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The Psychological Mechanism of the Slippery Slope Argument
... Although Proposition 5 is intuitively absurd, variants of Proposition 6 are influential. The Bayesian approach treats SSAs as consequentialist arguments based on a cost-benefit analysis (Corner et al. 2011, Hahn & Oaksford 2007: Do not act (p = allow gay marriage) unless the benefit associated with the action [U(p)] exceeds the expected cost [Pr(q|p)U(q)] of the consequences to which it may lead (q = allowing interspecies marriage). In this respect, SSAs are similar to warnings or utility conditionals more generally (Bonnefon 2009) (see section titled Utility Conditionals). ...
... Proposition 5 can be characterized as the argument that if we categorize gay marriage (a) as allowable (Fa), this will lead to us categorizing interspecies marriage (b) as allowable (Fb). Thus, the similarity between a and b should (and does) affect people's willingness to assign them to the same category and hence to endorse the corresponding SSA (Corner et al. 2011; see also Rai & Holyoak 2014 on moral hypocrisy). Circular reasoning. ...
... Circular reasoning. Circularity (Hahn 2011) is an oddity among the fallacies because certain formulations are logically valid (if p then p is a tautology). As usual, the fallacy has strong and weak variants. ...
The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion and is typically modeled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical fallacies. It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be erroneous responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, in which people extrapolate beyond the data they are given and logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 71 is January 4, 2020. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
... In line with this idea, recent work has started to examine empirically the descriptive, psychological aspect of classical argumentative fallacies. In particular, modern approaches for studying argumentation such as Bayesian theory (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007;Corner and Hahn, 2009;Corner et al., 2011), the pragmadialectical account (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004;van Eemeren et al., 2009van Eemeren et al., , 2012, epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010), and evolutionary psychology (Sperber and Mercier, 2012), have proposed plausible explanations for the mechanisms and cognitive aspects of argumentation in more ecologically valid contextual accounts. In this article, we show how these descriptive approaches shed light onto the psychological mechanisms of argumentation. ...
... In argumentation, the structure of the slippery slope argument has raised the question of its highly successful implementation in contexts in which a subject or a group of subjects attempts to persuade the audience in favor of an argument even when the argument or its usage are incorrect. In particular, cognitive psychology has initiated the investigation of the mechanisms underlying persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument by employing the cognitive concept of similarity and statistical tools from Bayesian theory (Corner et al., 2011). ...
... Recent experimental evidence from the study of informal fallacies and decision making have shed light on the psychological mechanisms of the slippery slope argument by employing the notion of similarity (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007;Corner and Hahn, 2009;Corner et al., 2011). Specifically, this line of research has tested the hypothesis that the more similar the antecedents in an argumentative chain are, the more persuasive (or slippery) the slope will be. ...
While the chapters range over a number of areas of research, this collection is focused on current prospects for conceptual synthesis within - or convergence of research between - aspects of mind Frontiers in Psychology 3 August 2016 | How Best to ‘Go On’?
and mindedness. As is clear from the contributions, it highlights integrative conceptual proposals that emphasize action-orientation, process, embeddedness and connectivity – especially between explanatory ‘levels’.Beyond specific proposals for integration, several of the contributions explicitly or implicitly expose broader questions about the purpose of psychological research, the epistemological and ontological commitments required, and the relevant social, political and economic contexts within which such research is performed. This is perhaps inevitable since any aim for synthesis of various understandings of mind will - or should - lead to consideration of the general implications,
beyond the ‘science’, that follow from an integrated account of mind and mindedness.
Whether or not the contributions in this volume provide insights into profitable paths towards greater theoretical synthesis in the sciences of mind or, alternatively, provide grist for the mill of renewed skepticism over the potential or even desirability of such synthesis is unpredictable.
Whichever the outcome, we feel sure that they will help provoke future productive research in, and thinking about, the sciences of mind.
... La investigación reciente en lógica informal (e.g. Walton, 2010) y en ciencia cognitiva (Corner, Hahn & Oaksford, 2011) ha puesto de manifiesto formas distintas de concebir la idea de similitud en la manera en que fundamenta la explicación de la argumentación basada en precedentes (Walton, 2010) y los argumentos de pendiente resbaladiza (APP, en adelante) (Corner et al., 2011). Walton afirma que el razonamiento legal donde se intenta establecer la existencia de un precedente relevante, consiste en una forma de razonamiento por analogía. ...
... La investigación reciente en lógica informal (e.g. Walton, 2010) y en ciencia cognitiva (Corner, Hahn & Oaksford, 2011) ha puesto de manifiesto formas distintas de concebir la idea de similitud en la manera en que fundamenta la explicación de la argumentación basada en precedentes (Walton, 2010) y los argumentos de pendiente resbaladiza (APP, en adelante) (Corner et al., 2011). Walton afirma que el razonamiento legal donde se intenta establecer la existencia de un precedente relevante, consiste en una forma de razonamiento por analogía. ...
... Por otro lado, Corner et al. (2011) proponen una análisis de los APP en el marco de la aproximación bayesiana a la argumentación (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). Su proyecto general consiste en ofrecer un análisis probabilístico de las bases psicológicas y ambientales de la evaluación de esquemas argumentativos. ...
Resumen: El concepto de similitud es indispensable para comprender el funciona-miento de distintos esquemas argumentativos, incluyendo los denominados argu-mentos de pendiente resbaladiza. Sin embargo, la pluralidad de formas de entender la similitud desarrolladas en el campo de la ciencia cognitiva parece no haber encon-trado suficiente resonancia en los estudios teóricos y empíricos sobre argumentación. En el presente texto se enfatiza la necesidad de enriquecer el análisis de los mecanis-mos psicológicos de evaluación de argumentos incorporando las principales nociones de similitud que se han propuesto en ciencia cognitiva. A manera de ilustración, se examina el caso de los argumentos de pendiente resbaladiza y se explora la hipótesis de que la similitud entre las propiedades causales de los elementos presentados en este tipo de argumentos es crucial para la evaluación que hacen las personas de su grado de convicción. Como conclusión, se traza la agenda de un nuevo programa de investigación que conecta la literatura en evaluación de argumentos con los estudios cognitivos en formación de conceptos a través de la idea de similitud.
... Hahn and Oaksford (2006)'s main point is that the acceptability of "empirical" or "rational grounds" horrible result SSAs varies as a function of the strength of the probabilistic connection between the consequent and the antecedent in the conditional, and as a function of the negative utility of the outcome (how bad or "horrible" the outcome is supposed to be). This was experimentally confirmed by Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford (2011) for horrible result SSAs of length 1, by having participants rate the acceptability of argument strength as a function of the utility and probability of outcomes. 2 The results of Corner et al. (2011) can be brought to bear on the discussion of arbitrary result SSAs more broadly. ...
... This was experimentally confirmed by Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford (2011) for horrible result SSAs of length 1, by having participants rate the acceptability of argument strength as a function of the utility and probability of outcomes. 2 The results of Corner et al. (2011) can be brought to bear on the discussion of arbitrary result SSAs more broadly. That is, the consideration of the probability of conditional premises can serve to determine where the line should be drawn. ...
... In this political context, citizens who do not trust the government may oppose even incremental changes away from their policy ideal point, in part, because they are concerned it is only the first step toward the other side's extreme and unacceptable policies-a process akin to a "slippery slope." They refuse to support even "reasonable" policies-policies that come at a relatively low cost to them-for fear they might lead to more unwanted and ideologically extreme policies (Corner et al. 2011). The intersection of a politically-divided context and lack of trust, we suggest, means that even moderate policies put forward by the opposition may be perceived as the first step toward unacceptable outcomes. ...
... As A moves farther away from P and closer to some undesirable policy B, as illustrated in Fig. 1, Case 2, then the effect of trust in government on the probability of supporting A will increase-at least initially. Individuals who fear a slippery slope have a subjective perception of the probability that B will occur given that A occurs, represented as Pr(B|A), which is influenced by the degree of similarity between A and B (Corner et al. 2011). The subjective probability of B given A increases as the distance between policy B and A decreases. ...
Declining trust in government is often cited as the cause of declining support for policies that require ideological sacrifices. Yet pivotal to the effect of trust is the broader political context, which can vary over time. In a context of deep partisan divisions, for individuals who do not trust the government, even small ideological costs can signal the beginning of a process that leads to much larger ideological costs down the line—a process akin to a “slippery slope.” We demonstrate the conditional relationship between partisan divides, governmental trust, and support for policy through empirical tests that focus on the case of gun control. We first show that the effect of trust in government on conservatives’ gun control attitudes increases as polarization over the issue grows. We then use a continuum of gun control policies to demonstrate that the effect of trust on policy support can follow a slippery slope structure during polarized points.
