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Perspective taking in children and adults: Equivalent egocentrism but differential correction

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Children generally behave more egocentrically than adults when assessing another's perspective. We argue that this difference does not, however, indicate that adults process information less egocentrically than children, but rather that adults are better able to subsequently correct an initial egocentric interpretation. An experiment tracking participants' eye movements during a referential communication task indicated that children and adults were equally quick to interpret a spoken instruction egocentrically but differed in the speed with which they corrected that interpretation and looked at the intended (i.e., non-egocentric) object. The existing differences in egocentrism between children and adults therefore seems less a product of where people start in their perspective taking process than where they stop, with lingering egocentric biases among adults produced by insufficient correction of an automatic moment of egocentrism. We suggest that this pattern of similarity in automatic, but not controlled, processes may explain between-group differences in a variety of dual-process judgments.
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... Although many researchers have provided possible explanations for the difficulties children and adults experience with level-2 VPT, the cognitive mechanism of this phenomenon is still unclear. Epley et al. (2004) proposed the "anchoring and adjustment heuristic" theory, which suggested that people adopt others' perspectives by initially anchoring their own, and subsequently adjusting to account for differences between themselves and others. However, this theory does not explain how to overcome the initial tendency to anchor one's own perspective. ...
... Another possible explanation is that both children and adults share an automatic egocentric default in the initial stage of perspective-taking. However, compared to children, adults are better at correcting initial interpretations in subsequent processing stages to accommodate differences between their own and others' perspectives (Epley et al., 2004). ...
... One possible explanation is that children do not have sufficient cognitive capacity to suppress others' perspectives. Another possible explanation is that children are always more egocentric than adults (Epley et al., 2004). Compared with adults, the less competitive other perspectives may not be strong enough to disturb children's perspective selection. ...
Article
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Level-2 visual perspective taking (VPT) refers to the ability to understand that other people may see objects differently. Using the number verification task, previous studies have found egocentric and altercentric biases in level-2 VPT. However, the cognitive mechanism of these biases is still unclear. Thus, the present study used the adapted negative priming (NP) paradigm to investigate the role of inhibitory control in overcoming these biases in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we found egocentric bias and observed the NP effect for children and adults. However, there was no significant difference between children and adults in the magnitude of the NP effect, indicating that when children can overcome the egocentric bias in the level-2 VPT, their inhibitory control ability is comparable to that of adults. In Experiment 2, altercentric bias was confirmed in children and adults. However, we did not observe the NP effect in children. These results suggest that children may not have sufficient cognitive capacity to suppress others’ perspectives, or may not experience interference by others’ perspectives and thus have no need to inhibit.
... Adults also appear to generally employ an egocentric heuristic, which they must seek to overcome when it is necessary for resolving interpersonal ambiguity (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000). Epley and colleagues (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004) have found that one's own perspective acts as an "egocentric anchor," in that people adopt the perspective of others only after adjusting from their own. Because of this, adults in suboptimal conditions, such as when they are under time constraints, will tend to produce more egocentric errors, relying on their own view and failing to notice their partner's discrepancy . ...
... Despite experimental procedures meant to elicit perspective taking (e.g., only allowing them to touch certain pieces, making them believe their descriptions were for the table), less than half of all participants clarified their own point of view, and only a very small minority (14%) explicitly acknowledged the other participant's point of view. These results are consistent with accounts emphasizing the predominance of egocentrism when considering spatial layout Epley, Morewedge, et al., 2004). It is worth noting, however, that this measure of perspective taking was taken just prior to beginning the actual task. ...
... Nevertheless, the expected effect was not found for either explicit mentions of their partner or for implied acknowledgment when clarifying that they were writing from their own perspective. It is possible that other experimental paradigms that are independent of the pragmatic, communicative component of the present study's measure, such as egocentric adjustments in eye gaze (Epley, Morewedge, et al., 2004;Wu & Keysar, 2007), may be needed to detect subtle differences in social attunement. However, perspective taking is just one way in which individuals may show evidence of attending to another person. ...
Article
The creation and maintenance of physical territories are behaviors common to many species, including humans. One of the most well-documented outcomes associated with territories is the phenomenon of home advantage, the tendency for residents to prevail disproportionally over intruders during competition. Previous attempts to explain this effect have focused largely on a defense framework: residents, in response to an intruder, experience dominance motivation, which leads to more aggressive behavior. In the current work, I draw on ecological theorizing to develop an alternative account, arguing that differences in perceptual activity necessary for adaptive functioning produces distinct performance outcomes for hosts, relative to visitors. Across four experiments, this proposal is contrasted with the defense account using multiple types of territories (e.g., lab settings, computerized scenes, dormitories) and multiple types of outcomes (e.g., visuospatial ability, visual search, persistence). In Experiment 1, I evaluate a procedure for inducing territoriality after a brief period of time in the laboratory. In Experiment 2, I employ this procedure to evaluate performance on a block design task, measuring visuospatial ability and perspective taking. In Experiment 3, I assess visual search ability across a range of interior scenes designed to simulate resident and visitor status. Finally, in Experiment 4, I employ an ego-depletion paradigm in participants’ dorm rooms and find that residents exhibit greater self-regulatory strength following a depleting task. Taken together, these studies represent initial steps towards moving the study of territorial behavior away from a preoccupation with competitive defense to a broader understanding of the resident-territory relationship.
... It is important to highlight that although the studies listed above focus mainly on audience design in dialogue among adult speakers, numerous studies have focused on the features of audience design in adult-child dialogue (e.g., Bates & Silvern, 1977;Clark, 2010Clark, , 2015Clark & Bernicot, 2008;Clark & Estigarribia, 2011;Epley et al., 2004;Nadig & Sedivy, 2002;Ntsame-Mba & Caron, 1999;O'Neill, 1996;Sachs & Devin, 1976;Shatz & Gelman, 1973;Warden, 1976). When adults are establishing common ground with young children, the status of the addressee (child) is immediately available, allowing for audience design. ...
... Previous research on adult-child interaction suggests audience design is characterized by an adjustment of what is said, so that adults make lexical choices dependent on whether the addressee is another adult or a child (e.g., Bates & Silvern, 1977;Clark, 2010Clark, , 2015Clark & Bernicot, 2008;Clark & Estigarribia, 2011;Epley et al., 2004;Nadig & Sedivy, 2002;Ntsame-Mba & Caron, 1999;O'Neill, 1996;Sachs & Devin, 1976;Shatz & Gelman, 1973;Warden, 1976). In addition, studies show that while older teenagers manage definite references and the process of establishing common ground better than younger children, they have yet to master this in a fully adult-like manner (Fukumura, 2016;Ntsame-Mba & Caron, 1999). ...
Article
When two people interact, reference presentation is shaped with the intention of supporting addressee understanding, allowing for ease of acceptance, thus minimizing overall collaborative effort. To date, analysis of such audience design has focused largely on adult–adult or adult–child interaction but seldom on adult–teenager interaction, including teacher–student interaction. An experiment was conducted in a British school in which teachers and students interacted to establish a reference for abstract tangram figures. Teachers were able to account for the students’ increased ability to behave in a more adult-like collaborative way with dialogue features similar to those in adult–adult contexts. Set apart was dialogue with young students, where teachers continued to guide the interaction by producing lengthier descriptions and by encouraging participation. Dialogue with young students differs from that with other teachers in terms of the amount of effort put into the interaction and in how this effort is distributed and shared among dialogue partners.
... In perspective-taking tasks, participants are usually confronted with a situation that elicits congruent or incongruent perceptions compared to the situation the target person is exposed to. For example, in visual perspective-taking tasks, participants are asked to make judgments about what another person is seeing (Epley, Morewedge, et al., 2004;Samson et al., 2010). Crucially, some of the stimuli are occluded from the target's point of view and are only visible to the participant. ...
... Assessing accuracy is much easier in cognitive egocentricity tasks, in which inferences often refer to external objects or agents whose perceptibility can be tracked. For example, in visual perspective-taking paradigms the participants' judgment on what the target sees can be compared to the actual stimuli that are visually accessible to them (Epley, Morewedge, et al., 2004;Samson et al., 2010). Given that feelings and emotions are subjective, estimating the inferential accuracy of affective self-projections is a stronger challenge. ...
