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Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions
Abstract
One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America? To a large measure, the answer to this question should determine the behavior of the strategic leaders of these professions, including the uncommon behavior of public dissent. Using the “Revolt of the Generals” in 2006 as stimulus, the author develops from the study of military professions the critical trust relationships that should have informed their individual decisions to dissent. After doing so, he makes recommendations for the restoration of the professions’ ethic in this critical area of behavior by the senior Officers who are the professions’ strategic leaders.
... It is questionable whether anyone can detect "civil-military gaps" within such arrangements. Yet, the sum of its parts comprise an establishment that seeks to establish itself as a genuine profession (Kohn, 2017;Snider, 2008;2014;. ...
... Since the 1970s "objective civilian control" precepts are recognized across the U.S. defense establishment as the archetype civil-military arrangement taught in civilian colleges, service academies, and senior service colleges (Burk, 2005, pp. 44-48;Snider, 2008;2009;Rapp, 2015). Army scholars supplement it with borrowed conceptions of professions from civilian scholars to validate the expansion of the military's role in the management of national defense (Abbott, 1988;Burk, 2005, pp. ...
... 8-16;83-85). Since 9/11, and with the development of ever more lethal weapons and enemies, senior "strategic leaders" have a "unique responsibility" to cultivate such professional attributes in the officer corps to ensure that the military retains "significant autonomy to organize and execute their own work", thereby raising their status and increasing autonomy along-side other professions such as medicine and law (Snider, 2008(Snider, , 2017. ...
Identifying the military as a profession carries with it conceptual baggage that clashes
with democratic values because it inspires ideas of elitism that can lead to dogmatism. Along with seeking a monopoly on managing violence, the professional military narrative suggests that career military soldiers warrant a higher status in society. The military “expert” that wages warfare on behalf of their “client” (civilian citizen) seeks more autonomy, along with increased benefits and rights compared with those citizens who avoid military service. Such an outlook, based on an ideology, challenges civic accountability, the freedom of speech, civilian control over the military, and due process of law. As many occupations are portrayed as professions, military service entails fundamentally different values that are not conducive to a professional
view. In a democratic republic, developing a professionalized military can risk denying
opportunities to people of diverse backgrounds, worldviews, and values. As traditional
professions such as medicine, law, education, and engineering require autonomy to conduct their work free from coercion to enhance benefits to society, such occupations also lack the capabilities to physically coerce or dominate the public. What makes the military career unique as a vocation vis-à-vis other occupations? What degree of autonomy and self-policing is warranted for the military? What are the key attributes of democratic citizenship that sustains democracy? The professions are evaluated using four factors proffered by James Burk: expertise, jurisdiction, legitimacy, and public service to discover a “moral vocabulary” that will improve our understanding of the relationship between military service and democracy.
... They self-police their distinct standards of conduct. Members of these professions have unique skills that they continually advance for the good of society (Dempsey, 2010;Snider, 2008). ...
... Johnson (2011) addressed the need for even the most junior soldiers and marines to understand that their actions could have strategic implications and had to be ethically defensible. Dempsey (2010) and Snider (2008) cited the need for ethical leadership at a strategic or collective level to preserve trust with the American people. The initial version of the Navy Leader Development Framework (NLDF 1.0, 2017) also underscored the need for trust with the American people and emphasized the need to align behavior with the Navy's core values (NLDF 1.0, 2017). ...
The US Navy requires leaders of competence and character in combat. The elements of competence are developed in numerous schoolhouses, but the path for developing leaders of character is less well-defined, influenced by individuals and organizational culture. If the Navy fails to develop ethical decision-makers, it could cost the trust of the American people or combat effectiveness in wartime. For centuries, mentors have demonstrated influence on their protégés. One possible vehicle for ethical decision-making is the more intentional use of mentors to serve as role models for ethical leadership. We know little about the development of ethical decision-making in Navy leaders and the influence that mentors have on their preparation for command. This study investigated the impact of mentors in developing ethical leaders. I surveyed 42 Navy officers who served in command about their mentoring experiences. In addition to survey results, I interviewed 16 former Commanding Officers and thematically analyzed their leader development, preparation for command and how they evolved their ability to make ethical decisions. I found that mentors were often in the chain of command and provided support as young officers navigated the challenges of the workplace. Mentors were role models throughout their protégés’ careers and helped them establish a mental model of what good leadership looked like as their protégés prepared for command. Lastly, mentors influenced their protégés’ ethical leadership and helped them make ethical decisions in command. I will use the results of this study to recommend that the Navy include a more intentional approach to mentoring future commanding officers (COs) and to prepare COs by mentoring them for ethical decision-making. I also recommend that further study should be conducted on the impact of mentoring on ethical leadership.
... Huntington's theory was codified with the publication of The Soldier and the State and based on post-World War II outlooks of an idealized type of soldier that considered anything "civilian" as nonmilitary while anything military as "isolated and divorced from society" (Huntington, 1956b, p. 381). It is now a fixed ideology of the defense establishment, a static professionalized viewpoint, and orthodoxy of the armed services' military academies, senior service colleges, and elite universities (Snider, 2008(Snider, , pp. 263-266, 2017. ...
... The theory grants the defense establishment an elite standing claiming apolitical status that also confers "autonomy" along with sizable annual public revenues, a high degree of organizational sovereignty, generous job and business opportunities, and handsome medical and pension benefits amplified by the compact all-volunteer military system. As an ideology, objective civilian control theory articulates how the military commands its unique role in securing the state that involves land, air, sea, cyber, finance, law enforcement, and space power to reveal a self-styled moral superiority above other professions and the common citizenry (Huntington, 1956b;Kohn, 2008Kohn, , 2009aKohn, , 2009bMills, 1956Mills, /2000Snider, 2008Snider, , 2017. The fact that there is civil-military blending into a single political institution and culture contests the validity of spin-off theories such as the civil-military problematique (Feaver, 1996). ...
