Conference Paper

Manipulation in group argument evaluation

DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-032 Conference: 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Taipei, Taiwan, May 2-6, 2011, Volume 1-3
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT

Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needs to reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. This problem has been recently investigated by Caminada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the behaviour of two of such operators from a social choice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.

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Available from: Gabriella Pigozzi
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