Using Personal Electronic device for
authentication-based service access
Abhishek Gaurav∗, Ankit Sharma†, Vikas Gelara‡, Rajat Moona§
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
Abstract—A person usually carries multiple authentication to-
kens in the form of various cards to access services electronically.
Often the service outlets are equipped with a strong infrastruc-
ture to permit the user interactions. The network connectivity
is usually a must for the service outlet to authenticate the user
with the server. In this paper, we propose a solution which uses
the personal mobile devices held by the user to interact with the
service outlets. Such a system can then alleviate the needs for
interaction console and communication infrastructure at service
In today’s world, scenarios in which we have to access
services using electronic means are common. These include
services such as bank Automatic Teller Machines (ATM),
petrol dispensing stations etc. Presently, such services typically
involve an authentication card (such as magnetic stripe card)
that needs to be presented to the service outlet. Additionally,
the user may have to enter a password or biometric imprint
for authentication. After authentication the user interacts with
the service outlet console to request specific set of services.
The console carries input output devices such as keyboard and
screen for this purpose.
This paper proposes a different model of authentication
and service-access. In this model a user carries a personal
intelligent ubiquitous device such as a mobile phone or a PDA.
This personal device authenticates itself to the service outlet
on behalf of the user. This new model of authentication and
service-access has several advantages over the currently used
techniques. For instance, personal devices are usually equipped
with a screen and a keypad which can be used for the user
interaction alleviating the need of these interfaces on the ser-
vice console. These devices can store the authentication related
information for several services. Therefore a user need not
carry multiple cards for multiple services. Proposed scheme
also poses several technical challenges in implementation.
The authentication of services and documents have been
tried by several researchers in variety of applications.
Horn et. al.  has given a protocol for mutual authentication
between mobile device and server. They assumed limited
computation power of mobile device and proposed a protocol
where little cryptographic computation is done by the mobile
Amir Herzberg proposed an architecture for payments and
banking with mobile devices . In this paper, he addressed
several critical security aspects and trust model and presented
an authentication mechanism to overcome that.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we introduce the current model of authentication. In section
III, we introduce the proposed model vis-a-vis the shortcom-
ings of the present model. We describe the proposed model in
section IV and the implementation and simulations in section
V and summarize the work in section VI.
II. THE CURRENT MODEL OF AUTHENTICATION BASED
There are numerous examples of services where service-
access requires authentication. In such services, the customer
is asked to authenticate himself and upon success, is allowed
to access the service. Examples include Automatic Teller
Machine (ATM) services by banks where the user inserts a
magnetic stripe card and enters a password to authenticate
himself, before being allowed to make financial transactions.
Many bookstores and food outlets provide the customers with
a loyalty card so that they can access certain privileges. Petrol
dispensing outlets also have similar method of authentication
The present model of authentication based service-access
can be summarized as follows. The service provider gives an
authentication material, usually a magnetic stripe card or a
smart card, to the customer. This authentication
card1carries information about the customer. In order to access
a service, the customer presents his authentication card to
the service outlet. The customer is asked to enter a password
which is used to authenticate the customer. The service outlet
extracts customer information from the card and sends this
information (including the entered password) to a central
server for authentication. Sometimes, the authentication may
include biometric mechanisms which are usually matched at
the service outlet. After authentication, the customer is allowed
to access services. The customer usually interacts with the
outlet using a keypad and a screen provided at the outlet.
In our system and in many other systems, the authentication
mechanism also incorporates cryptography in some form.
1In this paper, we interchangeably use the terms “authentication material”
and “authentication card”
There are two general ways of encrypting and decrypting
In Public Key or Asymmetric Key based cryptography
systems, there is a pair of public and private keys. A message
can be encrypted using the public key of the receiver and
decrypted by the receiver using the corresponding private key.
In Symmetric Key Cryptography, there is a common key
shared between the sender and the receiver. The same key is
used for encryption and decryption.
III. WEAKNESSES OF THE EXISTING SYSTEMS AND
A. Weaknesses of the existing system
There are certain shortcomings in the existing model of
authentication and service-access.
1) Necessity to trust the service outlet: In the existing
model of authentication and service access, the user is forced
to trust the service outlet. The existing model does not provide
means to establish the authenticity of the service outlet. In
case, the service outlet is not authentic, it can potentially store
the private data entered by the user and use it for a playback
2) Infrastructure requirement: The service provider has
to provide an infrastructure with each service outlet. This
includes a display screen, a keyboard and other peripherals,
which are required for the user to interact with the machine.
