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Being and Nothingness
... Sartre argues that the Self (the reality of the world) is meaningless and incomprehensible in itself, and that the Self (consciousness) interprets the Self and gives meaning to it, so that it is the self that creates the whole world for the self, and for the self-nothing else exists but my own world (Krill, 1966). The "world dasein" is not an infinite homogeneous space, not a collection of objects separated from each other, but a meaningful whole world centered on the "dasein", and the "world of the dasein" first encompasses the dasein, and the tools and equipment used by dasein, and each of them points to a larger world that is closely related to it (Jean, 2014), and ultimately the whole world is organized according to the purposes and needs of the dasein. ...
Existentialism, after over a century of development, has evolved from a philosophical idea into a way of life. In recent years, a group known as "refined egoists" has emerged in both reality and animated works. The appearance of these extreme existentialists who ignore social responsibility reveals that in this era of transition between old and new ideologies, existentialist thought has awakened in people's value systems. This article intends to analyze the external manifestations of character’s existentialism in animation works to summarize the reflections of objective phenomena in reality and to discuss the contradictions and problems that the current young generation are facing between themselves and society. This article uses qualitative research methods to analyze representative characters from three animated series, The Outcast, Killer Seven, and Incarnation, and uses a thematic analysis method that combines existentialism theory to summarize the external manifestations of characters in terms of their internal conflicts, conflicts between individuals, and conflicts between individuals and society. These manifestations include the denial of determinism, affirmation of subjectivity under relative justice, identification with minority groups, denial of authority, and autonomous choice of values. Young generation people are confronted with unprecedentedly great uncertainty and insecurity brought about by the freedom of choice, as well as the social reality of the gradual awakening of existentialist consciousness in contemporary society.
The concept of God has long been a subject of philosophical inquiry, with various thinkers offering diverse perspectives on its nature and existence. Among them, Ludwig Feuerbach, a 19 th century German philosopher, stands out for his radical interpretation of the divine. Through his seminal work "The Essence of Christianity," Feuerbach posited that God is merely a projection of human qualities and desires through his famous dictum "Homo homini Deus est" (Man is God for man), challenging traditional theological notions and prompting a re-evaluation of religious belief. Through a critical analysis of Feuerbach's work, this paper aims to examine and uncover the implications of his ideas on our understanding of religion, atheism, human consciousness, and the nature of the divine as seen practiced in our modern day society; illuminate the ways in which human beings invest their hopes fears and desires in a divine entity, and how this investment shapes our understanding of ourselves and the world around us. It will look at some atheistic philosophies and try to strike a balance between their philosophies without outright rejection of same.
In this paper we introduce Critical Praxeological Analysis (CPA). CPA respecifies critical studies and research by operationalising insights from gestalt psychology and, in particular, the praxeological and linguistic gestalts identified by Harold Garfinkel and Ludwig Wittgenstein. CPA offers a framework for analysing the in-situ production, maintenance, challenging, repair and overcoming of norms and structures. Using naturally occuring data, as well as fictional and imagined examples, CPA examines the meanings that situations have for the participants who constitute them. The paper provides brief praxeological analyses, which draw upon themes from Frantz Fanon’s work to illustrate CPA in practice. We conclude by inviting others to apply CPA to themes drawn from the critical studies literature, in the hope that such analyses will deepen our understanding of how norms and structures are produced, maintained, challenged, repaired and overcome in interaction.
This article criticises David Chalmers’ ‘Reality+’ by interrogating its distinction of virtual reality (VR) from 2D, non-VR video games, a distinction made on the grounds that VR is immersive and these types of video games are not because immersion is a distinct characteristic of 3D perceptually represented VR. Building on the Balcerak Jacksons’ account of ‘representational immersion’, which they acknowledge has ‘perceptual’ and ‘non-perceptual’ elements, I develop an account of ‘non-perceptual representational immersion’ and use it to critique Chalmers’ treatment of VR, immersion, and video games, indirectly problematizing his central ontological claim that ‘virtual reality is genuine reality’ and the reflections he makes about future society which rest upon it. I argue that video games are rich in non-perceptual representational immersion, which includes the representation of non-perceptual information about the structure and behaviour of a virtual world and its systems, the non-perceptual cognitive states that are generated in the player by the virtual world, and the immersion which comes from the constitutively cognitive nature of the player’s engagement with the virtual world, a cognitive engagement construed in an enactive sense. These are just as crucial to the phenomenon of digital immersion as perception. Immersion generally is a much more complicated phenomenon than Chalmers allows for, and it is better conceived as taking place on a spectrum which includes both 3D and 2D experiences of virtual worlds, not as hinging on 3D perceptual representation. I use ‘immersive simulation’ games as a case study.
