landau, and Rothschild (2010) demonstrated that control
motivation lies behind the related individual-level tendency to
attribute malevolent power to an enemy figure. These researchers
theorized that people’s perception of control is threatened by their
awareness that multiple sources of potential hazard are spread
diffusely throughout their environment, because this implies that
their well-being and even existence is subject to the influence of
indifferent and indeterminate forces. To the extent that people
perceive an enemy to be an influential source of misfortune in their
life, they can perceive their environment as containing less ran-
domly distributed risk and thus feel a greater sense of personal
control.
This analysis yields the hypothesis that people will imbue real or
imagined enemies with undue power as a way of transferring
ambient danger onto a more concrete and comprehensible adver-
sary. Consistent with this hypothesis, Sullivan et al. (2010) showed
that increasing the salience of diffuse potential hazards in the
environment (e.g., natural disasters, airborne diseases) led partic-
ipants to attribute increased responsibility to a personal enemy for
a range of potential misfortunes unrelated to those salient hazards
(e.g., lost computer files; suspicious bank account activity). A
follow-up study showed that among participants who contem-
plated diffuse chaotic hazards, those presented with an enemy
figure capable of perpetrating a wide range of misfortunes per-
ceived their environment as containing less randomly distributed
risk and, consequently, perceived themselves as having more con-
trol over their life.
These findings provide indirect support for our claim that the
motive to maintain perceived personal control lies behind scape-
goating. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the conceptual
differences between the processes behind scapegoating and en-
emyship. Theoretical perspectives on enemyship view it as a
broad, distal strategy for maintaining perceived control by reduc-
ing the perceived likelihood of encountering myriad prospective
threats in the world (see M. Douglas, 1966). Consistent with this
notion, research shows that people respond to salient chaotic
hazards by projecting onto an enemy figure influence over mis-
fortunes unrelated to the precipitating hazards (Sullivan et al.,
2010). In contrast, scapegoating is viewed as a more proximal
strategy for maintaining perceived control in the face of a seem-
ingly inexplicable negative outcome by blaming a plausible agent
for that outcome. In light of these differences, we believe that the
findings from Sullivan et al.’s enemyship research are suggestive but
do not bear directly on the possibility that increasing the salience of
causal uncertainty surrounding a particular negative outcome will
motivate people to attribute increased blame for that outcome to a
viable scapegoat target, but not a nonviable scapegoat target. Further-
more, it remains to be tested whether this effect occurs indirectly
through decreased perceptions of personal control over the relevant
negative outcome, and whether it is moderated by situational varia-
tions in perceived personal control. One goal of the present research
was to directly test these possibilities.
A Dual-Motive Model of Scapegoating
The preceding literature review highlights two conceptually
distinct motives that potentially lie behind scapegoating at the
individual level: maintaining one’s perceived moral value by min-
imizing guilt over one’s wrongdoing, and maintaining one’s per-
ceived personal control by explaining a negative outcome in one’s
environment that otherwise seems beyond one’s ability to under-
stand or control. Rather than attempt to determine which motive is
paramount, reduce one to the other, or reduce both to a common
source, we propose that each motive contributes independently to
scapegoating. An advantage of this approach is that it allows us to
propose separate “paths” to scapegoating. Each path explains why
scapegoating occurs in response to the salience of different con-
struals of a negative outcome, how scapegoating is mediated and
moderated by different intervening variables, and the different, and
even divergent, consequences of scapegoating for self-perceptions
and behavioral intentions. These two paths are integrated in our
dual-motive model, which is graphically represented in Figure 1
and described next.
The Moral Value Maintenance Path
Our model defines scapegoating along the moral value mainte-
nance path as a response to a significant negative outcome con-
Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of the dual-motive model of scapegoating.
1150 ROTHSCHILD, LANDAU, SULLIVAN, AND KEEFER

strued as being at least partially the result of the harmful actions of
oneself or one’s group. In this situation, individuals experience
feelings of guilt over their harmful actions and a compensatory
desire to minimize their guilt. These feelings of guilt partly stem
from an elevated sense that the self or one’s group has control
over, and is therefore responsible for, the negative outcome in
question. If individuals are unable to restore perceived moral value
by other means, they will attribute increased blame to an available
scapegoat target that is perceived as capable of bearing responsi-
bility for the outcome (i.e., a viable scapegoat), thus yielding their
own perceived responsibility over the outcome. They will also
report a corresponding desire to punish the scapegoat.
The Perceived Control Maintenance Path
Our model defines scapegoating along the control maintenance
path as a response to a significant negative outcome construed as
caused by factors that are beyond one’s ability to explain or
control. In this situation, individuals experience decreased percep-
tions of personal control, defined as a general sense of personal
efficacy, and a compensatory desire to restore perceived personal
control. If individuals are unable to restore perceptions of general
personal control by other means, they will attribute increased
blame to an available scapegoat target seen as capable of providing
a clear causal explanation for, and potential means of coping with,
the relevant negative outcome.
Downstream Consequences
Proposing independent motivational paths for scapegoating al-
lows us to specify hypotheses about not only distinct predictors,
mediators, and moderators, but also the divergent downstream
consequences of scapegoating as a function of which path is
involved. Along the moral value maintenance path, blaming a
viable scapegoat for the relevant negative outcome should reduce
feelings of guilt. It should also result in lower perceived respon-
sibility for the relevant negative outcome. The latter hypothesis is
based on previous research and theory suggesting that feelings of
guilt emerge in response to perceiving oneself as having causal
control over, and thus responsibility for, a given negative outcome
(e.g., McGraw, 1987; Tangney, 1993). Insofar as feelings of guilt
are predicated on feeling personal control over a particular nega-
tive outcome, we expect that attributing blame to a viable scape-
goat for that outcome will cause participants to report both reduced
feelings of guilt and reduced perceptions of personal responsibil-
ity.
Along the control maintenance path, attributing blame to a
viable scapegoat for the relevant negative outcome should have the
opposite consequence for perceptions of personal control defined
more broadly as a general sense of personal efficacy. When people
are exposed to a particular negative outcome that seems beyond
their ability to comprehend and control, subsequent exposure to a
scapegoat who can be viably blamed for that outcome should
increase perceived personal control. This hypothesis is indirectly
supported by evidence that exposure to an enemy figure after a
reminder of diffuse hazards bolstered participants’ perceptions of
general personal control (Sullivan et al., 2010). In contrast to its
hypothesized influence on perceived personal control over a spe-
cific negative outcome, scapegoating along the control mainte-
nance path is not hypothesized to influence feelings of personal
guilt, because the salience of an uncontrollable negative outcome
does not necessarily assign causal responsibility for that outcome
to the self.
Our dual-motive model also specifies hypotheses related to the
downstream consequences of scapegoating on behavioral inten-
tions. Prior research shows that the motivation to reduce feelings
of guilt drives people to engage in behaviors aimed at repairing the
harm they have caused (e.g., Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones,
2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Nelissen, Dijker, & De Vries, 2007).
Therefore, along the moral value maintenance path, the presence
of a viable scapegoat should, by reducing feelings of guilt, reduce
individuals’ willingness to engage in behaviors aimed at amelio-
rating the harm they have caused. In contrast, we do not expect
scapegoating along the control maintenance path to have this effect
on intentions to engage in reparative behaviors.
Overview of the Present Studies
In the present studies, we tested hypotheses derived from our
dual-motive model with the broad goal of demonstrating the ex-
istence and independence of two motivational paths to scapegoat-
ing. More specifically, we tested whether scapegoating can occur
as a function of distinct, theoretically specified predictors, medi-
ating variables, and moderating variables, and furthermore
whether scapegoating along each path produces distinct down-
stream consequences for self-perceptions and behavioral inten-
tions. We tested our model in the context of people’s attitudes
surrounding environmental destruction and catastrophic climate
change, topics which we felt lent themselves equally to framings
that threatened either perceived moral value or perceived personal
control.
In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that framing environmental
destruction as a threat to either moral value or control would lead
to scapegoating as a function of different mediating variables.
