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To agree or not to agree:
Legal issues in online
contracting
Carl Pacini
Assistant Professor of Accounting, Florida Gulf Coast
University, Fort Myers
Christine Andrews
Assistant Professor of Accounting, Florida Gulf Coast
University, Fort Myen
William Hillison
Arthur Andersen Professor of Accounting, Florida State
University, Tallahassee
E-commerce for merchants
and consumers is more than
just establishing or visiting an
attractive Web site to conduct
business over the Internet. For
companies and consumers alike,
conducting business in cyberspace
C ompanies have been doing business electronically
for a number of years. Take electronic data inter-
change, for example. Defined as the electronic
exchange of information between trading partners, EDI
has been used successfully by General Electric, General
Motors, Sears, Wal-Mart, and a number of other major
corporations. Human intervention is often nonexistent,
with goods being ordered and delivered and payments
initiated via electronic fund transfers (EITs). Unlike e-
commerce transactions, EDI traditionally requires trading
partners to use a dedicated leased transmission line or a
connection to a value-added network (VAN). Moreover, it
involves both a direct connection and high start-up and
operating costs-entry barriers that the Internet has low-
ered through its use of a common information and com-
munication platform.
Or consider Financial Electronic Data Interchange (FEDI),
which integrates EFI and ED1 and results in both remit-
tance data and fund transfers being accomplished simul-
taneously. If the seller’s bank is not EDI-capable, a buyer
can implement FED1 by contracting with a financial
value-added network @VAN), a separate organization that
enables the linking of various ED1 networks.
However, in nearly all these electronic relationships, prior
agreements (called “trading partner agreements”) provide
answers to most of the legal questions that might arise.
Virtually every contingency can be anticipated, and the
partners can agree on how to proceed, even over a dis-
pute. In contrast, when e-commerce participants are deal-
ing with strangers over an open system like the Internet,
bilateral agreements are harder to arrange. Agreements
that anticipate all contingencies cannot be expected to be
agreed to by thousands of customers who might visit an
e-merchant’s Web site.
As the world of e-commerce continues to expand, uncer-
tainty about the enforceability of electronic agreements
and the legitimacy of the parties involved has led many
executives, attorneys, business owners, regulators, and
others to ponder what might happen when disputes arise
over electronic transactions. A 1997 court ruling by a
43
Georgia appellate court has contributed to this uncer-
tainty. In Georgia Dept. of %znspurtation u. Norris, the court
held that filing a notice by fax did not satisfy a require-
ment that notice be in writing because the transmission of
“beeps and chirps” along a telephone line is not writing
in the customary sense of the term.
The risks or uncertainties related to conducting business
over the Internet are:
Jurisdiction-Who has legal jurisdiction over a cybercon-
tract, given the global nature of e-business?
Contract farmtim-Is a business or other Web site owner
making a contractual offer or an invitation to bargain?
Contract valid@-What is the legal validity of a Web
wrap or click-on contract?
Contract changes and errors-What is the legal effect of
changes and errors in transmission over the Internet?
Authentication and attribution--How can parties to a con-
tract be assured that those they are dealing with are legit-
imate?
Message integrity-Is the message received exactly the
same as the message sent?
iVonr@udiution-How can a business or consumer be
assured that parties cannot deny the content of a trans-
action or event?
Given the importance of understanding these various
risks, e-business participants should become familiar with
the basic legal issues involved. Here we will analyze the
status of contract law applicable to e-transactions, provide
an overview of recent legislative efforts that have been
undertaken to classify e-business contract law, and offer
practical suggestions for contracting in cyberspace. It is
important to note here that we do not offer legal advice in
this article; readers needing legal advice should seek such
services from competent legal counsel.
Jurisdiction
C ontracting in cyberspace presents a challenge to
Web site owners because the Internet is a form of
communication that rises above spatial bound-
aries. Its domain flows indiscriminately across intema-
tional boundaries as easily as it flows across the street.
This creates jurisdiction problems in disputes between e-
commerce buyers and sellers, such as where a contract
was formed or which state’s law applies. Moreover, because
Internet technology allows “pull” relationships (a customer
reads or downloads information from an e-merchant’s
Web site) as well as “push” relationships (an e-merchant
sends information to a customer automatically), the ques-
tion of the location of legal contact becomes complex.