These common peripherals needs are in addition to the service-
specific needs which include, for instance, a money dispensing
slot for an ATM machine, a petrol dispensing nozzle with
the petrol dispensing outlet etc.. In the prevalent model, these
common needs are being provided with the service outlet.
Further, the outlet, in general, also needs to have a connec-
tion to the service provider’s network because such services
usually have a centralized database where the user data is
3) Extra baggage with each new service for the user:
Every service provider, who needs to authenticate the user,
before providing the service, generally provides the user
with some personalized or generic authentication material to
authenticate himself. We use a generic term “card” to denote
such authentication material, which may include entities such
as magnetic stripe card, smart card, RF cards, e-
If a user subscribes to many services, he carries on himself
many such cards which means an extra card per new service.
4) Means of authentication and user-specific interaction:
For most services today, the service outlet initially authenti-
cates the user. In such authentication mechanisms, generally
an “input” (such as password or biometric imprint etc.) is
taken from the user and is matched against an “expected
or correct user input”. which is usually stored in a central
database. In case of certain authentication mechanisms such
as biometric authentication, this access to the central database
may require large amount of data transfers. Thus network and
infrastructure requirements limit the use of computationally-
intensive or data-intensive authentication schemes.
B. Proposed Solution to the shortcomings
We believe that all the above described drawbacks can be
addressed if we use a ubiquitous device belonging to the user
to authenticate him to the service-outlet. For this, the device
needs to carry authentication material on itself.
If in addition, the personal device of the user is equipped
with a screen and a keypad, then the user can use the device
to type in his service-requests and view the response from the
service outlet on the device’s screen. The user no longer needs
a screen and a keypad to be provided at the service-outlet.
For example, in an Automatic Teller Machine service
provided by the banks, our proposed solution requires the
user to get his personal device registered with the bank.
In the registration process, the bank securely stores enough
information into the device so that the device is able to
authenticate itself to an ATM later.
In order to access a service, the user has to authenticate
himself to the device first. This authentication is done either
by means of a PIN or biometrics or some other suitable
The device can then establish its own authentication and
can conduct subsequent communication with the ATM. Here,
the ATM need not communicate with the back-end to estab-
lish authentication, since the device securely carries enough
information to establish its own authentication.
The user can avail the services provided by the ATM by
using the interface of the device for interactive actions such
as typing in the amount of money the user wishes to withdraw.
The information is sent to the ATM and the ATM processes
the request. The user can receive the money through a money-
This changed authentication model has certain advantages
over the existing scheme.
1) Service outlet authenticates itself to the personal device:
In the proposed solution, the personal device authenticates the
user to the service outlet. In addition, the proposed model
as described in Section IV, ensures that the personal device
can authenticate the service outlet as well. This implies that
the user no longer needs to trust the service outlet without
2) Infrastructure requirement is reduced: The proposed
solution tries to capture the common needs of all services
(such as display screen, keyboard etc.) and fulfill them through
a ubiquitous enabled-device, which is with the user rather than
it being provided at each outlet. This implies that the service
outlet needs to only provide infrastructure which is specific to
the service being provided. This also means that the service
outlet can be smaller, cheaper and easier to protect against
Further, as the device is able to authenticate itself to the
service outlet without the service-outlet requiring to contact
the central database, the network access would reduce from
one per transaction to few a day.
3) All authentication material is stored in a single device:
The proposed model tries to incorporate authentication ma-
terials for all services into a single device which should be
Fig. 1. Trust Model
familiar, easy to use and carry and sufficiently ubiquitous so
that the user carries and uses it everywhere and has it with
himself all the time.
4) Computationally intensive means of authentication be-
come feasible: The device carries the user authentication
material in a secure fashion. In order to authenticate the user,
the outlet can take a fresh sample (such as biometric) from the
user and compare it with the “signed sample” carried within
the authenticated device. This reduces the transaction require-
ment with the central database. Moreover, in tasks such as
authentication, the computational power of the device can also
be used. For example, an “authenticated” program, installed by
the service provider, can run on the device and can process
the data required by the outlet, if the computational power of
the device allows it. This ensures that even computationally
intensive and data-intensive authentication measures can be
5) User-specific interaction is possible: User-specific inter-
action can also be done since user-specific data such as past
history of user and any special offers or bonus points specific
to the user can all be stored in the personal device and passed
on to the outlet, if needed. Further, the user can personalize
the device to suit his needs. For example, a visually-challenged
person can choose a personal device which meets his specific
needs and can use the device to access the service.