Thesis
In der vorliegenden Dissertation werden vier Studien vorgestellt, in denen untersucht wurde, wie altrozentrische (Mimikry) und egozentrische (Selbstprojektion) Prozesse der sozialen Kognition in Abhängigkeit vom sozialen Kontext und persönlichen Dispositionen reguliert werden. Studie 1 zeigte, dass die Tendenz, fröhliche Gesichtsausdrücke anderer nachzuahmen abhängig von dem mit der beobachteten Person assoziierten Belohnungswert ist. Die Auswirkung der Belohnung ging jedoch weder in die vorhergesagte Richtung, noch konnten wir einen Einfluss von Oxytocin, einem Hormon, das der Neurobiologie der sozialen Anpassung zugrunde liegt, finden. Studie 2 zeigte, im Vergleich zu vorherigen Studien, keine allgemeine Verbesserung der automatischen Nachahmung nach direktem Blickkontakt im Vergleich zum abgewandten Blick. Wir konnten jedoch potenzielle dispositionelle Faktoren (z.B. autistische Eigenschaften) identifizieren, denen unterschiedlichen Mimikry-Reaktionen auf den Blickkontakt zugrunde liegen könnten. Studie 3 kombinierte kurze Phasen der Emotionsinduktion mit psychophysischen Messungen der Emotionswahrnehmung. Es zeigte sich, dass emotionale Gesichtsausdrücke tendenziell als fröhlicher beurteilt werden, wenn Personen angeben, dass sie sich fröhlich im Vergleich zu traurig fühlen. Emotionale egozentrische Verzerrungen wurden in Studie 4 erneut untersucht. Im Gegensatz zu unseren Vorhersagen fanden wir jedoch keine stärkeren egozentrischen Verzerrungen, wenn die Teilnehmenden emotionale Gesichtsausdrücke von ähnlichen im Vergleich zu unähnlichen Personen beurteilten. In allen Studien fanden wir Hinweise für den kontextabhängigen Charakter der sozialen Kognition. Allerdings konnten wir einige der in der Literatur berichteten Phänomene nicht replizieren. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Notwendigkeit, die Robustheit und Generalisierbarkeit früherer Befunde systematisch neu zu bewerten.
... Based on earlier studies, this study goes a step further and using meditation as a mediator, looks at addressing egocentrism in the workplace and its relationship with workplace spirituality. Workplace spirituality is defined as a workplace where people have compassion towards others, experience a mindful inner consciousness in the pursuit of meaningful work and enables transcendence (Petchsawang & Duchon, 2012) Egocentrism is the inability to accurately assume or understand any perspective other than one's own (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Overcoming egocentrism may be a lifelong development that never achieves completion (Pronin, & Olivola, 2006). ...
... Egocentric: Is the describing word for egocentrism. Egocentrism: Egocentrism is a subtype of selfishness (Raine & Uh, 2019) exhibiting inability to accurately assume or understand any perspective other than one's own (Epley et al., 2004). ...
... It requires going beyond one's own psychological point of view to take into account the perspective of another who most probably has a somewhat or very different psychological point of view (Epley & Caruso, 2008). In the expanded literature of the field, the terms "theory of mind" (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and "mentalizing" (Frith & Frith, 2003) are often used interchangeably with PT (Apperly, 2009;Astington, 1998;Epley et al., 2004;Henry et al., 2014;Hillis, 2014;Singer & Klimecki, 2014;Stietz et al., 2019); notwithstanding, it should be stressed that there are scholars who identify some conceptual distinctions between them (Archer, 2018;David et al., 2010David et al., , 2008Harwood & Farrar, 2006;Schnell et al., 2011). However, these variety of terms have been used to portray a wide range of phenomena such as adopting another's visual perspective, anticipating another person's thoughts, intuiting another person's emotion and more (Kavanagh et al., 2020). ...
Article
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Previously we found perspective taking (PT) influenced affect ratings of negative pictures more than neutral pictures. The current follow-up experiments extend that research to explore effects of perspective taking with positive valence pictures. We used stimuli consisting of neutral, happy and sad pictures. Stimuli were presented either mixed within blocks (Experiment 1) or separated by emotion (neutrals + happy/sad) into two separate blocks (Experiment 2). Participants rated (from 1‐ to 7 based on emotional strength) stimuli from different perspectives (sensitive/tough/their own, i.e., “me”). Emotional strength rating was a dependent variable. A significant interaction between valence and PT was found in both experiments. The difference between adopting sensitive and tough perspectives toward sadness was larger than toward the neutral condition, replicating our results from the previous study. The same difference (sensitive-tough) was larger toward the happiness condition than toward the neutral one (this was a trend in Experiment 1 and was significant in Experiment 2) and toward the sadness condition than toward the happy one. These results suggest that PT effects on emotional ratings are modulated by valence of stimuli.
... Normally, people do consider intentions when responding to requests. For instance, when asked "please give me the small candle", people will typically hand over the smallest nearby candle the requester knows about, even if they could instead provide an even smaller one the requester is unaware of (e.g., Epley et al., 2004). Sensitivity to ...
Article
Evil supernatural beings are often depicted as responding to unintended requests, whereas this may be less common in representations of good supernatural beings. This asymmetry suggests that people may expect good and evil agents to differ in their sensitivity to other people's intentions. We investigated this proposal across five experiments on 2231 adult US residents. In Experiments 1 to 4, participants judged whether good or evil agents would grant requests from individuals who varied in their understanding of what they requested, and in whether they executed requests correctly. Across experiments, the good and evil agents were either supernatural beings or regular humans. Participants predicted good agents would be sensitive to intentions behind requests, but predicted evil agents would be comparatively insensitive to these intentions. In some experiments, they also predicted that evil agents would be more sensitive to whether requests were executed correctly. In Experiment 5, participants rated explanations for why an agent would grant a request from someone who did not understand what they were requesting. Participants thought evil agents might grant such requests because they are indifferent to the others' intentions, but participants did not strongly endorse this explanation for good agents. Taken together, our findings suggest that people have distinct expectations of how moral character affects decision-making. They also suggest that people's beliefs about good and evil supernatural beings may be grounded in their views of ordinary humans.
... For a long time, existing parsing theories took two rather different, apparently contradictory views. On the one side there were theories that assume autonomous lexical and syntactic activation with contextual and other pragmatic constraints, such as CG, entering the parsing process only at a later stage at which the different sources of information are integrated (e.g., Ferreira and Clifton, 1986;Keysar et al., 2000;Epley et al., 2004b;Barr, 2008;Kronmüller et al., 2017). We will refer to these accounts as "late integration" accounts. ...
Article
Full-text available
One of the most important social cognitive skills in humans is the ability to “put oneself in someone else’s shoes,” that is, to take another person’s perspective. In socially situated communication, perspective taking enables the listener to arrive at a meaningful interpretation of what is said (sentence meaning) and what is meant (speaker’s meaning) by the speaker. To successfully decode the speaker’s meaning, the listener has to take into account which information he/she and the speaker share in their common ground (CG). We here further investigated competing accounts about when and how CG information affects language comprehension by means of reaction time (RT) measures, accuracy data, event-related potentials (ERPs), and eye-tracking. Early integration accounts would predict that CG information is considered immediately and would hence not expect to find costs of CG integration. Late integration accounts would predict a rather late and effortful integration of CG information during the parsing process that might be reflected in integration or updating costs. Other accounts predict the simultaneous integration of privileged ground (PG) and CG perspectives. We used a computerized version of the referential communication game with object triplets of different sizes presented visually in CG or PG. In critical trials (i.e., conflict trials), CG information had to be integrated while privileged information had to be suppressed. Listeners mastered the integration of CG (response accuracy 99.8%). Yet, slower RTs, and enhanced late positivities in the ERPs showed that CG integration had its costs. Moreover, eye-tracking data indicated an early anticipation of referents in CG but an inability to suppress looks to the privileged competitor, resulting in later and longer looks to targets in those trials, in which CG information had to be considered. Our data therefore support accounts that foresee an early anticipation of referents to be in CG but a rather late and effortful integration if conflicting information has to be processed. We show that both perspectives, PG and CG, contribute to socially situated language processing and discuss the data with reference to theoretical accounts and recent findings on the use of CG information for reference resolution.
... A second distinction between tests of ToM that may be of theoretical interest is between those that measure the ability to infer accurately the mental states of others, and those that measure the propensity to make mental state inferences (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2004;Cage, Pellicano, Shah, & Bird, 2013;Conway et al., 2019;Epley et al., 2004;Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017). One of the defining features of alexithymia is an externally-oriented thinking style, i.e. a tendency to avoid thinking about internal states and instead to focus thoughts on external matters. ...
Article
Full-text available
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to represent the mental states of oneself and others, is an essential social skill disrupted across many psychiatric conditions. The transdiagnostic nature of ToM impairment means it is plausible that ToM impairment is related to alexithymia (difficulties identifying and describing one’s own emotions), as alexithymia is seen across psychiatric conditions. Whilst many studies have examined links between alexithymia and ToM, results are mixed. Therefore, the purpose of this systematic review is to provide a taxonomy of ToM tests and assess their relationship with alexithymia. Tests are grouped according to whether they assess propensity to engage spontaneously in ToM or accuracy of ToM inferences, with tests further subdivided into those that do, and do not, require emotion recognition. A review of 63 suitable studies suggests that alexithymia is often associated with reduced ToM, and inaccurate ToM when tasks require emotion recognition. This latter finding appears due to impaired emotion recognition, rather than ToM impairment per se. Further directions and considerations for future research are discussed.
... Keeping these secrets requires considering how others might evaluate the third-party should the secret become public, which may require perspectivetaking abilities, and therefore become more prominent with age. Indeed, our ability to override egocentric biases and consider others' perspectives becomes less effortful and more automatic across development (Epley et al., 2004). Thus, prosocial reasons for keeping a secret (e.g., wanting to minimize others' distress) may increase over the course of childhood. ...
