Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national

ArticleinSafety Science 45(6):697-722 · July 2007with 3,246 Reads
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Abstract
This paper reports on the implementation of an advanced safety culture in a major oil and gas multi-national. The original proposal came from the company after it had become clear that expectations had been raised after the successful implementation of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Management Systems subsequent to the Piper Alpha disaster. The proposal made by the company, to develop a workforce intrinsically motivated for HSE, was operationalised as the development of an advanced safety culture after a review of the literature on motivation. The model used was the HSE Culture Ladder that had become the industry standard accepted by the OGP (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers). This model was intended to show that there were considerable opportunities for improvement even after HSE-MS had been implemented and that the more advanced cultures were ones people felt were desirable and achievable for themselves. Once top management had provided the initial support for the development of a more advanced safety culture, a number of supporting tools were developed, under the Hearts and Minds brand, and a strategy for implementation was developed that relied more on bottom-up ‘pull’ rather than top-down ‘push’ – the standard implementation model for new initiatives. The tools were designed to provide a clear direction, a road map to an advanced culture defined in terms provided by people within the industry, to support lasting changes in attitudes and beliefs, to promote an increased feeling of control when solving HSE-specific problems – all components of a more advanced culture. The tactics employed, using a pull rather than a push approach, had to allow for local variation within the general limits set by the strategy that eventually became a mixed top-down and bottom-up approach. Next there is a discussion of the current status and the lessons to be learnt from the implementation so far: moving away from command and control is hard for large organizations; such programs have to be driven by different performance indicators; managers have to learn to disperse their control; it is essential to communicate both successes and failures. Finally there is a discussion about the respective roles of academia and the industry in such endeavours, the requirement to concentrate on more than a single cultural characteristic such as reporting, and the difficulties of evaluating such programs in a worldwide environment that is continuously changing.

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    Background: Small construction businesses (SCBs) account for a disproportionate share of occupational injuries, days lost, and fatalities in the US and other modern economies. Owner/managers of SCBs confront risks associated with their own and workers' safety and business survival, and their occupational safety and health (OSH) related values and practices are key drivers of safety and business outcomes. Given owner/mangers are the key to understanding and affecting change in smaller firms, as well as the pressing need for improved OSH in small firms particularly in construction, there is a critical need to better understand SCB owners' readiness to improve or adopt enhanced OSH activities in their business. Unfortunately, the social expectation to support safety can complicate efforts to evaluate owners' readiness. Objectives: To get a more accurate understanding of the OSH values and practices of SCBs and the factors shaping SCB owners' readiness and intent to implement or improve safety and health programming by comparing their discourse on safety with their self-rated level of stage of change. Methods: In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 SCB owner managers. Respondents were asked to self-rate their safety program activity on a 5-point scale from unaware or ignorant ('haven't thought about it at all') to actively vigilant ('well-functioning safety and health program for at least 6 months'). They were also asked to discuss the role and meaning of OSH within their trade and company, as well as attitudes and inclinations toward improving or enhancing business safety practices. Analysis and results: Respondents' self-rating of safety program activity was compared and contrasted with results from discourse analysis of their safety talk, or verbal descriptions of their safety values and activities. Borrowing from normative and stage theories of safety culture and behavioral change, these sometimes contradictory descriptions were taxonomized along a safety culture continuum and a range of safety cultures and stages of readiness for change were found. These included descriptions of strong safety cultures with intentions for improvement as well as descriptions of safety cultures with more reactive and pathological approaches to OSH, with indications of no intentions for improvement. Some owner/managers rated themselves as having an effective OSH program in place, yet described a dearth of OSH activity and/or value for OSH in their business. Conclusion: Assessing readiness to change is key to improving OSH performance, and more work is needed to effectively assess SCB OSH readiness and thus enable greater adoption of best practices.
