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The decline of the world's IQ

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Abstract

Dysgenic fertility means that there is a negative correlation between intelligence and number of children. Its presence during the last century has been demonstrated in several countries. We show here that there is dysgenic fertility in the world population quantified by a correlation of − 0.73 between IQ and fertility across nations. It is estimated that the effect of this has been a decline in the world's genotypic IQ of 0.86 IQ points for the years 1950–2000. A further decline of 1.28 IQ points in the world's genotypic IQ is projected for the years 2000–2050. In the period 1950–2000 this decline has been compensated for by a rise in phenotypic intelligence known as the Flynn Effect, but recent studies in four economically developed countries have found that this has now ceased or gone into reverse. It seems probable that this “negative Flynn Effect” will spread to economically developing countries and the whole world will move into a period of declining genotypic and phenotypic intelligence. It is possible that “the new eugenics” of biotechnology may evolve to counteract dysgenic fertility.
The decline of the world's IQ
Richard Lynn
a,
, John Harvey
b
a
University of Ulster, Coleraine, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom
b
1 Drove Cottages, Lewes, East Sussex, BN7 3HD, United Kingdom
Received 28 November 2006; received in revised form 19 March 2007; accepted 19 March 2007
Available online 27 April 2007
Abstract
Dysgenic fertility means that there is a negative correlation between intelligence and number of children. Its presence during the
last century has been demonstrated in several countries. We show here that there is dysgenic fertility in the world population
quantified by a correlation of 0.73 between IQ and fertility across nations. It is estimated that the effect of this has been a decline
in the world's genotypic IQ of 0.86 IQ points for the years 19502000. A further decline of 1.28 IQ points in the world's genotypic
IQ is projected for the years 20002050. In the period 19502000 this decline has been compensated for by a rise in phenotypic
intelligence known as the Flynn Effect, but recent studies in four economically developed countries have found that this has now
ceased or gone into reverse. It seems probable that this negative Flynn Effectwill spread to economically developing countries
and the whole world will move into a period of declining genotypic and phenotypic intelligence. It is possible that the new
eugenicsof biotechnology may evolve to counteract dysgenic fertility.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Intelligence; Decline; Dysgenics; New eugenics; Intelligence, IQ, Dysgenic fertility
1. Introduction
In this paper we seek to answer four questions. These
are, first, what is the world's IQ? Second, is the world's
IQ declining? Third, if the world's IQ is declining, what
is the rate of this decline? And fourth, what is the likely
future of the world's IQ? These questions are difficult to
answer, but we believe that the probability that the
world's IQ is declining is a sufficiently important issue to
be worth tackling.
The possibility that the intelligence of the population
of Britain and other economically developed nations is
declining was raised by Galton (1869) and was a cause of
widespread concern in the first half of the twentieth
century. The decline of intelligence was first inferred
from the negative association between intelligence and
number of siblings, shown by Lentz (1927) in the United
States and by Cattell (1937) and Burt (1952) in Britain,
from which it was inferred that more intelligent couples
were having fewer children than the less intelligent. This
inference was later confirmed by a number of studies
reviewed in Lynn (1996). For instance, Herrnstein and
Murray (1994) showed that in the United States women
with an average IQ of 111 had 1.6 children, while women
with an average IQ of 81 had 2.6 children.
The negative association between IQ and number of
children became known as dysgenic fertility. Since it
was assumed that intelligence is to some degree
inherited, it became widely believed that dysgenic
fertility entailed a decline in the intelligence of the
A
vailable online at www.sciencedirect.com
Intelligence 36 (2008) 112 120
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: Lynn540@aol.com (R. Lynn).
0160-2896/$ - see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.intell.2007.03.004
population. Calculations of the rate of decline were
made by Lentz (1927),Cattell (1937) and Burt (1952).
Empirical studies were carried out to examine whether
intelligence was in fact declining but these showed that,
contrary to expectation, intelligence was increasing.
This was reported in the United States by Tuddenham
(1948), in Scotland by the Scottish Council for Research
in Education (1949), and in England by Cattell (1950).
These increases in intelligence subsequently became
known as the Flynn Effect because of the extensive
work confirming them by Flynn (1984, 1987).
These studies showing that intelligence has been
increasing, contrary to the expectation that it should be
declining, led to a rethink on the problem. The solution
was found by Retherford and Sewell (1988) and lies in the
distinction between phenotypic and genotypic intelli-
gence. Phenotypic intelligence is measured intelligence
and it is this that has been increasing. Genotypic intel-
ligence is the genetic component of intelligence and it is
this that has been declining.