Article
The lion's share of research on secrecy focuses on how deciding to keep or share a secret impacts a secret‐keeper's well‐being. However, secrets always involve more than one person: the secret‐keeper and those from whom the secret is kept or shared with. Although secrets are inherently social, their consequences for people's reputations and social relationships have been relatively ignored. Secrets serve a variety of social functions, including (1) changing or maintaining one's reputation, (2) conveying social utility, and (3) establishing friendship. For example, if Beth has a secret about a past misdemeanor, she might not tell any of her friends in order to maintain her reputation as an outstanding citizen. If Beth does share this secret with her friend Amy, Amy could interpret this as a sign of trust and think that their friendship is special. However, Amy could also choose to share Beth's secret with the rest of the friend group to show that she is a useful member with access to valuable information about others. Attention to these social functions of secrets emerges from a young age, and secrets play a prominent role in human relationships throughout the lifespan. After providing an overview of what is currently known about the relational consequences of secrecy in childhood and adulthood, we discuss how social and developmental psychologists could work together to broaden our understanding of the sociality of secrets. Future steps include incorporating more dyadic and social network analyses into research on secrets and looking at similar questions across ages. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Secrets are inherently social and cannot exist outside of the social relationships in which they are kept and shared. Accordingly, secrets can also serve a variety of social functions, including (1) changing or maintaining one's reputation, (2) conveying social utility, and (3) establishing friendship.
... Cette stabilité invite à le considérer comme un bon indicateur du degré d'égocentrisme « brut », non/peu socialisé. Les jeunes enfants fonctionnent de façon autocentrée, mais c'est aussi le cas pour les adultes: simplement, les conduites égocentriques étant socialement peu valorisées, ces derniers ont appris à les inhiber ou les ajuster aux situations, et disposent d'un plus large répertoire de réponses comportementales, leur permettant de contrebalancer ou de masquer cet égocentrisme latent (e.g., Epley et al., 2004;Golubickis, Ho, Falbén, Mackenzie, et al., 2019). Au cours du développement, les normes sociales et morales prônant la capacité à la décentration, la Théorie de l'Esprit et un souci ardent et précoce pour la présentation de soi sont progressivement intégrés (Banerjee et al., 2010;Botto & Rochat, 2018). ...
Article
Full-text available
The self is a crucial component of the psychic life and plays a central role for the adaptation to the environment. In daily life, this adaptative function is ensured, inter alia, by numerous biases filtering information and favoring those which are self-related. After succinctly reviewing the most documented among them which are affective and mnesic biases, the current paper provides a critical review of literature about a bias which is supposed to be perceptive, the self-prioritization effect (SPE). That has been revealed by Sui et al. (2012, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 38(5), 1105) with an astute matching task and consists in the fact that arbitrarily tagging shapes to a word referring to the participant (e.g., you-square) leads to faster and more accurate responses as compared to shapes tagged to a word referring to another identity (e.g., stranger-circle). The methodological variations of this task and the SPE's both extension and putative origins will be presented, as well as the restrictions which border it, related to the individuals, to the experimental situation and to some more general properties of the self. Finally, some avenues for future research will be proposed, drawing some promising paths: beyond being a robust and intriguing phenomenon, SPE can indeed be considered as a convenient tool to assess some mechanisms underlying social cognition, in various fields using an experimental approach such as developmental psychology and social psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
... Projection bias "assuming others' emotions, thoughts, and values are similar to one's own" (Epley et al., 2004;Robbins and Krueger, 2005) 4 ...
Article
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Cognitive biases can adversely affect human judgment and decision making and should therefore preferably be mitigated, so that we can achieve our goals as effectively as possible. Hence, numerous bias mitigation interventions have been developed and evaluated. However, to be effective in practical situations beyond laboratory conditions, the bias mitigation effects of these interventions should be retained over time and should transfer across contexts. This systematic review provides an overview of the literature on retention and transfer of bias mitigation interventions. A systematic search yielded 52 studies that were eligible for screening. At the end of the selection process, only 12 peer-reviewed studies remained that adequately studied retention over a period of at least 14 days (all 12 studies) or transfer to different tasks and contexts (one study). Eleven of the relevant studies investigated the effects of bias mitigation training using game- or video-based interventions. These 11 studies showed considerable overlap regarding the biases studied, kinds of interventions, and decision-making domains. Most of them indicated that gaming interventions were effective after the retention interval and that games were more effective than video interventions. The study that investigated transfer of bias mitigation training (next to retention) found indications of transfer across contexts. To be effective in practical circumstances, achieved effects of cognitive training should lead to enduring changes in the decision maker's behavior and should generalize toward other task domains or training contexts. Given the small number of overlapping studies, our main conclusion is that there is currently insufficient evidence that bias mitigation interventions will substantially help people to make better decisions in real life conditions. This is in line with recent theoretical insights about the “hard-wired” neural and evolutionary origin of cognitive biases.
... Studies of these biases have provided valuable evidence about how theory of mind matures into adulthood. Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar (2004) looked at egocentric biases in children and adults, with results indicating that theory of mind in adults is a more practiced and efficient version of the skills seen in children. The investigations about a more specific type of egocentric bias called a "knowledge bias" give further information about how theory of mind develops. ...
Thesis
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/112161/1/arzolt.pdf
... Normally, people do consider intentions when responding to requests. For instance, when asked "please give me the small candle", people will typically hand over the smallest nearby candle the requester knows about, even if they could instead provide an even smaller one the requester is unaware of (e.g., Epley et al., 2004). Sensitivity to ...
Preprint
Evil supernatural beings are often depicted as responding to unintended requests, whereas this may be less common in representations of good supernatural beings. This asymmetry suggests that people may expect good and evil agents to differ in their sensitivity to other people's intentions. We investigated this proposal across five experiments on 2231 adult US residents. In Experiments 1 to 4, participants judged whether good or evil agents would grant requests from individuals who varied in their understanding of what they requested, and in whether they executed requests correctly. Across experiments, the good and evil agents were either supernatural beings or regular humans. Participants predicted good agents would be sensitive to intentions behind requests, but predicted evil agents would be comparatively insensitive to these intentions. In some experiments, they also predicted that evil agents would be more sensitive to whether requests were executed correctly. In Experiment 5, participants rated explanations for why an agent would grant a request from someone who did not understand what they were requesting. Participants thought evil agents might grant such requests because they are indifferent to the others' intentions, but participants did not strongly endorse this explanation for good agents. Taken together, our findings suggest that people have distinct expectations of how moral character affects decision-making. They also suggest that people's beliefs about good and evil supernatural beings may be grounded in their views of ordinary humans.
... Anchoring bias "overweighting the first information primed or considered in subsequent judgment" [1] Base rate neglect "the tendency of people to neglect statistical base rate information when making decisions" [52,53] Bias blind spot "perceiving oneself to be less biased than one's peers" [14,54] Confirmation bias "gathering and interpreting evidence in a manner confirming rather than disconfirming the hypothesis being tested" [18] Correspondence bias, a.k.a. Fundamental attribution error "tendency to make correspondent inferences" or "neglect of external demands" [55], "attributing the behavior of a person to dispositional rather than to situational influences" [19,20] Covariation detection "how people judge whether a component has an effect, with or without taking into account the other elements of the contingency table" [56] Framing effect "the tendency of people to decide differently when the same information is worded differently" [6,32] Insensitivity to sample size "people's tendency to disregard the fact that small samples don't follow the laws of big samples" [1] Outcome bias "the tendency of people to evaluate quality of decisions based on their outcome" [22] Overconfidence bias "the tendency of people to perceive their ability as better than it actually is" [49] Projection bias "assuming others' emotions, thoughts, and values are similar to one's own" [57,58] Regression to the mean "the tendency of people not to take into account that after an extreme value the next value will more probably be closer to the mean" [59] Representativeness bias "using the similarity of an outcome to a prototypical outcome to judge its probability" [60] Sunk cost fallacy "people's tendency to continue an activity if they have already invested money, time or effort in it" [24,61] 163 ...
... Thus I can attribute to her the intention to cooperate while my own is to defect. In Goldman's account of the ST, self-reflection allows the attributor to simulate and project some mental states -in an 'anchoring phase' -and to adjust this 'simulation plus projection' -in an 'adjustment phase' -when the prediction or explanation of the target decisions do not seem accurate (see Gilovich, Savitzky, and Medvec, 1998;Epley, Morewedge, and Keysar, 2004;Epley, Keysar, van Boven, and Gilovich, 2004). This process of adjustment will take the form, in the next chapter, in the game theoretic model proposed, of what we have identified as the massaging process which is a form of rationalization of the others' beliefs. ...