Specifically, we predicted that participants primed to view envi-
ronmental destruction as due to their own negligent behavior
(value threat condition) would attribute greater responsibility for
environmental destruction to oil companies (and report a corre-
sponding desire to punish oil companies) compared with partici-
pants who were not primed with the hazardous consequences of
environmental destruction (no threat condition), and that this effect
would occur indirectly through feelings of personal guilt, but not
through perceptions of personal control. We further predicted that
participants primed to view environmental destruction as due to
unknown causes (control threat condition) would attribute greater
responsibility to, and desire stronger punishment of, oil companies
compared with participants in the no-threat condition, and that this
effect would occur indirectly through perceptions of personal
control, but not through feelings of guilt.
We further assessed the independence of the value- and control-
maintenance paths in Study 2 by testing whether the effects of
framing climate change in a value-threatening or control-
threatening manner on scapegoating would be differentially mod-
erated by distinct affirmation inductions. Specifically, we pre-
dicted that the effect of a value threat on scapegoating would be
attenuated if participants had the opportunity to affirm their moral
value in a domain superficially unrelated to climate change,
whereas the effect of a control threat on scapegoating would be
1151
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

attenuated if participants had the opportunity to affirm their per-
ceived personal control in an unrelated domain. As a critical test of
the proposed independence of these motivational paths, we hy-
pothesized that the effects of value threat and control threat on
scapegoating would not be attenuated, respectively, by affirmation
of one’s personal control and moral value. To clarify, our empir-
ical approach was to provide converging tests of our proposed
model by measuring key hypothetical constructs in Study 1 and
testing their hypothesized role in mediating scapegoating, and then
experimentally manipulating those same constructs in Study 2 and
testing their hypothesized role in moderating scapegoating.
Focusing on downstream consequences, in Study 3 we tested the
hypothesis that participants in a value threat condition would
report increased feelings of guilt and that this effect would be
attenuated if participants were given the opportunity to blame a
viable scapegoat (oil companies) for climate change, but not if they
had the opportunity to blame a nonviable scapegoat (the Amish)
for climate change. We also predicted that, among participants in
a control threat condition, those given a chance to blame a viable
scapegoat, but not a nonviable scapegoat, would report bolstered
perceptions of general personal control. Finally, we hypothesized
that participants under value threat and subsequently presented
with a viable scapegoat would report less willingness to engage in
behaviors meant to reduce their harmful impact on the environ-
ment, and that this interactive effect would be mediated by de-
creased feelings of guilt.
Study 1
In recent years, there has been a growing popular concern about
hazards resulting from human destruction of the natural environ-
ment. People rarely assume personal responsibility for contributing
to environmental destruction, however, and instead relegate blame
to other groups such as governments or business organizations
(Lorenzoni & Langford, 2002). In Study 1, we used this real-life
context of scapegoating to provide an initial test of our dual-
motive model. Specifically, we hypothesized that framing a neg-
ative outcome in either a value-threatening or a control-threatening
manner would increase scapegoating equally but that these effects
would be differentially mediated by feelings of personal guilt and
perceptions of personal control.
We manipulated threat by framing the harmful consequences of
environmental destruction as either the result of the participants’
own actions (value threat condition) or the result of unknown
causes and thus beyond participants’ control (control threat con-
dition). Participants assigned to a third, no-threat condition were
not reminded of the hazards of environmental destruction. After-
wards, participants reported their feelings of personal guilt for their
negative environmental impact and their perceptions of personal
control over the harmful effects of environmental destruction.
Finally, participants indicated the extent to which they believed
that oil companies should be blamed and punished for the harmful
consequences of environmental destruction.
We predicted that participants in both the value threat condition
and the control threat condition would blame (and seek to punish)
oil companies more than participants in the no-threat condition.
We also predicted that the effect of threat on scapegoating would
occur via distinct indirect effects according to condition: In the
value threat condition, increased scapegoating should occur
through increased feelings of personal guilt, but not through vari-
ations in perceived control, whereas in the control threat condition,
increased scapegoating should occur through decreased percep-
tions of personal control, but not through variations in feelings of
personal guilt.
Method
One-hundred fourteen participants (62 women;
1
ages 18–55)
completed a survey on a midwestern university campus in ex-
change for candy. Potential participants were approached by male
and female experimenters and asked to complete a packet of
opinion questionnaires dealing with current issues. Only 5% of
those asked declined to participate. Participants were randomly
assigned to conditions in a single-factor design with three levels:
value threat versus control threat versus no threat.
Threat manipulation. The first questionnaire constituted the
threat manipulation. In the value threat and control threat condi-
tions, this questionnaire was described as an “Environmental
Awareness Survey.”
In the value threat condition, the purported purpose of the
survey was to assess people’s awareness of the lifestyle choices
that contribute to environmental destruction. The instructions
stated that threatening hazards result from environmental destruc-
tion, which is caused by the lifestyle choices that some people
make every day. Participants were instructed to read seven state-
ments describing environmentally destructive behaviors, which
were purportedly proven to cause harmful environmental condi-
tions, and to rate how true each statement was for them personally.
In an effort to increase participants’ feelings of personal respon-
sibility for environmental hazard, the seven statements refer to
behaviors that we assumed would be common for participants in
our sample (e.g., “I drive my car when I could walk, ride a bike,
or take public transportation; I use the dryer when I could air-dry
my clothing instead”). Responses were made on a 7-point scale
(1 ⫽not at all true for me,7⫽completely true for me). Support-
ing our assumption that the items referred to common behaviors, a
one-sample ttest revealed that the grand mean of the composite
scores averaging across the seven items (M
grand
⫽5.00, SD ⫽
1.11) was significantly higher than the scale’s midpoint (4),
t(31) ⫽5.26, p⬍.001.
In the control threat condition, the purported purpose of the
survey was to assess people’s beliefs about how much control they
have over hazards caused by the unexplained destruction of the
natural environment. The instructions stated that threatening haz-
ards result from environmental destruction, which is caused by
“unknown sources.” Participants were instructed to indicate their
agreement with seven statements regarding their personal control
over hazardous environmental conditions, all of which concerned
large-scale environmental hazards meant to be perceived as be-
yond any individual’s control (e.g., “I have control over tornadoes
and other natural disasters; I have control over whether my state
suffers from drought or flooding”; 1 ⫽not at all true for me,7⫽
1
In this and the following studies, we originally performed our primary
analyses including gender as a between-subjects variable. Because we
observed no significant main effects or interactions involving gender, we
omit gender from our reporting of the results to simplify presentation.
1152 ROTHSCHILD, LANDAU, SULLIVAN, AND KEEFER

completely true for me). Although specific examples of hazardous
environmental conditions were identified, the instructions empha-
sized that the source of the environmental destruction purportedly
causing these hazardous conditions is unexplained. Supporting our
assumption that these items referred to outcomes that participants
would perceive to be beyond their personal control, a one-sample
ttest revealed that the grand mean of the composite scores aver-
aging across the seven items (M
grand
⫽2.40, SD ⫽1.03) was
significantly lower than the scale’s midpoint (4), t(37) ⫽⫺7.14,
p⬍.001.
Participants in the no-threat condition responded to a “Person-
ality Awareness Survey” purportedly designed to assess the gap
between university administrators’ awareness of student lifestyles
and students’ actual behavior. Participants indicated their agree-
ment with seven statements referring to relatively benign aspects
of daily life (e.g., “I like to stay busy and get bored easily”) using
the same 7-point scale used in the other two conditions.
Guilt measure. After the threat manipulation, participants
were presented with response items developed by Ferguson (2009)
for the purpose of measuring feelings of guilt over contributing to
climate change, but here adapted to refer to one’s personal con-
tribution to environmental harm more generally. Specifically, par-
ticipants were instructed to indicate their agreement with four
statements referring to their guilt over contributing to environmen-
tal harm (e.g., “I feel guilty for the negative impact my lifestyle has
on the environment”). Participants made their responses by mark-
ing an Xon a continuous line anchored on the left with “not at all”
and on the right with “very much.” These responses were coded in
centimeters from the left end of the line, such that higher scores
indicated higher feelings of guilt (possible scores ranged from 0 to
13). Responses across the four items were internally reliable (␣⫽
.95) and were averaged to create composite guilt scores (M
grand
⫽
5.59, SD ⫽3.37).
Personal control measure. Because no existing measure
could be found that specifically assessed perceptions of control
over hazardous environmental conditions, this construct was mea-
sured by asking participants to indicate their agreement with a
single face-valid item: “There is nothing I can do to prevent
worsening environmental conditions.” Participants made their re-
sponses using the same continuous scale used for the guilt measure
(M
grand
⫽9.29, SD ⫽3.15). Responses on this item were reverse
scored, such that higher scores indicated greater perceived per-
sonal control.