Retherford and Sewell (1988) presented an estimate
of the magnitude of the decline of genotypic intelligence
in the United States. They used the formula for
calculating the magnitude of the genotypic change
(decline or increase) of a trait resulting from differential
fertility worked out by population geneticists and ap-
plied it to the decline of genotypic intelligence. This
formula is given by Plomin, DeFries and McClearn
(1990, p. 281) as R=h
2
S, where Ris the response to
selection (i.e. the change in genotypic value resulting
from differential fertility), h
2
is the narrow heritability
of the trait (i.e. the heritability attributable to additive
genes, whereas broad heritability includes the effects of
dominants and recessives), and Sis the selection
differential (the difference between the parental and
the child generations (for a further explanation of this,
see Plomin et al. (1990, p. 280 ff).Retherford and
Sewell (1988) calculated the IQ difference between the
parental and the child generations by assuming that
children have on average the same IQ as their parents,
and weighting the IQs of the child generation by their
proportions in the child population. This gives the
selection differential, which in their data set was 0.81
(i.e. the mean IQ of the child generation was 0.81 IQ
points lower than that of the parental generation).
Adopting the narrow heritability of intelligence of 0.71
given by Jinks and Fulker (1970), there is therefore a
decline of genotypic intelligence of 0.57 IQ points a
generation (0.81 × 0.71 = 0.57). About the same magni-
tude of dysgenic fertility has been found in several other
economically developed nations, reviewed in Lynn
(1996).
2. Estimating the decline of the world's genotypic IQ
Here we use the formula given above for calculating
the decline of the genotypic value of a trait (R=h
2
S) and
used by Retherford and Sewell (1988) to calculate the
decline of genotypic intelligence in the United States, to
examine the question of whether the genotypic intelli-
gence of the world has been declining. To do this we
need first to obtain estimates of the world's IQ for two
successive generations to calculate the selection differ-
ential. To obtain this we have estimated the world's IQ in
1950 and in 2000. To calculate the world's IQ in 1950 we
have used the IQs for all the 192 nations in the world
given by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) and weighted these
by the size of the populations given by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census (2006). These data are given in the appendix.
These calculations assume that national IQs were the
same in 1950 and 2000. This assumption is justified by the
demonstration that there is a correlation of 0.92 between
two measures of national IQs obtained at different times,
based on 71 countries (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2002,p.62).
This assumption can be questioned on the grounds that the
immigration into the United States, Canada and Europe of
non-European peoples with lower average IQs than the
indigenous peoples is likely to reduce the national IQs of
these countries. We accept that this is likely the case but
believe that the effect is too small to have any significant
effect on our calculations.
These calculations give the IQ of the world in 1950 as
92.75. Applying the same method to calculate the world's
IQ in 2000, we obtain an IQ of 90.31 (note that these
figures are notional IQs, i.e. the IQs that would be
present if environmental conditions for the development
of intelligence had been the same in 1950 and 2000).
Thus, there has been a decline of 2.44 notional IQpoints
in the world's IQ from 1950 to 2000. This 50 year period
represents approximately two generations, so the decline
per generation is half this figure =1.22 notional IQ
points for one generation (notice that this is a little greater
than the decline of 0.81 notional IQpoints a generation
in the United States calculated by Retherford and Sewell).
This is the selection differential for intelligence in the
world. The principal reason for the decline in notional
IQlies in the negative correlation coefficient of 0.73
across nations between IQ and fertility (Total Fertility
Rates are given by the CIA World Factbook, 2006).
To calculate the decline of the world's genotypic intel-
ligence, we also need to know the narrow heritability of
intelligence in the world. This is more difficult to estimate.
Heritability is a population statistic and the heritability of
intelligence may be expected to vary in different popula-
tions. In fact, however, the narrow heritability of
113R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
intelligence has been found to approximately be the same
(about 0.70) in a number of economically developed
nations and in India reported in two studies (Nathawat &
Puri, 1995; Pal, Shyam & Singh, 1997). The magnitude of
heritability depends on the variability in environmental
conditions in the population and is therefore likely to be
lower for the whole world because the variability in
environmental conditions is greater across the whole world
than in individual nations. We propose as a reasonable
assumption that the world heritability of intelligence is half
that of the heritability within economically developed and
economically developing nations, i.e. about 0.35. Adopting
this figure, the decline of the world's genotypic IQ over the
period 19502000 is estimated at 2.44× 0.35 =0.86 IQ
points. A generation is typically around 25 years, so this
represents a decline of the world's genotypic IQ of 0.43 IQ
points a generation. The world heritability of intelligence of
0.35 is a guesstimate. If we assume a higher heritability
of 0.50, the decline of the world's genotypic IQ would be of
0.61 IQ points a generation. Alternatively, if we assume a
lower heritability of 0.15, the decline of the world's
genotypic IQ would be of 0.183 IQ points a generation.
3. Estimating the future decline of the world's
genotypic IQ
It is possible to estimate the future rate of decline of
the world's genotypic IQ for the period 20002050 by
using the US Bureau of the Census estimates of the
populations of all nations for the year 2050. These
estimates are based on reasonable assumptions about
fertility and mortality in different countries, including
increasing rates of mortality from AIDS in sub-Saharan
Africa. Using the same method as for the calculation of
the world's IQ in 1950 and 2000, we calculate that the
world's IQ in 2050 will be 86.67. We recall that in the
year 2000 the world IQ was 90.31, so we estimate a
decline of 3.64 notional IQpoints by the year 2050.