Thesis
Our thesis proposes to change the ontology and methodology of game theory, appraising games as the understanding of the players’ strategic reasoning process. Our contribution is based on an interdisciplinary approach for a reassessment of the kind of intersubjectivity involved in strategic reasoning. We claim that the analysis of games should involve the study and the determination of the reasoning process that lead the players to a specific outcome, i.e. to a specific solution. A game should not be understood, like in standard game theory, as a mathematical representation of an individual choice at the equilibrium. This requires investigating the players’ capacity of coordination. We assert that understanding the process of coordination allows understanding strategic reasoning and ultimately to provide new answers to the indeterminacy problem of game theory which is one of the stalemates that game theory faces and which underscores its positive and normative difficulties. The thesis is grounded on the argument that understanding the players’ reasoning process in games necessitates first and foremost to explain how the players form their beliefs regarding each other’s choices, but also each other‘s perceptions and beliefs and reasoning processes in a strategic context. One of the purposes of the thesis is to show that a psychological theory explaining the formation of players’ beliefs is required to account for coordination, and that the Theory of Mind (ToM) offers such adequate psychological framework. We suggest building an alternative theory of games based on the simulation theory as such theory of mind. We then specify an axiomatic characterization of rational choices in games in the presence of players able to simulate the reasoning of others.
... As seen in Fig. 1 , citation of any negative affective theme was much more frequent in younger children (6-9 years) than in the older children (14-16 years), perhaps reflecting the negativity bias known to exist in youth ( Hamlin et al., 2010 ;Tottenham et al., 2013 ). Interestingly, the theme 'broader consequences and societal impacts' was only expressed by children aged 10-13 years and 14-16 years, suggesting that the egocentric focus was lessening as children matured, which is in line with developmental expectations ( Riva et al., 2016 ;Epley et al., 2004 ). While we did not find high citations or strong endorsement of positive themes in children's written reports, at least some children mentioned positives such as learning new skills, whereas others were able to take a more familial perspective, reflecting on the closer family bonds that had developed during this time. ...
Article
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Background : Development and implementation of effective family-based psychosocial intervention and treatment strategies during COVID-19 will require a detailed understanding of how the virus has impacted the lives of families. Methods : Written reports on the life impacts of COVID-19 for parents (n=56) and their children (n=43), and a questionnaire assessing parent positive and negative affect, were collected between April and May 2020. An inductive approach was used to identify themes in written reports, followed by statistical analysis to explore associations between themes and changes in parent positive and negative affect pre- and post-writing. Results : Parents and children reported both positive and negative psychosocial impacts of the virus, though parents expressed a greater diversity of positive themes than children. Common themes reported by parents included concerns about the impact of COVID-19 on their children, health concerns for others, and the stressful balancing act of parenting, assisting with children's school work, and working from home. Many parents reported gratitude, and reflected on the upsides of the pandemic for family relationships and parent-child bonding. Parents who expressed gratitude reported a decrease in negative affect pre- to post-writing. Common child-reported themes included yearning to return to school, pandemic-related fears, and longing for social connection. Limitations : The sample included a cross-section of mostly White (non-Hispanic), dual income, well-educated mothers, primarily from the United States. Conclusions : Both parents and children reported reduced wellbeing during the COVID-19 pandemic. Future research should focus on identifying how to fulfill children's social needs and lessen caregivers’ burdens during this time.
... Research has found that when people evaluate a scene in terms of what is visible to an individual, they make random and systematic errors. Children often display an egocentric bias (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956; Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 October 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 722213 Moore et al., 1995), and errors in both children and adults can be influenced by the ability to distinguish our own perspective from the perspective of others (Moore et al., 1995;Birch and Bloom, 2004;Epley et al., 2004). In a complementary fashion, the importance of other people's viewpoint is also highlighted by the suggestion that adults compute other perspectives even when it is not necessary or detrimental to the task (Samson et al., 2010;Wilson et al., 2017). ...
Article
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The information about what one can see and what other people can see from different viewpoints is important. There are circumstances in which adults and children make systematic errors when predicting what is visible from their own or others’ viewpoints. This happens for example when reasoning about mirrors. We explored differences among three developmental groups: young adults ( N =60) typically developing children ( N =30); and children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, N =30). We used an illustration of a top-down view of a room with a mirror on a wall (Room Observer and Mirror Perspective test: ROMP). Participants selected (circled on paper) which objects behind the observer in the room were visible, reflected from the mirror and from a given position (viewpoint). For half of each group, the observer in the room was described as a teddy bear; for the other half, it was described as a child. Overall, there were many errors in all groups, which we separate in errors of ignoring the viewpoint (same response to all three locations) and inversion errors (choosing objects on the left instead of the right or vice versa). In addition to the overall task difficulty, the ASD group made relatively more mistakes of ignoring the viewpoint compared to the other groups and underestimated how many objects were visible in the teddy bear condition that is when the viewpoint was an inanimate object. We suggest that this is related to a delay in theory of mind (ToM) development.
... Accommodating pragmatic idiosyncrasies of the speaker is often considered a process reserved typically for specific populations with underdeveloped linguistic commands (e.g., young children or non-native speakers) [63][64][65][66][67][68]. The current results, however, suggest that comprehenders were sensitive even to more subtle deviations from what is deemed pragmatically "optimal", such as using a linguistic form (e.g., the scalar adjective large) when it is, strictly speaking, redundant given a visual context. ...
Article
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Linguistic communication requires understanding of words in relation to their context. Among various aspects of context, one that has received relatively little attention until recently is the speakers themselves. We asked whether comprehenders’ online language comprehension is affected by the perceived reliability with which a speaker formulates pragmatically well-formed utterances. In two eye-tracking experiments, we conceptually replicated and extended a seminal work by Grodner and Sedivy (2011). A between-participant manipulation was used to control reliability with which a speaker follows implicit pragmatic conventions (e.g., using a scalar adjective in accordance with contextual contrast). Experiment 1 replicated Grodner and Sedivy’s finding that contrastive inference in response to scalar adjectives was suspended when both the spoken input and the instructions provided evidence of the speaker’s (un)reliability: For speech from the reliable speaker, comprehenders exhibited the early fixations attributable to a contextually-situated, contrastive interpretation of a scalar adjective. In contrast, for speech from the unreliable speaker, comprehenders did not exhibit such early fixations. Experiment 2 provided novel evidence of the reliability effect in the absence of explicit instructions. In both experiments, the effects emerged in the earliest expected time window given the stimuli sentence structure. The results suggest that real-time interpretations of spoken language are optimized in the context of a speaker identity, characteristics of which are extrapolated across utterances.
... It is important for numerous cognitive processes, including understanding the layout of an environment (Fields & Shelton, 2006), navigation (e.g., Holmes et al., 2017), and giving directions (Hegarty & Waller, 2004). Extant research has illustrated the developmental trajectory of this skill (Epley et al., 2004;Newcombe & Frick, 2010), sex differences (Lawton, 1994;Linn & Petersen, 1985;Tarampi et al., 2016) and individual differences in performance (Hegarty & Waller, 2004;Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001), and has connected perspective taking to other skills like empathy (e.g., Ruby & Decety, 2004), mental simulation, and embodied cognition (e.g., Kessler & Wang, 2012). ...
Article
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Research on spatial perspective taking has suggested that including an agent in the display benefits performance. However, little research has examined the mechanisms underlying this benefit. Here, we examine how an agent benefits performance by examining its effects on three mental steps in a perspective-taking task: (1) imagining oneself at a location (station point) within in the array, (2) adopting a different perspective (heading), and (3) pointing to an object from that perspective. We also examine whether a non-agentive directional cue (an arrow) is sufficient to improve performance in an abstract map-like display. We compared a non-directional cue to two cues for position and orientation: a human figure (agentive, directional) and an arrow (non-agentive, directional). To examine the effects of cues on steps 2 and 3 of the perspective-taking process, magnitude of the initial perspective shift and pointing direction were varied across trials. Response time and error increased with the magnitude of the imagined perspective shift and pointing to the front was more accurate than pointing to the side, or back, but these effects were independent of directional cue. A directional cue alone was sufficient to improve performance relative to control, and agency did not provide additional benefit. The results overall indicate that most people adopt an embodied cognition strategy to perform this task and directional cues facilitate the first step of the perspective-taking process, imagining oneself at a location within in the array.
... Researchers have found a positive correlation between perspective-taking ability and cognitive complexity (Clark & Delia, 1977;Hale & Delia, 1976;Ku et al., 2015). Cognitive complexity can increase perspectivetaking (Alcorn & Torney, 1982;Hale & Delia, 1976;Lutwak & Hennessy, 1982;Suedfeld et al., 1992), and also perspective-taking can increase cognitive complexity (Epley et al., 2004;Todd et al., 2012;Vescio et al., 2003). Thus, we seek to replicate this research and extend it by being the first to examine this robust finding by operationalizing cognitive complexity with cognitive process language use: Hypothesis 10 (H10): There will be a positive relationship between reported perspective-taking and use of cognitive processes language. ...
Article
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The study examined the relationship between language use and perception of group processes. In an experiment, participants discussed their views about climate change in a group chat. Afterward, participants ( n = 239) filled out their perception of themselves and group processes. Participants who perceived more similarity among group members used less complex language (cognitive processes language) and more assenting language. As participants felt more knowledgeable and credible about the topic, their use of “we” pronouns and word count increased and use of “I” pronouns decreased. Replicating past research, participants with more extreme opinions used more “you” pronouns, and participants who reported engaging in more perspective-taking used more complex language and “we” pronouns. Results are integrated within an input–process–output model of group processes and suggest that language is reflective of individual inputs and perception of group processes.
