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Effect of outdoor temperature, heat primes and anchoring on belief in global warming
Abstract
It is generally acknowledged that global warming is occurring, yet estimates of future climate change vary widely. Given this uncertainty, when asked about climate change, it is likely that people’s judgments may be affected by heuristics and accessible schemas. Three studies evaluated this proposition. Study 1 revealed a significant positive correlation between the outdoor temperature and beliefs in global warming. Study 2 showed that people were more likely to believe in global warming when they had first been primed with heat-related cognitions. Study 3 demonstrated that people were more likely to believe in global warming and more willing to pay to reduce global warming when they had first been exposed to a high vs. a low anchor for future increases in temperature. Together, results reveal that beliefs about global warming (and willingness to take actions to reduce global warming) are influenced by heuristics and accessible schemas. Several practical implications are discussed.
... Much of this research presumes that it is the experience of fluctuating temperatures and/or extreme weather events that causes reappraisals of people's climate change attitudes. There could be at least three mechanisms for this: (1) experiences of hot weather act as an availability heuristic, increasing the salience of climate change (Joireman et al., 2010), (2) visceral and embodied experiences of heat activate a larger network of understanding about the climate (Lewandowski et al., 2012), or (3) experiences of hot weather reduce psychological distance (Leiserowitz and Broad, 2006), making climate change seem more immediate and personally relevant. ...
... For example, U.S. evidence documented that belief in climate change increased when respondents' local areas had experienced extreme weather activity (although these effects dissipated relatively quickly over time; Egan and Mullin, 2012;Konisky et al., 2016). Furthermore, laboratory research showed that concern about climate change fluctuated depending on the indoor or outdoor temperatures on the day of testing (Joireman et al., 2010;Li et al., 2011;Risen and Critcher, 2011). ...
... Hot summer weather should trigger all the psychological processes presumed in the literature to shape climate change concern: it should be an availability heuristic that sensitizes people to climate change, it should offer the embodied experiences of heat that activate larger networks of understanding about the climate, and it should reduce psychological distance of climate change in people's minds. In short, if lab-based research can document fluctuations in climate change concern based on situational experiences of temperatures on the day of testing (Joireman et al., 2010;Li et al., 2011;Risen and Critcher, 2011) then one should be able to document fluctuations in climate change beliefs based on whether the sample is collected in the hotter summer months versus cooler winter months. In making that prediction, however, we are mindful of the fact that most support for the experiential account has emerged in the first decade of this century, and that evidence in the years since has been relatively scarce. ...
Identifying historical patterns of fluctuation in climate change skepticism guides researchers, policy makers, and science communicators in efforts to catalyze change in the future. We analyzed data from 25 nationally representative polls collected in Australia from 2009 to 2019 (N = 20,655). Although it remains concerningly high, climate skepticism trended down in that 10-year period, particularly among conservatives. Multilevel analyses identified two variables that stood out as being relevant in explaining that trajectory. First, climate change skepticism was positively associated with support for conservative political parties in national polls. Second, climate change skepticism was negatively associated with the annual global temperatures the previous year. There was little evidence that climate change beliefs were associated with economic variables or with seasonal variations in temperature. Furthermore, there was only weak evidence that climate change beliefs were associated with national temperatures. This suggests that global temperatures in the previous year are impactful because of their informational value (as a communication heuristic for the urgency and immediacy of climate change) more so than for their experiential value (in the sense of people actually experiencing warmer weather). Importantly, the effect of previous global temperature was particularly pronounced among those with the strongest levels of skepticism: political conservatives. This suggests that rising global annual temperatures have the power to update beliefs among those most in need of converting to the climate cause.
... Studies that have measured the effect of observed temperature fluctuations on climate change beliefs provide evidence that abnormally warm temperatures in the short term (Joireman et al., 2010;Egan and Mullin, 2012;Hamilton and Stampone, 2013) and the long term (Deryugina, 2013;Shao et al., 2014Shao, 2017) are important predictors of climate change beliefs and risk perceptions. For example, three 10-year studies in the U.S. reported a positive relationship between increasing summer temperatures and belief in the immediate impacts and severity of climate change (Shao et al., 2014. ...
... Further, as highlighted by Li et al. (2011) heightened temperatures on the day/days leading up to a study are associated with increased belief in and concern about climate change (Joireman et al., 2010;Egan and Mullin, 2012;Brooks et al., 2014). For example, in one study, belief that climate change is happening was predicted by temperature anomalies (i.e., unseasonable warm and/or cool temperatures) on the interview day and the previous day (Hamilton and Stampone, 2013). ...
... Therefore, as the opportunities for individuals to witness extreme weather events increase, we encourage researchers to utilize a longitudinal and/or experimental design that allow stronger assessments of causality, as studies using such designs are scarce (e.g., Myers et al., 2013;Sobkow et al., 2017). For example, experimental studies could manipulate participants' experience with extreme events in game-like settings (Sobkow et al., 2017) or priming of heat-related cognitions (Joireman et al., 2010). ...
Global climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as heatwaves, droughts, and flooding. This is the primary way many individuals experience climate change, which has led researchers to investigate the influence of personal experience on climate change concern and action. However, existing evidence is still limited and in some cases contradictory. At the same time, behavioral decision research has highlighted the importance of pre-existing values and beliefs in shaping how individuals experience changes in environmental conditions. This is in line with theories of motivated reasoning, which suggest that people interpret and process information in a biased manner to maintain their prior beliefs. Yet, the evidence for directional motivated reasoning in the context of climate change beliefs has recently been questioned. In the current paper, we critically review the literature on the interrelationships between personal experience of local weather anomalies, extreme weather events and climate change beliefs. Overall, our review shows that there is some evidence that local warming can generate climate change concern, but the capacity for personal experience to promote action may rely upon the experience first being attributed to climate change. Rare extreme weather events will likely have limited impact on judgments and decisions unless they have occurred recently. However, even recent events may have limited impact among individuals who hold strong pre-existing beliefs rejecting the reality of climate change. We identify limitations of existing research and suggest directions for future work.
... In other words, the framing of these experiences might have a key role to play. For example, in their study, Joireman et al. (2010) primed participants with words either neutral or related to heat before surveying them on their climate change belief and experience [19]. Participants primed with heat-related words were significantly more likely to have noticed signs of global warming and to believe in global warming. ...
... In other words, the framing of these experiences might have a key role to play. For example, in their study, Joireman et al. (2010) primed participants with words either neutral or related to heat before surveying them on their climate change belief and experience [19]. Participants primed with heat-related words were significantly more likely to have noticed signs of global warming and to believe in global warming. ...
... As defined by Teovanovic (2019), the "Anchoring effect refers to a systematic influence of initially presented numerical values on subsequent judgments of uncertain quantities, even when presented numbers are obviously arbitrary and therefore unambiguously irrelevant" [20]. Joireman and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that participants initially presented with high values in relation to global warming were more likely to believe that global warming was currently happening and more willing to pay to mitigate global warming compared to participants who were initially presented with lower values in relation to global warming [19]. ...
As coastal communities around the globe contend with the impacts of climate change including coastal hazards such as sea level rise and more frequent coastal storms, educating stakeholders and the general public has become essential in order to adapt to and mitigate these risks. Communicating SLR and other coastal risks is not a simple task. First, SLR is a phenomenon that is abstract as it is physically distant from many people; second, the rise of the sea is a slow and temporally distant process which makes this issue psychologically distant from our everyday life. Virtual reality (VR) simulations may offer a way to overcome some of these challenges, enabling users to learn key principles related to climate change and coastal risks in an immersive, interactive, and safe learning environment. This article first presents the literature on environmental issues communication and engagement; second, it introduces VR technology evolution and expands the discussion on VR application for environmental literacy. We then provide an account of how three coastal communities have used VR experiences developed by multidisciplinary teams—including residents—to support communication and community outreach focused on SLR and discuss their implications.
... Perceptions and behaviors can vary during heatwave events, and people are not necessarily consistent in their actions on similarly hot days that do not occur during an extended heatwave (Lam et al., 2018). Interestingly, exposure to, and experience of, heat can also influence beliefs about global warming (Joireman et al., 2010) and the belief that one has experienced climate change personally , which in turn may influence behavior. ...
... Aforementioned study which manipulated photographs of a university campus to show different weather conditions (a "cold prime" and "warm prime") found that imagery was able to influence beliefs in global warming-however, the effects were dependent on individuals' levels of environmental concern (Joireman et al., 2010). Viewing "unseasonably cold" photographs led to significantly lower belief in "global warming" among participants low in environmental concern, while the warm prime had a polarizing effect depending on low versus high environmental concern. ...
Heat risks, such as those associated with heatwaves, are increasing in frequency, severity, and duration due to climate change. The ways in which people around the globe perceive and respond to heat risks are now of great importance to reduce a range of negative health outcomes. A growing body of literature aims to assess the factors that influence people's behaviors in relation to heat risks. This research can inform better interventions, such as improved communications approaches, that attempt to facilitate adaptive behavioral responses to such risks. This review focuses on how insights from behavioral and attitudinal studies about heat risk responses can inform communication approaches. These insights are organized into three key themes: (1) Behaviors—What types of actions can be taken by people, and what evidence is there for adaptive behavior? (2) Antecedents—Which individual and contextual factors can influence people's behaviors? (3) Communications—How can existing insights be better integrated into interventions? Aspects of communication, including the role of message characteristics, messenger, and imagery, are discussed, with examples of messages and narratives that target influential antecedents of adaptive responses to heat risks. The paper makes three important contributions. First, it organizes literature on the antecedents and behavioral responses to heat risk; second, it provides a typology of the range of heat risk behaviors; and, third, it discusses how antecedents can be integrated into communication interventions. The review concludes with a proposed agenda for research, highlighting the need for substantial testing and evaluation of heat risk communication, applying insights from the literature.
This article is categorized under: Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Communication
Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Behavior Change and Responses
... Recent research demonstrates that personal experience and vulnerability to climate change affect public opinion. Exposure to symptoms of climate change such as warmer temperatures, extreme weather, and natural hazards are potentially associated with increased belief in the existence of climate change (Deryugina, 2013;Druckman, 2015;Egan and Mullin, 2012;Joireman, Barnes Truelove and Duell, 2010;Konisky, Hughes and Kaylor, 2016;Zaval et al., 2014), although the duration of these effects might be limited (Druckman and Shafranek, 2016;Konisky, Hughes and Kaylor, 2016). ...