... Such a standard would not only be helpful to our daily lives, it is also crucial to a whole range of scientific goals. Cognitive psychologists wish to assess the quality of people's argumentation (e.g., [8][9][10]) as part of the long tradition of rationality focused research on reasoning, judgment, and decision-making [11,12]. Educational psychologists who want to improve argument skills [13,14] must know what counts as good argument. ...
... To be clear, though it has been outlined how the treatment extends to the bulk of the fallacies in the catalogue [33], only a handful have received detailed probabilistic analysis. In each case, however, this has not just revealed important new distinctions (e.g., Box 2), it has also fostered new empirical work aimed at probing lay intuitions: there is now a growing body of experimental work on arguments from ignorance [36,37], ad hominem arguments [38][39][40], slippery slope arguments [9,41,42], circular arguments [18,28,43], or appeals to popular opinion [44]. That each of these schemes has been found to contain theoretical and empirical richness of its own should encourage future work. ...
The idea of resolving dispute through the exchange of arguments and reasons has been central to society for millennia. We exchange arguments as a way of getting at the truth in contexts as diverse as science, the court room, and our everyday lives. In democracies, political decisions should be negotiated through argument, not deception, or even worse, brute force. If argument is to lead to the truth or to good decisions, then some arguments must be better than others and ‘argument strength’ must have some meaningful connection with truth. Can argument strength be measured in a way that tracks an objective relationship with truth and not just mere persuasiveness? This article describes recent developments in providing such measures.
... Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 10 May 2017 slope arguments, see, e.g., Volokh, 2003): The act of categorizing some instance (say, voluntary euthanasia) under a more general predicate (here, legal medical intervention) is assumed to lead inevitably to other items (e.g., involuntary euthanasia or "medical murder") eventually falling under the same predicate. Corner et al. (2011) examined not only the effects of utility on the perceived strength of slippery slope arguments, but also examined a specific mechanism underlying the conditional probability P(q|p). Specifically, they examined the causal mechanism involved in "sorites"-type slippery slope arguments, namely "category boundary reappraisal": Current theories of conceptual structure typically agree that encountering instances of a category at the category boundary should extend that boundary for subsequent classifications, and there is a wealth of empirical evidence to support this (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). ...
... Specifically, they examined the causal mechanism involved in "sorites"-type slippery slope arguments, namely "category boundary reappraisal": Current theories of conceptual structure typically agree that encountering instances of a category at the category boundary should extend that boundary for subsequent classifications, and there is a wealth of empirical evidence to support this (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). Building on this, Corner et al. (2011) showed how people's confidence in classifications of various acts as instances of a particular category was directly related to their degree of endorsement for corresponding slippery slope arguments, and that this relationship is moderated by similarity. Slippery slope arguments from one instance to another were viewed as more compelling, the more similar the instances were perceived to be. ...
This chapter outlines the range of argument forms involving causation that can be found in everyday discourse. It also surveys empirical work concerned with the generation and evaluation of such arguments. This survey makes clear that there is presently no unified body of research concerned with causal argument. It highlights the benefits of a unified treatment both for those interested in causal cognition and those interested in argumentation, and identifies the key challenges that must be met for a full understanding of causal argumentation.
... The type of slippery slope argument schematized above is an empirical argument, because support for its conclusion depends on empirical claims about causal or statistical connections between human behaviors and adverse outcomes. Therefore, facts and theories from the social and behavioral sciences and other disciplines often have a bearing on the strength of this type of argument [49,50]. For example, evidence concerning steadily increasing rates of physician-assisted suicide in countries that have legalized this practice is regarded by many as supporting the slippery slope argument against legalization of physician-assisted suicide [51]. ...
The bioethical debate about using gene drives to alter or eradicate wild populations has focused mostly on issues concerning short-term risk assessment and management, governance and oversight, and public and community engagement, but has not examined big-picture- 'where is this going?'-questions in great depth. In other areas of bioethical controversy, big-picture questions often enter the public forum via slippery slope arguments. Given the incredible potential of gene drive organisms to alter the Earth's biota, it is somewhat surprising that slippery slope arguments have not played a more prominent role in ethical and policy debates about these emerging technologies. In this article, we examine a type of slippery slope argument against using gene drives to alter or suppress wild pest populations and consider whether it has a role to play in ethical and policy debates. Although we conclude that this argument does not provide compelling reasons for banning the use of gene drives in wild pest populations, we believe that it still has value as a morally instructive cautionary narrative that can motivate scientists, ethicists, and members of the public to think more clearly about appropriate vs. inappropriate uses of gene drive technologies, the long-term and cumulative and emergent risks of using gene drives in wild populations, and steps that can be taken to manage these risks, such as protecting wilderness areas where people can enjoy life forms that have not been genetically engineered.
... Hoeken, Šorm, & Schellens, 2014;Hoeken, Timmers, & Schellens, 2012;Hornikx, 2008). There is no evidence that people are easily taken in by fallacious argument (such as egregious slippery slope arguments or arguments from ignorance, Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011;Oaksford & Hahn, 2004). Moreover, people seem to change their minds when confronted with strong enough arguments, even when the arguments challenge confidently held opinions (Trouche, Sander, & Mercier, 2014;Trouche, Shao, & Mercier, in press). ...
People are good at taking communicated information into account, using reliable cues to decide whom to trust and what to believe. However, people have no abstract understanding of how this process of information aggregation works, and tend to underestimate how well it works. Even though many institutions have evolved that take advantage of our ability to aggregate information, I argue that they appeared in spite of, rather than thanks to, our understanding of information aggregation.
... Steps down slippery slopes are the result of an absence of a sharp line between cases (9) that I will simply describe here as similarity between the steps. Basic cognitive processes lead to this slippage (10). To foreshadow relevant instances of similarity causing slippage, think about the similarity between Huntington's and early-onset Alzheimer's. ...
The ethical debate about what is now called human gene editing (HGE) has gone on for more than 50 y. For nearly that entire time, there has been consensus that a moral divide exists between somatic and germline HGE. Conceptualizing this divide as a barrier on a slippery slope, in this paper, I first describe the slope, what makes it slippery, and describe strong barriers that arrest the slippage down to the dystopian bottom of pervasive eugenic enhancement. I then show how the somatic/germline barrier in the debate has been weakened to the level of ineffectiveness, with no replacement below. I examine a number of possible barriers on the slope below the somatic/germline barrier, most of which lack sufficient strength. With the exception of the minority of people in the HGE debate who see the eugenic society as utopia, the majority will need a barrier on the slope to stop the slide to dystopia.
... The level of fallaciousness can then vary depending on the way the arguments are worded. Corner et al. (2011) illustrate the differences providing the following examples of a slippery slope argument: ...
... Several logic textbooks classify the SSA-scheme as an informal fallacy (e.g., Barry 1976;Hurley 1982;Bowell and Kemp 2005). However, argumentation scholars today broadly agree that the reasonableness of most argument scheme instances depends on contextually variable particulars, requiring a situated analysis (Walton 1992;Groarke et al. 2004;Corner et al. 2011). In the pragma-dialectical theory (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), which is our point of departure, an argument scheme is treated as a "characterization of the way in which the reason given in support of a standpoint is supposed to bring about a transfer of acceptance to the standpoint in a particular type of argumentation" (Van Eemeren 2018, p. 7). ...
Addressing the slippery slope argument (SSA) in legal contexts from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, this paper elaborates the conditions under which an SSA-scheme instance is used reasonably (rather than fallaciously). We review SSA-instances in past legal decisions and analyze the basic legal SSA-scheme. By illustrating the institutional preconditions influencing the reasoning by which an SSA moves forward, we identify three sub-schemes (causal SSA, analogical SSA, and Sorites SSA). For each sub-scheme we propose critical questions, as well as four rules that clarify when the SSA scheme is used reasonably. The institutional preconditions make the analogical SSA expectable in common law contexts; the Sorites SSA is expectable in civil law contexts; whereas the causal SSA is common to both contexts. This result should inform future work on the identification of typical argumentative patterns for the SSA in legal contexts.
... The level of fallaciousness can then vary depending on the way the arguments are worded. Corner et al. (2011) illustrate the differences providing the following examples of a slippery slope argument: ...
... In particular, prior cheating leads to the forgetting of moral rules and ethical boundaries and makes subsequent moral disengagement more likely (Shu et al. 2011). This has led researchers to explicitly refer to the existence of a positive "feedback loop" when describing the psychological mechanism of the slippery slope in general (Corner et al. 2011) or in the context of moral disengagement (Moore and Gino 2015;Shu et al. 2011) and escalation of deception (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos 2008). Thus, a positive relationship between legitimacy lies and subsequent moral disengagement is expected, leading us to propose that: ...