... Projection bias "assuming others' emotions, thoughts, and values are similar to one's own" (Epley et al., 2004;Robbins and Krueger, 2005) 4 ...
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Cognitive biases can adversely affect human judgement and decision making and should therefore preferably be mitigated, so that we can achieve our goals as effectively as possible. Hence, numerous bias mitigation interventions have been developed and evaluated. However, to be effective in practical situations beyond laboratory conditions, the bias mitigation effects of these interventions should be retained over time and should transfer across contexts. This systematic review provides an overview of the literature on retention and transfer of bias mitigation interventions. A systematic search yielded 41 studies that were eligible for screening. At the end of the selection process, only seven studies remained that adequately studied retention over a period of at least 14 days (six studies) or transfer to different tasks and contexts (two studies). Retention of bias mitigation was found up to 12 months after the interventions. Most of the relevant studies investigated the effects of bias mitigation training with specific serious games. Only two studies (the second one being a replication of the first) found evidence for a transfer effect of bias mitigation training across contexts. Our main conclusion is that there is currently insufficient evidence for the retention and transfer of bias mitigation effects to consider the associated interventions as useful tools that can help people to make better decisions in daily life. This is in line with recent theoretical insights about the hard-wired neural and evolutionary origin of cognitive biases.
... However, adults often attempted to move the object the director could not see, suggesting that even adults make errors when analyzing another's perspective (Keysar et al., 2000). As children often fail PT tasks and adults make mistakes, both children and adults have been described as "egocentric" in their communication (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004). Despite these claims, other work has demonstrated that children can consider others' points of view in non-egocentric ways (e.g., Khu, Chambers, & Graham, 2020). ...
Article
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Understanding others’ perspectives and integrating this knowledge in social interactions is challenging for young children; even adults struggle with this skill. While young children show the capacity to understand what others can and cannot see under supportive laboratory conditions, more research is necessary to understand how children implement their perspective-taking (PT) skill during interactions and which socio-cognitive skills support their ability to do so. This preregistered study examined children’s Level 1 visual PT in a real-time social interaction and tested whether social-cognitive skills (focusing on inhibition of imitation) predicted PT. Thirty-six 3-year-old children (mean age: 37.3 months) participated in a PT task and responded implicitly (via eye gaze) and explicitly (via toy choice) to situations where their communicative partner could see some objects but not others. Three-year-olds demonstrated sensitivity to another’s perspective via implicit responses, but did not consistently take their partner’s perspective into account in their actions when considering objects their partner could not see. Contrary to adult findings, children who struggled to inhibit imitating (those more affected by another’s actions) demonstrated better PT, again when considering objects outside their partner’s sight. Thus, 3-year-olds’ sensitivity to others’ perspectives was robust, while acting on PT knowledge may still be developing; further, children more affected by another’s actions demonstrated improved PT skills.
... Given the ambiguity of the judgements, it is reasonable to assume that the readers in the narrative feedback condition kept assessing the target's feelings based on an (incorrect) self-anchor. Especially in ambiguous situations, readers are expected to judge other people's perspectives using their own knowledge as a frame of reference (e.g., Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004;Krueger, 2003; see also "extratarget strategies" such as egocentric projection and stereotyping in Ames, 2005). This reliance on self-knowledge is argued to decrease in light of behavioural counterevidence (for a review, see Ames, 2005). ...
Article
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People are likely to use their own knowledge as a frame of reference when they try to assess another person’s perspective. Due to this egocentric anchoring, people often overestimate the extent to which others share their point of view. This study investigated which type of feedback (if any) stimulates perceivers to make estimations of another person’s perspective that are less biased by egocentric knowledge. We allocated participants to one of three feedback conditions (no feedback, accuracy feedback, narrative feedback). Findings showed that participants who were given feedback adjusted their perspective-judgment more than those who did not receive feedback. They also showed less egocentric projection on future assessments. Participants adjusted their perspective within the same trial to the same degree for both feedback types. However, participants’ egocentric bias was only reduced when they received narrative feedback and not when they received accuracy feedback about their performance. Implications of these findings for theories of perspective-taking are discussed.
... Bei Erwachsenen bleiben immer alle Aspekte der prä-und protorationalen wie auch rationalen Phase zugänglich und dadurch werden spezifische Wahrnehmungsperspektiven der Säuglingszeit wie auch der Kindheit erhalten (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). Die reifere Fähigkeit besteht vor allem darin, Fehlannahmen und Verzerrungen (nachträglich) korrigieren zu können und nicht darin, keine globalen oder egozentrischen Missinterpretationen zu machen (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Die Wahrnehmungen eröffnen Weltanschauungen, Weltsichten und Menschenbilder, in welchen die Grundphänomene der Nähe und Distanz eingebettet sind und sich u.a. ...
Article
Der Beitrag thematisiert die Frage, wie und unter welchen Bedingungen sich eine kulturelle Nachhaltigkeit unter Berücksichtigung von Welterschließungen und Weltanschauungen entwickeln kann. Dazu ist unerlässlich, neben einer Klärung der Nachhaltigkeit im Folgenden das Verständnis für Subjektivation und Objektivation sowie Nähe und Distanz zu reflektieren. Kulturelle Nachhaltigkeit verweist auf das Natur-Sein, nämlich sowohl auf die Natur, in der wir uns als Mensch befinden (erfahren, wahrnehmen) als auch auf die Natur, die wir als Mensch in uns empfinden. Daher ist die Beziehung zwischen der scheinbar inneren und äußeren Natur „aus der Mitte heraus zu denken“ (Böhme, 2000, 23), so „daß, was jeweils Mensch und Natur ist, von dieser Mitte her in einer wechselseitigen Zusammengehörigkeit gesehen wird“. Wesentlich erscheint dabei, von welchem „Naturkonzept“ und „Naturverständnis“ (Friedrich, 2000, 32) der Mensch sich leiten lässt, zu welcher Haltung dieses Verständnis mit Blick auf die eigene, die belebte und die unbelebte Natur führt und wie Bildung für eine gelingende Nachhaltigkeit darin verortet werden kann. Das aktuelle Verhältnis des Menschen zur Natur führt nach Friedrich (2000) zu einer „Krise der Wahrnehmung“ (ebd., 32), vermutlich ist es ebenso eine Krise der aktuellen, technisch-instrumentellen Naturwissenschaft. Zugleich haben wir es je nach Anschauung mit höchst divergierenden Ideen von Nachhaltigkeit zu tun, worauf der Beitrag deutlich hinweisen möchte. Aus der Krise der Wahrnehmung ergibt sich, dass die Natur durch die technisch-instrumentelle Naturwissenschaft niemals vollständig objektivierbar sein wird und die gegenwärtige „Naturwissenschaft zur Bestimmung dessen, was Natur ist stets unzureichend bleiben muß“ (Böhme, 2000, 23). Da der Mensch „selbst zur Natur gehört, ist die Natur die er [der Mensch] objektiviert, niemals die ganze“ (ebd., 24; Erg. d. Verf.). Das In-Beziehung-Sein mit der Natur ist ein „fundamentales Thema der Ethik“ (Friedrich, 2000, 33) und ein wesentliches Thema der Phänomenologie. Daher kann die aktuelle Naturwissenschaft nicht als Orientierung im Sinne eines Sensitivitäts- und Reflexionswissens zur Verfügung stehen, da das menschliche Natur-Sein ethisch zu verorten wie auch zu diskutieren ist. Der Beitrag führt in einige Überlegungen als Teilheiten ein, um am Ende alle vorgetragenen Ideen als eine Gesamtheit zusammenzuführen und durch einen Ausblick zu erweitern. Um die im Beitrag entworfene Ganzheit verstehen zu können, sind ein umgreifendes Verständis für die vorgestellten Teilheiten maßgeblich (Wiesner & Windl, 2021), die im Sinne der sokratischen Methode durch die Klärung wie auch An- und Abgrenzung von Ideen, Konzepten und Theorien noetisch zusammengeführt werden, um neue, andere und noch unbekannte Erkenntnispotenziale zu aktivieren. Was ist Nachhaltigkeit? Sokrates (470–399 v. Chr.) würde vermutlich buchstäblich diese Frage an den Anfang der Behandlung des Themas stellen und die Antworten kritisch prüfen. Dabei wäre Sokrates bewusst, dass Wörter auf vielfältige und unterschiedliche Weise gebraucht werden. Ebenso würde Sokrates vermuten, dass es nicht nur ein gemeinsames bedeutungselement gibt, um Wörter zu begründen. Daher ist die Geschichte einer kulturellen Nachhaltigkeit zugleich eine Geschichte der Menschenbilder und der Weltanschauungen. Menschenbilder und Weltsichten entstehen durch Grundphänomene wie Nähe und Distanz sowie deren jeweilige Ausprägung, die wiederum zu Phänomenen des Anthropomorphismus oder der Dehumanisierung führen. Es sind also die jeweiligen Ausprägungen von Geltungsansprüchen, die Sokrates in seinen ‚Was ist …?-Fragen‘ untersucht. Mögliche Ideen, Theorien und Modelle und deren Geltungsansprüche werden in diesem Beitrag nun systematisiert und die Relationen zueinander verortet, um Phänomenstrukturen sichtbar zu machen. Aus „einer Mittellage“ (Rombach, 1974, 51) heraus werden die Bilder des Mensch-Seins „aufgedeckt“ (ebd., 49), um aus einer phänomenologischen Perspektive einen „sinngebenden Boden“ für die Entwicklung einer kulturellen Nachhaltigkeit zu generieren.