The guilt and control measures were counterbalanced in order of
presentation, and preliminary analyses revealed no main effects or
interactions involving presentation order; thus, this factor was
omitted from subsequent analyses.
Scapegoating measure. Finally, participants answered five
questions assessing the extent to which they believed oil compa-
nies should be blamed and punished for the harmful consequences
of environmental destruction: “To what extent do you believe that:
oil companies are responsible for the destruction of the environ-
ment?; oil companies are to blame for the effects of environmental
devastation?; oil companies are at fault for the effects of environ-
mental damage?; oil companies are guilty of severely damaging
the global environment?; oil companies should be punished for
their contribution to the destruction of the natural environment?”
Responses were made on a 6-point scale (1 ⫽not at all,6⫽very
much) and were averaged to form composite scapegoating scores
(␣⫽.94).
Results
Guilt. First, we tested whether the threat manipulation influ-
enced feelings of personal guilt in the hypothesized direction.
Submitting guilt scores to a one-way (value threat vs. control threat
vs. no threat) analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant
omnibus effect, F(2, 111) ⫽4.74, p⫽.01, ␩
2
⫽.08.
2
Supporting
predictions, pairwise comparisons (Fisher’s least significant dif-
ference test) revealed that participants in the value threat condition
reported feeling more guilt over the negative impact that their
lifestyle has on the environment (M⫽7.03, SD ⫽3.24) compared
with participants in the control threat condition (M⫽4.69, SD ⫽
3.26), F(1, 111) ⫽8.94, p⫽.003, and the no-threat condition
(M⫽5.31, SD ⫽3.26), F(1, 111) ⫽5.15, p⫽.03. Mean levels
of guilt in the control threat and no-threat conditions were statis-
tically equivalent (F⬍1.00, p⫽.39).
Personal control. A Levene’s test for heterogeneity of vari-
ance indicated that responses to our measure of perceived personal
control violated the homogeneity of variance assumption, F(2,
111) ⫽8.23, p⬍.001. Accordingly, we conducted Welch’s
alternative ANOVA procedure on perceived personal control
scores, which Tomarken and Serlin (1986) identify as the optimal
procedure when the homogeneity of variance assumption is vio-
lated. This analysis revealed a significant omnibus effect, F(2,
65.139) ⫽5.04, p⫽.009.
3
As predicted, post hoc contrasts
showed that participants in the control threat condition reported
feeling less control over worsening environmental conditions
(M⫽7.94, SD ⫽3.73) compared with participants in the value
threat condition (M⫽9.67, SD ⫽2.97), t(67.829) ⫽2.14, p⫽.04,
and no-threat condition (M⫽10.16, SD ⫽2.24), t(58.695) ⫽3.19,
p⫽.002. Mean personal control scores in the value threat and
no-threat conditions were statistically equivalent, t(54.997) ⫽
0.79, p⫽.44.
Scapegoating. Submitting scapegoating scores to an
ANOVA revealed a significant omnibus effect, F(2, 111) ⫽6.53,
p⫽.002, ␩
2
⫽.11. Compared with participants in the no-threat
condition (M⫽3.94, SD ⫽1.01), participants attributed more
blame to, and reported greater desire to punish, oil companies for
the harmful consequences of environmental destruction in both the
value threat condition (M⫽4.53, SD ⫽0.95), F(1, 111) ⫽7.02,
p⫽.01, and the control threat condition (M⫽4.66, SD ⫽0.93),
2
Across all three studies, we conducted a Levene’s test for heterogene-
ity of variance for all primary analyses. Although this analysis yielded a
significant Fstatistic for the one-way ANOVA on personal control in
Study 1 (p⬍.001), all subsequent tests were nonsignificant (Fs⬍2.15,
ps⬎.10), indicating that the homogeneity of variance assumption was met
for the remainder of our analyses.
3
For all cases in which the assumption of homogeneity of variance was
met, pairwise comparisons were tested with Ftests using full-sample
degrees of freedom and corresponding omnibus MSE terms. However,
because it is not appropriate to use an omnibus MSE term for pairwise
comparisons when the variance between groups is heterogeneous (Howell,
1997), we performed pairwise comparisons on perceived personal control
in Study 1 with ttests using the Welch procedure and degrees of freedom
estimated for each simple effect.
1153
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

F(1, 111) ⫽11.36, p⫽.001. Mean scapegoating scores did not
significantly differ between the two threat conditions (F⬍1.00,
p⫽.59).
Analysis of indirect effects. We then conducted separate
indirect effect analyses to test our mediational hypothesis that the
increased scapegoating produced by value threat and control threat
occurs, respectively, through increased feelings of guilt and de-
creased perceptions of personal control.
Using the bootstrapping procedure and corresponding SPSS
macro of Preacher and Hayes (2008), we first regressed scapegoat-
ing scores onto value threat condition (coded: value threat ⫽
1/control threat ⫽0/no threat ⫽0), with guilt scores and personal
control scores entered as the proposed mediators and control threat
condition (coded: value threat ⫽0/control threat ⫽1/no threat ⫽
0) entered as a covariate. Five-thousand bootstrap resamples were
performed. As predicted, the 95% confidence interval obtained for
the indirect effect of value threat condition on scapegoating scores
through the mediator of guilt did not contain zero [.04, .39],
whereas the confidence interval for the indirect effect of value
threat through the mediator of perceived control did contain zero
[⫺.24, .06]. These results are consistent with our mediational
hypothesis that the increase in scapegoating in the value threat
condition (vs. the no-threat condition) occurs through a corre-
sponding increase in feelings of guilt; and importantly that this
effect does not occur through variations in perceptions of personal
control.
Using the same bootstrapping procedure, we then regressed
scapegoating scores onto dummy-coded control threat condition
with guilt scores, and personal control scores entered as proposed
mediators and dummy-coded value threat condition entered as a
covariate. The 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of
control threat on scapegoating scores through the mediator of
perceived personal control did not contain zero [.03, .36], whereas
the confidence interval for the indirect effect of control threat
through the mediator of guilt did contain zero [⫺.04, .17]. These
results support our mediational hypothesis that the increase in
scapegoating in the control threat condition (vs. the no-threat
condition) occurs through the corresponding decrease in perceived
personal control, but not though variations in feelings of guilt (see
Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of the mediation model).
Discussion
Supporting hypotheses, the results of Study 1 show that, com-
pared with participants who were not reminded of the hazards of
environmental destruction, those primed to feel personally respon-
sible for environmental destruction or uncertain of its cause attrib-
uted more blame to oil companies and showed a greater desire to
punish oil companies for the negative consequences wrought by
such destruction. Results were also consistent with our differential
mediational hypothesis: The effect of value threat on scapegoating
occurred indirectly through increased feelings of personal guilt,
but not through perceptions of personal control, whereas the effect
of control threat on scapegoating occurred indirectly through de-
creased perceptions of personal control, but not through feelings of
guilt. These results suggest that when individuals are confronted
with a negative outcome framed as the result of their own harmful
actions, they scapegoat in response to elevated feelings of personal
guilt; when the cause of the harm is unknown, they scapegoat to
compensate for decreased perceptions of personal control. These
results support our broader theoretical claim that the desire to
maintain a sense of personal moral value and the desire to maintain
a sense of personal control constitute independent motivational
paths to scapegoating.
In the next study, we sought to complement the meditational
approach used in Study 1 with a moderation approach that in-
volved manipulating (rather than measuring) the constructs of
perceived moral value and perceived personal control. Specifi-
cally, we tested whether the effect of value threat and control threat
on scapegoating would be attenuated, respectively, by affirmations
of moral value and personal control. In addition, in Study 2 we
addressed one limitation of Study 1, namely, that the general
salience of negative environmental hazard differed as a function of
threat condition. That is, beyond experiencing a value threat or a
control threat, participants in both threat conditions were primed
with the harmful consequences of environmental destruction,
whereas those in the no-threat condition were not. This introduces
the possibility that participants in both the value threat condition
and the control threat condition showed higher scapegoating than
participants in the no-threat condition simply because environmen-
tal hazard was more salient in those threat conditions. This possi-
Figure 2. Indirect effects of threat condition on scapegoating through feelings of personal guilt and perceived
personal control (Study 1). All path coefficients represent standardized regression weights. The direct effect
coefficients represent the effect of each threat variable on the dependent variable after controlling for the effect
of the proposed mediators. Total adjusted R
2
for the model ⫽.20, F(4, 109) ⫽8.21, p⬍.001. Total effect of
value threat: ␤⫽.25
ⴱ
. Direct effect of value threat: ␤⫽.17, ns. Total effect of control threat: ␤⫽.36
ⴱ
. Direct
effect of control threat: ␤⫽.29
ⴱ
.
