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Host society's dislike of the Islamic veil: The role of subtle prejudice, values, and religion
Abstract
The wearing of the Islamic veil by Muslim women has become a source of tensions in Western European countries. In order to investigate majority members’ attitudes towards the veil, the present two studies (Ns = 166 and 147), carried out in Belgium, integrated three lines of research that have focused on (a) the role of subtle prejudice/racism on the host society's attitudes towards immigrants, (b) the role of values on acculturation, and (c) the role of religious attitudes on prejudice. Results revealed the effects of subtle prejudice/racism, values (self-enhancement values and security versus universalism), and religious attitudes (literal anti-religious thinking versus spirituality), in predicting greater levels of anti-veil attitudes beyond the effects of other related variables such as age and political conservatism. The studies also suggest the importance of including religious attitudes as part of the intergroup-relation factors that predict attitudes towards immigrants, at least with regard to specific components of intercultural relations.
... Individuals with more negative attitudes toward outgroups are more likely to oppose particular outgroup beliefs and practices. For example, majority members with stronger anti-Muslim sentiments tend to strongly oppose the building of Mosques and minarets, Islamic schools, and the wearing of headscarves (e.g., Helbling, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2014;Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). Thus, opposition to and rejection of these specific practices can reflect a general negativity toward Muslims and be used to justify anti-Muslim prejudices. ...
... One strategy for assessing the role of group-based prejudice in rejection of specific outgroup practices is to measure the endorsement of general beliefs and values and statistically control for prejudicial attitudes. For example, enlightenment values of personal autonomy and rationality (e.g., Gustavsson et al., 2016;Imhoff & Recker, 2012), secularism (Dangubic et al., 2021), and self-direction and universalism (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009) have been found to predict disapproval of specific Muslim minority practices and beliefs, over and above the statistical effect of generalized prejudice, both explicit and implicit. ...
... For example, Helbling (2014) found in six European countries that people with secular liberal values felt positively toward Muslims as a group, but also conflicted regarding the legislation of religious practices such as the wearing of the headscarf. In addition, among national samples in the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, a substantial portion of people with a positive attitude toward Muslims supported a ban on headscarves (Van der Noll, 2010; see also Saroglou et al., 2009), and also rejected Islamic education and the building of Mosques (Van der Noll, 2014). ...
Living with cultural, religious, and ideological diversity inevitably creates situations where people are confronted with beliefs, values, or practices that they disapprove of. In such situations, people may consider reasons to nevertheless tolerate what they disapprove of (i.e., forbearance tolerance), or reject these (i.e., intolerance). In the current review, we consider empirical research on the processes of intergroup tolerance and consider different manifestations of (in)tolerance. Then we discuss recent work on the dual process model of tolerance, which considers intuitive versus deliberative objections to cultural, religious, and ideological differences, and how these can be overridden to produce tolerance. We then review literature on the boundaries of tolerance including the role of moralization and moral values, before considering individual difference factors and situations of threat that can hamper intergroup tolerance. We conclude by considering five areas ripe for future exploration on the social psychology of intergroup tolerance and intolerance.
... Одни исследователи объясняют неприятие иммигрантов с помощью социально экономических фак торов, таких как безработица, бедность и т. п. [Billiet, Meuleman, De Witte 2014;Citrin et al., 1997;Meuleman, 2011;Swank, Betz, 2003]. Другие видят причины поддержки антииммигрантской повестки дня в культурно символической сфере, то есть в опасениях за национальную идентичность и отторжении людей с по веденческими установками и мировоззрением, отличными от господствующих в принимающем обществе [Davidov et al., 2014;Leong, Ward, 2006;Lucassen, Lubbers, 2012;Saroglou et al., 2009]. Представление об иммигрантах как источ нике опасности обычно основано на воспринимаемой (perceived threat), а не на реальной угрозе или личном опыте, при этом различные группы иммигрантов связываются с разными типами угроз [Azrout, Wojcieszak, 2017;Schneider, 2008]. ...
... В Бельгии хуже всего воспринимают ношение хиджаба в общественных местах ультраконсерватив ные верующие христиане, а также индивиды, негативно относящиеся к любым религиям как таковым. Другими словами, нетерпимость к иммигрантам связана скорее с непримиримостью в вопросах религии, чем собственно с религиозно стью [Saroglou et al., 2009]. Дифференцированные эффекты различных аспектов индивидуальной религиозности отмечают П. Схеперс, М. Гейсбертс и М. Хелло в исследовании одиннадцати европейских стран -частота посещения церкви положительно связана со склонностью к этническим предрассудкам, тогда как степень знакомства с религиозной доктриной и важность религии для индивидаотрицательно [Scheepers, Gijsberts, Hello, 2002]. ...
... Едва ли можно говорить о том, что обна ружены какиелибо устойчивые паттерны как в мировом, так и в европейском контексте. В существующих работах обычно рассматривается только одно из этих измерений религиозности [Davidov et al., 2014;Fetzer, 2000;Hayes, Dowds, 2006;Karyotis, Patrikios, 2010;Saroglou et al., 2009;Storm, 2011], реже -оба [Savelkoul et al., 2010], при этом лишь в рамках одной или нескольких стран (исключения см. [Scheepers, Gijsberts, Hello, 2002;Davidov et al., 2014]). ...
В статье исследуется, как конфессиональная принадлежность и уровень индивидуальной религиозности европейцев связаны с их отношением к иммигрантам, представляющим различные религиозные группы. На основании теории социальной идентичности и теории религиозного сострадания выдвигается ряд гипотез относительно связи указанных факторов и толерантности к приезжим. Теория социальной идентичности утверждает, что индивиды склонны видеть в «своей» группе источник позитивной самоидентификации и потому воспринимают «инаковость» (например, принадлежность к иной религиозной группе; в случае Европы — к мусульманскому сообществу) как символическую угрозу. Согласно теории религиозного сострадания, религиозные индивиды сильнее привержены таким ценностям, как сострадание и забота о тех, кто испытывает трудности, и поэтому в большей степени склонны сочувствовать иммигрантам как уязвимой страте. При этом уровень солидарности прямо связан с тем, насколько «близкой» с религиозной точки зрения воспринимается конкретная группа приезжих.
На материалах седьмой волны Европейского социального исследования (ESS) по двадцати странам (сбор данных проводился в 2014—2015 гг., в разгар миграционного кризиса в Евросоюзе) строятся две многоуровневые регрессионные модели (в качестве первого уровня анализа выступают респонденты, в качестве второго — страны), в которых зависимыми переменными являются неприятие иммигрантов-мусульман и важность наличия у иммигрантов христианского бэкграунда. Результаты анализа показывают, что христиане (и католики, и протестанты) и более религиозные люди в большей степени склонны отдавать предпочтение иммигрантам из преимущественно христианских стран по сравнению с не принадлежащими ни к одной конфессии или нерелигиозными респондентами. При этом отношение к иммигрантам-мусульманам не связано ни с конфессиональной принадлежностью, ни с уровнем индивидуальной религиозности. Таким образом, в европейском контексте и теория религиозного сострадания, и теория социальной идентичности подтверждаются лишь отчасти.
... Erisen and Kentmen-Cin (2017) demonstrate that hostility towards Muslims increases intolerance of their political and social practices. Saroglou et al. (2009) conclude that subtle prejudices underlie the support for banning the wearing of the headscarf. Further, Van der Noll (2014) finds significant associations between the dislike of Muslims and the willingness to ban various civil rights (wearing headscarves, Islamic education, building mosques). ...
... The rejection of Muslim practices is often linked to prejudice, which is examined, for example, in terms of negative stereotypes (e.g. Saroglou et al. 2009), xenophobia (Helbling 2014), outgroup hostility (Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2017), general feelings of dislike or feelings of cultural threat (Bilodeau et al. 2018). Regardless of the specific operationalization used, the findings are similar: prejudice is positively related to the rejection of Muslim religious practices (e.g. ...
... For example, valuing civil liberties was associated with lower support for banning headscarves in Germany (Van der Noll 2014). Further, Saroglou et al. (2009) showed that those who value freedom more tend to be more accepting of Muslim religious symbols. And those who emphasize that the state should not restrict individual choices, tend to express less negative attitudes towards veiling (Gustavsson, van der Noll, and Sundberg 2016). ...
Rejection of Muslim religious practices in West European societies is typically explained by prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group. However, although people can oppose Muslim religious practices because they feel negatively towards Muslims as a group, they might also have more general reasons for doing so. By simultaneously considering multiple religious acts (wearing religious symbols and following religious education in public schools) and multiple religious actors (Muslims and Christians), we theoretically differentiate between individuals who apply a double-standard by rejecting Muslim but not Christian religious practices (discriminatory rejection) and those who reject practices independently of the religious group engaged in them (equal rejection). Among majority members in five West European countries, the findings support the existence of equal rejection next to discriminatory rejection with both patterns of responses having different associations with people's prejudices towards Muslim, their endorsement of civil liberties and secular values, and their religious affiliation.
... With respect to Muslims, culture maintenance might be associated with various practices or symbols, such as women's headscarves or men's turbans, the building of mosques, the observance of specific religious festivals, or the status and rights of women. Such practices may be viewed less favourably within some Western societies (Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009;Statham, 2016;Van der Noll, 2010). Islamic religious symbols might be disliked, not only by highly religious (Christian) majority members, but also by individuals who endorse a secular and laic ideology (Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2014). ...
... Such practices may be viewed less favourably within some Western societies (Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009;Statham, 2016;Van der Noll, 2010). Islamic religious symbols might be disliked, not only by highly religious (Christian) majority members, but also by individuals who endorse a secular and laic ideology (Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2014). Previous research suggests that Muslim immigrants are sometimes perceived as posing a threat to European majority members' values and identities (McLaren & Johnson, 2007;Van der Noll, Saroglou, Latour, & Dolezal, 2018). ...
... As a matter of fact, it seems that the minority's religion activates beliefs about what culture maintenance entails. Practices or symbols which are considered typical of Muslim culture might be not valued in host-societies founded on Christian values (Saroglou et al., 2009). Indeed, Muslim immigrants who wanted to maintain their culture were associated with less positive stereotypic beliefs. ...
A 2 × 2 × 2 experiment examined the role of immigrants’ religion and perceived acculturation strategy on majority members’ attitudes. Acculturation strategies were manipulated along the two dimensions of contact and culture maintenance. Italian majority members (N = 247) read fictitious but seemingly real interviews with Arab immigrants, in which the immigrants’ religion (Muslim vs. Christian) and acculturation preferences (desire for contact and for culture maintenance) were manipulated. MANOVA showed a main effect of contact: majority members associated immigrants who were perceived to favour contact with more positive attitudes, empathy, trust, positive stereotypes and metastereotypes, and lower levels of threat. MANOVA also showed a main effect of culture maintenance: when immigrants were perceived to abandon their culture, majority members reported lower levels of symbolic threat and greater empathy towards them. A significant Religion x Culture maintenance interaction effect emerged on majority members’ stereotypes and contact intentions: Muslim immigrants who were perceived to abandon their heritage culture elicited more favourable responses than Muslim immigrants who were perceived to maintain their heritage culture. Taken together, these findings suggest that desire for intergroup contact amongst immigrants, independently of their religion, can promote harmonious intergroup relations with the majority group.
https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1aDXJXTj04hyv
... Vermeulen en Penninx 2000). In veel Europese landen worden migranten van Arabische en Turkse afkomst geconfronteerd met aanzienlijke vooroordelen (Saroglou et al. 2009). In Europa zijn er overwegend negatieve publieke houdingen tegenover religie in het algemeen (Voas en Crockett 2005) en vijandige houdingen tegenover de islam en moslims in het bijzonder (Allen en Nielsen 2002). ...
... Religieuze praktijken, overtuigingen, coping en ethische principes zijn relevante componenten van het dagelijkse leven (Duderija 2008; Thomas en Sanderson 2011) en lijken een positief effect te hebben op de perceptie dat moslim-zijn een waardevol (dat wil zeggen zinvol) aspect van iemands leven is (Abu Raiya et al. 2008). Religieuze praktijken onder islamitische migrantengroepen in Europa (en elders) zijn van bijzonder belang voor het acculturatieproces 1 , omdat deze religieuze praktijken worden ervaren als cultureel verschillend van de Westerse samenleving (Saroglou et al. 2009), belangrijk zijn voor etnische identificatie (Güngör et al. 2011) en negatief gerelateerd zijn aan identificatie met de nationale identiteit (Fleischmann en Phalet 2018). Aan de ene kant zorgen praktijken zoals moskeebezoeken of dagelijkse gebeden voor een gevoel van continuïteit in een leven dat gefragmenteerd is door migratie en signaleren de praktijken ook grote betrokkenheid bij wereldbeelden, rituelen en gewoonten die gedeeld worden met co-etnische moslims, wat co-etnische banden en saamhorigheid in de loop van de tijd versterkt (Güngör et al. 2011;Maliepaard en Schacht 2018). ...