In the United States, two different groups of court deci-
sions have emerged with regard to Web sites. One line of
judicial authority has granted jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents on the grounds that their Internet involvement
encompassed significant interactivity (or follow-on con-
tracts). In CompuServe Inc. II. Putterson (1996), a federal
appeals court ruled that a computer programmer in Texas
was subject to Ohio law. The programmer and Ohio-
based CompuServe had formed an electronic contract
under which CompuServe distributed and sold copies of
software. During contract negotiations, the programmer
had never visited Ohio. In Cody v. Ward (1997), a federal
district court asserted jurisdiction based on telephone and
e-mail communications that consummated a business
relationship started over Prodigy’s “Money Talk” discus-
sion forum for financial matters.
In both these cases, the Internet activities of those sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of a distant court involved more
than a visit to a passive Web site. In other cases, reports
Takach (1999), courts have asserted jurisdiction based on
solicitation of donations, signing up subscribers for Net
services, and negotiations and other dealings that occurred
as the result of an initial Internet communication.
In a second group of cases, US courts are refusing to exer-
cise jurisdiction over an out-of-state person or business
because of mere Web site access or creation. In Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. V. Richard King (1997), a Missouri jazz
club called the Blue Note established a Web site on which
it advertised. People wishing to visit the establishment
had to telephone to order tickets and physically take
delivery of them at the club in Missouri. The Web site also
contained a disclaimer that the Blue Note was not afflliat-
ed with the famous New York jazz club of the same name.
When the New York club brought a trademark infiinge-
ment suit, the federal court dismissed the action for lack
of jurisdiction, reasoning that a Web site that merely pro-
vides information is not equivalent to advertising, selling,
or promoting in New York City. The federal appeals court
deemed it significant that almost 100 percent of the cus-
tomers of the Blue Note lived in Missouri.
In the 1998 case IDS Life hurunce Co. v. SunAmericu, Inc.,
plaintiff IDS Life sued SunAmerica for unfair competition,
tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of
trade secrets, and intentional interference with business
relationships. IDS claimed that SunAmerica was inducing
IDS’s sales agents to leave the company and switch their
customers over to SunAmerica in violation of IDS employ-
ment contracts. The federal district court refused to find
jurisdiction solely on the basis of SunAmerica’s operation
of a Web site. This case reflects the common approach in
the second group of cases in that mere, general Web site
access is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court over
a nonresident defendant.
44 Business Horizons I January-February 2002
These two lines of US court decisions suggest the use of a .
sliding-scale standard in deciding e-business jurisdiction
issues that relates to the amount and level of online com- e
mercial activity A clear statement of this standard appears in
Zippo Mfg. Co. V. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc. (1997):
The likelihood that persona1 jurisdiction can be consti- l
tutionally exercised is directly proportional to the
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Intemet....If the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction
that involve the knowing and repeated transmissions of
computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper. At the opposite end are situations where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Inter-
net Web site that is accessible to users in foreign juris-
dictions. A passive Web site that does little more than
make information available to those who are interested
in it is not grounds for the exercise of persona1 jurisdic-
tion. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web
sites where a user can exchange information with the
host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is determined by examining the level of interactiv-
ity and commercial nature of the exchange of informa-
tion that occurs on the Web site.
Figure 1 illustrates the approach taken by US courts in
determining jurisdiction issues in commercial cyberspace
transactions.
The legal uncertainty faced by e-merchants is increased by
dealing with parties from other nations. Conceivably, a
foreign court could deem it reasonable to exercise juris-
diction over a US merchant who engaged in an e-business
transaction with one of its citizens. Under current law, a
foreign nation can usually assert jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents when the exercise of that jurisdiction is “reason-
able.” According to the American Law Institute (1987),
circumstances that have been found to be reasonable
include those in which a nonresident was:
regularly conducting business in a foreign country;
engaging in an activity outside the foreign country that
has a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect in that
country; or
engaging in an activity that is the subject of court action
being owned, possessed, or used in the foreign country.
