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Four Score and Seven Years from Now: The Date/Delay Effect in Temporal Discounting
Abstract
We describe a new anomaly in intertemporal choice---the "date/delay effect": discount rates that are imputed when time is described using calendar dates (e.g., on October 17) are markedly lower than those revealed when future outcomes are described in terms of the corresponding delay (e.g., in six months). Date descriptions not only reduce discount rates, but also affect the implied shape of the discount function: When inferred from intertemporal choices between options referenced by calendar dates, the discount function appears markedly less hyperbolic. We discuss potential psychological bases of the date/delay effect, its implications, and other modes of temporal reference.
... For example, outcome gains are discounted more steeply than outcome losses, a finding commonly referred to as the sign effect (e.g., Benzion et al., 1989;Cox et al., 2020;Estle et al., 2006;Johnson et al., 2007;Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989;Yeh et al., 2020). Likewise, delays described in terms of specific dates (e.g., October 24, 2024) produce less discounting than the same delays described in typical delays (e.g., 1 year), a form of temporal framing (Read et al., 2005;DeHart & Odum, 2015;Reyes-Huerta et al., 2023). Finally, larger outcomes are discounted less steeply than smaller outcomes, a finding known as the magnitude or amount effect (e.g., Baker et al., 2003;Green et al., 1997Green et al., , 2013Johnson & Bickel, 2002;Kirby, 1997;Thaler, 1981). ...
... To date, relatively little research has examined the effect of temporal framing on monetary gains (DeHart & Odum, 2015;Klapproth, 2012;LeBoeuf, 2006;Naudé et al., 2018;Read et al., 2005), and even fewer studies have examined temporal framing effects on monetary losses (LeBoeuf, 2006;Reyes-Huerta et al., 2023). Thus, we examined how temporal framing affects both the discounting of gains and losses. ...
... Overall, these types of framing effects may have a similar mechanism by which the future (delayed) event is made more concrete. In Experiment 1 as well as other studies (e.g., DeHart & Odum, 2015;Read et al., 2005), framing delays in terms of specific dates reduced discounting. This technique may be related to Episodic Future Thinking (EFT), in which participants vividly imagine personal future events (Schacter et al., 2017). ...
Delay discounting, the decrease in outcome value as a function of delay to receipt, is an extensive area of research. How delays are framed (i.e., temporal framing), as well as the sign and magnitude of an outcome, produce important effects on the degree to which outcomes are discounted. Here, we examined how recent experience (i.e., order of presentation) modifies these well-known findings. Experiment 1 examined the effects of temporal framing across gains and losses. Regardless of outcome sign, the order of task presentation affected the effect of temporal framing. In particular, when typical delay frames (e.g., 1 week) preceded delays framed as actual dates (e.g., February 15), discounting was less in the date-framed task. However, when dates were followed by the delay frame, there was no difference in the degree of discounting. The experience of date-framed delays persisted or carried over to the delay-framed task. Experiment 2 examined recent experience and the magnitude effect. In particular, 100 were discounted similarly between-subjects when it was the first task completed. However, once participants completed the second magnitude task, the magnitude effect was present both within-subjects and across subjects. Furthermore, 100, and 10. The impact of recent experience on delay discounting has important implications for understanding mechanisms that may contribute to delay discounting. Recent experience should be considered when designing delay discounting experiments as well as when implementing interventions to reduce steep delay discounting.
... The date/delay effect has been replicated several times (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;Keidel et al., in press;LeBoeuf, 2006;Naudé et al., 2018;Read et al., 2005; though see , with medium effect size on average (Rung & Madden, 2018). At present, there is little evidence about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. ...
... At present, there is little evidence about the cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect. Different hypotheses are based on differences in the perceived concreteness of response options (construal level theory; Kim et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Trope & Liberman, 2003), differences in attentional strategies (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005), influences of subjective time perception (Jiang & Dai, 2021;Zauberman et al., 2009), and the role of emotional valuation (LeBoeuf, 2006;. In this article, we focus on potential differences in attentional processes between intertemporal choices involving delay units and those involving dates (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005). ...
