Electronic Voting in Belgium: Past and Future

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of the electronic and paper-based voting systems that are used in Belgium. It compares the
advantages and disadvantages of these systems, and presents a selection of voting systems that have been recommended to the
federal and regional governments for future elections in Belgium: an improved paper-based voting system with voter-verifiable
paper trails, a family of optical scanning systems, a remote/Internet voting system, and a kiosk/intranet voting system.

Full text

7 December 2010 1eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future
Electronic Voting in Belgium
Past and Future
Danny De Cock
K.U.Leuven ESAT/COSIC
Slides available from http://godot.be/slides

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 27 December 2010
Outline
Classic Electronic Voting System
Interesting Things to Know
Different Voting Channels
Real Voting Ballots
Requirements for (Belgian) Voting Systems
Voting using Magnetic Stripe Cards
Improved Paper-based Voting System
Requirements for Belgian Elections
Organizing Elections

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 37 December 2010
Classic Electronic Voting…
Introduced in 1991, pilots in 1994, large scale
deployment in 1999, currently 44% coverage
Standalone voting computers – not networked
Impossible to cast invalid vote – only valid or blank
Open-source software
Voter uses light pen to select candidates
Voting ballot encoded on magnetic stripe card
Ballot secrecy & integrity through cryptography

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Interesting Things to Know (ITK) 
Voting is mandatory in Belgium
Everyone strictly older than 17 must go to the polling
station
Sanctions & Fines with respect to ignored voting duty:
Police court rules, no appeal possible
First offender: 50 Euro
Second offense: 125 Euro
4 offenses in less than 15 years: 10 years
revocation of
Voting rights
Right to become a civil servant
Possibility to get a promotion or distinction as a civil
servant
7 Election types 7 Paper ballot forms 
European, Federal (Chamber + Senate), Provincial,
Regional, Communal, Local Council

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Different Voting Channels
Uncontrolled environment
Pencil + paper
Postal vote – Belgian citizens living abroad
Electronically
Internet voting – Nobody
Controlled environment
Pencil + paper
Voting booths
56%: mostly in Wallonia
Electronically
Voting booths with offline voting machines
44%: Brussels, Flanders
Networked voting machines – Nobody

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 67 December 2010
Real Voting Ballots
46cm wide, 24.19cm high
18.11” x 9.45”

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Real Voting Ballots
50.41cm wide, 68.56cm high
19.69” x 26.78”
44.54cm wide, 52.61cm high
17.4” x 20.55”

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Real Voting Ballots
61.3cm wide, 86.68cm high
23.94” x 33.86”
49.54cm wide, 64.07cm high
19.35” x 25.03”

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1 Voting Ballot per Election (Chamber,
Senate, Regional, European Parliament,…)
Easily 1 meter
Easily 0.5 meter
Up to 88 Candidates Per List!

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ITK – Casting a Valid Vote
Number of elected
seats equals
number of List
votes + number of
votes of main
candidates +
number of votes of
successors
Number of list
votes influences
the number of
elected candidates
per list
A ballot is
rendered invalid if
a voter ticks
candidates of more
than one list
1.
2.
3.
…
…
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Voter can also
tick any number
of successors
Voter can also
tick any number
of main candidates
Voter can tick
List Vote

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Electronic Representation of a Voting Ballot
Candidates are numbered
Large voting ballot is represented
electronically in two menus:
Party menu
Voter selects his/her party
Candidates Menu per party
Number of candidates determines the number of
columns
Voter selects candidates or list
Note:
It is impossible to cast an invalid electronic voting
ballot
Voter can vote blank by choosing the “Blank party”

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Requirements for (Belgian) Voting Systems
Universal
Everybody can cast a vote
Equal
Everybody has just one vote
Freedom
Everybody can cast his/her vote of his/her choice
Secrecy
Only the voter knows who he has voted for
Transparency
All procedures are simple, publicly available and
known
Verifiability
Voting and counting systems are verifiable

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 137 December 2010
Correctness…
Transparency
Voter can/cannot check voting ballot
correctness
Observer can/cannot check voting ballot
correctness
Auditability
Voter can/cannot audit election
Observer can/cannot audit election

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 147 December 2010
Issues – Trustworthiness
Voting system =
Technology + People + Processes
Paranoia:
Does the technology function correctly?
Did the voting officials validate the configuration?
Is the vote correctly recorded?
Is the vote correctly counted?
Is the election result correct?
Did independent auditors validate the elections?
Pop quiz:
Why would a voting system reflect the voter’s choice?