Businesses that host Web sites can implement measures to
reduce the likelihood of being summoned into court in
an undesirable jurisdiction. First, the site should include
both a forum selection clause (in which state or country a
case will be heard) and a choice of law provision (which
state’s or nation’s law applies) that are agreed to when a
purchaser decides to buy. In Burger King v. Ruahwicz
(1985), the US Supreme Court held that forum selection
clauses are generally enforceable because a person can
consent to personal jurisdiction. However, courts decide
their enforceability on a case-by-case basis. On the other
hand, in The Bremen v. Zupata Off-Shore Co. (1972), the
Supreme Court indicated that forum selection clauses
must be fair and reasonable to be enforced. These same
principles also apply to a choice of law provision.
Cmpi v. MicrosofC Network (1999) can serve as a useful
illustration of these principles. Microsoft Network, an
online computer service, required prospective subscribers
to view multiple computer screens of information, includ-
ing a membership agreement containing a forum selec-
tion clause. The membership agreement appeared on the
screen in a scrollable window next to blocks providing the
choices “I Agree” and “I Don’t Agree,” either of which
prospective members had the option to click at any point.
A New Jersey appellate court struck down a challenge to
the forum selection clause because there was no basis to
conclude that it was proffered unfairly or designed to con-
ceal its provisions. The court concluded the plaintiffs
knew they were entering into a contract.
Figure 1
Sliding scale standard of jurisdiction in e-commerce cases
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction depends
oninteractivity No jurisdition
I
Interactive Web site:
l Provides information
for users to make
purchase decisions
l Actively solicits
business
I I
Mixed Web site: Passive Web site:
l Provides information l Provides only
l Users can exchange information
information with l Does not solicit
host computer business
Source: Ferrera et al. (2001 j
Hence, a brilliantly worded provision
on jurisdiction and/or choice of law is
not useful unless the Web site owner
has brought it to the attention of the
user. For example, a forum selection
and/or choice of law clause may be
unenforceable if it appears only at the
foot of the home page and does not
appear on subsequent pages. Some
Internet users will not visit a Web site
via a home page but may do so from a
hyperlinked site or from a bookmark
list. To help reduce the noted risks, a
required checkbox for indicating agree-
ment to a forum selection and/or
choice of law clause can be included,
placed just before or as part of a trans-
action execution selection.
To agree or not to agree: Legal issues in online contracting 45
Second, the Web site owner should use technology that
counts site “hits” (and possibly have it audited by a CPA
firm) to document the number of sales in another state or
foreign nation. Such evidence could be valuable in demon-
strating that the Web site does little or no business in the
location where a plaintiff files a lawsuit. Failure to satisfy
the “minimum contacts” requirement of due process can
result in the plaintiff being unable to establish jurisdiction.
Third, e-business Web site owners should use written dis-
claimers, which give owners more control over the parties
with whom they do business. A site disclaimer clause may
state that certain transactions will not be entered into with
residents of specific states, provinces, or countries. More-
over, the clause could be used in conjunction with a tech-
nology filter that precludes the site from being accessed by
visitors from certain states or countries. In the final analy-
sis, those who employ the Net to do business out of state
and/or abroad must closely examine the parameters of
dealing in cyberspace.
Contract formation
T
he advent of e-commerce over the Net has raised
various legal issues about the formation of elec-
tronic contracts. One area of uncertainty is whether
a business Web site owner is making an offer or merely an
invitation to make an offer. Does the potential customer’s
communication constitute an offer or an acceptance? The
answer will dictate the time and place a contract is made.
The question of offer or acceptance was aptly demon-
strated recently when an e-merchant in the UK advertised
televisions on its Web site for f3.99 instead of f399
because of a computer error. More than 20,000 orders
were placed before the e-merchant realized why the televi-
sions were so popular and closed down its site. The legal
issue to be resolved is whether displaying goods or ser-
vices on a Web site amounts to an offer by the seller,
which e-consumers accept, or an invitation to negotiate,
to which they respond with an offer.
Given the risks, businesses would be well advised to con-
struct a Web site that is, in effect, a “shop window” or an
invitation to make an offer. This allows the customer to
make an offer to buy goods or services that the site owner
is free to accept or reject. The prudent e-business should
clearly set out an agreed-upon method of contract accept-
ance. First, the screen should state in large, bold print that
any indication of interest sent by an e-customer is an
offer, not an acceptance. Once the e-business receives an
offer from a purchaser, it can decide whether or not to
accept. It then sends an e-mail to the customer after con-
sidering and approving the purchaser’s offer. These proce-
dures give greater control to the e-merchant in choosing
the terms that will govern the contract.