The collection of papers “Philosophical Anthropology II” is the second volume of papers in philosophical anthropology that contains papers written by members of the Department of Humanities at Rīga Stradiņš University. The collection consists of a foreword and ten chapters. Each chapter addresses its individual topic. The collection is oriented to general reader and does not presume background knowledge of philosophy or philosophical anthropology. / Krājumā “Filosofiskā antropoloģija II” tiek turpināts pirmajā krājumā iesāktais konceptuālais virziens, saskaņā ar kuru filosofiskā antropoloģija “ieņem vidutāja lomu starp dabaszinātnēm un humanitārajām zinātnēm, cenšoties apkopot dažādu zinātņu nozaru atklājumus par cilvēku” (Sīlis, 2015, 14). Tā ir multidisciplināra pieeja, kas izmanto filosofijas metodes, lai interpretētu empīriskus datus (procesus, stāvokļus) un izdarītu vispārinājumus par konkrētiem ar cilvēka eksistenci saistītiem jautājumiem. Tāpat kā iepriekšējā krājumā, arī šī krājuma rakstu struktūra ir saistīta ar nepieciešamību aplūkot pagātnes domātāju veikumu, lai noskaidrotu, cik tas ir aktuāls mūsdienās. Vienlaikus krājuma autori cenšas iekļaut arī mūslaiku problēmas, kas parādās viņu izvēlētās tēmas kontekstā. Atbilstīgi katras tēmas specifikai tiek izskatītas vairākas teorētiskās nostādnes, kritiski analizēti to trūkumi un priekšrocības. Krājums sastāv no desmit rakstiem. 6.3. Filozofija, reliģija, ētika. Filozofiskās antropoloģijas apakšnozare.
Hegel and Marx diagnosed the state of self-estrangement or alienation of the proletarian workers from processes and products of labor, coworkers, community, and the self. Presently, such alienation re-manifests among the immigrant and racially minoritized delivery riders, who comprise the bulk of the workforces of the digital platform capitalism, with repercussions on their societal integration.
Paradoxically, on-demand platform delivery work enables the immigrant messengers’ temporary labor insertion and mobility through the urban landscape of the host city, ergo, a broader scope for day-to-day social and spatial interactions with coinhabitants and their establishments. Such diverse encounters could stimulate the immigrant messengers’ social cohesion within the host communities and acculturation to the host language and customs.
This chapter builds on mental mapping and semi-structured interviews with immigrant messengers from the Glovo and Deliveroo platforms in the Barcelona metropolitan area amid the March 2020 coronavirus lockdown. Reinforced by interactions with immigrant platform riders via their social media and chat groups, the chapter explores their contrasting workaday experiences of alienation and acculturation in the host society, revealing exchanges that could partially diminish their segregation, fostering their integration.
In recent philosophical and (neuro)psychological discussions of phenomena such as motivated forgetting, memory inhibition, self-deception, and implicit bias, various authors have suggested that repression might be a useful notion to make sense of these phenomena, or that these phenomena indeed provide evidence for repression. However, surprisingly, these claims usually do not rely on any explicit model of repression. Consequently, it remains unclear whether invoking repression in these discussions is justified. In this paper, I propose a psychological “how-possibly” model that can serve as a basis for scientific research that I call the hybrid model of repression. This model combines the advantages while avoiding the problems of two types of models of repression—the higher-order model and the separation model—that have been discussed and defended by different authors and that both have their origin in Freud. This “how-possibly” model may then set the stage for further empirical research, which can form the basis for a “how-actually” model in the longer run.
In this chapter, I discuss the revelatory experience of art and “wonder.” Heidegger argues that the work of art opens a world to its audience in a way that allows the audience to contemplate it. There is always an opacity to art works—a medium that both attracts its audience and keeps them at a remove, which inspires a mood of wonder that allows the consideration of the structure of the world of human experience itself. In this way, art can reveal conditions for human experience through a distanced captivation that allows for phenomenological inquiry. I argue, further, that art which grows out of specific social situations and identities can offer insight into shared background conditions of human experience—these art works are revelatory because of not in spite of a socially specific starting point. Feminist art provides one example. I also use the work of Eva Hesse to make this point—exploring the way her understanding and depiction of existential absurdity was shaped by her experiences as a Jewish woman and also her chronic and terminal illness.
In this article, I call attention to the Yogavāsiṣṭha’s depiction of Rāma’s existential crisis and Vasiṣṭha’s various methods for resolving it. However, I illuminate this crisis and Rāma’s lengthy monologue by turning to an altogether different frame of reference: Albert Camus’s philosophy of the absurd as developed in his absurd-oriented works, from The Myth of Sisyphus to The Rebel. Arguing that Rāma’s existential crisis is strongly reminiscent of Camus’s awakening to life’s absurdity, and that his monologue may be considered among the most successful meditations on this predicament, I examine not only Rāma’s quandary but also what the Yogavāsiṣṭha deems the ultimate response to it. In this way, I throw into sharp relief two contrasting responses to the absurd condition in human life that effectively challenge one another. Considering some of the Indian classical works, such as the Yogavāsiṣṭha, in this light suggests that they too acknowledge the absurd as their starting point and, at least to a certain extent, develop doctrines that aid their practitioners in facing it. Nevertheless, the Yogavāsiṣṭha also enables us to develop our thinking about absurdity and expand the discussion of constructive responses to the reality of the absurd.