... Different hypotheses are based on differences in the perceived concreteness of response options (construal level theory; Kim et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Trope & Liberman, 2003), differences in attentional strategies (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005), influences of subjective time perception (Jiang & Dai, 2021;Zauberman et al., 2009), and the role of emotional valuation (LeBoeuf, 2006;. In this article, we focus on potential differences in attentional processes between intertemporal choices involving delay units and those involving dates (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005). Specifically, a major difference between the date and the delay conditions is that in the delay condition, rewards and delay units, which are both numerical variables, can be directly integrated to compute discounted values (Ainslie, 1975), while more complex operations would be required to compute discounted values when delays are presented in terms of dates. ...
Temporal discounting refers to the tendency to discount future rewards as a function of time until receipt of rewards. The discount rate can be reduced by experimentally manipulating time framing, an example being the date/delay effect: Specifically, if time until receipt of the reward is presented as a date (e.g., August 21, 2022) rather than as a delay (e.g., 136 days), temporal discounting is reduced. While this effect has been replicated several times, its underlying cognitive mechanisms are not well understood. Therefore, we used eye tracking to examine the role of attention in the date/delay effect. Participants completed both a delay and date condition of the Monetary Choice Questionnaire, while eye movements were recorded (N = 54). Results revealed a successful replication of the date/delay effect (p < .001, gav = 0.48). Eye tracking showed that participants compared time attributes (relative to reward attributes) more and fixated them longer in the date compared to the delay condition. Moreover, the absolute difference in reward values of choice options was more predictive of choosing the delayed reward in the date compared to the delay condition. Finally, explorative correlations revealed a stronger date/delay effect in participants who paid more attention to time than reward attributes in the delay condition and who used a more integrative search strategy. Our findings suggest that the date manipulation causes participants to weight rewards more strongly in their decision process than in the delay condition, ultimately reducing temporal discounting. Computation of time intervals in the date condition could possibly reflect an adaptation lowering the date/delay effect.
... Specifically, previous studies have shown that TD can be influenced by experimentally manipulating task framing, incidental affective states, or prospection-related processes 37 . Some of these manipulations, e.g., presenting time until receipt of rewards in dates instead of delay units (date/delay effect) [38][39][40] , reduce TD not only in the general population but especially in individuals initially showing particularly steep TD, such as problematic alcohol users 41 or persons with high positive schizotypy scores 42 . Therefore, finding transdiagnostic symptom dimensions that are associated with TD and that are particularly responsive to such manipulations could be of high therapeutic value. ...
... Psychiatric symptom patterns and the date/delay effect The date/delay effect was replicated, as the paired difference (delay minus date) of discount rates had a probability of > 99.9% to be above zero (median paired difference = 0. 39 A more pronounced date/delay effect was correlated with higher scores in uncontrolled eating, emotional eating, ADHD, positive urgency, negative urgency, and lack of premeditation (rs ranging between 0.07 and 0.12, all p < 0.05; Fig. 2, Supplementary Table 6). Using a single regression, uncontrolled eating (β = 0.14, 95% CI [0.01, 0.26], p = 0.03) and positive urgency (β = 0.12, 95% CI [0.00, 0.23], p = 0.048) persisted as statistically significant predictors (Supplementary Table 7). ...
... Specifically, the date manipulation, which has been associated with narrower time estimation and more episodic thinking 42,67 , was particularly effective in reducing TD in participants scoring high on the IIO dimension. Thus, it appears likely that higher TD in people who are more sensitive to the passage of time, e.g., impulsive individuals 68 , can be alleviated by experimentally enhancing episodic thinking, e.g., by using episodic tags 52,69 or date cues [38][39][40] . Moreover, associations between the magnitude effect and IIO point towards another underlying mechanism. ...
Temporal discounting (TD), the tendency to devalue future rewards as a function of delay until receipt, is aberrant in many mental disorders. Identifying symptom patterns and transdiagnostic dimensions associated with TD could elucidate mechanisms responsible for clinically impaired decision-making and facilitate identifying intervention targets. Here, we tested in a general population sample ( N = 731) the extent to which TD was related to different symptom patterns and whether effects of time framing (dates/delay units) and monetary magnitude (large/small) had particularly strong effects in people scoring higher on specific symptom patterns. Analyses revealed that TD was related to symptom patterns loading on anxious-depression and inattention-impulsivity-overactivity dimensions. Moreover, TD was lower in the date than the delay version and with higher magnitudes, especially in people scoring higher on the inattention-impulsivity-overactivity dimension. Overall, this study provides evidence for TD as a transdiagnostic process across affective and impulsivity-related dimensions. Future studies should test framing interventions in clinical populations characterized by impulsivity.