... First, flood experience could influence attitudes about climate change harm. In particular, recent experience of floods could increase the acknowledgement of climate change harm in affected communities (Deryugina, 2013;Druckman, 2015;Egan and Mullin, 2012;Joireman, Barnes Truelove and Duell, 2010;Konisky, Hughes and Kaylor, 2016;Zaval et al., 2014). Flood experience could lead to changes in attitudes about climate change harm as the amount of damage increases (Thistlethwaite et al., 2018). ...
Despite increasing evidence of the effects of climate change and scientific consensus about its threat, significant political barriers to climate action remain in the US. American public opinion about climate change is generally perceived as stable and sharply divided along partisan lines. However, less is known about the relationship between flood sensitivity and public opinion about climate change. Combining the ND-GAIN Urban Adaptation Assessment data of American cities with public opinion data from the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, this paper demonstrates the positive association between flood sensitivity and beliefs about climate change, risk perceptions, and support for climate action. These results have important implications for the understanding of public opinion about climate change, suggesting that flood sensitivity shapes perceptions of climate change. The results also have important implications for advocates of political action, suggesting that making flood sensitivity salient could help mobilize public support for climate action.
... Relevant to the current study is the so-called anchoring effect, which can be seen as motivational-free information, and which we use to study how extrinsic information influences tradeoffs. The anchoring effect is an extensively studied cognitive phenomenon, demonstrated in a variety of domains, such as general knowledge (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995), age estimation (Langeborg and Eriksson, 2016), payment (Jung et al., 2016), real estate evaluation (Northcraft and Neale, 1987), and estimation global warming (Joireman et al., 2010; for a review on the anchoring effect, see Furnham and Boo, 2011). In an anchoring task, participants first make a comparative judgment to a presented question, e.g., Did the Roman Emperor Julius Caesar weigh more or less than 70 pounds? ...
... Similarly, previous studies have shown that high environmental concern is related to pro-environmental behavior, e.g., willingness to reduce household energy consumption (Steg et al., 2005). People with positive attitudes toward the nature and the environment have also been found to be willing to pay higher taxes, higher prices on products and services (Joireman et al., 2010) as well as willing to sacrifice spare time or money for the environment (Kuhlemeier et al., 1999). Further, Huffman et al. (2014) studied recycling and found a significant interaction between anthropocentrism (e.g., selfcontainment from nature) and recycling attitudes. ...
One of the today’s greatest challenges is to adjust our behavior so that we can avoid a major climate disaster. To do so, we must make sacrifices for the sake of the environment. The study reported here investigates how anchors (extrinsic motivational-free information) and normative messages (extrinsic motivational information) influence people’s tradeoffs between travel time and carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions in the context of car travel and whether any interactions with environmental concern (an intrinsic motivational factor) can be observed. In this study, people received either a CO 2 , health or no normative message together with either a high anchor, a low anchor, or no anchor. People that received both a high anchor and a CO 2 emission normative message were willing to travel for a longer time than those that only received a high anchor. If a low anchor was presented, no differences in willingness to travel for a longer time were found between the three different conditions of normative message groups, i.e., CO 2 normative message, health normative message, or no normative message. People with higher concern for the environment were found to be willing to travel for a longer time than those with lower concern for the environment. Further, this effect was strongest when a high anchor was presented. These results suggest that anchors and normative messages are among the many factors that can influence people’s tradeoffs between CO 2 emission and travel time, and that various factors may have to be combined to increase their influence over pro-environmental behavior and decisions.
... Research investigating the impact of local temperature perceptions on climate change beliefs has so far focused on the high and low ends of the temperature scale, revealing that belief in climate change increases when temperatures are perceived as being warmer or colder than usual (Hamilton and Stampone, 2013;Joireman et al., 2010;Kirilenko et al., 2015;Li et al., 2011;Sisco et al., 2017;Zaval et al., 2014). These studies have privileged a long-term perspective when defining a "normal" climate, frequently relying on deviations from a 30-year reference period (Howe et al., 2013;Kirilenko et al., 2015). ...
... Independently of the effects of short-term temperature volatility on climate change twitter activity, our findings also revealed that high and low weekly mean temperatures increase public attention to climate change. This finding relates to what researchers refer to the local warming effect, where belief in climate change increases when temperatures are perceived as being warmer or colder than usual (Hamilton and Stampone, 2013;Joireman et al., 2010;Kirilenko et al., 2015;Li et al., 2011;Sisco et al., 2017;Zaval et al., 2014). By conjointly tracking the development of these two effects over time between 2014 and 2017, we demonstrate that warmer and colder temperatures contributed to public attention toward climate change across the whole measurement period, but that local volatility contributed only from 2016 onwards. ...
Variability in local weather patterns has long been suggested as a major barrier impeding laypeople from recognizing long-term climate trends. However, as humans are able to detect and interpret rapid signal fluctuations, it seems psychologically plausible to assume that they are able to integrate short-term variations of weather variables into their mental representations of climate change. Using a combined analysis of social media and weather station data, here we investigated the impact of the short-term volatility of local temperature on climate change-related tweets from 2014 to 2017. We found a nonlinear hockey stick relationship between weekly temperature volatility and climate change-related tweets, a volatility rise of 1 °C corresponds to an 82% increase in climate change tweets when volatility is above 3.5 °C. This volatility effect was observed from 2016 onwards, suggesting a recent change in people’s mental representations of climate change. This study provides empirical evidence illustrating that in the public mind, climate change may not be represented as a mere temperature increase any more, but as a disruption of the climate system in general.
... The vast majority of relevant existing inquiries have used cross-sectional data that were collected only after an extreme weather event occurred (Spence et al., 2011;Haden et al., 2012;Niles et al., 2013). Second, previous studies on the topic have focused principally on personal experiences among the general public (Joireman et al., 2010;Li et al., 2011;Goebbert et al., 2012;Myers et al., 2013;Shao, 2016;Howe et al., 2019;Gärtner and Schoen, 2021). Only a few have focused on professionals whose business choices and performance outcomes are weathersensitive (Carlton et al., 2016). ...
... Further, the mean of psychological distance is 2.171 (the highest score is 5), indicating that individuals have relatively strong and close perceptions of climate change, which is different from previous studies, most of which believe that climate change is manifested as (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006;Loy and Spence 2020). This may be due to the fact that extreme temperature changes in recent years have influenced people's perceptions of climate change (Joireman et al. 2010). Individuals have a clearer and more accurate understanding of the phenomenon of climate change after comprehensive consideration of various factors (such as temperature changes or changes in weather patterns). ...
Promoting climate change communication is an effective way to raise awareness of carbon neutrality and thus promote low-carbon behavior among the public. In this study, a model with risk perception as the independent variable, psychological distance and environmental values as mediating variables, and climate change communication behavior as the dependent variable was constructed. Results show that: (1) different from most previous studies, individuals’ psychological distance to climate change is relatively close. (2) Psychological distance and environmental values play a chain mediating role in the relationship between risk perception and climate change communication behavior. (3) Compared with offline climate communication, the public tends to communicate and obtain climate change information through online channels. (4) Women, middle-aged, individuals with higher education level, and higher income level have stronger willingness to engage in climate change. Finally, in conjunction with the findings, corresponding policy implications were proposed.
... However, reviews on the determinants of climate change beliefs concluded that the experience of extreme weather events did not consistently predict climate change beliefs, but the variation in local temperature did (Hornsey et al., 2016). For example, people have been found to be more concerned about climate change on hot days compared to cold days, or when exposed to heat primes (Bohr, 2017;Joireman et al., 2010;Lewandowski et al., 2012;Risen and Critcher, 2011;Schuldt and Roh, 2014;Zaval et al., 2014). Furthermore, this finding was particularly prevalent in many African and Asian countries, where perception of local temperature change was the strongest predictor of climate change risk perceptions (Lee et al., 2015). ...
... These are not natural weather phenomena. These natural disasters are the effects of the problems caused by the negative effects of humans on the environment, and perhaps the most serious of these problems, global warming, has been put on the agenda (Erten, 2012;Erten, 2015;Joireman et al., 2010;Pinto & Totti, 2020). ...
Global warming is the most serious problem of our age. The most permanent measure to be taken against this problem is to ensure that individuals receive an effective and well-equipped education, free from misconceptions, which are obstacles to the efficiency of education. In this study, it is aimed to develop a four-stage diagnostic test that can reveal the misconceptions of pre-service science teachers about global warming. The sample of the study, in which the survey approach was used, consists of 401 pre-service teachers studying in the science teaching department at different universities in Turkey. The results show that the test is a valid and reliable measurement tool that can be used to determine the misconceptions, scientific knowledge, and lack of knowledge about global warming. In the study, the factor with the highest percentage of pre-service science teachers’ scientific knowledge and misconceptions was the consequences of global warming, while the factor with the highest percentage of lack of knowledge was calculated as the greenhouse effect factor. It is recommended to use the test to determine the current situation regarding the level and areas where the misconceptions of individuals are concentrated to improve the missing or faulty areas in the science curriculum. Keywords: conceptual learning, environmental misconceptions, four-tier diagnostic test, global warming
... Within this context, exposure to natural disasters is reported to have a long-lasting and pronounced impact (Elder, 2018). In line with this reasoning, previous studies demonstrate that local weather conditions can generate attention for climate change (Joireman et al., 2010;Egan and Mullin, 2012;Zaval et al., 2014;Sisco et al., 2017;Rudman et al., 2013) and may even trigger a behavioral shift towards more sustainable choices (See, for instance, Akerlof et al. (2013); Lowe et al. (2006); Zanocco et al. (2018); Choi et al. (2020)). While it is generally accepted that EWEs are a salient manifestation of the consequences of anthropogenic cli-mate change (Bazaz et al., 2018), only few papers investigate the role of EWEs specifically (Sisco et al., 2017). ...
While the drastic physical impacts of climate change and related extreme weather events (EWEs) are increasingly apparent, little is known about long-term behavioral consequences of climate change-related experiences. In this study, we investigate whether extreme weather events experienced by CEOs during their early lives induce a systematic shift towards more climate-friendly professional decisions. Our sample covers decisions of 447 U.S. born Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) between 1991 and 2018. The results of our study reveal a significant positive effect of early-life EWE experiences on sustainability-related and climate-related corporate policies during a CEO's tenure. These findings are robust to different proxies and model specifications. Our results provide evidence that extreme weather experiences have long-lasting effects on climate-related attitudes and thereby moderate the willingness to act with respect to climate change.