It would seem, on the surface, logical that entrepreneurs would treat stakeholders with honesty and respect. However, this is not always the case—at times, entrepreneurs lie to stakeholders in order to take a step closer to achieving legitimacy. It is these legitimacy lies that are the focus of the current work. Overall, while we know that legitimacy lies are told, we know very little about the psychological processes at work that may make it more likely for someone to tell a legitimacy lie. Thus, we theorize about the pressure to pursue legitimacy, the situational and individual factors that affect this pursuit, as well as how this context can lead to moral disengagement and the telling of legitimacy lies. Our theorizing advances the existing literature and provides a dynamic framework by which future research can delve more deeply into the nuanced context that breeds the escalation of legitimacy lies.
... Recientemente, la aproximación bayesiana a la argumentación se ha ocupado de 1) establecer los criterios que permiten distinguir entre argumentos falaces y razonables desde un punto de vista probabilístico y 2) determinar si tales criterios coinciden o no con los que emplean de manera implícita las personas a la hora de juzgar un argumento como razonable o falaz en escenarios cotidianos. En particular, estas aproximaciones han aplicado esta estrategia al análisis de las falacias de apelación a la ignorancia (ad ignorantiam), petición de principio (petitio principii) (Hahn y Oaksford 2007), pendiente resbaladiza (Corner et al. 2011) y, más recientemente, argumentos contra la persona (ad hominem) (Harris et al. 2012). En este apartado se presentarán brevemente tres falacias: apelación a la autoridad (ad verecundiam), a la popularidad (ad populum) y petición de principio, examinando las diferencias y semejanzas entre los criterios normativos que pueden derivarse desde la aproximación bayesiana y desde el razonamiento plausible. ...
Este artículo presenta un análisis comparativo de los modelos de argumentación basados en las nociones de probabilidad subjetiva y de razonamiento plausible. Se hacen explícitos los “parecidos de familia” entre probabilidad y plausibilidad, y se examinan las diferencias en las prescripciones invocadas para la evaluación de tres tipos de falacias informales: apelación a la autoridad (ad verecundiam), a la popularidad (ad populum) y petición de principio (petitio principii). Se concluye que el razonamiento plausible, como Rescher y Walton lo describen, no proporciona una alternativa sólida a la probabilidad como modelo normativo o descriptivo de la evaluación de argumentos.
... Our starting point was the postulate that deontic introduction is a common type of informal inference. We adopted a broadly decision-theoretic approach, inspired by previous psychological work which successfully analysed informal arguments within a Bayesian framework (Corner et al. 2011;Hahn and Oaksford 2007), and by previ-ous work on utility conditionals (Bonnefon 2009). 3 Such conditionals are a paradigm case of what has been dubbed 'bridge constructs' (Schurz 1997), that is, constructs that mix both descriptive and evaluative elements. ...
Originally identified by Hume, the validity of is–ought inference is much debated in the meta-ethics literature. Our work shows that inference from is to ought typically proceeds from contextualised, value-laden causal utility conditional, bridging into a deontic conclusion. Such conditional statements tell us what actions are needed to achieve or avoid consequences that are good or bad. Psychological research has established that people generally reason fluently and easily with utility conditionals. Our own research also has shown that people’s reasoning from is to ought (deontic introduction) is pragmatically sensitive and adapted to achieving the individual’s goals. But how do we acquire the necessary deontic rules? In this paper, we provide a rationale for this facility linked to Evans’s (Thinking twice: two minds in one brain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) framework of dual mind rationality. People have an old mind (in evolutionary terms) which derives its rationality by repeating what has worked in the past, mostly by experiential learning. New mind rationality, in contrast, is evolutionarily recent, uniquely developed in humans, and draws on our ability to mentally simulate hypothetical events removed in time and place. We contend that the new mind achieves its goals by inducing and applying deontic rules and that a mechanism of deontic introduction evolved for this purpose.
... Brem and Rips 2000;Petty and Cacioppo 1979; for review, see Tormala and Briñol 2015). This has also been found in studies that use classical argument schemes to evaluate argument strength (Hoeken et al. 2012(Hoeken et al. , 2014Hornikx 2008; see also Hornikx and Hahn 2012), as well as in studies using a Bayesian framework Corner et al. 2011;Hahn et al. 2005;Harris et al. 2015;Oaksford and Hahn 2004; for reviews, see Hahn and Oaksford 2007;Hahn and Hornikx 2016). ...
Many experiments suggest that participants are more critical of arguments that challenge their views or that come from untrustworthy sources. However, other results suggest that this might not be true of demonstrative arguments. A series of four experiments tested whether people are influenced by two factors when they evaluate demonstrative arguments: how confident they are in the answer being challenged by the argument, and how much they trust the source of the argument. Participants were not affected by their confidence in the answer challenged by the argument. By contrast, they were sometimes affected by their trust in the argument’s source. Analyses of reaction times and transfer problems suggest that source trustworthiness did not directly affect argument evaluation, but affected instead the number of times the participants considered the arguments. Our results thus suggest that people can evaluate demonstrative arguments objectively. In conclusion, we defend the hypothesis that people might also be able to evaluate non-demonstrative arguments objectively. These results support the predictions of the argumentative theory of reasoning.
... An extension of this account will also be required to account for deontic or more generally utility conditionals (Bonnefon, 2009), for example, the conditional underlying the slippery slope argument if we legalize cannabis, then we will have to legalize heroin (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011). The argument suggests that the antecedent action should not be taken because of the dire consequences of the consequent action to which it will inexorably lead. ...
Book synopsis: Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Although causal reasoning is a component of most of our cognitive functions, it has been neglected in cognitive psychology for many decades. The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning offers a state-of-the-art review of the growing field, and its contribution to the world of cognitive science. The Handbook begins with an introduction of competing theories of causal learning and reasoning. In the next section, it presents research about basic cognitive functions involved in causal cognition, such as perception, categorization, argumentation, decision-making, and induction. The following section examines research on domains that embody causal relations, including intuitive physics, legal and moral reasoning, psychopathology, language, social cognition, and the roles of space and time. The final section presents research from neighboring fields that study developmental, phylogenetic, and cultural differences in causal cognition. The chapters, each written by renowned researchers in their field, fill in the gaps of many cognitive psychology textbooks, emphasizing the crucial role of causal structures in our everyday lives. This Handbook is an essential read for students and researchers of the cognitive sciences, including cognitive, developmental, social, comparative, and cross-cultural psychology; philosophy; methodology; statistics; artificial intelligence; and machine learning.
... Hahn and Oaksford developed a Bayesian framework to analyse such informal argumentation fallacies. Take, for example, slippery slope arguments (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011), such as "If voluntary euthanasia is legalised, then in the future there will be more cases of 'medical murder'." ...
... For slippery slope arguments, they argue, utility plays a role as well. Corner et al. (2011) analyse the slippery slope argument as a Denial of the Antecedent argument which can be stronger or weaker, depending on its conditional probability and the utility of the consequent. (Denial of the Antecedent is a classically and probabilistically invalid conditional inference of the form 'If p, then q; not-p; therefore, not-q'.) ...
... The slippery slope argument is a powerful one in public debates: if successful it reverses the onus of proof, so that rather than arguing about a particular proposition, the advocate is forced to argue that some horrific hypothetical consequence will never occur (Walton 2011). Slippery-slope arguments are stronger, and more believable, if the position being argued against (assisted dying) and the down-slope consequences-whatever they may be-are perceived as close (Corner, Hahn and Oaksford 2011). ...
Assisted dying is a topic fraught with theological and ethical contention. It has been regularly debated in Australian parliaments and is currently under active consideration in New South Wales and Victoria. The Victorian process involved a public inquiry by a committee of Victoria’s upper house which attracted more than a thousand submissions. This paper analyses the submissions made to that committee by Christian churches and organi- sations with a Christian affiliation. All bar one of the submissions were opposed to legalising assisted dying. The two most common themes in the Christian submissions were the need to expand palliative care services and that adequate palliative care could be an alternative to assisted dying; and that even narrowly constrained legalising of assisted dying could lead to a slippery slope with further expansions and potential harm to vulnerable populations. These arguments were not successful and the committee supported legalising assisted dying. Possible reasons for the failure of the Christian arguments are explored.
... We propose a psychological mechanism: According to the satisficing principle, the link need only be strong enough, in the sense of being subjectively supported. For example, it can be supported by informal argumentation such as described by Hahn and Oaksford (2007; see also Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011); by heuristic or pragmatic cues, as suggested by Evans and Over (2004); or by some form of inference to the best explanation (Douven, 2013(Douven, , 2017a(Douven, , 2017bDouven & Schupbach, 2015). On the computational level, the semantic output of these cues often takes the shape of inductive or abductive inference, or even deductive inference. ...