Preregistration: This research was preregistered at https://osf.io/fg9sc .
... Various experimental manipulations have been shown to attenuate temporal discounting (Rung & Madden, 2018;H. Scholten et al., 2019), including the date/delay effect (LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005): People discount future rewards less when time until receipt of rewards is framed in terms of dates (date condition; e.g., 8th June 2023) instead of delay units (delay condition; e.g., 30 days). While this effect has been replicated several times (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;Jiang & Dai, 2021;Keidel, Murawski, Pantelis, & Ettinger, 2023;Naudé et al., 2018), its cognitive and neural underpinnings are still ambiguous. ...
... 1.2 | Potential mechanisms of the date/delay effect Different cognitive mechanisms of the date/delay effect have been proposed (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005), including the differential time estimation hypothesis (Read et al., 2005;Zauberman et al., 2009), the attention-focusing or reward-weighting hypothesis LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005) and the choice strategy hypothesis (Read et al., 2005). ...
... 1.2 | Potential mechanisms of the date/delay effect Different cognitive mechanisms of the date/delay effect have been proposed (Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005), including the differential time estimation hypothesis (Read et al., 2005;Zauberman et al., 2009), the attention-focusing or reward-weighting hypothesis LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005) and the choice strategy hypothesis (Read et al., 2005). ...
Temporal discounting, the tendency to devalue future rewards as a function of delay until receipt, is influenced by time framing. Specifically, discount rates are shallower when the time at which the reward is received is presented as a date (date condition; e.g., June 8, 2023) rather than in delay units (delay condition; e.g., 30 days), which is commonly referred to as the date/delay effect. However, the cognitive and neural mechanisms of this effect are not well understood. Here, we examined the date/delay effect by analysing combined fMRI and eye‐tracking data of N = 31 participants completing a temporal discounting task in both a delay and a date condition. The results confirmed the date/delay effect and revealed that the date condition led to higher fixation durations on time attributes and to higher activity in precuneus/PCC and angular gyrus, that is, areas previously associated with episodic thinking. Additionally, participants made more comparative eye movements in the date compared to the delay condition. A lower date/delay effect was associated with higher prefrontal activity in the date > delay contrast, suggesting that higher control or arithmetic operations may reduce the date/delay effect. Our findings are in line with hypotheses positing that the date condition is associated with differential time estimation and the use of more comparative as opposed to integrative choice strategies. Specifically, higher activity in memory‐related brain areas suggests that the date condition leads to higher perceived proximity of delayed rewards, while higher frontal activity (middle/superior frontal gyrus, posterior medial frontal cortex, cingulate) in participants with a lower date/delay effect suggests that the effect is particularly pronounced in participants avoiding complex arithmetic operations in the date condition.
... Alternatively, one could argue that a timeline is a more concrete representation of time than a verbal description. As more concrete delays (e.g., in the form of a date; see Read et al., 2005) have been shown to increase patience, the timeline display might lead to greater patience than the verbal display. ...
... version; Hypothesis 5). This fits previous notions that display formats can affect choice by changing the way choice options become represented psychologically (Johnson et al., 2012;Read et al., 2005). We speculate that the display effect may be due to (i) a possible anchoring effect in the timeline but not word version (i.e., in the timeline version, the maximum delay was always visible and may have served as an anchor; Furnham & Boo, 2011), (ii) a difference in concreteness (i.e., compared with the word version, timelines may have made delays more concrete resulting in more patience, like the date/delay effect 7 ; Read et al., 2005), or (iii) an attention or saliency difference (i.e., amounts stood out more in the timeline than word version, as amounts were displayed in a [relatively] bigger font and the delay/ time-ambiguity information was more complicated in the timeline version). ...
