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The Freezing and Unfreezing of Lay-Inferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, and Numerical Anchoring

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Abstract

Three experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that primacy effects, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring all represent “epistemic freezing” in which the lay-knower becomes less aware of plausible alternative hypotheses and/or inconsistent bits of evidence competing with a given judgment. It was hypothesized that epistemic freezing would increase with an increase in time pressure on the lay-knower to make a judgment and decrease with the layknower's fear that his/her judgment will be evaluated and possibly be in error. Accordingly, it was predicted that primacy effects, ethnic stereotyping, and anchoring phenomena would increase in magnitude with an increase in time pressure and decrease in magnitude with an increase in evaluation apprehension. Finally, the time-pressure variations were expected to have greater impact upon “freezing” when the evaluation apprehension is high as opposed to low. All hypotheses were supported in each of the presently executed studies.

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... Although one could hardly gather it from Neuberg et al.'s various accounts (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993;Neuberg et al., 1997), both scales were originally meant to operational! ze the very same concept of the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Accordingly, the relation between them is hardly surprising and does not represent a lack of discriminant validity. ...
... Instead, Neuberg et al. (1997) noted that the Need for Structure Scale reflects an individual difference measure of a motive "previously conceptualized by others as situationally induced" (p. 1402, emphasis ours), where "others" refers equally to Harvey and Schroder (1963; who barely mention the concept in their chapter) and Kruglanski and Freund (1983). This particular approach, consistently adopted by Neuberg and his associates, naturally deemphasizes the common conceptual origins of the PNS Scale and the NFCS and obscures their equivalence status as the intended operationalizations of the very same variable. ...
... In early lay epistemic writings (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) the construct presently at issue was referred to as the need for structure and was subsequently renamed as the need for closure (Kruglanski, 1989;Kruglanski & Jaffe, 1988). It is appropriate, in the present context, to dwell at some length on the reasons for this change. ...
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S. L. Neuberg, T. N. Judice, and S. G. West (1997) faulted our work with the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS) on grounds that the NFCS lacks discriminant validity relative to S. L. Neuberg's and J.T. Newsom's (1993) Personal Need for Structure (PNS) Scale and is multidimensional, which, so they claim, renders the use of its total score inadmissible. By contrast, the present authors show that neither of the above assertions is incompatible with the underlying need for closure theory. Relations between NFCS and the PNS are to be expected, as these were designed to operationalize the very same construct (of need for closure). Furthermore, no unidimensionality of the NFCS has been claimed, and none is required to use its total score for testing various theoretically derived predictions. An instrument's ultimate utility hinges on theoretical considerations and empirical evidence rather than on questionable psychometric dogma unrelated to the substantive matters at hand.
... Study 4 examined the link between attachment style and the primacy effect-the tendency to make judgments on the basis of early information and to ignore late new data (Luchins, 1957). According to Kruglanski and Freund (1983), variations in the primacy effect reflect a person's attitude toward new information. On the one hand, persons who are reluctant to deal with new data should show a strong primacy effect; they should prefer to attain closure early in the informational sequence and be impervious to later information. ...
... Study 5 examined the association between attachment style and ethnic stereotyping-the tendency to judge a member of an ethnic group in terms of a generalized notion of the group rather than in terms of specific information about the member (Stephan & Rosenfield, 1982). Kruglanski and Freund (1983) suggested that ethnic stereotyping also reflects a person's reactions to new information. On the one hand, persons who are unable or unwilling to integrate new data within their cognitive structures would be prone to judge a person on the basis of their knowledge of the person's group and would be reluctant to analyze new data on the specific target person. ...
... Participants were divided into three conditions according to information about the writer's ethnic origin: no information, Western (Ashkenazi) origin, and Middle Eastern (Sepharadi) origin. The method was the same as that used by Kruglanski and Freund (1983). In Israel, Sepharadi children are stereotypically perceived to be underachievers and to obtain low grades in school. ...
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Five studies examined the association between adult attachment style and information processing. Studies 1–2 focused on information search (curiosity-related beliefs and behaviors). Studies 3–5 focused on the integration of new information within cognitive structures; namely, the level of cognitive closure and its expressions in social judgments. Secure and anxious–ambivalent persons described themselves as more curious and held more positive attitudes toward curiosity than did avoidant persons. Time competition between information search and social interaction increased information search among avoidant persons, but decreased it among anxious–ambivalent persons. Finally, secure persons reported less preference for cognitive closure and were more likely to rely on new information in making social judgments than avoidant and anxious–ambivalent persons. The theoretical implications of the link between attachment and information processing are discussed.
... constrained: time constraints induce a sense of urgency for a predetermined outcome, prompting arguers to engage in rushed reasoning to achieve it (Kruglanski and Freund 1983). time of response reaction Prolonged (Kunda 1990) Short (Kunda 1990) choice of inferential rules to evaluate inconsistent evidence inconsistent evidence is appraised based on its content, involving a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the argument (chaiken, Liberman, and eagly 1989). ...
... Limited (Kruglanski and Freund 1983). time pressures lead to the arousal of a need for a preselected outcome, and arguers pursue hasty thinking to attain it. ...
Article
Reasoning asymmetry arises when biased argument production aligns with biased argument evaluation by the same arguer, a phenomenon commonly termed motivated criticism or biased assimilation. This practice, often wielded by individuals in positions of power, aims to advocate for specific decision options. Argument Continuity exemplifies this asymmetry within a distorted reasoning context, where a motivated critic incessantly reiterates arguments in counterarguments to discredit less powerful opponents, disregarding evidential priority in reasoning exchanges. When these restatements are bolstered by appeals to authority, uncertainty, or the unlikelihood of adverse effects of a decision option, they signify moves of motivated criticism, perpetuating Argument Continuity discursively. The paper seeks to identify and annotate instances of Argument Continuities in Indigenous consultation reports, reconstructing a discourse of motivated criticism among officials responding to resource concerns. By developing annotation guidelines, it aims to classify and predict Argument Continuity, providing a tool to preempt fallacious reasoning by authorities across diverse public policy contexts.
... Cette tendance a été conceptualisée dans la Theory of Lay Epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989) comme deux dimensions orthogonales rendant compte de la part motivationnelle des processus d'acquisition de la connaissance : les individus peuvent être orientés à la recherche d'une clôture cognitive (spécifique ou non spécifique) ou au contraire éviter cette clôture. Selon la théorie, les individus rechercheront une forte clôture/cristallisation épistémique (epistemic freezing) en situation de pression temporelle tandis qu'ils opteront pour une faible clôture/cristallisation face à la peur du jugement et la possibilité d'une erreur (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985). Par ailleurs, l'importance subjective de l'objet pour la personne ou bien l'attractivité qu'il génère déterminera si cette clôture cognitive porte sur cet objet spécifiquement ou non. ...
... Le besoin d'une clôture spécifique reflète une motivation à atteindre une réponse à une question spécifique, et personnellement désirable ». Selon la théorie, cette tendance psychologique motivée peut être considérée comme une différence inter-individuelle relativement stable dans le temps, mais également comme un état induit par certaines circonstances comme la pression temporelle (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) ou le bruit environnant (Kruglanski & Webster, 1991) indépendamment des niveaux d'intelligence. Des différences liées à l'autoritarisme (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) ou la culture (Hofstede, 1985) peuvent 15 « L'étendue des responsabilités fait référence à un manque d'informations claires sur l'étendue de ses propres responsabilités. ...