Intuition suggests that for a conditional to be evaluated as true, there must be some kind of connection between its component clauses. In this paper, we formulate and test a new psychological theory to account for this intuition. We combined previous semantic and psychological theorizing to propose that the key to the intuition is a relevance-driven, satisficing-bounded inferential connection between antecedent and consequent. To test our theory, we created a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were presented with a soritical series of objects, notably colored patches (Experiments 1 and 4) and spheres (Experiment 2), or both (Experiment 3), and were asked to evaluate related condi-tionals embodying non-causal inferential connections (such as " If patch number 5 is blue, then so is patch number 4 "). All four experiments displayed a unique response pattern, in which (largely determinate) responses were sensitive to parameters determining inference strength, as well as to consequent position in the series, in a way analogous to belief bias. Experiment 3 showed that this guaranteed relevance can be suppressed, with participants reverting to the defective conditional. Experiment 4 showed that this pattern can be partly explained by a measure of inference strength. This pattern supports our theory's " principle of relevant inference " and " principle of bounded inference, " highlighting the dual processing characteristics of the inferential connection.
... RQ4 Are people's assessments of the number of members in a popular opinion needed to counter an expert opinion quantitatively in line with Bayesian predictions? crossed with five levels of layperson expertise using a Latin Square design (for implementation of this design in argumentation research, see Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011). Consequently, each participant responded to five scenarios and each of the levels of expert expertise and layperson expertise, although the combinations of these were randomised across participants (see Table 2). ...
In everyday situations, people regularly receive information from large groups of (lay) people and from single experts. Although lay opinions and expert opinions have been studied extensively in isolation, the present study examined the relationship between the two by asking how many laypeople are needed to counter an expert opinion. A Bayesian formalisation allowed the prescription of this quantity. Participants were subsequently asked to assess how many laypeople are needed in different situations. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the relevant factors identified for determining how many lay opinions are required to counteract a single expert opinion. People's assessments were fairly good in line with Bayesian predictions.
... This approach is reminiscent of work conceptualizing supposed reasoning flaws through cognitively reasonable processes. This work includes, but is not limited to, Bayesian accounts of argument fallacies (e.g., Corner et al., 2011;Harris et al., 2012), a Bayesian model of appeals to authority (e.g. Hahn et al., 209;Harris et al., 2015), and skepticism in climate change (Cook & Lewandoswky, 2016). ...
Conspiracy theories cover topics from politicians to world events. Frequently, proponents of conspiracies hold these beliefs strongly despite available evidence that may challenge or disprove them. Therefore, conspiratorial reasoning has often been described as illegitimate or flawed. Here, we explore the possibility of growing a rational (Bayesian) conspiracy theorist through an Agent-Based Model. The agent has reasonable constraints on access to the total information as well its access to the global population. The model shows that network structures are central to maintain objectively mistaken beliefs. Increasing the size of the available network, yielded increased confidence in mistaken beliefs and subsequent network pruning, allowing for belief purism. Rather than ameliorating and correcting mistaken beliefs (where agents move toward the correct mean), large networks appear to maintain and strengthen them. As such, large networks may increase the potential for belief polarization, extreme beliefs, and conspiratorial thinking – even amongst Bayesian agents.
... There are other members, mostly other forms of informal argumentation. Slippery slope arguments are a good example (Corner et al., 2011): in this type of informal argumentation, people draw negative normative conclusions from negative descriptive premises, such as "legalization of euthanasia will lead to an increase in the number of instances of 'medical murder"' , with the invited conclusion that 'euthanasia should not be legalized.' Similarly, persuasions and dissuasions (Thompson et al., 2005) are informal arguments expressed as conditional sentences with negative or positive outcome, such as 'If Britain leaves the European Union, there will be a severe recession.' ...
Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism - deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative ('deontic') conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.
... In particular, with regard to euthanasia, it is often feared that the acceptance of voluntary adult euthanasia for highly serious reasons will gradually extend to an acceptance of involuntary euthanasia and euthanasia of minors, as well as euthanasia for less serious reasons, or even for eugenic motives (see Jones, 2011;Verbakel & Jaspers, 2010). Psychological research has started to identify the mechanisms that contribute to the perceived strength of slippery slope arguments, such as a high similarity perceived between the beginning and the end of a slippery slope argument (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011) or the use of inflammatory language inducing anger (Quraishi et al., 2014). ...
Is opposition to child euthanasia motivated only by ideology, or also by other personality characteristics and individual differences? In Belgium, the first country to legalize child euthanasia (in 2014), we investigated religious, moral, emotional, and cognitive factors underlying the (dis)approval of this legalization ('N' = 213). Disapproval was associated with religiousness, collectivistic morality (loyalty and purity), and prosocial dispositions, in terms of emotional empathy and behavioral generosity, but not values (care and fairness). It was also associated with low flexibility in existential issues and a high endorsement of slippery slope arguments, but not necessarily low openness to experience. A regression analysis showed that in addition to religiousness, low flexibility in existential issues and high empathy and generosity distinctly predicted opposition to child euthanasia. Whereas most of the findings parallel those previously reported for adult euthanasia, the role of prosocial inclinations in predicting moral opposition seems to be specific to child euthanasia.
... An example of a metaphorical frame was the 'improbable mechanism frame' (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011). Both the words improbable and mechanism were entered into the online version of the Macmillan Dictionary for British English. ...
Framing theory is one of the most important theories in communication. One of the key debates today is about the tendency of scholars to mostly study issue-specific frames instead of generic frames. As a new approach to this debate, we propose a recategorization of frames. Following the proposition that metaphor is an important reasoning device in political communication, we examined the presence of metaphorical framing in recent political framing experiments. The main results show that almost one in three experiments involves metaphorical framing, and one in six frames is metaphorical, irrespective of frame type. By showing reasonable presence of metaphorical framing, this study demonstrates that the challenge of issue-specific prevalence may not be as problematic as previously suggested.
... Argumentation from negative consequences presents a reason to reject a proposal for action tentatively, again subject to counter-arguments that may be put forward later. Both arguments from positive and negative consequences have been shown to be species of a more general type of argumentation called argument from values (Capon and Dunne, 2002; Walton, Reed and Macagno, 2008, 321). The first argumentation scheme below represents the form of argument from positive value. ...
This article applies tools from argumentation theory to slippery slope arguments used in current ethical debates on genetic engineering. Among the tools used are argumentation schemes, value-based argumentation, critical questions, and burden of proof. It is argued that so-called drivers such as social acceptance and rapid technological development are also important factors that need to be taken into account alongside the argumentation scheme. It is shown that the slippery slope argument is basically a reasonable (but defeasible) form of argument, but is often flawed when used in ethical debates because of failures to meet the requirements of its scheme.
... The second part of the fork is that when we make the NATURAL-BORN ARGUERS definition of fallacies more flexible, to encompass more realistic arguments, then we find that we lose grip on the normative question: Now there is nothing wrong anymore with the fallacious arguments. For instance, the following slippery slope seems quite reasonable: "If we accept voluntary ID cards in the UK, we will end up with compulsory ID cards in the future" (see Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011). And the inference that a pill has worked may or may not be plausible, depending on your background knowledge (What is the active substance?) the plausibility of a causal link (Does the pill usually help for your condition?), and the prior probability of the effect (How likely was it for me to feel better?). ...
We summarize the argumentative theory of reasoning, which claims that the main function of reasoning is to argue. In this theory, argumentation is seen as being essentially cooperative (people have to listen to others' arguments and be ready to change their mind) but with an adversarial dimension (their goal as argument producers is to convince). Consistent with this theory, the experimental literature shows that solitary reasoning is biased and lazy, whereas reasoning in group discussion produces good results, provided some conditions are met. We formulate recommendations for improving reasoning performance, mainly, to make people argue more and better by creating felicitous conditions for group discussion. We also make some suggestions for improving solitary reasoning, in particular to maximize students' exposure to arguments challenging their positions. Teaching people about the value of argumentation is likely to improve not only immediate reasoning performance but also long-term solitary reasoning skills.
... Given the set of premises' probabilities, the degree of posterior belief in the conclusion C in light of the premises P 1 and P 2 will be x). This flexibility has allowed researchers to offer successful explanations of how people assess arguments from ignorance (ad ignorantiam), begging the question arguments (petitioprincipii) (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), slippery slope situations (Corner, Hahn & Oaksford, 2011), and arguments against the person (ad hominem) (Harris, Hsu & Madsen, 2012). The evidence suggests that when people face an argumentation situation, they update their belief in the conclusion consistently with Bayesian standards. ...
Plausible reasoning has been proposed as an alternative to deductive and inductive norms of argument evaluation in informal logic. In this paper, we present the first systematic empirical contrast between the Bayesian account of argumentation and a plausible reasoning model. Results suggest that the Bayesian approach to argumentation provides a more precise picture of how people evaluate the strength of appeals to witness testimony when considering coherence and argument structure as relevant factors.