... This fits previous notions that display formats can affect choice by changing the way choice options become represented psychologically (Johnson et al., 2012;Read et al., 2005). We speculate that the display effect may be due to (i) a possible anchoring effect in the timeline but not word version (i.e., in the timeline version, the maximum delay was always visible and may have served as an anchor; Furnham & Boo, 2011), (ii) a difference in concreteness (i.e., compared with the word version, timelines may have made delays more concrete resulting in more patience, like the date/delay effect 7 ; Read et al., 2005), or (iii) an attention or saliency difference (i.e., amounts stood out more in the timeline than word version, as amounts were displayed in a [relatively] bigger font and the delay/ time-ambiguity information was more complicated in the timeline version). The last explanation might be the most plausible, as it is consistent with the stronger amount effects in the timeline version. ...
Time ambiguity—that is, having partially/fully incomplete information about when an outcome will occur—is common in everyday life. A recent study showed that participants preferred options with time‐exact delays over options with time‐ambiguous delays, a phenomenon they called time‐ambiguity aversion. However, the empirical robustness and boundaries of this phenomenon remain unexplored. We conducted three online studies: Study 2 ( n = 118) was a replication of Study 1 ( n = 76) using preregistered analyses; Study 3 ( n = 202; preregistered) was a follow‐up study suggested during review. In Studies 1 and 2, participants completed hypothetical choices between €5 today versus later‐but‐larger (LL) rewards that systematically varied in their amount, delay, and time‐ambiguity level (e.g., for a 180 day delay, time ambiguity varied from 179 to 181 to 0–360 days). Effects of time ambiguity on choice were best encoded in an absolute, dose‐dependent manner and depended on delays and amounts: Increasing time ambiguity led to more time‐ exact LL choices at shorter delays but more time‐ ambiguous LL choices at longer delays. Additionally, time‐ambiguity ranges including today were chosen more frequently than ranges excluding today, akin to the present bias in intertemporal choice. Lastly, evidence suggested that more time ambiguity was preferred for smaller LL amounts yet disliked for larger LL amounts. Study 3 demonstrated that time‐risk and time‐ambiguity preferences are differentiable by giving participants choices involving hypothetical time‐exact, time‐ambiguous, and time‐risky options. Taken together, our results extend the nascent literature on time ambiguity by showing that (i) time‐ambiguity preferences are distinguishable from both time‐risk and delay preferences and (ii) time ambiguity is not generally aversive, but its impact depends on delay and amount magnitude.
... In another manipulation of framing, time is described using different units. Read et al. (2005) compared preference between two future rewards by describing delays as either calendar units (e.g., 3 months) or the corresponding dates (e.g., March 31). Based on the estimation of a single indifference point, 1 one experiment in the study had two important findings: First, preference for the more delayed reward was greater when specific dates were used, and second, when calendar units were used, temporal discounting decreased as delay to both alternatives increased, as predicted by hyperbolic discounting. ...
... This finding was interpreted by the authors as being more consistent with exponential discounting. Read et al.'s (2005) findings are particularly compelling because they have practical and theoretical implications. First, framing might be helpful in clinical settings where it could be used to curtail the excessive temporal discounting frequently linked to maladaptive behaviors such as drug addictions, pathological gambling, obesity, poor adherence to treatment protocols of chronic diseases, eating disorders, and others (Dixon et al., 2006;Gray & MacKillop, 2015;Jarmolowicz et al., 2014;Lebeau et al., 2016;Steward et al., 2017;Stoianova et al., 2018). ...
... Exponential delay discounting predicts constant relative preference for the large later consequence (LL) or the small sooner consequence (SS) depending on delay-discounting rate. 1 (as in Equation 5, see data analysis section), then consistent decision making over time should be expected. Read et al. (2005) findings align with this idea despite evidence against exponential discounting. Thus, if framing with specific dates makes discounting more constant, then it is reasonable to expect that adding a delay to both LL and SS will not promote preference reversal, as the common delay should proportionally decrease the discounting rate. ...