IV. DESIGN OF PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION MODEL
The service outlet and the personal device build trust (figure
1) by authenticating each other.
In the proposed model, the personal device performs the
1) The personal device authenticates the user to the service
outlet. As an added security user may need to authenti-
cate himself to the personal device, so that a misplaced
device is unusable by a fraudulent.
2) The personal device acts as an interface for the user to
access the services.
3) The personal device provides information (signed by the
service provider) about the user so as to obviate the need
of the service outlet to communicate with the server.
The personal device that is used to authenticate and access
control should have the following minimal set of features.
1) ability to store and process cryptography related data
such as a key in a secure fashion.
2) an input device such as keyboard through which the user
can interact with the device and issue commands to the
3) an output device such as a display unit to convey
information received from the service outlet to the user.
4) ability to communicate with the service outlet of the
A mobile phone with smart card based authentication and
security mechanism and a wireless communication technology
such as Bluetooth or NFC is an ideal device for such
Since, the device has to authenticate the user to the service
outlet, it needs to carry enough information required for
authentication to the service outlet. Hence, the service provider
needs to securely store authentication material in the device.
We term this procedure of storing authentication material in
the device as “registration of the device with the service
Each time the user wishes to access the service, the follow-
ing steps are required.
1) Authentication of the user to the outlet using user’s
2) Establishment of a secure channel between the personal
device and the service outlet.
3) Access to the service.
A. Modeling the proposed scheme of authentication and
We use Public Key Infrastructure for mutual authentication
of the service outlet and the personal device in our model.
In the model, there are three parties — the service provider
(P), the service outlet (O) and the user(U) with his personal
device(D). Each party has a public-private key pair.
In the discussion below, we use the following notations.
Ppb: Service Provider’s public key
Ppr: Service Provider’s private key The private key of the
service provider is stored securely with the service provider
Upb: User’s public key
Upr: User’s private key The private key of the user is stored
securely in the smart card with D
Opb: Service Outlet’s public key
Opr: Service Outlet’s private key The private key of the
service outlet is stored securely at the service outlet.
Sign(X,Y): Digital signature of X using private key of Y
Certificate(X,Y): A tuple containing the public key of X,
along with the credentials of X and digital signature of Y
on the first two items.
Verify(X, Y, Z): Boolean function that evaluates to true or
false depending opon whether Y provides the digital signature
of entity Z on message X
ExtractPublicKey(certificate, Y): Public Key embedded in
the certificate, provided the certificate is verified for signature
and credentials using the public key of Y.
1) Registration of the user with the service outlet: In this
one time process, the service provider securely stores the
authentication related information in the personal device which
is then used at the time of service access. The registration
involves the following.
• A user certificate (Certificate(U,P)) is generated for the
user’s public key by the service provider. The certificate
comprises of U’s public key, Credentials (such as certifi-
cate validity period etc.) and Digital signature on these
informations by P.
• The information of account of U with P is first signed by
U, which is then countersigned by P and loaded into D.
The reason for this is to prevent a fraudulent user from
providing someone else’s account information as his own
without having the corresponding private key.
• The necessary user interface software is loaded into D,
so that it can communicate with O. This step is optional
since the software may also be provided by O as long as
it is signed by P and verified by D.
2) Authentication of Uto D: U authenticates itself to D us-
ing authentication mechanisms such as password or biometric
3) Mutual authentication between D and O:
• D authenticates itself to O:
D presents U’s certificate to O. O verifies the certificate
and extracts Upb.
O then issues a challenge (usually a large random num-
ber) to U in order to verify whether D possesses the
corresponding private key.
D passes the challenge to the smart card which operates
on the challenge using the private key and provides the
response from the smart card to O.
O verifies whether the response is valid using the public
key of U and the challenge.
• O authenticates itself to D:
O then authenticates itself to D in a similar manner. For
this purpose O provides Certificate(O, P) to D.
4) Direct authentication of U to O: In case O wishes,
it can authenticate U directly through some authentication
mechanisms such as biometrics. For example, O can ask U to
present his finger-print and then match this against a signed
fingerprint specimen provided by D.
5) Presentation of U’s information: D presents U’s in-
formation signed by U and countersigned by P to O. This
information shall convey to O, details regarding U’s account
with P. For example, if P is a bank, then the information can
be bank account information of U.
6) Establishment of a secure channel between D and O: O
and D then generate a random session key using key exchange
protocols with the help of the public keys of U and O.