Contract validity
A
nother emerging issue is the legal validity of Web
wrap or click-on contracts. Such a contract is typi-
cally found on a Web site offering goods or ser-
vices for sale. The e-consumer or e-business wanting to
create a legal relationship (buyer and seller) with a Web
merchant finds legal terms on the computer screen, often
in a dialogue box that permits messages and responses.
The consumer usually consents to the terms by clicking a
box on the screen that says “OK” or “I agree.” The ques-
tion arises, however, as to when an acceptance occurs in
such a situation.
Traditional contract law usually holds that an acceptance
is effective when sent by the offeree using an authorized
mode of communication. This “mailbox rule” applies
unless the offer provides otherwise, the offeree uses an
unauthorized method of acceptance, or the acceptance is
sent after the offeree sends a rejection. In Bickmore v. Bick-
more (1996), a Canadian court held that a faxed accept-
ance of a faxed offer was delivered when the acceptance
was sent. The mailbox rule developed, however, in the
nineteenth century when contracts were often negotiated
at a distance through the mails and the courts had to pro-
tect the offeree from losses incurred by any delay or failure
on the part of the post office. Given the advent of instanta-
neous communication, such as the Net, some courts have
The issue is whether displaying
goods or services on a Web site
amounts to an offer by the seller,
which e-consumers accept, or an
invitation to negotiate, to which
they respond with an offer.
held that the rationale behind the mailbox rule does not
apply. In Enrores u. Miles Far East Corporation (1955) and
Brinkibon v. S&hag (1983), two English courts ruled that
acceptance is effective upon receipt in situations involving
instantaneous forms of communication.
Thus, if the Net can be regarded as an instantaneous com-
munication medium, then it appears more appropriate to
consider that acceptance occurs (or the contract is formed)
when the response-the “clicking on an icon”-is received.
This principle is a clear abrogation of the mailbox rule, but
is consistent with the policy in virtually all EDI model trad-
ing partner agreements that have addressed the issue. It is
46 Business Horizons / January-February 2002
also consistent with existing or proposed legislation such as
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (CISG), proposed revisions to Arti-
cle 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, the United
Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce, and the Uni-
form Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).
“Receipt” does not require that the recipient of the elec-
tronic message know of, open, or read the message. All it
requires is that the electronic message be available for pro-
cessing by the recipient’s information system.
Contract changes
and errors
W ith recent advances in information technology,
the use of software to send or answer mes-
sages automatically has moved from the realm
of science fiction to business reality. The new technology,
referred to as “electronic agents” or “intelligent agents,”
makes it possible for computers to initiate and complete a
transaction without human intervention. In fact, the entire
point of the new technology is to allow such transactions
to take place without any need for human traders to
review or even be aware of particular transactions.
Currently the common law is more or less unclear on the
How the law responds to such innovation will have an
enormous impact on the development and growth of e-
legal effect of using an electronic agent even though the pol-
commerce. For example, where no prior EDI agreement
icy of “owner responsibility” seems generally accepted.
exists between the parties, may one of them make an offer
Moreover, two model statutes provide some guidance to
or acceptance by machine? Who is responsible if the com-
those who operate Web sites with electronic agent character-
puter “makes a deal” contrary to the programmer’s inten-
tion? These questions relate to risk that must be considered
by those involved with computer-to-computer transactions.
istics. For example, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA), which has been adopted by several states, does
Another area of concern in e-commerce is the legal effect
of changes and errors in transmission. The common law
remains unclear in this area, but UETA offers a practical
solution. When a business or person (Party A) conducts
an electronic transaction with the Web site of Party B, and
if Party B does not allow Party A a chance to correct or
prevent an error, the error can be avoided provided that
Party A:
l promptly notifies Party B of the error and the fact that
Party A did not intend to be bound by the electronic
message sent;
l takes reasonable steps, including those that conform to
Party B’s reasonable instructions, to destroy or to return
to Party B (according to Party B’s instructions) any item
of value received as a result of the erroneous electronic
message; and
l has not used or received any benefit or value from the
consideration received from Party B.