... A number of studies have examined if exposure to extreme heat shifts individuals' climate change beliefs and policy preferences, though results are mixed. Evidence for a "local warming" effect has emerged in recent years, suggesting that elevated temperature in the short term (daily to monthly) is associated with increased concern about climate change (Joireman et al., 2010;Li et al., 2011). For example, Hamilton and Stampone (2013) merged 5000 state-level telephone interview data with temperature indicators. ...
Issuing early heat warnings and enhancing public climate change awareness and engagement are important local policy options for heat wave adaptation. Here, we used a laboratory experiment to inform major gaps in making these two policies, including setting proper thresholds for heat alerting systems and figuring out how heat experience shifts individuals’ climate change perceptions. Taking Nanjing as a case city, we simulated a heat event by increasing temperature from 25 °C to 40 °C (70% relative humidity) in a climate chamber and recruited 58 young adults as participants. Physical thermal responses, including skin temperature and heart rate variability, were recorded using portable devices. Subjective thermal perceptions, climate change belief and psychological distance were measured by self-rated scales before, during, and after the exposure. We found physiological responses were correlated with subjective thermal perceptions and showed sharp rises from 30° to 35°C, presenting aggravated thermal discomfort. Moreover, heat exposure increased climate change belief and reduced psychological distance significantly. After the experiment, follow-up surveys showed participants had a short memory of the heat exposure, but daily temperature variations still predicted climate change belief. The findings suggest in our case city, the current threshold (35 °C) for heat warnings may not be safe enough. Local authorities should consider prolonged periods of hot weather with temperature between 30 and 35 °C. Due to strong links between heat experience and climate change perceptions, we encourage to take this “window of opportunity” when heat events occur to communicate climate risks and enact post-event policy changes.
... Climate parameters under investigation have included long-term climatic patterns and trends (Shao, 2017) as well as seasonal, monthly and daily temperature anomalies relative to a statistically constructed baseline (Bergquist & Warshaw, 2019;Bohr, 2017;Deryugina, 2013;Marlon et al., 2021;Shao, 2016). A related strand of literature has produced ample evidence for a link between climate change beliefs and short-run weather fluctuations, which has been termed the "local warming effect" (Damsbo-Svendsen, 2020; Joireman et al., 2010;Zaval et al., 2014). The local warming effect refers to the phenomenon that individuals are more likely to believe in the existence of global warming if interviewed on a hot day, in contrast to cold days. ...
Human behaviour lies at the heart of the climate crisis. Not only is it the primary cause of global climate change and environmental degradation, but also key to responding and adapting to them. Tackling the climate crisis thus requires a complete understanding of human behaviour. So far, however, environmental policies have largely been guided by the canonical economic model of human behaviour, based on the idea of ‘homo economicus’, neglecting important behavioural aspects of the relationship between human behaviour and the environment. This thesis examines some of the complex interrelations between human behaviour and the environment through a behavioural environmental economics lens, drawing on recent insights from behavioural economics and psychology. The first part of this thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) focuses on the impact of environmental stressors on human behaviour, attitudes and beliefs. The second part (Chapters 3 and 4) examines the impact of policy interventions to foster more environmentally sustainable behaviour. All chapters adopt an experimental or quasi-experimental approach to provide causal insights and formulate robust policy recommendations. Chapter 1 develops and tests a novel experimental design, that exploits natural discontinuities in air pollution episodes in Beijing, China to experimentally isolate the causal effect of acute air pollution on social decision-making and economic preferences. Chapter 2 utilises data from a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of extreme weather events on climate change attitudes and pro-environmental behaviours. Chapter 3 uses an online ‘message framing’ experiment to explore whether appealing to ‘warm glow’ motives can encourage voluntary pro-environmental behaviour, relative to other common climate change communication strategies. Chapter 4 presents the results of a large-scale field experiment conducted at five university cafeterias, exploring whether carbon footprint labels can promote more sustainable food choices.
... For example, abnormal temperatures affect attitudes about climate change in the short-term (Borick and Rabe, 2014;Deryugina, 2013;Egan and Mullin, 2012;Hamilton and Stampone, 2013;Joireman et al., 2010;Kaufmann et al., 2017;Zaval et al., 2014). van der Linden (2015) finds that experiential factors explain significantly more variance in climate change risk perception than cognitive or socio-demographic characteristics. ...
Public support of climate policies crucially depends on climate change beliefs. Here we analyze the effects of natural disaster experience on the belief in the existence of climate change. The primary data source is a panel survey covering 22,251 observations from 11,194 geo-located households collected in Germany between 2012 and 2015, combined with satellite imagery of a major flood event in 2013. We find that flood experience had a significant positive effect on the beliefs in the existence of climate change for those respondents living close to the flooded area. However, the effect decreases sharply with distance. We further show that this overall effect is driven by those respondents who already believed in climate change before the flood – they saw their belief confirmed by their experience. In contrast, spatial proximity to the flood had no measurable effect on skeptics. These results imply that climate skeptics may not be influenced by the experience of natural disasters at their doorsteps.
... Each individual's perception was taken into account where different factors were considered, such as changes in temperatures or shifts in weather patterns that were then co-related with different variables, i.e., belief that humans are responsible, climate change is an immediate threat and worry about this global issue. Another study found that outdoor temperatures influenced people's perceptions about climate change [26]. This research supported a causal relationship between personal experience related to climate change and the belief in anthropogenic causes of climate change. ...
Climate change contributes to the increasing frequency and severity of floods around the globe. Developing countries are being disproportionally affected. In 2010, Pakistan witnessed one of the worst floods in its history. One-fifth of the country was severely affected, leading to major economic losses and casualties. Thus, it is imperative to understand climate change and flood risk perception for designing flood risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies. This study examines flood risk perception and psychological distance to climate change of rural communities along the Indus and Chenab rivers in Muzaffargarh district, Pakistan. Flood risk perception was measured using three main components, i.e., awareness about floods, worry (about floods), and preparedness. Psychological distance to climate change was quantified using five dimensions, i.e., psychological, geographic, social, temporal, and uncertainty. Yamane sampling method was used, and 365 samples were collected. The data was collected using household surveys from rural communities. Descriptive statistics, chi-square test, ANOVA-test, and Pearson's correlation were performed. Results indicate that overall flood risk perception and psychological distance to climate change was moderate in a high flood risk area. A negative correlation was also observed between uncertainty and worry. Regression analyses indicate a strong positive influence of homeownership on flood risk perception and the converse impact on the psychological distance to climate change. This study can help integrate the philosophies of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. The paper also highlights the need to improve risk communication strategies to help people understand climate change and its impacts, adopt precautionary measures, and reduce flood risks.
... In the case of climate change, it refers to whether farmers understand the changing temperature and rainfall patterns over time and respond to the negative impact through adaptation (Madison, 2006). Experience with local weather may also influence global warming beliefs (Joireman et al., 2010;Li et al., 2011). ...
Communities’ perception of climate change must be integrated with research information to improve their adaptive capacity successfully. Thus, to propose appropriate adaptation options to the specific localities, understanding the levels of perception of rural communities to climate change and variability is crucial. This study aims to capture the rural communities’ perception of climate change and its determinants in Dejen district, Nile basin of Ethiopia. Cross-sectional socio-economic and time series climatic data were used. Stratified and snowball sampling techniques were employed to select a sample of 398 households. Chi-square analysis was carried out at p≤0.05. The majority (65.7%) of households had information about climate change before this study survey. Age, farming experience, income, the number of relatives, access to weather information, farmer to farmer access, and government experts’ extension services had a significant effect on the majority of climatic variables perception of households. The households’ perception of climate change was in line with results of climate data analysis. The chi-square analysis test of hypothesis shows gender has no significant effect on the perception of climate change. The implication is that all social groups in the study area perceived that there are changes in climate.
... However, uncertainty could remain in the causal connection between the event and climate change. Studies have found that personally experiencing anomalous or extreme weather events makes people more concerned about climate change (Akerlof et al. 2013;Donner and Mcdaniels 2013;Li et al. 2011;Joireman et al. 2010;Hamilton and Stampone 2013;Egan and Mullin 2012;Zaval et al. 2014). Weather can even impact major consumer purchases in ways that contradict rational expected utility theory. ...
... A number of researchers have made the relationship between the levels of perception and resulting concern about climate change and local temperatures Joireman, Truelove and Duell, 2010;Li, Johnson and Zaval, 2011;Akerlof et al., 2013;Howe et al., 2013). This has been demonstrated with studies proving that civil society are more likely to believe that climate change is occurring when local temperatures are warming beyond the normal (Krosnick et al., 2006;Egan and Mullian, 2010;Li, Johnson and Zaval, 2011). ...
Despite anthropogenically induced climate change being viewed by many as one of the greatest societal challenges of the 21st century, discernment from the public, especially young people, remains under explored within the mitigation debate. This is surprising given research demonstrating the potential for collective action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions nationally through individual behaviour changes. Young people are those in society that will live with the effects of future climate change the longest but are typically overlooked in forward planning. Consequently, this PhD thesis aims to provide detailed understanding of intersecting perception of climate change and levels of engagement being undertaken to explore how people, particularly the young, are reacting to climate change.
The nexus of these themes was explored using a mixed method approach through the use of primary data collection, including interviews (N = 5), two national surveys (N = 1,134, survey 1 and N = 1,700, survey 2) and a participatory workshop using the Yonmenkaigi System Method approach (N = 16). In addition, this primary data is cross-analysed through the use of secondary data (BEIS and Eurobarometer) to extrapolate a more comprehensive picture based on the case of the United Kingdom.
The research found that in the United Kingdom (and implicitly elsewhere) there are high-levels of perception of climate change as a major concern, especially amongst young people, and more extensively since 2013 when a social tipping point around this issue occurred. This has occurred despite of the ‘finite pool of worry’, a theory suggesting a likely plateauing or decline in concern when other crises start to predominate in people’s day to day, such as during the aftermath of the Brexit vote, COVID-19 and associated economic uncertainty.
In terms of youth and perception, this thesis found that whilst young people were the most likely to believe a climate change was happening and most likely to view that climate change is a serious problem, they were one of the least likely group of people to be able to determine what impacts were already being felt within the United Kingdom due to climate change.
Although there is this high level of belief in climate change amongst young people and civil society more widely, the level of engagement through mitigation strategies varies. Those strategies that are behavioural are generally undertaken, especially among the youngest in society and those who view climate change as serious. However, this applies when there is substantive investment. This demonstrates that if the government wants to implement significant change through the will of society to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, investment for those on low incomes is needed to enable the requisite behaviour change needed. This research also confirms a view, as iterated by many of its respondents, that education on climate change within the United Kingdom is lacking; application of participatory methods, such as the Yonmenkaigi System Method, demonstrated how education would progress the interconnection between perception and engagement.