  • The purpose of this paper is to present a critical review of the use of safety performance indicators in the construction industry. The authors consider the strengths, limitations and managerial consequences associated with commonly used indicators. The authors combine two separate data sets in this critical review. These include 32 semi-structured interviews with construction industry representatives involved in the collection and reporting of safety indicators, as well as a multi-level safety climate survey that was conducted at 12 construction sites across Australia. The analysis provides new evidence that, in their current use, commonly used H&S indicators are subject to manipulation and misinterpretation. Their usefulness as tools to support safety management activities in construction projects and organisations needs to be understood in the context of their limitations. In particular, safety indicators do not reflect the full set of factors that affect workplace safety and there will always be disagreement about what should be counted and how. As a result of the substantial shortcomings of safety indicators, great care needs to be taken when using them to determine or evaluate organisational safety policy and practices. Article available at: https://www.emeraldinsight.com/eprint/5WMA4R8MCMVX9EX8ITFT/full
  • Article
    The UK construction industry accounts for a disproportionately high number of major and fatal injuries. The industry has a poor worker safety record, and several stakeholders have made efforts to improve its performance. Much of such efforts have, however, targeted reactive control measures. Research indicates that there is a positive correlation between a proactive alternative – safety behaviours – and safety performance. These behaviours are shaped by the personality of individuals or determined by their social sphere of interaction, including supervisors. Thus, the role that the supervisor plays in influencing the behaviours of front-line workers (FLWs) was investigated. Using a survey and statistical tests, the perspectives of FLWs were obtained and analysed, respectively, to establish the vital supervisors’ qualities that improve their safety behaviours. The emerging qualities were found to rank from highest to lowest potential as follows: integrity/trust, openness/transparency, genuine care, accountability, flexibility, respect, fairness, consistent high personal standards, ability to empower and beliefs. The findings from this study suggest that organisations can improve their safety performance by focusing on the aforementioned qualities in three stages. The findings also highlight the need for organisations to focus on subtle but significant human qualities that are often ignored in safety management.
  • Chapter
    This introductory chapter will present a review of the current state of the art in relation to employee health, safety and well-being (HSW). The work environment and the nature of work itself are both important influences on HSW. A substantial part of the general morbidity of the population is related to work. It is estimated that workers suffer 270 million occupational accidents and 160 million occupational diseases each year. The chapter will first define HSW. It will then review the current state of the art by outlining key HSW issues in the contemporary world of work, identifying key needs. It will then discuss the evolution of key theoretical perspectives in this area by linking theory to practice and highlighting the need for aligning perspectives and integrating approaches to managing HSW in the workplace.
  • Article
    Health and safety (H&S) performance improvement in construction organizations is unlikely if culture is not improved. Despite the acknowledgement that culture improvement results in better H&S performance or behavior, there is still no consensus on how to measure and improve H&S culture in an organization. The study therefore aimed to characterize and rate construction organizations’ H&S culture using existing H&S culture models and to determine the level on the safety culture maturity model (SCMM) and its relationship with H&S behavior in the organizations. Empirical data were collected using questionnaires distributed in three provinces in South Africa. Data were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistical techniques, to output mean scores, standard deviation and Pearson's correlation values. The study revealed a strong correlation between an organization’s leadership, involvement, procedures, commitment, communication and competence (LIP +3C) and the Safety Culture Maturity as well as behavior. These findings demonstrate that improving the level of factors characterized by the LIP +3C model would lead to improving H&S performance as evidenced on the SCMM model and the exhibited behavior in workers and management. Cultural progress and maturity can be tracked using the SCMM model.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    The development of a health culture assessment tool based on the Hudson HSE Culture Ladder.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    This article briefly explains the development of health culture assessment tool based on the Hudson HSE Culture Ladder.
  • Research
    This article outlines the approach adopted in the development of a health culture assessment tool (HCAT).
  • Article
    'safety work’ consists of activities, conducted within organisations, that have the primary purpose of managing safety. Safety work is distinct from operational work, which directly achieves the primary objectives of the organisation. Safety work is also distinct from the 'safety of work’, which is the prevention of injury. In this paper, we argue that safety work is primarily a performance rather than goal-directed behavior. It may contribute to the safety of work, but this is only part of its purpose. Our argument is presented in the form of a model for organisational safety activity that represents safety as a special case of ‘institutional work’. Evidence of the 'safety work’ takes the place of evidence of the 'safety of work’, which is extremely difficult to measure or demonstrate in its own right. Even where it does not contribute to the safety of work, safety work may be necessary for organisations to make sense of safety in an uncertain world. If organisations did not perform safety work, they would be unable to convince stakeholders that they were doing enough for safety, which would in turn prevent them from pursuing their core business.