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Further analyses show that children significantly changed their perspective choices particularly after the robot failed to reach the goal in the first session. Studies support that not only children but also adults tend to have automatic moments of egocentric perspective, however, adults tend to correct theirs faster than children [9]. While We observed children significantly changed to an addressee-centric frame of reference, they were not as prone to switch their perspective marking to an explicit one. ...
Conference Paper
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Spatial understanding and communication are essential skills in human interaction. An adequate understanding of others’ spatial perspectives can increase the quality of the interaction, both perceptually and cognitively. In this paper, we take the first step towards understanding children’s perspective-taking abilities and their tendency to adapt their perspective to a counterpart while completing a task with a robot. The elements used for studying children’s behaviours are the frame of reference and perspective marking, which we evaluated through a task where players needed to compose instructions to guide each other to complete the task. We developed the interaction with an NAO robot and analyzed the children’s instructions and their performance throughout the game. Our initial findings demonstrated that children tend to compose their first instruction by following the principle of least collaborative effort. Children significantly changed and adapted their perspective, i.e. frame of reference and perspective marking to the robot, mainly when the robot failed to follow their instructions correctly. Additionally, results show that children tend to create a mental model of their counterparts and the robot changing that frame of reference might affect their performance or the flow of the interaction.
... Based on earlier studies, this study goes a step further and using meditation as a mediator, looks at addressing egocentrism in the workplace and its relationship with workplace spirituality. Workplace spirituality is defined as a workplace where people have compassion towards others, experience a mindful inner consciousness in the pursuit of meaningful work and enables transcendence (Petchsawang & Duchon, 2012) Egocentrism is the inability to accurately assume or understand any perspective other than one's own (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Overcoming egocentrism may be a lifelong development that never achieves completion (Pronin, & Olivola, 2006). ...
... Of course, nonmotivated biases also may affect the detection of selfishness. For instance, people tend to exhibit egocentric biases (Epley et al., 2004;Ross et al., 1977) that may impede their ability to consider others' desires or the prevailing expectations for a situation. Thus, teasing apart the role of motivated and nonmotivated biases in detecting selfishness remains an important direction for future work as well. ...
Article
Selfishness is central to many theories of human morality, yet its psychological nature remains largely overlooked. Psychologists often draw on classical conceptions of selfishness from evolutionary biology (i.e., selfish gene theory), economics (i.e., rational self-interest), and philosophy (i.e., psychological egoism), but such characterizations offer limited insight into the psychology of selfishness. To address this gap, we propose a novel framework in which selfishness is recast as a psychological construction. From this view, selfishness is perceived in ourselves and others when we detect a situation-specific desire to benefit the self that disregards others’ desires and prevailing social expectations for the situation. We argue that detecting and deterring such psychological selfishness in both oneself and others is crucial in social life—facilitating the maintenance of social cohesion and close relationships. In addition, we show how using this psychological framework offers a richer understanding of the nature of human social behavior. Delineating a psychological construct of selfishness can promote coherence in interdisciplinary research on selfishness and provide insights for interventions to prevent or remediate the negative effects of selfishness.
... In tasks measuring explicit perspective taking participants are directly instructed to report the perspective of another agent or respond to instructions given from another agent's perspective, where that agent's perspective is different from that of the participant. On such tasks errors are typically "egocentric intrusions": participants mistakenly respond from their own perspective (e.g., Epley et al., 2004;Mazzarella et al., 2012). Further, adult participants are typically slower and more error prone when reporting the different perspective of another agent, than when participants either (a) report their own perspective, or (b) report the perspective of another when that perspective is the same as the participants' own perspective (e.g., Samson et al., 2010;Surtees & Apperly, 2012). ...
Article
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Autistic and non-autistic adults completed a visual perspective taking (VPT) task, reporting an object’s location from an actor’s perspective, or their own. On half the trials the actor looked at and reached for the object, and on half did not. Accuracy and reaction time were measured. In Experiment 1, both groups (N = 34, mean age = 24 years) responded slower when reporting the actor’s perspective, with no group differences in this effect. Experiment 2 included “other” VPT trials only. Both groups (N = 30, mean age = 25 years) showed sensitivity to the actor’s behaviour, more accurately reporting his perspective when he acted upon the object. No group differences were observed. In contrast to developmental studies, these experiments suggest similar VPT abilities in autistic and non-autistic adults.
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Bei Erwachsenen bleiben immer alle Aspekte der prä-und protorationalen wie auch rationalen Phase zugänglich und dadurch werden spezifische Wahrnehmungsperspektiven der Säuglingszeit wie auch der Kindheit erhalten (Diamond & Kirkham, 2005). Die reifere Fähigkeit besteht vor allem darin, Fehlannahmen und Verzerrungen (nachträglich) korrigieren zu können und nicht darin, keine globalen oder egozentrischen Missinterpretationen zu machen (Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004). Die Wahrnehmungen eröffnen Weltanschauungen, Weltsichten und Menschenbilder, in welchen die Grundphänomene der Nähe und Distanz eingebettet sind und sich u.a. ...
Chapter
Der Beitrag thematisiert die Frage, wie und unter welchen Bedingungen sich eine kulturelle Nachhaltigkeit unter Berücksichtigung von Welterschließungen und Weltanschauungen entwickeln kann. Dazu ist unerlässlich, neben einer Klärung der Nachhaltigkeit im Folgenden das Verständnis für Subjektivation und Objektivation sowie Nähe und Distanz zu reflektieren. Kulturelle Nachhaltigkeit verweist auf das Natur-Sein, nämlich sowohl auf die Natur, in der wir uns als Mensch befinden (erfahren, wahrnehmen) als auch auf die Natur, die wir als Mensch in uns empfinden. Daher ist die Beziehung zwischen der scheinbar inneren und äußeren Natur „aus der Mitte heraus zu denken“ (Böhme, 2000, 23), so „daß, was jeweils Mensch und Natur ist, von dieser Mitte her in einer wechselseitigen Zusammengehörigkeit gesehen wird“. Wesentlich erscheint dabei, von welchem „Naturkonzept“ und „Naturverständnis“ (Friedrich, 2000, 32) der Mensch sich leiten lässt, zu welcher Haltung dieses Verständnis mit Blick auf die eigene, die belebte und die unbelebte Natur führt und wie Bildung für eine gelingende Nachhaltigkeit darin verortet werden kann. Das aktuelle Verhältnis des Menschen zur Natur führt nach Friedrich (2000) zu einer „Krise der Wahrnehmung“ (ebd., 32), vermutlich ist es ebenso eine Krise der aktuellen, technisch-instrumentellen Naturwissenschaft. Zugleich haben wir es je nach Anschauung mit höchst divergierenden Ideen von Nachhaltigkeit zu tun, worauf der Beitrag deutlich hinweisen möchte. Aus der Krise der Wahrnehmung ergibt sich, dass die Natur durch die technisch-instrumentelle Naturwissenschaft niemals vollständig objektivierbar sein wird und die gegenwärtige „Naturwissenschaft zur Bestimmung dessen, was Natur ist stets unzureichend bleiben muß“ (Böhme, 2000, 23). Da der Mensch „selbst zur Natur gehört, ist die Natur die er [der Mensch] objektiviert, niemals die ganze“ (ebd., 24; Erg. d. Verf.). Das In-Beziehung-Sein mit der Natur ist ein „fundamentales Thema der Ethik“ (Friedrich, 2000, 33) und ein wesentliches Thema der Phänomenologie. Daher kann die aktuelle Naturwissenschaft nicht als Orientierung im Sinne eines Sensitivitäts- und Reflexionswissens zur Verfügung stehen, da das menschliche Natur-Sein ethisch zu verorten wie auch zu diskutieren ist. Der Beitrag führt in einige Überlegungen als Teilheiten ein, um am Ende alle vorgetragenen Ideen als eine Gesamtheit zusammenzuführen und durch einen Ausblick zu erweitern. Um die im Beitrag entworfene Ganzheit verstehen zu können, sind ein umgreifendes Verständis für die vorgestellten Teilheiten maßgeblich (Wiesner & Windl, 2021), die im Sinne der sokratischen Methode durch die Klärung wie auch An- und Abgrenzung von Ideen, Konzepten und Theorien noetisch zusammengeführt werden, um neue, andere und noch unbekannte Erkenntnispotenziale zu aktivieren. Was ist Nachhaltigkeit? Sokrates (470–399 v. Chr.) würde vermutlich buchstäblich diese Frage an den Anfang der Behandlung des Themas stellen und die Antworten kritisch prüfen. Dabei wäre Sokrates bewusst, dass Wörter auf vielfältige und unterschiedliche Weise gebraucht werden. Ebenso würde Sokrates vermuten, dass es nicht nur ein gemeinsames Bedeutungselement gibt, um Wörter zu begründen. Daher ist die Geschichte einer kulturellen Nachhaltigkeit zugleich eine Geschichte der Menschenbilder und der Weltanschauungen. Menschenbilder und Weltsichten entstehen durch Grundphänomene wie Nähe und Distanz sowie deren jeweilige Ausprägung, die wiederum zu Phänomenen des Anthropomorphismus oder der Dehumanisierung führen. Es sind also die jeweiligen Ausprägungen von Geltungsansprüchen, die Sokrates in seinen ‚Was ist …?-Fragen‘ untersucht. Mögliche Ideen, Theorien und Modelle und deren Geltungsansprüche werden in diesem Beitrag nun systematisiert und die Relationen zueinander verortet, um Phänomenstrukturen sichtbar zu machen. Aus „einer Mittellage“ (Rombach, 1974, 51) heraus werden die Bilder des Mensch-Seins „aufgedeckt“ (ebd., 49), um aus einer phänomenologischen Perspektive einen „sinngebenden Boden“ für die Entwicklung einer kulturellen Nachhaltigkeit zu generieren.