This study recognises complexity involved in the interconnection between perception, engagement and reaction. However, it is argued that if social media generates fake news especially around climate change, then young people who are the most personal users of social media should be the most exposed. The results show that they are the most believing of climate change and that it is likely social media self-reinforces consistent beliefs through echo chambers.
Into the current lacuna of action by the government during this PhD research period, climate activism groups of ‘Extinction Rebellion’ and ‘School Strikes for Climate Change’ materialised. It is argued that the actions of these groups are a form of ‘post-normal engagement’, where people apply their understanding, and that arises through a lack of facilitation of ‘post-normal science’ in relation to climate change within the United Kingdom. It was found that the majority of survey respondents were overall supportive of “Extinction Rebellion”. In addition, it was found that there was also a majority of support for the children striking for climate change and the mass civil disobedience that “Extinction Rebellion” called for in London in April 2019, though at varying levels across the demographic. However, respondents were generally not willing to themselves join future “Extinction Rebellion” protests. Women, younger people and left-leaning voters were more likely to support these two types of protests. The monitoring of the demographic composition of climate protests in terms of perception and engagement drivers helps to assess the nature of likely reactions and resistance to future climate policy including that associated with the content of COP26 being hosted in the UK during 2021. However, the implementation of a post-normal climate change science might help reduce the need for climate activism.
... A constructivist approach, on the other hand, may persuade students to accept the scientific consensus on climate change by relating scientific observations to their personal experiences. Recent studies (Egan & Mullin, 2012;Akerlof et al., 2013;Joireman et al., 2010;Myers et al., 2012) show that personal experiences of climate change have a significant impact on belief in global warming. ...
En este artículo se presenta un estudio de caso dentro del marco de la pedagogía constructivista del curso libre de orientación a la física Science, Techonology, and Society. Ponemos especial atención en los desafíos que conlleva el uso de la pedagogía constructivista en la enseñanza de la ciencia, una materia cuya filosofía es inherentemente realista. Por otro lado, nuestro estudio de caso demuestra que un enfoque realista de la pedagogía no es siempre la forma más efectiva de enseñar ciencia. Siendo críticas con la filosofía constructivista, reconocemos que un enfoque constructivista de la pedagogía puede ser efectivo para la educación científica, especialmente en la medida en que ésta queda sujeta a cierto realismo. El estudio de caso consiste en tres preguntas realizadas a 234 alumnos de grado durante dos semestres consecutivos. Sus respuestas muestran el sesgo individual y cultural, así como la escasa formación en matemáticas que pueden impedir que se sientan atraídos por el pensamiento científico. El estudio de caso proporciona apoyo para poner en práctica una pedagogía constructivista enfocada a una formación científica realista, y pone de manifiesto los conflictos cognitivos que enfrentan algunos estudiantes cuando las creencias previas difieren de lo que está siendo enseñado en el aula como una realidad universal. Nuestro análisis de las respuestas explora la labor colaborativa que puede establecerse entre la filosofía realista y la pedagogía constructivista.
... Understanding the drivers of changes in public concern and support for Green parties is important to identify the mechanisms underlying transformations towards a greener economy and more sustainable society. Previous studies showed that experiences of extreme climate events and changes are positively associated with climate change belief and environmental concern (Deryugina, 2013;Howe et al., 2013;Bohr, 2017;Joireman et al., 2010;Konisky et al., 2016;Sisco et al., 2017;van der Linden, 2015;Arıkan and Günay, 2021;Kvaloy et al., 2012;Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). However, the overall size of the reported effects is rather small and depends on local conditions as found in a recent meta-analysis and systematic review of the literature (Hornsey et al., 2016;Howe et al., 2019). ...
... Numerous studies have found personal experiences of various sorts can weigh in the formation of opinions, perceptions and policy preferences. For example, recent studies find that personal experiences with local weather can affect attitudes on global warming and preferred mitigation strategies (Egan and Mullin 2012;Li, Johnson, and Zaval 2011;Zaval et al. 2014;Joireman, Truelove, and Duell 2010;Hamilton and Stampone 2013;Howe and Leiserowitz 2013). Experiencing stressful events, such as terrorism, migration, and pervasive corruption, can increase psychological stress, which, in turns, affect political attitudes toward aggressors (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009;Klašnja, Tucker, and Deegan-Krause 2016). ...
Sexual harassment and gender discrimination have become more salient in U.S. politics in recent years due, in part, to the #MeToo movement. We conducted two surveys on Californians in the 2018 primary and general election. We find that experiencing either of these types of interactions shaped how Independent voters evaluated political figures but had a smaller effect on Democratic and Republican party identifiers. On average, experiencing gender discrimination has stronger effects on the evaluation of political figures than sexual harassment. Both experiences played out differently for Independent men and Independent women. The boost in female support for Democratic candidates was counterbalanced by a backlash vote from Independent men who reported they experienced gender discrimination, aiding the President and hurting Democratic political figures. This suggests that the pro-Kavanaugh backlash had deeper roots in male resentment towards the perceived preferential treatment of women, especially in work environments.
... However, uncertainty could remain in the causal connection between the event and climate change. Studies have found that personally experiencing anomalous or extreme weather events makes people more concerned about climate change (Akerlof et al. 2013;Donner and Mcdaniels 2013;Li et al. 2011;Joireman et al. 2010;Hamilton and Stampone 2013;Egan and Mullin 2012;Zaval et al. 2014). Weather can even impact major consumer purchases in ways that contradict rational expected utility theory. ...
Globally, investment in climate change mitigation has lagged far behind the optimal level as estimated by a large body of science. This lag may be caused, in part, by the psychological distance between decision-makers today and those who will likely experience the worst impacts of climate change in the future. This psychological distance reduces the salience of those impacts in today’s decisions. In a randomized control experiment using a letter-to-the-future treatment and a climate change essay treatment, I find that compared to a control group, both writing tasks that focus attention on the future risks of climate change increase the willingness to donate to climate change mitigation efforts. I also find evidence that for parents and grandparents, writing a letter to one’s child or grandchild increases the salience of existing concerns about how climate change may impact one’s children. These findings contribute to the understanding of how to bridge the psychological distance between choices and consequences for climate change mitigation and have implications for a wide range of decisions from personal health choices to retirement savings.
... For example, climate change beliefs are influenced by irrelevant information, such as knowledge of today's particular temperature (Zaval et al., 2014), the framing of questions in terms of whether the wording refers to "global warming" or "climate change" (Schuldt et al., 2011) and whether temperature scales are in Celsius or Fahrenheit (Chan, 2018). In addition, climate change beliefs are susceptible to anchoring effects, such as having first been primed with heat-related words (Joireman et al., 2010). ...
People’s belief that one or more environmentally friendly items that are added to a set of conventional items can reduce the total environmental impact of these items (the negative footprint illusion) could lead to unwanted environmental consequences. An averaging bias seems to underpin this illusion: people make their estimates based on the average of the environmental impact produced by the items rather than the total sum of their environmental impact. We report four studies that used various priming manipulations to explore whether people’s preoccupation to think in terms of an average can be eliminated by fostering a summative mindset. The results demonstrate that participants avoid succumbing to the negative footprint illusion when the critical judgment task is preceded by tasks that engender a summation judgment. Our evidence indicates that the negative footprint illusion can be tempered when a primed concept (summation) is used adaptively on subsequent judgments, thereby correcting for bias in environmental judgments.
... On the other hand, interactions between environmental attitudes and situational prompts to promote pro-environmental behavior are not always easily observed (Moussaoui, Desrichard, & Milfont, 2020). The longer travel time answers among participants with higher environmental concern are in line with previous research showing that a biospheric value orientation contributes to the explanation of personal norms concerning moral obligations to reduce household energy consumption (Steg, Dreijerink, & Abrahamse, 2005) and that willingness to pay (higher taxes, higher prices on products and services) increases with positive attitudes toward nature and the environment (Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010). ...
If human behavior is to become more sustainable, people will have to be willing to sacrifice personal gains and benefits for the sake of sustainability. Decisions will have to involve making tradeoffs between what is good for the self and what is good for sustainability. In the present paper, we studied the psychology of such tradeoffs in the context of a carbon dioxide (CO2) emission versus travel time tradeoff task. The experiment investigated how intrinsic motivational factors (environmental concern), extrinsic motivational information (a normative message) and extrinsic motivation-neutral information (anchoring points) influence these tradeoffs. The results revealed that extrinsic factors interact in their effects on tradeoffs such that participants were willing to travel for a longer time for the benefit of less CO2 emissions when they were externally motivated by a normative message, but only when this motivational emphasis was combined with a high anchoring point. Furthermore, this interaction was particularly strong in participants with high environmental concern. We conclude that extrinsic and intrinsic motivational factors interact in their effect on making people willing to accept personal losses in exchange for sustainability gains and that these motivational factors may have to be combined with further extrinsic information to influence decisions.
Research has demonstrated that members of the public recognize anomalous weather patterns, and that subjective perceptions of the weather are related to beliefs about the occurrence of climate change. Yet despite two decades of scholarship and dozens of studies, inconsistent and insufficient data have made it difficult to credibly identify the causal impact of objective experiences on perceptions, and the impact of perceptions on beliefs regarding climate change occurrence. Here, we overcome these limitations by collecting and analyzing data from a 5-y panel survey of 2,500 individuals in Oklahoma, a US state that is highly divided on questions about climate change. Our findings indicate that the relationship between local weather anomalies and climate change beliefs is heavily dependent on baseline beliefs about whether climate change was occurring. For people who did not believe in climate change in the initial survey in our series, perceptions of anomalously hot and dry seasons shifted their beliefs towards the occurrence of anthropogenic climate change, whereas their perceptions of anomalously cool and wet seasons shifted their beliefs away from anthropogenic climate change. This relationship was not present among people who believed that climate change was occurring at the beginning of the study; their perceptions of seasonal temperature and precipitation anomalies had no effect on their beliefs about climate change. These patterns have substantial implications for the evolution of public beliefs about climate change.
Undergraduate biology educators strive to understand how to best teach students the concepts of climate change. The root of this understanding is the establishment of what students know about climate change. This research aims to describe undergraduate biology students’ conceptions of climate change and their argument practices and associated cognitive biases in how they think about the topic. We used qualitative conception interviews to obtain data from 26 American biology undergraduate students who predicted how climate change would affect a forested ecosystem after an average of 1° increase in Fahrenheit (0.5°C change) over 25 years. Through deductive coding, we found the majority of students’ predictions agreed with expert ideas. However, the students used various argument strategies (i.e., Reasoning and Cognitive Biases) in defending their choices, including Ecological Explanations, Observations, Anchoring, and Contrast Effects.