ⴱ
p⬍.05.
1154 ROTHSCHILD, LANDAU, SULLIVAN, AND KEEFER

bility seems unlikely given that we found evidence that these threat
conditions increased scapegoating indirectly through distinct me-
diating variables specified by our model. Nevertheless, we at-
tempted to rule out this possibility in Study 2 by exposing partic-
ipants in all conditions to the same information about the perils of
climate change and manipulating only the causal framing of this
negative outcome.
Study 2
Study 2 provides a further test of the existence of independent
motivational paths to scapegoating by including experimental ma-
nipulations designed to target the conceptual variables that we
measured as mediators in Study 1. Specifically, in Study 2 we est
whether the effects of value threat and control threat on scape-
goating found in Study 1 are differentially moderated by affirma-
tion inductions designed to restore perceptions of one’s moral
value or personal control. If framing a negative outcome as due to
individuals’ own harmful actions motivates them to compensate
for the threat to their moral value by means of scapegoating, then
providing an alternative means of restoring perceived moral value
should attenuate this effect. Analogously, if framing a negative
outcome as due to unknown causes motivates individuals to restore
perceived personal control by means of scapegoating, then provid-
ing an alternative means of restoring perceived personal control
should attenuate this particular effect.
To test these hypotheses, we presented participants with what
was purported to be a scientific article that, depending on condi-
tion, framed catastrophic climate change as primarily caused by
harmful actions on the part of participants’ ingroup (young Amer-
icans), unknown sources, or the harmful actions of an outgroup
(middle-aged Americans). Including this third condition allowed
us to expose all participants to the same information about cata-
strophic climate change and thus control for possible effects of
differential salience of environmental hazards.
After the threat manipulation, participants were asked to com-
plete a writing task that gave them the opportunity to affirm either
their own moral value or their sense of personal control in a
domain unrelated to climate change. Participants then indicated the
extent to which they blamed and desired to punish international
corporations for the hazardous consequences of climate change.
We changed the target scapegoat group from Study 1 (oil compa-
nies) to Study 2 (international corporations) to improve the gen-
eralizability of our hypothesized effects and ensure that they are
not specific to oil companies as a targeted scapegoat. Given the
popularity of blaming international corporations for various neg-
ative social, economic, and environmental outcomes (e.g.,
Kortens, 2001), we felt that this group would readily serve as a
viable scapegoat target for the present study. Guided by our
dual-motive model, we predicted that participants would show
increased scapegoating of international corporations when the in-
group (vs. an outgroup) was framed as responsible for hazardous
climate change and that this effect would be attenuated by a moral
value affirmation, but not by a personal control affirmation. Fur-
thermore, we predicted that participants would show increased
scapegoating when hazardous climate change was attributed to
unknown causes (compared with participants in the outgroup re-
sponsible condition) and that this effect would be attenuated by a
personal control affirmation, but not by a moral value affirmation.
Method
Sixty-one psychology undergraduates (35 women) from a mid-
western university participated in partial fulfillment of a course
requirement. Because in this and the following study, moral value
was threatened through an article attributing responsibility for
global climate change to people ages 18–25, only participants
within this age range were recruited. In a laboratory setting,
participants were told that they would be taking part in two
separate studies. The first study was described as an investigation
of personality and knowledge about climate change, whereas the
second study was described as an investigation of people’s judg-
ments about different groups. In private cubicles, participants
completed all the materials on computers. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to conditions in a 3 (threat condition: value threat
vs. control threat vs. no threat) ⫻2 (affirmation: moral value vs.
personal control) between-subjects factorial design, with scape-
goating serving as the dependent variable of primary interest.
Threat manipulation. First, all participants read an article,
ostensibly written by scientific experts, entitled “The Causes and
Consequences of Climate Change.” The first section of this
experimenter-fabricated article was identical across conditions and
discussed the negative effects of climate change, including animal
extinctions and an increasing threat of natural disasters. The sec-
ond section, entitled “Who’s to Blame?” differed across condi-
tions.
In the value threat condition, this section identified young
Americans (ages 18–25) as the primary contributors to climate
change. The article concluded by stating that “Until young Amer-
icans start to acknowledge their responsibility for the damaging
effects of climate change, things are likely to only get worse.” In
the control threat condition, this section of the article stated that
scientists are currently unable to determine what causes climate
change. The article concluded “Until we can identify who or what
is responsible for the damaging effects of climate change, things
are likely to only get worse.” In the no-threat condition, this
section of the article was nearly identical to the corresponding
section of the article in the value threat condition except that
middle-aged Americans (ages 35–55), rather than young Ameri-
cans, were identified as the primary contributors to climate change.
Affirmation manipulation. Next, participants received a
questionnaire purported to be a personality assessment. This ques-
tionnaire constituted our affirmation manipulation. Participants
assigned to the moral value affirmation condition responded to the
following writing prompt: “In a few sentences briefly describe
something about yourself that makes you feel like a good and
decent person.” Participants in the control affirmation condition
responded to the following writing prompt: “In a few sentences
please briefly describe something in your life that you have com-
plete control over.” Underneath both prompts was a full page of
blank lines. Inspection of participants’ written responses revealed
that no participant wrote about issues surrounding climate change.
Participants were then introduced to what was ostensibly a
second, unrelated study. They were told that they would be asked
to answer some questions about a group. To minimize suspicions
about connections between the threat manipulation and our pri-
mary dependent measure, we arranged it so that the computer
chose a target group ostensibly at random from an assortment of
1155
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

candidate groups. In actuality, all participants answered questions
about international corporations.
Scapegoating measure. The degree to which participants
blamed and sought to punish international corporations for their
role in climate change was measured by having participants com-
plete the same scapegoating measure used in Study 1, with the
exception that the five items referred to international corporations
rather than oil companies (␣⫽.88).
Results
Scapegoating. We predicted that participants primed to view
climate change as due to their own group’s harmful actions (value
threat condition) and those primed to view climate change as due
to unknown causes (control threat condition) would show higher
levels of scapegoating than participants primed to view climate
change as due to an outgroup’s harmful actions (no-threat condi-
tion). Furthermore, we predicted that the effects of value threat
and control threat would be attenuated, respectively, by affir-
mations of moral value and personal control. To test these
predictions, we submitted scapegoating scores to a 3 (threat
condition: value threat vs. control threat vs. no threat) ⫻2
(affirmation: moral value vs. personal control) between-
subjects ANOVA. We obtained the predicted two-way interac-
tion, F(2, 55) ⫽10.46, p⬍.001, ␩
2
⫽.27.
Supporting predictions, pairwise comparisons and the pattern of
means depicted in Figure 3 revealed that, among participants who
were not given the opportunity to affirm their moral value (i.e.,
who affirmed their personal control instead), those in the value
threat condition exhibited higher levels of scapegoating (M⫽
4.15, SD ⫽0.66) than participants in both the control threat
condition (M⫽2.92, SD ⫽0.72), F(1, 55) ⫽10.63, p⬍.001, and
the no-threat condition (M⫽3.38, SD ⫽1.22), F(1, 55) ⫽8.46,
p⫽.03. Also as predicted, among participants who were not given
an opportunity to affirm their personal control (i.e., who affirmed
their personal moral value), those in the control threat condition
exhibited higher levels of scapegoating (M⫽4.37, SD ⫽0.62)
than participants in both the value threat condition (M⫽2.90,
SD ⫽0.66), F(1, 55) ⫽12.49, p⬍.001, and the no-threat
condition (M⫽3.52, SD ⫽0.66), F(1, 55) ⫽4.23, p⫽.04.