This essay is responding to Dr. Ionut Popescu’s review of the article “Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil-Military Relations.” He challenges the pragmatist outlook by questioning its usefulness to “manage relations between the military and its civilian superiors in a democracy such as the United States.” Based on the concerns of Morris Janowitz regarding military relations, three assertions are made in defense of the pragmatic approach. First, the choice between “professional versus civilian supremacy” for making crucial decisions during wartime is misleading because it is based on obsolete thinking from the twentieth-century Cold War. Second, types of wars waged are determined by complex and provisional decision-making processes amid political struggle. Third, Huntington’s civil–military theory wrongly maligns the word “politics” by distorting its meaning and purpose. Politics is a natural process and an essential feature of democracy.
... However, in spite of the fact that the war is existential and total in character, contentious opposition may exist (Snider, 2008). Under such conditions, whether it is limited or total war, the military may need to retreat from the political arena to focus energy exclusively on waging war. ...
... Finally we come to the most disturbing part of the civil-military spectrum shown in Figure 1: the lower right area where higher intensity conflicts could be fraught with ambiguity, manifesting in extreme forms of partisanship and internecine conflict (Snider, 2008). 10 When a nation lacks sufficient unity and resolve to confront existential threats, there may be no luxuries for professionals. ...
How the U.S. military establishment interacts with other parts of the American government and the people impacts American national power. Because civil–military relationships are influenced by the context of the environment and the “kind of war” being waged, there are a variety of ways that military and civilian leaders can work together to improve the nation’s security. This article proposes an alternative civil–military relations model called pragmatic civilian control. It integrates Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control theory with traditional American political philosophy and concepts established by Morris Janowitz, while accounting for current geopolitical conditions.
... Nonetheless, we can see the contours of the responsibility and values school in various ways as scholars explore what it means to be a military professional. For example, in the language of bureaucratic values, scholars seek to understand the political behavior of members of the military and veteran communities (Brooks, 2009;Coletta & Crosbie, 2021;Urben, 2014), military advising (McMaster, 1998, and leadership (Snider, 2008). Students of civil-military relations also investigate professionalism vis-à-vis ethics and public values, wherein they investigate obedience, dissent, and resignation (Feaver, 2017;Golby, 2015;Snider, 2017); (organizational) culture (Herspring, 2005;Mansoor & Murray, 2019); and political attitudes and values (Ulrich, 2021). ...
All democracies wrestle with the problem of representation. Most people intuitively understand this through electoral politics, but this connection is less clear when we consider bureaucracy. And when it comes to civil-military relations, many think about this problem in terms of “civilian control.” We present a different approach and contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we critique assumptions often used in thinking about civilian control. Second, we offer a classification system with three schools of thought on the problem of bureaucratic accountability. These are the (a) political control school (representation through the politics-administration dichotomy and compliance model), (b) responsiveness through institutional design school (representation through formal institutions), and (c) responsibility through values school (representation through informal institutions). We provide examples from scholarship and cinema for each school to aid in understanding and to facilitate teaching and learning. Third, using bureaucratic accountability as an organizing concept, we propose bureaucratic discretion as a different organizing problem or puzzle for civil-military relations scholars to consider. Furthermore, by providing an organizing concept for civil-military relations using insights from the field of public administration, we additionally lay the groundwork to encourage public administration scholars to conduct research on civil-military relations.
... The strategic leaders in the military cope with many difficulties, uncertainties and ambiguities because the operational environment, conditions and policies in a modern society are changing rapidly and unexpectedly. (Snider, 2008) Sometimes it is difficult to explain the "big picture" to the lower echelons, and sometimes there is simply no time for it. In the military this happens often, therefore the strategic leadership must enforce trust and loyalty to the lowest echelons through organizational leadership. ...
A number of third countries which are not EU members, including EU membership candidate countries, are actively contributing to the European common security and defense policy by participating with their own staff and forces in EU-led peacekeeping missions. The legal basis for the participation of these states in peacekeeping missions are the agrements on participation in EU-led crisis management operations, which the EU has signed with each interested country. These agreements determine the general conditions for the participation of non-EU Member States in EU-led peacekeeping missions. These agreements do not imply the compulsory participation of contracting parties in every peacekeeping mission/ operation.
This paper will analyze the content of the agreements for participation in crisis management operations led by the European Union. The focus of the analysis is the rights and obligations of third countries arising from the concluded agreements for participation in peacekeeping missions, the costs associated with their participation in peacekeeping missions, as well as the security procedures for the exchange of classified information during EU-led peacekeeping missions.
The objective of the analysis is to determine whether third countries participate in the planning and decision-making process related to crisis management operations in which they participate, and whether they have the same rights and obligations as the Member States of the Union in the operation management.
... Moreover, norms are also crucial when members of the profession act as professionals: expertise is not just a matter of knowing what your goals are, or knowing how to reach them, but knowing how to reach them correctly. It is perhaps for this reason that a focus on norms constitutes the dominant view in studies of the military professions, either heralding how norms help in maintaining high professional standards or bemoaning how the loss of normative or ethical standards has led to the decay of the military profession (Snider, Nagl, & Pfaff, 1999;Rockwood, 2005;Kohn, 2009;Snider, Oh, & Toner, 2009;Snider, 2000Snider, , 2008Box, 2012;Clark, 2016, Crosbie & Kleykamp, 2018. The military professions are distinguished by the legitimising of the transgression of norms that we would elsewhere regard as part and parcel of social order -the prohibition of killing and the obligation of self-preservation. ...
