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A MULTICOMPONENT
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
AUTHENTICITY: THEORY
AND RESEARCH
Michael H. Kernis
Brian M. Goldman
And if by chance I wake at night and I ask you who I am, oh take me to the
slaughterhouse I will wait there with the lamb.
—Leonard Cohen
Whatever satisfies the soul is truth.
—Walt Whitman
I prefer to be true to myself, even at the hazard of incurring the ridicule of others,
rather than to be false, and to incur my own abhorrence.
—Frederick Douglass
In this chapter, we present research and theory pertaining to our multicom-
ponent perspective on authentic functioning. We begin with a historical ac-
count of various philosophical perspectives on authentic functioning and
briefly review several past and contemporary psychological perspectives on
authenticity. We then define and discuss our multicomponent conceptualiza-
tion of authenticity and describe each of its components and their relationships
to other constructs in the psychology literature. Next, we present an individual
diVerences measure we have developed to assess dispositional authenticity
and each of its components, and we report findings attesting to the adequacy
of its psychometric properties. In addition, we present findings from a variety of
studies we have conducted to examine how authenticity relates to diverse
aspects of healthy psychological and interpersonal functioning. These studies
pertain to a wide range of phenomena, including the following: verbal de-
fensiveness, mindfulness, coping styles, self‐concept structure, social‐role
283
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL ‘‘Authenticity Inventory’’ Copyright ß2006
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 38 Brain M. Goldman and Michael H. Kernis
DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38006-9 0065-2601/06 $35.00
functioning, goal pursuits, general well‐being, romantic relationships, parent-
ing styles, and self‐esteem. Following this, we discuss potential downsides or
costs for authentic functioning and describe some future directions for research
on authenticity.
I. A Historical Overview of Authenticity
Poets, painters, clergy, scholars, philosophers, and scientists have long
sought to define who one ‘‘really’’ is. Descriptions of authentic functioning
are found among a variety of works and disciplines across the arts and
sciences. However, these descriptions are often vague, relegated to peripher-
al segments of larger works, and lack continuity in their lineage or origin. At
times, descriptions of authenticity seem to be at the ‘‘limits of language,’’
being loosely described in such diverse topics as ethics, well‐being, con-
sciousness, subjectivity, self‐processes, and social or relational contexts, or
characterized in terms of its opposite (i.e., inauthenticity), with references to
inauthentic living, false‐self behaviors, or self‐deception.
Despite such limitations, contemporary psychological views of authenticity
owe a great debt to the works of philosophy. Within the field of philosophy,
authenticity is loosely set within topics, such as metaphysics or ontology,firmly
entrenched in particular movements, such as existentialism or phenomenology,
and localized to specific authors like Sartre or Heidegger. In the following
section, we identify and discuss some of the historical ideas and perspectives
within philosophy that contribute to the development of the concept of psy-
chological authenticity. This historical summary points to a portrayal of au-
thenticity as involving a variety of themes. Most notably, authentic functioning
is characterized in terms of people’s (1) self‐understanding, (2) openness to
objectively recognizing their ontological realities (e.g., evaluating their desir-
able and undesirable self‐aspects), (3) actions, and (4) orientation towards
interpersonal relationships.
Portrayals of authentic functioning date back to the Ancient Greek philo-
sophers. Perhaps, the earliest account dates back to Socrates’stance that the
‘‘unexamined’’ life is not worth living. While self‐inquiry is paramount for
Socrates, in his work Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle emphasized the impor-
tance of actions. Aristotle viewed ethics in terms of people’s pursuit of the
‘‘higher good.’’ Specifically, he proposed that the highest good is ‘‘activity of
the soul in accordance with the best and most complete virtue in a complete
life’’ (Hutchinson, 1995). Such pursuits are intimately tied with people’s well‐
being (Waterman, 1993). From this view, well‐being (i.e., ‘‘eudaimonia’’)is
attained through self‐realization, that is, by performing activities that reflect
284 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
one’s true calling. Such activities do not have happiness or pleasure as their
desired end; instead, pleasure is a consequence of a life in which one success-
fully manages to perform these activities well. This view seems akin to exis-
tential philosophers like Nietzsche and Kierkegaard (May, 1960, p. 22), who
described man as ‘‘the organism who makes certain values—prestige, power,
tenderness, love—more important than pleasure and even more important
than survival itself. ’’ The similarity among these perspectives, and many of
the subsequent perspectives discussed in this section, is the portrayal of people
in a manner that transcends measuring success primarily via hedonic qualities
(e.g., happiness), or even basic evolutionary success (e.g., survival). What
emerges in its place is a broad depiction of people as being rich in complexity,
actively and intentionally pursuing a life in accord with their deepest poten-
tials.
Aristotle also discussed how people’s pursuit of the higher good involves
diVerent virtues (e.g., continence, pleasure, friendship, and theoretical wis-
dom). Whereas the highest good refers to the end that people pursue for its
sake only, every other good is pursued for the sake of the highest good
(Hutchinson, 1995). As such, the described relationship between pursuit of
the good and highest good seems to underscore a sense of unity or integration
among people’s pursuits—a perspective that contemporary self‐theorists
would suggest reflects self‐organization (e.g., Donahue, Robins, Roberts, &
John, 1993; Showers & Ziegler‐Hill, 2003), integrated self‐regulation (e.g.,
Deci & Ryan, 2000), or self‐concordance (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Aristotle’s
contribution to conceptualizing authenticity is in having paved a connection
between people’s self‐knowledge and behavioral self‐regulation. In his view,
knowledge of the highest good significantly aVects peoples’lives because it
allows them to organize their lives well ‘‘like an archer with a target to aim at’’
(Irwin, 2003). Thus, from this perspective, authentic functioning is the result
of sustained activity in concert with a deeply informed sense of purpose.
Renee Descartes’Meditations oVers a variety of concepts and insights
relevant to conceptualizing authenticity. Descartes’perspective demon-
strated a radical departure from his predecessors. According to Groscholz
(2003), prior to Descartes, philosophers asked: What must the world be like
for it to be intelligible? Following Descartes, they asked: What must the mind
be like for the world to be intelligible to it? This shift in focus demonstrates the
centrality of cognitive processes in directing and interpreting experience.
While such a view clearly advances the role of psychological functioning
in experience, perhaps Descartes’greatest contribution to conceptualizing
authenticity lies in his emphasis on subjectivity in mental processes.
Descartes’proclamation ‘‘I think, therefore Iam’’ suggests that what ‘‘I
am’’ is a thing that thinks; a thing that doubts, understands, aYrms, denies,
is willing, unwilling, imagines, and has sensory perceptions. In contrast to
AUTHENTICITY 285
the epistemological precedent established by Aristotle, Descartes rejected
the notion that all knowledge originates in sense perception and sense
perception is our conduit to external things (Grosholz, 2003). In lieu
of Aristotelian epistemology, Descartes proposed that if one can know
objects, one must firstly learn to think them, or reason upon them. Subse-
quently, with mistrust, one may rely on sensory perceptions, abstracting
from them and correcting them, in light of the constructions of reason
(Grosholz, 2003).
Descartes demonstrates the importance of subjectivity in the case of a
piece of wax just taken from a honeycomb. Presumably, the wax may be
conceived of as an object of sense perception—retaining some of the scent of
the flowers from which it was gathered. However, the piece of wax is not
merely an object sensed by sensory perceptions, but rather it is also always
thought, that is, submitted to being understood or reasoned upon (Grosholz,
2003). Whereas the qualities of the wax delivered by sense perception depend
on sensory information, what one can think about the piece of wax, as it
melts, or diminishes in its smell, is what remains constant under all trans-
formations. Thus, individuals may doubt sensory perceptions about objects
(since sense perception is just a modality of awareness), but they cannot
doubt that they are aware of their perceptions of the objects (Grosholz,
2003). From this perspective, what validates the ontological reality of the
object (e.g., what really constitutes the wax) is the quantifiable mental
scrutiny of it. That is, the certainty that individuals’place on known objects
is not caused by the objects’objective reality; rather, certainty of the object
results from a formal subjective process of consciousness, constructed by
reason. Knowledge of an object is not a function of the contents of an object,
but of the contents of our consciousness and mental activities regarding the
object. As such, by relying on the formal process of mentally scrutinizing
their consciousness, people may attain clarity and distinctiveness in their
idea of things, and thereby grasp their very essence (Grosholz, 2003).
What then, if the object of one’s attention is one’s‘‘self ’’? Philosophers
like Descartes, Kant, and Dewey struggled with the role of self‐consciousness
in people’s emotion, will, and thinking (Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin,
1999). However, conscious attention that regarded the falseness of others’
behaviors seems to have emerged within a particular cultural context. For
instance, the cultural historian Burckhardt (Winter & Barenbaum, 1999)
concluded that people of the middle ages were conscious of themselves only
as a member of a general category, for example, race, party, family, or
corporation. Subsequent to the Renaissance, people construed themselves
as individuals with personal attributes. Such societal changes appear to have
corresponded with people’s specific concerns in perceiving others’authentic
286 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
functioning. Harter (1999) describes this as the historical emergence of
interest in false‐self behavior.
According to Baumeister (1987), people of the 16th century became
interested in distinguishing between others’private concealment from that
which was observable in them. Similarly, Trilling (1971) discusses themes of
deception and pretense found among English politics, philosophy, and
literature (e.g., Shakespeare). Concerns about self‐concealment were, in
Baumeister’s (1987) view, initially limited to perceptions of others—were
people hiding their true‐selves from others? Baumeister (1987) notes that
with the arrival of Puritanism so too emerged concerns over whether indivi-
duals were deceiving themselves. Determining whether one’s own actions
were true or false depended on a consideration of one’s standing on char-
acteristics deemed necessary for one to possess in order to enter into heaven
(i.e., piety, faith, and virtue). Thus, authentic functioning from this perspec-
tive (i.e., being one’s true‐self ) involves regulating one’s actions to be in
accord with religious dictates.
Historical perspectives on false‐self behaviors demonstrate the vital role
that cultural contexts play in people’s perceptions of their own and others’
authenticity. In many respects, false‐self behaviors represent the lower end of
an authenticity continuum (i.e., the relative absence of authentic action or
experience). Contemporary interest in false‐self behaviors is evident in such
varied topics as self‐monitoring (Snyder, 1987), impression management and
strategic self‐presentations (GoVman, 1959; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980),
and voice (Gilligan, 1982; Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1997). In terms of
conceptualizing authenticity, the notion of false‐self behaviors reflects the
continual tension between the person and the social structure—the interface
of personal inclinations and social obligations that form the stage on which
authenticity is portrayed.