Understanding how personal experience of extreme weather events raises awareness and concern about climate change has important policy implications. It has repeatedly been argued that proximising climate change through extreme weather events holds a promising strategy to increase engagement with the issue and encourage climate change action. In this paper, we exploit geo-referenced panel data on climate change attitudes as well as natural variation in flood and heatwave exposure in England and Wales to estimate the causal effect of extreme weather events on climate change attitudes and environmental behaviours using a difference-in-differences matching approach. Our findings suggest that personal experience with both flooding and heatwaves significantly increases risk perception towards climate change impacts but has no effect on climate change concern or pro-environmental behaviour, on average. Moreover, the findings indicate that the effect of flooding on risk perception is highly localised and diminishes at greater distances. For heatwaves, we find that the effect on risk perception is driven by the recent salient summer heatwaves of 2018 and 2019. Having experienced both events also significantly increases climate change concern and pro-environmental behaviour, in addition to risk perception.
This book empirically tests, compares, and explains the effects of British and American legacy conservative press and far-right websites, on accordant political views and behavioural intentions.
Correspondingly, the 2016 Brexit Referendum and American Presidential election results are often attributed to the spread of fake news through social media, Russian Bots, and alt-right news websites. This has raised concerns about the impact of digital disinformation on democracy, as well as the rise of nativist parties and movements worldwide. However, this book argues that these causal attributions are largely based on unproven assumptions and deflect attention from the more influential and harmful role of traditional conservative media.
To support this argument, Leyva incorporates insights from various fields such as neurocognitive science, media-communication research, cross-cultural psychology, and sociology. Additionally, the book presents primary evidence from a series of experiments that examined the effects of candidate-related fake news and immigration coverage from both old and new media right-wing sources. These experiments focused on how such content influences anti-immigrant attitudes and voter preferences. By doing so, the book provides a nuanced and robustly tested theoretical account of how right-wing media affects political beliefs, sentiments, and practices at the neuronal level, and of how this can in turn negatively impact democratic multicultural societies.
Given its interdisciplinary approach, this book will be of interest to scholars in the social, behavioural, and cognitive sciences who are studying media psychology, online misinformation, authoritarian populism, political sociology, new media, and journalism.
The lack of stringent policies to avert climate change has increased the importance of effective and timely adaptation. Adequate adaptation is particularly important for agricultural communities in developing countries, which may most suffer the consequences of climate change. Evidence is still scarce on how people in the most vulnerable areas form climate change beliefs and whether such beliefs exhibit cognitive biases. Using survey data from rural households in Bangladesh together with a meteorological measure of excess dryness relative to historical averages, I study the effect of long-term average drought exposure and short-term deviations on beliefs about drought frequency and the interpretation of drought events. To explore how individuals interpret past droughts, I use an instrumental variable approach and investigate whether individual beliefs lead to asymmetric distortion of objective information. The results show that individuals recollect and overweight evidence tilted towards their prior beliefs, providing evidence of confirmation bias as a directional motivated reasoning mechanism. The findings highlight the need for models that account for behavioral factors and cognitive biases in the study of climate change beliefs for effective communication and adaptation policies.
The extent and complexity of climate change can hardly be described in a few words. However, for a large part of the scientific community, one thing is certain: the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions quickly. Yet, we are still emitting too much compared to the economically optimal path. This thesis studies the political economy of climate change and contains three essays to understand this so-called emission gap. Each chapter covers different parts of the political economy of climate change. In Chapter 2, we study the influence of migration on mitigation from a political economy perspective. We find a problematic mechanism that may lead to a socially inefficient mitigation level and a trapped population. Chapter 3 investigates the political economy of the German Climate Package and the commuting allowance. In contrast to Chapter 2, in Chapter 3, we identify a mechanism that allows the government to implement a higher mitigation level in the form of a carbon tax in the transport sector. Finally, in Chapter 4, we study the influence of weather on climate change concerns. One may ask how this is related to the political economy of climate change. However, we argue that climate change concerns can be seen as a proxy for the support of protection measures. If someone is very concerned about the consequences of climate change, it is more likely that he will support stricter climate protection laws. Compared to Chapters 2 and 3, where we use a partial equilibrium model within a political economy framework, in Chapter 4, we use German survey data to examine this question empirically.
Natural disasters can affect individuals’ views about the environment, especially when these events are extreme and experienced by people directly (locally). In one of the first comprehensive and systematic attempts, we explore whether a similar relationship exists transnationally – a cross‐border effect stemming from environmental disasters abroad on public opinion “at home.” Spatial analyses present robust evidence that people's environmental salience attitudes are substantially driven by disaster‐related deaths in nearby countries. It follows that environmental disasters cannot be treated as isolated incidents within state borders, but they rather have far‐reaching, transnational consequences on public opinion and, potentially, policy. Accordingly, this research adds to our understanding of environmental politics, public opinion, natural disasters, and diffusion effects. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
This article uses interview data with people who were once skeptical about climate change but have come to accept climate science to assess the factors that contribute to their shifts in perspectives. Our findings show two trajectories of change for skeptics, depending on the nature of their skepticism. For those who move from actively denying climate change, shifting beliefs about climate change occur via a profound need to reconcile what emerges as cognitive dissonance due to challenges to their religious identities. For skeptics who move from being unsure about climate change, moving to accept climate science happens through either encountering new information from a trusted source or personally observing the effects of climate change. This extends existing scholarship on the factors that contribute to changing minds on climate change.
Two studies examine the effects of temperature anomalies (relative to ten-year averages) on interest in and support for climate policies. Study 1 analyzes the impacts of local temperature anomalies on information acquisition, namely Google searches, about climate change and climate policies. We find strong evidence that temperature anomalies are associated with increased climate change information acquisition. Our results show that deviations from seasonal norms in both directions (i.e., temperatures higher or lower than expected) predict increased interest. Study 2 analyzes voting for Republican candidates, who in the timeframe of our data were not likely to support climate policies. Analysis of voting records from ten US midterm elections from 2002 to 2020 shows that greater local temperature anomalies are significantly associated with lower vote shares for Republican candidates.
The dissertation aims to map and analyse in detail the climate attitudes and behaviour of the Czech public. It is based on representative questionnaire surveys conducted in the Czech Republic. In the introductory chapter, the attitudes and behaviour of the Czech society regarding climate change are characterised, and their development over the last years is presented. The dissertation follows a research tradition that seeks to explore and describe relevant predictors of climate attitudes and behaviour at the individual level. The theoretical part of the thesis presents the theoretical background used in this research tradition and provides an overview of factors potentially influencing climate attitudes and behaviour. It summarises the existing knowledge on their influence on climate variables, based on a search of meta-analyses, review studies and analyses of international surveys. The empirical part of the thesis aims to identify and present the factors that most significantly influence the attitudes and behaviour of the Czech public in the field of climate change and to compare them with the findings of previous studies. The basis for its elaboration are data sets from two large-scale representative questionnaire surveys, Česká veřejnost a změna klimatu 2015 and České klima 2021. In each survey, predictors of ten selected climate variables were identified using regression analyses. The influence of sociodemographic variables on climate attitudes and behaviour is, with few exceptions, relatively weak and less consistent in the Czech Republic. As expected, there is a strong influence of environmental attitudes on most climate variables and also of basic climate attitudes on support for climate policies and pro-climate behaviour, which have not yet been explored in the context of Czech society. Compared to previous studies, several new potential predictors of climate variables were included in the regression analyses. The results show a positive effect of the amount of time that respondents spend in nature, media interest in the environment, the opinion that the Czech state should address problems that threaten the future, and a negative evaluation of the environment in the place of residence. On the contrary, the influence of a hedonistic attitude is significantly negative.
In the United States, people are deeply divided over the issue of climate change. Ideological and partisan divisions have been found to have a major influence on the way homebuyers evaluate flood risks to their homes and their neighborhoods. The survey reported in this book focused on the views of real estate agents, and their understanding of the way in which prospective homebuyers perceive flood risk related to sea-level rise. To put these responses into context, this chapter synthesizes some of the social science research about factors that affect risk perception, as well as the effectiveness of communication strategies that use salient, local and visual imagery.
This paper studies how extreme weather and natural disasters affect campaign contributions and elections. Weather events associated with climate change may influence these outcomes by leading voters to re-evaluate the incumbent politician’s environmental position. In a short-run analysis, we find that the number of online contributions to the Democratic Party increases in response to higher weekly temperature, with a larger effect in counties with more anti-environment incumbent politicians. In a medium-run analysis, we find that, when a natural disaster strikes, the election becomes more competitive if the incumbent leans more anti-environment: total campaign contributions increase for both candidates and the increase is skewed towards the challenger, the race is more likely to be contested, and the incumbent is less likely to be re-elected. These results suggest that extreme weather events carry a moderate electoral penalty for anti-environment incumbents during 1990–2012. This mechanism will likely play a more important role as the public awareness of climate change continues to increase.
Climate change has been positioned as one of the most severe environmental threats facing us today. To address climate change, enhancing climate change risk perception and reducing climate change inaction are both critical. However, little research has touched on the issue of whether climate change risk perception is linked to climate change inaction in a negative manner. Moreover, there is still much unknown about the complex process behind this relationship, and the boundary conditions of this process await clarification. To address these gaps in the literature, two studies were conducted to first confirm the possible negative association between climate change risk perception and climate change inaction and, second, explore through a parallel mediational model whether climate change belief and environmental efficacy mediate simultaneously the relation between climate change risk perception and climate change inaction. Finally, a moderated sequential mediational model was used to investigate whether climate change risk perception is associated with climate change inaction through the sequential mediation of climate change belief and environmental efficacy, and to clarify underlying boundary conditions by analyzing the moderation of mindfulness as well. The results showed that, as expected, higher levels of climate change risk perception were related to less climate change inaction, and this relation was mediated by enhanced climate change belief and heightened environmental efficacy in a sequential manner. Furthermore, the sequential mediating effect of climate change belief and heightened environmental efficacy was stronger among those who had a higher level of mindfulness. These findings advance the emerging climate change inaction research by revealing the underlying mechanism of climate change risk perception’ effect. Moreover, they extend the Domain-Context-Behavior (DCB) model and Gateway belief model (GBM). In practice, climate change education and climate change inaction interventions can be designed and implemented to nudge clean production, green supply chain and green consumption, which finally contributes to sustainable development and the ‘green transformation’ of society.