What characterises the development and social transformation of the military profession in Scandinavia? Has the broadening of tasks, function and scope of the military profession lead to changes in the values, outlook and behaviour of groups of the armed forces? And what kind of changes are the cultural and structural interpenetration of civilian and military spheres, including hybrid forms of professionalism, generating and what are the significance and implications of such changes? Transformations of the Military Profession and Professionalism in Scandinavia brings together a number of expert scholars within Military Studies and related fields to provide timely and updated answers to these highly important questions – answers with potential implications far beyond the Scandinavian case.
... Moreover, norms are also crucial when members of the profession act as professionals: expertise is not just a matter of knowing what your goals are, or knowing how to reach them, but knowing how to reach them correctly. It is perhaps for this reason that a focus on norms constitutes the dominant view in studies of the military professions, either heralding how norms help in maintaining high professional standards or bemoaning how the loss of normative or ethical standards has led to the decay of the military profession (Snider, Nagl, & Pfaff, 1999;Rockwood, 2005;Kohn, 2009;Snider, Oh, & Toner, 2009;Snider, 2000Snider, , 2008Box, 2012;Clark, 2016, Crosbie & Kleykamp, 2018. The military professions are distinguished by the legitimising of the transgression of norms that we would elsewhere regard as part and parcel of social order -the prohibition of killing and the obligation of self-preservation. ...
What characterises the development and social transformation of the military profession in Scandinavia? Has the broadening of tasks, function and scope of the military profession lead to changes in the values, outlook and behaviour of groups of the armed forces? And what kind of changes are the cultural and structural interpenetration of civilian and military spheres, including hybrid forms of professionalism, generating and what are the significance and implications of such changes? Transformations of the Military Profession and Professionalism in Scandinavia brings together a number of expert scholars within Military Studies and related fields to provide timely and updated answers to these highly important questions – answers with potential implications far beyond the Scandinavian case.
... It is also possible that the level of compliance observed in the sample population of Study 1 may be different than that of a military population, for example, where following orders is instituted through an established chain-of-command. Military officers, particularly those in a chain of command, are expected to provide "a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination" (see Snider, 2008). Rosenbloom (2011) found that a military population was more compliant than a civilian population in exhibiting safe road-crossing behaviors. ...
The anticipated social capabilities of robots may allow them to serve in authority roles as part of human-machine teams. To date, it is unclear if, and to what extent, human team members will comply with requests from their robotic teammates, and how such compliance compares to requests from human teammates. This research examined how the human-likeness and physical embodiment of a robot affect compliance to a robot's request to perseverate utilizing a novel task paradigm. Across a set of two studies, participants performed a visual search task while receiving ambiguous performance feedback. Compliance was evaluated when the participant requested to stop the task and the coach urged the participant to keep practicing multiple times. In the first study, the coach was either physically co-located with the participant or located remotely via a live-video. Coach type varied in human-likeness and included either a real human (confederate), a Nao robot, or a modified Roomba robot. The second study expanded on the first by including a Baxter robot as a coach and replicated the findings in a different sample population with a strict chain of command culture. Results from both studies showed that participants comply with the requests of a robot for up to 11 min. Compliance is less than to a human and embodiment and human-likeness on had weak effects on compliance.
... This conforms to the wisdom of both sociologists and political scientists who have long fretted over dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. Leading civil-military relations scholars have agreed not only that military politics should be avoided but also how it should be avoided, namely through some combination of a professional military culture that disavows political meddling and a sufficiently robust external oversight regime to make sure no such meddling occurs (Shields, 2017;Snider, 2008;Ulrich, 2015). ...
Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military’s inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Machiavelli’s virtú.
... 8)." Beyond giving voice (Snider, 2008), debate educates. Particularly, if debate uses Indigenous discursive group processes such as tok stori (Melanesian discursive group communication; Sanga & Reynolds, 2018), discussions are more likely to be relevant, practical and sustainable for Indigenous Solomon Islanders. ...
A central feature of Indigenous Solomon Islands socialization of family, clan and tribal members is character-shaping. What this looks like, however, has not been researched. This study provides a first look at what is taught as ethics education in Indigenous Solomon Islands. Using data from a wider qualitative study of an Indigenous tribe of Mala’ita Island in the Solomon Islands archipelago, the study is authored and gifted by a Mala’ita Indigenous ethics educator to other Indigenous Pacific and other global educators and researchers. The study findings include: a clearer understanding of Indigenous Mala’ita ethics education including its integrated curriculum, its emphasis on character-shaping and its particular age-gender variations and pedagogies. The study offers pragmatic, conceptual, pedagogical, contextual and research insights for institutional and societal ethics education in Solomon Islands and other Pacific Islands modern states and to others interested in understanding ethics in context.
... " Social scientists and historians have a track record of exposing ethical lapses in the American military. Their insights are usually accompanied by stern warnings of the potential ill effects of such lapses on military readiness and democracy (Fallows, 2015;Galbraith, 1969;Kohn, 2002;Luttwak, 1985;Mills, 1956Mills, /2000Snider, 2008;Tuchman, 1984). Determining the impacts of such lapses-whether they emerge from a "chickenhawk" populace, narcissistic elected officials, arrogant military careerists, or weaknesses in human nature-is a worthy effort if we take into account the lethality and influence of America's military around the world. ...