Many of the works from middle‐age philosophers were consistent with the
Puritanical interpretation of authenticity by equating falsehood with non-
conformity to religious prescriptions. In contrast, philosophy from the
Enlightenment and onward often challenged the premise that authentic
functioning occurs through acting in accordance with prescribed religious
doctrines, or any learned social conventions. For instance, philosophers like
Hobbes and Hume discussed morality and the structure of social contexts as
central features of ontological concerns.
Hume asserted that the concept of oneself is one that people derive
through their social interactions with others—a position championed by
symbolic interactionists (Cooley, 1902; Meade, 1934) and advocated by
current psychological theorists who emphasize the reflected self (e.g., Tice
& Wallace, 2003). Thus, Hume asserted that morality and authenticity are
AUTHENTICITY 287
best understood through the relationships that connect individuals to others.
Specifically, Hume described morality in terms of how people judge
‘‘virtues’’—behavior that produces pleasure or reduces pain for the actor
or for others (Wilson, 2003). Whereas ‘‘artificial’’ virtues are those that
depend on social conventions, and that people evaluate for its social pru-
dence, ‘‘natural’’ virtues reflect behaviors people would perform even if there
were no need for social conventions to regulate their occurrence (Wilson,
2003). Thus, in contrast to the implicit conformity found in artificial virtue
pursuits, natural virtues, similar to Aristotle’s notion of the pursuit of the
higher good, are actions taken for their own sake. Furthermore, Hume
describes such actions as emanating from relational concerns that promote
social well‐being, and thus, by extension promote individuals’personal well‐
being. Thus, the distinction between artificial and natural virtues provides an
important basis for further diVerentiating authentic functioning in terms of
people’s motives, as opposed to merely actions taken in tandem with pre-
scribed social norms. Moreover, Hume’s views provide an important histor-
ical basis for considering interpersonal concerns as central to authentic
functioning.
With the onset of developments in existential philosophy around the 19th
century, metaphysical critiques often equated conformity to religious con-
ventions with inauthentic functioning. As a precursor to the Existential
movement, Kierkegaard asserted that authentic functioning reflects subjec-
tivity in choices that involve people’s‘‘essential knowing’’—knowledge that
concerns the deepest meanings of their existence. Objective certainty of
essential knowledge is neither final nor complete, and thus, its truth is always
an approximation (Westphal, 2003). Kierkegaard also observed that cultural
institutions tend to produce pseudo‐individuals (i.e., stereotyped members of
‘‘the crowd’’). Whereas ‘‘the crowd is untruth,’’ Kierkegaard states, ‘‘truth is
subjectivity’’ (Kierkegaard, 2004). In response to objective uncertainty and
institutionalized identity production, individuals must take responsibility for
their existential choices (e.g., their choices regarding who they will be) and
become who they are beyond culturally imposed identities (McDonald,
2005).
In becoming their self, individual’s existential anxiety is aroused. That is,
people experience ambivalence regarding how to be, experiencing joy and
excitement for their freedom, yet dread for self‐repudiation and the respon-
sibility for choosing how to be. Existential anxiety reflects a form of self‐
alienation or as Kierkegaard (2004, p. 26) put it, ‘‘there is an interiority that
is incommensurable with exteriority.’’ Through a process of becoming their
own self, individuals pass through the stage of self‐alienation, and subse-
quently rely on their subjective faith to energize and organize their chosen
actions toward their absolute end/goal (e.g., their essential purpose).
288 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
For Kierkegaard, faith is not rooted in the clarity of people’s knowledge
(e.g., ‘‘How certain is my knowledge?’’), but rather in the embracing of their
paradoxes in spite of their absurdities (e.g., ‘‘How deep is my commitment to
what I fallibly take to be true?’’). Faith signifies a particular cognitive stance
(e.g., recognition of the absurd) that involves a radical transformation in
one’s life (Westphal, 2003). The challenge of this transformation occurs in a
‘‘process of highest inwardness’’—whereby people accept their faith as nor-
mative and orient their actions toward becoming their ‘‘innermost’’ selves.
From this perspective, authentic functioning is not attainable via learning
and conforming to norms derived from external dogmatic beliefs (be
they religious, or otherwise). Rather, authentic functioning occurs when
individuals choose to be in accordance with their absolute end/goal.
Personally, for Kierkegaard, existence emerges as a philosophical problem
to embrace the paradoxical presence of God, by smuggling ‘‘Christianity
out of the system of Christendom.’’ A generation later, Neitzsche’s‘‘philos-
ophy of the future’’ sought to deconstruct the interpretations and evalua-
tions implicit in cultural authorities (including the prior teachings of
philosophy itself). According to Neitzsche, absolutisms in social categories,
such as ‘‘good and evil,’’ needed to be reinterpreted and revalued (e.g.,
‘‘beyond good and evil’’). By abandoning any, and all culturally constructed
absolutes, nihilism emerges—the recognition that life has no intrinsic mean-
ing. In light of this recognition, Nietzsche proposed that some people would
fall victim to despair. Alternatively, Halling and Carroll (1999, p.97) note
Nietzsche’s proposal of the emergence of a new person—the Ubermensch
(‘‘Overman’’), a ‘‘creator of authentic values.’’ The Ubermensch represents a
particular mode of existence, found in a person who goes beyond a mere
nihilistic devaluation of all prevailing values, to make possible a ‘‘reva-
luation of values’’ (Schacht, 2003). Thus, by people ‘‘naturalizing’’ their self
understanding to fit within a reinterpreted sensible context of their constitu-
tion, resources, and circumstances, people realize their life‐aYrming poten-
tial. Schacht (2003, p. 412) describes this state as ‘‘a fundamental expression
reflecting how one is or how one has come to be constituted,’’ noting that ‘‘it
signals no abandonment of commitment to truthfulness, but rather the
ascent to a further, highest humanly possible form of it.’’
Thus, for Nietzsche and Kierkegaard alike, the essence of people’s being is
unfounded in objective inventories designed to measure what they are, but
rather, people’s essence is understood in terms of their way of being. This
idea that no general or uniform account of what it means to be human can
be put forth, because the meaning of being is decided in and through
existence itself, is captured in Sartre’s infamous existential slogan: ‘‘existence
precedes essence’’ (Crowell, 2005). Thus, Sartre (2004, p. 344) puts forth the
view that subjectivity must be the starting point on which people’s essence is
AUTHENTICITY 289
predicated. Whereas entities are defined in terms of their essential properties
(e.g., what type or kind of thing they are), the essence of people is not fixed by
their type, but rather by what they make of themselves. Existential psycholo-
gist Rollo May (1960, p. 17) amplifies this view through his assertion ‘‘that
only as we aYrm our existence do we have any essence at all.’’
Within the realm of existential philosophy, the studies of Martin Heidegger
and Jean‐Paul Sartre are generally regarded as prototypes for characterizing
authenticity. While both philosophers employed a phenomenological meth-
odology, Heidegger is credited with having united existential concerns
with the phenomenological method posed by the phenomenologist Edmund
Husserl . Husserl proposed that through the psychological process epoche
´,
people clear away their preconceptions about experience and return ‘‘to the
things themselves’’ (Halling & Carroll, 1999). This process relies on people’s
intentionality—the interaction between the subjective and objective compo-
nents of consciousness. Rather than just passively registering an object’s
existence, people ‘‘cocreate’’ phenomena through intentionality (Halling &
Carroll, 1999).
Heidegger (1968) implemented the phenomenological method in seeking
to understand the question ‘‘What is meant by being?’’ Heidegger framed
existence (Dasein or Being‐there) with respect to both its historical and
temporal aspects. For Heidegger, authentic possibility exists in relation to
Geworfenheit (i.e., ‘‘thrown‐ness’’). Thrown‐ness refers to the idea that peo-
ple are born into a world that they did not construct, live amid conditions
over which they have little control, and are insuYciently equipped to deter-
mine solutions to existential questions such as ‘‘Who am I?’’ Consequently,
the totality of people’s behaviors is at first a function of the behavioral
prescriptions derived from the social environment. In light of the constraints
of their ‘‘thrown‐ness,’’ and the inevitability of their finitude (e.g., death),
people can embrace their individuality and freedom to live authentically
(Halling & Carroll, 1999).
By counteracting their thrown‐ness and imminent finitude, the whole of
Dasein’sactivity—people’s‘‘Being‐in‐the‐world’’—gains significance from
the purpose or aim to which they understand themselves as existing
(Heidegger, 1968). Authentic possibility occurs in the condition of self‐making,
when having been confronted with the ‘‘nothingness’’ of their existence (e.g.,
acting solely in accord with social norms), individuals transform their mode of
being to reflect a sense of care (i.e., assumed responsibility) toward others and
their being themselves. ‘‘Being‐in‐the‐world’’ does not constitute the self
as an independent isolate of the world, but rather it reflects an existential
modification of how one exists with others (Heidegger, 1968). When such
a transformation occurs, the activity of Dasein is governed by the project
of existential possibility in which people ‘‘make themselves.’’ Accordingly,
290 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
authenticity in German, Eigentlichkeit refers to the attitude through which
individuals engage their projects as their own (Crowell, 2005).
From Heidegger’s perspective, authentic functioning reflects people
resolutely choosing to act with care those projects that permit their Being‐
in‐the‐World. Moreover, authentic functioning is marked by a sense of unity
among the temporal and historical aspects of existence. For instance,
Crowell (2005) refers to existential temporality in which the future (the
possibility aimed at by one’s projects) recollects the past (what no longer
needs to be done or completed) in order to give meaning to the present (the
things that take on significance in light of what currently needs doing). These
facets of existential temporality resemble various cognitive‐motivational
terms used by contemporary psychologists to describe people’s pur-
posive behavior (e.g., Cantor & Zirkel, 1990) and seem relevant to the
notion of personal narratives or self‐stories (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1988;
McAdams, 1995, 1999). In particular, existential temporality complements
the fundamental concerns of Hermans’Valuation Theory (1987) in which
people’s personal construction of meaning is examined with respect to
specific spatio‐temporal instances ascribed to their life stories (Hermans,
Rijks, & Kempken, 1993). Thus, an authentic existence is one in which
people understand their choices and commit themselves to enact those
projects that give shape to their existence.