The purpose of this study is to determine the mental models of primary school students about the concept of environment. The research group consisted of 400 students, 219 girls and 181 boys, enrolling to the 3rd and 4th grade in a primary school located in İstanbul. The students were asked to draw the environment and explain the items they draw. Students’ drawings were converted into quantitative data and scored with Draw an Environment Test-Rubric. When the drawings were examined, it was found that there are 110 different items related to the concept of environment. These items include biotic elements such as humans, different kinds of animals and plants, as well as abiotic elements such as sun, cloud, rain and sea. It was seen that there are also elements of artificial environment such as houses, cars, schools, factories and roads. Mann-Whitney U Test was used in statistical comparisons to determine the difference between the total scores obtained from the drawings according to grade level and gender. While there was a significant difference between the scores of the 3rd and 4th grade students (MD3rd grade=189,46 n=200, MD4th grade =211,54 n=200, U=17792, p=.04), no significant difference was found in the comparisons made according to the gender (MDgirls=205,92 n=219, MDboys=193,94 n=181, U=18632,50, p=.29). The drawings showed that the majority of the students do not see humans as a part of the environment and they have unscientific and missing mental models about the environment.
In recent years, wildfires have ravaged the landscape in many Western American states, especially California. But will these horrific wildfire experiences increase public support for wildfire adaptation measures? We conducted an individual-level survey in California in 2019. Combining survey data with geocoded information about a respondent’s proximity to wildfire events and exposure to wildfire smoke, we assess whether respondents’ experiences increased support for several wildfire adaptation policies. We also control for party affiliation. We find that Californians generally oppose restrictive resilience policies and view the decision to take adaptive steps as a matter of personal choice. Republicans are generally more opposed than Democrats to spending public funds to incentivize resilience measures, but proximity to wildfires lessens their opposition to using public funds to encourage homeowners to upgrade their properties for increased protection from wildfires and encourage relocation to safer places. Although exposure to wildfire smoke is extensive and harmful to health, we found that its main impact on policy preferences was statistically insignificant.
Numbers can convey critical information about political issues, yet statistics are sometimes cited incorrectly by political actors. Drawing on real-world examples of numerical misinformation, the current study provides a first test of the anchoring bias in the context of news consumption. Anchoring describes how evidently wrong and even irrelevant numbers might change people’s judgments. Results of a survey experiment with a sample of N = 413 citizens indicate that even when individuals see a retraction and distrust the presented misinformation, they stay biased toward the initially seen inaccurate number.
Climate change is a complex phenomenon that the public learns about both abstractly through media and education, and concretely through personal experiences. While public beliefs about global warming may be controversial in some circles, an emerging body of research on the ‘local warming’ effect suggests that people’s judgments of climate change or global warming are impacted by recent, local temperatures. A meta-analysis including 31 observations across 82 952 participants derived from 17 papers published since 2006 found a small but significant effect overall: a 1°C increase in temperature increases worry about climate change by 1.2%. Moderation analysis found larger effects for temperatures over longer time frames and smaller effects for behaviors versus beliefs. We also review conceptually related effects due to other extreme weather events, as well as effects on behaviors related to climate change beliefs.
Researchers interested in climate change communication have investigated how people respond to messages about it. Through meta-analysis, the current research synthesizes the multitude of experimental studies on this topic to uncover which interventions are most effective at influencing attitudes about climate change. The meta-analysis focuses on experimental studies that included a control condition and measured climate change attitudes among participants in the United States. After a large literature search, 396 effect sizes were retrieved from 76 independent experiments (N = 76,033 participants). Intervention had a small, significant positive effect on attitudes, g = 0.08, 95% CI [0.05, 0.10], 95% prediction interval [-0.04, 0.19], p < .001. Surprisingly, type of intervention was not a statistically significant moderator of this effect, nor was political affiliation. However, type of attitude was a significant moderator: the treatment-control difference in attitudes was smaller for policy support than for belief in climate change, indicating that policy attitudes are more resistant to influence than belief in climate change. Interventions that aimed to induce skepticism (e.g., misinformation) had a significantly stronger average effect on attitudes than did ones that intended to promote belief in climate change, suggesting that belief in climate change is more easily weakened than strengthened.
Unlike many models of bias correction, our flexible correction model posits that corrections occur when judges are motivated and able to adjust assessments of targets according to their naive theories of how the context affects judgments of the target(s). In the current research, people flexibly correct assessments of different targets within the same context according to the differing theories associated with the context-target pairs. In Study 1, shared theories of assimilation and contrast bias are identified. Corrections consistent with those theories are obtained in Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 shows that idiographic measures of thoeries of bias predict the direction and magnitude of corrections. Implications of this work for corrections of attributions and bias removal in general are discussed.
Mitigating global climate change requires not only government action but also cooperation from consumers. Population-based, cross-sectional surveys were conducted among 1202 respondents in Portland OR and Houston TX between June and September 2007 regarding awareness, concern, and behavior change related to climate change. The data were subjected to both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Awareness about climate change is virtually universal (98% in Portland and 92% in Houston) with the vast majority reporting some level of concern (90% in Portland and 82% in Houston). A multivariate analysis revealed significant predictors of behavior change: individuals with heightened concern about climate change (p<0.001); respondents with higher level of education (p= 0.03); younger compared with older individuals (p<0.001); and Portlanders more likely to change behavior compared with Houstonians (p<0.001). Of those who changed behavior, 43% reported having reduced their energy usage at home, 39% had reduced gasoline consumption, and 26% engaged in other behaviors, largely recycling. Qualitative data indicate a number of cognitive, behavioral, and structural obstacles to voluntary mitigation. Although consumers are interested in global climate change-mitigation strategies and willing to act accordingly, considerable impediments remain. Government policy must eliminate economic, structural, and social barriers to change and advance accessible and economical alternatives. Individual-level mitigation can be a policy option under favorable contextual conditions, as these results indicate, but must be accompanied by mitigation efforts from industry, commerce, and government.
People respond to the hazards they perceive. If their perceptions are faulty, efforts at public and environmental protection are likely to be misdirected. In order to improve hazard management, a risk assessment industry has developed over the last decade which combines the efforts of physical, biological, and social scientists in an attempt to identify hazards and measure the frequency and magnitude of their consequences.**
In a survey of 1,218 Americans, the key determinant of behavioral intentions to address global warming is a correct understanding of the causes of global warming. Knowing what causes climate change, and what does not, is the most powerful predictor of both stated intentions to take voluntary actions and to vote on hypothetical referenda to enact new government policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Identifying bogus causes (e.g., insecticides) correlates with the belief that the globe will warm, but is only weakly related to voluntary actions and not at all related to support for government policies. General pro-environmental beliefs and perceptions that global warming poses serious threats to society also help to explain behavioral intentions. The explanatory power of an air pollution framework is substantial in bivariate analyses, but has little explanatory power in multivariate analyses that include knowledge, risk perceptions, and general environmental beliefs. Translating public concern for global warming into effective action requires real knowledge. General environmental concern or concern for the negative effects of air pollution appear not to motivate people to support programs designed to control global warming.
In environmental literature it is argued that three different value orientations may be relevant for understanding environmental beliefs and intentions: egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric. Until now, the distinction between altruistic and biospheric value orientations has hardly been supported empirically. In this article, three studies are reported aimed to examine whether an egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric value orientation can indeed be distinguished empirically by using an adapted value instrument. Also, it is examined whether these value orientations are differently and uniquely related to general and specific beliefs and behavioral intention. Results provide support for the reliability and validity of the value instrument. All studies replicated the distinction into three value orientations, with sufficient internal consistency. Furthermore, when altruistic and biospheric goals conflict, they seem to provide a distinct basis for proenvironmental intentions. The value instrument could therefore be useful to better understand relationships between values, beliefs, and intentions related to environmentally significant behavior.
This article reports results from a 1992 Gallup survey conducted in six nations (Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal and Russia) that explored public perceptions of global warming in some detail. Overall the results tend to support those of the small-scale but in-depth studies on which the present study built: Lay publics in these six nations see global warming as a problem, although not as serious as ozone depletion or rain forest destruction. Most people acknowledge that they do not understand global warming very well, and results from questions about the perceived causes and consequences of global warming illustrate their limited understanding. While often confusing global warming with ozone depletion and air pollution, majorities of respondents in all but Russia believe that it is already occurring and large majorities within all nations believe that it will occur within their lifetimes. Furthermore, as discussions of the `risk society' suggest, public perceptions of global warming do not vary consistently across differing social strata within the nations. The article ends by discussing implications of the results, and questions whether detailed public understanding of highly complex issues like global warming is feasible or even necessary for effective policy-making.
Knowledge and confidence in one's own knowledge of climate change was investigated among experts, journalists, politicians, and laypersons. Subsamples of 65 experts, 72 environmental journalists, 145 politicians being chairs of environmental committees, and 621 laypersons in Sweden responded to survey questions concerning current climate state, causes, and consequences of climate change. Experts presented the highest level of knowledge, followed by journalists, politicians, and laypersons. In all the groups, knowledge of causes was greater than that of climate state and of future consequences, and among the latter knowledge was less of health consequences than that of weather and sea/glacier consequences. Also, experts expressed the highest level of confidence in their own knowledge, followed by journalists, politicians, and laypersons. Nevertheless, the adjustment of confidence in one's own knowledge to actual knowledge was somewhat higher among journalists than among experts.
The effects of support for free-market ideology and environmental apathy were investigated to identify some bases for not believing in global climate change. A survey of community residents' (N= 185) beliefs about global climate change also assessed ecocentrism, anthropocentrism, perceived knowledge about climate change, and self-efficacy. The beliefs that global climate change is not occurring, is mainly not human caused, will also have positive consequences and that weaker intentions to undertake ameliorative actions were significantly associated with greater support for free-market ideology, greater environmental apathy, less ecocentrism, and less self-efficacy. About 40% of the variance in each belief and 56% of the variance in the behavioral intention was explained by these factors. The results suggest that the relation between support for free-market ideology and the beliefs about global climate change is mediated by environmental apathy.