Minorities who face negative interactions with other groups may experience both an increased identification with their ethnic group and a decreased identification with a majority group. First, we argue that it is important to understand the associations minorities have with negative interactions with other groups, especially among minorities who are rarely included in empirical research. Muslim refugees are often treated differently and experience more negative interactions than other immigrants. Second, we combine insights (a) about the role of religiosity in acculturation, suggesting that religiosity does not have positive effects on well-being in societies that do not value (a specific) religion (the religiosity-as-social-value hypothesis), and (b) insights from rejection (dis)identification models, to understand which aspects of being Muslim are associated with discrimination, (dis)identification, and well-being. The central research question is whether the religious practices of Muslims, but not their religious beliefs, coping mechanisms, or principles, are associated with increased perceived discrimination and identification, suggesting that this is due to the high visibility of such practices. Data from Islamic Afghan refugees in the Netherlands (N = 183) shows that only religious practices are positively related to perceived discrimination. Perceived discrimination intensifies the relationship between religious practices and disidentification with the majority group, as well as the relationship between religious practices and well-being. We propose that the visibility of an individual’s religious behavior is relevant to the outcomes of the acculturation process.
... Another study conducted by Saroglou et al. [18] examined the perceptions of the Muslim veil and the prejudice associated with it in relation to values. By utilizing the Schwartz Value Survey, these researchers investigated the correlation between values and negative attitudes toward the veil, discomfort with its presence, and the inclination to prohibit it. ...
... The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of various human values (e.g., benevolence, universalism, power, and achievement) on individuals' perceptions of immigrants as threats in the United States. Earlier studies proposed that individuals with higher self-transcendence values positively influenced perceptions toward immigrants, while those with self-enhancement values had a more negative impact [17,18,20]. Additionally, research indicated that individuals scoring higher in universalism and benevolence values would be more concerned with the overall welfare of society, and consequently, would be less likely to express prejudice. ...
Researchers have explored human values can effectively induce changes in attitudes and behaviors toward immigrants. This study compared the impact of different human values (self-transcendence and self-enhancement) on individuals' perceptions toward immigrants. A total of 250 participants were included in the study. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: control condition, priming condition on universalism, benevolence, power, or achievement. All participants completed a Scrambled Sentences Task to prime the value saliency, a Short Schwartz’s Value Survey for the manipulation check, and a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of threat toward immigrants. One-way ANOVAs were conducted between each value priming condition (achievement, benevolence, power, and universalism) and the control condition, along with planned contrasts. The results did not reveal any statistically significant differences between the conditions across the composite scale and subscales (realistic and symbolic threat). Post Hoc tests indicated that individuals who identified as White were more likely to perceive immigrants as threats compared to Blacks and Hispanics, suggesting racial and ethnic background differences in perception. Across all groups, negative correlations were found between threat perceptions and self-transcendent values, while positive correlations were found between threat perceptions and self-enhancement values. Although experimental evidence using Scrambled Sentences Tak for priming human values was not found, the study supports the correlational associations between human values and attitude toward immigrants.
... For example, in the event of the election of the Prophet's successor in the Saqifa of Bani Sa'deh and the subsequent clashes between government officials during the Rashidun caliphate and finally the enthronement of Mu'awiyah and the 115 establishment of the Umayyad rule, and even in later Islamic dynasties such as the Abbasids, prejudice was not ineffective. The effect of prejudice is on tribal rivalries for power (Saroglou et al., 2009;Shaver et al., 2017). For example, in the early period of Islam, this tribal rivalry is evident. ...
... The Umayyads also took over wherever they ruled. They controlled Khorasan, Rey, Sistan, Sindh, Qaliqala, Tbilisi and other areas (Saroglou et al., 2009). The areas in the hands of the Umayyads can be divided into five provinces whose governors were Arabs, especially Umayyad Arabs. ...
In all human civilizations, there is the concept of prejudice, which is one of the requirements for the survival of a civilization. In this article, the aim is to examine the prejudice in the tribal structure of the Arabs. Prejudice is one of the characteristics of the pre-Islamic Arabs that existed structurally among the Arabs even after Islam. This prejudice, which was very evident among the pre-Islamic Arabs, played an important role not only among the post-Islamic Arabs but also in the events of the Islamic realm. Including in the incident of Saqifah Bani Saadeh and the Arab policies of the Umayyads. In this article, using the second and third hand sources, the role of prejudice in the events of the Islamic Caliphate has been investigated.
... Restrictions on Islamic dressing in public space are often seen as a sign of Islamophobia (e.g. Saroglou et al., 2009). However, some studies suggest that the positive correlation between prejudice against Muslims and acceptance of their religious practices is not always significant ( Van der Noll et al., 2010;Adelman and Verkuyten, 2019). ...
... When answering a survey that measures attitudes towards Muslims, the respondents in many western societies score low on prejudice against this social group and they score high on the rejection of practices related to the Muslim religion. Indeed, studies with national samples from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands demonstrate that a large proportion of individuals with positive attitudes toward Muslims also support a headscarf ban (Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll et al., 2010) and reject Islamic education or the building of mosques (Van der Noll, 2014). ...
... Ethnic minority groups, particularly Muslim groups, are subject to widespread discrimination and prejudice (e.g., Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). In many European countries, immigrants of Arab and Turkish origin face significant prejudice (Saroglou et al., 2009). In Europe, there are predominantly negative public attitudes toward religion in general (Voas & Crockett, 2005) and even hostile against Islam and Muslims in particular (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). ...
... Religious practices, beliefs, coping and values are relevant components of daily life (Duderija, 2008;Thomas & Sanderson, 2011) and seem to have a positive effect on the perception that being Muslim is a valuable (i.e., meaningful) aspect of one's life (Abu Raiya et al., 2008). Religious practices among Muslim immigrant groups in Europe (and elsewhere) are of particular importance for the acculturative process, as these are experienced as culturally distant from the host society (Saroglou et al., 2009), are important for ethnic identification (Güngör et al., 2011) and are negatively related to identifying with the national host identity (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2018). On the one hand, practices such as mosque visits or daily prayers do not only provide some sense of continuity in a life fragmented by migration, they also signal higher commitment to worldviews, sacred rituals and habits shared with co-ethnic Muslims, which, in turn, strengthens co-ethnic ties and belonging over time (Güngör et al., 2011;Maliepaard & Schacht, 2018). ...
Minorities facing adverse intergroup contact can experience both increased identification with their ethnic group and decreased identification with a host majority group. First, we argue it is important to understand what is associated with adversity, particularly in previously overlooked samples. Muslim refugee samples are often treated differently and experience more adversity than other immigrants. Second, we combine insights on the role of religiosity in acculturation with the observation that religiosity may not have positive effects in societies that do not value (a specific) religion (religiosity-as-social-value hypothesis) as well as insights from rejection (dis)identification models, to understand which domains of being a Muslim are associated with discrimination, (dis-)identification, and well-being. We hypothesized that Muslim religious practices, but not beliefs, coping, or values, are associated with increased perceived discrimination, and suggest that this is because practices are highly visible. Data from Muslim Afghan refugees in the Netherlands (N = 183) revealed that indeed only religious practices were related positively to perceived discrimination. Perceived discrimination in turn mediated the relationship between religious practices and dis-identification with the majority group, as well as the relationship between religious practices and well-being. We suggest that the visibility of one’s religious behavior is relevant for acculturation outcomes.
... Given the rise in anti-minority sentiment, and specifically anti-Asian acts of violence and aggression that accompanied the pandemic in North America (Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, 2021;Choi, 2021), it is important to better understand some of the factors that influence person perception in a health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Previous studies have documented that Muslim head and face coverings reduce the rated attractiveness of the wearer and the participant's empathy toward them (Saroglou et al., 2009;Mahmud and Swami, 2010;Unkelbach et al., 2010). Yet it is unclear whether these effects reflect stereotyping of an out-group (Saroglou et al., 2009;Mahmud and Swami, 2010) or the emotional valence of the head-coverings themselves. ...
... Previous studies have documented that Muslim head and face coverings reduce the rated attractiveness of the wearer and the participant's empathy toward them (Saroglou et al., 2009;Mahmud and Swami, 2010;Unkelbach et al., 2010). Yet it is unclear whether these effects reflect stereotyping of an out-group (Saroglou et al., 2009;Mahmud and Swami, 2010) or the emotional valence of the head-coverings themselves. In any case, it is important to remind the reader that protective masks were worn for health reasons by people worldwide during the COVID-19 pandemic. ...
This study tests the influence of wearing a protective face mask on the perceived attractiveness of the wearer. Participants who identified as White, and who varied in their ideological stance toward mask wearing, rated the attractiveness of facial photographs. The photos varied in baseline attractiveness (low, medium, and high), race (White and Asian), and whether or not the face was wearing a protective mask. Attitudes regarding protective masks were measured after the rating task using a survey to identify participants as either pro- or anti-mask. The results showed that masked individuals of the same race were generally rated as more attractive than unmasked individuals, but that masked individuals of another race were rated as less attractive than unmasked individuals. Moreover, pro-mask participants rated masked individuals as generally more attractive than unmasked individuals, whereas anti-maskers rated masked individuals as less attractive. A control experiment, replicating the procedure but replacing the protective masks with a partially occluding notebook, showed that these effects were mask-specific. These results demonstrate that perceived attractiveness is affected by characteristics of the viewer (attitudes toward protective masks), their relationship to the target (same or different race), and by circumstances external to both (pandemic).
... Ethnic minority groups, particularly Muslim groups, are subject to widespread discrimination and prejudice (e.g., Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). In many European countries, immigrants of Arab and Turkish origin face significant prejudice (Saroglou et al., 2009). In Europe, there are predominantly negative public attitudes toward religion in general (Voas & Crockett, 2005) and even hostile against Islam and Muslims in particular (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). ...
... Religious practices, beliefs, coping and values are relevant components of daily life (Duderija, 2008;Thomas & Sanderson, 2011) and seem to have a positive effect on the perception that being Muslim is a valuable (i.e., meaningful) aspect of one's life (Abu Raiya et al., 2008). Religious practices among Muslim immigrant groups in Europe (and elsewhere) are of particular importance for the acculturative process, as these are experienced as culturally distant from the host society (Saroglou et al., 2009), are important for ethnic identification (Güngör et al., 2011) and are negatively related to identifying with the national host identity (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2018). On the one hand, practices such as mosque visits or daily prayers do not only provide some sense of continuity in a life fragmented by migration, they also signal higher commitment to worldviews, sacred rituals and habits shared with co-ethnic Muslims, which, in turn, strengthens co-ethnic ties and belonging over time (Güngör et al., 2011;Maliepaard & Schacht, 2018). ...
Minorities facing adverse intergroup contact can experience both increased identification with their ethnic group and decreased identification with a host majority group. First, we argue it is important to understand what is associated with adversity, particularly in previously overlooked samples. Muslim refugee samples are often treated differently and experience more adversity than other immigrants. Second, we combine insights on the role of religiosity in acculturation with the observation that religiosity may not have positive effects in societies that do not value (a specific) religion (religiosity-as-social-value hypothesis) as well as insights from rejection (dis)identification models, to understand which domains of being a Muslim are associated with discrimination, (dis-)identification, and well-being. We hypothesized that Muslim religious practices, but not beliefs, coping, or values, are associated with increased perceived discrimination, and suggest that this is because practices are highly visible. Data from Muslim Afghan refugees in the Netherlands (N= 183) revealed that indeed only religious practices were related positively to perceived discrimination. Perceived discrimination in turn mediated the relationship between religious practices and dis-identification with the majority group, as well as the relationship between religious practices and well-being. We suggest that the visibility of one’s religious behavior is relevant for acculturation outcomes.
Keywords: rejection (dis-)identification model, perceived discrimination, ethnic identity, religiosity, Muslim
... As such, we explored a variety of moral values and sociopolitical beliefs drawn from the prejudice literature. These correlates include social values (Saroglou et al., 2009), moral foundations (Hadarics & Kende, 2018, and ideological variables such as RWA, social dominance orientation (SDO), and conservatism (for a review see Duckitt & Sibley, 2017). We tested whether these variables marked different styles of prejudice. ...
... Materials for all studies can be found on the OSF page (https://osf.io/cy93k/?view_only=ffe50fe62bfa4fe7b18ede 6d2829e16d). Previous research suggests that values are associated with attitudes toward outgroups (Saroglou et al., 2009) as are moral foundations (Hadarics & Kende, 2018), so we included these as distal outcomes of the profiles. We also included several known predictors of attitudes toward outgroups including patriotism (Wagner et al., 2012), RWA, and religiosity (Tsang & Rowatt, 2007). ...
Much of the recent work on prejudice emphasizes individual differences, which focuses on the strength of relations between variables on specific instances of prejudice such as racial–ethnic or sexual prejudices. However, the relations between religiosity and prejudice variables are inconsistent and sometimes even paradoxical (Allport, 1954). In three studies of Christian Americans (N = 2,271), we utilized a person-centered data-analytic approach to identify distinct subgroups or profiles characterized by similar self-reported prejudices. Our results support four distinct profiles of prejudice among Christians in the United States. We labeled the profiles of prejudices Generalized, Tepid, Sanctioned, and Warm. The Generalized profile demonstrated prejudice toward people in historically disadvantaged racial, ethnic, and sexual orientation groups. People in the Sanctioned profile demonstrated a pattern of value-based prejudice. The Tepid profile reported neutral attitudes toward people groups, and the Warm profile reported positive attitudes toward minority groups and warm (but slightly less so) attitudes toward conservative groups. These results support the generalized and value violation models of prejudice and provide further insight to other variations in prejudice among Christian Americans.