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 157 December 2010
Comparing (e)Voting Systems
Paper + Pencil
Well known, highly trusted
Current System (Magnetic Stripe Cards)
Good compromise to deal with complex
voting rules, mostly trusted
Improved Paper-based Voting
Best compromise, verifiable trustworthiness

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 167 December 2010
Paper + Pencil
Cheap
Simple
Everybody understands how it works
Not everybody understand potential problems…
But
Easy to invalidate voting ballots
Sometimes hard to distinguish voting ballot marks
Not really anonymous
Physical traces on paper: fingerprints, scratches, stains,…
Voting ballots can grow large in some cantons
Costly preparation, printing and distribution of ballots
Counting is cumbersome and slow

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 177 December 2010
Components of Classic Electronic Polling
Station
589 municipalities
44% of these use voting computers
Each municipality has one or more polling stations
Each polling station has one or more voting offices
Each polling office using electronic voting is equipped
with
5 or 6 voting booths, each with one voting computer
1 electronic urn to collect magnetic stripe ballots
1 computer associated with the president of the voting
office
About 20.000 voting computers in total
On average 300 voters per voting computer

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 187 December 2010
Classic Electronic Voting Booth

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 197 December 2010
Observations wrt Magnetic Stripe
Cards System
How to convince a voter that the magnetic
stripe card corresponds with the voter’s
choice?
Voting computer may have stored a different ballot
How to convince a voter that his/her vote is
read from the magnetic stripe?
Voting urn may have overwritten the magnetic
stripe
Organizational and procedural measures
neutralize these potential issues

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 207 December 2010
Key Arguments to Introduce New System
Hardware of “current” system is outdated
Supply issues
Countering issues with magnetic stripe cards
Dependable and verifiable marking of
candidates
Voter can verify voting ballot
Secure transport of voting ballots
Protection against eavesdropping and modification
of ballot storage and transmission
Counting votes: accurate and fast
No need for manual counting
Support for recounting
Manual audit

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 217 December 2010
optional interface for
visually challenged
Future eVoting Booth Components 
printer
chip card
reader mini PC
touch screen with
inductive pen

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 227 December 2010
Future Voting Ballot

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 237 December 2010
Future Voting Office’s Equipment
Ballot Verifier Ballot Box
© George Patton Associates, Inc.

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 247 December 2010
Voter’s Secrecy
Belgian election system is ‘vulnerable’ to
pattern-based voting
Avoid manual processing of ballots
Voter’s fingerprints or marks on paper based
ballots
Cameras in mobile phones, cf. vote selling
Miniaturized cameras in voting office or booth
Electromagnetic radiation (TEMPEST)
Perfect protection is complicated and expensive
Adequate protection is feasible

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 257 December 2010
Voting in Practice – Voters cast their vote
at a Polling Place
Facts:
1. Voters living in a municipality cast their vote in a
voting office
2. Each voting office has a list with eligible voters
3. Each voting office has one voting urn to collect
completed voting ballots
4. A voting ballot consists either of a paper ballot or
of a magnetic stripe card
5. Election period = 1 Sunday, starting at 9.00
1. Offices using paper ballots close at 13.00
2. Offices using magnetic stripe cards close at 15.00

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 267 December 2010
Voting Procedure – Magnetic Stripe Ballots
Voting Urn
Voting Computer
Action: Start Voting Process
Confirm Eligible Voter
Voter
Identification Proof, Voting Convocation Letter, and possibly the form to Vote By Proxy
President of
Voting Office
Insert Magnetic Stripe Card
Magnetic Stripe Card with Blank Vote
Retrieve Magnetic Stripe Card Ballot
Magnetic Stripe Card Ballot
Confirm Voting Ballot
Action: Store Selected Votes
Inspect Card for Marks
Present Magnetic Stripe Card Ballot for Inspection
Magnetic Stripe Card Ballot
Cast Votes
Register Ballot (Classic)

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 277 December 2010
Voting in Practice – Voters cast their
Magnetic Stripe Ballot at a Polling Place
Procedure:
1. Voting officials seal an empty voting urn before first voter arrives
2. Administration broadcasts invitation cards by paper mail to all
Belgian citizens who are 18 or older on the Election Day
3. Voter hands over the identity card and invitation card to the
voting officials
Officials verify identity of the voter
Officials check whether the voter is listed on their list with eligible
voters
4. Voter receives voting ballot or magnetic stripe card from voting
officials
5. Voter casts his/her vote in the voting booth
If voter makes a mistake, the president of the voting office may decide
to give the voter a second chance
6. Voting official verifies whether the voter did not put a mark on the
ballot or magnetic stripe card
Marked ballots are invalid
7. Voter inserts the ballot or magnetic stripe card in the voting urn
8. Voting officials stamp the invitation letter to confirm that the
voter completed his/her duty
9. Voting officials return identity card and invitation card to voter