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
... Niezależnie od tego, czy ma ono charakter afektywny, czy poznawczy, czy polega na wyobrażaniu sobie rzeczywistości z cudzego punktu widzenia, czy na wyobrażaniu sobie siebie w sytuacji innej osoby, czy stanowi doraźnie aktywizowany stan, czy jest przejawem względnie trwałych właściwości jednostki, przyjmowanie perspektywy jest procesem angażującym zasoby poznawcze (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, Keysar, 2004) i wymagającym osiągnieć rozwojowych, do których należy decentracja poznawcza (Piaget, Inhelder, 1993). Decentracja poznawcza pojawia się zwykle między 7. a 10. rokiem życia i pozwala wyjść poza egocentryczny punkt widzenia oraz zrozumieć, że rzeczywistość może wyglądać nieco inaczej, niż wygląda ona z punktu widzenia podmiotu. ...
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Tom 2 Serii wydawniczej Wydziału Psychologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego pt. Psychological Currents. Theory and Research.
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Recent data suggests a link between spatial perspective taking and social skills (Erle & Topolinski, 2015, 2017; Tian et al., 2021; Xie et al., 2018). This paper aims to contribute to this line of research by examining whether preschool children who are better at spatial perspective taking, are also assessed as more skilled in psychological perspective taking by their preschool teachers, as well as more prosocial. In the current study (N = 77) with children aged 5–6 years, we show that spatial and psychological perspective taking are related, even when controlling for age, individual differences in affective processing inhibition, and motor inhibition. No gender differences were found. Results complement and extend the existing knowledge on the relationship between cognitive and social skills development.
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Judges who had estimated the likelihood of various possible outcomes of President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow were unexpectedly asked to remember, or reconstruct in the event that they had forgotten, their own predictions some time after the visits were completed. In addition, they indicated whether or not they thought that each event had in fact occurred. Remembered—reconstructed probabilities were generally higher than the originally assigned probabilities for events believed to have occurred and lower for those which had not (although the latter effect was less pronounced). In their original predictions, subjects overestimated low probabilities and underestimated high probabilities, although they were generally quite accurate. Judging by their reconstructed—remembered probabilities, however, subjects seldom perceived having been very surprised by what had or had not happened. These results are discussed in terms of cognitive “anchoring” and possible detrimental effects of outcome feedback.
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This research provides evidence that people overestimate the extent to which their actions and appearance are noted by others, a phenomenon dubbed the spotlight effect. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who were asked to don a T-shirt depicting either a flattering or potentially embarrassing image overestimated the number of observers who would be able to recall what was pictured on the shirt. In Study 3, participants in a group discussion overestimated how prominent their positive and negative utterances were to their fellow discussants. Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence supporting an anchoring-and-adjustment interpretation of the spotlight effect. In particular, people appear to anchor on their own rich phenomenological experience and then adjust--insufficiently--to take into account the perspective of others. The discussion focuses on the manifestations and implications of the spotlight effect across a host of everyday social phenomena.
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When people suffer an embarrassing blunder, social mishap, or public failure, they often feel that their image has been severely tarnished in the eyes of others. Four studies demonstrate that these fears are commonly exaggerated. Actors who imagined committing one of several social blunders (Study 1), who experienced a public intellectual failure (Studies 2 and 3), or who were described in an embarrassing way (Study 4) anticipated being judged more harshly by others than they actually were. These exaggerated fears were produced, in part, by the actors' tendency to be inordinately focused on their misfortunes and by their resulting failure to consider the wider range of situational factors that tend to moderate onlookers' impressions. Discussion focuses on additional mechanisms that may contribute to overly pessimistic expectations as well as the role of such expectations in producing unnecessary social anxiety.
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Two studies are presented that challenge the evidentiary basis for the existence of evolved sex differences in jealousy. In opposition to the evolutionary view. Study 1 demonstrated that a sex difference in jealousy resulting from sexual versus emotional infidelity is observed only when judgments are recorded using a forced-choice response format. On all other measures, no sex differences were found; both men and women reported greater jealousy in response to sexual infidelity. A second study revealed that the sex difference on the forced-choice measure disappeared under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings suggest that the sex difference used to support the evolutionary view of jealousy (e.g., D. M. Buss, R. Larsen, D. Westen, & J. Semmelroth, 1992; D. M. Buss et al., 1999) likely represents a measurement artifact resulting from a format-induced effortful decision strategy and not an automatic, sex-specific response shaped by evolution.
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Two studies examined the relationship between need for cognition and the correspondence bias. In Experiment 1, high and low need for cognition subjects read a speech on abortion that the target was constrained to write and then rated the target's true attitude on this issue. A correspondence bias was found only in the ratings of the low need for cognition subjects. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and also found that cognitive busyness tended to increase the correspondence bias for all subjects. It was concluded that need for cognition moderates the correspondence bias and that high need for cognition subjects are less prone toward this bias because they correct more adequately for situational constraints than do low need for cognition subjects.
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The hindsight bias is the tendency for people with outcome knowledge to believe falsely that they would have predicted the reported outcome of an event. This article reviews empirical research relevant to hindsight phenomena. The influence of outcome knowledge, termed creeping determinism, was initially hypothesized to result from the immediate and automatic integration of the outcome into a person's knowledge of an event. Later research has identified at least 4 plausible, general strategies for responding to hindsight questions. These explanations postulate that outcome information affects the selection of evidence to make a judgment, the evidence evaluation, the manner in which evidence is integrated, or the response generation process. It is also likely, in some situations, that a combination of 2 or more of these mechanisms produces the observed hindsight effects. We provide an interpretation of the creeping determinism hypothesis in terms of inferences made to reevaluate case-specific evidence once the relevant outcome is known and conclude that it is the most common mechanism underlying observed hindsight effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Conducted 3 experiments in which undergraduate males (N = 261) chose their preferred bet from pairs of bets and later bid for each bet separately. In each pair, 1 bet had a higher probability of winning (P bet); the other offered more to win ($ bet). Bidding method (selling vs. buying) and payoff method (real-play vs. hourly wage) were varied. Results show that when the P bet was chosen, the $ bet often received a higher bid. It is concluded that these inconsistencies violate every risky decision model, but can be understood via information-processing considerations. In bidding, S starts with amount to win and adjusts it downward to account for other attributes of the bet. In choosing, there is no natural starting point: amount to win dominates bids but not choices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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How do children (and indeed adults) understand the mind? In this paper we contrast two accounts. One is the view that the child's early understanding of mind is an implicit theory analogous to scientific theories, and changes in that understanding may be understood as theory changes. The second is the view that the child need not really understand the mind, in the sense of having some set of beliefs about it. She bypasses conceptual understanding by operating a working model of the mind and reading its
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“Anchoring” results from insufficient adjustment up or down from an original— often arbitrary—starting value. Six sets of surveys were designed to assess the effects of anchoring on subjective likelihood estimates of a nuclear war. Based on responses from 1600 students, results indicated that: (a) likelihood estimates were strongly susceptible to anchoring; (b) neither likelihood estimates nor the effects of anchoring were significantly influenced by the ease with which respondents could imagine a nuclear war (outcome availability), by instructions to list the most likely path to nuclear war (path availability), or by casting the problem in terms of the avoidance, rather than the occurrence, of nuclear war; (c) the effects of anchoring extended to estimates concerning the efficacy of strategic defenses; and (d) likelihood estimates were affected by anchoring even after correcting for social demand biases. In estimating the likelihood of nuclear war and otherwise attempting to “think the unthinkable”, many students responded in a manner consistent with denial; the paper concludes with a discussion of these individuals.