The practice of human resource development plays out at the intersection of an array of stakeholders whose interests and goals sometimes overlap but often diverge. Practical questions about what actions to take are at the core of daily work in our field and call for the ability to discern values to be enacted and valuable ends to be pursued. The field of ethics addresses such normative questions about rights and wrongs and responsibilities and duties at individual, group, organizational, and societal levels of analysis. Understanding different approaches to ethics, their fundamental principles, and implications for practice is essential for professional practice in all organizational domains, and especially in HRD, a field that is centrally focused on learning, development, and flourishing in the context of work and working. This chapter is divided into two sections: The first outlines the key concepts of values, norms, and morals as well as the distinctions among pure, applied, and behavioral ethics as they relate to work organization in the North American context. The second addresses the dominant theoretical perspectives on ethics and their relevance for HRD practice based on libertarian and liberal philosophical traditions. The conclusion summarizes the key features of the two perspectives and discusses how they occur in HRD practice, alone and in combination. The chapter closes with a reflection on the value-laden nature of HRD practice in the context of the push and pull of interests and understandings of rights and wrongs in the emerging, open-ended arena of work and work organizations.
Most mainstream theories of selfhood and personhood in the European and North-American tradition, regardless of whether they are naturalistic or dualistic, presuppose an egocentric paradigm. This means, they assume that consciousness is primary in our conceptions of self and person. From its very beginning, the Buddhist traditions provide alternative models to this egocentric paradigm, be it the network model of early Buddhist scriptures, the distinctively phenomenological approaches of Yogācāra Buddhism, or the deconstructive approaches of Zen Buddhist thinkers and texts. The philosophers of the Kyoto School have also inherited a critical stance towards the egocentric paradigm, whether intentionally or unintentionally. In this chapter, I will interrogate a plethora of approaches discussed in Japanese Buddhism and twentieth century Japanese philosophy. Concretely, I will introduce language developed by these philosophers to highlight four different modalities of the self, namely the thetic, a-thetic, bi-thetic, and non-thetic modalities. The goal is to envision a complex conception of consciousness that is relational rather than egocentric and that is grounded in a second-person, rather than a first- or a third-person, approach. The result will be an innovative conception of the self that is inspired by various philosophers in the Buddhist and/or Japanese philosophical traditions.
The article addresses the issue of the relationship between existentialism and late modern projectivity interpreted in terms of project work and of biographical projectivity. It does so from the perspective of transformations of subjectivity in modernity and late modernity, and, therefore, from the perspective of the process of individualization. The objective is to answer the question of the belonging of existentialism to one of these sociocultural formations. For these purposes, some major categories of existentialism such as project, anxiety, and temporality are analyzed. Their analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a close, structural correlation between existentialism and sociocultural structures of modernity as well as that existentialism, in contrast to late modern projectivity, has some emancipatory potential related to its alienating status in modernity. The article refers to the methodology of qualitative sociology.
Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies.
Some contemporary Western theories of consciousness, such as the higher-order thought (HOT) theory and self-representationalism, hold that there is an implicit (pre-reflective) “self-awareness” that accompanies each conscious mental state. Important twentieth-century historical figures, such as Sartre and Brentano, have also embraced a similar position. This view, or something very close to it, can also be found centuries earlier in some Indian philosophy (such as in Dignāga) where conscious experience is thought of as “inherently reflexive” and cognition is understood to have a “dual-aspect.” In this chapter, I lay out some of the similarities and differences among these views and explain why I prefer the way that HOT theory accounts for such self-awareness as compared to the others, including HOT theory’s ability to avoid the much-discussed infinite regress threat and its more plausible explanation of introspection. I also explain how HOT theory, like many Buddhist accounts, is not logically committed to the existence of an enduring substantial “self.”
In this article, our focus is on the topic of engagement and possibility of empathy with future generations. We acknowledge that empathy for future generations is practically unattainable in its strictest sense due to the lack of access to their potential mental states and the absence of direct interaction. Additionally, we will draw upon the arguments presented by Goldie and Slaby to address concerns regarding the potential paternalization that may arise in empathic relations towards future generations. However, despite these limitations, it is important to emphasize that we are still engaged with future generations. Instead of adopting a paternalizing approach where we impose expectations on how they should feel, our engagement exposes us to the anticipated but unknown judgments of future generations. Throughout this article, we will argue that engagement with future generations brings out our own social self-consciousness and provides a basis of our connectedness and responsibility towards future generations.