This avoidance rule is limited to human error when deal-
ing with a machine or computer system.
correct any error.
Authentication, attribution,
Resort to the law can be avoided if Party B constructs a
Web site that enables an e-customer or e-merchant to pre-
vent the transmission of an erroneous record, or enables
an e-customer or e-merchant to correct an error once sent.
For example, an electronic agent may be programmed to
provide a “confirmation screen” to the e-customer with
the ability to prevent the erroneous record from being
transmitted. Similarly, the electronic agent might receive
the transmission sent by the e-consumer and then send
back a confirmation that the person must accept before
the transaction is consummated. In either case, the elec-
tronic agent would provide an opportunity to prevent or
address the limited circumstance in which a contract is
formed solely by electronic agents in an automated transac-
tion. Although UFXA applies only to parties who have
agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means, it makes
clear that a contract may be formed by the interactions of
the electronic agents of the parties, even if no individual was
aware of or reviewed the agent’s actions or the final contract
terms. Both UETA and the UN Model Law on Electronic
Commerce consider information systems to be instruments
of the owner for purposes of forming contracts. Machines or
computers may not appear to have the necessary intent
required to form a contract, but those who place them in
operation for that purpose do have that intent.
and nonrepudiation of
electronic contracts
A nother key issue in e-commerce is the problem of
attributing an electronic message to the person
who purports to send it. Although cyberspace
involves anonymity, e-customers and e-merchants must be
matched up with legally responsible parties in the real
world. Those involved in e-business must confront issues
linked to the authentication of an electronic message
sender. First, consumers and businesses want to know that
they can rely on a message as having actually been sent by
the purported sender. Second, e-commerce participants
wish to avoid liability in the event a message allegedly sent
by one party was actually sent by an interloper or hacker.
To agree or not to agree: Legal issues in online contracting 47
Both UETA and UCITA take the position that an electronic
record (information that is inscribed on a tangible medi-
um or stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceptible form) or signature (a mark
made with the intention of authenticating the marked
document) is attributable to a person or entity if it was
the act of the person or entity. One’s actions include those
of both human and electronic agents. For example, an
electronic signature on a purchase order, in response to a
declining inventory level, is attributable to a person
whether it originated with that person, an employee, or a
software program (intelligent or electronic agent).
UETA and UCITA also indicate that the person’s act may be
attributable in virtually any manner. This includes any
security procedure used to determine the person or entity
to which an electronic record or signature can be attrib-
uted. A “security procedure” is one employed for the pur-
pose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or
performance is that of a specific person, or for detecting
changes or errors in the information in an electronic
record. The term includes procedures that require the use
of algorithms or other codes, passwords, encryption, or
callback, or any other acknowledgment procedure. Security
procedures are, in fact, only one way of attributing an elec-
tronic communication to a specific party or entity.
According to UCITA, a receiving party, acting in good
faith, who properly applies an attribution procedure and
ascertains that a message was from a given party can bind
that party. An electronic communication may be attrib-
uted to a party when:
the message was dispatched by one who obtained the
necessary access number or device(s) from a source
under the control of the alleged sender;
the access occurred because of the purported sender’s
failure to exercise reasonable care in protecting the
number or device; and
the receiving party relied upon the message to his, her,
or its detriment.
In essence, one who negligently permits an electronic
message to be sent is bound by that communication to
anyone who detrimentally relies on it.
Electronic signatures
A common attribution procedure used in the e-business
environment is an electronic signature. Traditionally, a sig-
nature is any mark or symbol affixed to a writing to mani-
fest the signer’s intent to adopt it as his own and to be
bound by it. UETA defines an electronic signature as an
electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically
associated with a record and executed or adopted by a per-
son with the intent to sign the record. Numerous types of
electronic signatures have been developed through
48
advances in technology. However, the two primary cate-
gories are: (1) non-cryptographic methods and (2) crypto-
graphic methods. The former are designed primarily to mit-
igate identification and authentication risks. The latter pro-
vide controls necessary to meet the additional risks of non-
repudiation and security. The spectrum of electronic signa-
ture technologies currently available is discussed below.