The rate of delay discounting exhibited by individuals has been experimentally altered by manipulating the way in which time is described, a specific application of the framing effect. Previous research suggests that using specific dates to describe delays tends to lower temporal discounting and change the shape of the discounting function. The main purpose of this study was to assess the influence of framing on discounting in different temporal contexts. Participants chose between hypothetical monetary gains (gains group), or between hypothetical monetary losses (losses group). Each group completed eight discounting tasks over two sessions (two choice tasks [SmallNow/SmallSoon] by two time frames [dates/calendar units] by two magnitudes. The results indicate that Mazur's model adequately described the observed discounting functions in most conditions. However, the decrease in discounting rate when both consequences were delayed only occurred when calendar units (but not dates) were used for both gains and losses. These findings suggest that framing affects the influence of a shared delay instead of changing the shape of the discounting function. Our results support the idea that time influences behavior similarly in humans and nonhumans when they choose between two delayed consequences.
... The date-delay effect implies that future outcomes are discounted at higher rates when time is described as an extent of time (e.g., six months), than when it is expressed as a calendar date (e.g., October 17). This anomaly was discover by Read (Read et al., 2005). ...
... However, considering the date-delay effect, it was shown that in both gains (lottery or investment) and losses individuals were willing to pay more for delaying the outcome when the time was expressed as an extent of time than when it was expressed as a date (LeBoeuf, 2006). Likewise, this effect appeared in both real and hypothetical results, although the date-delay effect was substantially greater when the chosen reward was real (Read et al., 2005). This was also confirmed when using different types of questionnaire, such as choice-based and matching based (Read et al., 2005;Breuer and Soypak, 2015). ...
... Likewise, this effect appeared in both real and hypothetical results, although the date-delay effect was substantially greater when the chosen reward was real (Read et al., 2005). This was also confirmed when using different types of questionnaire, such as choice-based and matching based (Read et al., 2005;Breuer and Soypak, 2015). Elsewhere, the effect was also observed regardless of how time was described, i.e., whether it was described in months or weeks (Read et al., 2005). ...
... Reward framing refers to how the reward stimulus is presented and is categorized into hidden-zero and explicit-zero framing, where explicit-zero framing reduces individual perceptions of uncertainty through attentional manipulation (Radu et al., 2011;Read et al., 2005). The smaller sooner (SS) options and lager later (LL) options in the hidden-zero condition are usually stated as "SS: US $20 today; LL: US $30 in 15 days", while the options in the explicit-zero condition are stated as "SS: US $20 today, US $0 in 15 days; LL: US$0 today, US $30 in 15 days" (Dang et al., 2021). ...
... Explicit-zero framing reduces individuals' preferences for immediate options by associating negative future zerovalued outcomes with the immediate option through attentional manipulation (Magen et al., 2008;Naudé et al., 2018;Read & Scholten, 2012;Scholten et al., 2019). The results also showed that the proportion of individuals choosing the immediate option increased significantly as the delay time increased, reflecting the delay effect (Read et al., 2005). ...
With high intolerance of uncertainty (IU), patients with anxiety-related disorders may impulsively engage in maladaptive avoidance behaviors, which may further exacerbate anxiety symptoms. To advance the treatment of anxiety-related disorders, the present study based on the perspective of the integrative model of uncertainty tolerance explored whether reward framing and positive episodic future thinking could alleviate impulsivity in individuals with high IU. In Study 1, high IU participants (N = 36) and low IU participants (N = 36) completed the delay discounting task in both hidden-zero and explicit-zero framing conditions. In Study 2, high IU participants (N = 38) and low IU participants (N = 38) completed the delay discounting task in both future thinking and control conditions. In Study 1, participants with high IU preferred more immediate options than participants with low IU under the hidden-zero framing condition. However, under the explicit-zero framing condition, there was no significant difference in decision preferences between the two groups. In Study 2, participants with high IU preferred more immediate options than low IU participants under the control condition, but there were no significant differences between the two groups under the future thinking condition. The present study found that explicit-zero framing and positive episodic future thinking can alleviate impulsivity in individuals with high IU. Thinking of positive future events and focusing on opportunity costs may be considered in future interventions for impulsivity in high IU groups.