This essay is in response to Thomas Crosbie and Meredith Kleykamp’s article that investigates relationships between what they consider to be three fault lines in the American military profession: ethical lapses, expertise, and identity. As they explore the literature to contemplate how professionalism might help to prevent ethical lapses, they also seek to reveal relationships between lapses, military expertise, and identity. To enhance the relevance of their research, it is recommended that they examine ethical lapses more broadly. Their core subject is American civil–military relations, which is a complex, contentious, and often ambiguous topic. They can mitigate the ambiguity by developing a clear problem statement and a set of research assumptions. In addition, because not all lapses are treated the same, they can be categorized to identify more serious lapses, which will allow for a focused examination of institutional responses to the lapses. Also, integrating other academic approaches such as political science and history into their research will improve the theoretical and explanatory power of their investigation. Adopting these and other aspects of inquiry will support the testing of their six hypotheses and improve our understanding of the military profession.
... 32 Two examples illustrate this conflict: The early retirement of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, and what has become known as "The Revolt of the Generals," when several senior flag officers, all retired, spoke out publicly in 2006 against both the military policies being pursued in Iraq and the civilian leaders who were most responsible for them. 33 Gibson is in good company in his analysis of this last case. As Hew Strachan, the British military historian, has pointed out, strategy is the product of dialogue between politicians and soldiers, and its essence is the harmonization of the two elements, not the subordination of one to the other. ...
... Don Snider, a strong advocate for appropriate civil-military relations, acceptsWong's and Lovelace's set of choices, but adds that the elemental bond of trust must fundamentally be considered by dissenting military leaders.22 For Snider, dissent must be analyzed against this bond of trust with the strategic leader's three clients: the American people, civilian leaders and subordinates.23 ...
... This is the second time this vexing problem has arisen recently, the other being known in 2006 as "the revolt of the generals" when a group of more junior retired generals, several Army, went public with their criticisms of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 3 While not effective in their attempt to bring down the Secretary of Defense, their actions-largely outside long-standing Army norms-did result is much angst, anger, and mistrust from the junior professionals they had formerly led in combat. ...
... Other scholars may be more tolerant of senior retired officers engaging in public political discourse, but note the real implications their continued involvement carries for civil-military relations and have cited the need for senior leaders within the military to more clearly articulate who truly represents the profession of arms (Brooks 2009, Cook 2008, Nielsen and Snider 2009, Snider 2008. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs seems to agree. ...
This chapter explores the evolving concept of military strategy as the critical link between political ambitions and military capabilities. Historically, military strategy bridges the civil-military divide, aligning political objectives with military means. However, our research and teaching experience suggest that military strategy is often misunderstood, seen through a fragmented lens influenced by personal experiences, academic backgrounds, and cultural contexts. This chapter aims to address this conceptual ambiguity and deepen the narrative around civil-military relations in strategic decision-making. By examining political statecraft and military operational art, we seek to highlight the importance of shared understanding between political and military leaders in the strategic process. Our goal is to facilitate clearer communication and collaboration across the civil-military divide, ultimately enhancing the use of military strategy as a cohesive tool in political discourse.
This chapter is published in Military Strategy in the 21st Century – The Challenges for NATO, edited by J. M. Haaland & R. Johnson (Hurst & Company: London), pp. 131-151.
This article explores contemporary understandings of military duty and dynamics of cohesion during deployment with a focus on host–citizen relations. Duty is treated as a perception-based dynamic construct shaped, in part, by operational experiences. Traditionally, Western military duty is defined by conventional obligations of loyalty to the military unit and mission in the context of combat operations, in these ways linked to military cohesion. However, in response to increasingly “population-oriented” military operations, I argue the need to broaden the study of military duty and cohesion beyond interpersonal bonds of the military organization to include the role of host–citizen relations. In-depth interviews with Swedish service members reaffirm the centrality of conventional duty to the mission and military unit, yet also indicate varying levels and forms of obligations to local actors. Overall, understandings of duty matter to cohesion both as a unifying force and source of tension within the mission.
An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have “the right to be wrong” about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans’ trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans’ views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military’s judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans’ views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their “right to be wrong.”
Disobedience among military personnel is common and can be highly consequential, given the military's centrality to the conduct of foreign policy and war. Despite this, scholars of international affairs typically assume that subordinates in the military obey their orders. While scholarship on military politics acknowledges the prevalence of disobedience, it focuses on group-level forms of resistance and characterizes all such behavior as undesirable. Both of these analytical choices obscure the fact that individuals in the military can respond to orders they do not like in any number of ways. Building on existing work on civil–military relations and military decision-making, this article develops a novel conceptual typology of individual-level disobedience in military organizations. Drawing on dozens of diverse examples, it shows how such resistance is best categorized into four broad types: defiance, refinement, grudging obedience, and exit. Further, it demonstrates the advantages of adopting this typology. In particular, it highlights how military disobedience can be either disloyal or loyal; disobedience can be productive by fostering innovation, adaptability, or cohesion in military organizations. In addition to providing new variables for research on military politics, this typology also points to underexplored linkages between behaviors that have so far been studied separately, such as desertion, surrender, and mutiny.