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Ce travail de thèse s’intéresse aux facteurs de régulation de l’incertitude des individus au travail. L’incertitude, de par l’évolution constante du monde organisationnel, s’impose de plus en plus comme un facteur avec lequel conjuguer, et ce dans différents contextes autour du travail. Ce facteur constitue un risque pour les individus de par sa nature aversive. Dans cette optique, nous nous sommes intéressés, dans un premier temps aux théories portant sur le concept d’incertitude. Cela nous a permis de mieux comprendre et délimiter le concept. Dans un deuxième temps, nous avons été chercher dans les théories autour du concept de leadership les moyens de réguler l’incertitude. Ce qui nous a conduits à envisager cette régulation comme étant soit potentiellement possible par une forme directive de leadership, soit au contraire par une forme participative du leadership. Après avoir étayé ces deux pistes, nous nous sommes fixés trois objectifs : (1) identifier quelle forme de leadership est la plus à même de réguler l’incertitude ; (2) vérifier si cette forme de leadership peut contribuer au bon fonctionnement psychologique de l’individu ; et enfin (3) mettre à jour les mécanismes inhérents à ladite forme de leadership permettant de comprendre par quels moyens s’opère cette régulation. Ces objectifs ont guidé une série de sept études. Les trois premières études nous ont permis de répondre à nos deux premiers objectifs. Les résultats de ces études ont indiqué globalement que le leadership participatif contribuait à réguler l’incertitude, ce qui permettait d’alimenter un ensemble de variables positives pour le bon fonctionnement psychologique des salariés, ou bien la recherche d’emploi pour les demandeurs d’emplois. Trois autres études ont-été réalisées, dans l’optique cette fois de répondre à notre troisième objectif. Chaque étude se concentrait sur un aspect du leadership participatif que nous avons assimilé à un levier. Toutefois, même si nous avons obtenu quelques résultats intéressants, nous n’avons pas considéré cet objectif comme atteint. C’est pourquoi nous avons réalisé une dernière étude destinée à répondre aux limites identifiées précédemment. Cette dernière étude nous a permis de répondre à un troisième objectif, et de rendre plus manifestes les mécanismes relatifs à la régulation de l’incertitude. Les apports, tant théoriques, que méthodologiques et bien sûr pratiques, sont discutés. La conclusion que nous pouvons apporter à cette discussion, et à ce travail de recherche plus généralement, est que la régulation de l’incertitude n’est pas une simple démarche individuelle, mais requiert plutôt un effort mis en place par les organisations de travail. Selon nous, une organisation peut être évaluée selon trois critères d’importance quant à la régulation de l’incertitude : l’affiliation de l’individu à un réseau relationnel, le partage d’informations, et la projection dans le futur. Il s’agit des trois pistes par lesquelles, selon nous, ce travail de thèse pourrait être poursuivi.
... Needs for clarity and structure drove behaviour of many individuals but others might be more conscious about unbearable cost of committing mistakes. They tend to avoid potential mistakes and having a greater concern about personal fear of invalidity, this resistance is reflected through cognitive hesitancy (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; M. M. Thompson et al., 2001). So, it is hypothesized that. ...
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This study is an attempt to understand the effect of impression management (IM) on impulse buying Behaviour(IBB). It is a centrally held attribute, which triggers motivation for buying behavior. Given the subconscious prevalence of IM, it has been observed that consumers are sophisticated users of this attribute. Various impression management concerns arise when consumers choose products to share with others. Whether the chosen products are consistent or inconsistent with self-images, depends on the consumer's social goals, approvals and self-perception. A larger proportion of this cognition occurs beyond the conscious control during the purchase situations. It is found that in situations when buyers do not have enough knowledge about the brand, self attributes like impression management asserts a noticeable impact on IBB. The study borrowed assumptions from impression management theory and concluded that impulse buying behavior was attributed to impression management in collectivistic culture. The major focus of this study was to assess that how consumers, predominately, attempt to use impression management in impulsive buying situations.
... As previously noted, individuals with an NCC desire and seek out any knowledge that provides perceived certainty and stability [4]. It has also been noted, since the earliest NCC research, that it is related to the acceptance of harmful stereotypes [6]. Given that specific cultural stereotypes represent sources of knowledge that apply to large groups of people and are resistant to change, they can be perceived to offer stability and certainty. ...
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This research investigated the relation between the need for cognitive closure (i.e., a desire for epistemic certainty) and attitudes toward women as managers among men and women. In a cross-sectional study (total N = 241) collected in Italy, we found that need for cognitive closure, controlling for participants’ gender, was related to having more prejudice toward women leaders. Furthermore, the results revealed that the positive relation between the need for cognitive closure and negative attitudes toward women as managers was sequentially mediated by belief in a just world (i.e., the belief that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get and other people do not) and gender essentialism (i.e., the belief that women and men are distinctly, immutably, and naturally different, and thus have complementary skills to bring to the workplace). We suggest that men and women who are characterized by a need for cognitive closure are more sensitive to stereotypes of women as being incompatible with leadership roles. Either priming a low need for cognitive closure or providing contrary stereotypes could obviate the effect on beliefs in a just world and in gender essentialism that impedes progress towards greater gender equality in the workplace.
... Specifically, when individuals expect to justify their judgments to others, they are likely to use more cognitive efforts on issue-related reasoning, attend to relevant information more, and process it more deeply, often using more complex and time-consuming strategies (Kunda, 1990). In addition, various experimental studies have demonstrated that manipulations designed to increase accuracy motives decrease the tendency to use ethnic stereotypes in evaluations (for instance, see Freund et al., 1985;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). ...
Article
Despite being touted as a game-changing technology, studies on the influence of body-worn cameras (BWCs) on policing outcomes have produced mixed results, with the underlying reasons for such findings unclear. Drawing on the sociology of culture and organizational theory, we argue that BWCs often have mixed impacts due to deeply ingrained, valued occupational assumptions and practices shaped by the structural and organizational context. These assumptions and practices, collectively known as the police métier, are not politically neutral and can lead to motivated decisions rather than accurate ones. We suggest that such motivated reasoning can be mitigated by changing the structural or organizational context, such as establishing a citizen oversight agency (COA), which could decrease racial disparities in policing outcomes. To test these arguments, we examined the impact of BWCs on racial disparities in two types of policing outcomes: police homicides of citizens and disorderly conduct arrests (DCAs). Our findings indicate that while the adoption of BWCs does not impact racial disparities in DCAs or police homicides of citizens, there is a significant decrease in racial disparity in DCAs when BWCs and COAs are used in conjunction. Additionally, while the racial disparity in police homicides of Blacks and Whites does not decrease when BWCs and COAs are used together, there is an overall decrease in police homicides across both racial groups. Overall, our study demonstrates that technology's impact on bureaucratic performance is influenced by occupational assumptions and practices, which can be altered by external accountability mechanisms such as COAs.