In recent studies of the structure of affect, positive and negative affect have consistently emerged as two dominant and relatively independent dimensions. A number of mood scales have been created to measure these factors; however, many existing measures are inadequate, showing low reliability or poor convergent or discriminant validity. To fill the need for reliable and valid Positive Affect and Negative Affect scales that are also brief and easy to administer, we developed two 10-item mood scales that comprise the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The scales are shown to be highly internally consistent, largely uncorrelated, and stable at appropriate levels over a 2-month time period. Normative data and factorial and external evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the scales are also presented. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
This effort argues for an augmented version of the relatively new Risk Information Seeking and Processing (RISP) Model, and subsequently applies this augmented RISP model specifically to environmental risk information seeking. Nearly 830 randomly selected members of a national panel were surveyed about their attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors regarding seeking information about an environmental risk—global warming. Path analysis suggests the promise of applying an augmented RISP model to environmental risk information seeking (R2 = .72 for information seeking intent) and reinforces prior research, which indicated the notable contribution that perceived social pressures may have when individuals seek such information (β = .68, p < .001).
Climate change is occurring: where is psychology? The conventional wisdom is that amelioration of the impacts of climate change is a matter for earth and ocean science, economics, technology, and policy-making. This article presents the basis for psychological science as a key part of the solution to the problem and describes the challenges to this both from within psychology and from other points of view. Minimising the personal and environmental damage caused by climate change necessarily is a multidisciplinary task, but one to which psychology not only should, but must contribute more than it has so far. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Set/reset (L. L. Martin; see record
1987-01092-001) hypothesis that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation was examined. In Exp. 1, the impressions of distracted Ss showed assimilation toward blatantly primed concepts, whereas the impressions of nondistracted Ss showed contrast. In Exp. 2, Ss told that their ratings would be lumped into a group average showed assimilation, whereas Ss told that their ratings would be examined individually showed contrast. In Exp. 3, the impressions of Ss low in need for cognition showed assimilation, whereas the impressions of Ss high in need for cognition showed contrast. Exp. 1 also showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the target information, and Exp. 3 showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the priming stimuli. Together, the results suggest that the processes involved in contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Reviews what is known about the causes and effects of anchoring. This chapter begins with some definitions, and then identifies some styled facts about this heuristic. Next, the authors examine 2 families of causes of anchoring. They close by reviewing other phenomena related to anchoring and potential applications. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Past research has generated mixed support among social scientists for the utility of social norms in accounting for human behavior. We argue that norms do have a substantial impact on human action; however, the impact can only be properly recognized when researchers (a) separate 2 types of norms that at times act antagonistically in a situation—injunctive norms (what most others approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (what most others do)—and (b) focus Ss' attention principally on the type of norm being studied. In 5 natural settings, focusing Ss on either the descriptive norms or the injunctive norms regarding littering caused the Ss' littering decisions to change only in accord with the dictates of the then more salient type of norm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Although global warming has been the subject of some public discussion since the turn of the 20 th Century, it was pushed into the national spotlight during the fall of 1997, when President Bill Clinton's administration instigated a campaign to build public support for the Kyoto treaty. To examine the effect of this campaign and the debate it sparked, we conducted two national surveys, one immediately before and the other immediately after the campaign. We addressed three questions: (1) What were Americans' beliefs and attitudes about global warming before the debate? (2) Did the debate catch the public's attention? and (3) Did the debate change people's beliefs and attitudes about global warming? We found that a majority of the American general public and of the global warming "issue public" endorsed the views advocated by President Clinton before the media campaign began. The debate did attract people's attention and strengthened the public's beliefs and attitudes. The debate produced almost no changes in public opinion when the nation's population is lumped together. But beneath this apparently calm surface, strong Democrats came to endorse the positions advocated by the Clinton administration, while strong Republicans were less inclined to endorse the administration's views.
Key Words values, environment, pro-environmental behavior ■ Abstract Values are often invoked in discussions of how to develop a more sus-tainable relationship with the environment. There is a substantial literature on values that spans several disciplines. In philosophy, values are relatively stable principles that help us make decisions when our preferences are in conflict and thus convey some sense of what we consider good. In economics, the term values is usually used in discussions of social choice, where an assessment of the social value of various alter-natives serves as a guide to the best choice under a utilitarian ethic (the greatest good for the greatest number). In sociology, social psychology, and political science, two major lines of research have addressed environmental values. One has focused on four value clusters: self-interest, altruism, traditionalism, and openness to change and found relatively consistent theoretical and empirical support for the relationship of values to environmentalism. The other line of research suggests that environmentalism emerges when basic material needs are met and that individuals and societies that are postma-terialist in their values are more likely to exhibit pro-environmental behaviors. The evidence in support of this argument is more equivocal. Overall, the idea that values, especially altruism, are related to environmentalism, seems well established, but little can be said about the causes of value change and of the overall effects of value change on changes in behavior.
Climate change is a threat to human health and life, both now and in the future. Despite this, studies show that the public typically do not consider the issue a priority concern or a direct, personal threat. Furthermore, few are taking any preventive or protective action. Previous studies identify direct experience as a major influence on risk perception, learning and action. Drawing on such evidence, this paper focuses on the intangibility of climate change as a key impediment to personal engagement and explores whether relevant experiences of flooding and air pollution influence individuals' knowledge, attitudes, risk perception and behavioural responses to climate change. Perhaps surprisingly, interviews and a survey conducted in the south of England indicate flood victims differ very little from other participants in their understanding of and responses to climate change, but that experience of air pollution does significantly affect perceptions of and behavioural responses to climate change. Air pollution victims are no more likely to cite pollution as a cause of climate change than non?victims; but they do have higher pro?environmental values. Respondents with these values are significantly more likely to consider climate change a salient risk and to take action in response to it. Therefore the relationship between air pollution experience and responses to climate change may be indirect and mediated by environmental values. The paper concludes by highlighting implications of this research for developing climate change policies and strategies for public engagement.
The individual and household sector generates roughly 30 to 40 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and is a potential source of prompt and large emissions reductions. Yet the assumption that only extensive government regulation will generate substantial reductions from the sector is a barrier to change, particularly in a political environment hostile to regulation. This Article demonstrates that prompt and large reductions can be achieved without relying predominantly on regulatory measures. The Article identifies seven "low-hanging fruit:" actions that have the potential to achieve large reductions at less than half the cost of the leading current federal legislation, require limited up-front government expenditures, generate net savings for the individual, and do not confront other barriers. The seven actions discussed in this Article not only meet these criteria, but also will generate roughly 150 million tons in emissions reductions and several billion dollars in net social savings. The Article concludes that the actions identified here are only a beginning, and it identifies changes that will be necessary by policymakers and academicians if these and other low-hanging fruit are to be picked.
The need for effective communication, public outreach and education to increase support for policy, collective action and behaviour change is ever present, and is perhaps most pressing in the context of anthropogenic climate change. This book is the first to take a comprehensive look at communication and social change specifically targeted to climate change. It is a unique collection of ideas examining the challenges associated with communicating climate change in order to facilitate societal response. It offers well-founded, practical suggestions on how to communicate climate change and how to approach related social change more effectively. The contributors of this book come from a diverse range of backgrounds, from government and academia to non-governmental and civic sectors of society. The book is accessibly written, and any specialized terminology is explained. It will be of great interest to academic researchers and professionals in climate change, environmental policy, science communication, psychology, sociology and geography.
In September and October of 2008 a research team from Yale and George Mason Universities
conducted a nationally representative survey of 2,164 American adults. Survey
participants were asked about their issue priorities for the new administration and Congress,
support and opposition regarding climate change and energy policies, levels of political
and consumer activism, and beliefs about the reality and risks of global warming.
Overall, the survey found that concerns about the economy dwarfed all other issues: 76
percent of Americans said that the economy was a “very high” priority. Global warming
ranked 10th out of 11 national issues; nonetheless it remains a high or very high national
priority for a majority of Americans. In addition, 72 percent of Americans said that the
issue of global warming is important to them personally.
In line with these concerns, large majorities of Americans said that everyone - companies,
political leaders at all levels of government, and individual citizens - should do more to
reduce global warming. Likewise, despite the economic crisis, over 90 percent of Americans
said that the United States should act to reduce global warming, even if it has economic
costs. This included 34 percent who said the U.S. should make a large-scale e≠ort,
even if it has large economic costs.
Americans strongly supported unilateral action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: 67%
said the United States should reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases, regardless of what
other countries do, while only 7 percent said we should act only if other industrialized and
developing countries (such as China, India, and Brazil) reduce their emissions.
Americans also strongly supported a wide variety of climate change and energy policies:
• 92 percent supported more funding for research on renewable energy sources, such as
solar and wind power;
• 85 percent supported tax rebates for people buying energy e∞cient vehicles or solar
panels;
• 80 percent said the government should regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant;
• 69 percent of Americans said the United States should sign an international treaty that
requires the U.S. to cut its emissions of carbon dioxide 90% by the year 2050.
Large majorities of Americans also supported policies that had a directly stated economic
cost. For example:
• 79 percent supported a 45 mpg fuel e∞ciency standard for cars, trucks, and SUVs,
even if that meant a new vehicle cost up to $1,000 more to buy;
• 72 percent supported a requirement that electric utilities produce at least 20 percent of
executive summary
beliefs, attitudes, policy preferences, actions 5
their electricity from wind, solar, or other renewable energy sources, even if it cost the
average household an extra $100 a year;
• 72 percent supported a government subsidy to replace old water heaters, air conditioners,
light bulbs, and insulation, even if it cost the average household $5 a month in
higher taxes;
• 63 percent supported a special fund to make buildings more energy e∞cient and teach
Americans how to reduce their energy use, even if this cost the average household $2.50 a
month in higher electric bills.
At the time of the survey, nationwide retail gas prices were approximately $3.25/gallon
and energy had become a major issue in the presidential campaign. Within this context,
respondents also supported a variety of other energy policies:
• 75 percent supported the expansion of o≠shore drilling for oil and natural gas o≠ the
U.S. coast;
• 61 percent supported the building of more nuclear power plants;
• 57 percent supported drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge;
• Only 33 percent, however, supported increasing taxes on gasoline by 25 cents per gallon
and returning the revenues to taxpayers by reducing the federal income tax.
Finally, this study found relatively weak support for a national cap and trade system. Only
53 percent of Americans supported the creation of a new national market that allows companies
to buy and sell the right to emit greenhouse gases. Further, this proposal was strongly
supported by only 11 percent of Americans, while it was strongly opposed by 23 percent.
Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. In general, the heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors. The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. These judgments are all based on data of limited validity, which are processed according to heuristic rules. However, the reliance on this rule leads to systematic errors in the estimation of distance. This chapter describes three heuristics that are employed in making judgments under uncertainty. The first is representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event belongs to a class or event. The second is the availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development, and the third is adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available.