La désobéissance du personnel militaire est courante et peut avoir de lourdes conséquences selon la centralité de l'Armée dans la conduite de la politique étrangère et de la guerre. Malgré cela, les chercheurs en affaires internationales présupposent généralement que les subordonnés de l'Armée obéissent aux ordres qui leur sont donnés. Bien que les recherches sur la politique militaire admettent la prévalence de la désobéissance, ces dernières se concentrent sur les formes de résistance au niveau Groupes et caractérisent toutes un tel comportement comme indésirable. Ces deux choix analytiques obscurcissent le fait que les individus de l'Armée peuvent réagir aux ordres qui ne leur plaisent pas de bien des façons. Cet article s'appuie sur des travaux existants portant sur les relations entre civils et militaires et sur la prise de décisions militaires pour développer une nouvelle typologie conceptuelle de la désobéissance au niveau Individus dans les organisations militaires. Il s'inspire de dizaines d'exemples divers pour montrer à quel point il est préférable de classer une telle résistance en quatre grands types: Défiance, Peaufinement, Obéissance à contrecœur et Sortie de l'Armée. De plus, cet article montre les avantages qu'offre l'adoption de cette typologie. Il met en particulier en évidence la mesure dans laquelle la désobéissance militaire peut être soit loyale, soit déloyale; la désobéissance peut s'avérer productive lorsqu'elle encourage l'innovation, l'adaptabilité ou la cohésion dans les organisations militaires. En plus de fournir de nouvelles variables pour les recherches sur la politique militaire, cette typologie montre également des liens insuffisamment explorés entre des comportements qui ont jusqu'ici été étudiés séparément, tels que la désertion, l'abandon et la mutinerie.
La desobediencia entre el personal militar es común y puede tener consecuencias de importancia debido al lugar central del ejército en la conducción de la política exterior y la guerra. A pesar de esto, los estudiosos de los asuntos internacionales suelen dar por sentado que los subordinados en el ejército obedecen las órdenes. Si bien los estudiosos de la política militar reconocen la prevalencia de la desobediencia, se centran en las formas de resistencia a nivel de grupo y caracterizan todo ese comportamiento como indeseable. Ambas opciones analíticas ocultan el hecho de que las personas en el ejército pueden responder de muchas maneras a las órdenes que no son de su agrado. A partir de trabajos existentes acerca de las relaciones cívico-militares y la toma de decisiones en el ejército, este artículo desarrolla una novedosa tipología conceptual de la desobediencia a nivel individual en las organizaciones militares. A través de numerosos ejemplos diversos, muestra cómo esa resistencia se clasifica mejor en cuatro categorías amplias: desafío, perfeccionamiento, obediencia de mala gana y retirada. Además, muestra las ventajas de adoptar esta categorización. En concreto, destaca cómo la desobediencia militar puede ser desleal o leal. Puede ser productiva al fomentar la innovación, la adaptabilidad o la cohesión en las organizaciones militares. Además de proporcionar nuevas variables para la investigación en materia de política militar, esta categorización también señala vínculos poco explorados entre comportamientos que hasta el momento se han estudiado por separado, como la deserción, la rendición y el motín.
Contemporary “population-oriented” military intervention and the objectives of protecting, supporting, and fighting alongside host-nation authorities and populations pose new challenges to Western armed forces’ traditionally combat-oriented understanding of duty. The article argues that military personnel who engage in unarmed and nonthreatening interaction—noncombat contact—with host citizens are more likely to develop a stronger sense of duty—perceived obligations—toward the host-nation population. Interviews with US Army officers with experiences from Afghanistan show that noncombat contact with Afghan citizens led to increased willingness to safeguard the interests and well-being of the Afghan population and adapt the mission accordingly.
Current norms among professional military officers that govern obedience and dissent strongly discourage officers from offering public criticism of policy enacted by civilian authorities, even if that policy is immoral, illegal, or unconstitutional. We identify a set of circumstances that create a moral imperative for an officer to take action and we leverage prevailing ethical guidelines to argue that in certain cases, even individual officers not directly involved in the execution of the policy have moral standing to offer public criticism of it. We consider the consequences of relaxing norms prohibiting public dissent and explore the trade-off between tolerating immoral policy and the likelihood of mistakenly criticizing appropriate policy. Finally, we offer evidence that current military-civilian relations in the United States are such that placing higher value on dissent would benefit professional military officers and may improve policy.
This chapter explores the concept of military duty in the context of contemporary war. It focuses on the recent developments in the normative and strategic frameworks of Western military operations, which emphasize that mission effectiveness is largely dependent on the security and wellbeing of the local population. This has seemingly stretched the traditional notion of military duty, which is to master and apply organized military force to achieve political objectives and defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Based on empirical insights from the U.S. military and its recent missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the chapter argues that this development has created tensions between political and military understandings of duty, as well as between organizational and individual notions of duty within the U.S. military. Conflicting notions of military duty hold important policy implications to both domestic civil-military relations and U.S. military power abroad because they challenge the integrity of political objectives and threaten military cohesion and unity of effort with regard to the management of local populations during war.
We find that managers with military experience pursue less tax avoidance than other managers and pay an estimated 1–2 million more in corporate taxes per firm-year. These managers also undertake less aggressive tax planning strategies with smaller tax reserves and fewer tax havens. Although they leave tax money on the table, boards hiring these managers benefit from reductions in other gray areas in corporate reporting. The broad implications are as follows: for employee selection, boards can consider employees’ personal characteristics as a control mechanism when outputs are difficult to contract ex ante or measure ex post.
This short article answers the question of whether, in the context of current American civil–military relations, senior military professionals may loyally dissent from a decision by civilian authorities, even including by resignation. Stated another way, can their constitutional duties to obedience to civilian authority ever clash so severely with their responsibilities to their profession and its fiduciary trust with the American people that dissent is obligated. The position offered here is that senior military professionals always retain the moral agency for such dissent. It inheres in their role as a steward of an American military profession exercising the discretionary judgments that are the moral core of their professional work.