... Study 2 used real product selections to assess shape preferences, aiming to replicate the test for H1 and provide initial evidence for the mediating role of NFU outlined in H2. Moreover, considering that individuals in time-pressured situations tend to have a higher need for structure (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983) and angular shapes appear more ordered and organized than circular ones (Jiang et al., 2016;Westerman et al., 2012), we investigated whether the busy mindset's inclination toward preferring angular shapes is driven by need for structure rather than NFU. ...
Article
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Purpose The shape of a product plays a crucial role in shaping consumer behavior. Despite the voluminous research on factors influencing consumers’ shape preferences, there remains a limited understanding of how the busy mindset, a mentality increasingly emphasized by marketing campaigns, works. This study aims to fill this gap by exploring the relationship between a busy mindset and the preference for angular-shaped versus circular-shaped products and brand logos. Design/methodology/approach This research consists of seven experimental studies using various shape stimuli, distinct manipulations of busy mindset, different assessments of shape preference and samples drawn from multiple countries. Findings The findings reveal that a busy mindset leads to a preference for angular shapes over circular ones by amplifying the need for uniqueness. In addition, these effects are attenuated when products are scarce. Originality/value This research represents one of the pioneering efforts to study the role of a busy mindset on consumers’ aesthetic preferences. Beyond yielding insights for practitioners into visual marketing, this research contributes to the theories on the busy mindset and shape preference.
... Study 2 used real product selections to assess shape preferences, aiming to replicate the test for H1 and provide initial evidence for the mediating role of NFU outlined in H2. Moreover, considering that individuals in time-pressured situations tend to have a higher need for structure (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983) and angular shapes appear more ordered and organized than circular ones (Jiang et al., 2016;Westerman et al., 2012), we investigated whether the busy mindset's inclination toward preferring angular shapes is driven by need for structure rather than NFU. ...
Article
Purpose – The shape of a product plays a crucial role in shaping consumer behavior. Despite the voluminous research on factors influencing consumers’ shape preferences, there remains a limited understanding of how the busy mindset, a mentality increasingly emphasized by marketing campaigns, works. This study aims to fill this gap by exploring the relationship between a busy mindset and the preference for angular-shaped versus circular-shaped products and brand logos. Design/methodology/approach – This research consists of seven experimental studies using various shape stimuli, distinct manipulations of busy mindset, different assessments of shape preference and samples drawn from multiple countries. Findings – The findings reveal that a busy mindset leads to a preference for angular shapes over circular ones by amplifying the need for uniqueness. In addition, these effects are attenuated when products are scarce. Originality/value – This research represents one of the pioneering efforts to study the role of a busy mindset on consumers’ aesthetic preferences. Beyond yielding insights for practitioners into visual marketing, this research contributes to the theories on the busy mindset and shape preference. Keywords Busy mindset, Need for uniqueness, Angular, Circular, Product shape, Brand logo, Product scarcity
... Consequently, the seller may interpret the use of time pressure by the buyer as a sign of weakness and question the truthfulness of their statements, which could lower trust in the buyer. Thirdly, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) argue that time pressure may lead individuals to stop searching for alternatives. However, in buyer-initiated communication, the buyer is discussing the alternatives they have, which may not be effective in persuading the seller to accept the deal. ...
Article
The information asymmetry in a B2B negotiation between the buyer and seller can be a source of concern. Sharing the asymmetric information can alleviate some of these concerns. However, the negotiating parties may be skeptical about the motive behind the asymmetric information sharing. In this research, we investigate how buyers and sellers respond to sharing initiatives in the negotiation process by examining their effects on trust, fear of missing out, and willingness to accept the offer. We conducted three experiments with both sellers and buyers who work in B2B sales and procurement, respectively. Our research findings indicate that time-sensitive asymmetric information sharing can generate higher trust, FOMO, and sellers' willingness to accept the offer. However, buyers have more trust and subsequent willingness to accept the offer if the seller uses no time-sensitive asymmetric information sharing strategy. The findings therefore contribute to the information asymmetry and negotiation strategy literature. The findings also offer practical policy suggestions for both B2B buyers and sellers, indicating that sellers can utilize time pressure as a negotiation tactic, whereas buyers should refrain from doing so in the information asymmetry context.
... Assessment for selection also requires a more firm, nonambiguous response (to give a grade, to decide about grade repetition) than assessment for learning. The desire for clear-cut answersknown as need for closure-relates to biases in thinking (Webster & Kruglanski, 1997), and high need for closure can be involved in discrimination in grading (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). It is, therefore, possible that the discriminatory behavior observed in the present studies is partly because of the higher need for closure triggered by the selection context compared with the educational context. ...
Article
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To understand the persistent social class achievement gap, researchers have investigated how educational settings affect lower versus higher socioeconomic status (SES) students’ performance. We move beyond the question of actual performance to study its assessment by evaluators. We hypothesized that even in the absence of performance differences, assessment’s function of selection (i.e., compare, rank, and track students) leads evaluators to create a SES achievement gap. In 2 experiments (N = 196; N = 259), participants had to assess a test supposedly produced by a high- or a low-SES student, and used assessment for selection (i.e., normative grading) or learning (i.e., formative comments). Results showed that evaluators using assessment for selection found more mistakes if the test was attributed to a low-rather than a high-SES student, a difference reduced in the assessment for learning condition. The third and fourth experiments (N = 374; N = 306) directly manipulated the function of assessment to investigate whether the production of the social class achievement gap was facilitated by the function of selection to a greater extent than the educational function. Results of Experiment 3 supported this hypothesis. The effect did not reach significance for Experiment 4, but an internal meta-analysis confirmed that assessment used for selection led evaluators to create a SES achievement gap more than assessment used for learning, thereby contributing to the reproduction of social inequalities.
... Current theory strongly suggests that most cognitive activity is goal dependent (Kruglanski, 1989(Kruglanski, , 1990a(Kruglanski, , 1990b(Kruglanski, , 1996bKruglanski & Meinholdt, 1990;Kruglanski & Webster, 1996;Kunda, 1990), providing an interface by which motivation may affect the initiation (Caccioppo & Petty, 1982;Ditto & Lopez, 1992;Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai, 1991;Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993;Martin & Tesser, 1989), termination (Martin & Tesser, 1989), and intensity (Abelson, 1995;Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989;Ditto & Lopez, 1992;Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995;Kruglanski, 1989;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Kruglanski et al., 1991;Kunda, 1990;Petty & Caccioppo, 1986) of cognition, as well as subsequent behavior (Bonninger, Krosnick, Berent, & Fabrigar, 1995;Crano, 1995). Conversely, much of motivation has a cognitive aspect, in that goals themselves can be thought of as cognitive structures. ...
Article
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Four studies examined the effect of positive versus neutral affect on preference among potential discussion partners who were members of two in-groups, two out-groups, or both an in-group and an out-group (crossed targets). The importance of targets' category memberships was manipulated by idiographically based selection. Positive affect elevated evaluation of crossed targets with a dominant (differentially important) in-group (Study 1). When categories were made equally important, positive affect had no impact (Studies 2 and 3). Study 4 presented crossed targets with both equally and differentially important group memberships and showed that differential category importance (dominance) is necessary for positive affect to influence judgments about them. These results are explained by the broadened categorization induced by positive affect.