Assuming a narrow heritability of intelligence for the
world of.35, the decline of genotypic IQ in the world
over this 50 year period is estimated at 3.64 × 0.35 = 1.27
IQ points. Assuming as before that this 50 year period
comprises approximately two generations, this repre-
sents a decli ne of half this figure = 0.64 IQ points per
generation. Notice that this is not greatly different from
the decline of 0.57 IQ points a generation for the United
States on the basis of Retherford and Sewell's data).
It will be noted that this predicted decline of the
world's genotypic IQ duringthe years 20002050 is 50%
greater than that for the years 19502000. The main
reason for this is that total fertility rates are projected by
the US Bureau of the Census to be lower in high IQ
countries during 20002050 than between the years
19502000.
4. The decline of genotypic IQ within countries
The negative association between IQ and fertility across
nations is not the only factor responsible for a decline in the
world's genotypic intelligence. An additional factor is
dysgenic fertility within countries. As noted in Section 1,
the Retherford and Sewell (1988) study indicated a decline
of genotypic intelligence in the United States of 0.57 IQ
points a generation. About the same magnitude of dysgenic
fertility has been found in several other economically
developed nations, reviewed in Lynn (1996).
Much less is known about whether dysgenic fertility is
present in economically developing countries. The only
work known to us is that of Meisenberg, Lawless, Lambert
and Newton (2005) and is a study of the Afro-Caribbean
population of Dominica. In this study of 352 people aged
5162 it was found that for men the association between
intelligence measured by the Progressive Matrices and
number of children was slightly positive for men (r=0.06),
but negative for women (r=0.163). The greater dysgenic
fertility for women than for men has typically been found
in economically developed countries. If we combine the
results for men and women, the correlation between
intelligence and fertility in Dominica is 0.08 and is
therefore slightly dysgenic. It is not possible to estimate
the magnitude of the decline of genotypic intelligence
from the data. All that can be inferred from this study is
that dysgenic fertility is present in Dominica and this may
or may not be typical of other economically developing
countries. If it is, dysgenic fertility within countries is a
likely a worldwide phenomenon and is increasing the
magnitude of the decline of the world's genotypic
intelligence estimated in Sections 2 and 3.
5. The rise and fall of the world's phenotypic
intelligence
While the evidence suggests that the world's genotypic
IQ has declined over the period 19502000, and can be
projected to decline more strongly over the period 2000
2050, there is much evidence to indicate that the world's
phenotypic IQ increased over the period 19502000, and
may (or may not) continue to increase over the period
20002050. This increase over the period 19502000
that has become known as the Flynn Effect, is attributable
to improvements in the environment for the development
of intelligence. There is no consensus as to what these
improvements in the environment consist of, but sugges-
tions have included improvements in nutrition, education,
114 R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
and a more cognitively stimulating environment. The
magnitude of the Flynn Effect among school age children
is about 3 IQ points a decade, and somewhat higher at
around 5 IQ points a decade among military conscripts
where later generations have had more years of education
than earlier generations.
There is considerable evidence for the Flynn Effect in a
number of economically developed countries (Flynn,
1984, 1987). There is much less evidence on whether
similar increases in intelligence have been taking place in
economically developing countries, but there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that IQ increases of broadly similar
magnitude have been taking place in these. For instance,
in the 16 studies of the IQs of blacks in South Africa that
span the years from 1929 to 2004, summarized in Lynn
(2001, pp. 314), the IQ of 65 reported in the first study
published in 1929 was barely different from the IQ of 67
in the most recent study published in 2004. This indicates
that the IQ of blacks in South Africa has been increasing at
just about the same rate as that of IQs in Britain, against
which the IQs in South Africa have been calibrated. A
Flynn Effect has been reported in Kenya (Daley et al.,
2003) and in Dominica, where a gain of 18 IQ points
among the adult Afro-Caribbean population has been
found over 35 years, measured by the Progressive Matri-
ces and representing an increase of 5.1 IQ points a decade
(Meisenberg et al., 2005). This rate of gain is comparable
to the increases among adults in economically developed
nations reported by Flynn (1987).
These IQ gains of around 3 IQ points a decade (about
7.5 IQ points a generation) among school age children and
5 IQ points among adults are clearly much greater than the
loss of around 0.43 IQ points a generation in the world's
genotypic IQ that we have estimated for the period 1950
2000, plus a further loss arising from dysgenic fertility
within countries that is unquantifiable. Thus, the situation
for the world's IQ appears to be similar to that in the
United Statesand other economically developed countries
in so far as the genotypic IQ has been declining, but the
phenotypic IQ has been increasing at a greater rate as a
result of environmental improvements.