... At the same time, the ability to measure argument quality through use of the Bayesian, probabilistic framework allows one to generate both qualitative and quantitative predictions against which people's judgments of everyday arguments can be compared. Such comparisons have been conducted, not just in the context of the fallacies, but in the context of other arguments as well (e.g., Hahn and Oaksford, 2007;Hahn et al., 2009;Corner et al., 2011;Harris et al., 2012). ...
... A it will lead to a consequence C, where C has a clearly defined utility. Reasoning with such rules frequently violates standard logical laws (Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004) but in many cases can be shown to conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility (Corner et al., 2011) or to sensible heuristic approximations to it (Bonnefon, 2009). ...
Book synopsis: This volume contributes to a current debate within the psychology of thought that has wide implications for our ideas about creativity, decision making, and economic behavior. The essays focus on the role of implicit, unconscious thinking in creativity and problem solving, the interaction of intuition and analytic thinking, and the relationship between communicative heuristics and thought. The analyses move beyond the conventional conception of mind informed by extra-psychological theoretical models toward a genuinely psychological conception of rationality—a rationality no longer limited to conscious, explicit thought, but able to exploit the intentional implicit level.
The contributors consider a new conception of human rationality that must cope with the uncertainty of the real world; the implications of abandoning the normative model of classic logic and adopting a probabilistic approach instead; the argumentative and linguistic aspects of reasoning; and the role of implicit thought in reasoning, creativity, and its neurological base.
... This seminal early contribution to the new paradigm was also the first attempt to present a formal, Bayesian system to explain a classic reasoning task, covering both utility and probability . One prominent offshoot of this line of research is the work into Bayesian analysis of informal argumentation (Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011; e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), recently feeding into a special issue of Thinking & Reasoning (see Hornikx & Hahn, 2012, for the introduction). The recent surge of interest in argumentation, boosted by Mercier and Sperber's (2011) proposal that argumentation was the main function of all human inference, is entirely in the spirit of the new paradigm, both in the emphasis on social pragmatics , and the combination of probability and utility to explain argumentative effectiveness. ...
As conflicting as they seem, Panglossianism and Meliorism nevertheless share some common ground. Both positions are normativist: They accept that rationality is measured by conformity to certain normative standards, while disagreeing, at least to an extent, on what those standards are, and how far the conformity exists. It is easy to see that identifying which normative standard is the right one would have far-reaching consequences for the Panglossians vs. Meliorists debate. Some normative standards may fit human behavior better than others, decreasing the normative-descriptive gap. In particular, the proponents of Bayesian rationality (Oaksford and Chater, 1998, 2007, 2009) suggested that probabilistic norms might provide a better fit to human rationality than norms derived from classical logic. However, arbitrating between normative standards is far from trivial. Elqayam and Evans (2011) criticized normativist theories (Panglossian and Meliorist alike) for trying to base this arbitration on empirical evidence, and so being in danger of committing the dubious inference from is to ought, considered a fallacy by many philosophers (Hudson, 1969; Pigden, 2010).
... An option that is available for Lillo-Unglaube et al.'s proposal is to explain rhetorical effectiveness (e.g., persuasiveness, degree of unreasonableness) in relation to truth-a central epistemic concept that cognitive agents aim at (Corner and Hahn, 2013). This is in line with Hahn and Oaksford's (2006a) view that the Bayesian approach has considerable potential for advancing epistemic approaches to argumentation and evident in the very manner by which the Bayesian approach via probability theory provides explanations for the quality of arguments that cognitive agents encounter in real life (Hahn and Oaksford, 2006b;Corner et al., 2011;Hahn and Hornikx, 2015). As is well-known, the Bayesian approach interprets probabilities (which are measured in numbers from 0 to 1 where the probability of a necessary truth is 1) as "subjective degrees of belief " (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007, p. 707). ...
Argumentation is a complex human activity. Its complexity stems from the fact that cognitive agents in various situations perform multiple tasks in real-time to assess an argument presented to them. These tasks involve the quantity, quality, and relevance of the statements that make up the argument. To illustrate, suppose cognitive agent A is presented with an argument for assessment. The quantity of statements included in the premise set has repercussions on what A can correctly infer (e.g., an argument with a single statement for a premise greatly reduces the number of inferential moves that A can make). It is also important for A to consider the quality of the statements included in the premise set (i.e., whether or not they are true). Finally, A must also consider the relevance of the statements included in the premise set to the conclusion of the argument (i.e., the premise set must be connected to the conclusion). As an additional complication, most of the time, cognitive agents are characterized by a condition of uncertainty. For example, all the relevant premises are oftentimes unavailable to cognitive agents, they are not always “in a position to know” (Sosa, 1995, p. 28), for instance, whether or not the premises of an argument are true.
Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt.
This article seeks, first, to show that much of the existing normative work on argument from expert opinion (AEO) is problematic for failing to be properly informed by empirical findings on expert performance. Second, it seeks to show how, with the analytic tool of Bayesian reasoning, the problem diagnosed can be remedied to circumvent some of the problems facing the scheme-based treatment of AEOs. To establish the first contention, we will illustrate how empirical studies on factors conditioning expert reliability can be drawn upon to re-construct. Walton’s critical questions matching the scheme of AEOs. To establish the second contention, we will illustrate how Walton’s re-constructed set of critical questions can be formalized within a Bayesian network. Finally, we will highlight how the specific ways in which the Bayesian framework we propose is both continuous with and distinct from the models of source reliability put forward by theorists like Bovens and Hartmann (2003 Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian epistemology. Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]).
Central to the conceptual spaces framework is the thought that concepts can be studied mathematically, by geometrical and topological means. Various applications of the framework have already been subjected to empirical testing, mostly with excellent results, demonstrating the framework's usefulness. So far untested is the suggestion that conceptual spaces may help explain certain inferences people are willing to make. The experiment reported in this paper focused on similarity-based arguments, testing the hypothesis that the strength of such arguments can be predicted from the structure of the conceptual space in which the items being reasoned about are represented. A secondary aim of the experiment concerned a recent inferentialist semantics for indicative conditionals, according to which the truth of a conditional requires the presence of a sufficiently strong inferen-tial connection between its antecedent and consequent. To the extent that the strength of similarity-based inferences can be predicted from the geometry and topology of the relevant conceptual space, such spaces should help predict truth ratings of conditionals embodying a similarity-based inferential link. The results supported both hypotheses.
Slippery slope beliefs capture the idea that a non-problematic action will lead to unpreventable and harmful outcomes. While this idea has been examined in legal and philosophical literatures, there has been no psychological research into the individual propensity to hold slippery slope beliefs. Across five studies and six samples (combined N = 5,974), we developed and tested an individual difference measure of slippery slope beliefs, finding that it predicted intolerance of outgroup freedoms above and beyond key demographic and psychological predictors (Studies 1-2 and 5). We also found that slippery slope beliefs predict intolerance of debated behaviors in two countries (Study 3), and that it predicted agreement with real-world slippery slope examples across the political spectrum (Studies 4-5).
Analogies have captivated philosophers for millennia, yet their effects on modern public opinion preferences remain largely unexplored. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence as to whether analogies aid in political persuasion has not stopped politicians from using these rhetorical devices in public debates. To examine such strategic attempts to garner political support, we conducted survey experiments in the United States that featured the analogical arguments being used by Democrats and Republicans as well as some of the policy rationales that accompanied their appeals. The results revealed that analogies—especially those that also provided the underlying policy logic—increased support for individual health coverage mandates, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and even single payer national health proposals. However, we demonstrated that rebutting flawed analogies was also possible. Thus, within the health care arena, framing proposals with analogies can alter policy preferences significantly, providing a way to deliver policy rationales persuasively.
Cambridge Core - Economic Theory - Escaping Paternalism - by Mario J. Rizzo
Classical models predominantly approach persuasion qualitatively or descriptively. In the past couple of decades, researchers have explored quantitative and predictive models to describe how people integrate new evidence within their pre-existing beliefs. The so-called Bayesian models take point of departure in people’s subjective view of the world to predict how they will integrate new information. The predictive capacities of these models highlight the possibility of generating process-oriented mathematical models that can capture individual differences and predict people’s belief revisions. This chapter shows how formal models can capture subjective rationality.
Cross-cultural differences in argumentation may be explained by the use of different norms of reasoning. However, some norms derive from, presumably universal, mathematical laws. This inconsistency can be resolved, by considering that some norms of argumentation, like Bayes theorem, are mathematical functions. Systematic variation in the inputs may produce culture-dependent inductive biases although the function remains invariant. This hypothesis was tested by fitting a Bayesian model to data on informal argumentation from Turkish and English cultures, which linguistically mark evidence quality differently. The experiment varied evidential marking and informant reliability in argumentative dialogues and revealed cross-cultural differences for both independent variables. The Bayesian model fitted the data from both cultures well but there were differences in the parameters consistent with culture-specific inductive biases. These findings are related to current controversies over the universality of the norms of reasoning and the role of normative theories in the psychology of reasoning.