This article focuses on Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas regarding civil–military relations and in particular how those ideas relate to Samuel Huntington’s models of objective and subjective civilian control. Huntington believed that Clausewitz supplied the foundation for his concept of objective control. Yet an examination of Clausewitz’s own experiences, as well as his theoretical writings, rejects the basic tenants of objective control: a politically neutral military, the separation of political from military considerations during the professional officer’s analytical processes, and the reliance on the professional military as opposed to the citizen soldier. Instead, Clausewitz embraced something similar to Huntington’s concept of subjective control and with it a fusionist model of civil–military relations.
After initial successes, the US military suffered many painful years in Afghanistan and Iraq before undertaking the most significant retooling of any military while in active combat since the German Army in 1917. The change to a counter-insurgency posture was catalysed by a combination of junior leadership responding to the tactical problems that confronted them and senior institutional dissidents driving deep, controversial changes in doctrine and culture to meet the new requirements. Both components were necessary, but neither was sufficient on its own. They were the product of an institutional culture that strove to be self-learning, with varying levels of success. Specific recommendations recognise, preserve and advance this dynamic in anticipation of future requirements for rapid change in response to the next conflict.
Det här är tredje och sista delen i ett arbete som började med en förfrågan om att titta på internutredningsverksamheten i Sverige, och där Dennis Töllborg i två tidigare rapporter kommit med omfattande och konkreta förslag till förändring. Denna rapport ändrar inget av vad som sagts i dessa – behovet är lika stort och förändringarna alltjämt lika relevanta. I denna avslutande rapport försöker Dennis fullfölja den grundläggande analys som gjordes tidigt – att ta ett samlat grepp över all form av illojal maktanvändning i Sverige, inte bara den som förekommer bland polisen.
Integrity is generally considered to be an important military virtue. The first part of this article tries to make sense of integrity's many, often contradicting, meanings. Both in the military and elsewhere, its most common understanding seems to be that integrity requires us to live according to one's personal principal values and principles - we have a moral obligation to do so, and it is a prerequisite to be able to 'look ourselves in the mirror.' This notion of integrity as upholding personal values and principles is a very problematic one in itself, especially to those working in the military. For several reasons, perhaps the role that the virtue of integrity has in a military organization could in fact be better played by other virtues.
The unique characteristics of the "Global War on Terrorism" have implications for the relationship society has with its military, and therefore, for military effectiveness in achieving political ends. Using an "institutional presence" theoretical foundation, four factors of the "GWOT" are described: the length of the conflict; its prosecution through an All-Volunteer Force; the fact that it is directed at non-states actors; and the nature of the enemies' methods. The author discovers that each factor does close, create or widen the gap between the military and society. However, this is not necessarily problematic given the nature of this struggle, particularly if one focuses on effective formulation and execution of strategy. Finally, recommendations for managing the gap are included.
The Air Force can greatly benefit by increasing the role of followership in professional military education at all ranks, officer and enlisted, to help create more effective leaders. It is important to understand that leadership and followership are complementary competencies and military leaders must work to master both of them. Regardless of rank, every member of the United States Military is a subordinate to someone, whether it is to the Secretary of Defense or a newly commissioned Lieutenant. In the military community, every officer is both a leader and follower simultaneously in every position they hold. Therefore, it is vital for officers to hone their followership skills in addition to leadership skills to improve their overall effectiveness. Just as followers are expected to learn from leaders, the converse should also hold true. Leaders that learn from followers become more effective leaders. Understanding this, effective followership requires both dissent and flexibility - these essential elements must be part of the development of 21st century Air Force senior leaders. This paper draws from the current body of knowledge on followership focusing on the foundational works and the followership styles they identify. It includes in-depth analysis of two traits recommended for effective leaders. This paper uses the problem/solution research methodology. The idea is not to provide a cookie-cutter follower checklist. Rather, the goal of this work is to initiate discussion of both the importance of followership and how the development and improvement of followership skills can improve the effectiveness of Air Force leaders.
Strained relations between U.S. civilian leaders and operational commanders have hindered the development of a coherent policy for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM (OIF/OEF) in Iraq and Afghanistan. To demonstrate a connection between failed civil-military relations and its resultant impact on strategy, this paper will describe the state of civil-military relations during the preliminary and execution phases of the two most recent wars in the Middle East. It will then analyze how those relations have hindered the United States' ability to formulate war strategy. Little research has been conducted to examine how the civilian-military relationship influences the formulation and execution of strategy and policy. In the United States, strong civil-military relations depend on four core principles: the recognition of military subordination to civilian leaders; the willingness of military leaders to offer candid advice; the ability for civilian and military leaders to engage each other in a respectful, professional manner; and an environment that fosters trust and collaboration. Moreover, civil-military relations can negatively affect strategy in five ways: if there exists a "broad line of demarcation" between civilian and military leaders; if service cultures influence the collaborative process; if statutory changes, such as those brought about by Goldwater-Nichols, inherently alter the civil-military relationship; if politicization of the officer corps forces a disconnect in the upper echelons of leadership; and if a breakdown in policy cooperation occurs. Drawing on examples from OIF/OEF, civilian leaders and operational commanders should realize that the nature of their interactions has a real, measurable effect on the policies they produce. Recommendations for bridging the civilian-military divide -- with the goal of creating stronger policy -- are discussed.