  • Chapter
    Legal requirements on safety culture and human factors has been part of the regulations in high hazard industries such as nuclear and aviation for several years and will now be a part of the European railway safety legislation.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    This research deals with an analysis of Safety Management System performance (SMSP) in a military aviation organization which is the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). Specifically, the scope of analysis addresses the factors of Organizational Identity (OI), Organizational Behavior (OB) and Situational Awareness (SA) and how these affects the SMS Performance. The interest is to investigate whether Safety Culture (SC) plays a significant mediating role that affects the SMSP. The study population consisted of pilots and engineers from different air bases throughout the country. The results indicate that OI, SA and SC showed significant impact on the RMAF's SMSP. However, Safety Culture was found to have a significant mediating effect only for Organizational Identity and Situational Awareness.
  • Chapter
    Stage theories of health behaviour assume that behaviour change involves movement through a set of discrete stages, that different factors influence the different stage transitions and that interventions should be matched to a person’s stage (Sutton, 2005; Weinstein et al., 1998). The transtheoretical model (TTM; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983; Prochaska et al., 1992, 2002; Prochaska & Velicer, 1997) is the dominant stage model in health psychology and health promotion. It was developed in the 1980s by a group of researchers at the University of Rhode Island. The model has been used in a large number of studies of smoking cessation, but it has also been applied to a wide range of other health behaviours (Prochaska et al., 1994). Although it is often referred to simply as the stages of change model, the TTM includes several different constructs: the ‘stages of change’, the ‘pros and cons of changing’ (together known as ‘decisional balance’), ‘confidence and temptation’ and the ‘processes of change’. The TTM was an attempt to integrate these different constructs drawn from different theories of behaviour change and systems of psychotherapy into a single coherent model; hence the name transtheoretical (for example, see ‘Health belief model’, ‘Self-efficacy and health behaviour’ and ‘Theory of planned behaviour’). The stages of change provide the basic organizing principle. The most widely used version of the model specifies five stages: precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action and maintenance.
  • Management and myths: challenging the fads, fallacies and fashions
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    Furnham, A., 2004. Management and myths: challenging the fads, fallacies and fashions. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
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  • Prevention of accidents involving hazardous substances: the role of the human factor in plant operation. Discussion document prepared for the OECD Workshop
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  • Bending the rules: violation in the workplace. Exploration and Production Newsletter
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  • Moving towards a generative safety culture: The Hearts and Minds HSE Research Programme (Part 2) Exploration and Production Newsletter
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  • Developing Measures of Readiness to Change and Safety Culture in an Organisation
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  • Report on the Piper Alpha Disaster. Her Majesty's Stationery Office The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry. Her Majesty's Stationery Office
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  • Onderzoek naar veiligheidscultuur Koninklijke Luchtmacht Basis Volkel [Study of the Safety Culture at Royal Dutch Air Force base Volkel
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    Croes, S.A.E.W., 2000. Onderzoek naar veiligheidscultuur Koninklijke Luchtmacht Basis Volkel [Study of the Safety Culture at Royal Dutch Air Force base Volkel]. Master's Thesis, Department of Psychology, Leiden University. P. Hudson / Safety Science 45 (2007) 697–722
  • Micro-tools for the management of change. Micro-tool Manual 1
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    Hudson, P.T.W., Parker, D., 1999. Micro-tools for the management of change. Micro-tool Manual 1. Report for Shell International Exploration and Production.
  • Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Rail Accident. Department of Transport A framework for understanding the development of organisational safety culture
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  • The cause of impossible accidents. The sixth Duijker lecture
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  • Bending the rules II
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  • The analysis of accidents with a view to prevention. Paper for Shell International Petroleum Mij
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  • A new approach to safety: TRIPOD
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  • Profiling safety culture: the OGP study
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  • Intrinsic motivation for HSE: The Hearts and Minds HSE Research Programme (Part 1). Exploration and Production Newsletter
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  • The Organisational Antecedents of Individual Safety Behaviour in the U.K. Offshore Oil and Gas Industry
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  • The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry. Her Majesty's Stationery Office
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    Cullen, The Hon. D., 2001. The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London.