For Sartre, people’s way of ‘‘being’’ is inextricably linked to their choices.
Similarly, contemporary psychological theories of motivation (Deci &
Ryan, 2000) and psychological well‐being (RyV, 1989) place a premium on
people’sautonomy. In Sartre’s view, we are our choices: ‘‘to be’’ is to choose;
‘‘to cease to choose’’ is to cease to be (Flynn, 2003). While Sartre’s basic
message attests to people’s conscious decisions and their responsibility
for their actions (or inaction), such choices are noted to occur within
situations themselves. More specifically, Sartre describes situations in terms
of a synthesis of a person’s‘‘facticity’’ (e.g., life’s givens, such as a person’s
past experience, psychological properties, and broader sociocultural
milieu) and one’s‘‘transcendence’’ (e.g., the willful agent capable of going
beyond, or surpassing the situations’facticity). Actions governed by facticity
reflect a particular form of determinism, a predilection toward what pra-
ctically ‘‘is’’ in the situation. Alternatively, actions governed by trans-
cendence reflect a predilection toward what can be. By recognizing that
they are radically free to ‘‘choose’’ otherwise, to be other than the way they
‘‘are’’ (e.g., beyond their facticity alone), people exhibit a form of self‐
negation expressed as existential angst. Thus, the kind of being one is,
reflects the choices and decisions one makes amid the facts and the possibi-
lities of the situation. In this respect, Sartre frames authentic functioning as a
particular instance of peoples’behavioral self‐regulation. That is, authentic
AUTHENTICITY 291
actions reflect the intrapsychic resolve that emerges from the choices
found among the operative self‐schemas governing individuals’situated
freedom (cf., involving the actual self and the possible self, Markus & Nurius,
1986).
For Sartre, ‘‘Bad faith’’ emerges when individuals lie or deceive them-
selves about their ontological duality. Such deceptions occur when people
either dissolve the possibilities of transcendence in the throws of ‘‘facticity,’’
or conversely when they act with only sheer ‘‘transcendent’’ will, and ignore
the facts of the situation. Thus, authentic functioning from this perspective
emerges when individuals openly embrace the ontological duality of their
situated freedom when deciding on how they will behave.
II. Taking Stock of These Various Perspectives: Towards a
Psychological View of Authenticity
This brief and necessarily selective historical account of philosophical perspec-
tives on authenticity demonstrates the construct’s richness and complexity.
These perspectives depict various themes and help to illuminate the develop-
ment of the construct. First, authenticity reflects self‐understanding. Whereas
Socrates equated self‐examination with the very value of a person’sexistence,
other philosophers emphasized the importance of self‐understanding in orga-
nizing one’s actions. Thus, a second aspect of authenticity involves behaviors
that are rooted in self‐knowledge, as in Aristotle’s‘‘pursuit of the highest
good,’’ Heidegger’s notion of ‘‘project,’’ Kierkegaard’s essential knowledge
and subjective truth, and Husserl’s intentionality. Moreover, authentic
behavior reflects particular actions, actions expressive of people’s values
(e.g., Hume, Nietzsche), and that are freely chosen with a sense of agency
(e.g., Sartre, Kierkegaard, & Heidegger). Third, authentic functioning reflects
people’s willingness and capacity for objectively acknowledging and accept-
ing their core self‐aspects. That is, authenticity reflects the relative absence of
self‐deception and the relative presence of unbiased recognition of self‐rele-
vant information, including ontological realities (e.g., consider the discussion
on false‐self behaviors, or Sartre’s discussion of facticity and transcendence).
Fourth, authentic functioning involves a particular orientation towards
others (e.g., Heidegger’s notion of Being‐in‐the‐World).
Taken as a whole, authentic functioning also reflects a set of processes.
The notion of authenticity reflecting a set of processes is essential to the
perspectives discussed from Kierkegaard through Sartre. Collectively,
the existential philosophy perspective couches authenticity as occurring
when people freely choose to commit themselves to engage their activities
292 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
with agency, in a process of self‐authoring their way of being. In this respect,
the existential view of authenticity is consistent with Trilling’s (1971)
description of the Greek ancestry of the word authentic, authenteo, meaning
‘‘to have full power.’’ That is, authentic functioning is reflected in an
individual being ‘‘the master of his or her own domain.’’
Taken as a whole, this historical overview of authenticity documents a
variety of mental and behavioral processes that account for how individuals
discover, develop, and construct a core sense of self and, furthermore, how
this core self is maintained over time and situation. While various historical
accounts emphasize that authenticity involves a union between thought and
action, they often place a premium on whether these actions originate within
the self or without by societal expectations, norms, or pressures. We will see
many of these same themes in psychological perspectives on authenticity. In
the following section, we briefly discuss authenticity from the perspective of
several humanistically oriented psychological frameworks and describe how
these frameworks informed our own conceptualization of authenticity, to
which we then turn.
III. Psychological Perspectives on Authenticity
Self‐determination theory (SDT) (Deci, 1980; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan &
Deci, 2000, 2002) holds that people are authentic when their actions reflect
their true‐or core‐self, that is, when they are autonomous and self‐determining.
Our multicomponent framework of authentic functioning owes a great deal to
this conceptualization. Hodgins and Knee (2002) capture many aspects of
this convergence in their description of autonomously functioning individuals.
For example, they suggest that autonomously functioning individuals
‘‘will meet the continually changing stream of consciousness experience with
openness. By ‘openness’we mean a readiness to perceive ongoing experience
accurately, without distorting or attempting to avoid the experience, and a
willingness to assimilate novel experiences into self‐structures’’ (p. 88). They
further suggest that autonomously functioning individuals ‘‘grow toward
greater unity in understanding and functioning’’ (p. 88), ‘‘have a high tolerance
for encountering experience without being threatened or defending against it’’
(p. 88–89), ‘‘feel choiceful and endorsing of their behavior’’ (p. 90), and exhibit
‘‘greater honesty in interactions of all types’’ (p. 90). According to SDT, self‐
determination is one of three basic psychological needs (the others being
competence and relatedness), the satisfaction of which is critical for optimal
psychological health and well‐being. Considerable research supports this claim
(Deci & Ryan, 2000).
AUTHENTICITY 293
Our conceptualization of authenticity also owes a great deal to Rogers’
(1961) conceptualization of a self‐actualizing or fully functioning individual
(Maslow, 1968), who possesses the following characteristics (Cloninger,
1993). First, the fully functioning individual is open to experience, both
objective and subjective, that life has to oVer. Accompanying this openness
is a tolerance for ambiguity and the tendency to perceive events accurately,
rather than defensively distorting or censoring them from awareness. Sec-
ond, fully functioning individuals can live fully in the moment, they are
adaptable and flexible, and they experience the self as a fluid process rather
than a static entity. Third, they inherently trust their inner experiences to
guide their behaviors. Fourth, a fully functioning person experiences free-
dom. This freedom may be reflected in the attitudes one adopts toward
experiences—even if the environment is immovable, one still has a choice
about how to respond and feel about it. Fifth, the fully functioning individ-
ual is creative in his or her approach to living, rather than falling back on
well‐established modes of behavior that become unnecessarily restrictive.
This creativity is fueled by a strong trust in one’s inner experiences and a
willingness to adapt to ever‐changing circumstances.
IV. A Multicomponent Conceptualization of Authenticity
We have seen that most perspectives on authenticity stress the extent to which
one’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors reflect one’strue‐or core‐self. More-
over, most perspectives emphasize a nondefensive stance toward evaluative
information, openness toward, and trust in, internal experiences, and fulfilling
interpersonal relationships. In line with these perspectives, we (Goldman &
Kernis, 2002; Kernis, 2003; Kernis & Goldman, 2005a,b) define authenticity as
the unobstructed operation of one’strue‐or core‐self in one’s daily enterprise.
However, instead of viewing authenticity as a single unitary process, we suggest
that authenticity can be broken down into four separate, but interrelated,
components. We refer to these components as awareness,unbiased processing,
behavior,andrelational orientation. Each of these components focuses on an
aspect of authenticity that, while related to each of the others, is distinct. We
turn now to a description of each component.
A. AWARENESS
The awareness component refers to possessing, and being motivated to
increase, knowledge of and trust in one’s motives, feelings, desires, and
self‐relevant cognitions. It includes, for example, knowing what type of food
one likes and dislikes, how motivated one is to lose weight, whether one is
294 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
feeling anxious or depressed, in what circumstances one is most likely to be
talkative, whether one desires to attend graduate or professional school, and
so forth. Moreover, it involves being motivated to learn about such things
as one’s strengths and weaknesses, goals and aspirations, dispositional
characteristics, and emotional states.
Having knowledge about one’s propensities and characteristics (i.e., of
one’s true‐self ) promotes the integration of one’s inherent polarities into a
coherent and multifaceted self‐representation. As Perls and his colleagues
(Perls, HeVerline, & Goodman, 1951) and many others have suggested,
people are not masculine or feminine, introverted or extroverted, emotional
or stoic, and so forth. Instead, while one aspect of these dualities (‘‘figure’’)
generally predominates over the other (‘‘ground’’), individuals invariably
possess both aspects to some degree. As people function with greater
authenticity, they become more aware of the fact that they possess these
multifaceted self‐aspects and strive to integrate them into a cohesive self‐
structure. In short, awareness involves knowledge and acceptance of one’s
multifaceted and potentially contradictory self‐aspects (i.e., being both
introverted and extraverted), as opposed to rigid acknowledgement and
acceptance only of those self‐aspects deemed internally consistent with one’s
overall self‐concept.
As we have noted elsewhere (Kernis & Goldman, 2005a,b), our view diVers
from J. Campbell’s conceptualization of self‐concept clarity (Campbell, 1990;
Campbell et al., 1996) and is more closely aligned with Sande, Goethals, and
RadloV’s (1988) approach to the multifaceted self‐concept. According to
Campbell, endorsing as self‐descriptive both adjectives that reflect endpoints
of bipolar trait dimensions (e.g., introversion, extraversion) reflects an inter-
nally inconsistent self‐concept. In contrast, for Sande et al. (1988), such an
endorsement strategy reflects a multifaceted self‐concept.
We believe that this apparent contradiction can be resolved by taking into
consideration Paulhus and Martin’s (1988) concept of functional flexibility.