... However, when time is framed in dates, TD is reduced compared to the standard delay condition, an effect known as the date/delay effect. [76][77][78][79] While the exact cognitive mechanisms underlying the effect are not entirely clear, time sensitivity likely plays a major role. Specifically, time periods represented by dates are perceived as shorter than those represented by time units. ...
... Importantly, we replicated the date/delay effect and found it to be robust against the well-known magnitude effect in TD (ie, larger rewards being discounted less steeply than smaller ones 96,97 ) and against order of MCQ presentation (although it was greater when the date version was presented first). The date/delay effect has been found previously, 76,77,80,[98][99][100][101] with a meta-analysis revealing a slightly larger effect size than our study. 78 However, this difference could be partly due to our effect size calculation in which we corrected for the correlation of measurements (ie, our uncorrected effect size is d z = 0.51). ...
Background and Hypothesis
Many patients with psychiatric disorders show increased temporal discounting (TD), ie, they discount future rewards more steeply than healthy controls. However, findings for schizophrenia and schizotypy, a personality constellation considered to be on the schizophrenia spectcrum, are less clear. Moreover, the role of future time representation in TD in the schizophrenia spectrum has not been examined. We hypothesized positive associations between schizotypal personality traits and TD and reduced TD when the timepoint of future rewards is represented in dates rather than delay units (the date/delay effect). Further, we explored associations between schizotypy and the magnitude of the date/delay effect.
Study Design
We conducted a large-scale, general-population online study (N = 1000) assessing TD with the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ) and schizotypal traits with the Short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (sO-LIFE). Time representation in the MCQ (dates vs delays) was manipulated within subject.
Study Results
Associations between TD and sO-LIFE subscales were not significant after Bonferroni correction (all r ≤ .06). The date/delay effect was successfully replicated (P < .001, gav = 0.22). Interestingly, higher values in the sO-LIFE Unusual Experiences subscale predicted the magnitude of the date/delay effect when controlling for influences of other sO-LIFE subscales, age, education, and drug use.
Conclusions
TD was not associated with schizotypy, but individuals with higher levels of positive schizotypy were more sensitive to manipulations of the representation of future timepoints. Future studies should focus on these processes as potential mechanisms in the development and treatment of cognitive-perceptual deficits in the schizophrenia spectrum.
... Some studies have found that the different expressions of the time attribute in options can affect decision-making behavior. Specifically, compared with the typical delayed presentation mode, date presentation can significantly promote the selection of more delayed options, which is called the date effect (Dehart & Odum, 2015;Leboeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005). The researchers suggested that a possible mechanism behind this framing effect is that the description of the date makes the delay appear closer to the present, leading to a preference for the larger but later (LL) outcome. ...
... In Experiment 3, we found that decision-makers can be nudged into changing from the alternative-wise time discount strategy to the attribute-wise attribute comparison strategy because of slight changes in the presentation mode. This approach improves the patience of decision-making behavior, which further verifies the effect (Read et al., 2005). ...
Intertemporal choice, a pervasive phenomenon in social life, involves evaluating and balancing gains and losses occurring at different times. Research into the mechanisms underlying intertemporal choice has yielded varied findings. Time discounting models propose an alternative-wise strategy, where decisions are driven by the discounting of future rewards. In contrast, attribute comparison models advocate an attribute-wise strategy, emphasizing the comparison of specific attributes across different options. Therefore, we adopted a comparative paradigm combining evidence from both process and outcome using the MouselabWEB and the eye-tracking techniques in three experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 37), the mouselabWEB process data indicates that intertemporal choice processes are more similar to those on the time discount task. These results were supported in Experiment 2 (N = 37), in which eye-tracking data was analyzed. The drift-diffusion model analysis suggested that the diffusion velocity under the free answer strategy condition was significantly lower than in the attribute comparison strategy condition. In Experiment 3 (N = 35), participants tended to use an attribute-wise strategy and chose more delayed options when the choices were presented with a date rather than a number of days. In conclusion, evidence from both the processes and the outcomes supported the time discount model explanation of intertemporal choice. Moreover, the findings indicated that people could be nudged into using an attribute-wise strategy with a slight change in the time representation.