Military officers, particularly those in the chain of command, are expected to provide "a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination" (Snider, 2008). The aim of the present study was to examine the extent to which these values are reflected in the behavior that military officers exhibit crossing roads, as compared with soldiers' and civilians' road-crossing behavior. One thousand two hundred pedestrians were observed while crossing the street at an urban intersection in the center of Israel. Of these pedestrians, 594 (49.5%) were soldiers, 112 (9.33%) were officers and 488 (40.66%) were civilians. An observation grid was constructed to register pedestrians' crossing behavior. The independent variables encoded were gender, military status and military rank. The dependent variables encoded were crossing the road at a red light; crossing a busy road; running across the road; crossing the road diagonally; crossing the road without looking both ways; and crossing without first stopping at the sidewalk edge. To compare the crossing behaviors of each group of pedestrians, a summation was made for the six parameters of safe crossing. An ANOVA compared the means of unsafe road-crossing behaviors of males and females, on the one hand, and of civilians, soldiers and officers, on the other. A post hoc Scheffe test conducted on the means showed that the mean of the unsafe road-crossing behaviors of the civilians (M=1.55, SE=.04) was higher than that of the soldiers (M=1.35, SE=.04) and of the officers (M=1.21, SE=.08) p<.05. No significant difference was found between the means of the unsafe road-crossing behaviors of soldiers and officers, although the means of the officers' unsafe behaviors was lower than that of the soldiers. That is, both soldiers and officers exhibited road-crossing behavior that was significantly safer than that of civilians. Generally, more females waited for the green light (54.1%) than males (45.9%). No main effect of gender or interaction with belonging to the military was found.
At the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC), students are charged with balancing their lives in mind, body, and spirit; however, self-development tools are readily available to U. S. military leaders in the first two of these realms, but not in the third realm of the spirit. Also, political scientist Samuel Huntington commented in his essay, "The Clash of Civilizations?," that future conflicts will arise among cultures which are most clearly delineated by religious differences; therefore, military officers must understand faith differences around the world in order to prevent and respond to future conflicts. Because the human spirit is often, though not always, tended to through religion, these requirements are inherently linked. Military leaders would benefit by having a practical tool to aid the self-development of their spirit and their religious cultural awareness. This thesis presents a strategy to guide development of a military-specific spiritual self-assessment and religious cultural awareness measure in order to rectify the military's current dearth of such resources. The goal of this tool is to offer the service member a simple way to quickly understand their own spirit in light of how people of other religions see themselves and how they might see the service member.
YINGLING "You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict." -Frederick the Great For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war. These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF GENERALSHIP Armies do not fight wars; nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire nations. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy each play their role in war. Any understanding of war that ignores one of these elements is fundamentally flawed. The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required. When the ends of policy are small, the statesman can prosecute a conflict without asking the public for great sacrifice. Global conflicts such as World War II require the full mobilization of entire societies to provide the men and materiel necessary for the successful prosecution of war. The greatest error the statesman can make is to commit his nation to a great conflict without mobilizing popular passions to a level commensurate with the stakes of the conflict.
This article examines the elevated rate of voluntary attrition from the junior officer corps of the United States Army between 1995 and 2001 to consider how it relates to the army’s vision of the future. There was a conflict between the army’s need for numbers of officers in the short term (to overcome the captain deficit) and its need for high-quality officers in the long term. Army transformation is predicated on the presence of mature, experienced, and highly skilled leaders at the lower levels who will use emerging technologies to achieve a level of military capability that exceeds what is possible today. However, trends in junior officer effectiveness and quality during this exodus period moved in the opposite direction. The army adopted measures to counter increased attrition, but the method had negative quality implications. This article recommends that junior officer attrition should be regarded as a symptom of a systemic problem, instead of an isolated challenge.
This new work explores the meaning and implications of professionalism as a form of social organization. Eliot Freidson formalizes professionalism by treating it as an ideal type grounded in the political economy; he presents the concept as a third logic, or a more viable alternative to consumerism and bureaucracy. He asks us to imagine a world where workers with specialized knowledge and the ability to provide society with especially important services can organize and control their own work, without directives from management or the influence of free markets. Freidson then appraises the present status of professionalism, exploring how traditional and national variations in state policy and organization are influencing the power and practice of such professions as medicine and law. Widespread attacks by neoclassical economists and populists, he contends, are obscuring the social value of credentialism and monopolies. The institutions that sustain professionalism in our world are simply too useful to both capital and state to dismiss.
As an example of the growing sharpness of this debate r33 “Bush and the GeneralsSalute and Disobey?” Foreign Affairs
- Richard B Myers
- Richard H Kohn
- Mackubin Owens
- Lawrence J Korb
- Michael C Desch
As an example of the growing sharpness of this debate r33 “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3, May-June 2007, p. 97; and Richard B. Myers, Richard H. Kohn, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Lawrence J. Korb, and Michael C. Desch, “Salute and Disobey?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5, September/October 2007, pp. 147-156. 167, April 17, 2006, pp. 42-43.
co-chairs, The Iraq Military Security and Civilian Control of the Military,” chapter manuscript delivered at Senior Conference 07, United States Military Academy
- James A Baker
- Lee H Hamilton
James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, The Iraq Military Security and Civilian Control of the Military,” chapter manuscript delivered at Senior Conference 07, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, June 2007. Papers from the conference will be published in an edited volume in 2008.
Why Iraq was a Mistake places in the journalistic literature. One good source is David Margolick, “The Night of the Generals
- Gregory Newbold
Gregory Newbold, “Why Iraq was a Mistake,” Time, Vol. places in the journalistic literature. One good source is David Margolick, “The Night of the Generals,” Vanity Fair, April 2007.
Even so, those interested in the legal aspects should, at a minimum, see: Ives
- J Mackey
- Michael J Davidson
Even so, those interested in the legal aspects should, at a minimum, see: Ives, J. Mackey, and Michael J. Davidson. ''Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Retirees under Articles 2(4) and
Rethinking Subjective Control: Political Activity of the Military in Democracies, " chapter manuscript delivered at Senior Conference 07 Military and Civilian Behaviors to Maximize National Security and Assure Civilian Control
- See Risa Brooks
See Risa Brooks, " Rethinking Subjective Control: Political
Activity of the Military in Democracies, " chapter manuscript
delivered at Senior Conference 07.