... 1. providing clear and diagnostic counterstereotypical behavior from a member of a stereotyped group that forces perceivers to individuate and attend to stereotype-inconsistent information (e.g., Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980;Moskowitz, 1996), 2. providing goals (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990;Jones & Thibaut, 1958;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Tetlock, 1985) that serve to similarly promote a movement away from heuristic information processing to systematic evaluations of members of stereotyped groups, and 3. instructing individuals to suppress stereotypic thoughts (e.g., Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998;. These strategies suggest that control is exerted through effortful processing and the intention to curb one's use of stereotypes after stereotypes have been activated. ...
Article
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This research shows stereotype activation is controlled by chronic egalitarian goals. In the first 2 studies it was found that the stereotype of women is equally available to individuals with and without chronic goals, and the discriminant validity of the concept of egalitarian goals was established. In the next 2 experiments, differences in stereotype activation as a function of this individual difference were found. In Study 3, participants read attributes following stereotypical primes. Facilitated response times to stereotypical attributes were found for nonchronics but not for chronics. This lack of facilitation occurred at stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) where effortful correction processes could not operate, demonstrating preconscious control of stereotype activation due to chronic goals. In Study 4, inhibition of the stereotype was found at an SOA where effortful processes of stereotype suppression could not operate. The data reveal that goals are activated and used preconsciously to prevent stereotype activation, demonstrating both the controllability of stereotype activation and the implicit role of goals in cognitive control.
... The need for closure has been defined as a desire to possess a definite answer on some topic, any definite answer as opposed to confusion or uncertainty (Kruglanski, 1989(Kruglanski, , 1990. This motivation toward closure is thought to be proportionate to the perceived benefits of possessing, or the costs of lacking, closure and to be made salient by conditions that render information processing difficult or unpleasant, such as time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Kruglanski & Webster, 1991), noise (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), or mental fatigue (Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). Furthermore, people were shown to exhibit stable individual differences in the degree to which they value closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). ...
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Two experiments examined the impact of the motivation for cognitive closure on the abstractness of linguistic communications in intergroup contexts. Participants described positive and negative behaviors attributed to either an in-group or an out-group member. Individuals high (vs. low) in need for closure exhibited greater linguistic abstraction when describing positive behaviors of in-group members and negative behaviors of out-group members. These differences disappeared for descriptions of negative behaviors of out-group members. The discussion relates these results to the interface of motivation, language, and social cognition.
... For example, processing information in a noisy environment may be laborious. Alternatively, continued processing may be costly when it implies the missing of a decision deadline or when it occurs under time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Kruglanski & Webster, 1991). Other conditions capable of inducing a closure motivation may relate to the individual's mental or physical state. ...
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Three experiments explored need-for-closure effects in the question–answer paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants under high (vs. low) need for closure selected more abstract interview questions. In Experiments 2 and 3, such questions elicited more abstract answers—answers that causally implicated the object (vs. the subject) of the sentence and that prompted a less positive perceived rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee. These findings are discussed in reference to the role of motivation in language and the possible interpersonal consequences of motivated language use.
... motivation for processing this information is high (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Neuberg&Fiske, 1987). ...
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High- and low-task-importance Ss read a strong or weak unambiguous message or an ambiguous message that was attributed to a high- or low-credibility source. Under low task importance, heuristic processing of the credibility cue was the sole determinant of Ss' attitudes, regardless of argument ambiguity or strength. When task importance was high and message content was unambiguous, systematic processing alone determined attitudes when this content contradicted the validity of the credibility heuristic; when message content did not contradict this heuristic, systematic and heuristic processing determined attitudes independently. Finally, when task importance was high and message content was ambiguous, heuristic and systematic processing again both influenced attitudes. Yet, source credibility affected persuasion partly through its impact on the valence of systematic processing, confirming that heuristic processing can bias systematic processing when evidence is ambiguous. Implications for persuasion and other social judgment phenomena are discussed.
... In such conditions, possession of firm knowledge may represent a goal that a person may strive to attain, often by choosing the quickest route to closure rather than processing information more extensively. Indeed, in previous research, manipulations of time pressure, for example, assumed to elevate the costs of lacking closure, increased subjects* tendency to use early cues (early information about a target or numerical anchors) and preexisting knowledge structures (stereotypes) in reaching judgments as opposed to a more complete examination of the stimulus information (Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985;Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991;Jamieson and Zanna, 1989;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). ...
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Four experiments examined freely interacting groups to investigate the determinants of group members' reactions to opinion deviates and conformists. In the 1st experiment, the deviate was rejected more when he or she articulated the dissenting opinion in close proximity to the group-decision deadline versus at an earlier point in the group discussion. In the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th experiment, the deviate was rejected more when the group discussion was carried out in a noisy versus a quiet environment. Furthermore, when the conformist's contributions to the group's attempts to reach consensus were made salient (in Experiment 4), he or she was evaluated more positively in a noisy versus a quiet environment. The results were discussed in terms of the notion that group members' tendency to denigrate a deviate or extol a conformist may be stronger when their need for collective cognitive closure is heightened.
... In low-motivation settings (e.g, low personal relevance, low accountability), perceivers engage in negligible amounts of systematic processing and, moreover, seem to base their social judgments primarily on easily processed heuristic cues when such cues are available (e.g, Axsom et al, 1987;Borgida & Howard-Pitney, 1983;Chaiken, 1980;Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1991;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Petty & Cacioppo, 1984;Petty et al, 1981;Tetlock, 1985a). For example, Chaiken (1980, Experiment 1) had subjects who did or did not expect to discuss their attitudes in a subsequent session read a message that they believed was written by a likable or unlikable person. ...
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Ss received consensus information that was either congruent or incongruent with the valence of persuasive message content. In Experiment 1 Ss believed that their processing task was either important or unimportant whereas in Experiment 2 all Ss believed that their task was unimportant. In accord with the heuristic–systematic model's sufficiency principle, high-task-importance Ss exhibited a great deal of systematic processing regardless of congruency, whereas low-importance Ss processed systematically only when they received incongruent messages; in the congruent conditions heuristic processing dominated. Attitude data generally reflected these processing differences and confirmed the additivity and attenuation assumptions of the model. The utility of the sufficiency principle for understanding motivation for elaborative processing and the relevance of the findings to understanding the processing and judgmental effects of expectancy disconfirmation are discussed.
... A good deal of research has indicated that our motivations and goals can influence how we think about social information (e.g., Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976;Erber & Fiske, 1984;Fiske & Neuberg, in press;Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985;Harkness, DeBono, & Borgida, 1985;Kruglanski, in press;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Omoto & Borgida, 1988;Showers & Cantor, 1985;Sorrentino&Higgins, 1986;Tetlock, 1983aTetlock, , 1983b. Especially relevant to the present concerns are data from a series of studies by Neuberg and Fiske (1987) in which perceivers expected to interact with a person they believed to be schizophrenic. ...
Article
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Investigated the idea that impression formation goals may regulate the impact that perceiver expectancies have on social interactions. In simulated interviews, interviewer Ss were given a negative expectancy about one applicant S and no expectancy about another. Half the interviewers were encouraged to form accurate impressions; the others were not. As predicted, no-goal interviewers exhibited a postinteraction impression bias against the negative-expectancy applicants, whereas the accuracy-goal interviewers did not. Moreover, the ability of the accuracy goal to reduce this bias was apparently mediated by more extensive and less biased interviewer information-gathering, which in turn elicited an improvement in negative-expectancy applicants' performances. These findings stress the theoretical and practical importance of considering the motivational context within which expectancy-tinged social interactions occur.