Functional flexibility involves having confidence in one’s ability to call into
play multiple, perhaps contradictory, self‐aspects in dealing with life situa-
tions. An individual high in functional flexibility believes that he or she will
experience little anxiety or diYculty in calling forth these multiple selves
because they are well‐defined and can be enacted with confidence.
These aspects of multiple selves can be thought of as constituting figure–
ground aspects of personality because the ‘‘selves’’ under consideration
are arranged around the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins, 1979). In this
circumplex model, 16 interpersonal trait characteristics are arrayed around
two orthogonal dimensions (dominance and warmth). Examples of trait
pairs include ambitious–lazy, warm–cold, dominant–submissive, agree-
able–quarrelsome, extroverted–introverted, and arrogant–assuming. For
each item constituting the eight pairs, respondents indicate the extent to
AUTHENTICITY 295
which ‘‘they are capable of being [insert trait] if the situation requires it,’’ ‘‘it is
diYcult forthemtobehaveina[inserttrait]manner,’’ ‘‘how anxious they are
when they behave in a [insert trait] manner,’’ and ‘‘the extent to which they
attempt to avoid situations that require them to behave in a [insert trait] manner.’’
In Paulhus and Martin’s (1988) research, functional flexibility related to a high
sense of agency and other indices of adaptive psychological functioning.
Kernis, Goldman, Piasecki, and Brunnell (2003) (reported in Kernis &
Goldman, 2005b) administered the Functional Flexibility Inventory (Paulhus
& Martin, 1988) and the Authenticity Inventory (AI) (Version 2) to a sample
of 84 individuals. We created summary indexes of capable,diYculty,anxiety,
and avoidance scores by summing responses to the 16 traits (Paulhus &
Martin, 1988). Total authenticity scale scores correlated significantly posi-
tively with capability, and negatively with diYculty,anxiety, and avoidance
(Kernis & Goldman, 2005b). These findings support our contention that
authenticity relates to a multifaceted and integrated self that is anchored in
strong self‐beliefs, self‐confidence, self‐acceptance, and agency rather than
self‐doubt, confusion, and conflict. Later in this chapter, we report additional
findings linking authenticity to a ‘‘stronger sense of self ’’ (Kernis, Paradise,
Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000).
One of the premises underlying our conceptualization is that awareness of
self is a component of healthy functioning. Awareness is really just a first step,
however. Also important is that this awareness fosters self‐integration and
acceptance of self. As integration and acceptance of self‐aspects increase, more
information about them will become accessible. An important issue, therefore,
is how individuals attain self‐knowledge in ways that foster integration and
acceptance of self. A number of techniques are available, some of which stem
from the Gestalt therapy framework developed by Fritz Perls and his colleagues
(Perls et al., 1951). These techniques emphasize deliberately attending to
aspects of self without evaluating their implications. A similar principle under-
lies the use of techniques or strategies designed to enhance individuals’mind-
fulness. Through these exercises, people can become aware of currently ignored
or unexamined self‐aspects with which they often are uncomfortable. Other
techniques can then be applied to understand and resolve the basis of the
uncomfortableness, thereby fostering self‐integration and acceptance.
B. UNBIASED PROCESSING
The second component of authenticity involves the unbiased processing
of self‐relevant information. This component involves objectivity with respect
to one’s positive and negative self‐aspects, emotions, and other internal
experiences, information, and private knowledge. In addition, it involves
296 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
not denying, distorting, or exaggerating externally based evaluative informa-
tion. In short, unbiased processing reflects the relative absence of interpretive
distortions (e.g., defensiveness and self‐aggrandizement) in the processing of
self‐relevant information. To the extent that unbiased processing reflects an
aspect of authentic functioning, variables that are theoretically related to
authenticity should predict the relative absence of self‐serving biases and
illusions. Importantly, highly autonomous and self‐determining individuals
do not engage in self‐serving biases following success or failure (Knee &
Zuckerman, 1996).
Our characterization of the unbiased processing component of authentici-
ty resonates with conceptualizations of ego defense mechanisms that link
them to a wide range of important outcomes. For example, whereas adaptive
defense mechanism styles that involve minimal reality distortions predict
psychological and physical well‐being many years into the future (e.g.,
Vaillant, 1992), maladaptive or immature defenses that involve considerable
reality distortion and/or failure to acknowledge and resolve distressing
emotions predict psychological and interpersonal diYculties (e.g., poor mar-
ital adjustment) (Ungerer, Waters, Barnett, & Dolby, 1997). Note that our
perspective stands in direct contrast to perspectives in which defensive
processing is considered to be an adaptive solution to inevitable threats
(e.g., Terror Management Theory) (Greenberg, Pyszcynski, & Solomon,
1986; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszcynski, 1991). While we agree that people
can and do react defensively to threat, we believe that people’s natural
inclinations are toward open and nondefensive processing of self‐relevant
information (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
The major benefit of unbiased processing is that it contributes to an
accurate sense of self. This accuracy is highly beneficial for behavioral
choices that have either short‐or long‐term implications. The more impor-
tant the outcome, the more important is accuracy. Pursuing the right occu-
pation, investing time in developing one’s talents, and even finding a dance
partner at a club all benefit from accurate or unbiased processing of evalua-
tive information. Engaging in biased processing may unwittingly limit one’s
options because relevant self‐knowledge is ignored or distorted.
We believe, as many have before us (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000; Rogers,
1961), that people are oriented toward growing, developing, and increasing
in complexity. We believe that these processes are inherently geared toward
obtaining accurate, not necessarily flattering, information. In essence, we
believe that positive self‐illusions generally are less healthy than accurate
self‐realities (in contrast to Taylor & Brown, 1988), even though the former
may confer short‐term benefits by helping individuals cope with unpleasant
emotions (Crocker, 2002). In the end, possessing and portraying accurate
AUTHENTICITY 297
self‐knowledge is more beneficial than possessing and portraying positive
but false self‐knowledge (e.g., Crocker, 2002; Robins & Beer, 2001).
Controversy currently exists over whether positive self‐related illusions
promote and reflect healthy psychological functioning (Robins & Beer, 2001;
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Our view is that often these distortions stem from
insecurity rather than strength (Kernis, 2000). In support of this contention,
research has shown that people who function autonomously and are self‐
determining do not show such self‐serving distortions (Knee & Zuckerman,
1996). In contrast, people who rely on defense mechanisms that involve
major distortions of reality have relatively poor interpersonal and psycho-
logical outcomes throughout their lifetimes (Vaillant, 1992). While self‐
illusions may minimize negative aVectivity in the short‐run (Crocker, 2002;
Kernis, 2003; Robins & Beer, 2001) and therefore seem to be adaptive, this
adaptiveness is itself an illusion, as it does not holdup over time and, in fact,
may contribute to poorer outcomes in the end (Robins & Beer, 2001). Other
forms of defensive functioning also appear reflective of insecurity and sub-
optimal functioning and are antithetical to authentic functioning, as we will
describe shortly.
Individuals high in unbiased processing are motivated to evaluate them-
selves objectively with respect to both positive and negative self‐aspects.
Thus, processing self‐relevant information in an unbiased manner is likely
to reflect what NeV(2003) referred to as a sense of self‐compassion (e.g.,
extending kindness and understanding to oneself rather than harsh self‐
criticism and judgment, and holding one’s painful thoughts and feelings in
balanced awareness rather than overidentifying them). Sample items on
NeV’s (2003) measure of self‐compassion include ‘‘I try to be understanding
and patient towards those aspects of my personality I don’t like’’ and ‘‘I’m
disapproving and judgmental about my own flaws and inadequacies
(reversed scored).’’ In fact, Goldman, Lakey, and Kernis (2005d) found that
higher unbiased processing was associated with greater self‐compassion.
C. BEHAVIOR
The third component of authenticity involves behaving in accord with one’s
values, preferences, and needs as opposed to acting ‘‘falsely’’ merely to
please others or to attain rewards or avoid punishments. In essence, this
component reflects the behavioral output of the awareness and unbiased
processing components. We acknowledge that instances exist in which the
unadulterated expression of one’s true‐self may result in severe social sanc-
tions. In such instances, we expect that, at the very least, authenticity will
reflect heightened sensitivity to the fit (or lack thereof ) between one’s true‐self
298 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
and the dictates of the environment, and a heightened awareness of the
potential implications of one’s behavioral choices. In contrast,
blind obedience to environmental forces typically reflects the absence of
authenticity (cf., Deci & Ryan, 2000).
Authentic behavior can be distinguished from inauthentic behavior by the
conscious, motivated intentions that underlie it. Authentic behavior is guid-
ed by an honest assessment of one’s self‐aspects via the awareness and
unbiased processing components. To the extent that one is conscious of
the ‘‘figure’’ and ‘‘ground’’ inherent in one’s self‐aspects, one is aVorded
the opportunity to act in a manner that is consistent with these multiface-
ted self‐aspects. In essence, authentic behavior is choiceful behavior oriented
toward a ‘‘solution’’ derived from consciously considering one’s self‐relevant
‘‘problems’’ (e.g., potentially competing self‐motives, beliefs, etc.). In con-
trast, inauthentic behavior does not reflect a choiceful and conscious regu-
latory focus designed to eventuate in behavior that resonates with one’s
complex, multifaceted self‐aspects. Rather, inauthentic behavior involves
being unaware of, ignoring, oversimplifying, and/or distorting self‐aspects
relevant to the behavioral context. In essence, whereas authentic behavior
reflects the awareness and operation of one’s true‐or core‐self, inauthentic
behavior generally is oriented toward glorification and reverence by self and
others (though on occasion it may be oriented toward excessive deprecation
by self and others).
Authenticity is not reflected in a compulsion to be one’s true‐self, but rather
in the free and natural expression of core feelings, motives, and inclinations.
When this expression stands at odds with immediate environmental contin-
gencies, we expect that authenticity will be reflected in short‐term conflict.
How this conflict is resolved can have considerable implications for one’s felt
integrity and authenticity as well as for one’s overall functioning and well‐
being. An important implication of this reasoning is that it is insuYcient to
focus exclusively on whether one’s actions per se reflect authenticity. Rather,
it is crucial to focus also on the manner in which processes associated with
the other authenticity components inform one’s behaviors.
