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Good computing
Abstract
Explicit attention to computer ethics began with Norbert Weiner's (1950) groundbreaking book, The Human Use of Human Beings [33]. The teaching of computer ethics arguably started in the 1970s with the distribution of Walter Maner's Starter Kit in Computer Ethics and the publication of Deborah Johnson's seminal text Computer Ethics [18], [19] (see Bynum [4] for a short history). Since that time, many excellent scholars have entered the field and much work has been done. Work on the philosophical groundwork for computing ethics [9], [31], the policy diffi culties associated with computing [22], [24], [30], and professional ethics in computing [10], [11] has multiplied and borne much fruit.
... As Colby and Damon point out, though, part of the appeal of the criteria is not just who they identify for inclusion in the study but also who they exclude (e.g., people who advance goals inconsistent with humanitarian principles). As a result, these criteria have proven to be useful for other researchers interested in adult moral exemplars (Damon & Colby, 2015;Huff & Barnard, 2009;Rule & Bebeau, 2005;Plaisance, Skewes, & Larez, 2014). ...
... It is important to note that the criteria typically serve a specific purpose -to facilitate a nomination process. In some cases, teachers, community organization leaders, or professors serve as nominators (e.g., Hart & Fegley, 1995;Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004;Floyd, 2015), while in other cases nominators are experts in the professional field (Huff & Barnard, 2009;Plaisance et al., 2014;Rule & Bebeau, 2005). Thus, in a practical sense, whatever listing materializes must use terminology that is accessible and relatable to nominators, in addition to being valid for the particular population and setting. ...
For the last 25 years, moral psychologists have sought to systematically study the lives of morally excellent people and their impact on others in a line of inquiry commonly referred to as exemplar methodology. This paper reviews the existing literature using exemplar methodology and analyzes three methodological approaches to identifying moral exemplars – descriptive (based on a priori criteria), demonstrative (based on demonstrated moral action), and affective (based on the emotions exemplars inspire in others). These three approaches offer complementary, rather than competing, perspectives of moral excellence. After reviewing each approach, the paper considers fruitful areas for future research using exemplar methodology including studying new populations and forms of moral excellence using diverse methods.
... Two types of moral exemplars have been identified (Huff and Barnard, 2009): (i) 'reformers' who focus on changing social systems; and (ii) 'craftpersons' who focus on designing systems to aid individuals; though individuals may also be involved in both types of activity. Studies of moral exemplars (Colby and Danon, 1992;Oliner and Oliner, 1988) have found that both the integration of moral commitment into the self and having other people who supported and challenged them were very important for moral examplars. ...
The paper presents a new seven-step methodology for using narrative ethics and two case studies illustrating its application. A brief discussion of the importance of ethics to engineers and the need to consider outcomes and macroethics introduce the paper. This is followed by overviews of the literature on narrative ethics, the ethics of care, and virtue ethics and moral exemplars. The ethics of care and virtue ethics are included due to their relationship to narrative and the fact they are probably less known to many engineers than other types of ethical theories. The paper also considers the important issues of culture, diversity and the ‘other’ and the need for support and collective responsibility. Understanding diversity and the ‘other’ are very important for engineers for a number of reasons, including the need to design technologies, goods and services for people who are not engineers and who are also different from them on other characteristics, such as gender, race and disability. Although ethical behaviour is often portrayed as an individual responsibility, it is much easier to behave ethically in a context which supports and encourages ethical behaviour. Collective action is frequently more effective than individual action and can prevent victimisation.
The scale and complexity of the data and algorithms used in artificial intelligence (AI)‐based systems present significant challenges for anticipating their ethical, legal, and policy implications. Given these challenges, who does the work of AI ethics, and how do they do it? This study reports findings from interviews with 26 stakeholders in AI research, law, and policy. The primary themes are that the work of AI ethics is structured by personal values and professional commitments, and that it involves situated meaning‐making through data and algorithms. Given the stakes involved, it is not enough to simply satisfy that AI will not behave unethically; rather, the work of AI ethics needs to be incentivized.
As mentors and educators, coaches contribute to and influence athlete moral development in and through sport, especially during college, a critical window of development for young adults. However, little is known about the moral development of coaches. While unethical coach behavior frequently garners media headlines, moral exemplar coaches do exist. The purpose of this study was to examine moral exemplars—coaches deeply committed to moral values in their personal and professional lives—and better understand how they are able to maintain integrity in the high-stakes, win-at-all-costs environment of NCAA Division-I college sport. In-depth interviews based on moral exemplar and moral identity development theories were conducted with peer-nominated, “moral exemplar” Division-I collegiate head coaches (n = 12). Interviews elicited themes of moral exemplarity, including having an internalized moral compass; ongoing personal and professional growth; care and respect for others; a focus on goals and concerns greater than oneself; a high internalized standard of excellence; gratitude and positivity; and an ability to reconcile internal conflicts. Illuminating the themes and mechanisms by which moral exemplar collegiate coaches develop and sustain moral identity can inform and improve applied work with coaches and coach education efforts for current and future members of the profession.