... Accountability can also reduce bias through unconscious cognitive processes, such as the encoding of information (Tetlock, 1992, cited in Reskin, 2000Tetlock, 1985). Research shows that accountability and the evaluation apprehension it creates reduce the use of ethnic stereotypes in evaluating writing samples (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983), and reduces bias against older job candidates (Gordon et al., 1988). Others show that when organizations enhance social accountability, inequality in personnel decisions or in workforce composition declines (Castilla, 2015;Kalev, 2014;Kalev et al., 2006). ...
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Managerial bias is a major source of workplace inequality and a central target of employer diversity efforts, yet we know little about the content of stereotypes and where they prevail. Stereotypes can be ambivalent, mixing negative and positive dimensions. Ambivalent stereotypes can rationalize discriminatory decision-making but they may also be more amenable to change. This article examines the prevalence of wholly negative and ambivalent age-based stereotypes across organizational contexts. Data on 551 managers reveals, first, that the modal manager holds ambivalent stereotypes about older workers, with positive perceptions of their personal attributes and negative perceptions regarding their employability. Second, both negative and ambivalent stereotypes are common in the presence of a labour union. Their prevalence declines, however, in different contexts: ambivalent stereotypes decline with increased intergroup contact and negative stereotypes decline when accountability triggers are implmented. Implications for research on work, organizations, older workers, and diversity management are discussed.
... System 1 responds quickly to propose intuitive solutions, while System 2 takes longer to settle and may "endorse, correct, or override" these proposals (Kahneman & Frederick, 2012). As time pressure prevents thorough information processing [47], System 2 is less likely to prevail [33,48,49]. Therefore, we expect people to be more likely to employ fast and associative heuristics under more intense time pressure [50,51]. ...
Article
We investigate emergency decision-making behaviors in the face of life losses under an uncertain time limit. We design a behavioral experiment with the background of a hypothetical disaster to investigate the subjects' decision strategies. We find that prior experience affects a subject's estimation and actual consumption of time on comparing the rescue options in the following disaster. We also observe a risk shift that when an uncertain time limit is imposed, most risk-averse subjects with no time limit exhibit risk-taking behaviors. Moreover, under more intense time pressure, subjects are more likely to adopt heuristics such as seeking the best outcome with the highest probability, seeking the best while avoiding the unacceptable worst, and achieving a satisficing result with a target probability. As time pressure relaxes, most subjects perform actuarial calculations to compare the available options. We recommend emergency managers to be cautioned against the anchoring effect of prior experience and the heuristics of seeking the possibility of saving more people (which could pose an unwarranted risk).
... This is normally operationalized by making them believe they would have to justify these explanations in front of other people. For example, subjects motivated to be accurate have shown less of a primacy effect in impression formation, less of a tendency to use ethnic stereotypes in their evaluations of essay quality, and less anchoring when making probability judgments (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). However, in situations where other motives are more relevant, beliefs and strategies that aid satisfying those motives will be strengthened instead. ...
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This paper examines the folk theory of ELO Hell, which stems from the community of esports players. ELO Hell is a causal explanation for the failure to achieve which is prominent but controversial in esports. Within the community, the belief in the existence of ELO Hell associated with lower skill. We aim to explain the persistence of this folk theory despite the debate within the community using psychological theories. We find this folk theory relevant for investigation because the blame placed on other players could escalate to patterns of harmful behavior, known as toxicity. Given the association with lower-ranked players, we predict this could be an operationalization of the Dunning-Kruger effect, a tendency for lower-skilled performers to overestimate themselves, and its associated motivational biases. Surveying 267 players of the esports League of Legends and triangulating the quantitative, qualitative, and mined data collected, we find evidence of lower-skilled players overestimating their skills more so than higher-skilled players. Further, we find that motivational biases regarding causal attributions for failure and success did explain significant variance in the degree of overestimation. However, we also found some players withdraw their effort from competitive play and we use self-determination theory to categorize their reason for losing motivation. Taken together, we show the psychological mechanisms which lead to the formation of the folk theory of ELO Hell and the motivational biases that uphold the conflict about its existence.
... We employed a time-pressure manipulation, which in previous research has been shown to increase the mediator NFC (47,48). Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to a time-pressure or control condition. ...
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Understanding the psychological processes that drive violent extremism is a pressing global issue. Across six studies, we demonstrate that perceived cultural threats lead to violent extremism because they increase people's need for cognitive closure (NFC). In general population samples (from Denmark, Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, and an international sample) and a sample of former Mujahideen in Afghanistan, single-level and multilevel mediation analyses revealed that NFC mediated the association between perceived cultural threats and violent extremist outcomes. Further, in comparisons between the sample of former Afghan Mujahideen and the general population sample from Afghanistan following the known-group paradigm, the former Mujahideen scored significantly higher on cultural threat, NFC, and violent extremist outcomes. Moreover, the proposed model successfully differentiated former Afghan Mujahideen participants from the general Afghan participants. Next, two preregistered experiments provided causal support for the model. Experimentally manipulating the predictor (cultural threat) in Pakistan led to higher scores on the mediator (NFC) and dependent variables (violent extremist outcomes). Finally, an experiment conducted in France demonstrated the causal effect of the mediator (NFC) on violent extremist outcomes. Two internal meta-analyses using state-of-the-art methods (i.e., meta-analytic structural equation modeling and pooled indirect effects analyses) further demonstrated the robustness of our results across the different extremist outcomes, designs, populations, and settings. Cultural threat perceptions seem to drive violent extremism by eliciting a need for cognitive closure.
... Beyond demonstrations of peoples' readiness toward forming beliefs, research has repeatedly affirmed people's tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty and found a preference for "cognitive closure" (i.e., a made-up mind) instead (Dijksterhuis et al., 1996;Furnham & Marks, 2013;Furnham & Ribchester, 1995;Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Ladouceur et al., 2000;Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). And last but not least, D. T. Gilbert (1991) made a strong case for the Spinozan view that comprehending something is so tightly connected to believing it that beliefs may be unaccepted only after deliberate reflection-and yet may affect our behavior (Risen, 2016). ...
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One of the essential insights from psychological research is that people's information processing is often biased. By now, a number of different biases have been identified and empirically demonstrated. Unfortunately, however, these biases have often been examined in separate lines of research, thereby precluding the recognition of shared principles. Here we argue that several-so far mostly unrelated-biases (e.g., bias blind spot, hostile media bias, egocentric/ethnocentric bias, outcome bias) can be traced back to the combination of a fundamental prior belief and humans' tendency toward belief-consistent information processing. What varies between different biases is essentially the specific belief that guides information processing. More importantly, we propose that different biases even share the same underlying belief and differ only in the specific outcome of information processing that is assessed (i.e., the dependent variable), thus tapping into different manifestations of the same latent information processing. In other words, we propose for discussion a model that suffices to explain several different biases. We thereby suggest a more parsimonious approach compared with current theoretical explanations of these biases. We also generate novel hypotheses that follow directly from the integrative nature of our perspective.