For example, Goldman (in press) presents findings indicating that aware-
ness scores negatively correlate with tendencies to engage in social compari-
son, self‐monitoring, and public self‐consciousness. He argues that such
tendencies can undermine one’s behavioral authenticity, because one fails
to consider internal self‐knowledge and instead depends primarily on exter-
nally derived information (by comparing oneself to others, relying on others’
actions as the norm for one’s own actions, or by habitually focusing on how
one publicly appears). More generally, sometimes the needs and values of
the self are incompatible with the views of the larger society (e.g., when an
artist focuses on a highly controversial subject matter). In these instances,
AUTHENTICITY 299
authenticity may be reflected in awareness of one’s needs and motives and an
unbiased assessment of relevant evaluative information. Sometimes the
resulting behavior may also reflect authenticity, but sometimes it may not
(as when the aforementioned artist ‘‘sells out’’). Consequently, while the
awareness, unbiased processing, and behavior components of authenticity
relate to each other, they clearly are separable. We return to this issue shortly.
D. RELATIONAL ORIENTATION
The fourth component of authenticity is relational in nature, and bears
resemblance to Jourard’s (1971, p. 133) proposition that ‘‘authentic being
means being oneself, honestly, in one’s relations with his fellows.’’ In our
view, relational authenticity involves valuing and striving for openness,
sincerity, and truthfulness in one’sclose relationships. In essence, relational
authenticity means being genuine rather than fake in one’s relationships with
close others. It is characterized by honesty in one’s actions and motives as
they pertain to one’s intimates, and to accuracy in beliefs about oneself and
one’s intimates. Moreover, it involves endorsing the importance of close
others seeing the ‘‘real’’ you and relating to them in ways that facilitate their
being able to do so. Furthermore, given that dispositional authenticity
involves heightened levels of self‐knowledge and understanding (i.e., aware-
ness), and the capacity to evaluate one’s self objectively (i.e., unbiased
processing), higher authenticity levels may enhance self–other perception
congruence.
Research focused on self‐verification theory suggests that people are
motivated by their need for self‐knowledge (Swann, Stein‐Seroussi, &
Giesler, 1992) and are drawn toward others who confirm their preexisting
self‐conceptions (Swann, 1983). We believe that self‐verification processes in
close relationships are especially likely to occur when the other components
of authenticity are operative within individuals (e.g., possessing high levels
of awareness, unbiased processing, and behavioral authenticity). Converse-
ly, self‐enhancement processes that involve distorted evaluations within
close relationships are especially likely to occur among individuals who are
low in authenticity (i.e., those who are uncertain who they really are, and
who resist accurate self‐evaluation). Stated diVerently, low authenticity may
reflect the presence of fragile self‐feelings that motivate self‐enhancement
tendencies (Kernis, 2003; Kernis & Goldman, 2002). In such cases, incon-
gruence between individuals’self‐evaluation and their perceptions of how
their intimates evaluate them may stem from motivations that stifle accuracy
and consensus in favor of positive self‐views. Consistent with this line of
reasoning, Mikulincer, Orbach, and Iavenieli (1998) found that securely
300 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
attached people were more accurate in assessing self–other similarity than were
insecurely attached people. In short, substantive intimate relationship adjust-
ment is likely to involve feeling understood or ‘‘known’’ to intimates, and
accuracy in such appraisals is likely to occur when authenticity is operative.
Authentic relationships involve a reciprocal process of self‐disclosure and
of mutual intimacy and trust (Reis & Patrick, 1996). Thus, relational au-
thenticity involves developing and achieving secure attachments with inti-
mates that further promotes the genuine expression of core self‐aspects
without threat of reprisal or criticism. In support of this contention, Kernis
and Goldman reported that higher relational orientation related to higher
secure attachment styles and lower preoccupied and fearful attachment
styles (2005a), as well lower rejection sensitivity (2005b). In short, we expect
that people high in relational authenticity will be involved in healthier, more
satisfying, and fully functioning relationships than people low in relational
authenticity. Later in the chapter, we report additional data relevant to
examining these claims.
In other research, Harter, Waters, Pettit, Whitesell, Kofkin, and Jordan
(1997) found that relationship partners who each viewed themselves as
‘‘mutual’’ (e.g., exhibiting a balance between one’s personal needs and one’s
partner’s needs) reported the highest levels of validation and authentic beha-
viors, whereas ‘‘self‐focused autonomy’’ partners were perceived as least
validating. In terms of well‐being, Harter et al. (1997) found evidence for a
process model. Specifically, the relationship between individuals’perceived
validation from their partners and their own well‐being (i.e., self‐esteem and
cheerfulness) depended on the extent to which they exhibited authentic self‐
behavior within their romantic relationship. Taken as a whole, Harter et al.’s
(1997) findings demonstrate that behavioral authenticity within one’s inti-
mate relationships involves adopting a relationship orientation that fosters
mutuality. Furthermore, their findings suggest that how a person’s intimate
relationships influence his or her well‐being is aVected by the extent to which
one acts in accord with one’s true‐self within those relationships.
E. MORE ON THE SEPARATENESS OF THESE COMPONENTS
We view these multiple components of authenticity as related to, but sepa-
rable from, each other (Table I). For instance, situations invariably exist in
which environmental pressures may inhibit the expression of one’s true‐self
(e.g., a person may not express his true opinion to a close friend who is
highly depressed). Although behavioral (and perhaps relational) authenticity
may be thwarted in such instances, authenticity at the levels of awareness
and unbiased processing may be operative. Specifically, awareness may
AUTHENTICITY 301
involve active attempts to resolve conflicting motives and desires involved in
knowing one’s true opinion and the implications expressing it may have for
one’s friendship and the well‐being of one’s friend.
In many respects, the awareness component of authenticity is the most
fundamental. Self‐knowledge is at the heart of both behavioral and relation-
al authenticity. Although we can envision instances in which behavioral and
relational authenticity emerge spontaneously with little or no conscious
deliberation, ultimately the self‐aspects that are involved will be available
and accessible with the growth of one’s self‐knowledge. Unbiased processing
may involve acknowledgment of the fragile underpinnings of one’s attitude.
In contrast, inauthenticity may involve actively ignoring or denying one’s
opinion or emphasizing the superiority of one’s judgmental abilities. In
short, it is possible for a person to be operating authentically at some levels
but not at others. Therefore, it is important to examine the processes
associated with each component of authenticity (Kernis, 2003).
F. CONNECTIONS WITH OTHER CONSTRUCTS
Each of these aspects of authenticity has received some attention in the
past, although not usually with explicit reference to the construct of authen-
ticity. For example, researchers have examined aspects of the awareness
TABLE I
AUTHENTICITY COMPONENTS
Awareness
Awareness and knowledge of, and trust in, one’s motives, feelings, desires, and self‐relevant
cognitions
Includes awareness of one’s strengths and weaknesses, dominant–recessive aspects of person-
ality, powerful emotions, and their roles in behavior
Unbiased Processing
Minimal, if any, denial, distortion, exaggeration, or ignoring of private knowledge, internal
experiences, and externally based self‐evaluative information
Objectivity and acceptance with respect to one’s strengths and weaknesses
Behavior
Acting in ways congruent with one’s values, preferences, and needs
Rather than acting merely to please others or to attain rewards or avoid punishments
Relational Orientation
Value and make eVorts to achieve openness and truthfulness in close relationships
Important for close others to see the real you, those deep, dark, or potentially shadowy self‐
aspects that are not routinely discussed
Relational authenticity means being genuine and not ‘‘fake’’ in one’s relationships with others
302 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
component in research on public and private self‐consciousness (e.g.,
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Some implications of biased processing
of self‐relevant information have been examined in research on self‐serving
biases (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 1993). Aspects of behavioral authenticity
have been examined in research on personality–behavior and attitude–
behavior consistency (Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 1992; Snyder,
1987). Finally, aspects of relational authenticity have been studied in re-
search on attachment processes and self‐disclosure (Mikiluncer & Shaver,
2005). Readers of this chapter undoubtedly will recognize aspects of our
theory in this prior work. However, our theory has the capacity to integrate
these various strands of research to explicate the processes associated with
the construct of authenticity in a way not done before. For research to be
conducted, however, an empirically based measure of authentic functioning
is needed. We turn now to our eVorts to develop such a measure.
V. Measuring Individual DiVerences in Dispositional Authenticity:
The Authenticity Inventory
We started with a large pool of items that we believed would tap into these four
components, and we administered them to several samples of male and female
college students. We eliminated items based on interitem correlations and
exploratory factor analyses. In the research reported in this chapter, we used
three successive versions of the scale. The final scale (AI‐3, Goldman & Kernis,
2004) consists of 45 items (Awareness—12 items, Unbiased Processing—10
items, Behavior—11 items, and Relational Orientation—12 items). We include
the scale items, along with instructions for its administration and scoring, in the
Appendix. CoeYcient alphas for the scale as a whole (.90) and for each of the
subscales (Awareness ¼.79, Unbiased Processing ¼.64, Behavior ¼.80, and
Relational Orientation ¼.78) are acceptable. Test retest reliabilities (over
approximately 4 weeks, N¼120) were high (Total ¼.87, Awareness ¼.80,
Unbiased Processing ¼.69, Behavior ¼.73, and Relational Orientation ¼.80).
How do these proposed authenticity components relate to the construct of
authenticity? One possibility is that these four components of authenticity
reflect conceptually distinct but interrelated aspects of authenticity. Stated
diVerently, authenticity may be a multifaceted construct that consists of four
distinct components. In factor analytic terminology, this would equate to a
four‐factor model.
A second possibility is that authenticity is a unidimensional rather than
multidimensional construct. That is, while the components we introduced
may be conceptually distinct, empirically they may be so highly interrelated
AUTHENTICITY 303
that they are not distinguishable and, therefore, represent a single broad
authenticity construct. In factor analytic terminology, each component may
load very highly on a single factor.
A third possibility combines aspects of the two previous possibilities. That
is, on the one hand, authenticity may reflect four conceptually distinct facets
as in the first possibility. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to suppose that these
four aspects are going to be completely unrelated to one another. However,
it is also unrealistic to expect that they would be completely redundant with
one another. Consequently, there may be value in conceiving of a broad
authenticity construct at a higher level of abstraction that subsumes each of
the four facets of authenticity. In this instance, while the four components
are distinct, they may also measure a single latent construct of authentic
functioning. Thus, parsimony exists, but at a higher level of abstraction than
with a single‐factor model. In other words, a hierarchical structure exists in
which overall authenticity exerts its eVects through the four separable, but
interrelated, components of awareness, unbiased processing, behavior, and
relational orientation.