43. See Richard H. Kohn, " Military and Civilian Behaviors
to Maximize National Security and Assure Civilian Control, "
chapter manuscript delivered at Senior Conference 07.
The Military Mind and the Military Profession: A Reassessment of the Ideological Roots of American Military Professionalism
- See Darrell
- W Driver
See Darrell W. Driver, " The Military Mind and the Military
Profession: A Reassessment of the Ideological Roots of American
Military Professionalism, " chapter manuscript delivered at Senior
Conference 07.
Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession Chapter 28 in The Future of the Army Profession
- See Leonard Wong
- Don M Snider
See Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, " Strategic
Leadership of the Army Profession, " Chapter 28 in The Future of
the Army Profession, 2nd Ed., pp. 601-624.
Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq The Rules of the Game: The Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force Chapter 10 in The Future of the Army Profession
- Bernard E Gordon
- Trainor
Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Pantheon Books, 2006.
36. See Suzanne C. Nielsen, " The Rules of the Game: The
Weinberger Doctrine and the American Use of Force, " Chapter 10
in The Future of the Army Profession, 1st Ed., pp. 199-224.
The Soldier and The State, p. 73. 38. Indeed, one respected scholar concludes The law is now generally understood to require that soldiers resolve all doubts about the legality of a superior's orders in favor of obedience
- See Huntington
See Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 73.
38. Indeed, one respected scholar concludes: " The law is now
generally understood to require that soldiers resolve all doubts
about the legality of a superior's orders in favor of obedience. "
The Multiple Identities of the Army Officer Chapter 6 in The Future of the Army Profession
- Don M Snider
Don M. Snider, " The Multiple Identities of the Army
Officer, " Chapter 6 in The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd Ed., p.
143.
Army Officers and the First Amendment Army For a superb account of the influences on administration decisionmaking before and during the Iraq War
- See Lloyd Matthews
See Lloyd Matthews, " Army Officers and the First
Amendment, " Army, January 1998, pp. 31-32.
35. For a superb account of the influences on administration
decisionmaking before and during the Iraq War, see Michael R.
The Iraq Study Group Report available at bakerinstitute. org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf Bush and the Generals Salute and Disobey?
- A James
- Iii Baker
- Lee H Hamilton
James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, The Iraq
Study Group Report, December 2006, p. 52, available at bakerinstitute.
org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf.
" Bush and the Generals, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3, May-June
2007, p. 97; and Richard B. Myers, Richard H. Kohn, Mackubin
Thomas Owens, Lawrence J. Korb, and Michael C. Desch, " Salute
and Disobey? " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5, September/October
2007, pp. 147-156.
Responsible Obedience and Discretion to Do What is Wrong
- See James Burk
See James Burk, " Responsible Obedience and Discretion
to Do What is Wrong, " chapter manuscript delivered at Senior
Conference 07.
The Officer as Leader of Character: Leadership, Character, and Ethical Decision-Making
- See Tony Pfaff
See Tony Pfaff, " The Officer as Leader of Character:
Leadership, Character, and Ethical Decision-Making, " Chapter 6
High-Impact Military Leadership: The Positive Effects of Authentic Moral Leadership on Followers Chapter Forging the Warrior's Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer, Sisters, OR: Jericho LLC American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century
- See Patrick
- J Sweeney
- Sean T Hannah
See Patrick J. Sweeney and Sean T. Hannah, " High-Impact
Military Leadership: The Positive Effects of Authentic Moral
Leadership on Followers, " Chapter 4 in Don M. Snider and Lloyd
J. Matthews, eds., Forging the Warrior's Character: Moral Precepts
from the Cadet Prayer, Sisters, OR: Jericho LLC, 2007, pp. 127-162.
51. See Walter F. Ulmer and Joseph J. Collins (Project
Directors), American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century,
Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2000, pp. xv-xxvii.
Changing Conceptions of the Military Professions
- David Segal
- Karen Deangelis
David Segal and Karen DeAngelis, " Changing Conceptions of the Military Professions, " chapter manuscript delivered
at Senior Conference 07.
Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice Losing Control of the Profession Through Outsourcing? " Chapters 9 and 12, respectively, in The Future of the Army Profession
- See Richard Lacquement
- Deborah Avant
See Richard Lacquement, " Mapping Army Professional
Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice, " and Deborah
Avant, " Losing Control of the Profession Through Outsourcing? "
Chapters 9 and 12, respectively, in The Future of the Army Profession,
2nd Ed., pp. 213-236, 271-290.
Senior Conference 07. 30. Huntington, The Soldier and The State My own experience chairing interagency meetings while on the staff of the National Security Council, The White House, 1987-89, confirmed the accuracy of this understanding. 32. See Huntington, The Soldier and The State
- Approach
Approach, " chapter manuscript delivered at Senior Conference
07.
30. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, pp. 72-73.
31. My own experience chairing interagency meetings while
on the staff of the National Security Council, The White House,
1987-89, confirmed the accuracy of this understanding.
32. See Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 72.
33. Ibid.
Opportunity for the Army: Defense Transformation and the Emergence of a New Joint Military Profession The Future of the Army Profession
- See Don
- M Snider
- Jeffrey Peterson
See Don M. Snider and Jeffrey Peterson, " Opportunity for the
Army: Defense Transformation and the Emergence of a New Joint
Military Profession, " chapter 10 in Snider and Matthews, eds., The
Future of the Army Profession, 2nd Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill,
2005, pp. 237-251.