Lay summary: This study looks at coaches who are known by their peers and athletic directors as having strong morals and integrity despite the challenges they face balancing the competing values of fostering athlete well-being with winning while working in the highly competitive environment of NCAA Division I athletics.
Coaches have the potential to influence athletes’ moral development, especially at the collegiate level—a powerful period of growth in young adults’ lives. As central agents in athlete moral education, coaches’ moral development and understanding of professionalism is currently unknown. The purpose of this study was to increase understanding of the ethical professional identity development of sport coaches. In-depth interviews based on moral exemplar and moral identity development theories were conducted with NCAA Division-I collegiate head coaches (n = 12) in the United States who were peer nominated ‘moral exemplars’. Interviews elicited themes of moral exemplarity, professionalism, and above average ethical identity development. Results can inform and improve coach education for current and future members of the profession.
Rapid advances in technology within accounting information systems (AIS) accompanied by an increase in information accessibility render organizations vulnerable to the misuse of confidential data. AIS professionals are uniquely equipped and positioned to address these information security risks and to strengthen the trust stakeholders and the public place in the AIS function. We contend that reforms to control and protect intelligence with improved systemic controls must be complemented with reforms to control and protect professional integrity. We propose a Systems Trust Model that elevates professional virtue as a fundamental and necessary control element that complements IT governance and systemic controls. We then analyze the necessity and sufficiency of the trust model elements for creating and protecting system trust-regardless of additional opportunities and incentives present in new and evolving technologies in AIS. Implications for future research, AIS curriculum, and the AIS profession ...
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present a four component model of ethical behavior that integrates literature in moral psychology, computing ethics, and virtue ethics as informed by research on moral exemplars in computing. This is part 2 of a two part contribution, part 1 having appeared in Vol. 6 No. 3. Design/methodology/approach This psychologically based and philosophically informed model argues that moral action is grounded in relatively stable personality characteristics, guided by integration of morality into the self-system, shaped by the context of the surrounding moral ecology, and facilitated by morally relevant skills and knowledge. Findings The model seeks to explain the daily successful (and unsuccessful) performance of moral action by computing professionals and to provide groundwork for a pedagogy that emphasizes ethically effective performance. Practical implications The model has significant implications for how ethical action to computer professionals and other design professionals might be taught. It also makes recommendations about what need to be measured to construct a complete picture of sustained ethical action in a profession. Originality/value Most accepted models of ethical behavior are unidimensional, emphasizing either principled reasoning or a simplistic model of integrity/character. This model brings together a variety of disparate literatures in the light of its emphasis on sustained moral action in the profession. It thereby provides researchers and educators with a picture of what is needed to construct a complete understanding of moral action in the profession.
What challenges do students face in preparing to practice responsible engineering in a global world? How can students be brought to recognize and avoid pitfalls like paternalism? One answer to this question comes from an unlikely source. While satirizing telescopic philanthropy, Charles Dickens lays down the conditions that a curriculum in global engineering ethics must address. One must “adapt [one’s] mind to those very differently situated,” address other cultures “from suitable points of view,” cultivate a “delicate knowledge of the heart,” and realize that “good intentions alone” are not enough.
This essay situates teaching engineering ethics in a global context by outlining the pitfalls students must learn to avoid, putting forward moral imagination as a means to recognize and work around these pitfalls, and showing how moral imagination informs the different modes of engineering moral expertise. This paper will conclude with three learning modules that address some of the pedagogical challenges posed by moral imagination.
Purpose
– This paper aims to demonstrate that computing social issues courses are often being taught by articulating the social impacts of different computer technologies and then applying moral theories to those impacts. It then argues that that approach has a number of serious drawbacks.
Design/methodology/approach
– A bibliometric analysis of ETHICOMP papers is carried out. Papers from early in the history of ETHICOMP are compared to recent years, so as to determine if papers are more or less focused on social scientific examinations of issues or on ethical evaluations of impacts of technology. The literature is examined to argue the drawbacks of the impact approach.
Findings
– Over time, ETHICOMP papers have moved away from social scientific examinations of computing to more philosophic and ethical evaluations of perceived impacts of computing. The impact approach has a number of drawbacks. First, it is based on a technological deterministic style of social explanation that has been in disrepute in the academic social sciences for decades. Second, it uses an algorithmic approach to ethics that simplifies the social complexity and uncertainty that is the reality of socio-technological change.
Research limitations/implications
– The methodology used in this paper is limited in several ways. The bibliometric analysis only examined five years of ETHICOMP papers, while the literature review focused on published computing education research. It is possible that neither of these forms of evidence reflects actual common teaching practice.
Practical implications
– It is hoped that the arguments in this paper will convince teaching practitioners to modify the way they are teaching computing social issues courses: that is, the authors hope to convince educators to add more focus on the social context of computing.
Originality/value
– The use of bibliometric analysis in this area is unique. The paper’s argument is perhaps unusual as well.