... As discussed briefly above, an individual's motivations can shape their responses to information and how they use that information to construct or change their beliefs (Kunda 1990). For example, when accuracy motivations are high (due to financial or reputational incentives), individuals may employ more laborious and less biased decision-making processes (Kruglanski andFreund 1983, Tetlock 1985). However, directional motivations can also shape reasoning. ...
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Evidence-based policymaking has the potential to improve the efficiency and impact of climate mitigation and adaptation policies, but that promise cannot be fulfilled if policymakers fail to change their minds (update their beliefs) when presented with new evidence. Research suggests that individuals often resist changing their mind, especially on polarized topics like climate action. Here we explore whether an “evidence-based policymaker” intervention can reduce resistance when policymakers interpret new information. We hypothesize that, if policymakers wish to see themselves as "evidence-based", reminding them of that identity can make changing their beliefs more comfortable. This is because belief-updating provides an opportunity to affirm their identity as an evidence-based policymaker. In two survey studies of state and local U.S. policymakers – a neutral policy pilot (n = 152) and a polarizing climate policy experiment (n = 356) – we show that the intervention was effective, even when evidence was incompatible with prior policy beliefs or party ideology. This finding suggests that making evidence-based identities salient when presenting new evidence could increase that information’s impact on climate policymaking.
... In response to uncertainty, people with a strong need to achieve closure are more likely to engage in activities to attain closure; they tend to quickly make a decision and stick with it, even in light of disconfirming information; and experience negative affect when closure is not achieved (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996;Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Epistemically, someone with a high need for closure desires immediate closure (the urgency tendency to seize) and then desires to remain in a state of closure (the permanence tendency to freeze; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and they feel distressed when not in a state of closure (Roets & Van Hiel, 2008). A strong need to avoid closure is characterized by desiring uncertainty and an unwillingness to commit to a specific belief. ...
Article
Ghosting—the act of ending a relationship by ceasing communication without explanation—is a type of ostracism that threatens a person’s basic psychological needs for belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence, and control. The experience of ghosting creates uncertainty within the relationship and may vary based on individual differences in the need for closure, which is the desire to avoid ambiguity. Across three preregistered studies with emerging adults, we predicted that a greater need for closure would be associated with lower intentions to use ghosting (Studies 1 and 2) and lower needs satisfaction after being ghosted (Study 3). Results from Study 1 ( N = 553) and Study 2 ( N = 411) were inconsistent, but together indicate that a higher need for closure is not negatively associated—and may be positively associated—with ghosting intentions. In Study 3 ( N = 545), participants who recalled a time when they were ghosted reported lower needs satisfaction than included and directly rejected participants. Further, a higher need for closure was associated with lower needs satisfaction after being ghosted and after being directly rejected, but with greater needs satisfaction after being included. Overall, these findings suggest that the need for closure is less influential when deciding how to end a relationship, but it appears to play an important role in amplifying both positive and negative experiences within a relationship.
... 61 Lerner and Tetlock (1999). 62 Kruglanski and Freund (1983). 63 For the controversies about reasoned verdicts when it comes to jury decision-making see Burd and Hans (2018). ...
Chapter
The process of rendering numerical legal verdicts, such as non-economic damages or prison terms, is as common in legal systems, as it is inconsistent and erratic. The undue variability and unpredictability of numeric outcomes of legal proceedings may be a result of cognitive biases such as the anchoring effect. If anchors affecting verdicts are legally irrelevant, they might lead judges and jurors astray. In this Chapter, we review debiasing methods proposed in the literature to mitigate the anchoring effect in order to evaluate their effectiveness and applicability to the legal system. Then, we focus on an issue often neglected when it comes to the application of debiasing measures in law, namely the concept of judicial discretion. We argue that in cases in which judges are not aware of the biasing factors, they may not exercise their discretion properly. We try to assess which debiasing methods may make the process of rendering numerical verdicts more reasonable and predictable without necessarily eliminating the element of discretion in contexts where its preservation is deemed worthwhile.KeywordsJudicial decision-makingJudicial discretionDebiasingAnchoring effect
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Many researchers have drawn on the term “cognitive flexibility” to denote the explanatory mechanism underlying a broad array of organizational theories. However, conceptualization (and operationalization) of this construct is inconsistent, and sometimes conflates with that of other constructs, thereby weakening our understanding of cognitive flexibility and muddling the theories that rest on it. To bring clarity, we conduct a comprehensive search of cognitive flexibility constructs, strip away their labels, and use text analysis and manual coding of their descriptions to distinguish among five fluid thought processes: (1) elaborating, (2) dimensionalizing, (3) integrating, (4) juxtaposing, and (5) matching. We further group these processes into three higher-order categories involving the reshaping, contending, and shifting of cognitive structures—and conduct a literature review of their consequences and antecedents. Our surveying demonstrates that these processes’ substance and implications differ markedly. As such, we argue that cognitive flexibility may be more appropriately viewed as a multifaceted, rather than monolithic, construct. We discuss how a multifaceted approach helps bring clarity to implicated organizational theories—and opens up exciting questions about the transferability, antagonism, and trainability of cognitive flexibility’s distinct facets.
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Intergroup crimes are a ubiquitous element of our political reality, as are attempts to redress these crimes through apologies. Six experiments (N = 2,432) demonstrate that the victim group’s response to an offered apology has the power to shape uninvolved third parties’ impressions of the conflicting groups and influence their willingness to support the victim group. Across a variety of intergroup contexts, a victim group’s apology rejection attenuated perceived differences between the victim and perpetrator groups by diminishing the morality but increasing the power of the victim group while simultaneously reducing the power of the perpetrator group in the eyes of third parties (Experiments 1–4). These judgments, particularly the less favorable morality judgments of the victim group, suppressed the allocation of valued goods (Experiment 3a), political support (Experiments 3b–4), and actual donations (Experiment 4) granted to the victim group. Regarding the social costs imposed on the perpetrator group, we found mixed evidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the relevance of victim group responses in navigating posttransgression reactions and offer implications for understanding apologetic interactions from the perspective of uninvolved observers.
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A considerable amount of experimental research has been devoted to uncovering biased forms of reasoning. Notwithstanding the richness and overall empirical soundness of the bias research, the field can be described as disjointed, incomplete, and undertheorized. In this article, we seek to address this disconnect by offering “coherence-based reasoning” as a parsimonious theoretical framework that explains a sizable number of important deviations from normative forms of reasoning. Represented in connectionist networks and processed through constraint-satisfaction processing, coherence-based reasoning serves as a ubiquitous, essential, and overwhelmingly adaptive apparatus in people’s mental toolbox. This adaptive process, however, can readily be overrun by bias when the network is dominated by nodes or links that are incorrect, overweighted, or otherwise nonnormative. We apply this framework to explain a variety of well-established biased forms of reasoning, including confirmation bias, the halo effect, stereotype spillovers, hindsight bias, motivated reasoning, emotion-driven reasoning, ideological reasoning, and more.