This essay analyzes and evaluates the slippery slope argument (SSA) as presented by the National Rifle Association. The work of argument scholars and informal logicians, particularly of Douglas Walton, provides the central interpretive and evaluative vocabularies enabling the most complete understanding of this argument. Evaluation of the argument is enabled both by the SSA critical vocabulary, as well by a dialogic approach that considers the NRA's SSA within the larger context of President Obama's public discourses on the issue. Analysis of the argument generates insights that enrich the theoretical foundations of SSA scholarship, and potentially contribute to a more reasonable public debate about gun rights and gun control.
In this paper, I shall intend to show that the Sorites argument lies at the core of the Slippery Slope Argument and, for this reason, I shall deal with the logical validity of this argument. Once established its logical validity, I shall try to argue that the second premise of the Sorites argument – the premise in accordance with if an individual i has the property P by having n unities of something, then another individual i' which has n-1 unities is also P- in this kind of argument is always false; finally I shall draw some conclusions as to the way to stop the Slippery Slope.
In global bioethics, the slippery slope argument has been used in such issues as abortion, legalizing marijuana, physicians having to disclose their HIV status, euthanasia, and gene therapy. Its uses in ethical controversies on the latter two topics have been most prominent, and the main examples treated in this entry are slippery slope arguments about euthanasia and gene therapy.
In global bioethics, the slippery slope argument has been used in such issues as abortion, legalizing marijuana, physicians having to disclose their HIV status, euthanasia, and gene therapy. Its uses in ethical controversies on the latter two topics have been most prominent, and the main examples treated in this entry are slippery slope arguments about euthanasia and gene therapy.
Slippery Slope Arguments (SSAs) of the form if A, then C describe an initial proposal (A) and a predicted, undesirable consequence of this proposal (C) (e.g., “If cannabis is ever legalised, then eventually cocaine will be legalised too”). Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device, there has been surprisingly little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception. Here, we present evidence that SSAs are interpreted as a form of consequentialist argument, inviting inferences about the speaker’s (or writer’s) attitudes. Study 1 confirms the common intuition that a SSA is perceived to be an argument against the initial proposal (A), while Study 2 shows that the subjective strength of this inference relates to the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences (C). Because arguments are rarely made out of context, Studies 3 and 4 examined how one important contextual factor, the speaker’s known beliefs, influence the perceived coherence, strength and persuasiveness of a SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (eye movements during reading) Study 3 showed that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker’s beliefs and the implied meaning of their argument. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this degree of internal coherence influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of the argument. Together, these data indicate that SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument. People infer that the speaker of a SSA opposes the initial proposal; therefore SSAs are only perceived to be persuasive and conversationally relevant when the speaker’s attitudes match this inference.
Presents an integrative model of the emergence, direction (assimilation vs. contrast), and size of context effects in social judgment.
Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: see, e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) has been the most influential model of the persuasion process for almost two decades. Its basic postulate is that when people are confronted with a persuasive message, they want to assess the validity of the message’s claim. To do so, people may systematically and critically evaluate the arguments supporting this claim. Although this systematic evaluation is the safest way to assess a claim’s validity, people are not always motivated and/or able to do so. In that case, they can use rules of thumb to assess the validity of the message’s claim. They may reason, for instance, “Experts are usually right, and this claim is put forward by an expert, therefore this claim is correct.” Other factors that can influence their assessment under those conditions are the number of arguments (instead of the content of these arguments), or even more superficial message characteristics such as the layout or the use of attractive colors. Depending on the way in which people process the message, arguments will or will not determine the outcome of the persuasion process. Only when people are motivated and able to systematically evaluate the arguments does the quality of these arguments influence their assessment of the claim’s validity.
Although studies have yielded a detailed taxonomy of types of slippery slope arguments, they have failed to identify a basic argumentation scheme that applies to all. Therefore, there is no way of telling whether a given argument is a slippery slope argument or not. This paper solves the problem by providing a basic argumentation scheme. The scheme is shown to fit a clear and easily comprehensible example of a slippery slope argument that strongly appears to be reasonable, something that has also been lacking.
An argument is categorical if its premises and conclusion are of the form
All members of C have property P, where
C is a natural category like FALCON or BIRD, and
P remains the same across premises and conclusion. An example is
Grizzly bears love onions. Therefore, all bears love onions. Such an argument is psychologically strong to the extent that belief in its premises engenders belief in its conclusion. A subclass of categorical arguments is examined, and the following hypothesis is advanced: The strength of a categorical argument increases with (a) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to the conclusion category and (b) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to members of the lowest level category that includes both the premise and the conclusion categories. A model based on this hypothesis accounts for 13 qualitative phenomena and the quantitative results of several experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
The slippery slope argument (SSA) is generally treated as a fallacy by both traditional and contemporary theories of argumentation, but is frequently used and widely accepted in applied reasoning domains. Experiment 1 tests the hypothesis that SSAs are not perceived as universally weak arguments. The results provide the first empirical demonstration that SSAs vary predictably in their subjective acceptability. Experiment 2 identifies an empirical mechanism on which successful SSAs may be predicated, namely the process of category boundary reappraisal.
Argumentation logicians have recognized a specter of relativism to haunt their philosophy of argument. However, their attempts
to dispel pernicious relativism by invoking notions of a universal audience or a community of model interlocutors have not
been entirely successful. In fact, their various discussions of a universal audience invoke the context-eschewing formalism
of Kant’s categorical imperative. Moreover, they embrace the Kantian method for resolving the antinomies that continually
vacillates between opposing extremes – here between a transcendent universal audience and a context-embedded particular audience.
This tack ironically restores the very external mediation they thought to obviate in their aim to ‘dethrone’ the absolutism
and totalitarianism of formal logic with a democratic turn to audience adherence, the acceptability of premises and inferential
links, and a contextual, or participant-relative, notion of cogency.
Thirty college students made category membership decisions for each of 540 candidate exemplar-category name pairs (e.g.,apple-fruit) in each of two separate sessions. For highly typical category members (e.g., chair for thefurniture category), and for items unrelated to a category (e.g.,cucumber-furniture), subjects agreed with each other and were consistent in their decisions. However, for intermediate-typicality items (e.g.,bookends-furniture), subjects disagreed with each other and were frequently inconsistent from one session to the next. These data suggest that
natural categories are fuzzy sets, with no clear boundaries separating category members from nonmembers.
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional
fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades
several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which
slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes a slippery slope. Specifically, he argued that
the very reasons that can make SSAs strong arguments mean that we should be poor at abiding by the distinction between good
and bad SSAs, making SSAs inherently undesirable. We argue that Enoch’s meta-level SSA fails on both conceptual and empirical
grounds.
After decades of research into formal or logical fallacies of reasoning, psychologists have only recently begun to examine the informal reasoning fallacies that are routinely present in critical discussions, debates, and other forms of argumentation. The present study considers several possible influences on an ability to identify and analyze these fallacies. College students completed measures of deductive reasoning, personal epistemology, and knowledge of specific argumentation norms and analyzed arguments containing fallacies such as argument from ignorance, begging the question, and slippery slope. Results indicated that effective analysis of informal fallacies was associated with some aspects of deductive reasoning—especially an ability to overcome belief bias—and with higher-order epistemic beliefs, as well as a commitment to argumentation norms for critical discussion. Results are discussed in terms of argumentation research and implications for pedagogical treatments of the fallacies are noted.
Slippery slopes have been the topic of a spate of recent literature. In this Article, the authors provide a general theory for understanding and evaluating slippery slope arguments and their associated slippery slope events. The central feature of the theory is a structure of discussion within which all arguments take place. The structure is multilayered, consisting of decisions, rules, theories, and research programs. Each layer influences and shapes the layer beneath: Rules influence decisions, theories influence the choice of rules, and research programs influence the choice of theories. In this structure, slippery slope arguments take the form of meta-arguments, as they purport to predict the future development of arguments in the structure of discussion. Evaluating such arguments requires knowledge of the specific content of the structure of discussion itself. This Article then Presents four viable types of slippery slope arguments; draws attention to four different factors that, other things equal, tend to increase the likelihood of slippery slopes; and explores a variety of strategies for coping with slippery slopes.