... This phenomenon is known as intertemporal choice, where individuals must weigh the outcomes of gains or losses at different points in time (especially now and in the future) to make decisions Chen and He, 2012). Numerous studies have shown that the key factors influencing intertemporal decision-making include the decision object, the decision maker, and the external environment Read et al., 2005;Weber et al., 2007;Anokhin et al., 2011). When making intertemporal decisions, people tend to assign less importance to future losses or gains. ...
... Future outcome considerations significantly negatively predict the time discount rate in intertemporal decision-making (Rappange et al., 2010). Read et al. (2005) found that individuals who described their future selves were more willing to choose delayed gratification compared to those who described their current selves. Individuals who consider low future outcomes tend to focus more on immediate needs rather than future needs. ...
Intertemporal decision making refers to the behavior of making decisions after weighing the costs and benefits of two or more outcomes at different time points. This study explores the moderating effect of self-concept clarity on the influence of future self-continuity on intertemporal decision-making and the mediating effect of future outcome consideration, aiming to establish a mediated moderating model. In Study 1, we recruited 370 participants via questionnaire to explore the relationship between future self-continuity and intertemporal decision-making, as well as the moderating effect of self-concept clarity. The results showed that: (1) Future self-continuity significantly negatively predicted the time discount rate of intertemporal decision-making. (2) Self-concept clarity significantly negatively moderated the relationship between future self-continuity and the time discount rate of intertemporal decision-making. In Study 2, we recruited 234 participants using an experimental method and divided them into high and low future self-continuity groups to explore the mediating effect of future outcome consideration and the moderating role of self-concept clarity in the influence of future self-continuity on intertemporal decision-making. The results indicated that: (1) Self-concept clarity significantly negatively moderated the impact of future self-continuity on future outcome consideration. (2) Future outcome consideration mediated the moderating effect of self-concept clarity on the influence of future self-continuity on intertemporal decision-making. The findings indicated that future self-continuity negatively impacted the time discount rate in intertemporal decision-making. Furthermore, self-concept clarity could indirectly regulate the effect of future self-continuity on intertemporal decision-making through future outcome consideration. These two studies contribute to a better understanding of intertemporal decision-making behavior in different states, help reduce cognitive bias through rational analysis of current states, achieve maximum life benefits, and enrich empirical research in the fields of future self-continuity and intertemporal decision-making.
... Second, intertemporal choice has been shown to be influenced by external and internal contexts (for an overview, see Lempert and Phelps 2016). External contexts pertain to the structure of the intertemporal choice task that might impact the decisionmaking process, such as the way that the choice information is presented (e.g., Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, and Goschke 2013;Fassbender et al. 2014;Magen et al. 2014;Radu et al. 2011;Read et al. 2005). For example, presenting the delay in an intertemporal choice task in the form of calendar dates (e.g., November 17) instead of in the corresponding duration of days (e.g., 14 days) has been shown to increase the number of large/late choices (date-delay effect; e.g., DeHart and Odum 2015; Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, and Goschke 2013;Read et al. 2005). ...
... External contexts pertain to the structure of the intertemporal choice task that might impact the decisionmaking process, such as the way that the choice information is presented (e.g., Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, and Goschke 2013;Fassbender et al. 2014;Magen et al. 2014;Radu et al. 2011;Read et al. 2005). For example, presenting the delay in an intertemporal choice task in the form of calendar dates (e.g., November 17) instead of in the corresponding duration of days (e.g., 14 days) has been shown to increase the number of large/late choices (date-delay effect; e.g., DeHart and Odum 2015; Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, and Goschke 2013;Read et al. 2005). Internal contexts pertain to inner states of people that might impact the decision-making process. ...
Intertemporal choices (i.e., the choice between a sooner available but smaller reward and a later available but larger reward) were initially thought to reflect stable preferences for immediate or delayed rewards. However, recently, it has been shown that intertemporal choices are influenced by factors such as context variables and attentional processes. Here, we investigate if another factor, the choice repetition bias, affects decision making and attentional processes in intertemporal choice. The choice repetition bias is characterized by the tendency to repeat previous choices and to be slower when switching to an alternative choice. In a series of two experiments (including a preregistered, eye-tracking study), we find that the choice repetition bias exists in intertemporal choice. We also find tentative support for an early attentional bias towards the favored attribute dimension of the previous choice; however, this effect disappears when taking the whole decision process into account. This finding raises interesting questions about the cognitive processes underlying the choice repetition bias. In addition, we successfully replicate other attentional effects from the intertemporal choice literature (e.g., more fixations on monetary dimension, gaze cascade effect).