Non-cryptographic controls
Password or personal ID number. Passwords and PINS have
been used as controls over access to information for many
years to authenticate a user and allow access to a computer
network. However, it should be recognized that the role of
a PIN or password is just that of authentication. In other
words, the user who has the PIN provides a form of assur-
ance that he is the authorized person. In this sense, the PIN
is a form of electronic signature. To function properly, it
must be known by both parties prior to use. Use of the PIN
over an open communication channel can create additional
problems. It is usually essential that the PIN be encrypted
so that it cannot be intercepted and learned by others.
Smart card. A smart card contains an embedded chip that
can generate, store, and/or process data. The card can be
used to facilitate various authentication technologies when
inserted into a reader device. Information from the cards
chip is read by security software only when the user enters a
PIN or password or provides a biometric identifier. This
method provides greater security than use of a PIN alone
because a user must have both (1) physical possession of
the smart card and (2) knowledge of the PIN. This type of
control is common with ATM transactions. Because of the
physical nature of the card (or any other physical form of
identity), it is termed a “token.” Good security requires that
the smart card and the PIN be kept or stored separately.
Digitized signature. A digitized signature is a graphical
image of a handwritten signature recorded by digital pen
and pad. By using special software, the recipient compares
the digitized representation of the entered signature with a
stored copy of the graphical image of it. A digitized signa-
ture is more reliable for authentication than a PIN because
there is a biometric component to the creation of the
handwritten image. In other words, the recording device
and associated evaluation software compare not only the
shape of the letters but also the timing of each pen stroke,
its duration, and/or the pen pressure. Forging a digitized
signature can be more difftcult than on paper because digi-
tal comparisons with a computer program are more dis-
criminatory than those done with the human eye.
At first glance, this form of electronic signature appears
to be well suited for authentication. It is not only difficult
to forge, it also maintains a format familiar to manual
approaches. However, the user-created image on the digi-
tal pad is literally a stored digital file to be compared to
the maintained version. If the digital signature file is sent
Business Horizons / January-February 2002
electronically, it is subject to interception, copying, and
later resubmission by parties other than the signer. Thus,
just like PINS, digitized signatures should not be sent over
open networks unless encrypted.
Biometrics. Individuals have unique physical characteristics
that can be converted into digital format to be recorded in
a file and interpreted by a computer. Among these are
voice patterns, fingerprints, and patterns present on the
retina of one or both eyes. In this technology, the physical
characteristic is measured by a microphone, optical reader,
or some other device, converted into digital code, and
then compared with an authenticated copy of that charac-
teristic stored in the computer. No matter the type of bio-
metric measure, the resulting code is stored in a file. If the
security file is compromised, impersonation becomes a
serious risk. Thus, again, such information should be sent
over open networks only when it is encrypted.
Cryptographic controls
Symmetric encryption. In symmetric encryption, both the
sender and receiver have access to the same key, which is
not known publicly. If Paul wants to send Sally an en-
crypted message, he uses a key to encode the message and
Forging a digitized signature can
be more difficult than on paper
because digital comparisons with
a computer program are more
discriminatory than those done
with the human eye.
transmits the message to Sally. Sally uses the same key-
and only that key-to decrypt the message. Because the
same key performs these two functions, and only Paul
and Sally know it, Sally knows the message must have
come from Paul. This form of encryption provides assur-
ance about authentication as well as privacy and nonrepu-
diation. Keeping the key secret, however, is paramount
and difficult to manage with multiple users.
The most popular and widely used private-key cipher is
the Data Encryption Standard (DES), the federal standard
enunciated in 1977. Today, a more secure variant of DES,
called Triple DES (because it applies the encryption algo-
rithm three times using different keys) is now widely used
in the private sector. Other alternatives to DES have been
developed by RSA Data Security, including RC2, RC4, and
RC5. DES, however, is soon to be replaced by a new feder-
al standard.
In October 2000, after a three-year global competition,
the US Department of Commerce announced that an
encryption algorithm named Rijndael is the proposed
new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Reavis (2001)
reports that security products should be available by early
2002, based on AES. Rijndael will be unclassified, free of
any royalties, and publicly available for use and export
anywhere in the world.