... Many observers agree that immigration was the key decisive issue for those citizens that voted "leave" in the referendum. Finally, the UK has known important and highly controversial migrant demonstrations, such as the recent protests by Muslim communities against LGBT lessons in school. 1 The results of our survey experiment broadly support the backlash argument and contribute to recent debates on public attitudes toward immigrants in general (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) and Muslim immigrants in particular (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007;Strabac and Listhaug, 2008;Kalkan et al., 2009;Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2010;Sniderman et al., 2014;Adida et al., 2016;Spruyt and Van der Noll, 2017;Van der Noll et al., 2017;Wright et al., 2017). ...
... As Helbling and Traunmüller (2016: 393) argue, accommodating Muslim immigrants' claims often "involves the changing of existing rules as well as the loss of longstanding traditions, valuable privileges, and maybe even everyday habits." Some consider Muslims' cultural beliefs on gender roles or sexuality as incompatible with liberal and secular lifestyles (e.g., Norris and Inglehart, 2004;Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007;Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2010;Helbling, 2014). Others argue that Muslim immigration threatens the collective identities in Europe because the latter are deeply rooted in a religious tradition of Christianity (Helbling and Traunmüller, 2016). ...
Focusing on one specific aspect of immigrant political integration—how authorities deal with their political right to demonstrate—we show in a large-scale survey experiment that liberal policy decisions permitting demonstrations lead to a polarization in attitudes: citizens who agree with a permission become more sympathetic, while those in favor of banning become more critical of immigrants. This notion of opinion backlash to policy decisions adds a new perspective to the literature on immigration attitudes which has either assumed a congruence between public opinion and policy or ignored political sources of anti-immigrant sentiment altogether. By exploring the unintended consequences of policy decisions, we provide an alternative view and demonstrate the inherent dilemma of balancing citizen opinion and minority rights.
... Curiously, despite the question of religion being at the heart of the laïcité debate (Saroglou et al. 2009), very few studies have examined possible differences in the attachment to the principle of laïcité and the lay conceptions of laïcité held by believers and nonbelievers, or by members of different faiths. Nevertheless, this is a highly important issue given the large number of people who feel that Islam is incompatible with secularism and European values (Imhoff and Recker 2012), despite the arguments of some Muslim intellectuals, such as Abdennour Bidar, Leïla Babès, or Malek Chebel, who defend the idea of compatibility between Islam and secularism (Kiwan 2020). ...
... In conclusion, our study helps clarify the differences between the two conceptions of laïcité described in the literature Guimond 2015, 2017), while highlighting the importance of considering individuals' religious orientations when studying conceptions of laïcité (Saroglou et al. 2009). Indeed, by showing that religious affiliation plays an important role in which conception of laïcité a person embraces, our results enabled us to identify some of the societal issues underlying France's never-ending debate over the principle of laïcité. ...
In European countries, a large number of people feel that Islam is incompatible with secularism. France's legal principle of laïcité (a type of state "secularism") has governed the relationship between religion and society since 1905. However, recent research suggests that there coexist two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differ most notably in their tolerance for the presence of religious symbols in public places, one inclusive, the other restrictive. This latter conception appears to target mainly Muslims. The present research examined the lay conceptions of laïcité held by Catholics, Muslims, and nonbelievers. Analyses of participants' responses (N = 375) to a scale measuring lay beliefs about laïcité confirmed the existence of two distinct lay conceptions of laïcité that differed in the importance given to public expression of religious beliefs, religious neutrality of the state, and equal treatment of different religions. The results also showed that, independent of participants' religiosity, the restrictive conception was more prevalent among nonbelievers, the two conceptions were equally prevalent among Catholics, and the inclusive conception was more prevalent among Muslims.
... While some researchers argue that anti-Muslim feelings underlie the rejection of Muslim practices (e.g. Saroglou et al. 2009), others claim that it is more complex and that also people with positive feelings toward Muslims can reject certain practices, and people with negative feelings towards Muslims can accept specific practices (e.g. Van der Noll 2014). ...
... First, we found two opposite subgroups of individuals: a positive subgroup (16%) with a generally positive orientation towards Muslims and their practices, and a negative subgroup (28%) with a generally negative orientation towards Muslims and their practices. These subgroups are in line with the assumption that group-based feelings underlie the (in)tolerance of Muslim practices (Saroglou et al. 2009). However, the feelings and (in)tolerance of both subgroups appear not to be specific toward Muslims but rather reflect a more general positive or negative orientation towards minority groups (Polish immigrants, refugees) and controversial minority practices related to gender and sexuality. ...
Research has examined tolerance of Muslim minority practices and anti-Muslim sentiments. We go beyond the existing research by applying latent profile analyses (LPA) on majority member’s evaluations of a range of Muslim practices and their feelings toward Muslims. We found five different subgroups of individuals among a sample of Dutch majority members (N = 831): a group that is positive towards Muslims and their practices (‘positive’), a group that is negative towards Muslims and their practices (‘negative’), a group that rejects all Muslim practices but reports positive feelings towards Muslims (‘intolerant’), a group that rejects only some practices and also has positive feelings towards Muslims (‘partly intolerant’), and a group that is not positive towards Muslims but accepts one practice (‘partly tolerant’). Furthermore, we show that these subgroups differ on key psychological variables (authoritarianism, status quo conservatism, and unconditional respect), and in their feelings towards other minority groups and (in)tolerance of other non-Muslim practices. We conclude that majority members can combine feelings toward Muslims and (in)tolerance of Muslim practices in different ways, and that the LPA approach makes an important contribution to the literature by providing a more nuanced understanding of how the public views Muslim minorities.
... wearing of a headscarf) is driven by dislike of Muslims as a group (e.g. Helbling, 2014;Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009). The second explanation focuses instead on the nature of the practice. ...
... Several studies in Western Europe conclude that the rejection of a particular practice is associated with and driven by dislike of Muslims. For example, prejudice has been found to underlie the willingness to ban the wearing of the headscarf (Helbling, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2014). ...
West European societies have seen strong debates about the acceptance of Muslim minority practices. In the current research we sought to better understand intolerance by examining whether people use a double standard in which the same practices are tolerated of Christians but not of Muslims (discriminatory intolerance), or rather reject the practices independently of the religious minority group because these are considered to contradict society's normative ways of life (normative intolerance). The results of two survey‐embedded experiments among native Dutch were most in agreement with an interpretation in terms of normative intolerance rather than discriminatory intolerance. This suggests that the rejection of Muslim practices has less to do with Muslims per se but rather with the perceived normative deviance of the practices, independently of the religious minority group. These findings broaden the research on anti‐Muslim sentiments and thereby the debate on the place of Islam within Western liberal societies.
... We measured antiheadscarf attitudes with nine items adapted from Saroglou et al. (2009). The items tap the feeling of discomfort regarding the wearing of the headscarf in a number of places (e.g., "It bothers me that staff members of public services (administrations, hospitals, etc.) wear the headscarf" (reversed)). ...
Laïcité, a version of secularism typically encountered in France, is at the heart of a heated debate, notably because it is frequently invoked as a reason for public measures against the headscarf. Research conducted in France has suggested that two conceptions of laïcité coexist, a historical version and a more recent one limiting the expression of religious symbols (e.g., headscarf) in the public space. In Belgium, such debates about Islam and laïcité also came to the fore in recent years. However, no empirical work has examined the different conceptions of laïcité in Belgium nor their link with attitudes towards Islam, racism, and sexism. In Study 1 (N = 321), we relied on Confirmatory Factor Analysis and found that laïcité comprises three separate dimensions (historic, anti‐funding and anti‐public expressions of religious symbols laïcités), each having distinct links with intergroup attitudes of racism, sexism, and anti‐Islam attitudes. In Study 2 (N = 191), we used an experimental design and made either Islam or Catholicism salient. As expected, antiegalitarian participants increased their levels of endorsement of “anti‐public expression of religious symbols” in the Islam condition, compared to the Catholic one. In line with Study 1's findings, this interaction was not present for anti‐funding laïcité. These results suggest the presence of distinct forms of laïcité in Belgium while showing the existence of a strategic malleability of this concept in Belgium. Findings such as these further our understanding of the dynamics at work in the debates around the headscarf, the financing of cults, laïcité in Belgium, and implications for societal cohesion.
... In the case of Islamophobia, non-Muslim Americans might express prejudice to the extent that they believe Muslims violate gender equality norms (Van der Noll et al., 2018). For instance, Islamophobic attitudes are connected to the perspective that wearing a religious head covering such as a hijab symbolizes oppression and gender inequality (Aidenberger & Doehne, 2021;Saroglou et al., 2009). Brandt and Crawford (2019) identified worldview conflict as a consistent predictor of prejudice regardless of one's own belief system. ...
The present research explored the role of perceived moral differences between the self and a Muslim outgroup in predicting Islamophobic attitudes and the moderating role of political orientation. Non-Muslim North American participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) to report their own moral beliefs and those they ascribe to a Muslim outgroup. Perceived moral differences, Muslim-ascribed moral beliefs, and political orientation were then used to predict Islamophobic attitudes. Across two studies, Islamophobic attitudes were higher among participants who believed that Muslims undervalue the harm/care foundation. Study 2 determined that perceived differences in the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions predicted Islamophobia particularly for politically conservative participants. Among more politically liberal participants, Islamophobia was not related to a perceived difference on these foundations. Those who hold more conservative beliefs were particularly likely to engage in morality-based prejudice, with Islamophobic attitudes higher among conservative participants who perceive a greater moral difference between themselves and a Muslim outgroup on the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions.
... In the current globalization era, Muhammadiyah faces new challenges, including the influence of Arabization and Westernization (Hasanudin, 2023;Rogers, 2018), which can lead to the erosion of local cultural identity. In facing this challenge, Muhammadiyah strengthens the concept of "Sophisticated Islam" which seeks to unite Islamic values with advances in technology and knowledge (Anwar, 2005;Hefner, 2011;Saroglou, 2009), so that Indonesian Muslims can adapt to global changes without losing their Islamic identity. Through this approach, Muhammadiyah continues to strive to become a progressive Islamic movement, which is not only relevant to the global context but also remains strong in authentic Islamic principles. ...
This research aims to examine the historicity of KH Ahmad Dahlan, founder of Muhammadiyah, in emphasizing the theological principles of tajwid and ijtihad, describing the concept of development used by KH Ahmad Dahlan as an intellectual reaction to the social, political and economic challenges faced by Indonesian society during the Dutch colonial rule. This research uses systematic literature observation (SLR) methodology to identify, disseminate, and analyze all relevant research to answer research questions using the 7P technique. This research increases scientific knowledge about the Islamic reform movement, how insight into the theological principles it offers especially in the modern era, and how the concept of "Islamic Development" responds to the unique aspects of Globalization will be discussed in detail. The final results show the involvement of empowerment from the leaders of the Muhammadiyah movement to create effective educational and promotional initiatives to improve Islamic identity in society. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji historisitas KH Ahmad Dahlan, pendiri Muhammadiyah, dalam menekankan prinsip-prinsip teologis tajwid dan ijtihad, menggambarkan konsep pembangunan yang digunakan oleh KH Ahmad Dahlan sebagai reaksi intelektual terhadap tantangan sosial, politik dan ekonomi yang dihadapi oleh masyarakat Indonesia selama pemerintahan kolonial Belanda. Penelitian ini menggunakan metodologi systematic literature observation (SLR) untuk mengidentifikasi, menyebarluaskan, dan menganalisis semua penelitian yang relevan untuk menjawab pertanyaan penelitian dengan menggunakan teknik 7P. Penelitian ini meningkatkan pengetahuan ilmiah tentang gerakan reformasi Islam, bagaimana wawasan tentang prinsip-prinsip teologis yang ditawarkannya terutama di era modern, dan bagaimana konsep "Perkembangan Islam" menanggapi aspek-aspek unik Globalisasi akan dibahas secara rinci. Hasil akhir menunjukkan keterlibatan pemberdayaan dari para pemimpin gerakan Muhammadiyah untuk menciptakan inisiatif pendidikan dan promosi yang efektif untuk meningkatkan identitas Islam di masyarakat.
... For example, attire such as the hijab or keffiyeh demonstrates that the individual belongs to a different culture or religion. Indeed, anti-Muslim prejudice tends to be heightened when Muslim people wear more traditional attire (Brown et al., 2013;Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009). ...