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 287 December 2010
Counting the Magnetic Stripe Ballots
Paper ballots
Seal of the voting urn is removed at the end of the
Election Day, e.g., around 14.00
Talliers keep tallying at voting office-level until they
count twice the same result
Magnetic stripe cards
Voting urn reads magnetic stripe card ballot
immediately
PC controlling voting urn keeps the score on a
floppy
All floppies of voting offices are aggregated per
municipality at the end of the Election Day
Seal of the voting urn with magnetic stripe cards is
only removed when recounting is necessary

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 297 December 2010
Large
Municipality
Counting New Voting Ballots
Ballot Box
Voting Ballot
Decryption
Center
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center
Main Totalization Center
Second Totalization Center
First Totalization Center

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 307 December 2010
Large
Municipality
Counting New Voting Ballots
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Voting Ballot
Decryption
Center
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center
Main Totalization Center
Second Totalization Center
First Totalization Center

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 317 December 2010
Large
Municipality
Counting New Voting Ballots
Small Municipality
Ballot Box
Ballot BoxBallot Box
Ballot Box
Main Totalization Center
Voting Ballot
Decryption
Center
Voting Ballot
Decryption
Center
Second Totalization Center
First Totalization Center
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center Voting Ballot Reading Center

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 327 December 2010
Counting New Voting Ballots
Small Municipality
Large
Municipality
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center
Ballot Box
Ballot BoxBallot Box
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Ballot Box
Voting Ballot
Reading
Center
Main Totalization Center
Second Totalization Center
First Totalization Center
…
…
Legend:
Local transport of Ballot Boxes
Sending ballot information
Digital transport of partial voting results
Voting Ballot
Decryption
Center
Voting Ballot
Decryption
Center
Ballot Box
Voting Ballot Reading Center
(1)
(1) (1)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(4) (4)
(4) …
(4)

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 337 December 2010
Processing Election Results
If a candidate dies before the Election Day
The deceased is treated as if he/she never existed
Votes for the deceased are taken into account to
determine the number of voters for the candidate’s list
If a candidate dies on the Election Day or after the
Election Day but before the official announcement of
the Election Result
The deceased may be elected, but the first successor
takes his seat
If a candidate dies after the official announcement of
the Election Result
The deceased is replaced by the first successor
If a candidate dies after closing the candidate list but
before printing the paper ballots
The list does not include the name of the deceased

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 347 December 2010
Questions?
Email:
Danny.DeCock@esat.kuleuven.be
godot@godot.be
Homepage:
http://godot.be
Slides:
http://godot.be/slides

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 357 December 2010
Requirements for Belgian eVoting Systems
Be combinable with classic paper voting system
Be usable in the Belgian context
Cf. 7 election types, complex ballots…
Not too expensive
Available at all times
Modular & flexible
Different voting systems may be used in one canton
Installable in voting offices and voting booths
Customizable
List of elections, candidates & parties varies per election
Easy to verify
Correct casting of votes, 1 voter = 1 ballot
Correct counting of votes
Secrecy of the vote
Encourage the automated processing of votes
Automated casting of votes is less important
Be very easy to use (user friendliness, simple,…)
Be very accessible/attractive to
Non-computer literate people, elderly, disabled people,…

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 367 December 2010
Operational Aspects
D-80: Preparation of lists with eligible voters
D-40: Independent experts can start auditing the Election procedure
D-33: Publication of banned acronyms in Belgian Gazette
D-30: Lottery to rank parties on voting ballots
D-26: Publication of parties and their numbers in Belgian Gazette
D-28: Deadline to submit election candidates
D-24: Fixing lists with election candidates
D-15: Publishing names of election witnesses, Mail broadcast of election
convocation letters
D-12: Appointing presidents and assistants of voting offices
D-10: Mail broadcast of lists with eligible voters per voting office
D- 5: Appointing election witnesses of voting & counting offices
D- 3: Deadline of voting computer boot floppy delivery to president of
cantonal headquarters
D- 1: President of voting office receives voting ballots, distribution of
computer boot floppies to presidents of voting offices
D : Election day, processing voting ballots after closing election period
D+15: End of the audit possibility of independent experts
D+45: Publication of election results
D+75: Finalization of election-related expenses

eVoting in Belgium: Past and Future 377 December 2010
optional interface for
visually challenged
Voting Booth + Barcode voting ballots
lintprinter chip card
reader
mini PC
touch screen with
inductive pen
2. use touch
screen to mark
candidates
1. use chip card
to activate
voting computer
3. print
voting ballot