We anticipated finding the greatest support for the third possibility—a
second‐order factor model in which interrelations among the authenticity
components are not so high that they are redundant with one another, but
are high enough so that they are summarized adequately with a single
second‐order authenticity factor. If supported, this model would provide
evidence for a broad latent construct of authenticity, while simultaneously
providing support for treating the components as valid indicators of distinct,
but interrelated, aspects of authentic functioning.
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test these alternative
conceptions of authenticity. When developing measurement models for
theoretical constructs, one faces a number of options for operationalizing
them, ranging from (a) a total disaggregation model in which individual
elements (e.g., questionnaire items) are used as manifest indicators of the
latent constructs, to (b) some intermediate level of aggregation, such as
creating item parcels (‘‘testlets’’), for use as manifest indicators in latent
variable models, to (c) a total aggregation model in which a single composite
indicator is used to represent the latent construct (Bagozzi & Phillips, 1991;
Edwards, 2000). We opted for a meso‐level of aggregation by creating
multiple‐item parcels for each authenticity dimension. Use of item parcels
poses several advantages over use of individual items as manifest indicators.
Specifically, as compared to individual items, item parcels are more reliable,
have smaller ratios of unique to common variance, are less likely to violate
distributional assumptions, are more parsimonious, are less likely to have
unmeasured correlated disturbances, are less subject to sampling fluctua-
tions, and usually result in less biased CFA solutions (Bandalos, 2002; Little,
304 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). There are a number of app-
roaches to forming item parcels (Hagtvet & Nasser, 2004; Hall, Snell, &
Faust, 1999; Landis, Beal, & Tesluk, 2000), but random assignment is a
generally eVective approach. As such, we randomly assigned items to three
item parcels each for the awareness (AW), unbiased processing (UP), behav-
ior (BE), and relational orientation (RO) subscales. The three models we
tested are shown in Fig. 1. Figure 1A shows a unidimensional Authenticity
model in which all item parcels (shown in rectangles) are presumed to reflect
a single authenticity factor. The second model, shown in Fig. 1B, is a
four‐factor model, which diVers from the unidimensional model in that it
Fig. 1. Proposed theoretical models of dispositional authenticity.
AUTHENTICITY 305
proposes that authenticity is comprised of four distinct, yet possibly corre-
lated, components discussed earlier. The final model we tested, shown in
Fig. 1C, was a hierarchical model, which proposes that any interrelation-
ships among the four facets of authenticity proposed by the model shown in
Fig. 1B can be explained parsimoniously on the basis of their common
dependency on a more general, second‐order authenticity factor.
Goodness‐of‐fit indices for these three models are shown in Table II. The
2
statistic was significant for each model indicating that all three models
should be rejected statistically, but this is a common finding in CFA re-
search. Consequently, we shifted attention to alternative overall model fit
indices and comparisons between these rival models. The unidimensional
model provided a poor fit to the data by all conventional standards for
acceptable model fit (Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988). By comparison, the
four‐factor model provided a much better fit to the data [
2
(6) ¼242.64,
p<.01], and its goodness‐of‐fit indices satisfied (or approached) even more
stringent criteria suggested by Hu and Bentler (1998, 1999) (SRMSR .08,
RMSEA .06, CFI and TLI .95). This indicates that authenticity is best
regarded as a multidimensional construct and supports the discriminant
validity of the factors specified in the four‐factor model. The remaining
question, however, is whether a general, higher‐order authenticity factor can
explain any relationships that exist between the four first‐order authenticity
factors. To test this idea, we compared the fitofthefour‐factor model to that
of the hierarchical model and found that their fit to the data was not signifi-
cantly diVerent from one another (
2
¼1.89, ns). Alternative goodness‐of‐fit
indices were practically identical as well, indicating that the more parsi-
monious hierarchical model should be preferred as a plausible explanation
of the interrelationship among the first‐order authenticity factors. Results
TABLE II
CFA MODEL GOODNESS‐OF‐FIT INDICES
Model df
2
SRMSR RMSEA CFI TLI
1. Unidimensional Model 54 402.03* .073 .130 .82 .79
2. Four‐factor Model 48 159.39* .048 .075 .94 .92
1 versus 2 6 242.64* —– —– — —
3. Hierarchical Model 50 161.28* .049 .074 .94 .92
2 versus 3 2 1.89 —– —– — —
*p<.01.
Note: df ¼degrees of freedom,
2
¼model chi‐squared statistic, SRMSR ¼standardized
root mean squared error, RMSEA ¼root mean squared error or approximation,
CFI ¼Bentler’s (1990) comparative fit index, TLI ¼the Tucker‐Lewis index.
306 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
(LISREL’s completely standardized factor loadings) for the hierarchical
model are shown in Fig. 2. All parameters were statistically significant
(p<.01) and, with the exception of the first item parcel for the Unbiased
Processing factor, were uniformly large.
We turn now to a research in which we used the AI‐3 (unless otherwise
noted) to examine various aspects of psychological and interpersonal func-
tioning and well‐being. First, we focus on aspects of healthy psychological
functioning, including verbal defensiveness, mindfulness, coping styles, self‐
esteem, and self‐concept structure. We then turn to examining the implica-
tions of authenticity for social role functioning, goal pursuits, well‐being,
and close relationships.
VI. Authenticity and Healthy Psychological Functioning
A. AUTHENTICITY AND ABSENCE OF
VERBAL DEFENSIVENESS
Emotions, thoughts, behaviors, or information that are discrepant with
one’s consciously held self‐image often are threatening, producing decreases
in self‐esteem and/or increases in negative aVect. To ward oVthese threats,
people may utilize a wide range of defense mechanisms. ‘‘Defense me-
chanisms can be thought of as motivated cognitive‐behavioral strategies
that protect the self from perceived threat, maintain or augment self‐esteem,
Fig. 2. Confirmatory factor analysis findings for hierarchical model of authenticity.
AUTHENTICITY 307
reduce negative aVect, and maintain positive representations of attach-
ment figures (Feldman Barrett et al., 1996)’’ (Feldman Barrett, Cleveland,
Conner, & Williams, 2000). That is, defense mechanisms reduce the percep-
tion of threat by altering how people represent these events in conscious
thought. When people perceive a self‐esteem threat, for example, they may
attempt to deal with surfacing unpleasant aVect by controlling whether the
threat enters consciousness (awareness) or by controlling the specific content
of the thoughts or feelings that enter consciousness (distortion) (Feldman
Barrett et al., 2000). The result is that people distance themselves from the
threat and their emotional experience to some extent, and they avoid
thoughts and feelings that threaten their consciously held self‐image or
self‐feelings. The framework presented here suggests that people low in
dispositional authenticity will be especially likely to utilize defensive strate-
gies to ward oVpotentially threatening events or experiences. We theorize
that people high in dispositional authenticity are motivated to understand
themselves, to experience aVect as it is felt, and to not distort evaluative
information. Thus, they should have the strength and personal resources
to acknowledge information that is potentially threatening without being
overly defensive.
A number of verbal markers of defensiveness exist (Feldman Barrett et al.,
2000) that provide clues to the nature of people’s motivational strategies for
protecting the self against threat. Do they rationalize by blaming others? Do
they deny awareness of conflicting emotions, choosing only to identify
positive aVect? Examining the nature of these motivational strategies has
the potential to provide significant insight into diVerences in the ways those
individuals who are low or high in authenticity deal with threatening events.
Feldman Barrett, Williams, and Fong (2002) reported a structured inter-
view technique (and sophisticated coding scheme) for eliciting threatening
experiences and defensive processing. Specifically, individuals engage in a
taped 40–60‐minute stressful interview about their experiences. Respondents
first answer five nonstressful items to acclimate them to the interview con-
text. They then respond to 15 mild to moderately stressful items (e.g., ‘‘Tell
me about a time when you felt that your parents were really disappointed
in you,’’ ‘‘Tell me about a time when you’ve broken the rules,’’ ‘‘Tell me
about a time when you have done something unethical on an assignment,’’
‘‘Describe a time when someone has come to you for help and you didn’t
want to help them,’’ ‘‘Tell me about a time when you have disappointed
someone.’’) The interview concludes with five items designed to gradually
restore a nonthreatened self‐view.
Two highly trained coders rated responses to each of the 15 stressful items,
which we summed to form an overall verbal defensiveness score. Raters
incorporated two aspects of defensiveness into their ratings: awareness and
308 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
distortion. Awareness is defined as the conscious understanding and accep-
tance of one’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors in the face of threat.
Distortion is characterized as the reinterpretation of events through rational-
ization or justification to fit one’s preexisting self‐concept (Feldman Barrett
et al., 2002). As such, individuals can respond in a way that is nondefensive
(high awareness and acceptance and low distortion), mildly defensive (mod-
erate awareness with mild distortion), moderately defensive (limited aware-
ness and moderate distortion), or highly defensive (highly unaware and high
distortion of information). The training manual graciously provided to us by
Lisa Feldman Barrett contains extensive coding information and numerous
examples to facilitate the training of event coders.
This measure is well‐grounded in research and theory that have focused
on defensiveness and defense mechanisms (e. g., Cramer, 1990; Sackeim &
Gur, 1979; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993; Vaillant, 1992; Weinberger,
2003). The defensive verbal behavior assessment (DVBA) is ‘‘...a method
for detecting traces left by defensive processes in the content and structure
of speech’’ (Feldman Barrett et al., 2002, p. 777). Although individuals
may use diVerent defense mechanisms, the DVBA focuses on the shared
consequences of using these mechanisms.