Following 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-Muslim antipathy dramatically escalated in the United States. We argue that a major contributor to this hostility is endorsement of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) because people high in RWA tend to respond aggressively toward groups that they view as threatening particularly when they perceive that such aggression is supported by authority figures. We posit that Americans high in RWA view Muslims as threatening traditional American norms and perceive that the U.S. government is at war with Islam. Across three studies, we present consistent support for our hypothesis that RWA is associated with endorsing and engaging in hostile behavior toward Muslims. In addition, this hostility is mediated by the perception that Muslims threaten societal norms and that the government is actively at war with Islam (Study 3). The implications for the reduction of aggression toward Muslims and the impact of RWA on hostility toward other outgroups are discussed.
... Of the many outgroup religious and ethnic groups in the context of European cities, Muslim religion is one of the most contested (Doebler, 2014). The symbolic identity threat (threat to one's cultural and religious identity) is a strong predictor of Islamophobia (e.g., anti-Muslim racism), and the symbolic aspects of Islamophobia have strong links to the visibility of Muslim symbols in the public sphere (Burchardt & Griera, 2019;Saroglou et al., 2009). It is often suggested that the controversy over the visibility of Islam in the European public sphere (such as minarets, halal shops, and wearing a veil by Muslim women) represents a struggle over the nature of the public space because public spaces are shaped by visibility rules of the hegemonic ideological narratives (Burchardt & Griera, 2019). ...
... In line with this research, it is assumed that conventional religious beliefs and practices are associated with a traditional (more exclusive) understanding of religion and therefore increase ethnic prejudice. It seems plausible that a spiritually oriented lifestyle might cross boundaries between in-and outgroups and could promote values such as universalism and diversity (Saroglou et al. 2009). In a recent study with regard to anti-Muslim sentiments, Aschauer (2020) found that when Austrians see a deeper meaning in a religious life they react with more tolerance towards Muslims. ...
In this chapter I address three current social questions that are central for Europe, namely redistribution, ethnocentrism and environmental awareness. By analyzing perceptions of European citizens in a cross-national perspective it becomes clear that these pressing issues will remain major sources of dissent due to notable value cleavages between and within European states. The aims of my empirical approach, using the data of the four recent waves of the European Values Study (1990, 1999, 2008, 2017) are threefold. First, a cluster analysis based on relevant macro-indicators is conducted to distinguish certain groups of countries with a similar political, economic, social, and cultural profile. As a second step, attitudes towards those social challenges based on a well-functioning operationalisation are depicted using the last wave of the EVS. Additionally, single indicators (using mean comparisons) are analysed over the four time points to highlight the evolution of citizen’s perceptions to those societal challenges. The last part of the analysis computes separate regressions for each country cluster to derive the main antecedents of those attitudes using sociodemographic and structural characteristic, basic value orientations, religious indicators, political opinions and aspects of social inclusion. In general, the study reveals deep value polarisations between major European areas. These divisions are likely to increase in the current pandemic crisis.
... These symbolic threats are associated with negative attitudes toward refugees and migrants (Esses et al., 2017;Landmann et al., 2019;Riek et al., 2006;Stephan, 2014). Prejudice and intolerance of Islamic religious practices, such as headscarves, are associated (Helbling, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2014;Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). These findings may indicate that features of the Islamic religion are seen as dangerous in themselves. ...
The stereotypes and biases that people have about various religions may not be applied to just the individuals who belong to those religions, but to the belief systems themselves. We hypothesized that non-Muslim and Muslim Americans would demonstrate biased estimates about the language content of the Quran and New Testament holding positive views towards their relative ingroup and negative views towards the outgroup text. We used two samples (N1 = 163, N2 = 204) of Americans and the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count Software (LIWC) to test our hypotheses. We determined the differences between the texts across language categories. Participants then rated the categories in terms of their relative frequency across the texts. We compared these ratings to the actual differences between the texts. As hypothesized, participants perceived the ingroup text as positive and the outgroup text as negative. We discuss whether biased beliefs about religious teachings may be separate from but aligned with biases against believers and further contribute to religious stereotypes.
... Sunan Kalijaga, for instance, used one of Javanese culture's wayang performances to introduce Islam and Islamize Javanese society. Sunan Kalijaga plays wayang with great skill and incorporates Islamic values and elements into wayang stories (Saroglou et al., 2009). The audience members who saw the Sunan Kalijaga performance finally learned about Islam and expressed an interest in it. ...
This study was carried out to review the approaches and methods of Islamic da'wah in spreading Islam so that today Indonesia is one of the regions with the most significant number of Muslims in the world. The approach to this study was carried out in a descriptive qualitative manner which utilized all publications that had been published by various literary sources such as books and academic scientific works, which we then reviewed systematically to gain an understanding of the various approaches and methods that had been taken when preaching Islam to the archipelago. We found this data with a Google search to find relevant literature addressing issues that were more or less 10 to 12 years ago. The approach we took in the study included coding the data, evaluating and testing the data to gain understanding, and occasionally interpreting it so that the friend is genuinely valid and has validity and reality in answering the problems and hypotheses in this study.
... The presence of immigrant Muslims poses a cultural or symbolic threat to Western liberal societies. This produces anti-Muslim sentiments and affects social cohesion (Helbling, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009;Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007;Van der Noll, 2010). Several studies have demonstrated the connection between feelings of threat and anti-Muslim sentiments (Ciftci, 2012;Velasco González et al., 2008). ...
The capability of accommodation policies to create inclusive and cohesive societies for social integration has recently been called into question. Some people worry that accommodation may upset those who disagree about the policy and create a backlash effect. This study examines these issues using the theory of cognitive dissonance and empirically tests whether individuals’ policy preference influences the impact of accommodation of Islam policies on anti-Muslim sentiments. Using survey data from 15 Western European countries, we find that accommodation of Islam policies produce socialising effects on those whose opinions resonate with the policies. However, we do not find statistical evidence of backlash on those whose opinions dissonate with the policies. The findings suggest that accommodation of Islam policies do not radicalise dissonant opinions and are likely to reduce anti-Muslim sentiments among those whose opinions resonate with the policies.
... Of the many outgroup religious and ethnic groups in the context of European cities, Muslim religion is one of the most contested (Doebler, 2014). The symbolic identity threat (threat to one's cultural and religious identity) is a strong predictor of Islamophobia (e.g., anti-Muslim racism), and the symbolic aspects of Islamophobia have strong links to the visibility of Muslim symbols in the public sphere (Burchardt & Griera, 2019;Saroglou et al., 2009). It is often suggested that the controversy over the visibility of Islam in the European public sphere (such as minarets, halal shops, and wearing a veil by Muslim women) represents a struggle over the nature of the public space because public spaces are shaped by visibility rules of the hegemonic ideological narratives (Burchardt & Griera, 2019). ...
... They are less likely to engage with members of low-status groups (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995) and have negative affective responses and judgment toward members of stigmatized groups (i.e., drug users; Skinner et al., 2007). Similarly, individuals who endorse more self-enhancement values tend to have more negative attitudes toward outgroups members, such as immigrants (Falanga et al., 2015;Saroglou et al., 2009) and individuals from sexual minorities (Bacchini et al., 2021;Donaldson et al., 2017). In contrast, individuals who endorse more openness to change values tend to have more positive attitudes and are more willing to have closer contact with members of stigmatized groups (Roccas & Amit, 2011;Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995;Schwartz et al., 2010). ...
Studies have shown that romantic partners in consensual non-monogamous (CNM) relationships are targets of stigmatization. However, little is known about the underlying mechanisms and the conditions under which such stigmatization occurs. In two experimental studies (combined N = 772), we asked participants to read the description of two partners in a relationship (monogamous vs. open relationship vs. polyamorous) and make a series of judgments about those partners. Overall results showed that CNM (vs. monogamous) partners were perceived as less trustworthy and as having more sexual health concerns (Studies 1 and 2), and as being less committed and less sexually satisfied (Study 2). Results from a conditional mediation analysis (Study 2) further showed that participants with negative attitudes toward consensual non-monogamy perceived CNM (vs. monogamous) partners as having less conservation and more openness to change values, which was then associated with more stigmatization. In contrast, participants with positive attitudes toward consensual non-monogamy perceived CNM (vs. monogamous) partners as having more openness to change values, which was then associated with less stigmatization. Taken together, these results extended the literature focused on prejudice, discrimination, and stigmatization of minority groups and highlighted key elements that can be used to buffer stigmatization.
... Differences in ideological beliefs and values are often used to explain policy preferences toward religious accommodations, including support for bans on religious symbols ( Van der Noll 2014;O'Neill et al. 2015;Ferland 2018;Turgeon et al. 2019). Much attention has been paid to the importance of social or political values and civil liberties (Saroglou et al. 2009;Turgeon et al. 2019;Dangubić et al. 2020; Van der Noll 2014) and group-specific prejudice (Helbling 2014;Van der Noll and Saroglou 2014;Bilodeau et al. 2018), sometimes placing these considerations in conversation with one another (Helbling 2014;Bilodeau et al. 2018;Dangubić et al. 2020). Researchers have also made the important distinction between those who favor restricting all religious symbols from those who support restrictions only on religious minority symbols, while preserving the privileged position of Christian symbols in public settings (Bilodeau et al. 2018;Dangubić et al. 2020). ...
Understanding the social dynamics of public opposition to religious symbols is a pressing issue. This research finds that stereotypes of how committed group members are to the national community shape support for the right to wear religious symbols in various settings. These social perceptions are particularly influential in determining support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols. Drawing on data from a national survey experiment ( N = 974) conducted in Canada, the results show Christians benefit from a particularly strong perceived commitment to the nation, while religious minorities are stereotyped as less committed and identified to the country than the average Canadian. As the perceived national commitment of religious minorities increases, however, the gap in support shown for the rights of Christians over religious minorities disappears and may lead to particularly strong support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols in public when perceptions of national commitment are high.
... As highlighted by Fadil et al., "The question of women's oppression, neutrality, or the need for an 'enlightened' or 'modern' Islam" (2014, 242) generates "a sense of discomfort over the headscarf" conceived of as "a sign of a return to tradition or a rejection of Western norms and values" (2014, 226). Antiveiling sentiments (and policies) emerge as parts of anti-immigrant prejudice (Saroglou et al. 2009) and significantly affect Muslim women's everyday experiences. ...
Work and the division of labour have been central issues to the study of gender disparities and inequalities historically and worldwide. In Nepal, the changing modes of production and living under the urban-development paradigm have provoked a rapidly transformation of social structures and hierarchies, including gender.
Through a multi-sited ethnography in rural and urban settings of Nepal, this paper explores the constant (re)shaping of the meanings and patterns of work for Sherpa women.
This paper reveals at least three important factors to look at. First, the hegemonic development discourses symbolically situate ‘modern’ jobs as desirable, particularly for women, who are usually considered independent or empowered if they participate in the productive economy and bring a monetary income to the household. Consequently, government and international organization’s promote them as preferable over other traditional activities. Secondly, as far as those kinds of jobs are mostly accessible in urban settings, a particular mobility regime exists in Nepal, which promotes the dislocation of rural population to the main cities or abroad, especially young people. Finally, education is seen as a strategic access door to paid jobs and modern lifestyles, particularly for young women. To study further they need to move to Kathmandu or abroad, adapting therefore their livelihoods and job expectations.
Findings show how femininity is negotiated between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’, the public and the private, the rural and the urban, the ‘hard’ and the ‘easy’ work and lifestyles. A negotiation where their desires and expectations clash with the reality: poor quality of education, precarious jobs and an increasingly individualistic city-lifestyle. Their experiences reveal the opening of an intersectional dialogue where not only gender but also age becomes relevant to the valuation of women’s roles, capacities and values in a Nepal worshipping modern and ‘developed’ lifestyles.
... Those who value communion exhibit a universal care for the welfare of others, even those beyond their ingroup, and have exhibited lower prejudice in prior research not focused on responses to disease (Rokeach, 1973;Schwartz, 2015;Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). In contrast, those who emphasize agency report greater prejudice toward immigrants (Leong & Ward, 2006;Saroglou et al., 2009;Shin & Dovidio, 2018). Hence, the impact of COVID-19 on prejudice may depend on the values evoked by the health and economic threats people experience during the pandemic. ...
The current research examined the role of values in guiding people’s responses to COVID-19. Results from an international study involving 115 countries (N = 61,490) suggest that health and economic threats of COVID-19 evoke different values, with implications for controlling and coping with the pandemic. Specifically, health threats predicted prioritization of communal values related to caring for others and belonging, whereas economic threats predicted prioritization of agentic values focused on competition and achievement. Concurrently and over time, prioritizing communal values over agentic values was associated with enactment of prevention behaviors that reduce virus transmission, motivations to help others suffering from the pandemic, and positive attitudes toward outgroup members. These results, which were generally consistent across individual and national levels of analysis, suggest that COVID-19 threats may indirectly shape important responses to the pandemic through their influence on people’s prioritization of communion and agency. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
... This allows us to investigate whether prejudiced people can engage in tolerance of specific minority practices that they disapprove of and also whether nonprejudiced people can be intolerant of particular practices. Furthermore, intolerance of Muslim minority practices might reflect groupbased prejudice rather than moral concerns (e.g., Helbling, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009;Van der Noll, 2014), making it important to investigate whether moral concerns predict intolerance over and above the statistical effect of prejudice. ...