  • Man-Made Disasters Hearts and Minds: the status after 15 years research
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  • Organisational and inter-organisational thought
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  • Chapter
    When a large system is developed, there are always, in the early stages, a great number of serious problems with it. In some organizations these serious problems are quickly noted and rapidly attacked. In others they are hidden, skirted, or only half-solved. If we call the former organizations effective and the latter ineffective, we are led to an obvious question: what distinguishes the effective from the ineffective ones? The differences in performance are apparent; we need to explore their causes. In this paper I will use engineering examples from the 19th and 20th centuries to develop a more detailed picture of the kinds of differences that exist between those organizations likely to vet their systems successfully and those unlikely to do so.
  • Article
    Organizations in which reliable performance is a more pressing issue than efficient performance often must learn to cope with incomprehensible technologies by means other than trial and error, since the cost of failure is too high. Discovery and consistent application of substitutes for trial and error—such as imagination, simulation, vicarious experience, and stories—contribute to heightened reliability. Organizational culture is integral to the creation of effective substitutes. Using examples taken from air traffic control, nuclear power generation, and naval carrier operations, this article demonstrates that closer attention to the ways people construct meaning can suggest new ways to improve reliability.
  • Article
    This paper discusses four topics relating to safety culture, three theoretical and one practical. The first considers why it is that an unsafe culture is more likely to be involved in the causation of organizational rather than individual accidents. It is the pervasive nature of culture that makes it uniquely suitable for creating and sustaining the co-linear gaps in defences-in-depth through which an accident trajectory has to pass. The second topic relates to pathological adaptations, and discusses two examples: the Royal Navy of the mid-nineteenth century and the Chernobyl reactor complex. The third issue deals with recurrent accident patterns and considers the role of cultural drivers in creating typical accidents. The final topic is concerned with the practical question of whether a safety culture can be engineered. It is argued that a safe culture is an informed culture and this, in turn, depends upon creating an effective reporting culture that is underpinned by a just culture in which the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is clearly drawn and understood.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    Rules and procedures form a major part of the system of barriers andcontrols As there is the assumption in a HSE Management System that the rulesand procedures will be followed, rule-breaking and other violations constitutea major threat to HSE management. This paper reviews earlier work on why peopleviolate and introduces the ‘Lethal Cocktail' four factors that predict andpromote violation, Expectation, Powerfulness, Opportunity and Planning, as wellas the counter effect provided by good personal norms. This paper describes the philosophy and application behind a brochure"Managing Rule-Breaking - the Toolkit" that supports the management ofviolation in operations in a stand-alone manner. The structure of the brochureand the procedures proposed to identify and remedy procedural and complianceproblems are introduced. There is a discussion of the factors that can lead tofailure even if the supporting material is good. Introduction In situations where effective ‘hardware' barriers can not be put in place,barriers formed by administrative controls such as guidelines, rules andprocedures provide some of the most effective ways of managing the hazards ofoperations. As a result many of the controls for hazards provided by HSEmanagement systems (HSE-MS) are procedural. Failure to follow established rulesand procedures removes one or more of these barriers (See Figure 1). Incombination with a single error or mechanical failure, such violations can leadto disaster. Rule-breaking therefore forms one of the major threats to theintegrity of HSE-MS. Analyses of major accidents have repeatedly shown thatrule-breaking, violations at both the level of the individual and theorganisation, forms one of the most common causes of accidents¹. Forinstance, personal violations that can result in fatality include failures towear seta belts, speeding, failure to isolate electrical equipment or ensurethat an area is gas free. Organisational violations might include failure toapply the permit to work system, use of personnel without predefinedcompetencies etc. The effective management of HSE is therefore based upon thestrong assumption that known procedures and practices will be followed.However, reliable compliance may not always be the case and there may be timeswhen rules are broken and procedures not followed.