Asymmetric encryption. Two researchers at Stanford Univer-
sity developed public key cryptography because of the dif-
ficulties involved in exchanging and managing private
keys. Unlike symmetric key cryptography, this asymmetric
encryption uses an algorithm with a public key and a pri-
vate key that are mathematically linked. The private key is
kept secret by the owner while the public key is freely
available. One key can only decrypt a message encrypted
with the other key. Given this unique characteristic, the
two-key set can be used in creating electronic signatures.
The first one can be a signing key that is kept private,
while the second one can be used as a public validation
key that is available to all other parties. Thus, if Paul
encrypts a message with his private key that can be
decrypted by Sally with Paul’s public key, Paul must have
sent it because he is the only one with a key who can
encrypt a message that can be decrypted by the public key.
As long as the private signing key is kept privy only to
Paul, the integrity of the process can be virtually assured.
And as long as the receiving party can gain access to the
public key, the authenticity objective can be met. As with
symmetric key encryption, the length of the key dictates
the strength of the protection offered by symmetric en-
cryption. Thus, given a key of sufficient length, public key
cryptography can provide protection similar to that of
private key techniques.
Although the public key method is highly effective, several
operational shortcomings must be overcome. The first
entails recognizing that just because a public key decrypts
a message does not ensure that it is the key of the person
it is intended to represent. Anyone could make a key pub-
lic and claim it to be that of another party Current prac-
tice makes the public key part of a “digital certificate” (or
digital signature), a specialized electronic document pro-
vided by a trusted party called a Certificate Authority. The
CA investigates the identity of the party and maintains a
protected record of his public key. A receiving party who
receives a signed message from a purported person obtains
the public key from the CA as part of the digital certifi-
cate. Again, if the message can be decrypted using the cer-
tified public key, then the receiver can be confident that it
is from the assumed party.
The second shortcoming of public key encryption is its
inefficiency. Whereas symmetric keys are typically short-
perhaps 40 or 128 bits-asymmetric key technology
To agree or not to agree: Legal issues in online contracting 49
requires the keys to be long, typically 1,024 bits. This cre-
ates considerable overhead in encryption and decryption
that makes sending and receiving long messages impracti-
cal. One method used to mitigate this problem is to create
a “hash” from the original message and then just encrypt
the hash as a signature.
Hashing refers to the process of creating a short string of
characters, also called a “digest,” from the original plain-
text message. After creating a message digest, the sender’s
private key encrypts it and it becomes a digital signature.
The recipient uses the sender’s public key to decrypt the
message digest and confirm the identity of the sender.
Digital signatures ensure not only the authenticity of the
sender but also provide for nonrepudiation by binding the
sender of a message to its contents. However, it should be
noted that because the public key is available to anyone,
the message, though encrypted by the sender’s private key,
is not secure. It could be intercepted and read by anyone
having the sender’s public key prior to receipt by the
intended recipient.
The third shortcoming relates to extending the use of this
technology to meet security risk. The most popular tech-
nology now in use to secure retail e-business is Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL). For example, someone logging on
to a Web site can order flowers or books by clicking an
appropriate selection and entering a credit card number.
SSL is the security protocol that encrypts the order and
credit card information to provide secure e-commerce,
using a combination of private and public key encryption.
In lay terms, the computers of the two parties use public
key encryption techniques for authentication purposes and
generate, encode, and send a secret private (symmetric) key
to be used in sending the actual mes-
sages. This is the “best of all possible
worlds”; authentication can take place,
the message can be communicated
securely and efficiently, and nonrepu-
diation risks can be mitigated.
Legal status of
e-signatures
E-SIGN, the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act,
took effect on October 1, 2000, allow-
ing electronic signatures or documents
to satisfy most existing legal require-
ments for written signatures, disclo-
sures, or records. Its implementation,
however, does not mean that all e-sig-
natures and records are now automati-
cally legally binding. It does mean
that for any transactions involving
interstate or global commerce, any
laws or regulations that require the use
of signatures or written documents cannot be used to
deny the validity or legality of the transaction merely
because electronic records and signatures were used. The
most important exception for e-business is that E-SIGN
does not affect the laws governing contracts or business
transactions but is an overlay on those laws. If a signature
must be notarized or made under oath, then a certifying
official using an e-signature can satisfy the requirement.