Tolerance, the acceptance of disapproved conduct of others, is considered an indispensable feature of diverse societies. Yet tolerance can be expressed in one of two distinct ways, which is not reflected in the literature. In one way, tolerance is passive and involves suppressing the inclination to interfere with the disapproved conduct of others. In the other way, tolerance is active and involves endorsing the ability of others to engage in a disapproved practice. Using two nationally representative samples of Dutch majority members and eight scenarios involving real‐world debates about the accommodation of Muslim minority practices, we find that while a significant minority of people engage in passive tolerance toward disapproved outgroup practices, very few people are willing to engage in active tolerance by proactively supporting disapproved practices. Furthermore, we also find that people who have stronger moral concerns about particular minority practices are less willing to engage in either active or passive tolerance. These results emerged both in contexts where Muslim minority practices had a direct impact on one's personal life as well as those that impacted on society as a whole. Collectively, these results illustrate two different forms of tolerance and the influence of moral concern in tolerance.
... A clear and severe defect is either a break in the chain, or one of the transmitters is not the degree of "adl" -reliable -or an unsatisfactory fixation, such as something omitted in the text; The hadith transmits an adl -that is, a God-fearing, pious one who always does justice -from a person like him. In more detail, "adl" is a Muslim, sane, capable, who has reached sexual maturity, is clean from great sins, and is not known among people as one who often commits small sins and does not commit such degrading acts (Baele et al., 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009). A great sin is an act that all Islamic theologians have unanimously called such, according to the Quran and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. ...
The methodology for analysing the veracity and accuracy of the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad involves a set of specific procedures and activities. The science of hadith helps to clearly assess each individual expression attributed to the Prophet Muhammad in terms of its veracity. The task of hadith scholars is to determine the truth of hadith. Only after examining the biographies of the people mentioned in the Isnad (chain of transmissions) to convince them of their positive moral and intellectual qualities it is possible to judge the authenticity of a particular hadith. The purpose of the study was to conduct a systematic analysis of the stages of hadith study based on Sheikh Abdullah Harare's theology and to draw attention to the complexity of the science of hadith. This study provides traditional insights into the hadith and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad as an important source of Islamic religion and Muslim culture in general. All the Prophet's activities are covered by the Sunnah, which was, remains and will remain one of the main sources of Muslim law, secondary solely to the Holy Koran.
... Indeed, different studies endorse that liberal values relate differently to anti-Muslim attitudes, depending on the kind of liberalism concept (Elchardus and Spruyt 2014;Gustavsson et al. 2016). For example, liberalism conceived as the best way of life assessed through universalism -defined by Saroglou et al. (2009) as social justice and equality for all people -aligns with more positive attitudes towards the Islamic veil. Gustavsson et al. (2016) suggested that liberals who perceive reason and self-reflection as central characteristics of being a good liberal tend to have more negative attitudes towards religious practices, such as Muslim veiling, than individuals who value tolerance towards diverse lifestyles in society as a central liberal characteristic. ...
This study focuses on public opinion towards the face veiling of Muslim women and investigates the possibility of identifying different groups of citizens supporting distinct combinations of arguments regarding face veiling criticisms. Two groups are expected to argue for or against face veiling. Also, two other groups are expected to vary depending on their idea of liberalism inherent in face‐veiling arguments: a specific way of life versus respect for different ways of life. Using latent class (regression) analysis, the findings show that different groups emerged and that the political leftists were more diverse regarding argument patterns than the political rightists. Following the debate of why many political leftists have negative attitudes towards religious practices, this study does not find empirical support that anti‐Muslim and anti‐Islam attitudes systematically differ between the observed groups.
... Those who value communion exhibit a universal care for the welfare of others, even those beyond their ingroup, and have exhibited lower prejudice in prior research not focused on responses to disease THREATS AND VALUES DURING COVID-19 11 (Rokeach, 1973;Schwartz, 2015;Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). In contrast, those who emphasize agency report greater prejudice toward immigrants (Leong & Ward, 2006;Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009;Shin & Dovidio, 2018). Hence, the impact of COVID-19 on prejudice may depend on the values evoked by the health and economic threats people experience during the pandemic. ...
The current research examined the role of values in guiding people’s responses to COVID-19. Results from an international study involving 115 countries (N = 61,490) suggest that health and economic threats of COVID-19 evoke different values, with implications for controlling and coping with the pandemic. Specifically, health threats evoked prioritization of communal values related to caring for others and belonging, whereas economic threats predicted prioritization of agentic values focused on competition and achievement. Concurrently and over time, prioritizing communal values over agentic values was associated with enactment of prevention behaviors that reduce virus transmission, motivations to help others suffering from the pandemic, and positive attitudes toward outgroup members. These results, which were generally consistent across individual and national levels of analysis, suggest that COVID-19 threats may indirectly shape important responses to the pandemic through their influence on people’s prioritization of communion and agency. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
... In Europe, probably no other piece of cloth has been the object of so much contradictory hermeneutic work in public debates as has the Islamic headscarf or hijab. While the available interpretations cover the entire spectrum from very negative (e.g. a symbol of women's oppression [1]) to very positive (e.g. an expression of dignity and self-esteem [1]), in Europe the most common attitude towards the hijab consistently appears to be one of opposition, even among liberals [2][3][4][5]. ...
The Islamic headscarf has been in the middle of heated debates in European society, yet little is known about its influence on day-to-day interactions. The aim of this randomized field experiment (n = 840) is to explore how the generally negative views that surround the hijab in Europe manifest in the behavior that people direct to hijab-wearing women in everyday situations. Using a helping scenario and videotapes of the resulting interactions, we measured whether passengers offered assistance and also various details of behavior that indicate interpersonal involvement. We predicted that in interaction with the covered confederate less help would be offered, that women’s level of nonverbal involvement would increase but men’s decrease, and that responses would be stronger in Paris, intermediate in Brussels, and weaker in Vienna. We analyzed the data using Generalized Linear Models estimated with Bayesian inference. While the headscarf does not produce concluding differences in “overt” helping, it does affect “subtle” cues of interpersonal involvement. In response to the hijab, women across sites increase, but men in Paris decrease, the level of involvement that they show with their nonverbal behavior.
... Tolerance of minority group practices, and Muslim minorities in particular, are much-discussed topics in many western nations. The disapproval and rejection of Muslim minority behaviours has been commonly explained by the negative feelings that people have towards Muslims as a group, with research indicating that people who reject Muslim behaviours tend to have prejudices towards Muslims (e.g.,Blinder et al., 2019;Helbling, 2014;Saroglou et al., 2009). However, recent research suggests that people can also reject Muslim minority practices even when they have neutral or positive feelings towards the groupDangubić et al., 2021). ...
How do people decide whether specific minority behaviours should or should not be tolerated in society? The current research investigates the role of moralization in tolerance of Muslim minority behaviours that differ in their level of perceived normative dissent with four national samples of majority group members in the Netherlands and Germany (N = 3628). Study 1 revealed that behaviours perceived as more normatively dissenting were increasingly moralized and tolerated less. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that more normatively dissenting behaviours prompted people to prioritize the moral value of social cohesion over freedom and become less tolerant. Finally, Study 4 shows that priming the moral value of religious freedom decreases intolerance of a highly dissenting Muslim minority practice. Taken together, these studies reveal that moralization and value prioritizing can be associated with either intolerance or tolerance of minority behaviours depending on the perceived normative dissenting nature of these behaviours.
... Social identity research has consistently linked in-group belonging with anti-immigrant views (Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 2015; Mangum and Block 2018;Saroglou et al. 2009;Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004;Wojcieszak and Garrett 2018;Wright 2011). Here, SIT allows us to reinterpret the relationship between benevolence and perceived immigrant threat. ...
Personal values become increasingly relevant for immigrant-related bias in the European context. Situated in group conflict theories, human values theory and social identity theory encourage different interpretations of how our interest in the welfare of those closest to us, i.e. the in-group (benevolence), and the prosperity of all beings (universalism) inform attitudes towards immigrants. The present study examines how these self-transcending human values affect perceptions of immigrant threat. Using nationally pooled data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for fifteen European countries, the results show that benevolence and universalism tend to affect perceived immigrant threat in opposite directions. A part of individuals’ anti-immigrant bias does not stem from strictly self-interested motivations, as often proposed, but by a sense of loyalty to the interests of our immediate contacts. The group we place our loyalty matters. So does the national context suggesting that grand scheme interpretations can fall short.
... Along the self-transcendence/self-enhancement axis, social attitudes associated with fairness and care for others have been shown to share a motivational foundation with self-transcendence values (Boer & Fischer, 2013). Other research has shown that people who attach importance to selftranscendence values hold positive views of and are generally more accepting of immigrants (e.g., Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008;Schwartz, 2007;Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010;Vecchione et al., 2012;Wolf, Weinstein, & Maio, 2019), while people who attach importance to self-enhancement values tend to have less favorable views of immigrants (Leong & Ward, 2006;Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009;Wolf et al., 2019). Other research has shown that those who prioritize selfenhancement values are more likely to endorse "blind patriotism" or the "uncritical acceptance and support" for one's country regardless of the country's policies towards humans who are outside the nation's "in-group", suggesting that people with high self-enhancement values may be motivated to ignore social injustice in favor of their in-group's welfare (Livi, Leone, Falgares, & Lombardo, 2014, p. 141). ...
The extent to which individuals prioritize different personal values may be conceptually linked to endorsement of racial colorblindness beliefs as well as orientation toward social justice. The present study examined how personal values predicted racial colorblindness and social justice action orientation in a sample of undergraduates (N = 325; Age, M = 20.38, SD = 2.78). Results supported the hypotheses: Self-transcendence and openness to change values predicted higher social justice action orientation, mediated by lower colorblindness beliefs, whereas self-enhancement and conservation values predicted lower social justice action orientation, mediated by higher colorblindness beliefs. Hence, motives that emphasize others’ well-being and openness to change may be linked to less racial colorblindness and a greater willingness to address social inequalities. To encourage social justice efforts, institutions and social networks may benefit from considering implicit and explicit messages that promote the well-being of others and the value of openness as opposed to values that prioritize individual status and prestige and maintaining the status quo.
... Indeed, there is evidence that humanitarian values are negatively associated with anti-immigration attitudes (Cowan et al., 1997;Oyamot et al., 2006Oyamot et al., , 2012Newman et al., 2015;Verkuyten et al., 2018) unless people feel that immigration threatens such values (Kende et al., 2019). The endorsement of values, such as universalism, defined as being the "understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature, " (Schwartz, 2012, p.7; see also, Schwartz, 1992) has been linked to more favorable attitudes toward immigrants (Schwartz, 2007;Saroglou et al., 2009). ...
The Western hemisphere has witnessed recent increased immigration flows generating social and political debate across Europe. In one view, migration flows represent an opportunity to construct a diverse social cohesion. In another view, migration flows are perceived as a threat to existent national cultures. This view is held by political nationalisms and right-wing populist forces installed in the majority of EU countries’ parliaments, accentuating discrimination against immigrants and residents in Europe. We theorize that European identity predicts positive attitudes toward immigrants (prosocial behavior and support for inclusive policies), whereas national identity’s predictions of attitudes toward immigrants’ inclusion depends on participants’ political tendency. Moreover, we test the mediation effect of positive (humanitarian concerns and economic benefit) and negative (jobs scarcity, cultural deterioration, and invasion) arguments used in political discourses regarding immigrants’ inclusion on the relation between national and European identities and attitudes toward immigrants’ inclusion. Results (Portuguese sample, N = 176) show that national identity predicts negative attitudes toward immigrants’ inclusion, but only among right-wing individuals. Among left-wing individuals, national identity predicts less contestation to immigrant’s inclusion sustained by humanitarian concerns. Interestingly, European identification weakened right-wing individuals’ adherence to discriminatory arguments and increased perceived economic contribution that immigrants bring to society, increasing agreement with prosocial behavior and immigrants’ inclusion. We discuss that European identity, sustained in humanitarian values and economic benefit, may stimulate a stronger multicultural social cohesion, intergroup trust, and social well-being based on democratic values, social justice, and equality, and on the respect for human dignity.
... Batson et al. 1993). In a Belgian study, for example, Saroglou et al. (2009) found that secularly oriented persons are more strongly opposed to the headscarf, while spiritually oriented persons show more tolerance. The authors attribute this to the fact that a spiritually oriented lifestyle crosses boundaries between ingroups and outgroups and could promote values such as universalism and interreligious sensitivity (Saroglou et al. 2009, p. 421). ...
Terrorist attacks, refugee movements from crisis regions as well as barriers to integration among immigrants have also been increasing fears of Islam in Austria, whereby Muslims are often regarded all too generally as outsiders to Austrian society. In this article the results of a representative study (Social Survey Austria 2018) are presented, which includes the first time a sophisticated scale on attitudes towards Muslims. In addition, a sequential multiple regression analysis will be used for a more detailed analysis of classical factors influencing critical attitudes towards Islam, whereby a new research gap will be addressed focusing on religious attitudes and practices of Austrians. The analysis of the extent of anti-Muslim sentiment in Austria reveals a dominant critical view. However, the influences of religious orientations are manifold: While conventional religious practice (such as church attendance and praying) as well as superstition reinforces animosities, inclusive religious attitudes and individual practices of spirituality lead to more tolerant attitudes. The results, which indicate a tendency towards greater tolerance among religious people, show that we are in Austria mainly confronted with cultural rather than interreligious conflicts, which are primarily centered around identity and recognition.