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    Publisher Society of Petroleum Engineers Language English Document ID 61095-MS DOI 10.2118/61095-MS Content Type Conference Paper Title The Hearts and Minds Project: Creating Intrinsic Motivation for HSE Authors P.T.W. Hudson, Leiden University; D. Parker, Manchester University; R. Lawton, Leeds University; W.L.G. Verschuur, Leiden University; G.C. van der Graaf, J. Kalff, SIEP. Source SPE International Conference on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, 26-28 June 2000, Stavanger, Norway ISBN 978-1-55563-913-6 Copyright Copyright 2000,Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc. Preview Abstract The Hearts and Minds Project is aimed at developing intrinsic motivation for HSE. After an extensive review of the academic literature on motivation, with special emphasis on self-driven or intrinsic motivation, it was decided that the best way to establish an intrinsically motivated workforce was to develop a safety culture. This paper outlines the review of intrinsic motivation and describes the basic notions of a safety culture, ranging from the Pathological, through the Bureaucratic/Calculative to the Generative. These cultures are described with five basic dimensions covering Communications, Organisational Attitudes, Roles of the HSE Department, Organisational Behaviour and Working Practices. A laudable aim of an organisation is to become as advanced a culture as possible. This is often difficult to implement effectively; implementations often fail sooner or later and organisations are notoriously difficult to change. A model, based upon extensive experience with addiction, has been adapted and applied to help steer the evolution of organisations toward the Generative Safety Culture. This paper finally discusses the advantages to be gained from establishing an advanced safety culture. Not only are the costs and risks associated with HSE failures reduced, there are also direct benefits to be gained. Having a truly motivated workforce can allow less, rather than more, direct time to be allotted to HSE while maintaining or even improving performance. Introduction Health, Safety and Environment are not issues that will go away. Despite the considerable gains in performance that have been made in the last few years, primarily as a result of the systematic application of HSE-management systems, there is still room for improvement. Accidents still happen, the environment still damaged, the health of the workforce will always remain an issue. With a view to obtaining further improvements, especially in the area of safety, the requirement was set by a group of operators for a research program to develop intrinsic motivation for safety within the work force. The basic idea behind this proposal was that individuals who are internally or intrinsically motivated to perform safe behaviour can be left to look after themselves. We believe that the presence of such individuals in the workforce will provide a considerable impetus to safety performance. At current historically low levels of LTIF and numbers of fatalities the agreement is that the most effective way to become even safer is to win the Hearts and Minds of the workforce. This represents a development, not a substitute for HSE management systems, and it is to be hoped that the combination can provide HSE performance at lower overall cost in terms of time and effort. The direction one wishes to move in is one where good practice is automatic and where there are no barriers to performing work in the best and the safest possible ways. To understand how people can produce good practice, we can develop a model relating values to behaviour, such as is shown in Figure 1. This shows how values underlie beliefs, but also that barriers can ensure that people hold beliefs that mean that they feel incapable of attaining their values. For instance, while people may value safety above or as highly as production, they may also believe that safety costs money and that problems will not happen to them, so they can put safety issues aside while they have to meet difficult production targets. Likewise they may believe that doing the ‘right’ things is their ideal, but they may be prevented by circumstances from performing the correct actions. Previous programs have been aimed in ensuring that people are allowed to perform the right behaviours in order to be safe. The Hearts and Minds program is intended to act at the levels of values and beliefs. File Size 70 KB Number of Pages 8
  • Article
    This paper reviews the literature on safety culture and safety climate. The main emphasis is on applied research customary in the social psychological or organisational psychological traditions. Although safety culture and climate are generally acknowledged to be important concepts, not much consensus has been reached on the cause, the content and the consequences of safety culture and climate in the past 20 years. Moreover, there is an overall lack of models specifying either the relationship of both concepts with safety and risk management or with safety performance. In this paper, safety culture and climate will be differentiated according to a general framework based on work by Schein (1992 Schein) on organisational culture. This framework distinguishes three levels at which organisational culture can be studied — basis assumptions, espoused values and artefacts. At the level of espoused values we find attitudes, which are equated with safety climate. The basic assumptions, however, form the core of the culture. It is argued that these basic assumptions do not have to be specifically about safety, although it is considered a good sign if they are. It is concluded that safety climate might be considered an alternative safety performance indicator and that research should focus on its scientific validity. More important, however, is the assessment of an organisation's basic assumptions, since these are assumed to be explanatory to its attitudes.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    Tripod Delta (diagnostic evaluation tool for accident prevention) is a checklist-based approach to carrying out safety 'health checks'. This paper describes the theoretical background of the approach, which is based on a model for understanding the role of human error in accidents. The method for constructing databases from which to make checklists and use of the system to generate remedial safety plans are described. Finally, the implementation is discussed and the status is reviewed.