6. The future of the world's intelligence
We have suggested that over the period 19502000 the
increase of the world's phenotypic IQ has more than
compensated for the decline of the world's genotypic IQ,
just as it has in a number of individual countries. How-
ever, this compensation cannot be expected to continue
indefinitely. On the contrary, the environmental improve-
ments responsible for the Flynn Effect are likely to be
subject to diminishing returns. When their impact is
exhausted, and if dysgenic fertility continues, phenotypic
intelligence will begin to decline.
There is some evidence from four recent studies that
the expectation that the Flynn Effect will peter out and
then be superseded by a decline in phenotypic intelligence
has already occurred. These are, first, a study of the
intelligence of conscripts in Norway over 50 years has
reported that there were the usual gains up to the mid-
1990s, but from then until 2002 there has been no increase
(Sundet, Barlaug & Torjussen, 2004). Second, in
Australia the IQ of 611 year olds measured by the
Colored Progressive Matrices has shown no increase from
19752003 (Cotton et al., 2005). Third, in Denmark
where the IQs of all young men aged 1819 conscripted
for military service has been recorded since 1959, it has
been found that between 19591989 the mean IQ of the
conscripts increased by 3 IQ points per decade, confirm-
ing many other studies (Teasdale and Owen, 2005).
However, from 19891998 the mean IQ of the conscripts
increased by only 1.6 IQ points, showing a slowing of the
rate of increase. The IQ peaked in1998, and from this year
to 2004 the mean IQ of the conscripts declined by 1.6 IQ
points, representing 2.7 IQ points per decade. Thus,
phenotypic intelligence in Denmark has begun to decline
at just about the same rate as its previous rate of increase.
Fourth, in Britain a decline in IQ among 1112 year olds
of 12 IQ points over the years 19752003, representing a
decline of 4.3 IQ points a decade, has been reported by
Shayer (2007). The evidence of these four studies suggests
that the Flynn Effect has ceased in the economically
developed nations. There is, however, a problem with these
four studies that these countries have significant numbers of
non-European immigrants whose mean IQs are lower than
the indigenous populations and these will reduce the mean
IQs of recent samples. The contribution of this to the
negative Flynn Effectneeds to be quantified.
Nevertheless, it seems probable that in the economi-
cally developed nations the phenotypic intelligence will
first stabilize, as it apparently has in Norway and Aus-
tralia, and then decline, as it apparently has in Denmark
and Britain. In the economically developing nations
phenotypic intelligence will likely increase for some years
if environmental conditions improve. This will reduce the
intelligence gap between the economically developed and
the economically developing nations, but it must be
expected that in due course the impact of environmental
improvements in the economically developing nations
will cease. When this happens, and if dysgenic fertility
continues, it can be predicted that both genotypic and
phenotypic intelligencewill decline throughout the world.
The decline of theworld's intelligence andthe prospect
of a continuation of this decline must surely be a cause for
115R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
concern. Intelligence is an important determinant of sci-
entific and cultural achievement, earnings, health and
many aspects of the quality of life. All of these are likely to
deteriorate as the world's intelligence declines.
We should consider whether there are any plausible
alternative scenarios to the projected decline of the
world's intelligence. The problem lies in the presence of
dysgenic fertility worldwide and in whether this could be
reversed or is likely to reverse itself spontaneously. The
problem of arresting and if possible reversing dysgenic
fertility within countries was extensively discussed by
eugenicists in the first half of the twentieth century.
Accounts of these ideas have been given by Kevles (1985)
and Lynn (1996, 2001). The eugenicists considered a
twofold strategy to deal with the problem, which they
designated positive and negative eugenics. Positive
eugenics consisted of policies designed to persuade the
more intelligent to have greater numbers of children. The
principal method proposed was the provision of financial
incentives, as advocated by Cattell (1937), but it proved
impossible in the western democracies to introduce any
practical measures of this kind. Negative eugenics con-
sisted of the dissemination of knowledge of birth control
and the sterilisation of the mentally retarded, which was
first introduced in Indiana in 1907 and subsequently in
most of the American states and throughout most of
Europe. These programs had some success but did not
arrest dysgenic fertility (Lynn & van Court, 2004).
In the second half of the twentieth century, public
opinion turned against eugenics and from the 1960s on-
wards eugenics became virtually universally condemned.
Throughout western nations the eugenics societies for the
promotion of eugenics dissolved themselves. It seems
unlikely that any attempts to introduce eugenic programs
in the western democracies will be made in the foresee-
able future. The lesson to be drawn from the history of the
eugenics movement is that it would be immensely dif-
ficult and probably impossible to halt or reverse dysgenic
fertility by the methods of classical eugenics. The eugen-
icists tried to find ways of reversing dysgenic fertility in
individual countries and failed. It would be even more
difficult to reverse dysgenic fertility in the whole world.