7) Accessing the service: U can now use D to issue
requests/commands to O on the secure channel and view the
response of O on D’s screen.
8) End of Session: The session may be ended upon user
request or on time-out. Even if the session is not ended, a
fraudulent shall not be able to perform malicious activities
since he is not aware of the session key.
We chose ATM service facility to implement the proposed
model. We have chosen the mobile phone as the personal
device since mobile phones come equipped with keypad,
screens as well as network connectivity such as Bluetooth.
Secondly, for mutual authentication of the mobile phone
and the service outlet, we use Public Key Infrastructure. Smart
cards provided in mobile phones can provide support for
cryptography related operations (e.g. SIM card).
A. Steps in the proposed model
1) Registration of the user with the bank: After the
registration, the mobile phone carries the public key
of the user which has been signed by the bank as
well as the public key of the bank. Smart Card(SC)
contains the private key of the user and is responsible for
carrying out any processing which uses the private key.
Optionally, the mobile phone also carries an application
which enables it to communicate with the ATM.
2) User authenticates himself to the mobile phone using his
password as shown in Algorithm 1.
3) Mobile phones authenticates itself to ATM by presenting
the user’s certificate and responding on ATM’s challenge
as shown in Algorithm 2.
4) ATM authenticates itself to the mobile phone by pre-
senting its own certificate.
5) Mobile phone presents the bank account information of
the user signed by the user and countersigned by the
bank to the ATM.
6) ATM and mobile phone establish a session key using
standard key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman
Key Exchange along with an integrated authentica-
tion to avoid man-in-middle attack.
7) User now access the service of the ATM using the signed
application either loaded by the bank during registration
or by the ATM as shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 1 Password based user authentication to device
Display(“Please enter password”)
passwd= get input from user()
if verified then Authentication Successful
else Authentication Failed
Algorithm 2 Authentication of mobile phone to ATM
establish communication with ATM
if failure then Display(“ATM busy, please try later”) and exit
send user-certificate to ATM for verification
if failure then Display(“Bad certificate”) and exit
get challenge from ATM
send challenge to SC and get response from SC
send response to ATM for verification
if failure then Display(“User Authentication Failed”) and exit
else Authentication Successful
We explored various platforms for simulation which satisfy
the needs of the proposed model. Sun Java Wireless Toolkit
2.5 for CLDC, Beta provides a simulation platform for
device like a mobile phone supporting J2ME and Bluetooth.
For Public key cryptography, RSA algorithms are
used. SHA-1 and triple-DES algorithms are used for
calculating hash value (required for creating signature) and for
symmetric key operations respectively.
Algorithm 3 Service access Download full-text
Display(“Welcome to atm”)
Display(“Balance enquiry: press 1”)
Display(“Withdraw money: press 2”)
Display(“Exit: press 3”)
get input from user
if button one is pressed then
request ATM for balance
display balance on screen
else if button two is pressed then
Display(“How much money to withdraw”)
X= get input from keypad
request ATM to withdraw X from account
if successful then
Display(X + “deducted from account, collect money from the
else Display(“operation failed”)
else if button three is pressed
close connection with ATM and exit
else Display(“invalid button pressed”)
1) Challenges in Implementation: GSM SIM does not
support public key cryptography. Hence it can at best be used
to store the private key, which is then presented to the outside
world protected by a password. This compromises much of
the security of the proposed model.
In our approach, we propose to use phones such as
NFC-enabled phones which provide an additional
smart card that can process PKI based services.
In this paper, we proposed a model of authentication and
service-access in which a personal device is used for authen-
tication to a service outlet and to enable the service access.
With the proposed model, a service outlet needs to provide
only service-related infrastructure. The peripheral required to
interact with the user need not be provided at the outlet since
the personal device purveys such needs. This minimal infras-
tructure makes the service outlet better resistant to vandalism
and reduces the infrastructural and maintenance costs.
The proposed trust model does not require access to server
for authentication thereby reducing the demand on network
and server. Further, services can be provided even in remote
areas, lacking network accessibility.
In our proposed model, the user needs to carry only his
personal device to access various services. Further the per-
sonal device can be customized to suit the user’s needs and
requirements. For example, if the user is visually challenged,
the personal device can be chosen accordingly.
The trust model ensures that in addition to the customer be-
ing authenticated, the service outlet is also authenticated. This
reduces possibility of a fraudulent outlet storing customer’s
personal information and making a play back attack. The use
of secure device such as smart cards also enhances security
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