Also supporting predictions, within the value threat condition,
participants who affirmed their moral value following the threat
induction exhibited lower levels of scapegoating than those who
affirmed their personal control, F(1, 55) ⫽9.66, p⫽.003. Sim-
ilarly, within the control threat condition, participants who af-
firmed personal control following the threat induction exhibited
lower levels of scapegoating than participants who affirmed their
moral value, F(1, 55) ⫽11.18, p⫽.001. Affirmation condition
had no effect on scapegoating level among participants in the
no-threat condition (F⬍1.00, p⫽.71).
Discussion
When confronted with their ingroup’s culpability for climate
change, participants showed an increased tendency to scapegoat
international corporations, and this effect was eliminated if they
had an opportunity to affirm their moral value in an unrelated
domain, but not if they had an opportunity to affirm their personal
control. Analogously, when participants were confronted with the
causal indeterminacy of climate change, they showed an increased
tendency to scapegoat international corporations, and this effect
was eliminated if they had an opportunity to affirm their personal
control, but not if they had an opportunity to affirm their moral
value. These results support our broad theoretical claim that scape-
goating can represent a strategy for restoring one’s perceived
moral value or perceived personal control, depending on whether
a particular negative outcome is framed in a way that threatens
either of these self-perceptions. The fact that the salience of the
negative impact of climate change was equivalent across condi-
tions helps to rule out the possibility that the mere salience of
harmful environmental conditions accounts for our primary scape-
goating effects.
In conjunction with the separate indirect effects reported in
Study 1, the threat-specific moderation effects obtained in Study 2
highlight the independence of our proposed motivational paths to
scapegoating. Simultaneously, they provide converging evidence
to suggest that the effects of our threat conditions in Study 1 did in
fact occur through elevated feelings of guilt or reduced perceptions
of personal control. As discussed by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong
(2005), correlational indirect effects designs in which both pro-
posed mediators and outcomes are measured rather than manipu-
lated (as was the case for the present Study 1) do not yield
conclusive evidence regarding mediation. However, by directly
manipulating in Study 2 our key constructs (feelings related to
moral value and perceptions of control) that were measured as
mediators in Study 1, we were able to establish more direct causal
evidence to suggest that value threats and control threats increase
scapegoating via increased guilt and reduced personal control,
respectively.
Study 3
In Studies 1 and 2, we examined the factors that influence
scapegoating behavior. In Study 3, we built on these studies by
examining the downstream consequences of scapegoating. On the
Figure 3. Scapegoating as a function of threat condition (climate change
attributed to ingroup [value threat], unknown causes [control threat], or an
outgroup [no threat]) and affirmation type (Study 2). Higher scores indicate
higher attributions of blame and greater desire to punish international
corporations for the negative effects of climate change. Scale ranges from
1 to 6. Error bars represent standard errors.
1156 ROTHSCHILD, LANDAU, SULLIVAN, AND KEEFER

basis of our dual-motive model, we hypothesized that, depending
on whether climate change was framed as threatening one’s moral
value or perceived control, scapegoating should have differential
effects on self-perceptions and behavioral intentions. Focusing on
self-perceptions, we hypothesized that when climate change was
framed in a way that makes participants feel guilty for their own
actions, providing them with the opportunity to attribute blame to
a scapegoat would reduce feelings of personal guilt. Also, in line
with the findings reported by Sullivan et al. (2010), we hypothe-
sized that when climate change was framed in a causally indeter-
minate way threatening perceived personal control in the world,
the opportunity to scapegoat would bolster perceptions of general
personal control over one’s life. We did not expect this causal
indeterminacy framing of climate change to influence feelings of
guilt, however, because there is no reason to expect that partici-
pants would interpret this framing as implicating them personally
in contributing to climate change.
Because our model portrays scapegoating along the control
maintenance path as a strategy for maintaining general perceived
personal control in the face of threatening outcomes that seem
otherwise difficult to control, we sought to advance beyond Study
1 by measuring personal control in a way that captures a general
sense of personal efficacy over one’s life. Specifically, in Study 3
we assessed perceptions of general personal control, rather than
perceptions of control or responsibility specifically in relation to
the relevant negative outcome (in this case, climate change).
Nevertheless, we recognized the possibility that this measure
might also be sensitive to variations in participants’ perceptions of
their responsibility over climate change specifically, particularly in
the value threat condition where participants are told they bear
responsibility for climate change. As mentioned, past research and
theory suggest that feelings of personal guilt are linked to per-
ceived personal responsibility for a given negative outcome (e.g.,
Tangney, 1993). Thus, we allowed for the possibility that, in the
value threat condition, the opportunity to blame a scapegoat would
not only decrease feelings of personal guilt over climate change
but also decrease participants’ perceptions of general personal
control. To clarify, we believe that there is a useful distinction
between perceived personal control, defined broadly as a global
sense that one has efficacy over one’s life, and perceived personal
control, defined more specifically as a sense of personal respon-
sibility over a particular negative outcome. In Study 3, we mea-
sured the former type of perceived personal control because our
primary goal was to test our model-derived hypothesis that blam-
ing a scapegoat for an otherwise inexplicable negative outcome
will bolster people’s general sense that they have efficacy over
their lives. At the same time, we allow for the possibility that this
measure captures specific perceptions of responsibility over cli-
mate change; thus, insofar as value-threatened participants given
the opportunity to scapegoat experience decreased guilt over cli-
mate change, and decreased guilt corresponds to decreased respon-
sibility perceptions, it is possible that these participants will also
report decreased perceived personal control. We make this predic-
tion tentatively because we believe that a proper test of decreased
responsibility perceptions corresponding to decrease guilt should
use a more direct measure of perceived personal responsibility
over the relevant negative outcome, rather than perceptions of
general personal control.
Focusing on behavioral intentions, we hypothesized that, insofar
as increased feelings of guilt for illegitimate harm motivate repar-
ative action (e.g., Amodio et al., 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003;
Nelissen et al., 2007), participants made to feel responsible for
climate change, but then presented with an opportunity to scape-
goat, would be less willing to engage in environmental advocacy.
We also predicted that this effect would occur indirectly through
reduced feelings of personal guilt.
To test these hypotheses, we again manipulated threat by fram-
ing climate change as caused by either the harmful actions of
participants’ ingroup (value threat) or unknown sources (control
threat). Because the focus of Study 3 was on differentiating be-
tween the downstream consequences of scapegoating as a function
of value threat versus control threat, rather than on scapegoating
itself as an outcome, we did not include an additional no-threat
comparison condition as in Studies 1 and 2.
We manipulated opportunity to scapegoat by providing all par-
ticipants with a target outgroup to blame for climate change, but
varying whether or not that group represented a viable scapegoat-
ing target. As discussed in the introduction, Glick (2005) argued
that a social group can viably serve as a scapegoat only when that
group is perceived as sufficiently powerful and malevolent to have
realistically contributed to the negative outcome or event requiring
explanation (in this case, climate change). Accordingly, we pre-
sented participants with the opportunity to blame either oil com-
panies (a viable scapegoat target) or the Amish (a nonviable
scapegoat target) for climate change. We subsequently assessed
participants’ feelings of personal guilt for the negative effects of
climate change, their perceptions of general personal control, and
their willingness to take action to stop climate change.
It is worth noting that Glick’s (2005) notion of viability con-
trasts with earlier accounts of scapegoating, which propose that
weak and vulnerable groups, as opposed to powerful groups, tend
to be scapegoated (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979). In line with Glick’s
analysis of viability, we hypothesized that, insofar as the Amish
are perceived as lacking the power and influence necessary to be
responsible for climate change, blaming the Amish should fail as
an effective means of either reducing guilt or reasserting control.
Alternatively, if earlier theories of scapegoating are correct, we
would expect the Amish to be readily scapegoated.
Past research has shown that individual differences can be
important determinants of individuals’ attitudes toward climate
change and related environmental conditions. For example, polit-
ical orientation and general environmental concern have been
found to be strong predictors of individuals’ belief in climate
change and support for environmental advocacy (e.g., Krosnick,
Holbrook, & Visser, 2000; Schuldt, Konrath, Schwarz, 2011). On
the basis of these findings, we sought to advance beyond our first
two studies by measuring and statistically controlling for these
variables in Study 3 in order to isolate the unique effects of our
experimental manipulations.
Method
Sixty-four undergraduates (32 women; ages 18–25) from a
midwestern university participated in partial fulfillment of a course
requirement. The cover story was similar to that used in Study 2.