To achieve this ways would have to be found to increase
fertility in the high IQ nations and reduce fertility in the
low IQ nations. We do not see any probability of success
in achieving either of these objectives.
It remains possible that the new eugenicsof bio-
technology may evolve to counteract dysgenic fertility.
The most promising development would be embryo se-
lection. This would entail the culture of a number of
embryos by IVF, the genetic screening of them for
intelligence (as well as other desirable qualities), and the
implantation of those with the genetic potential to develop
high intelligence. A futuristic scenario of this kind has
been envisioned by Silver (1996). This technique is al-
ready being used to screen out embryos with the genes for
genetic disorders and to implant those free of these
disorders. It is not yet possible to use this technique to
identify and implant embryos with high potential intel-
ligence but it is likely that this will become possible in the
future. Any attempt to do this is at present prohibited in
the United States, Canada and Europe, but once the
technique has become feasible it is likely that it will be
permitted in some countries and couples will go to these
for the treatment.
If this happens it could have a considerable effect in
raising intelligence. Most couples have some alleles for
high intelligence and are capable of producing children
with higher intelligence than they have themselves. This
technology would allow them to do so. It is likely that
this technique would be used first by more intelligent and
affluent couples in economically developed nations and
come in time to be adopted by most of the population.
This would raise intelligence in the economically de-
veloped nations and increase further the intelligence gap
between the economically developed high IQ nations
and the economically developing low IQ nations. Even-
tually it might spread to the economically developing
nations.
This scenario posits that eugenic fertility may evolve
spontaneously in free societies through the exercise of
individual choice by couples. An alternative scenario is
that the rulers of some authoritarian state will recognise
the dangers of dysgenic fertility and declining intelli-
gence and impose measures to reverse it. The most likely
of these would be the requirement of licences for parent-
hood that would only be granted to couples with some
minimum level of intelligence. Since the intelligence of
parents is correlated with that of their children at around
0.5, a licensing scheme of this kind would increase the
intelligence of the child generation. A scheme of this
kind was proposed by Galton in an unpublished blue-
print for his eugenic Utopia, an account of which is given
in Lynn (2001). The Chinese came close to implement-
ing a program of this sort in the 1980s in the one-child
policy, in which couples were required to obtain a
certificate to have a child and were punished by fines and
other penalties for having unauthorized children (White,
2006).
Through these, or perhaps by other means, the
dysgenic fertility of the twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries could turn out to be only a temporary phase in
the world's demographic development and the decline
of the world's intelligence will be averted.
116 R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
Appendix
Country Fertility rates IQ Population 1950 Population 2000 Population 2050
1 Afghanistan 6.69 84 8,150,368 23,898,198 81,933,479
2 Albania 2.03 90 1,227,156 3,473,835 4,016,945
3 Algeria 1.89 83 8,892,718 30,409,300 43,983,870
4 Andorra 1.30 98 6176 66,824 69,129
5 Angola 6.35 68 4,117,617 10,377,267 24,746,652
6 Antigua & Barbuda 2.24 70 45,816 66,464 69,259
7 Argentina 2.16 93 17,150,336 37,497,728 48,740,060
8 Armenia 1.33 94 1,355,269 3,042,556 2,943,441
9 Australia 1.76 98 8,267,337 19,164,620 24,175,783
10 Austria 1.36 100 6,935,100 8,113,413 7,520,950