Drawing on results from earlier studies that used open-ended interviews, a questionnaire was developed to examine laypeople's knowledge about the possible causes and effects of global warming, as well as the likely efficacy of possible interventions. It was administered to two well-educated opportunity samples of laypeople. Subjects had a poor appreciation of the facts that (1) if significant global warming occurs, it will be primarily the result of an increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere, and (2) the single most important source of additional carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels, most notably coal and oil. In addition, their understanding of the climate issue was encumbered with secondary, irrelevant, and incorrect beliefs. Of these, the two most critical are confusion with the problems of stratospheric ozone and difficulty in differentiating between causes and actions specific to climate and more general good environmental practice.
Operating from a guard-dog perspective of the media, this study investigates whether "social change" or "status quo" news frames affected individuals' risk perceptions, using an experimental design. Participants who read a news story that used the social change frame reported the highest level of risk awareness (F = 34.88, p =.00), indicating that the way the media frame a story about environmental issues has the potential to influence the audience's perception of risk.
The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither “nonbelievers” who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they “believers” who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.
Operating from a guard-dog perspective of the media, this study investigates whether “social change” or “status quo”news frames affected individuals’ risk perceptions, using an experimental design. Participants who read a news story that used the social change frame reported the highest level of risk awareness ( F = 34.88, p = .00), indicating that the way the media frame a story about environmental issues has the potential to influence the audience’s perception of risk.
This study examines relationships between local temperature in two cities (New York and Washington, D.C.) and coverage of global climate change in their local newspapers (the Times and the Post). The results show that there are some relationships between local temperature and frequency of attention to climate issues, such that journalists are more likely to discuss climate during unusually warm periods. However, support for the hypotheses was only partial; the Post did not show confirming relationships. The discussion focuses on implications for public understanding of climate change.
The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1,225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavior intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither nonbelievers who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they believers who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.
This article extends recent work on the public arenas approach to social problems (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) by examining changes in audience receptiveness to claims-making activities. Scientists’ claims about global warming failed to attract much public attention until the extraordinary heat and drought of the “summer of '88” created a social scare. That is, environmental claims are most likely to be honored—and accelerate demands in the political arena—when they piggyback on dramatic real-world events. The dynamics of this social problem over time reveal that both demand attenuation and issue redirection processes have diminished global warming's standing as a “celebrity” social problem. Social scares hold potential importance for prospective social problems that revolve around new technologies.
Evolutionary psychology has been proposed as an analytic framework for the behavioral effects of landscapes displayed in advertising. In this study, an evolutionary and environmental psychology approach is used to analyze affective reactions to advertising depicting specific natural environments or urban scenes, both prominent ingredients of contemporary advertising imagery. The experimental field study exposed 750 participants at random to one advert of a set of 13 experimental green energy advertisements, each displaying a different biome. Six basic emotional responses (pleasure, arousal, happiness, freedom, safety, and interest) as well as attitude toward the ad and brand attitude were assessed subsequently. Anova and structural equation analysis were used for data analysis. Results of the study confirm the leading opinion on generalized more positive behavioral effects toward visual stimuli representing nature scenes with biospheric contents as opposed to pictures of urban environments or desert settings. In line with earlier empirical research, further findings do not support the hypothesis on an innate preference for savanna landscapes in adults but confirm preferences for images of lush green landscapes with water and familiar biomes. Overall results give significant support to the application of environmental and evolutionary psychology to advertising.
The authors present a brief inventory derived from Schwartz's 56-item instrument measuring the structure and content of human values. The inventory's four 3-item scales, measuring the major clusters called Self-Transcendence, Self-Enhancement, Openness to Change, and Conservation (or Traditional) values, all produce scores with acceptable reliability in two studies of pro-environmental attitudes and actions, and the brief inventory predicts those indicators nearly as well as much longer ones. The authors also present subscales of biospheric and altruistic values that can be used to assess whether Self-Transcendence values are differentiated in this way in special samples such as environmental activists. The brief inventory is suitable for use in survey research and other settings in which the longer instrument might be impractical.
This article is concerned with measures of fit of a model. Two types of error involved in fitting a model are considered. The first is error of approximation which involves the fit of the model, with optimally chosen but unknown parameter values, to the population covariance matrix. The second is overall error which involves the fit of the model, with parameter values estimated from the sample, to the population covariance matrix. Measures of the two types of error are proposed and point and interval estimates of the measures are suggested. These measures take the number of parameters in the model into account in order to avoid penalizing parsimonious models. Practical difficulties associated with the usual tests of exact fit or a model are discussed and a test of “close fit” of a model is suggested.
This article develops a conceptual framework for advancing theories of environ- mentally significant individual behavior and reports on the attempts of the author's research group and others to develop such a theory. It discusses defini- tions of environmentally significant behavior; classifies the behaviors and their causes; assesses theories of environmentalism, focusing especially on value-belief-norm theory; evaluates the relationship between environmental concern and behavior; and summarizes evidence on the factors that determine environmentally significant behaviors and that can effectively alter them. The article concludes by presenting some major propositions supported by available research and some principles for guiding future research and informing the design of behavioral programs for environmental protection. Recent developments in theory and research give hope for building the under- standing needed to effectively alter human behaviors that contribute to environ- mental problems. This article develops a conceptual framework for the theory of environmentally significant individual behavior, reports on developments toward such a theory, and addresses five issues critical to building a theory that can inform efforts to promote proenvironmental behavior.
For almost two decades both national polls and in-depth studies of
global warming perceptions have shown that people commonly conflate
weather and global climate change. Not only are current weather events
such as anecdotal heat waves, droughts or cold spells treated as
evidence for or against global warming, but weather changes such as
warmer weather and increased storm intensity and frequency are the
consequences most likely to come to mind. Distinguishing weather from
climate remains a challenge for many. This weather 'framing' of global
warming may inhibit behavioral and policy change in several ways.
Weather is understood as natural, on an immense scale that makes
controlling it difficult to conceive. Further, these attributes
contribute to perceptions that global warming, like weather, is
uncontrollable. This talk presents an analysis of data from public
opinion polls, focus groups, and cognitive studies regarding people's
mental models of and 'frames' for global warming and climate change, and
the role weather plays in these. This research suggests that priming
people with a model of global warming as being caused by a "thickening
blanket of carbon dioxide" that "traps heat" in the atmosphere solves
some of these communications problems and makes it more likely that
people will support policies to address global warming.
Climate change poses significant risks to societies worldwide, yet governmental responses differ greatly on either side of the North Atlantic. Risk perception studies have shown that citizens in the United States and Great Britain have similar risk perceptions of climate change: it is considered a distant threat, of limited personal importance. Engaging the public on this issue is thus challenging. Affect, the positive or negative evaluation of an object, idea, or mental image, has been shown to powerfully influence individual processing of information and decision‐making. This paper explores the affective images underlying public risk perceptions of climate change through comparative findings from national surveys in the USA and in Great Britain. American and British respondents predominantly referred to generic manifestations and impacts of climate change or to a different environmental problem (ozone depletion). The terms “global warming” and “climate change”, and their associated images, evoked negative affective responses from most respondents. Personally relevant impacts, causes, and solutions to climate change, were rarely mentioned, indicating that climate change is psychologically distant for most individuals in both nations. The role of affective images in risk judgements and individual decision‐making deserves greater study.
Public understanding of global warming, also known as global climate change, is treated here as an example of a mass communication problem that has yet to be adequately solved. A survey of metropolitan area residents found that although people are aware of this problem in a general sense, understanding of particular causes, possible consequences, and solutions is more limited. Both mass media and interpersonal communication appear to make a positive contribution to understanding, as well as to perpetuating some popular misconceptions.
This study examined the role of affect and risk perceptions in maintaining wood burning behavior in 256 residents of a small Australian city characterized by high levels of winter wood smoke pollution. Our analyses revealed that users of wood heaters, relative to non-users, had more positive affective associations with wood heating, perceived fewer health risks from wood smoke, and exhibited less support for wood smoke control policies. Moderation analyses revealed that the predictive effects of risk perceptions on policy support and switching behavior were weaker for respondents who had more positive affective associations with wood heating and stronger for those with more negative affective associations. Theoretical implications relating to the role of affect in decision-making are discussed, together with practical implications for developing more effective interventions to reduce wood smoke pollution.
Over the past 20 years, there have been dozens of news organization, academic, and nonpartisan public opinion surveys on global
warming, yet there exists no authoritative summary of their collective findings. In this article, we provide a systematic
review of trends in public opinion about global warming. We sifted through hundreds of polling questions culled from more
than 70 surveys administered over the past 20 years. In compiling the available trends, we summarize public opinion across
several key dimensions including (a) public awareness of the issue of global warming; (b) public understanding of the causes
of global warming and the specifics of the policy debate; (c) public perceptions of the certainty of the science and the level
of agreement among experts; (d) public concern about the impacts of global warming; (e) public support for policy action in
light of potential economic costs; and (f) public support for the Kyoto climate treaty.
A set of exploratory studies and mental model interviews was conducted in order to characterize public understanding of climate change. In general, respondents regarded global warming as both bad and highly likely. Many believed that warming has already occurred. They tended to confuse stratospheric ozone depletion with the greenhouse effect and weather with climate. Automobile use, heat and emissions from industrial processes, aerosol spray cans, and pollution in general were frequently perceived as primary causes of global warming. Additionally, the [open quotes]greenhouse effect[close quotes] was often interpreted literally as the cause of a hot and steamy climate. The effects attributed to climate change often included increased skin cancer and changed agricultural yields. The mitigation and control strategies proposed by interviewees typically focused on general pollution control, with few specific links to carbon dioxide and energy use. Respondents appeared to be relatively unfamiliar with such regulatory developments as the ban on CFCs for nonessential uses. These beliefs must be considered by those designing risk communications or presenting climate-related policies to the public. 20 refs., 4 tabs.
“Anchoring” results from insufficient adjustment up or down from an original— often arbitrary—starting value. Six sets of surveys were designed to assess the effects of anchoring on subjective likelihood estimates of a nuclear war. Based on responses from 1600 students, results indicated that: (a) likelihood estimates were strongly susceptible to anchoring; (b) neither likelihood estimates nor the effects of anchoring were significantly influenced by the ease with which respondents could imagine a nuclear war (outcome availability), by instructions to list the most likely path to nuclear war (path availability), or by casting the problem in terms of the avoidance, rather than the occurrence, of nuclear war; (c) the effects of anchoring extended to estimates concerning the efficacy of strategic defenses; and (d) likelihood estimates were affected by anchoring even after correcting for social demand biases. In estimating the likelihood of nuclear war and otherwise attempting to “think the unthinkable”, many students responded in a manner consistent with denial; the paper concludes with a discussion of these individuals.