This chapter analyzes a young adult trilogy that has yet to receive critical attention. Accordingly, the author first contextualizes the series within the larger tradition of young adult cyberpunk narratives that feature disability. Building upon this literature review, the author devotes their attention to The Six Series by Mark Alpert—The Six (2015), The Siege (2016), and The Silence (2017)—which tells the story of six terminally ill teenagers whose only choice is to die or to have their consciousnesses uploaded into machines. Although the bulk of the analysis centers around Adam, the protagonist, and how his virtual selves and physical self are remediated through his simulated experiences, the author also explores how the other characters address prescient concerns related to virtual identity. In addition to raising questions about what happens to aspects of identity like race, gender, sexuality, and, of course, disability in virtual spaces, the trilogy offers a powerful narrative about the attempted oppression of a marginalized community.
This paper has two objectives. The first objective is a decoupling of the African body from ‘blackness’—a discursive formation—that was attached to the body by the slave and the colonial regimes. The second aim is a critique of modern epistemic and epistemological regimes that give ‘blackness’ its modern currency. To achieve these goals, I use phenomenology, a philosophy of self-responsible beginning according to Edmund Husserl, to return to the African body before colonialism and slavery. Through phenomenology I can ‘bracket’ what the above regimes and their legacies have been conditioning the African to see and know about the body. The paper is therefore an attempt at a liberatory epistemology aimed at overcoming what Achille Mbembe has referred to as a ‘dungeon of appearance’. Since ‘blackness’ is continental and diaspora Africans (CADA) seen through discursive colonial eyes, phenomenology provides an epistemological freedom to observe the body in-time.
Existing phenomenological accounts of anorexia nervosa suggest that various forms of bodily alienation and distorted bodily self-consciousness are common among subjects with this condition. Subjects often experience a sense of distance or estrangement from their body and its needs and demands. What is more, first-person reports and existing qualitative research reveal struggles with authenticity and a search for identity. Is there a connection between the two? I argue that to gain a fuller understanding of anorexia nervosa, how it is experienced by subjects, and why many of them express concerns about authenticity, we need to look more closely at their experiences of bodily alienation and the ways in which they encounter a diminished sense of bodily ownership. After presenting a general overview of the various sorts of bodily alienation that appear to be characteristic of anorexia nervosa, I outline three conceptions of authenticity and introduce some empirical evidence indicating that many subjects with this condition have concerns about identity and authenticity. Then, I examine how different sorts of bodily alienation have the potential to compromise authenticity at various stages of the disorder. Throughout, I draw from several first-person accounts of anorexia nervosa to illustrate and support my claims.
Building on the landmark O’Regan and Noë (Behav Brain Sci 24:939–973, 2001) that introduced us to the sensorimotor theory of perception, Alva Noë has continued to develop and defend a highly influential enactivist account of perception. Said account takes perceptual experience to be mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (knowledge of the law-like relations that hold between bodily movements and sensory changes). In recent work, Noë has argued that we should construe sensorimotor knowledge as a kind of conceptual knowledge. One significant theoretical advantage of his account, he contends, is that it allows us to better characterize our embodied coping skills by way of showing how they are manifestations of a conceptual-and-yet-not-representational kind of understanding. He argues that both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of skill alike assume that conceptual understanding must be wedded to explicit judgement, and therefore have failed to correctly characterize the role of understanding in skilled performance. This paper argues against Noë’s contention that skilled action is always permeated with understanding. It argues additionally that Noë’s of unorthodox notion of conceptual understanding is unstable and, if it were adopted, would over-intellectualize the role of perception in action. The paper concludes by arguing that doing so frees us up to take more seriously the enactivist options for understanding skilled performance without introducing notions of conceptual understanding at all.
In this professional theoretical article, the authors argue that patient care should be centered on connection and that authentically turning toward suffering necessitates an approach to care that transcends medicine's traditional focus on cure and physical restoration and differentiates between pathology and disability. The meaning of illness and suffering for those who have experienced life-changing injuries or illness is explored. Strategies for approaching the lifeworld of these individuals are discussed using the concepts of phenomenology and embodiment, rooted in the work of philosophers from the phenomenological tradition. The authors also propose an approach to patient care offering a case-based example based on postmodernist concepts that elevate connection, relationship, and interdependency above the traditional focus of restoring normality and physical independence for individuals with disabilities. Traditional assumptions about quality of life, illness, and disability are called into question by focusing on the fluidity of being and disability identity, which serves to destabilize static, binary conceptions of individuals as either healthy or ill, disabled, or able-bodied. A postmodern lens invites healthcare practitioners to envision themselves as part of an assemblage that may promote a more expansive view of the relationship between patient and healthcare practitioner.
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