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (threat
condition: value threat vs. control threat) ⫻2 (scapegoat target:
1157
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

viable vs. nonviable) between-subjects factorial design. Effects on
a number of dependent variables, discussed shortly, were exam-
ined.
Individual differences. Prior to any experimental manipula-
tions, participants first responded to a single-item measure assess-
ing their political orientation (1 ⫽very conservative,7⫽very
liberal;M
grand
⫽4.63, SD ⫽1.25) and a single-item measure
assessing their preexisting belief in the importance of environmen-
tal responsibility (“How important is it for people to do everything
they can to minimize their impact on the environment?”; 1 ⫽not
at all important,5⫽very important;M
grand
⫽4.11, SD ⫽0.76).
Scores on these measures were used as covariates for all analyses.
Threat manipulation. Participants assigned to the value
threat condition read the same article used in Study 2 that framed
climate change as due primarily to the harmful actions of young
adults (the participants’ ingroup). Participants assigned to the
control threat condition read the article from Study 2 that framed
climate change as due to unknown causes.
Scapegoat target manipulation. As in Study 2, participants
were then introduced to an ostensibly unrelated study in which
they would answer questions about a group selected at random by
the computer. Unlike Study 2, though, here participants were in
fact randomly presented with one of two target outgroups. Partic-
ipants in the viable scapegoat condition were presented with oil
companies, whereas participants in the nonviable scapegoat con-
dition were presented with the Amish. To test our assumption that
participants would perceive oil companies as a more viable source
of responsibility for climate change than the Amish, we had
participants rate their level of agreement with the statement “How
much does this group contribute to climate change?” on a 6-point
scale (1 ⫽not at all,6⫽a very large amount).
Guilt. Next, participants completed a series of filler surveys,
embedded in which was a modified single-item measure of per-
sonal guilt, selected from the larger guilt scale originally used by
Ferguson (2009) to assess guilt for contributing to global warming.
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with the
statement “I feel guilty for my contributions to global warming”
using a 6-point scale (1 ⫽very strongly disagree,6⫽very
strongly agree). A single-item measure of guilt was used in an
attempt to shorten the study completion time, and this particular
item was chosen because it is the most face-valid of the original
scale items and had the strongest loading on the four-item com-
posite in Study 1.
Personal control. Participants’ perceptions that they have
control over their lives were measured by asking them to respond
to the same single-item measure that Sullivan et al. (2010) used to
measure perceived personal control: “In general, how much con-
trol do you feel you have over what happens in your life?”
Responses to this item were made along a 6-point scale (1 ⫽not
at all,6⫽very much). The guilt and personal control items were
randomized in order of presentation.
Environmental advocacy measure. The final measure was a
shortened version of Ferguson’s (2009) Environmental Advocacy
scale. Participants responded to four items assessing their willing-
ness to engage in behaviors intended to reduce the impact of global
warming (e.g., “In order to reduce the impact of global warming,
to what extent would you be willing to give a short presentation in
an elementary school about global warming and how to reduce
it?”). Responses were made on a 6-point scale (1 ⫽not at all
willing,6⫽extremely willing) and were averaged to form com-
posite environmental advocacy scores (␣⫽.80).
Results
Scapegoating. We first tested our assumption that partici-
pants would perceive oil companies as a more viable scapegoat
target for climate change than the Amish. We submitted ratings of
the target group’s contribution to climate change to a 2 (threat
condition: value threat vs. control threat) ⫻2 (scapegoat target: oil
companies vs. Amish) between-subjects ANOVA. This analysis
yielded the predicted main effect for target such that participants
rated oil companies as contributing significantly more to climate
change (M⫽4.78, SD ⫽1.06) compared with the Amish (M⫽
1.93, SD ⫽0.83), F(1, 58) ⫽132.64, p⬍.001. No other effects
reached significance (Fs⬍1.00, ps⬎.59).
Guilt. Next, we tested our prediction that, when climate
change was framed as the result of the harmful actions of their
ingroup, participants would experience increased guilt, but this
effect would be attenuated if participants additionally had the
opportunity to attribute blame to a viable scapegoat, but not to a
nonviable scapegoat. Submitting guilt scores to a Threat Condi-
tion ⫻Scapegoat Target ANOVA returned a significant interac-
tion, F(1, 58) ⫽11.49, p⫽.001, ␩
2
⫽.17. Supporting predictions,
pairwise comparisons and the pattern of means depicted in Figure
4 revealed that, among participants given the opportunity to blame
a nonviable scapegoat, those in the value threat (i.e., ingroup
responsible) condition reported greater feelings of guilt (M⫽4.25,
SD ⫽1.32) than those in the control threat (i.e., unknown cause)
condition (M⫽2.95, SD ⫽1.32), F(1, 58) ⫽7.14, p⫽.01.
However, participants in the value threat condition who were given
an opportunity to blame a viable scapegoat reported feeling less
guilt (M⫽3.17, SD ⫽1.33) than those in both the value threat/
nonviable scapegoat condition, F(1, 58) ⫽5.24, p⫽.03, and the
control threat/viable scapegoat condition (M⫽4.17, SD ⫽1.48),
F(1, 58) ⫽4.94, p⫽.03.
Figure 4. Personal guilt as a function of threat condition and viability of
scapegoat target (Study 3). Higher scores indicate greater feelings of guilt
for one’s own contributions to climate change. Scale ranges from 1 to 6.
Error bars represent standard errors.
1158 ROTHSCHILD, LANDAU, SULLIVAN, AND KEEFER

Unexpectedly, participants in the control threat condition who
were exposed to a viable scapegoat reported more guilt than
participants in the control threat/nonviable scapegoat condition,
F(1, 58) ⫽6.73, p⫽.01. We return to this finding in the
Discussion section.
Personal control. Next, we tested our prediction that, when
climate change was framed as the result of unknown causes,
exposure to a viable scapegoat would increase perceived personal
control, whereas exposure to a nonviable scapegoat would not
have this effect. Submitting perceived personal control scores to
the same two-way ANOVA returned a significant interaction, F(1,
58) ⫽10.84, p⫽.001, ␩
2
⫽.15. Supporting predictions, pairwise
comparisons and the pattern of means depicted in Figure 5 re-
vealed that, among participants exposed to a viable scapegoat,
those in the control threat condition reported having more control
over their lives (M⫽4.81, SD ⫽0.66) than participants in both the
control threat/nonviable scapegoat condition (M⫽4.11, SD ⫽
1.23), F(1, 58) ⫽4.04, p⫽.05, and the value threat/viable
scapegoat condition, (M⫽3.94, SD ⫽0.90), F(1, 58) ⫽6.31,
p⫽.02.
We then tested our tentative prediction that participants in the
value threat condition who were exposed to a viable scapegoat
would report, in addition to less guilt (as reported above), less
personal control over their lives compared with those exposed to a
nonviable scapegoat. Among participants in the value threat con-
dition, perceived personal control was indeed lower after exposure
to a viable scapegoat than after exposure to a nonviable scapegoat
(M⫽4.92, SD ⫽1.04), F(1, 58) ⫽7.16, p⫽.01.
Environmental advocacy. We also tested the prediction that
participants exposed to a value-threatening framing of climate
change would be motivated to make reparative actions, unless they
were first given the opportunity to attribute blame to a viable
scapegoat. Performing the same two-way ANOVA on environ-
mental advocacy scores yielded a significant interaction, F(1,
58) ⫽10.14, p⫽.001, ␩
2
⫽.15. Pairwise comparisons and the
pattern of means depicted in Figure 6 revealed that, as expected,
participants in the value threat condition who were exposed to a
viable scapegoat reported lower environmental advocacy scores
(M⫽2.74, SD ⫽0.75) compared with participants in the value
threat/nonviable scapegoat condition (M⫽3.57, SD ⫽0.75), F(1,
58) ⫽9.17, p⬍.004, and those in the control threat/viable
scapegoat condition (M⫽3.32, SD ⫽0.73), F(1, 58) ⫽4.92,
p⫽.04.
Also, participants in the value threat condition presented with a
nonviable scapegoat reported higher environmental advocacy
scores than participants in the control threat/nonviable scapegoat
condition, (M⫽2.89, SD ⫽0.99), F(1, 58) ⫽5.72, p⫽.03. For
participants in the control threat condition, mean environmental
advocacy scores did not significantly differ between the two scape-
goat target conditions (F⫽2.42, p⫽.13).
