Conference Paper

Coalition formation games for relay transmission: Stability analysis under uncertainty

Sch. of Comput. Eng., Nanyang Technol. Univ. (NTU), Singapore, Singapore
DOI: 10.1109/WCNC.2011.5779259 Conference: 2011 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2011, Proceedings, Cancun, Mexico, 28-31 March, 2011
Source: DBLP


Relay transmission or cooperative communication is an advanced technique that can improve the performance of data transmission among wireless nodes. However, while the performance (e.g., throughput) of a source node can be improved through cooperation with a number of relays, this improvement comes at the expense of a degraded performance for the relay nodes due to the resources that they dedicate for helping the source node in its transmission. In this paper, we formulate a coalitional game among the wireless nodes that seek to improve their performance by relaying each other's data. The game is classified as a coalition formation game in which the nodes can take individual and distributed decisions to join or split from a given coalition while ensuring that their individual throughput is maximized. A Markov chain model is proposed to investigate the stability of the resulting coalitional structures. Further, we consider the practical case in which the wireless nodes do not have an exact and perfect knowledge of the parameters (e.g., channel quality) in coalition formation. For this scenario, we analyze the stability of the partitions resulting from the proposed coalition formation game under uncertainty. We also define the conditions needed for obtaining the stable and unstable coalitional structures among the nodes that are performing cooperative transmission.

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Available from: Walid Saad
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    • "Distributed coalitional formations with transferable utilities and stable outcomes in relay networks are studied in [6]. In [7], a coalition formation game for relay transmission is studied based on a Markov-chain model, where the nodes are assumed to be selfish and aim at maximizing their individual throughput. Furthermore, stability analysis of the coalition formation process under system parameters' uncertainty is also investigated. "
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    ABSTRACT: In this paper, altruistic coalition formation in cooperative relay networks is studied. The communication is performed over two phases, the broadcasting phase and the cooperation phase. In the broadcasting phase, each node broadcasts its signal in its time-slot, while in the cooperation phase, all the nodes within their coalitions simultaneously relay each others' signals. A distributed merge-and-split algorithm is proposed to allow nodes to form coalitions and improve their total achievable rate. Moreover, the impact of different power allocation criteria is studied, where the sum-of-rates maximizing power allocation is shown to promote altruistic coalition formation and results in the largest coalitions among the different power allocation criteria. Finally, the proposed algorithm is compared with centralized power allocation and coalition formation, and shown to yield a good tradeoff between network sum-rate and computational complexity.
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    • "Another coalitional game approach is formulated in [12] to examine how coalitions can form in a distributed manner, as well as possible resource allocation methods within groups. Moreover, in [13], a Markov chain model is proposed to investigate the stability of the coalitional structures. "
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    ABSTRACT: A matching theoretic approach to study the partner selection in cooperative relaying is followed. Partner selection is considered as a special stable roommate problem where each player ranks its partners by some criterion. Each agent aims here at finding a “good” partner in order to exploit efficiently the spatial diversity achieved with cooperation. We adapt Irving's algorithm [3] for determining the partners of each player. The ranking criterion here is chosen to be outage probability such that each player comprises its own preference list according to outage probability from the lowest to the highest. The first player in the preference list provides the lowest outage probability. We introduce a decentralized version of Irving's algorithm. Then, we compare the results obtained by stable-matching with the global optimum and random selection results. From the computational results, we observe that stable-matching results are near to global optimum as well as superior than random selection in terms of average outage probability.
    Full-text · Conference Paper · Sep 2013
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    • "In [11], the coalitional game theory was applied in studying how to stimulate message forwarding in vehicular networks. The coalition formation problem for rational nodes in a cooperative DF network was formulated in [12]. The coalitional game theoretic approach for secondary spectrum access in cooperative cognitive radio networks was studied in [13]. "
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    ABSTRACT: Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles' data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied. Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and 2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.
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