11 Azerbaijan 2.46 87 2,885,332 7,809,052 9,955,428
12 Bahamas 2.18 84 70,498 290,075 324,052
13 Bahrain 2.60 83 114,840 634,137 973,412
14 Bangladesh 3.11 82 45,645,964 130,406,594 279,955,405
15 Barbados 1.65 80 210,666 273,483 274,523
16 Belarus 1.43 97 7,722,155 1,033,697 7,738,613
17 Belgium 1.64 99 8,639,369 10,263,618 9,882,599
18 Belize 3.60 84 65,797 247,887 541,734
19 Benin 5.20 70 1,672,661 6,627,964 16,356,458
20 Bermuda 1.89 90 38,869 62,971 66,025
21 Bhutan 4.74 80 734,000 2,005,222 4,653,000
22 Bolivia 2.85 87 2,766,028 815,260 13,772,819
23 Bosnia & Herzegovina 1.22 90 2,662,000 4,035,457 3,891,669
24 Botswana 2.79 70 430,413 1,607,069 1,411,662
25 Brazil 1.91 87 53,443,075 175,552,771 228,426,737
26 Brunei 2.28 91 44,983 336,376 600,998
27 Bulgaria 1.38 93 7,250,500 7,818,495 4651,477
28 Burkina Faso 6.47 68 4,376,162 11,308,552 43,656,786
29 Burundi 6.55 69 2,362,522 6,621,166 22,852,556
30 Cambodia 3.37 91 4,471,170 12,466,262 25,089,909
31 Cameroon 4.39 64 4,887,591 15,343,036 34,908,839
32 Canada 1.61 99 14,011,422 31,278,097 41,429,579
33 Cape Verde 3.38 76 146,403 401,343 380,614
34 Central African Rep. 4.41 64 1,259,816 3,935,417 6,502,151
35 Chad 6.25 68 2,607,769 8,316,481 29,547,665
35 Chile 2.00 90 6,090,833 15,153,450 19,244,843
37 China 1.73 105 562,579,779 1,268,853,362 1,424,161,948
38 Colombia 2.54 84 11,591,658 39,685,655 64,534,420
39 Comoros 5.03 77 148,057 578,400 1,835,099
40 Congo: Dem Rep of (Zaire) 6.45 65 13,568,762 52,021,832 183,177,415
41 Congo: Rep of (Brazz) 6.07 64 826,308 3,102,404 9,618,358
42 Cook Islands 3.10 89 14,575 20,407 24,930
43 Costa Rica 2.24 89 866,982 3,710,558 5,696,700
44 Cote d'Ivoire 4.50 69 2,860,288 15,563,387 32,400,664
45 Croatia 1.40 90 3,837,297 4,410,830 3,864,201
46 Cuba 1.66 85 5,784,797 11,134,273 10,477,677
47 Cyprus 1.82 91 494,000 758,363 841,102
48 Czech Republic 1.21 98 8,925,122 10,270,128 8,540,221
49 Denmark 1.74 98 4,271,000 5,337,416 5,575,147
50 Djibouti 5.31 68 60,036 430,822 993,011
51 Dominica 1.94 67 51,423 71,540 81,961
52 Dominican Republic 2.83 82 2,352,968 8,410,393 146,579,62
53 Ecuador 2.68 88 3,369,955 12,505,204 20,332,088
54 Egypt 2.83 81 2,119,7691 70,492,342 126,920,512
55 El Salvador 3.12 80 1,939,800 6,122,515 12,039,149
56 Equatorial Guinea 4.55 64 211,204 473,216 1,063,071
(continued on next page )
117R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
Appendix (continued)
Country Fertility rates IQ Population 1950 Population 2000 Population 2050
57 Eritrea 5.08 68 1,403,000 4,356,581 10,164,000
58 Estonia 1.40 99 1,095,610 1,379,835 861,913
59 Ethiopia 5.22 64 20,174,562 64,690,052 144,716,331
60 Fiji 2.73 85 287,348 832,494 1,447,573
61 Finland 1.73 99 4,008,900 5,168,595 4,819,615
62 France 1.84 98 41,828,673 59,381,628 61,017,122
63 Gabon 4.74 64 415,767 1,235,484 3,221,749
64 Gambia 5.30 66 271,369 1,367,884 4,068,861
65 Georgia 1.42 94 3,515,602 4,777,209 3,784,724
66 Germany 1.39 99 68,374,572 82,187,909 73,607,121
67 Ghana 3.99 71 5,297,454 19,736,036 38,735,638
68 Greece 1.34 92 7,566,028 10,559,110 10,035,935
69 Grenada 2.34 71 75,806 89,312 87,136
70 Guatemala 3.82 79 2,968,976 11,085,025 22,995,434
71 Guinea 5.79 67 2,585,509 8,638,858 28,713,509
72 Guinea-Bissau 4.86 67 573,268 1,278,273 2,895,666
73 Guyana 2.04 87 427,971 755,171 597,806
74 Haiti 4.94 67 3,097,220 7,443,620 19,807,275
75 Honduras 3.59 81 1,431,447 6,347,658 12,641,869
76 Hong Kong 0.95 108 2,237,000 6,658,720 6,172,725
77 Hungary 1.32 98 9,338,000 10,137,449 8,374,619
78 Iceland 1.92 101 142,938 281,043 350,922
79 India 2.73 82 369,880,000 1,004,124,224 1,807,878,574
80 Indonesia 2.40 87 82,978,392 213,829,469 313,020,847
81 Iran 1.80 84 16,357,000 63,273,255 81,490,039
82 Iraq 4.18 87 5,163,443 22,675,617 56,360,779
83 Ireland 1.86 92 2,963,018 3,791,690 5,396,215
84 Israel 2.41 95 1,286,131 5,842,454 8,516,835
85 Italy 1.28 102 47,105,000 57,719,337 50,389,841
86 Jamaica 2.41 71 1,384,550 2,615,447 3,499,068
87 Japan 1.40 105 83,805,000 126,699,784 99,886,568