The DVBA provides a unique opportunity to assess the validity of our
authenticity measure. Specifically, some skeptics have argued that people
who are highly defensive will falsely answer items on our authenticity
inventory so that they appear to be authentic, especially on the subscale of
unbiased processing (‘‘Of course I am authentic—are you trying to say I am
a phony?’’). The line of reasoning provided by skeptics suggests that higher
authenticity would relate to greater defensiveness. Although we recognize
that people are motivated to present themselves in a positive light, we
attempted to minimize these considerations in the assessment of authentic
functioning (with the AI) by avoiding asking people directly about whether
or not they are authentic. Instead, we query individuals about the extent to
which their motives, emotions, and behaviors reflect processes and mechan-
isms theoretically linked to authentic functioning. These processes include
the tendency not to distort negative self‐relevant information and to be
comfortable with experiencing unpleasant emotions, or motivations reflec-
tive of one’s‘‘dark side.’’ Thus, we predicted that overall, greater authentici-
ty would relate to lower, not higher, defensiveness on the DVBA. Moreover,
we anticipated that higher awareness and unbiased processing subscale
scores would relate to lower defensiveness because these subscales deal
specifically with the extent to which people are aware of, and feel comfort-
able experiencing, unpleasant self‐relevant thought and aVect. Finally, we
anticipated that higher behavioral authenticity would relate to lower verbal
defensiveness because one’s behaviors are choiceful and reflective of one’s
AUTHENTICITY 309
true‐self, and therefore one should be more accepting of their implications
and consequences regardless of whether they are positive or negative. To the
extent that our findings support these predictions, they would provide
important construct validation support for the AI.
To test these hypotheses, we (Kernis, Lakey, Heppner, Goldman, &
Davis, 2005) had 101 male and female undergraduates participate in indi-
vidual DVBA interviews with one of three trained interviewers. We then
trained two additional raters to code the interviews according to the criteria
described in detail in a manual provided to us by Feldman Barrett. Interrater
reliability was excellent, exceeding .80. Total authenticity correlated inverse-
ly with defensiveness (r¼.25, p<.02). In addition, awareness correlated
inversely with defensiveness, (r¼.21, p<.04), as did behavior (r¼.28,
p<.01), and unbiased processing, although the latter only marginally
(r¼.19, p<.062). Finally, relational authenticity was nonsignificantly
correlated with defensiveness (r¼.10).
Other data collected in this study indicated that especially high levels of
defensiveness were associated with fragile forms of high self‐esteem, namely
unstable and contingent high self‐esteem (Kernis, 2003; Kernis & Paradise,
2002). These findings further corroborate conclusions we can draw from
measures of overall subjective and psychological well‐being that we admi-
nistered. To the extent that defensiveness is adaptive and reflective of opti-
mal functioning, greater tendencies toward defensiveness should correlate
positively with these measures of well‐being. However, this clearly was not
the case. Total scores on RyV’s (1989) multicomponent measure of psycho-
logical functioning were inversely correlated with defensiveness (r¼.25,
p<.02), as were scores on the Life Satisfaction Scale (r¼.25, p<.02).
Taken as a whole, our findings indicate that the higher the individuals’
dispositional authenticity, the more they were able to deal with self‐threaten-
ing information in an aware and nondistorting manner, which, as it turns out,
related to better overall psychological functioning, secure forms of high self‐
esteem and greater subjective well‐being. Whereas the current study examined
how dispositional authenticity related to individuals’defensive reactions to a
specifically threatening context, in the next study we report, we sought to
examine individuals’general tendencies toward actively and openly attending
to their experiences in a mindful and nonevaluative manner.
B. AUTHENTICITY AND MINDFULNESS
Mindfulness refers to a state of relaxed and nonevaluative awareness of
one’s immediate experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Research has linked
mindfulness with positive immediate experiences (LeBel & Dube
´, 2001)
310 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
and greater psychological health and well‐being (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Moreover, the capacity for mindfulness is an aspect of being fully function-
ing, so we expected that it would be associated with greater authenticity. The
mindfulness measure we used in our earlier research was the Mindful Atten-
tion Awareness Scale (MAAS) (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Greater mindfulness,
as assessed by the MAAS, relates to greater psychological well‐being and
positive aVect and lower stress (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Sample items, en-
dorsement of which reflects low mindfulness, include: ‘‘I could be experien-
cing some emotion and not be conscious of it until some time later’’;‘‘Ido
jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I am doing’’;‘‘I
find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the
same time.’’ Kernis and Goldman (2005) reported that MAAS mindfulness
scores correlated significantly with total authenticity scores, as well as with
each subscale score.
In more recent research, Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, and Davis (2005) adminis-
tered both the MAAS and the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills
(KIMS), which measures the specific mindfulness components of observing (OB-
SERVE), describing (DESCRIBE), acting with awareness (AWARENESS),
and accepting or allowing without judgment (ACCEPTANCE). Observing refers
to ‘‘observing, noticing, or attending to a variety of stimuli, including internal
phenomena, such as bodily sensations, cognitions, and emotions, and exter-
nal phenomena, such as sounds and smells’’ (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004, p,
193). Sample items include ‘‘I pay attention to whether my muscles are tense
or relaxed’’ and ‘‘I notice the smells and aromas of things.’’ Describing refers
to ‘‘describing, labeling, or noting of observed phenomena by covertly
applying words. ... This type of describing is done nonjudgmentally and
without conceptual analysis’’ (Baer et al., 2004, p. 193). Sample items
include ‘‘I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings’’ and ‘‘Even
when I am feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words.’’
Acting with awareness refers to ‘‘Engaging fully in one’s current activity with
undivided attention or focusing with awareness on one thing at a time....’’
(Baer et al., 2004, p. 193). Sample items include ‘‘When I’m doing
something, I’m only focused on what I am doing, nothing else’’ and
‘‘I’ll get completely absorbed in what I’m doing, so that all my attention
is focused on it.’’ Accepting or allowing without judgment refers to
‘‘...accepting, allowing, or being nonjudgmental or nonevaluative
about present moment experience ... to refrain from applying evaluative
labels such as good/bad, right/wrong, or worthwhile/worthless ....’’
(Baer et al., 2004, p. 194). Sample items include ‘‘I make judgments about
whether my thoughts are good or bad (reverse‐scored)’’ and ‘‘I tend to
make judgments about how worthwhile or worthless my experiences are
(reverse‐scored).’’
AUTHENTICITY 311
As shown in Table III, the findings obtained by Lakey et al. (2005) for the
MAAS scale replicated those reported by Kernis and Goldman (2005).
Specifically, total authenticity scores, as well as each authenticity subscale
score correlated significantly with total MAAS scores. In addition (and new
to this study), total authenticity and authenticity subscale scores correlated
positively with total KIMS scores as well as its subscales. Specifically,
awareness correlated with each KIMS subscale, relational orientation corre-
lated with each KIMS subscale with the exception of KIMS‐Acceptance,
unbiased processing correlated significantly with KIMS‐Describe and
KIMS‐Acceptance, and behavior correlated significantly with KIMS‐
Describe and KIMS‐Awareness. Most of these relationships were moderate
in strength. The relationships that emerged between the subscales of the two
measures have many interesting theoretical implications. For example, the
awareness authenticity subscale, which reflects a basic awareness of, trust in,
and openness toward, self‐knowledge, correlated with each of the KIMS
subscales. These relationships suggest that an open and trusting stance
toward one’s self‐aspects goes hand‐in‐hand with tendencies to observe
internal and external stimuli, competence in describing one’s internal states,
ability to focus one’s attention on the task at hand, and a nonjudg-
mental stance in general. In addition, the significant correlations between
our unbiased processing subscale and the KIMS describe and awareness
subscales suggests that engaging in biased processing may reflect a more
general tendency to engage in evaluative judgments. Finally, the fact that
TABLE III
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY,MINDFULNESS,AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
FUNCTIONING MEASURES
Measure Total Awareness
Unbiased
processing Behavior
Relational
orientation
Self‐actualization .61** .53** .42** .41** .41**
Vitality .23* .26* .16 .02 .27*
Psychological stress .30** .31** .14 .25* .13
Physical symptomatology .21 .22* .07 .14 .15
Mindfulness (KIMS) .64** .67** .40** .43** .45**
KIMS‐OBSERVE .26* .24** .06 .12 .29**
KIMS‐DESCRIBE .62** .60** .40** .50** .42**
KIMS‐AWARENESS .36** .44** .11 .25** .27**
KIMS‐ACCEPTANCE .28** .27** .39** .18 .10
Mindfulness (MAAS) .49** .45** .37** .40** .28**
*p<.05, ** p<.01.
Note: Higher Psychological Stress scores reflect lower levels of stress. See text for description
of KIMS subscales.
312 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
high behavioral authenticity related to competence in describing observed
phenomena and to focusing one’s attention on the task at hand is consistent
with research and theory on intrinsic motivation. When intrinsically moti-
vated, people are highly absorbed in activities that match their interests and
talents (Deci, 1975). Interestingly although, the relational orientation au-
thenticity subscale is explicitly interpersonal in nature, it is related to many
intrapersonal aspects of mindfulness processes.
Other findings obtained in our lab and reported in Table III indicate that
higher authenticity relates to other aspects of positive psychological func-
tioning. Specifically, higher authenticity relates to greater self‐actualizing
tendencies (Jones & Crandall, 1986) and vitality (Ryan & Frederick, 1997)
and to lower psychological distress (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983)
and (marginally) physical symptoms.
C. AUTHENTICITY AND THE USE OF VARIOUS
COPING STRATEGIES
If our assertion that authentic functioning is associated with greater adaptive
functioning is correct, we should find corroborating evidence by examining
people’s characteristic ways of coping with stressful events. The adaptive
value of coping strategies vary from healthy and helpful to unhealthy and
counterproductive (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Moos & Schaefer,
1993; Vaillant, 2000). For instance, Folkman and Lazarus (1980, 1985)
described healthy coping styles with respect to problem‐focused and
emotion‐focused strategies. Problem‐focused coping strategies aim toward
solving the problem or modifying the source of the threat (Folkman &
Lazarus, 1980, 1985). Emotion‐focused coping strategies aim toward manag-
ing or reducing the emotional distress associated with the threatening
circumstances (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980, 1985). Although this distinction
has proven highly useful, Carver et al. (1989) argued that each of these broad
categories is comprised of a number of distinct coping strategies. They
developed a multidimensional coping inventory (the COPE) to assess the
various ways that people cope with stressful events. Active coping: taking
active steps to remove the threat or reduce its impact (I concentrate my
eVorts on doing something about it). Planning: thinking about how to cope
with the threat such as the steps to take to deal with the problem (I think
about how I might best handle the problem). Suppression of competing
actions: putting other things aside to deal with the problem at hand (I put
aside other activities in order to concentrate on this). Instrumental social
support: seeking information, help, or advice about how to deal with the
stressor (I try to get advice from someone about what to do). An example of
AUTHENTICITY 313
emotion‐focused coping is emotional social support: seeking sympathy, moral
support, and the like (I discuss my feelings with someone). In addition, the
COPE assesses a number of potentially maladaptive strategies, as in the follow-
ing: venting one’semotions—focusing on and venting one’s distress (I get upset
and let my emotions out); behavioral disengagement—withdrawing one’seVort
to either deal with the stressor or achieve the goal hampered by the stressor
(I just give up trying to reach my goal); mental disengagement—engaging in
alternative activities to distract oneself from the problem at hand (I sleep more
than usual); substance use—using alcohol or drugs to take one’smindoVthe
problem (I drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less); and
denial—refusing to accept that the stressor is real (I pretend that it hasn’treally
happened). (The measure contains several other subscales, but they are not
discussed here because they did not relate to our authenticity measure.)