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Successful cooperation is tightly linked to individuals’ beliefs about their interaction partners, the decision setting, and existing norms, perceptions, and values. This article reviews and integrates findings from judgment and decision-making, social and cognitive psychology, political science, and economics, developing a systematic overview of the mechanisms underlying motivated cognition in cooperation. We elaborate on how theories and concepts related to motivated cognition developed in various disciplines define the concept and describe its functionality. We explain why beliefs play such an essential role in cooperation, how they can be distorted, and how this fosters or harms cooperation. We also highlight how individual differences and situational factors change the propensity to engage in motivated cognition. In the form of a construct map, we provide a visualization of the theoretical and empirical knowledge structure regarding the role of motivated cognition, including its many interdependencies, feedback loops, and moderating influences. We conclude with a brief suggestion for a future research agenda based on this compiled evidence.
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Two information-processing mechanisms that could potentially contribute to judgmental discrimination against the members of stereotyped social groups were examined in two experiments, using a mock juror decision-making task. Both postulated mechanisms involve biased processing of judgment-relevant evidence. The interpretation hypothesis asserts that the activation of stereotypic concepts influences the perceived probative implications of other evidence. The selective processing hypothesis asserts that stereotype-consistent evidence is processed more extensively than is inconsistent evidence. Judgment and memory data from the first experiment supported the general notion that stereotype-based discrimination emerges from biased evidence processing. The specific pattern of results supported selective processing rather than interpretation biases as the critical process underlying observed judgmental discrimination. The second experiment corroborated this conclusion by showing that a manipulation that prevents selective processing of the evidence effectively eliminated biases in judgments and recall pertaining to stereotyped targets. Implications for a general understanding of stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.
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Social scientific work on argumentation is yet to address the perennial tension between social cognition and social constructionism. Moreover, argumentation-based qualitative analysis protocols are needed for interview and textual data. Nonetheless, argumentation models remain too complex to reflect everyday argumentation and are not necessarily reflective of underlying cognitive processes. This presents the need for further theorising social behaviour, with a view to formulating a model of argumentation that (a) is parsimonious, and (b) aligns with the literature on joint projects, due to the fact that in social cognition terms, argumentation is for doing. In this paper, we draw upon interdisciplinary literature on argumentation, noting convergences among different approaches. We then proceed to consider the socio-cognitive bedding provided by Lay Epistemic Theory, to present our Minimal Model of Argumentation (MMA). In MMA, interlocutors are held to make claims concerning an issue of concern, and defend them using warrants, evidence and qualifiers. We end by providing empirical examples supporting the utility of our model in qualitative research.
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Drawing on a motivated information processing model, we tested the hypothesis that groups' receptivity to outside advice is facilitated by their epistemic motivation—the desire to gain an accurate understanding of the world. Epistemic motivation was measured by proxy in Study 1 using a team task reflexivity measure, and was experimentally manipulated in Studies 2 and 3 by varying, respectively, either the amount of time allotted to complete the task or whether a consensus judgment was required before receiving advice. Receptivity to advice was operationalized as group advice seeking in Studies 1 and 2, and as advice utilization in Study 3. In support of our hypothesis, groups with higher levels of epistemic motivation consistently sought out and utilized advice more than those with lower levels of epistemic motivation. Moreover, epistemic motivation affected judgment accuracy via groups' receptivity to advice.
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Previous research has investigated characteristics of individuating information, stereotypes, and evaluative circumstances that moderate reliance on social category information and individuating information in implicit person perception. However, possibly no research has examined characteristics of perceivers that may be involved in these processes. In four studies (N = 1,545), the present research tested the effects of six individual differences on application of race and gender stereotypes in implicit perceptions of individuals and the potential moderating effects of diagnosticity of individuating information. We found that individuating information affected implicit person similarly regardless of the diagnosticity of the individuating information, the target group, and—largely—individual differences. Although these findings involved several null results, these results are nonetheless informative because they provide evidence that individuating information is a promising means of bias reduction given its consistent effects.
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This paper examines the effect of teachers’ stereotypic perceptions on their evaluations and expectations of students. In Study 1 teachers responded in stereotypic manner when they were presented only with information regarding students’ ethnic origin and sex. The results of Study 2 show that teachers’ stereotypic perception influenced their grading practices. The results of Study 3 indicate that familiarity with students’ behavior might override teachers’ stereotypic impressions based on students’ group membership. The implications of these results for educational practices are discussed.
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Subjects were requested to choose between gambles, where the outcome of one gamble depended on a single elementary event, and the other depended on an event compounded of a series of such elementary events. The data supported the hypothesis that the subjective probability of a compound event is systematically biased in the direction of the probability of its components resulting in overestimation of conjunctive events and underestimation of disjunctive events. Studies pertaining to this topic are discussed.
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People who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased manner. They are apt to accept "confirming" evidence at face value while subjecting "disconfirming" evidence to critical evaluation, and, as a result, draw undue support for their initial positions from mixed or random empirical findings. Thus, the result of exposing contending factions in a social dispute to an identical body of relevant empirical evidence may be not a narrowing of disagreement but rather an increase in polarization. To test these assumptions, 48 undergraduates supporting and opposing capital punishment were exposed to 2 purported studies, one seemingly confirming and one seemingly disconfirming their existing beliefs about the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. As predicted, both proponents and opponents of capital punishment rated those results and procedures that confirmed their own beliefs to be the more convincing and probative ones, and they reported corresponding shifts in their beliefs as the various results and procedures were presented. The net effect of such evaluations and opinion shifts was the postulated increase in attitude polarization. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Outlines a theory of the lay epistemic process. According to this theory knowledge-seeking behavior is initiated by a purpose that a person has for reaching a given inference and consists of the stages of problem formulation and of problem resolution, the latter stage being governed by the principle of logical consistency. Major attributional formulations are interpreted within the lay epistemic framework. It is concluded that such formulations have typically addressed particular instances of epistemic (inferential) behavior rather than the underlying epistemic process. In this sense, the attributional formulations may be considered special cases of the present model applied to specific contents of knowledge. The present lay epistemic paradigm thus provides an integrative framework that allows for the consideration of diverse attributional models in common theoretical terms and for the derivation of the necessary applicability conditions of different such models. (34 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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160 undergraduates in 3 experiments were induced to explain particular events in the later lives of clinical patients whose previous case histories they had read, and they were then asked to estimate the likelihood of the events in question. Each experiment indicated that the task of identifying potential antecedents to explain an event increases that event's subjective likelihood. This phenomenon was replicated across a variety of clinical case studies and predicted events and was evident both under conditions in which Ss initially believed the events they explained to be authentic, only to learn afterward that no information actually existed about the later life of the patient, and under conditions in which Ss knew from the outset that their explanations were merely hypothetical. Implications for previous investigations dealing with belief perserverance and the consequences of hindsight perspective are outlined, and potential boundary conditions of the observed effect are discussed. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Applies functional measurement theory to 4 experimental situations in psychophysical scaling. 2 judgment models: additive and multiplicative are 1st applied to a psychophysical averaging task and to a ratio estimation task in which the numerical response is assumed to be a valid and proper measure of subjective magnitude. It is shown that factorial designs and analysis of variance procedures not only provide tests of the models, but also scales of the independent, stimulus variables. Next multisection (including bisection) and ratio setting tasks are considered. For these, the response is on the physical stimulus scale, and this is not in general an adequate psychological scale. However, the monotone rescaling procedure of functional measurement provides a way to get a valid scale of the dependent, response variable. A robust method for distinguishing between the log and power versions of the psychophysical law is also obtained. Finally, it is argued that the experimental base of traditional psychophysical scaling with direct, numerical response methods is inherently too narrow to support a solution to its problems. Tasks based on psychophysical information integration provide a broader and potentially simpler approach to scaling. In this approach, the psychophysical law appears as a by-product of the substantive development. (2 p. ref.)