Indirect effect of Threat Condition ⴛScapegoat Target on
environmental advocacy by guilt. Using the bootstrapping
procedure and corresponding SPSS macro of Preacher and Hayes
(2008), we regressed environmental advocacy scores onto the
interaction of threat condition (coded: value threat ⫽1/control
threat ⫽0) and scapegoat target (coded: nonviable ⫽0/viable ⫽
1) with self-reported guilt entered as the proposed mediator and
our main effects as covariates. Five-thousand bootstrap resamples
were performed. The 95% confidence interval obtained for the
indirect effects of the Threat Condition ⫻Scapegoat Target inter-
action on environmental advocacy scores through guilt did not
contain zero [⫺1.01, ⫺.03]. These results are consistent with our
mediated moderation hypothesis that the decrease in self-reported
intentions to participate in environmental advocacy among partic-
ipants in the value threat/viable scapegoat condition is partially
mediated by their corresponding decrease in feelings of guilt (see
Figure 7 for a graphical depiction of the mediation model).
Discussion
The presence of a viable scapegoat capable of bearing blame for
climate change differentially affected participants’ self-
perceptions and behavioral intentions as a function of the causal
framing of climate change. When climate change was framed in a
value-threatening manner as the result of the ingroup’s harmful
actions, exposure to a viable scapegoat reduced participants’ feel-
Figure 5. Perceived personal control as a function of threat condition and
viability of scapegoat target (Study 3). Higher scores indicate greater
perceived control over one’s life in general. Scale ranges from 1 to 6. Error
bars represent standard errors.
Figure 6. Environmental advocacy as a function threat condition and
viability of scapegoat target (Study 3). Higher scores indicate greater
willingness to participate in environmental advocacy to help stop climate
change. Scale ranges from 1 to 6. Error bars represent standard errors.
1159
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

ings of personal guilt. In contrast, when climate change was
framed in a control-threatening manner as the result of unknown
causes, exposure to a viable scapegoat bolstered participants’
perceptions of personal control. These findings lend further sup-
port to our broad claim that scapegoating behavior can be driven
by two distinct motives—to maintain feelings of moral value or
perceptions of personal control—depending on the particular type
of threat posed by a particular negative outcome. The findings of
Study 3 also support Glick’s (2005) assertion about the importance
of a scapegoat target’s perceived viability and contradict earlier
accounts of scapegoating, which suggested that groups perceived
as weak and vulnerable are preferred for the purposes of displacing
blame.
We additionally found that value-threatened participants ex-
posed to a viable (vs. a nonviable) scapegoat reported lower levels
of perceived personal control in addition to lower levels of guilt.
This suggests that our measure of general personal control, which
we designed to specifically assess the control maintenance path of
our model, also partly captured perceived causal responsibility for
climate change. This is consistent with the idea that when a person
is made to feel responsible for causing climate change, scapegoat-
ing involves relinquishing specific feelings of agency connected to
climate change in exchange for simultaneously reducing aversive
feelings of guilt. This relinquishing of responsibility seems to have
influenced broader perceptions of control among the value-
threatened participants exposed to a scapegoat. Insofar as our
control measure may have partly reflected feelings of specific
responsibility for climate change, the similar reduction in guilt and
control in the value threat condition is consistent with previous
research showing a positive association between guilt and personal
responsibility for a specific negative outcome (e.g., Tangney,
1993). Nevertheless, correlational analyses yielded no significant
association between participants’ personal feelings of guilt for
climate change and perceptions of personal control across any of
the conditions (rs⬍.19, ps⬎.13). These null results may be due
to the fact that whereas guilt was measured with an item that
referred specifically to the context of climate change, perceived
control was measured with an item designed to capture perceptions
of general personal control beyond the climate change context. In
support of this explanation, when in Study 1 we measured both
guilt and control perceptions with specific reference to partici-
pants’ responsibility for harmful environmental conditions, we
indeed observed a significant positive correlation between guilt
and personal control (r⫽.23, p⫽.01).
Returning to Study 3’s results, one unexpected finding was that,
within the control threat condition, participants exposed to oil
companies reported significantly higher guilt for their personal
contribution to climate change compared with participants exposed
to the Amish. One possible explanation for this effect is that
participants who were initially made to feel uncertain about the
cause of climate change may have come to associate some of their
own behaviors (e.g., driving cars, using electricity) with the harm-
ful actions of oil companies when given the chance to attribute
blame to such companies. In turn, this may have led them to feel
somewhat responsible for causing climate change and thus to
experience increased feelings of personal guilt. It is also possible
that participants may have felt guilty for failing to act when there
was an identified scapegoat target to act against.
Study 3 also tested the downstream consequences of scapegoat-
ing on participants’ reported willingness to engage in reparative
behaviors. Consistent with our predictions, participants made to
feel responsible for harmful climate change, and subsequently
exposed to a nonviable scapegoat, exhibited an increase in their
willingness to become environmental advocates (consistent with
prior research; e.g., Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). If, however,
this value-threatening framing was followed by an opportunity to
blame a viable scapegoat, participants reported significantly less
willingness to engage in environmental advocacy. Furthermore,
results were consistent with our mediated moderation hypothesis
suggesting that these effects are mediated by participants’ feelings
of guilt about their own personal contribution to climate change.
These results provide initial evidence that scapegoating can un-
dermine individuals’ willingness to help stop a harmful outcome
for which they are at least partially responsible.
General Discussion
Building on and integrating two influential theoretical accounts
of scapegoating, we proposed a model that identifies two distinct
motives behind scapegoating at the level of the individual: the
desire to maintain feelings of personal moral value and the desire
to maintain perceptions of personal control over one’s environ-
ment. Because each motive represents an independent path to
scapegoating, the compensatory function served by scapegoating is
dependent on whether the precipitating negative outcome primar-
ily threatens the individual’s felt moral value or perceived personal
control. Specifically, although perceived moral culpability for a
negative outcome motivates scapegoating to minimize elevated
Figure 7. Indirect effect of Threat Condition ⫻Scapegoat Target interaction on environmental advocacy
through feelings of personal guilt (Study 3). All path coefficients represent standardized regression weights. The
direct effect coefficient represents the effect of the interaction on the dependent variable after controlling for the
main effects, the effect of the proposed mediator, political orientation, and preexisting feelings of environmental
responsibility. Total adjusted R
2
for the model ⫽.28, F(6, 57) ⫽5.07, p⬍.001. Total effect: ␤⫽⫺.66
ⴱ
. Direct
effect: ␤⫽⫺.46
ⴱ
.
ⴱ
p⬍.05.
1160 ROTHSCHILD, LANDAU, SULLIVAN, AND KEEFER

feelings of guilt, the perceived causal indeterminacy of a negative
outcome motivates scapegoating to provide an explanation that
restores perceived personal control. We provided empirical sup-
port for this model in the present studies by testing whether
scapegoating behavior is increased by theoretically specified threat
inductions, is mediated and moderated by theoretically specified
self-perceptions, and produces divergent downstream conse-
quences on self-perceptions and behavioral intentions depending
on which path is activated.
Study 1 showed that participants primed to view the hazardous
consequences of environmental destruction as the result of their
own harmful actions (value threat), and participants primed to
view the hazardous consequences of environmental destruction as
the result of unknown causes (control threat), were more likely to
blame and punish oil companies for the hazardous consequences of
environmental destruction. Moreover, results were consistent with
the mediational hypothesis that scapegoating in response to a
value-threatening framing of environmental destruction occurs in-
directly through increased feelings of personal guilt, whereas
scapegoating in response to a control-threatening framing of en-
vironmental destruction occurs indirectly through decreased per-
ceptions of personal control.
Study 2 was designed to build on Study 1 by using experimental
manipulations that targeted the same proposed mediating variables
that were measured in the prior study. Study 2 conceptually rep-
licated the basic scapegoating effect and further highlighted the
independence of the two motivational paths to scapegoating by
showing differential moderation effects: Scapegoating of interna-
tional corporations in response to a value-threatening framing of
catastrophic climate change was eliminated by an affirmation of
one’s own moral value, but not by an affirmation of personal
control, whereas scapegoating in response to a control-threatening
framing of climate change was eliminated by an affirmation of
personal control, but not by an affirmation of moral value.