... Dies könnte auch vor allem für jene Personen gelten, die sich stärker an spirituellen Praktiken orientieren. In einer belgischen Studie stellten beispielsweise Saroglou et al. (2009) fest, dass sich säkular orientierte Personen stärker gegen das Kopftuch aussprechen, während spirituell Orientierte mehr Toleranz zeigen. Die AutorInnen führen dies darauf zurück, dass eine spirituell orientierte Lebensgestaltung Grenzen zwischen Innen-und Außengruppen überschreitet und Werte wie Universalismus und interreligiöse Sensibilität begünstigen könnte (Saroglou et al. 2009, 421). ...
Terroristische Anschläge, Fluchtbewegungen aus Krisenregionen sowie Integrationshürden für muslimische Zugewanderte nähren europaweit Ängste vor dem Islam, wobei MuslimInnen vielfach allzu verallgemeinernd als Angehörige einer Gegenwelt, die mit dem Westen als nicht kompatibel erscheint, betrachtet werden. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden die Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Studie (Sozialer Survey Österreich 2018) präsentiert, die erstmals eine differenzierte Erhebung antimuslimischer Ressentiments beinhaltet. Zusätzlich erfolgt über ein elaboriertes Strukturgleichungsmodell eine Pfadanalyse, um die Dynamiken der islamkritischen Haltungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung religiöser Einstellungen und Praktiken der ÖsterreicherInnen nachzuzeichnen. Analysiert man das Ausmaß antimuslimischer Ressentiments in Österreich, so wird eine dominant kritische Sichtweise deutlich. Vielschichtig sind jedoch die Einflüsse religiöser Orientierungen: Während konventionelle religiöse Praktiken und abergläubische Haltungen Animositäten verstärken, bewirken inklusive religiöse Haltungen und individuelle Praktiken der Spiritualität tolerantere Haltungen. Aktuelle Herausforderungen des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalts in Österreich betreffen also weniger das interreligiöse Miteinander, sondern kreisen viel stärker um Fragen der Anerkennung, Identität und Zugehörigkeit.
... All'interno dei contesti occidentali è stato dimostrato come indossare il velo rappresenti una pratica giudicata negativamente dall'opinione pubblica, che lo etichetta come una forma di subordinazione della donna all'uomo (Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke & Buxant, 2009). Tale visione evidenzia una semplificazione del fenomeno da parte dell'opinione pubblica, che ne può sottintendere una generalizzata paura dell'Islam, percepito come una religione connotata da violenza, maschilismo ed estremismi (Iannucci, 2018). ...
Premessa
Una delle principali sfide che le seconde generazioni di immigrati devono affrontare è rappresentata dalla costruzione di un’identità sulla base di una doppia appartenenza culturale. Tale costruzione deriva, da una parte, dalla trasmissione culturale dei loro genitori e, dall’altra, dalla pretesa assimilativa esercitata dalla società occidentale nei loro confronti.
In aggiunta, nel caso delle seconde generazioni di immigrati cresciute in famiglie che confessano la fede islamica, la complessità nella costruzione identitaria può essere esacerbata dalla presenza di una religione difficilmente conciliabile all’interno
delle società occidentali.
Tra le sfide che questi giovani devono affrontare, emerge un’ulteriore complessità per le giovani musulmane, data dalla scelta di indossare il velo. Infatti, questa pratica viene spesso considerata dagli autoctoni come simbolo della subordinazione della donna alla volontà dell’uomo.
L’obiettivo di questo studio è stato indagare, quindi, quale fosse il ruolo dell’Islam nella costruzione di un’identità religiosa attraverso un focus sulle principali differenze tra giovani uomini e donne musulmani.
Metodo
In uno studio qualitativo, attraverso interviste semi-strutturate, è stato indagato il ruolo della religione islamica nella costruzione identitaria in un campione di 20 giovani marocchini di seconda generazione (F = 10; età 18-27; M = 21; DS =2.3). Le interviste sono state codificate attraverso il software Atlas.Ti.
Risultati
I risultati hanno evidenziato una relazione tra il genere degli intervistati e il modo in cui viene vissuta la religione. Per i giovani musulmani l’identità religiosa viene considerata come un aspetto culturale ereditato. Per le giovani musulmane, invece, l’identità religiosa viene concepita come un sostegno per l’affermazione
della loro identità multiculturale, principalmente attraverso la scelta libera di indossare il velo.
Bu çalışmada, İsviçre ve Fransa’da yaşayan Türk vatandaşlarının etnik köken ve Müslüman kimliklerine sahip olmalarının ayrımcılık algılarına etkisi temel problem olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu problemin incelenebilmesi amacıyla çalışma grubu, kıyaslama yapılabilmesi için Batı Avrupa ülkeleri içerisinde ayrımcı tutumların öne çıktığı Fransa ve daha demokratik bir toplum yapısı olduğu düşünülen İsviçre’den seçilmiştir. Bu bağlamda söz konusu kişilerin dini aidiyet ve köken kimliklerinin ayrımcılık algılarına etkileri araştırılmaktadır. Konu hakkında ismi geçen iki ülkede yaşayan göçmenlerin algıları arasında mukayese yapılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bir yıl süre ile İsviçre’de TÜBİTAK desteğiyle araştırma ve katılımlı gözlem faaliyetlerinde bulunulmuştur. Çalışmada derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılarak daha zengin bir içeriğe ulaşılması amaçlandığından nitel araştırma yöntemi ve fenomenolojik araştırma deseni kullanılmıştır. Araştırma amaçları doğrultusunda daha zengin veri içeriğine ulaşmak için amaçlı örneklem yönteminin alt stratejilerinden olan maksimum çeşitlilik örneklemesi ve kartopu/zincir örneklemesi stratejilerinden istifade edilmiştir. Araştırmada veri toplanırken yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşme formları kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda araştırmada belirlenen örneklem stratejileri doğrultusunda seçilen kişilerle mülakatlar gerçekleştirilmiştir. Gerekli veri zenginliği sağlandığı düşünülene dek görüşmeler devam ettirilmiştir. Görüşmecilere ses kayıt cihazıyla kayıt yapılacağı ve kimlik bilgilerinin hiçbir şekilde açığa çıkarılmayacağı beyan edilmiştir. Mülakat öncesinde görüşme formunu incelemeleri talep edilmiştir. Gizliliğin korunması adına görüşmecilere anonim isimler verilmiştir. Bu kapsamda farklı sosyal tabakalardan 30’u Fransa (17 erkek 13 kadın), 25’i İsviçre (17 erkek 8 kadın), olmak üzere 55 kişi ile görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ulaşılan veriler MAXQDA 24 paket programı ile kodlanmış ve içerik analizi yapılmıştır. Sonuçta görüşmecilerde genel anlamda ayrımcılık algısı olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Söz konusu algılar ise iş hayatı, komşu ve arkadaşlık ilişkileri, eğitim, medya boyutları üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. Bahsi geçen boyutlarda başörtüsü ve dini pratiklere yönelik olumsuz tavrın ciddi boyutlara varabildiği görülmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, iş bulma konusunda isim ve dış görünüşün ciddi dezavantajlar oluşturabildiği, komşu ve arkadaş ilişkilerinin duruma göre değişkenlik arz ettiği, eğitim hayatında güçlü ayrımcılık tecrübeleri görüldüğü, medyanın İslam dinine yönelik önyargılı davranışlarının önemli dayanaklarından olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Netice olarak ise İsviçre’deki katılımcılarda daha düşük düzeyde görülmekle birlikte her iki ülkedeki görüşmecilerin de ayrımcılık algıladıkları bulgulanmıştır.
This study investigated whether existential quest, a relatively new construct defining individual willingness to reflect on existential issues such as the meaning of life and death, was negatively associated with generalized prejudice through the mediation with personal values of universalism and conservation (conformity, security, and tradition). A structural equation model was performed on a convenience sample of 1136 Italian adults. Results confirmed a negative indirect relationship with generalized prejudice mediated by universalism. Findings support the argument that engagement with existential issues is associated with the value of universalism, which in turn is associated with lower levels of generalized prejudice. The present study contributes to the scholarly literature to explain the concept of existential quest.
This paper describes the organic tolerance, capital, and management of harmony at a pesantren of the Muslim minority in Bali, Indonesia. The pesantren is Bali Bina Insani (BBI) in which there are Muslim and Hindu teachers. The organic tolerance, capital, and management of harmony with the accommodation of some Hindu teachers is a certainty. Data collection was carried out through documentation, participant observation, and in-depth interviews, then qualitatively analyzed. The results showed that the capital of the pesantren in harmonizing Muslim and Hindu teachers is tolerant (tasāmuh) and inclusive. Aligned with the pesantren's vision and mission is realizing Islam raḥmah li al-‘ālamīn in all community services and making friends with all people regardless of ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversity. In this context, organic tolerance which was developed by pesantren is a certainty. Also, the management of harmony has been implemented professionally. The pesantren does not emphasize religious symbols, but it concerns the essence of Islamic orthodoxy. The pesantren management never questioned the differences of ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious of some teachers. For them, the most important thing is doing their jobs very well and professionally according to their authority. So, the harmony in this pesantren is organic.
This article focuses on how exposure to different media genres relates to two components of attitudes, Muslims as a group and Islam as a religion. It also highlights how these components mediate the relationship between media exposure and behavioral intention, namely voting intention towards banning veiling in public spaces. The analysis builds on an online survey conducted in Switzerland. We found that exposure to specific media genres is not equally associated with attitudes towards Muslims versus attitudes towards Islam. Contrary to our expectation, we did not find the association to be stronger when it came to influencing attitudes towards Muslims as compared to influencing attitudes towards Islam. However, our findings clearly showed that it matters whether people consume news via television or newspapers, especially mass-market (commercial television and tabloids) versus upmarket news (public television and quality newspapers). Attitudes towards Muslims living in Switzerland are more negative among those consuming mass-market news than those consuming upmarket news. Anti-Islam attitudes, however, were only associated with reading newspapers—both tabloids and quality newspapers. The findings provided only partial support for the mediating role of attitudes towards Muslims and Islam concerning the indirect relation between media exposure and voting intention towards banning veiling.
Do societal religious practices affect European policies towards Muslim veils? We argue that public religious behavior has a substantial effect on European countries’ and regions’ decisions regarding whether or not to ban the wearing of the veil in public spaces. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that countries with higher levels of religious attendance are substantially less likely to enact veil bans than those where religious attendance is less common. We augment these findings with data from Switzerland, where variation across subnational units parallels the patterns witnessed in Europe more broadly: aggregate religious attendance decreases the likelihood of both voting on veil bans and actually enacting them. In environments characterized by a salient secular-religious divide, high levels of religious attendance lead to greater support for the public expression of religion – even for religious outgroups – and this support is often channeled into more accommodating policies towards religious expression.
In Western societies, generalized prejudice and anti-Muslim sentiments can be major drivers of the rejection of Muslim religious practices. However, people can also reject such practices for other reasons, such as concerns about civil liberties or the secular nature of the state. With national samples of German and Dutch majority members ( N = 3,703), we used a multiple-acts-multiple-actors design to simultaneously examine attitudes toward four religious practices of three religious groups. Latent profile analysis revealed a subgroup of people that used a double standard and more strongly rejected Muslims than Christians and Jews engaging in the same practices (discriminatory rejection, 16.3%). However, four other subgroups responded to the practices independently of religious group (equal acceptance, 18.3%; equally moderate, 35%; equal rejection, 17.3%; and partial equal rejection, 13.1%). The five subgroups differ on key psychological correlates and self-reported reasons for rejection. We conclude that a multiple-acts-multiple-actors design provides a more nuanced understanding of how majority members evaluate Muslim minority practices in Western nations.
Although the hijab has recently attracted much attention from social scientists, the discrimination experienced by hijabis has been insufficiently investigated. Data are difficult to obtain, partly because surveys usually do not have items on this practice and victims are difficult to reach. However, field experts, namely active agents in governmental racism-prevention institutions and in Muslim associations, can provide rich insights into processes of discrimination. Based on an analysis of semi-structured interviews, I answer the following question: how do governmental and non-governmental experts describe discrimination against hijabis in Switzerland? The results reveal that, according to the experts interviewed, the hijab is the most important marker leading to processes of discrimination; this discrimination takes a variety of forms and affects a wide range of life domains and profiles of hijabis; such discrimination leads to a segregation of the social space of hijabis; many women are unwilling to report discrimination to governmental services for different reasons.