The new law makes several notable exceptions for certain
contracts and other records that must still be completed
in writing and accompanied by a standard manual signa-
ture. This list includes wills, codicils, testamentary trusts,
cancellation notices involving health and life insurance
(other than annuities), legal documents related to family
law (such as divorce decrees), court orders and notices,
and default notices and foreclosure documents related to
a person’s primary residence. E-SIGN also does not affect
the writing requirement attached to records and docu-
ments governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, such
as checks, drafts, certificates of deposit, notes, letters of
credit, bulk transfers, warehouse receipts, and security
interests in personal property. The new law also does not
affect the rights of holders of most securities against secu-
rities issuers. In general, it allows e-signatures or docu-
ments to satisfy most existing legal requirements for writ-
ten signatures. On the other hand, it neither entirely elim-
inates risks related to e-signatures and documents nor
ensures their enforceability. Nor does it require any per-
son to agree to use electronic signatures.
E-SIGN sets forth certain conditions for the enforcement
of electronic transactions. Where an existing law mandates
that a contract be in writing such as the Statute of Frauds,
3 in business-to-business (B23) e-comtsxrce, where both parties have agreed to
conduct business by e!ectrunic means, electronic a$ents may form contracts
because those who placed them in operation had the intent to contract.
4 Confirmation screens should be used to give consumers an opportunity to
prevent the transmission of erroneous orders and correct an error once sent.
5 Security procedures should be used so e-consumers and merchants can be
matched with legally responsible parties.
50 Business Horizons I January-February 2002
the enforceability of the electronic record of the contract
requires that record to be capable of being retained and
“accurately reproduced” for later reference. Another condi-
tion of enforcement is that any action taken electronically
must be attributable to the person to be bound.
E-SIGN is “technology-neutral,” anticipating the use of
electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, and electro-
magnetic means for e-signatures. It also contains various
consumer protection provisions. First, a consumer must
have “afftrmatively consented” to the use of electronic
communication, and must not have withdrawn such con-
sent. Before consenting, the consumer must receive certain
disclosures. In a “clear and conspicuous” statement, the
consumer must be informed of
l the right to have a record of the transaction provided on
paper;
l the right to withdraw the consent to have the record
provided in electronic form;
l the fact that any consent provided applies only to a
specific transaction;
l how to obtain a copy of any electronic message sent
and whether any fee will be charged for a copy;
l the procedures required to withdraw any consent pro-
vided; and
l the type of hardware and software needed to access and
retain any electronic record created by the transaction
involved.
The law is written in such a fashion as to not restrict or
impinge on preceded consumer protection laws.
A s e-commerce grows, Web site owners remain
concerned about the outcome of potential dis-
putes or lawsuits over many aspects of online
contracting. E-businesses can increase the likelihood of
avoiding a costly dispute by gaining a basic familiarity
with the legal issues involved (see Figure 2).
To establish jurisdiction, business Web sites should be
constructed to include both a forum selection clause and
a choice of law provision, both of which should be part of
the contract terms. E-commerce participants should con-
sider what actions by buyers and sellers lead to forming a
contract, and the prudent Web site owner should set forth
an explicit means of contract formation (offer and accept-
ance). Because the use of electronic agents creates uncer-
tainty in contract formation-May one make an offer or
acceptance by machine?-a Web site should enable e-
commerce participants to prevent the transmission of an
erroneous record or to correct one after transmission.
When it comes to electronic messages, e-consumers and e-
merchants alike must be matched up with legally respon-
sible parties in the real world. Both must know that they
can rely on a message as having actually been sent by the
purported sender, and avoid liability in the event a mes-
sage was sent or altered by an interloper or hacker. Finally,
e-commerce participants must know the laws regarding e-
signatures, PINS, smart cards, digitized signatures, biomet-
rics, and various forms of encryption. Because E-SIGN
now allows electronic signatures to satisfy most existing
legal requirements for written signatures, documents, or
records, laws or regulations that require the use of signa-
tures or written documents cannot be used to deny the
validity of the transaction merely because electronic signa-
tures and records were used. This is true for any transac-
tions involving interstate or global commerce. 0
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52 Business Horizons I January-February 2002