Hypothetical thought involves the imagination of possibilities and the exploration of their consequences by a process of mental simulation. Using a recently developed theoretical framework called Hypothetical Thinking Theory, Jonathan St. B. T. Evans provides an integrated theoretical account of a wide range of psychological studies on hypothesis testing, reasoning, judgement and decision making. Hypothetical thinking theory is built on three key principles, implemented in a revised and updated version of Evans' well-known heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning. The central claim of this book is that this theory can provide an integrated account of some apparently very diverse phenomena including confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, acceptance of fallacies in deductive reasoning, belief biases in reasoning and judgement, biases of statistical judgement and a number of characteristic findings in the study of decision making. The author also provides broad ranging discussion of cognitive biases, human rationality and dual-process theories of higher cognition. Hypothetical Thinking draws on and develops arguments first proposed in Evans' earlier work from this series, Bias in Human Reasoning. In the new theory, however, cognitive biases are attributed equally to analytic and heuristic processing and a much wider range of phenomena are reviewed and discussed. It will therefore be of great interest to researchers and post-graduates in psychology and the cognitive sciences, as well as to undergraduate students looking for a comprehensive review of current work on reasoning and decision-making.
Previously published sets of classification and old-new recognition memory data are reanalyzed within the framework of an exemplar-based generalization model. The key assumption in the model is that, whereas classification decisions are based on the similarity of a probe to exemplars of a target category relative to exemplars of contrast categories, recognition decisions are based on overall summed similarity of a probe to all exemplars. The summed-similarity decision rule is shown to be consistent with a wide variety of recognition memory data obtained in classification learning situations and may provide a unified approach to understanding relations between categorization and recognition.
This article studies the joint roles of similarity and frequency in determining graded category structure. Perceptual classification learning experiments were conducted in which presentation frequencies of individual exemplars were manipulated. The exemplars had varying degrees of similarity to members of the target and contrast categories. Classification accuracy and typicality ratings increased for exemplars presented with high frequency and for members of the target category that were similar to the high-frequency exemplars. Typicality decreased for members of the contrast category that were similar to the high-frequency exemplars. A frequency-sensitive similarity-to-exemplars model provided a good quantitative account of the classification learning and typicality data. The interactive relations among similarity, frequency, and categorization are considered in the General Discussion.
Book synopsis: The conditional, if...then, is probably the most important term in natural language and forms the core of systems of logic and mental representation. It occurs in all human languages and allows people to express their knowledge of the causal or law-like structure of the world and of others' behaviour, e.g., if you turn the key the car starts, if John walks the dog he stops for a pint of beer; to make promises, e.g., if you cook tonight, I'll wash up all week; to regulate behaviour, e.g., if you are drinking beer, you must be over 18 years of age; to suggest what would have happened had things been different, e.g., if the match had been dry it would have lit, among many other possible uses. The way in which the conditional is modelled also determines the core of most logical systems. Unsurprisingly, it is also the most researched expression in the psychology of human reasoning.
Cognition and Conditionals is the first volume for over 20 years (On Conditionals, 1986, CUP) that brings together recent developments in the cognitive science and psychology of conditional reasoning. Over the last 10 to 15 years, research on conditionals has come to dominate the psychology of reasoning providing a rich seam of results that have created new theoretical possibilities. This book shows how these developments have led researchers to view people's conditional reasoning behaviour more as succesful probabilistic reasoning rather than as errorful logical reasoning. It shows how the multifarious, and apparently competing, theoretical positions developed over the last 50 years in this area - mental logics, mental models, heuristic approaches, dual process theory, and probabilistic approaches-have responded to these insights. Its organisation reflects the view that an integrative approach is emerging that may need to exploit aspects of all these theoretical positions to explain the rich and complex phenomenon of reasoning with conditionals. It includes an introductory chapter relating the development of the psychology of reasoning to developments in the logic and semantics of the conditional. It also includes chapters by many of the leading figures in this field
Unlike many models of bias correction, our flexible correction model posits that corrections occur when judges are motivated and able to adjust assessments of targets according to their naive theories of how the context affects judgments of the target(s). In the current research, people flexibly correct assessments of different targets within the same context according to the differing theories associated with the context-target pairs. In Study 1, shared theories of assimilation and contrast bias are identified. Corrections consistent with those theories are obtained in Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 shows that idiographic measures of thoeries of bias predict the direction and magnitude of corrections. Implications of this work for corrections of attributions and bias removal in general are discussed.
The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process of human reasoning, and many use the paradigm principally to study pragmatic and probabilistic processes. It is suggested that the methods used for studying reasoning be reviewed, especially the instructional context, which necessarily defines pragmatic influences as biases.
Similarity and analogy are fundamental in human cognition. They are crucial for recognition and classification, and have been associated with scientific discovery and creativity. Successful learning is generally less dependent on the memorization of isolated facts and abstract rules than it is on the ability to identify relevant bodies of knowledge already stored as the starting point for new learning. Similarity and analogy play an important role in this process - a role that in recent years has received much attention from cognitive scientists. Any adequate understanding of similarity and analogy requires the integration of theory and data from diverse domains. This interdisciplinary volume explores current developments in research and theory from psychological, computational, and educational perspectives, and considers their implications for learning and instruction. Well-known cognitive scientists examine the psychological processes involved in reasoning by similarity and analogy, the computational problems encountered in simulating analogical processing in problem solving, and the conditions promoting the application of analogical reasoning in everyday situations.
Diagrams and Tables. Measures of Location. Measures of Dispersion and Skewness. Basic Ideas of Probability. Random Variables and Their Probability Distribution. Some Standard Discrete and Continuous Probability Distributions. Approximations to the Binomial and Poisson Distributions. Linear Functions of Random Variables and Joining Distributions. Sample Populations and Point Estimation. Interval Estimation. Hypothesis Tests for the Mean and Variance of Normal Distributions. Hypothesis Tests for the Binomial Parameter p,p. Hypothesis Tests for Independence and Goodness-of-Fit. Non-Parametric Hypothesis Tests. Correlation. Regression. Elements of Experimental Design and Analysis. Quality Control Charts and Acceptance Sampling.
The conditional, if...then, is probably the most important term in natural language and forms the core of systems of logic and mental representation. It occurs in all human languages and allows people to express their knowledge of the causal or law-like structure of the world and of others' behaviour. The way in which the conditional is modelled also determines the core of most logical systems. Unsurprisingly, it is also the most-researched expression in the psychology of human reasoning. This book brings together recent developments in the cognitive science and psychology of conditional reasoning. Over the last ten to fifteen years, research on conditionals has come to dominate the psychology of reasoning, providing a rich seam of results that have created new theoretical possibilities. This book shows how these developments have led researchers to view people's conditional reasoning behaviour more as successful probabilistic reasoning rather than as errorful logical reasoning. It shows how the multifarious, and apparently competing, theoretical positions developed over the last fifty years in this area - mental logics, mental models, heuristic approaches, dual process theory, and probabilistic approaches - have responded to these insights. Its organisation reflects the view that an integrative approach is emerging that may need to exploit aspects of all these theoretical positions to explain the rich and complex phenomenon of reasoning with conditionals. It includes an introductory chapter relating the development of the psychology of reasoning to developments in the logic and semantics of the conditional.
The authors provide a general theory for understanding and evaluating slippery slope arguments (SSAs) and their associated slippery slope events (SSEs). The central feature of the theory is a structure of discussion within which all arguments take place. The structure is multi-layered, consisting of decisions, rules, theories,and research programs. Each layer influences and shapes the layer beneath: rules influences decisions, theories influence the choice of rules, and research programs influence the choice of theories. In this structure, SSAs take the form of meta-arguments, as they purport to predict the future development of arguments in this structure. Evaluating such arguments requires having knowledge of the specific content of the structure of discussion itself. The Article then presents four viable types of slippery slope argument, draws attention to four different factors that (other things equal) tend to incxrease the likelihood of slippery slopes, and explores a variety of strategies for coping with slippery slopes.
Slippery slope arguments are commonly thought to be fallacious. But is there a single fallacy which they all commit? A study of applied logic texts reveals competing diagnoses of the supposed error, and several recent authors take slippery slope arguments seriously. Clearly, there is room for comment. I shall give evidence of divergence on the question of what sort of argument constitutes a slippery slope, distinguish four different types of argument which have all been deemed to be slippery slopes, and contend that two of these types need involve no logical error.
We find in textbook accounts three quite differently oriented treatments of slippery slope: conceptual — relating to vagueness and the ancient sorites paradox; precedential — relating to the need to treat similar cases consistently; and causal — relating to the avoidance of actions which will, or would be likely to, set off a series of undersirable events.
Three experiments examined the sequence of cognitive processes that mediate the impact of a persuasive message on behavioral decisions. When participants could concentrate on the message content, they first estimated the likelihood of each behavioral outcome described in the message and then evaluated its desirability. They later used these outcome-specific beliefs and evaluations to compute an overall attitude toward the behavior, which influenced their behavioral intentions and their actual behavioral decisions. When participants were distracted from thinking carefully about the message content, they were more likely to use the message-relevant affect they were experiencing as a basis for their attitudes toward the behavior; these attitudes influenced their estimates of the likelihood and desirability of the behavior’s outcomes. Giving participants more time to think about the implications of the message eliminated the effects of distraction on the impact of argument strength and decreased the influence of the affect they were experiencing.