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Three experiments tested (1) whether anchoring (and insufficient adjustment) will occur during generation of subjective probabilities and (2) whether situation familiarity and performance-contingent incentives will reduce any anchoring effect. A total of 336 business school students either chose between two alternatives based on a preliminary judgment of relatively unlikely (low anchor) or likely (high anchor) event probabilities before generating final probability assessments or were in a no-choice control condition. The results indicate a strong anchoring effect. The anchoring effect is so dominant that increasing situational familiarity did not result in decreased anchoring. Monetary/recognition incentives for accurate judgments did, however, result in significantly less anchoring. Implications are suggested for research on judgment processes and the concept of professional judgment expertise.
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Decisions are often based on predictions of the hedonic consequences of future events. We suggest that people make such predictions by imagining the event without temporal context (atemporal representation), assuming that their reaction to the event would be similar to their reaction to the imagined event (proxy reactions), and then considering how this reaction might change were the event displaced in time (temporal correction). In a laboratory study, control participants based their predictions of future food enjoyment on the temporal location of its consumption, whereas cognitively loaded participants based their predictions on their current hunger. In a field study, shoppers based their food purchases on the temporal location of its consumption, whereas shoppers for whom this information was not salient based their purchases on their current hunger. These findings suggest that predictions of future hedonic reactions may initially be based on the hedonic reactions one experiences as one imagines the event atemporally, and that this initial prediction is then corrected with information about the time at which the event will actually occur.
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Discusses recent research on the acquisition of knowledge about the appearance–reality distinction. Findings suggest that many 3-yr-olds seem to possess little or no understanding of the distinction and are unresponsive to training. At this age level, skill in solving simple appearance–reality tasks is highly correlated with skill in solving simple visual perspective-taking tasks. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that what helps children finally master the distinction is an increased cognizance of the fact that people are sentient beings who have mental representations of objects and events. It is suggested that this realization allows children to understand that the same stimulus can be mentally represented in 2 different, seemingly contradictory ways: (a) in the appearance–reality case, how it appears to the self vs how it really is; and (b) in the perspective-taking case, how it presently appears to self vs other. It is noted that, while children of 6–7 yrs manage simple appearance–reality tasks with ease, they have great difficulty reflecting on and talking about such appearance–reality notions as "looks like," "really and truly," and especially, "looks different from the way it really and truly is." Children of 11–22 yrs, and to an even greater degree college students, however, give evidence of possessing a substantial body of rich, readily available, and explicit knowledge in this area. (38 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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This paper describes the different forms of egocentrism characteristic of each of the major stages of cognitive growth outlined by Piaget. Particular attention is paid to the egocentrism of adolescence which is here described as the failure to differentiate between the cognitive concerns of others and those of the self. This adolescent egocentrism is said to give rise to 2 mental constructions, the imaginary audience and the personal fable, which help to account for certain forms of adolescent behavior and experience. These considerations suggest, it is concluded, that the cognitive structures peculiar to a given age period can provide insights with respect to the personality characteristics of that age level.
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Understanding of another person's wrong belief requires explicit representation of the wrongness of this person's belief in relation to one's own knowledge. Three to nine year old children's understanding of two sketches was tested. In each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location x and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from x to location y. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in x. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return. None of the 3–4-year old, 57% of 4–6-year old, and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to location x in both sketches. Of the many cases where 4–6-year olds made an error they failed in only about 20% to remember the initial location correctly. As a test of the stability of children's representation of the protagonist's wrong belief the sketches continued with a statement about the protagonist's intention to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a friend about the object's location. Independent of age, of those children who correctly thought that the protagonist would search in x, 85% of the time they also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to location y and his friend to location x. This shows that once children can represent a person's beliefs they can constrain their interpretation of this person's stated intentions to the person's beliefs. In a more story-like situation another group of children had to infer a deceptive plan from the depiction of a goal conflict between two story characters and one character's expedient utterance. At the age of 4–5 years children correctly judged this utterance as a lie only 28% of the time while 5–6-year olds did so 94% of the time. These results suggest that around the ages of 4 to 6 years the ability to represent the relationship between two or more person's epistemic states emerges and becomes firmly established.RésuméComprendre que ce que croit un tiers est erroné requiert une représentation explicitée de cette fausse croyance en relation avec son savoir propre.On a testé la compréhension de deux sketches par des enfants de 3 à 9 ans. Dans chacun des sketches les sujets observent un protagoniste placer un objet dans un lieu ‘x’, puis sont témoins du transfert de cet objet de ‘x’ en ‘y’ en l'absence du protagoniste. Ce transfert doit causer une surprise chez le protagoniste dont on assume qu'il croit que l'objet se trouve toujours en ‘x’. Les sujets doivent dire où le protagoniste va chercher l'objet. Aucun 3–4 ans n'indique correctement le lieu ‘x’, 57% des 4–6 ans et 86% des 6–9 ans le font. Parmi les nombreuses erreurs des 4–6 ans seules 20% sont attribuables à une incapacité de se souvenir du lieu ‘x’. Pour tester la stabilité de la représentation de la croyance erronée, on dit que le protagoniste a l'intention soit de tromper un adversaire soit d'informer un ami sur le lieu où se trouve l'objet. Indépendamment de leur âge, les enfants ayant donné des réponses correctes disent correctement dans 85% des cas que le protagoniste conduirait l'adversaire en ‘y’ et l'ami en ‘x’. Lorsque les enfants se représentent les croyances d'une personne, ils peuvent faire dépendre leurs interprétations des intentions exprimées par celles-ci à partir de ses croyances.Dans une situation de type histoire, un autre groupe d'enfants doit inférer un essai de tromperie à partir de la représentation d'un but conflictuel entre deux des personnages de l'énoncé tactique d'un des personnages. A 4–5 ans les enfants ne jugent correctement cet énoncé comme mensonger que dans 28% des cas alors qu'à 5–6 on a 94% de reponses correctes. Les résultats indiquent que vers 4–6 ans la capacité de représenter une relation entre les états épistémiques de deux personnes ou plus émerge et se confirme.
Article
The present study examines whether a deficit in the production of definite descriptions can be compensated for and successfully resolved in social interaction. We first discuss the developmental reasons for contextually inadequate descriptions and also the mechanisms by which social interaction can reduce processing demands. Then we report on a cross-sectional study using 50 Dutch subjects aged 3, 6, and 9, compared to adults, in which we analyzed the interaction between speaker and addressee in a referential communication task. Our results reveal that all the referential ambiguities in the 6 and 9 year olds, and in the adults, were successfully resolved when the addressee repeated the preceding description in question format, where the initial description (plus the succeeding specification) had not been explicit enough to identify the target referent. In the youngest age group, the 3 year olds, the analogous percentage of resolutions was 89%. Moreover, we found that the length of interaction required depends on age-related differences in the explicitness of the initial descriptions and the (induced) repairs. The main results raise several questions that are discussed under three headings: the role of feedback in speaker-addressee interaction, the possibility of a procedural explanation for production deficits and their compensation, and the possible learning mechanisms underlying developmental changes in referential descriptions.
Article
The correspondence bias is the tendency to draw inferences about a person's unique and enduring dispositions from behaviors that can be entirely explained by the situations in which they occur. Although this tendency is one of the most fundamental phenomena in social psychology, its causes and consequences remain poorly understood. This article sketches an intellectual history of the correspondence bias as an evolving problem in social psychology, describes 4 mechanisms (lack of awareness, unrealistic expectations, inflated categorizations, and incomplete corrections) that produce distinct forms of correspondence bias, and discusses how the consequences of correspondence-biased inferences may perpetuate such inferences.
Article
Consensus bias is the overuse of self-related knowledge in estimating the prevalence of attributes in a population. The bias seems statistically appropriate (Dawes, 1989), but according to the egocentrism hypothesis, it merely mimics normative inductive reasoning. In Experiment 1, Ss made population estimates for agreement with each of 40 personality inventory statements. Even Ss who had been educated about the consensus bias, or had received feedback about actual consensus, or both showed the bias. In Experiment 2, Ss attributed bias to another person, but their own consensus estimates were more affected by their own response to the item than by the other person's response. In Experiment 3, there was bias even in the presence of unanimous information from 20 randomly chosen others. In all 3 experiments, Ss continued to show consensus bias despite the availability of other statistical information.
Article
Subjects read scenarios where a speaker made a comment that, depending on information that was privileged to the subjects, could have been interpreted as sarcastic or not sarcastic. Their task was to take the perspective of an uninformed addressee and determine whether he or she would perceive sarcasm. Overall, when subjects believed that the speaker was actually being sarcastic they were more likely to attribute the perception of sarcasm to the addressee--even when the message was conveyed in writing and could not have involved disambiguating cues such as intonation. Data from four different experiments suggest that readers do use information that is perspective-irrelevant and thus pose a problem for theories of language use that assume readers only use "relevant" information.
Article
Meta-accuracy is the extent to which people know how others see them. Following D.A. Kenny and L. Albright (1987), we show how the social relations model (SRM) can be used to investigate meta-accuracy. The results from 8 SRM studies involving 569 subjects are reviewed. We argue that people determine how others view them not from the feedback that they receive from others but from their own self-perceptions. Consistent with this argument are the findings that (a) people overestimate the degree of consistency in the ways that different targets view them and (b) people are better at understanding how others generally view them than how they are uniquely viewed by specific individuals.