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Two experiments demonstrated that self-perceptions and social perceptions may persevere after the initial basis for such perceptions has been completely discredited. In both studies subjects first received false feedback, indicating that they had either succeeded or failed on a novel discrimination task and then were thoroughly debriefed concerning the predetermined and random nature of this outcome manipulation. In experiment 2, both the initial outcome manipulation and subsequent debriefing were watched and overheard by observers. Both actors and observers showed substantial perseverance of initial impressions concerning the actors' performance and abilities following a standard "outcome" debriefing. "Process" debriefing, in which explicit discussion of the perseverance process was provided, generally proved sufficient to eliminate erroneous self-perceptions. Biased attribution processes that might underlie perserverance phenomena and the implications of the present data for the ethical conduct of deception research are discussed.
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Ss judged the likableness of persons described by sets of 3 adjectives under 1 of 4 instruction conditions: (1) each adjective is equally important, (2) the adjectives may differ in validity, (3) and (4) 1 adjective does not apply. The adjective sets embodied affective and antonymic inconsistency. The results were interpreted as indicating that the impression response was an average of the scale values of the adjectives. For Condition 1, a simple average model worked reasonably well though not perfectly. Data for the remaining conditions were interpreted in terms of a weighted average formulation in which inconsistent adjectives received a decreased weight.
Chapter
This chapter discusses the social psychologists study “top of the head” phenomena in their experimental investigations. Attention within the social environment is selective. It is drawn to particular features of the environment either as a function of qualities intrinsic to those features (such as light or movement) or as a function of the perceiver's own dispositions and temporary need states. These conditions are outlined in the chapter. As a result of differential attention to particular features, information about those features is more available to the perceiver. Relative to the quantity of information retained about other features, more is retained about the salient features. When the salient person is the self, the same effects occur, and the individual is also found to show more consistency in attitudes and behaviors. These processes may occur primarily in situations which are redundant, unsurprising, uninvolving, and unarousing. They seem to occur automatically and substantially without awareness, and as such, they differ qualitatively from the intentional, conscious, controlled kind of search which characterizes all the behavior.
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The present study tested the hypothesis that perseverance of discredited self-perceptions after debriefing varies with subjects' opportunity to engage in causal explanation. Subjects were presented with false feedback indicating that they had either succeeded or failed at a novel discrimination task. Four information processing conditions varied subjects' opportunity to explain their outcomes to themselves. Subjects who, through distraction, were prevented from generating explanations showed no evidence of perseverance, while perseverance increased with increasing opportunity to engage in causal explanation.
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A theory of epistemic behavior is applied to the problem of cognitive therapy. The theory addresses the process whereby all knowledge is acquired and modified. The task of cognitive therapy is to modify some types of knowledge, those with aversive consequences to the individual. Any knowledge is assumed to be inevitably biased, selective and tentative. It is assumed to be affected by three epistemically relevant motivations: the need of structure, the fear of invalidity and the need of conclusional contents. Such motivations can be appropriately enlisted in the aid of uprooting the patient's dysfunctional beliefs or “frustrative hypotheses” concerning his/her failures to attain important goals. Unlike major alternative approaches, the present one: (1) disputes the dysfunctional misconception hypothesis whereby neurotic inferences are distorted or biased as compared to normal inferences, (2) questions the value of constructing a priori lists, or taxonomies of dysfunctional beliefs, and (3) qualifies the suggestion that own behavior or personal experience is a superior vehicle of belief-induction. Instead, the persuasive value of behavior or experience is assumed to be restricted to cases in which the individual trusts his own ability to interpret the events at hand.
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Currently prevalent views of human inference are contrasted with an integrated theory of the epistemic process. The prevailing views are characterized by the following orienting assumptions: (1) There exist reliable criteria of inferential validity based on objectively veridical or optimal modes of information processing. (2) Motivational and cognitive factors bias inferences away from these criteria and thus enhance the likelihood of judgmental error. (3) The layperson's epistemic process is pluralistic; it consists of a diverse repertory of information-processing strategies (heuristics, schemas) selectively invoked under various circumstances. By contrast, the present analysis yields the following conclusions: (1) There exist no secure criteria of validity. (2) Psychological factors that bias inferences away from any currently accepted criteria need not enhance the likelihood of error. (3) The inference process may be considered unitary rather than pluralistic. The various strategies and biases discussed in the literature typically confound universal epistemic process with specific examples (or contents) of such processes. Empirical support for the present analysis is presented, including evidence refuting proposals that specific contents of inference are of universal applicability; evidence suggesting that people do not, because of a reliance on subnormative heuristics, underutilize nonnative statistical information—rather, people seem unlikely to utilize any information if it is nonsalient or (subjectively) irrelevant; and evidence demonstrating that the tendency of beliefs to persevere despite discrediting information can be heightened or lowered by introducting appropriate motivational orientations.
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The chapter summarizes evidence indicating that cognitive biases can result in the perceiver holding stereotypic conceptions of social groups; that is, cognitive mechanisms alone may be the foundation of perceived intergroup differences. The chapter reveals the significant role of cognitive mechanisms at several possible points in the overall attribution process. The cognitive orientation presented in the chapter provides a new perspective for understanding why stereotypes are so persistent over time and resistant to change. Stereotypes, as cognitive schemas, can influence the encoding, interpretation, retention, and retrieval of subsequently obtained information about members of stereotyped groups, along with the perceiver's causal attributions regarding the target person's behavior. The chapter discusses a number of cognitive biases, which have bearing on the stereotyping process. One of the primary challenges faced by researches in this field is the question of how these biases can be altered or modified in cases where they yield consequences hat reduce, rather than facilitate effectiveness. The chapter considers the question of what behavioral consequences result from the perceiver holding a stereotype of a particular group.
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A bstract Do causal attributions serve the need to protect and / or enhance self‐esteem? In a recent review, Miller and Ross (1975) proposed that there is evidence for self‐serving effect in the attribution of success but not in the attribution of failure; and that this effect reflects biases in information‐processing rather than self‐esteem maintenance. The present review indicated that self‐serving effects for both success and failure are obtained in most but not all experimental paradigms. Processes which may suppress or even reverse the self‐serving effect were discussed. Most important, the examination of research in which self‐serving effects are obtained suggested that these attributions are better understood in motivational than in information‐processing terms.
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This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
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The hypothesis that psychological stress will result in increased intolerance for ambiguity is supported by the generally significant differences between the stress and security groups on the experimental measures.
Lay epistemology: A theory for cognitive therapy Social-personality inference in clinical psychology
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Social-personality inference in clinical psychology
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Kruglanski, A. W., & Jaffe, Y. Lay epistemology: A theory for cognitive therapy. In L. Abramson (Ed.), Social-personality inference in clinical psychology. New York: Gui]ford
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Stereotypic perceptions of teachers
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