Slippery slope arguments pervade the legal discourse. Such arguments generally hold that we should resist a particular practice or policy, either on the grounds that allowing it could lead us to allow another practice or policy that is clearly objectionable, or on the grounds that we can draw no rationally defensible line between the two. Using examples of slippery slope arguments that have been invoked in various debates concerning law and social policy, this Comment analyzes the roles that slippery slope arguments can play in legal reasoning. After discussing the basic structure of slippery slope arguments and distinguishing among some of their different forms, the author argues that the context in which someone invokes a slippery slope argument can influence that argument's strength. The author then discusses some of the reasons why judges may be troubled by the thought of stepping on a slippery slope. While some such worries are unfounded, others cannot be so easily dismissed. The author argues that slippery slope arguments that rely on predictions can be valid arguments. He also both describes some of the factors that can help fuel slides down such slippery slopes and provides some general guidelines for evaluating those slippery slope arguments that rely on predictive claims. The author then describes some of the roles that slippery slope arguments can play in judicial decision making, even in those cases in which a judge thinks that the claims of such arguments do not provide sufficient grounds for resisting the practice under consideration altogether. In addition, the author argues that slippery slope arguments can be valuable in ways that people often fail to notice. Sometimes, the problems implicit in the case at the top of the slope will be accentuated in the case at the bottom. Reflecting on the latter can illuminate problems associated with the former. Such reflections can provide grounds for resisting the case at the top, even if we are not persuaded by the literal claims of the relevant slippery slope argument. This Comment thus concludes by arguing that there are good reasons for rethinking some of the roles that slippery slope arguments can play in legal debates.
Two authorities in argumentation theory present a view of argumentation as a means of resolving differences of opinion by testing the acceptability of the disputed positions. Their model of a “critical discussion” serves as a theoretical tool for analyzing, evaluating and producing argumentative discourse. This major contribution to the study of argumentation will be of particular value to professionals and graduate students in speech communication, informal logic, rhetoric, critical thinking, linguistics, and philosophy. © Frans H. van Eemeren and Henriette Greebe and Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Categorization of complex stimuli under time pressure was investigated in 3 experiments. Participants carried out standard binary classification tasks. In the transfer stage, different response deadlines were imposed. Results showed that response deadlines affected the applied level of generalization and the dimensional weight distribution. At short deadlines, participants generalized more than at longer deadlines. Dimensional weights were influenced heavily by perceptual salience at shorter deadlines, whereas they depended primarily on the formal category structure in conditions without a deadline. A formal model that extends the generalized context model of categorization with a time-dependent similarity concept is proposed to account for these results. That model provides a parsimonious and accurate account of the data from the 3 experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Previously published sets of classification and old–new recognition memory data are reanalyzed within the framework of an exemplar-based generalization model. The key assumption in the model is that, whereas classification decisions are based on the similarity of a probe to exemplars of a target category relative to exemplars of contrast categories, recognition decisions are based on overall summed similarity of a probe to all exemplars. The summed-similarity decision rule is shown to be consistent with a wide variety of recognition memory data obtained in classification learning situations and may provide a unified approach to understanding relations between categorization and recognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Discusses man's capabilities and limitations as an element in a closed loop control system under normal environmental conditions. Factors considered include the nature of manual control, modes of tracking, mathematical models of human operators, and characteristics of controls and displays in tracking tasks. (21/2 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This article studies the joint roles of similarity and frequency in determining graded category structure. Perceptual classification learning experiments were conducted in which presentation frequencies of individual exemplars were manipulated. The exemplars had varying degrees of similarity to members of the target and contrast categories. Classification accuracy and typicality ratings increased for exemplars presented with high frequency and for members of the target category that were similar to the high-frequency exemplars. Typicality decreased for members of the contrast category that were similar to the high-frequency exemplars. A frequency-sensitive similarity-to-exemplars model provided a good quantitative account of the classification learning and typicality data. The interactive relations among similarity, frequency, and categorization are considered in the General Discussion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Describes a simple method for estimating the sample size per group required for specified power to detect a linear contrast among
J group means. This allows comparison of sample sizes to detect main effects with those needed to detect several realistic kinds of interaction in 2 × 2 and 2 × 2 × 2 designs with a fixed-effects model. For example, when 2 factors are multiplicative, the sample size required to detect the presence of nonadditivity is 7 to 9 times as large as that needed to detect main effects with the same degree of power. In certain other situations, effect sizes for the main effects and interaction may be identical, in which case power and necessary sample sizes to detect the effects will be the same. The method can also be used to find sample size for a complex contrast in a nonfactorial design. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
We've all made plenty of slippery slope arguments in our day, and we've all pooh-poohed plenty. Do these arguments make sense, and, if so, when? This article tries to go behind the metaphor of the slippery slope to the mechanisms by which one step today may make the next step more likely tomorrow. "Slippery slopes," I argue, can operate through several distinct mechanisms, which need to be discussed separately. And these mechanisms, it turns out, relate to rational ignorance, heuristics, path-dependence, the expressive effect of law, and multi-peaked preferences - important subjects that have received extensive attention recently, but that have not so far been linked to the slippery slope question. I suggest that slippery slopes may indeed sometimes happen (though they aren't logically inevitable). The flip response that "if we can draw a line today, we'll be able to draw the line tomorrow" is correct only if decisionmakers have firm and single-peaked preferences, and unbounded rationality. In the real world, where these conditions don't always hold, one decision can indeed help grease the slope to another, in various ways. And this can happen not just with judicial decisions - where slippery slopes relate in complex ways to the system of precedent - but also with legislative ones, where precedent is not supposed to play a formal role. Understanding the full range of slippery slope mechanisms can help us evaluate the risk of slippage, craft better arguments related to this risk, and perhaps minimize this risk.
Slippery slope arguments hold that one should not do A in order to prevent from arriving in some clearly undesirable situation B. There are various types of slippery slope arguments which should be carefully distinguished. We should also distinguish the contexts in which the slope is used, as the mechanisms of social dynamics and the role of logic differ in each of these contexts. They are not fallacies, but they are only seldom fully convincing arguments - although they are often rhetorically highly effective. Their most important role is in institutionalized contexts like law where they may shift the burden of proof. Revised version of article in Enc. of Applied Ethics, submitted for second edition.
Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation disappears from sight. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion.
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Six experiments explored the hypothesis that the members of categories which are considered most prototypical are those with most attributes in common with other members of the category and least attributes in common with other categories. In probabilistic terms, the hypothesis is that prototypicality is a function of the total cue validity of the attributes of items. In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects listed attributes for members of semantic categories which had been previously rated for degree of prototypicality. High positive correlations were obtained between those ratings and the extent of distribution of an item's attributes among the other items of the category. In Experiments 2 and 4, subjects listed superordinates of category members and listed attributes of members of contrasting categories. Negative correlations were obtained between prototypicality and superordinates other than the category in question and between prototypicality and an item's possession of attributes possessed by members of contrasting categories. Experiments 5 and 6 used artificial categories and showed that family resemblance within categories and lack of overlap of elements with contrasting categories were correlated with ease of learning, reaction time in identifying an item after learning, and rating of prototypicality of an item. It is argued that family resemblance offers an alternative to criterial features in defining categories.
Informal reasoning typically draws on a wider range of inferential behaviour than is measured by traditional inference tasks. In this paper, we developed several tasks to study informal reasoning with two novel types of conditional statements: Persuasions (e.g., if the Kyoto accord is ratified, greenhouse gas emissions will be reduced) and dissuasions (e.g., if the Kyoto accord is ratified, there will be a downturn in the economy). For these statements, the consequent event, q, is offered as an incentive or disincentive for undertaking action p. Forty-eight university students reasoned about the statements from the point of view of the writer; another forty-eight reasoned from their own perspective. We found that reasoning about these statements involves a sophisticated chain of implicit inferences (e.g., a downturn in the economy should be avoided; ratifying the accord will produce a downturn; in order to avoid a downturn the accord should not be ratified) in support of an implicit conclusion (i.e., the accord should not be ratified). When generating arguments to either support or refute a position, reasoners relied on two main strategies: addressing the truth of the conditional or arguing the merits of undertaking action p (i.e., ratifying the Kyoto accord). Finally, using a traditional conditional arguments task, we found that reasoners were more likely to adopt a deductive strategy when reasoning from the writer’s point of view than their own point of view, even though we did not include any instructions to reason logically. We discuss the relevance of these findings for formal and informal models of reasoning, the writer’s theory of mind, and the role of pragmatic implicatures in reasoning.