88 Jordan 2.63 84 561,254 4,998,564 11,772,789
89 Kazakhstan 1.89 94 6,693,230 15,032,140 15,099,700
90 Kenya 4.91 72 6,121,184 30,507,979 65,175,864
91 Kiribati 4.16 85 33,448 91,985 235,342
92 Kuwait 2.91 86 144,774 1,973,572 6,374,800
93 Kyrgyzstan 2.69 90 1,738,961 4,851,054 8,237,623
94 Laos 4.68 89 1,885,984 5,497,733 13,176,153
95 Latvia 1.27 98 1,936,498 2,376,178 1,544,073
96 Lebanon 1.90 82 1,364,030 3,578,036 4,940,731
97 Lesotho 3.28 67 726,182 2,037,961 1,448,643
98 Liberia 6.02 67 823,885 2,693,780 7,072,402
99 Libya 3.28 83 961,305 5,115,450 10,817,176
100 Lithuania 1.20 91 2,553,159 3,654,387 2,787,516
101 Luxembourg 1.78 100 295,587 438,777 720,603
102 Macedonia 1.57 91 1,224,627 2,014,512 1,990,728
103 Madagascar 5.62 82 4,620,437 15,741,942 56,513,827
104 Malawi 5.92 69 2,816,600 11,559,538 29,820,957
105 Malaysia 3.04 92 6,433,799 21,793,293 43,122,397
106 Maldives 4.90 81 79,293 301,475 815,031
107 Mali 7.42 69 3,687,654 10,048,561 40,002,414
108 Malta 1.50 97 311,973 389,947 395,639
109 Marshall Islands 3.85 84 10,904 53,064 102,761
110 Mauritania 5.86 76 1,005,595 2,667,859 8,635,801
111 Mauritius 1.95 89 481,270 1,179,368 1,451,156
112 Mexico 2.42 88 28,485,180 99,926,620 147,907,650
113 Micronesia 3.16 84 30,715 107,754 74,296
114 Moldova 1.85 96 2,336,432 4,382,462 3,620,416
115 Mongolia 2.25 101 778,555 2,600,835 4,086,025
118 R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
Appendix (continued)
Country Fertility rates IQ Population 1950 Population 2000 Population 2050
116 Morocco 2.68 84 9,343,384 30,122,350 50,871,553
117 Mozambique 4.62 64 6,250,443 18,124,564 41,842,274
118 Myanmar (Burma) 1.98 87 19,488,000 44,301,206 54,430,000
119 Namibia 3.06 70 463,729 1,905,659 1,795,852
120 Nepal 4.10 78 8,989,915 24,702,119 53,293,874
121 Netherlands 1.66 100 10,113,527 15,907,853 17,334,090
122 New Caledonia 2.28 85 55,069 201,816 290,682
123 New Zealand 1.79 99 1,908,310 3,819,762 48,42,397
124 Nicaragua 2.75 81 1,097,916 4,932,420 9,437,504
125 Niger 7.46 69 3,271,073 10,516,111 34,419,502
126 Nigeria 5.49 69 31,796,939 114,306,700 356,523,597
127 North Korea 2.10 106 9,471,140 21,647,682 26,363,688
128 Northern Mariana Isles 1.24 81 6,286 69,706 143,132
129 Norway 1.78 100 3,265,126 4,492,400 4,966,385
130 Oman 5.77 83 488,588 2,533,389 8,237,623
131 Pakistan 4.00 84 39,448,232 146,342,958 294,995,104
132 Panama 2.68 84 892,502 2,889,485 5,038,122
133 Papua New Guinea 3.88 83 1,412,466 4,926,984 10,670,394
134 Paraguay 3.89 84 1,475,669 5,585,828 14,635,743
135 Peru 2.51 85 7,632,500 25,979,722 38,300,067
136 Philippines 3.11 86 21,131,264 79,739,825 147,630,852
137 Poland 1.25 99 24,824,000 38,654,164 32,084,570
138 Portugal 1.47 95 8,442,750 10,335,597 9,933,334
139 Puerto Rico 1.75 84 2,218,000 3,815,909 3,770,496
140 Qatar 2.81 78 25,101 744,483 1,239,216
141 Romania 1.37 94 16,311,000 22,451,921 18,678,226
142 Russia 1.28 97 101,936,816 146,709,971 109,187,353
143 Rwanda 5.43 70 2,439,435 8,278,209 25,089,909
144 Samoa 2.94 88 81,858 179,466 170,739
145 Sao Tome & Principe 5.62 67 59,730 159,883 502,489
146 Saudi Arabia 4.00 84 3,859,801 23,153,090 49,706,851
147 Senegal 4.38 66 2,653,637 10,332,013 27,519,852
148 Serbia 1.78 89 6,710,261 10,117,908 9,274,767
149 Seychelles 1.74 86 32,903 79,326 89,713
150 Sierra Leone 6.08 64 2,087,055 4,808,817 13,998,936
151 Singapore 1.06 108 1,022,100 4,036,753 4,635,110
152 Slovakia 1.33 96 3,463,446 5,400,320 4,943,616
153 Slovenia 1.25 96 1,467,759 2,010,057 1,596,947
154 Solomon Islands 3.91 84 106,647 466,194 1,110,514
155 Somalia 6.76 68 2,437,932 7,253,137 25,128,735
156 South Africa 2.20 72 13,595,840 44,066,197 33,002,952
157 South Korea 1.27 106 20,845,771 47,351,083 45,224,224
158 Spain 1.28 98 28,062,963 40,016,081 35,564,293
159 Sri Lanka 1.84 79 7,533,097 19,435,869 24,920,558
160 St Kitts & Nevis 2.31 67 44,341 38,819 52,348
161 St Lucia 2.18 62 79,050 156,260 235,420
162 St Vincent 1.83 71 66,452 115,461 92,335