  • Article
    Publisher Society of Petroleum Engineers Language English Document ID 61229-MS DOI 10.2118/61229-MS Content Type Conference Paper Title HSE Tools: Which Tools are Appropriate? Authors P.T.W. Hudson, SPE, Leiden University, G.C. van der Graaf, SIEP, D. Parker, Manchester University, R. Lawton, Leeds University, and W.L.G. Verschuur, Leiden University Source SPE International Conference on Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, 26-28 June 2000, Stavanger, Norway ISBN 978-1-55563-913-6 Copyright 2000. Society of Petroleum Engineers Preview Abstract A study into different HSE tools reveals why some tools may be better than others. Tools can be structured along two dimensions. One dimension loads on how much a tool is a managerial, long-term aid, providing information for improvement. The other dimension loads on the extent to which a tool is applicable at the workforce level, helping to manage immediate hazards and make current practices better. The appropriateness and acceptability of tools is also strongly determined by the company’s safety culture and the national culture. The analysis of why tools work found four crucial dimensions: Proactive vs Reactive - Reactive tools are more appropriate in early stages, proactive tools are needed and effective only when the safety culture is sufficiently advanced. Hazard Recognition vs Hazard management - Some tools help people recognise the presence of their hazards, other tools help them to manage and prioritise. Behaviour vs Attitude - Early stages of safety culture require behaviour to lead attitude change; later stages are characterised by attitudes leading behaviour. Reward vs Punishment - Disciplinary methods have their place in abolishing specific bad practices, rewards help cultivate generally good practices but are easy to misapply. Continuous striving for improvement creates a tension between how people think and feel about HSE and how they actually behave. This tension can be structured by the right tools to generate real improvement. Internal or mental models of what HSE management is about can only develop slowly. Proactive approaches rely on such models as positive attitudes become internalised. Introduction There are many tools and techniques used to promote and improve safety. One of the experiences of many safety managers is that some tools appear to work, while others do not. It remains a continuing source of frustration that, despite copying all their tools and emulating their practices, many organisations are still unable to emulate Du Pont’s safety performance. If we had a better understanding of what tools there are, and how they work, this frustration could be alleviated and safety performance improved. File Size 70 KB Number of Pages 11 Add to Cart 0 items Checkout PRICE SPE Member Price: US $ 8.50 SPE NonMember Price: US $ 25.00 Change Currency DOWNLOAD HISTORY Past 30 days - 0 times Since 2007 - 51 times RIGHTS & PERMISSIONS Author rights Get permission for reuse ABOUT ONEPETRO • What is OnePetro • Top Downloads • Document Coverage • Participating Organizations • Subscription Options • Login Help • Administrator Access LATEST NEWS Have you visited PetroWiki? IMPORTANT NOTE Download accelerators and bots of any kind are prohibited on this website. Offenders may have their access
  • Article
    In UK industry, particularly in the energy sector, there has been a movement away from ‘lagging’ measures of safety based on retrospective data, such as lost time accidents and incidents, towards ‘leading’ or predictive assessments of the safety climate of the organisation or worksite. A number of different instruments have been developed by industrial psychologists for this purpose, resulting in a proliferation of scales with distinct developmental histories. Reviewing the methods and results from a sample of industrial surveys, the thematic basis of 18 scales used to assess safety climate is examined. This suggests that the most typically assessed dimensions relate to management (72% of studies), the safety system (67%), and risk (67%), in addition themes relating to work pressure and competence appear in a third of the studies.
  • Article
    Full-text available
    Accidents are the consequences of highly complex coincidences. Among the multitude of contributing factors human errors play a dominant role. Prevention of human error is therefore a promising target in accident prevention. The present analysis of 100 accidents at sea shows that human errors were not as such recognizable before the accident occurred. Therefore general increase of motivation or of safety awareness will not remedy the problem. The major types of human error that contribute to the occurrence of accidents are wrong habits, wrong diagnoses, lack of attention, lack of training and unsuitable personality. These problems require specific preventive measures, directed at the change of undesired behaviors. Such changes should be achieved without the requirement that people comprehend the relation between their actions and subsequent accidents.
  • Article
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