This chapter summarizes the available evidence on twelve controversies surrounding symbolic racism, which was proposed over 30 years ago to explain new forms of racial conservatism appearing after the civil rights era. The conceptualization of symbolic racism was originally somewhat fuzzy and has evolved over time; but the measurement of it has been surprisingly constant over time; and it seems to form a substantively meaningful and statistically consistent belief system, with two highly correlated variants that differ slightly in the language they use but not in their effects. Its effects on racial politics are quite stable and consistent. It is a distinctive construct necessary for the understanding of Whites' responses to racial politics, not merely redundant with other constructs and hence disposable in the service of parsimony. It focuses on antagonism toward Blacks, which has little to do with either symbolic racism or opposition to policies targeted for Blacks.
This study reports on the development of the Spiritual Transcendence Scale, a measure designed to capture aspects of the individual that are independent of the qualities contained in the Five-Factor Model of Personality (FFM). Using 2 separate samples of undergraduate students including both self-report (
Ns = 379 and 356) and observer data (
N = 279), it was shown that Spiritual Transcendence: (a) was independent of measures of the FFM; (b) evidenced good cross-observer convergence; and (c) predicted a wide range of psychologically salient outcomes, even after controlling for the predictive effects of personality. Given the long theoretical pedigree of Transcendence in the psychological literature, it was argued that Spiritual Transcendence represents a broad-based motivational domain of comparable breadth to those constructs contained in the FFM and ought to be considered a potential sixth major dimension of personality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Recently, Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten and Hutsebaut (2003) have shown that the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS; Duriez, Fontaine & Hutsebaut, 2000) captures the two orthogonal bipolar dimensions of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic along which Wulff (1991, 1997) organized the various possible approaches to religion. This chapter outlines the original and valuable contribution of the PCBS to the psychology of religion. In addition, this chapter provides additional evidence from 9 different samples (total N = 2657) gathered in Flanders (Belgium) of the fact that its internal structure can truly be represented in terms of the dimensions of Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic. Finally, this chapter reviews the results of the research that has been conducted so far on the external relationships of these two dimensions.
Responds to Coenders et al (see record 2001-06995-005) experiment replication and comments on the article by T. F. Pettigrew and R. W. Meertens' (see record 1995-28884-001) which investigated blatant and subtle intergroup prejudice. Coenders et al produced a different analysis of prejudice from the current authors. The authors see no reason to withdraw their claims for both the concept and measurement of subtle prejudice. The authors believe that by obscuring their theoretical structure and offering none of their own, Coenders et al follow their empirical preferences to reach a meaningless solution.
Relations of individuals' value priorities to their readiness for out-group social contact were examined in dominant and minority groups. Study 1 examined readiness of 151 Israeli Jewish teachers (dominant group) for contact with Israeli Arabs (minority). Readiness correlated positively with emphasizing universalism and self-direction values and negatively with emphasizing tradition, security, and conformity values. This confirmed an integrated set of hypotheses from S. H. Schwartz's (1992) value theory. Study 2 examined readiness of Israeli Arab Muslim (
N = 111) and Christian (
N = 88) teachers for contact with Israeli Jews. Hypotheses took account of differences between the two Arab minorities in motivation to integrate into the dominant society versus to preserve their uniqueness. Correlations with values confirmed most hypotheses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Publisher Summary This chapter addresses the universals in the content and structure of values, concentrating on the theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries, and its four basic issues: substantive contents of human values; identification of comprehensive set of values; extent to which the meaning of particular values was equivalent for different groups of people; and how the relations among different values was structured. Substantial progress has been made toward resolving each of these issues. Ten motivationally distinct value types that were likely to be recognized within and across cultures and used to form value priorities were identified. Set of value types that was relatively comprehensive, encompassing virtually all the types of values to which individuals attribute at least moderate importance as criteria of evaluation was demonstrated. The evidence from 20 countries was assembled, showing that the meaning of the value types and most of the single values that constitute them was reasonably equivalent across most groups. Two basic dimensions that organize value systems into an integrated motivational structure with consistent value conflicts and compatibilities were discovered. By identifying universal aspects of value content and structure, the chapter has laid the foundations for investigating culture-specific aspects in the future.
This paper develops, measures, and tests two types of intergroup prejudice—blatant and subtle. Blatant prejudice is the traditional, often studied form; it is hot, close and direct. Subtle prejudice is the modern form; it is cool, distant and indirect. Using data from seven independent national samples from western Europe, we constructed 10-item scales in four languages to measure each of these varieties of prejudice. We report the properties, structure and correlates of both scales across the seven samples, and make initial checks on their validity. The cross-nationally consistent results support the value of the blatant-subtle distinction as two varieties of prejudice. While they share many correlates, their distinctive differences suggest better specification of these correlates of prejudice. And the blatant-subtle distinction also aids in more precise specification of the effects of prejudice on attitudes toward immigrants. The paper closes with a normative interpretation of Subtle Prejudice.
Millions of ex-colonials, "guest workers," refugees, and other immigrants have settled in western Europe during recent decades. Extensive research on this phenomenon broadens sociology's understanding of intergroup relations in industrial societies. Unlike African Americans, these new Europeans are often viewed as not "belonging," and gaining citizenship can be difficult. The chapter discusses four major reactions to the new minorities: prejudice, discrimination, political opposition, and violence. Both blatant and subtle forms of prejudice predict anti-immigrant attitudes. And between 1988 and 1991, a hardening took place in these attitudes. Similarly, direct and indirect discrimination against the new minorities is pervasive. Moreover, anti-discrimination efforts have been largely ineffective. Far-right, anti-immigration political parties have formed to exploit this situation. These openly racist parties have succeeded in shifting the political spectrum on the issue to the right. In addition, violence against third-world immigrants has increased in recent years, especially in nations such as Britain and Germany where far-right parties are weakest. The chapter concludes that these phe-nomena are remarkably consistent across western Europe. Furthermore, the European research on these topics supports and extends North American re-search in intergroup relations.
The concept of symbolic racism was originally proposed 30 years ago. Much research has been done and the society itself has changed, yet many of the original items measuring symbolic racism remain in use. The primary objective of this paper is to present and evaluate an updated scale of symbolic racism. The scale proves to be reliable and internally coherent. It has discriminant validity, being distinctively different from both older forms of racial attitudes and political conservatism, although with a base in both. It has predictive validity, explaining whites' racial policy preferences considerably better than do traditional racial attitudes or political predispositions. Evidence is presented of its usefulness for both college student and general adult population samples, as well as for minority populations. Data using this scale contradict several critiques of the symbolic racism construct (most of which are speculative rather than based on new data) concerning the consistency of its conceptualization and measurement, the coherence of the symbolic racism belief system, possible artifacts in its influence over whites' racial policy preferences (due to content overlap between the measures of independent and dependent variables), and its differentiation from nonracial conservatism and old-fashioned racism.
According to Wulff (1991, 1997) the various approaches to religion can be located in a two-dimensional space along the bipolar dimensions Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence and Literal vs. Symbolic. Drawing on Wulff, Hutsebaut and his colleagues (1996, 1997, 2000) developed the Post-Critical Belief scale to measure interindividual differences in these dimensions. In this article, results from multidimensional scaling and principal component analyses in 16 samples (N=4648) gathered in Flanders (Belgium) are presented which support the interpretation of the relationships between the Post-Critical Belief scale items in terms of Wulff's dimensions.
Investigated whether (1) subtle prejudice against outgroups can be measured reliably and separately from the more traditional form of blatant prejudice; (2) subtle prejudice will relate closely to blatant prejudice but distinct from political conservatism; and (3) subtle prejudice is an outgrowth of the establishment of norms that proscribe blatant expressions of prejudice and discrimination. Data were derived from 3,806 respondents drawn from 7 national probability samples of 4 Western European nations (France, Netherlands, Great Britain, and West Germany). Completion of the authors' Subtle Prejudice Scale shows subtle prejudice can be reliably measured from blatant prejudice. Conservatism relates either equally or more positively with blatant prejudice. High scorers on prejudice scales preferred harsh policies of immigrant exclusion, while Ss with subtle prejudic preferred ostensibly nondiscriminatory methods of exclusion.
This chapter reviews the extensive literature on bias in favor of in-groups at the expense of out-groups. We focus on five issues and identify areas for future research: (a) measurement and conceptual issues (especially in-group favoritism vs. out-group derogation, and explicit vs. implicit measures of bias); (b) modern theories of bias highlighting motivational explanations (social identity, optimal distinctiveness, uncertainty reduction, social dominance, terror management); (c) key moderators of bias, especially those that exacerbate bias (identification, group size, status and power, threat, positive-negative asymmetry, personality and individual differences); (d) reduction of bias (individual vs. intergroup approaches, especially models of social categorization); and (e) the link between intergroup bias and more corrosive forms of social hostility.
According to J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner's (1998) integrated model of racism, politically liberal European Americans tend to express racism differently than conservative European Americans, with liberals demonstrating aversive racism and conservatives, symbolic or modern racism. In support of the model, in Experiment 1 liberals showed bias in favor of a twice-prosecuted African American relative to a European American in their judgment of double jeopardy, whereas conservatives did the reverse. Experiment 2 replicated these effects while eliminating a confound in the design of Experiment 1. Experiment 3 found evidence for the intrapsychic conflict hypothesized to underlie aversive racism. Specifically, only liberals displayed greater physiological arousal to the touch of an African American versus a European American experimenter.
Some psychologists treat religious/spiritual beliefs as a unitary aspect of individual differences. But a distinction between mysticism and orthodox religion has been recognized by scholars as well as laypersons, and empirical studies of "ism" variables and of "spirituality" measures have yielded factors reflecting this distinction. Using a large sample of American adults, analyses demonstrate that subjective spirituality and tradition-oriented religiousness are empirically highly independent and have distinctly different correlates in the personality domain, suggesting that individuals with different dispositions tend toward different styles of religious/spiritual beliefs. These dimensions have low correlations with the lexical Big Five but high correlations with scales (e.g., Absorption, Traditionalism) on some omnibus personality inventories, indicating their relevance for studies of personality.
Extending our previous research on personality and prejudice, we tested the predictive power of Big Five facet compared with factor scores in three studies. Study 1 (N=170) examined the predictive power of factors and facets when explaining generalized prejudice, a composite of four prejudice types. Study 2 (N=158) focused on sexism and Study 3 (N=80) examined the impact of personality and experimentally manipulated social norm against expressing sexism. Multiple regression analyses showed the strongest facets (Tender-Mindedness and Values) to outperform the strongest factors (Agreeableness and Openness to Experience) in predicting prejudice in all three studies. We discuss the outcome against the background of previous empirical findings and the two major approaches - the personality and the social psychological - to explaining individual differences in prejudice.
Four experiments confirmed the hypothesis that people discriminate the out-group on the basis of the expression of uniquely human emotions. In Study 1, using a lost e-mail paradigm, the expression of a uniquely human emotion resulted in "nicer" replies when the sender was an in-group compared with an out-group member. The same pattern of results was obtained in Studies 2 and 3 using a conformity paradigm. In addition, perceived similarity was measured and proposed as a potential underlying mechanism (Study 3). Finally, using an approach-avoidance procedure, Study 4 showed that people not only deprive the out-group of positive consequences as in the former studies but that people also act against the out-group. The role of infrahumanization underlying prejudice and discrimination is discussed.
The balance of the population is shifting in all EU states and people over 50 years of age make up an increasingly diverse section of the population. To seize the many positive opportunities of this new reality, a number of attitudes towards older people must be subject to a serious reflection and age discrimination in a wide range of areas must be combated. To promote a positive conception of older people, it is vital to address ageist prejudices and outlaw age discrimination in all areas of life. In 1997, the EU has received powers to combat discrimination. An EU Action Programme on discrimination now promotes measures to prevent and combat discrimination and the European Employment Directive introduces new rights for victims of age discrimination. However, transposition of this directive in the Member States varies widely and age discrimination is not covered in areas outside employment.
Law and state policy towards the Muslim headscarf differs widely from country to country.1 Western states in which the wearing of the headscarf is, or has been, a contentious issue, tend to follow one of two broad theoretical approaches: assimilationalist or culturally pluralist, although rarely in a pure form. Often policy will be made up of one, whilst containing threads of the other. This article will focus on the law and state policy predominantly in six countries where the headscarf issue has arisen, and where different political or legal approaches have been adopted, giving rise to different results or consequences. Often the veil debates in each country will give rise to the same broad issues. For example, integration, religious freedom, secularity and health and safety are all debated in respect of the Muslim headscarf. However, it is often the case that one issue will be more important or prevalent in one particular country than in another. For example in the UK integration has been highlighted in the recent debates, but in the US the concerns rest with the concept of religious freedom, per se. In France and Turkey there has been a need to protect secularism, where the veil has been particularly attacked as a form of pressure by Muslims on others or else regarded as a symbol of the oppression of women. Bans on the headscarf have been attempted in Germany based on employment law and in Canada on health and safety grounds. In other European countries concerns have centred on immigration issues or public security. State policy tends to be driven by various factors including the particular state’s historical makeup, immigration and demography, public opinion and political pressure, as well as the theoretical issues which underlie and inform the debate.