Complementing the findings from Studies 1 and 2, Study 3
illustrated the divergent effects of scapegoating along the value-
and control-maintenance paths on participants’ self-perceptions
and behavioral intentions. Although the opportunity to scapegoat
following a moral value threat effectively reduced feelings of
personal guilt, the opportunity to scapegoat following a control
threat effectively bolstered perceptions of personal control. In
addition, some evidence was found for the hypothesized relation-
ship between feelings of guilt and perceived control over a nega-
tive outcome along the value-maintenance path to scapegoating.
Specifically, the fact that value-threatened participants exhibited
lower perceived control after exposure to a viable scapegoat sup-
ports our claim that scapegoating in response to a value threat
represents an attempt to minimize guilt by transferring one’s own
responsibility for a negative outcome to a scapegoat target. How-
ever, the absence of a direct measure of perceived responsibility
for climate change in this study, the lack of a significant correla-
tion between guilt and control, and the unexpected increase in guilt
among control-threatened participants exposed to a viable scape-
goat suggests that any conclusions about the interplay between
control and guilt in scapegoating processes remain tentative.
Finally, in line with predictions, participants in Study 3 who
focused on their ingroup’s moral culpability for climate change,
and who subsequently encountered a viable scapegoat, reported
decreased behavioral intentions to engage in environmental advo-
cacy. An indirect effects analysis yielded evidence consistent with
our mediational hypothesis that this effect was partially mediated
by decreased feelings of personal guilt for climate change.
Connections With Past Research
By integrating the present studies with previous theory and
research, we are able to see how the present findings relate to
contentious issues in the literature and how they prompt new lines
of research and inquiry. For instance, there has been some dis-
agreement about whether scapegoating should be investigated at
the level of the individual or the level of the collective. In line with
Allport (1948, 1954/1979), the present studies approached scape-
goating at the level of the individual’s motives. All three studies
provide evidence that the individual’s tendency to blame and
punish a (collective) scapegoat target for a negative outcome is
motivated by the individual’s own concerns for personal value or
control. However, social identity theorists argue that as a group-
level phenomenon, scapegoating should be studied exclusively at
the level of the group (e.g., Billig, 1976; Tajfel, 1981). Consistent
with this idea, some theorists have focused on the role scapegoat-
ing plays in enhancing or maintaining ingroup cohesion in condi-
tions of social instability (Cantril, 1941; Silverstein, 1992).
Of course, recognizing scapegoating as a group-level response
to a shared misfortune does not imply an absence of individual-
level motives, nor does a focus on individual-level motives nec-
essarily ignore the shared social context in which scapegoating
arises. Although Glick (2005) proposes that scapegoating is a
collective process that manifests as a group-level ideology, he
recognizes that individual-level motives can still play a role in
determining how situational threats may lead individuals to show
increased antagonism against a scapegoat target. The present re-
search recognizes the role of group-level ideologies in providing
“viable” scapegoat targets for collectively experienced negative
events, but focuses on how individuals can be drawn to scapegoat
ideologies by the perceived threats such events pose to individual-
level needs for moral value and personal control. It thus bears
conceptual similarity to recent work by Kruglanski, Chen,
Dechesne, Fisman, and Orehek (2009) and Landau, Rothschild,
and Sullivan (2011) on the psychology of terrorist and extremist
behavior. These perspectives suggest that individuals who are
threatened by the potential loss of personal significance may be
attracted to extremist group-level ideologies that encourage them
to aggress against scapegoated others. The present work is also
consistent with work in the field of social identity theory, which
suggests that threats to one’s ingroup can, under certain circum-
stances, be experienced as threats to the self (Hogg, 2006). All
these approaches imply that individual- and group-level perspec-
tives on scapegoating offer complementary rather than conflicting
accounts of the phenomenon.
Another contentious issue in the previous literature concerns the
exact process or mechanism through which scapegoating occurs.
For example, Allport (1948, 1954/1979) claimed that scapegoating
operates by way of defensive projection; others (e.g., Wills, 1981)
have argued that this is not the case. Rather than taking a side in
this debate, the present research focused instead on how different
motivations can lead to scapegoating behavior. As such, the results
from the present studies support Allport’s claim that scapegoating
can represent a strategy for minimizing guilt feelings and bolster-
1161
A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING

ing self-esteem, but these results do not speak to the issue of
whether scapegoating necessarily involves projection. It remains
possible that scapegoating following a moral value threat operates
by way of downward social comparison instead (Wills, 1981).
Further research is required to determine whether scapegoating for
moral value maintenance is best conceptualized via a hydraulic
model of projecting one’s guilt onto a scapegoat target, or a
nonhydraulic model of amplifying the scapegoat target’s guilt to
maintain a relatively guiltless position.
Our results concerning the control maintenance function of
scapegoating are also consistent with previous research on enemy-
ship (Sullivan et al., 2010). However, the present studies go
beyond the findings of Sullivan and colleagues by showing evi-
dence consistent with the hypothesis that the tendency to focalize
blame on a scapegoat target following a control-threatening fram-
ing of a negative outcome is mediated by decreased perceptions of
personal control over that particular event, and can be eliminated
by alternate means of bolstering personal control. These findings
provide more direct evidence for the role played by an individual’s
underlying motivation to maintain perceptions of personal control
when confronted with otherwise inexplicable negative outcomes.
In the past, research on scapegoating has been hampered by
theories that relied on either overly ambiguous and undifferenti-
ated concepts, such as “frustration,” or a singular motive or pro-
cess that was unable to explain scapegoating behavior across
different contexts. In contrast, the present dual-motive model of
scapegoating overcomes these limitations by presenting two
clearly delineated motivational paths. By resisting the urge to
reduce one motive to the other or seek a common distal motive, the
present model allows us to see how the same behavioral phenom-
enon can occur in response to different threats, be eliminated by
different intervening variables, and lead to different downstream
consequences. Although we do not deny the possibility that other
individual-level motives may influence the individual’s likelihood
of engaging in scapegoating behavior, we believe that the present
research provides a strong case that the motives to maintain
perceived personal moral value and personal control underlie in-
dependent routes to scapegoating. Ultimately, the proposed dual-
motive model encourages further empirical investigation of the
individual-level and group-level motives behind scapegoating, and
more generally illustrates the strengths of considering a multi-
motive approach to understanding a variety of human behaviors.
Practical Implications
Beyond its theoretical contributions, the present research offers
important insights into a ubiquitous phenomenon shown to have
serious real-world consequences. Most importantly, the present
studies offer potential avenues for reducing individuals’ scape-
goating behavior. In particular, Study 2 found that participants’
tendency to scapegoat in response to a negative outcome framed as
a threat to personal value or personal control threat was eliminated
by a corresponding affirmation of personal value or personal
control. These findings suggest that providing alternate means of
bolstering threatened feelings of moral value or personal control in
the face of aversive conditions or negative events may reduce the
likelihood of scapegoating as a compensatory threat response, but
only when these affirmations are appropriate to the threat. These
findings highlight the fact that in order to determine the proper
ameliorative action for scapegoating behavior, one must first iden-
tify the type of precipitating threat posed by a given negative
event.
The results of Study 3 also have implications for how scape-
goating can affect people’s willingness to resolve a negative out-
come. In the context of devastating climate change and the haz-
ardous effects of environmental destruction, the issue of how to
motivate individuals to make different lifestyle choices is a topic
of major concern. Previous research has suggested that reminding
participants’ of their ingroup’s responsibility for the harmful ef-
fects of climate change increases feelings of guilt and motivates
individuals to report a greater willingness to engage in proenvi-
ronmental behaviors (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). However,
in Study 3, this effect was reversed when participants were able to
blame a viable scapegoat, which reduced feelings of guilt and in
turn their reported willingness to engage in environmental advo-
cacy. These results suggest that although highlighting individuals’
moral culpability for environmental destruction can motivate mit-
igating behavior, this strategy can backfire when a viable scape-
goat is available. Thus, the strategy of inducing guilt to motivate
reparative behaviors may have the unintended effect of increasing
scapegoating and reducing individuals’ willingness to take such
corrective actions.
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Received July 21, 2011
Revision received December 14, 2011
Accepted December 19, 2011 䡲
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A DUAL-MOTIVE MODEL OF SCAPEGOATING