163 Sudan 4.72 71 8,051,151 35,079,814 84,192,309
164 Suriname 2.32 89 208,068 432,485 617,249
165 Swaziland 3.53 68 277,384 1,109,750 720,603
166 Sweden 1.66 99 7,014,005 8,923,569 9,084,788
167 Switzerland 1.43 101 4,694,000 7,266,920 7,296,092
168 Syria 3.40 83 3,495,000 16,305,659 34,437,235
169 Taiwan 1.57 105 7,981,454 22,151,237 23,203,650
170 Tajikistan 4.00 87 1,530,047 6,229,697 12,132,365
171 Tanzania 4.97 72 7,934,924 33,065,142 71,949,135
172 Thailand 1.64 91 20,041,628 61,862,928 69,268,817
173 Timor-Leste 3.53 87 435,529 846,599 1,942,734
(continued on next page )
119R. Lynn, J. Harvey / Intelligence 36 (2008) 112120
Appendix (continued)
Country Fertility rates IQ Population 1950 Population 2000 Population 2050
174 Togo 4.96 70 1,171,897 4,711,655 14,714,623
175 Tonga 3.00 86 45,744 102,321 188,340
176 Trinidad & Tobago 1.74 85 632,000 1,118,204 622,011
177 Tunisia 1.74 83 3,517,210 9,563,816 12,462,798
178 Turkey 1.92 90 21,121,639 65,666,677 86,473,786
179 Turkmenistan 3.37 87 1,204,075 4,518,268 9,626,193
180 Uganda 6.71 73 5,521,758 23,955,822 128,007,514
181 Ukraine 1.17 97 36,774,854 49,005,222 33,573,842
182 United Arab Emirates 2.88 84 71,250 2,369,153 3,696,962
183 United Kingdom 1.66 100 50,127,000 59,522,468 63,977,435
184 United States 2.09 98 152,271,000 282,338,631 420,080,587
185 Uruguay 1.89 96 2,194,275 3,323,876 3,728,264
186 Uzbekistan 2.91 87 6,250,443 24,755,519 48,597,111
187 Vanuatu 2.70 84 52,000 189,618 310,486
188 Venezuela 2.23 84 5,009,006 23,542,649 37,106,394
189 Vietnam 1.91 94 25,348,144 79,060,410 107,772,641
190 Yemen 6.58 85 4,777,089 17,479,206 71,119,251
191 Zambia 5.39 71 2,553,000 10,205,262 18,435,053
192 Zimbabwe 3.13 66 2,853,151 11,751,323 12,221,257
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... Since the lower-SES cohorts have more children than the higher-SES cohorts, on average, this has led to a slight decline in the genetic selection for higher cognitive ability levels, starting around the mid-nineteenth century when living conditions and medicine improved (Lynn 1996). Furthermore, this seems to have emerged as a global pattern (Lynn and Harvey 2008), although in Sweden an opposite pattern has been identified (Kolk and Barclay 2019) and thus refuting some of Lynn (1996) and Lynn and Harvey's (2008) research. Nonetheless, Lynn and Harvey (2008, p. 113) assumes that the genotypic dimension of IQ has declined by 1.22 points from 1950 to 2000. ...
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Mental ability, as assessed by standardized tests, is not fixed in time. Large IQ gains have been recorded in many industrialized countries during the 20 th century, but very little is known about IQ trends in the less developed countries. The present study investigates generational changes in mental test performance on the Caribbean island of Dominica. In a cross-sectional design, Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices were administered to two age groups: young adults between the ages of 18 and 25 years, and older adults between the ages of 51 and 62 years. Raw scores were 23.3 ± 11.4 points for the older generation and 36.1 ± 10.9 points for the younger generation. Compared to the current British norms for their respective age groups, the average IQs of these two cohorts were estimated as 61 and 73, respectively. Since the age-specific British norms reflect a rising IQ trend in Britain already, the real gain in Dominica is not 12 points but approximately 17 to 19 points. The results on a vocabulary test suggest similar cohort gains in word knowledge. Differences between the Afro-Caribbean majority and the native Caribs were small. Data are presented to show that the difference between the two age groups represents a cohort effect rather than an aging effect. The implications of the Flynn effect for economic development and cultural evolution are discussed.
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