Linköping, Sweden. It is beginning to become two papers: (1) an empirical report of an interview study and (2) a theoretical paper on the psychological foundations of virtue in a profession. As a revision, (2) is still in early draft format with (ref) in many places where I intend to place references to current literature (and with much left out). I include this section primarily to get your comments on the structure of the argument rather than the detail of the numerous empirical claims I make. Abstract This is a progress report of a project to identify and interview moral exemplars in computing. Initial analyses of the interviews suggests that there are at least two types of moral exemplars, craftspersons (who use the values extant in computing to produce products that help clients) and reformers (who try to change the culture of computing based on external values). We explore the differences in these approaches and propose a first sketch of a positive model of the skills/virtues needed to be an effective ethical computing professional.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present a four component model of ethical behavior that integrates literature in moral psychology, computing ethics, and virtue ethics as informed by research on moral exemplars in computing. This is part 2 of a two part contribution, part 1 having appeared in Vol. 6 No. 3. Design/methodology/approach This psychologically based and philosophically informed model argues that moral action is grounded in relatively stable personality characteristics, guided by integration of morality into the self-system, shaped by the context of the surrounding moral ecology, and facilitated by morally relevant skills and knowledge. Findings The model seeks to explain the daily successful (and unsuccessful) performance of moral action by computing professionals and to provide groundwork for a pedagogy that emphasizes ethically effective performance. Practical implications The model has significant implications for how ethical action to computer professionals and other design professionals might be taught. It also makes recommendations about what need to be measured to construct a complete picture of sustained ethical action in a profession. Originality/value Most accepted models of ethical behavior are unidimensional, emphasizing either principled reasoning or a simplistic model of integrity/character. This model brings together a variety of disparate literatures in the light of its emphasis on sustained moral action in the profession. It thereby provides researchers and educators with a picture of what is needed to construct a complete understanding of moral action in the profession.
Most discussions of engineering ethics dismiss the idea of codes of ethics from the outset. Codes are described as self serving, unrealistic, inconsistent, mere guides for novices, too vague, or unnecessary. (1) This article argues instead that a code of professional ethics is central to advising individual engineers how to conduct themselves, to judging their conduct, and ultimately to understanding engineering as a profession. This article begins with a case now commonly discussed in engineering ethics ("the Challenger Disaster"), finding its general argument in a detailed analysis of a particular choice. While I believe the analysis applicable to all professions, I shall not argue that here.
This handbook provides an accessible overview of the most important issues in information and computer ethics. It covers: foundational issues and methodological frameworks; theoretical issues affecting property, privacy, anonymity, and security; professional issues and the information-related professions; responsibility issues and risk assessment; regulatory issues and challenges; access and equity issues. Each chapter explains and evaluates the central positions and arguments on the respective issues, and ends with a bibliography that identifies the most important supplements available on the topic.
Any discussion of possible goals in the teaching of ethics must begin by facing a number of formidable difficulties. The very phrase “the teaching of ethics” has a variety of connotations in our culture, and so for that matter does the term “ethics.” One can never be certain just what people hear when they encounter the notion of “teaching ethics”: for some, it means instructing people not to break the law, or to abide by some legal or professional code; for others, it means an attempt to improve moral character or to instill certain virtues; for still others, it primarily means imparting special skills in the handling of moral argumentation. Moreover, clarity is by no means guaranteed by the standard method of simply stipulating one’s own definitions or viewpoints. Someone who was once “taught ethics” by harsh and repressive methods of gross indoctrination may have trouble understanding “the teaching of ethics” in any more benign sense, however carefully one may point out other possibilities.
The purpose of this essay is to determine what exactly is meant by the claim computer ethics is unique, a position that will henceforth be referred to as the CEIU thesis. A brief sketch of the CEIU debate is provided, and an empirical case involving a recent incident of cyberstalking is briefly considered in order to illustrate some controversial points of contention in that debate. To gain a clearer understanding of what exactly is asserted in the various claims about the uniqueness of computer ethics, and to avoid many of the confusions currently associated with the term ``unique'', a precise definition of that term is proposed. We then differentiate two distinct and radically different interpretations of the CEIU thesis, based on arguments that can be found in the relevant computer ethics literature. The two interpretations are critically analyzed and both are shown to be inadequate in establishing the CEIU thesis. We then examine and reject two assumptions implicit in arguments advanced both by CEIU advocates and their opponents. In exposing and rejecting these assumptions, we see why it is not necessary to accept the conclusions reached by either side in this debate. Finally, we defend the view that computer ethics issues are both philosophically interesting and deserving of our attention, regardless of whether those issues might also happen to be unique ethical issues.
Should the responsibilities of business managers be understood independently of the social circumstances and "market forces" that surround them, or (in accord with empiricism and the social sciences) are agents and their choices shaped by their circumstances, free only insofar as they act in accordance with antecedently established dispositions, their "character"? Virtue ethics, of which I consider myself a proponent, shares with empiricism this emphasis on character as well as an affinity with the social sciences. But recent criticisms of both empiricist and virtue ethical accounts of character deny even this apparent compromise between agency and environment. Here is an account of character that emphasizes dynamic interaction both in the formation and in the interplay between personal agency and responsibility on the one hand and social pressures and the environment on the other.