The current paper uses archival data to examine variations in Schwartz's and Hofstede's cultural value orientations and their relationship to attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism reported in the Eurobarometer Survey [Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union: a special analysis of the Eurobarometer 2000 opinion poll on behalf of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Eurobarometer Opinion Poll. Retrieved September 1, 2003, from 〈http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm〉] on racism and xenophobia. The results demonstrated that mastery, masculinity, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and collectivism were associated with weaker support for policies that promote social co-existence. Masculinity and mastery were also linked to more pessimistic attitudes towards multiculturalism, and increased harmony was correlated with less desire for cultural assimilation. The results largely converge with research undertaken at the individual-level of analysis, and the data suggest four clusters of cultural values related to immigration attitudes: humanitarianism-egalitarianism, conservation, collectivism, and instrumentality.
Individual identity statuses (Marcia, 1980) and collective (national and transnational) identities; value (Schwartz, 1992) hierarchies and priorities; religion-spirituality; social desirability; and opinions related to the September 11, 2001 attacks were investigated in 3 groups of young adults living in Belgium (N = 246): native Belgians, immigrants from Muslim Mediterranean countries, and immigrants from other countries. Similar patterns were found across the 3 groups with regard to value hierarchies and the ways religion is related to identity statuses (achievement and foreclosure), value priorities (conservation, low autonomy, and low hedonism), social desirability (impression management, but not self-deception), and collective identities (transnational). However, young Muslim immigrants differed in their high religiosity, tendency for non-explorative identity statuses, values that motivated openness to transnational identities, and correlates of their high anti-Americanism in the interpretation of the September 11 attacks. These and other cross-cultural differences are discussed.
Abstract This chapter reviews the extensive literature on bias in favor of in-groups at the expense of out-groups. We focus on five issues and identify areas for future research: (a) measurement and conceptual issues (especially in-group favoritism vs. out-group derogation, and explicit vs. implicit measures of bias); (b) modern theories of bias highlighting motivational explanations (social identity, optimal distinctiveness, uncertainty reduction, social dominance, terror management); (c) key moderators of bias, especially those that exacerbate bias (identification, group size, status and power, threat, positive-negative asymmetry, personality and individual differences); (d) reduction of bias (individual vs. intergroup approaches, especially models of social categorization); and (e) the link between intergroup bias and more corrosive forms of social hostility.
This article considers the question of whether our field should relabel itself the psychology of religion and spirituality. The meanings of religion and spirituality appear to be evolving. Religion is moving from a broadband construct—one that includes both the institutional and the individual, and the good and the bad—to a narrowband institutional construct that restricts and inhibits human potential. Spirituality, on the other hand, is becoming differentiated from religion as an individual expression that speaks to the greatest of human capacities. Several dangers in these trends are considered, including the danger of losing the sacred core of our field. An alternate approach to defining religion and spirituality is presented that preserves the heart of our discipline while encouraging the study of new pathways to the sacred and new meanings of the sacred itself. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
This chapter examines one factor that contributes to the current frustrations of black Americans: the operation of a subtle form of racism among individuals that is less overt but just as insidious as old-fashioned racism.
Despite encouraging trends in the intergroup attitudes of white Americans, there are still reasons for concern. One reason is that, across a variety of surveys and polls, 10%–15% of the white population still expresses the old-fashioned, overt form of bigotry. These respondents consistently describe blacks as innately less intelligent than whites, say that they will not vote for a well-qualified presidential candidate simply because of that person's race, and oppose programs designed to ensure full integration and equal opportunity. Another reason for concern is that a substantial portion of the white population expresses merely racial tolerance but not true openness to or enthusiasm for full racial equality. A third reason for concern, which is this chapter's current focus, is that there is also evidence that many of the people who are part of the 85%–90% of the white population who say and probably believe that they are not prejudiced may nonetheless be practicing modern, subtle form of bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Two studies were conducted to provide reliability and validity support for a new anti-Arab prejudice scale. The scale was designed to fit to the European context and showed very satisfactory reliability. Moreover, both studies provided convergent validity support. Anti-Arab prejudice was correlated with authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and conservatism. The correlation between the new scale and an adapted version of McConahay's (1986) Modern Racism scale was very strong. Furthermore, the second study provided predictive validity support. Scores in the new scale explained 20% of the variance in an ulterior actual behavior (to return a signed form supporting an association aimed to defend European values and culture against Islamization).
Links between religion and prejudice have been interpreted to suggest that religion can both reduce and exacerbate prejudice. Here, the analysis of religion as a meaning system illuminates how religion can affect intergroup attitudes. Traditional psychological perspectives on religion and prejudice are summarized, followed by a discussion of religion and prejudice in cross-cultural and cross-religious contexts, involving varying target groups. Next, we explore possible explanatory mechanisms by proposing how four levels of meaning associated with religion—cognitive, motivational, societal, and intergroup—may both promote and attenuate prejudice. Finally, additional factors that might facilitate the paradoxical coexistence of religious egalitarian intentions with prejudiced attitudes are considered, and we speculate about the potential for religious groups to reduce prejudice within their adherents.
Predictors of immigration policy attitudes were investigated among members of receiving societies in large national probability samples in 15 Western European countries. We found that a considerable proportion of the variation in immigration policy orientations toward outgroups could be explained by self- and group interests and independent measures of perceived threat. Self-reported racism also contributed independently and significantly to these policy positions. It was concluded that a general framework of proximal self- and group-position indicators (Allport, 1954), perceived threat, and prejudice/racism was useful in predicting the immigrant policy orientations of dominant members of receiving societies across Western Europe. The meaning of these findings for future research on immigration policy orientations across, and especially within, European countries is discussed.
Previous research revealed that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are strongly related to racism. However, this line of inquiry neglected to study these relationships for various forms of racism. In Study 1, it was found in a Flemish heterogeneous adult sample (N= 146) that RWA and SDO bore about equally strong relationships with biological racism, symbolic racism, ethnocentrism, and aversive racism. Study 2 revealed in a heterogeneous adult sample (N= 176), also administered in Flanders (Belgium), that RWA was positively related to both subtle and blatant prejudice, whereas SDO was positively related only to blatant prejudice. Moreover, RWA differentiates better between different types of racists composed on the basis of scores on the racism dimensions. The implications of these results for RWA- and SDO-based prejudice are discussed.
This meta-analysis reviews studies on 21 samples from 15 countries (total N ¼ 8551), all using the SchwartzÕs model of values in order to investigate how religiosity is related to the importance attributed to values. Results lead to the conclusion that religious people tend: to favor values that promote conservation of social and individual order (Tradition, Conformity, and to a lesser extent, Security) and, conversely, to dislike values that promote openness to change and autonomy (Stimulation, Self-Direction); also, to favor values that allow for a limited self-transcendence (Benevolence, but not Universalism), and to dislike Hedonism and to a lesser extent values that promote self-enhancement (Achievement, Power). Many effects were constant across different religious denominations (Christians, Jews, and Muslims) and cultures but the magnitude of the effects seemed to depend on the socio-economic development of the countries concerned.
Despite the de jure equality achieved in the second half of the 20th century, racial discrimination and racist political movements persist. This has encouraged the orthodoxy that a ‘new racism’ serves as an ideological basis of contemporary white investment in racial inequality in Western Europe, North America and Australasia. It is argued that this ‘new racism’ is shown in more subtle and indirect formal expressions, such as a denial of societal discrimination, rather than the once popular expressions of ‘old-fashioned’ genetic inferiority and segregationism. In opposition to this conceptualization, I review quantitative and qualitative studies from social psychology, sociology and political science, as well as historical analyses, to show that the ‘old-fashioned’ formal expression of racism was not especially popular before de jure racial equality and is not especially unpopular now. I also show that there is nothing new about formal expressions that criticize cultural difference or deny societal discrimination. Thus, there is greater historical continuity in racism than the notion of a ‘new racism’ allows. This suggests that the first task of a critical social psychology of racism is a proper conceptualization of racism itself. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Personality, in terms of both strict personality traits (five factors) and their cultural adaptations (e.g., values), has systematically been found to predict religion. This article focuses on three issues that still remain unclear: predictiveness of personality facets versus the five factors; predictiveness of values versus personality; and similarities and differences between religiosity and spirituality in their associations with personality and values. We administered the NEO-PI-R, the Schwartz Value Survey, and religious measures to Spanish students (N = 256). The personality facets provided additional and subtler information than the five factors on individual differences in religion and spirituality. When the overlap between personality and values was controlled for, values were almost unique predictors of these differences. Spirituality shared with religion both a prosocial tendency (with even some intensification) and conscientiousness, but not the emphasis on conservation versus openness to change and to experience.
An important discrepancy seems to exist between self-reports and laboratory studies regarding prosociality among religious people. Some have even suggested that this involves moral hypocrisy on the part of religious people. However, the assumption of the four studies reported here is that the impact of religiousness on prosociality is limited but exists, and does not reflect self-delusion. In Study 1 (N= 106), religious young adults tended not to use indirect aggression in dealing with hypothetical daily hassles. In Study 2 (N= 105), female students' religiosity was associated with willingness to help close targets in hypothetical situations but the effect was not extended to unknown targets. In Studies 3 (N= 315, 105 triads) and 4 (N= 274, 109 targets), religious targets not only reported high altruistic behavior and empathy, but were also perceived as such by peers (friends, siblings, or colleagues) in three out of four cases. Other results from the studies suggested that the prosociality of religious people is not an artifact of gender, social desirability bias, security in attachment, empathy, or honesty.
The present research examines discordant acculturation attitudes of host society members and immigrants as an antecedent to intergroup threat. Based on integrated threat theory and the concordance model of acculturation, we posited that discordance on culture maintenance and on desire for contact would predict intergroup threat beyond the influence of other antecedents of threat, such as in-group identification, knowledge, and negative contact. A study with 202 German host society members and 151 Turkish and Italian immigrants was conducted. In line with our assumptions, path analyses revealed that culture discordance and contact discordance contribute independently to the prediction of realistic threat, symbolic threat, and intergroup anxiety for host society members and immigrants. Moreover, differences in threat between cultures were mediated by the discordance in acculturation attitudes.
Stereotype research depicts the generic immigrant as incompetent and untrustworthy. The current research expands this image, specifying key information dimensions (e.g. nationality, socioeconomic status) about immigrants. To see how perceivers differentiate among particular immigrant groups, we extend a model of intergroup perception, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878–902), to immigrant subgroups. The SCM predicts that perception centers on competence and warmth, and relates to targets’ perceived status and competition within society. Specified by nationality, race, ethnicity, and class, images of immigrants differ by both competence and warmth, with most groups receiving ambivalent (low–high or high–low) stereotypes rather than the uniform low–low for the generic immigrant. As predicted, ambivalent stereotypes reflect target nationality combined with socioeconomic status, supporting the SCM's ambivalent stereotypes and social structural hypotheses, as well as better defining immigrant stereotypes and their contingencies.
Although it has become common to suggest a conceptual distinction between traditional and contemporary forms of prejudice, Pettigrew and Meertens have actually attempted to distinguish the two empirically and developed measures to gauge each. Replication of their study, on the distinction between blatant and subtle prejudice, discloses a number of methodological flaws that have led to debatable substantial conclusions. We found two distinct measures, however, substantially different from the ones proposed by Pettigrew and Meertens. Our model shows, by all available indices, a better fit to the data: a first broad factor labelled general prejudice, and a small second factor labelled perceived cultural differences. The first factor is well explained by a number of social characteristics; the second is rather poorly explained and has a rather poor discriminatory power. The first one has strong effects on some consequential variables whereas the second has hardly any effects. Other evidence, considered to be crucial by Pettigrew and Meertens, contains other methodological flaws, i.e. the neglect of interdependent items. After this correction, their piece of evidence turns out to be artificial. As a benefit to future research, we try to clarify conditions for distinguishing empirically and conceptually between traditional and contemporary prejudice.
The stereotype content model (SCM) proposes potentially universal principles of societal stereotypes and their relation to social structure. Here, the SCM reveals theoretically grounded, cross-cultural, cross-groups similarities and one difference across 10 non-US nations. Seven European (individualist) and three East Asian (collectivist) nations (N=1,028) support three hypothesized cross-cultural similarities: (a) perceived warmth and competence reliably differentiate societal group stereotypes; (b) many out-groups receive ambivalent stereotypes (high on one dimension; low on the other); and (c) high status groups stereotypically are competent, whereas competitive groups stereotypically lack warmth. Data uncover one consequential cross-cultural difference: (d) the more collectivist cultures do not locate reference groups (in-groups and societal prototype groups) in the most positive cluster (high-competence/high-warmth), unlike individualist cultures. This demonstrates out-group derogation without obvious reference-group favouritism. The SCM can serve as a pancultural tool for predicting group stereotypes from structural relations with other groups in society, and comparing across societies.
Openness to Experience is one of the 5 broad factors that subsume most personality traits. Openness is usually considered an intrapsychic dimension, defined in terms of characteristics of consciousness. However, different ways of approaching and processing experience lead to different value systems that exercise a profound effect on social interactions. In this article, the author reviews the effects of Openness versus Closedness in cultural innovation, political ideology, social attitudes, marital choice, and interpersonal relations. The construct of Openness and its measures could profitably be incorporated into research conducted by social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and historians.
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