To test the hypothesis that greater authenticity would relate to greater
reliance on adaptive coping styles and to less reliance on maladaptive coping
styles, Goldman and Kernis (2005) administered the AI‐3 and then subse-
quently administered the COPE measure approximately 4 weeks later.
The correlations displayed in Table IV indicate that authentic func-
tioning is related to the (self‐reported) use of more adaptive and less
maladaptive coping strategies (Goldman & Kernis, 2005). First, scores on
each authenticity dimension, as well as total scores, correlated significantly
TABLE IV
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AUTHENTICITY AND COPING STYLES
Coping scale Total Awareness
Unbiased
processing Behavior
Relational
orientation
Problem‐Focused Coping
Active coping .48** .37** .27* .49** .26*
Planning .31** .32** .10 .37** .09
Suppress .14 .11 .05 .21* .12
Instrumental support .15 .03 .01 .11 .32**
Emotion‐Focused Coping
Emotional support .19 .03 .08 .09 .38**
Suboptimal Coping
Mental disengage .21
a
.13 .23* .17 .07
Behavior disengage .21
a
.22* .11 .10 .18
a
Emotion venting .12 .25* .15 .03 .13
Denial .22* .23* .10 .07 .24*
Substance use .25* .22* .09 .29** .30**
Note:
a
p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01.
314 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
with scores on the active coping subscale. Thus, greater authentic function-
ing involves ‘‘taking the bull by the horns’’ and directly tackling the problem
at hand. Second, higher awareness and behavioral authenticity, as well as
total authenticity, related to greater use of planning. This makes sense, as
thinking through stressors and how best to deal with them often involves a
thorough assessment of one’s qualities relevant to the situation and a will-
ingness to act on one’s values. Third, greater behavioral authenticity related
to greater suppression of competing activities. This finding suggests that
behavioral authenticity involves the capability to self‐regulate one’s actions
with respect to task relevant demands. Fourth, greater relational authentici-
ty related to greater seeking of emotional and instrumental social support.
Thus, the more people value and achieve honesty and sincerity with their
intimates, the more they are willing to rely on them in times of stress by
seeking their informational and emotional support.
Authenticity also related inversely to the use of mostly dysfunctional or
maladaptive strategies. For example, substance use related to lower overall
authenticity, as well as lower awareness, behavior, and relational orientation
scores. These findings indicate that authentic functioning relates to construc-
tive and active eVorts to deal with problems and stressors, rather than shying
away from them or simply venting one’s emotions. Interestingly, the fact that
awareness subscale scores related to lower emotional venting suggests that the
desire to know one’s self does not include becoming fixated on one’s emo-
tional distress in times of stress. Instead, becoming fixated on one’s distress
appears to signal a relative lack of self‐knowledge. We would argue that
authentic self‐knowledge involves knowledge about one’s sensitivities that
interact with stressors to produce certain emotions and that such knowledge
reflects a level of mature self‐understanding antithetical to the notion of
venting one’s emotions, either to self or to others. Finally, total authenticity
scores, as well as awareness and relational orientation scores, related to less
denial of a stressor. As we have suggested, these aspects of authenticity
involve a desire for accuracy in self‐knowledge and comfortableness with
close others, each of which would seem to mitigate the need to deny the
existence of a stressor.
We conducted additional analyses to examine whether overall authenticity
predicted coping styles independent of self‐esteem level. Overall authen-
ticity uniquely predicted a number of coping styles, namely, active coping,
planning, emotional support, and substance abuse. These data provide impor-
tant support for considering dispositional authenticity to be an important
construct that cannot be reducible to self‐esteem level. Later in the chapter,
we report additional findings regarding the independent predictive utility
of dispositional authenticity, and we consider in detail the interrelation
between self‐esteem and authenticity.
AUTHENTICITY 315
D. AUTHENTICITY, SELF‐CONCEPTS, AND
ROLE FUNCTIONING
In his dissertation, Goldman (2004) examined the relationship and predic-
tive utility of dispositional authenticity with respect to a diverse set of
measures assessing (1) aspects of self‐esteem and self‐concepts (self‐esteem
level and contingency, self‐concept organization, and self‐theories) and (2)
social role functioning (markers reflecting general and authenticity‐related
aspects of social role adjustment) across the five commonly enacted social
roles of being a student, a romantic partner, a son/daughter, a friend, and an
employee.
Self‐esteem and self‐concept can be represented with an enormous number
of variables. Goldman narrowed the field by making reference to the notion of
astronger sense of self, which Kernis et al. (2000) suggested is comprised of
three components: (1) feelings of self‐worth that are well‐anchored and se-
cure, (2) actions that reflect a strong sense of agency and self‐determination,
and (3) self‐concept that is clearly and confidently defined so that it con-
tributes to a coherent sense of direction in one’s daily experience. With
respect to self‐esteem, Goldman’s study included measures of self‐esteem
level (Rosenberg, 1965) and contingent self‐esteem (the Contingent
Self‐esteem Scale, Kernis & Paradise, 2004; reported in Kernis & Goldman,
in press). Previous research and theory indicate that the higher and less
contingent (i.e., less dependent on specific achievements or outcomes) one’s
self‐esteem, the healthier it is (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kernis, 2003).
Self‐concept organization reflects aspects of cognitive structures that
organize and guide the processing of self‐related information. Implicit in
most conceptualizations of self‐organization is a hierarchical organization of
self‐knowledge wherein specific contents or domains of one’s self‐concept
are subsumed by more global self‐representations (e.g., general evaluations
of one’s self ). This organization can reflect varying degrees of consistency,
unification, coherence, versus fragmentation, diVerentiation, confusion, and
the like. A number of variables capture aspects of this organization. Self‐
concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996) is defined as the extent to which the
contents of the self‐concept are clearly and confidently held, internally
consistent, and temporally stable. Identity integration (O’Brien & Epstein,
1988) reflects the extent to which one’s self‐concept is eYcacious in organiz-
ing and directing life experiences and in assimilating new information. Stated
diVerently, identity integration reflects the overall adequacy of one’s self‐
concept in one’s general functioning. Self‐concept diVerentiation (Donahue
et al., 1993) reflects the extent to which individuals see themselves as having
diVerent personality characteristics in diVerent social roles. Thus, higher
diVerentiation reflects greater fragmentation in one’s self‐concept because
316 MICHAEL H. KERNIS AND BRIAN M. GOLDMAN
one’s personality is judged to diVer depending on the social role being
considered. Implicit theories (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) pertain to
individuals’beliefs regarding the extent to which such characteristics as
intelligence, morality, and personality traits are fixed and unchange-
able (entity theory), or are malleable and subject to change and development
(incremental theory). Endorsement of an incremental self‐theory reflects
a mastery orientation characterized by personal development and self‐
improvement as opposed to performance displays at any given point in time.
Self‐organization also involves how individuals adjust their self‐concepts
to assimilate experiences into an identity, as they actively cope with emerging
social demands and developmental challenges (Erickson, 1959). Berzonsky
(1988) proposed that how individuals engage and negotiate identity‐
relevant issues involves specific social‐cognitive processing orientations that
he refers to as identity styles. Three identity styles are proposed: information-
al, normative, and diVuse/avoidant (Berzonsky, 1988, 1990). Individuals
characterized by an informational identity style ‘‘actively seek out, process,
and evaluate self‐relevant information before making identity decisions. They
are skeptical about their self‐constructs, open to new information and alter-
natives, and willing to revise and modify their self‐views in response to
discrepant feedback’’ (Nurmi, Berzonsky, Tammi, & Kinney, 1997, p. 556).
Individuals characterized by a normative identity style conform to standards
and expectations held by authority figures and significant others, whereas
individuals characterized by a diVuse/avoidant identity style are unwilling to
confront directly and to deal with problems and identity issues.
We anticipated that higher authenticity would relate to higher self‐esteem
level, clarity, identity integration, incremental self‐theories, and informa-
tional identity styles and would relate to lower contingent self‐esteem, self‐
concept diVerentiation, and normative and diVuse/avoidant identity styles.
Table V displays the correlations. As can be seen, the data strongly sup-
ported our expectations. Specifically, higher dispositional authenticity scores
related to feelings of self‐worth that were both more favorable (higher self‐
esteem level) and more secure (less contingent feelings of self‐worth). In
addition, higher authenticity scores related to aspects of self‐organization
that are characterized by possessing a self‐concept that (1) is clearly and
confidently defined (high self‐concept clarity) and (2) exhibits less variability
or fragmentation across one’s social roles (low self‐concept diVerentiation).
Furthermore, with respect to identity styles, higher authenticity related to
greater tendencies to actively explore identity relevant information (high
informational identity styles) and lower tendencies to avoid acknowledging,
deciding, or reconciling their identity (low diVuse identity styles). Finally,
higher dispositional authenticity reflected heightened tendencies toward
growth motivations reflected by possessing implicit self‐theories characterized
AUTHENTICITY 317
in incremental terms (i.e., believing one’seVorts have meaningful im-
plications for changing outcomes in important self‐aspects). In sum, greater
dispositional authenticity reflected components of self‐esteem, self‐
organization, and self‐theories that involved a stronger, as opposed to
weaker, sense of self.
Dispositional authenticity reflects heightened self‐knowledge and under-
standing and openness toward knowing one’s self accurately. In contrast to
most measures of self‐concept organization that focus on structural or meta‐
knowledge features of self‐concept (e.g., how clearly the self‐concept is
defined), dispositional authenticity also assesses one’s prevailing motivation-
al tendencies toward acquiring and processing self‐relevant information
(i.e., awareness and unbiased processing component). Consequently, the
strong relations that