... Moreover, preferences can be easily modified by manipulating temporal description as calendar dates vs. units of delay (Read et al., 2005), and the evaluation mode (joint vs. separate), which can potentially direct attention. Thus, the second objective of this study is to investigate how these factors moderate the impact of outcome desirability on ambiguity preference. ...
... Similarly, temporal framing affects intertemporal choices. Studies show rewards are discounted more heavily when expressed in units of delay (e.g., months) compared to calendar dates (e.g., June 1st, 2022) (LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005), which suggests reduced attention to the temporal dimension for calendar description and potentially affecting the weight individuals give to waiting time (Jiang et al., 2016). ...
People often experience uncertain waiting times, like when awaiting job interview decisions. Despite its prevalence, the preference for waiting time-ambiguity has received limited research attention. Drawing on the information gap theory, which suggests ambiguity avoidance is influenced by the affective response to the missing information caused by uncertainty, this work examined the effect of outcome desirability on ambiguity preference in the context of waiting time. Across five studies in China and the United States, this work observed that people strongly dislike unknown waiting time for undesirable outcomes compared with desirable outcomes. This effect held true in both rating tasks and choice tasks. Furthermore, this study explores factors influencing this desirability effect. Using calendar dates instead of waiting time units and evaluating the options separately rather than jointly, reduced the impact of outcome desirability on ambiguity preference. Additionally, this desirability affect was more pronounced for utilitarian than hedonic outcomes. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of outcome desirability, temporal description, and evaluation mode in shaping individuals' preference for ambiguity in the domain of waiting time.
... In short, people are more willing to wait when the time interval is less transparent or when the amount of reward is more transparent. The time interval can be made less transparent by presenting delays as specific dates rather than numbers of days [18][19][20]. The rewards can be made more transparent by making them easier to Behav. ...
... This presentation format made it easiest to compare Adapt and Exchange, as participants only had to compute the ratio of two numbers. In that sense, it was comparable to previous presentation formats that supported option evaluation, for instance, by presenting delays as days instead of dates [18][19][20] or presenting rewards in clear instead of fuzzy units [21]. Behav ...
Problem solvers often need to choose between adapting a current solution and exchanging it for a new one. However, previous studies have not considered how such decisions might depend on structural and surface features of the task. Therefore, the present study investigated the interplay between the costs of the two solutions (a structural feature) and the format in which this information is presented (a surface feature). In a computer-based modular plant scenario, participants chose between modifying process parameters (Adapt) and reconfiguring the module setup (Exchange). The solution costs were presented either as graphs depicting parameter relations, separate numbers for each parameter, or integrated numbers for each solution. It was hypothesised that graphs induce satisficing (i.e., basing decisions only on Adapt), whereas the numeric formats foster a comparison of the solutions (i.e., basing decisions on the Adapt/Exchange ratio). The hypothesised effects were restricted to situations with medium Adapt costs. A second experiment replicated these findings while adjusting the scale of the numeric formats. In conclusion, Adapt/Exchange decisions are shaped by an interaction of structural and surface features of the task. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the influences on decision strategies in complex scenarios that require a balance between stability and flexibility.
... Second, intertemporal choice has been shown to be influenced by external and internal contexts (for an overview, see Lempert & Phelps, 2016). External contexts pertain to the structure of the intertemporal choice task that might impact the decision-making process, such as the way that the choice information is presented (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;Fassbender et al., 2014;Magen et al., 2014;Radu et al., 2011;Read et al., 2005). For example, presenting the delay in an intertemporal choice task in the form of calendar dates (e.g., 17 November) instead of in the corresponding duration of days (e.g., 14 days) has been shown to increase the number of large/late choices (date-delay effect; e.g., DeHart & Odum, 2015;Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;Read et al., 2005). ...
... External contexts pertain to the structure of the intertemporal choice task that might impact the decision-making process, such as the way that the choice information is presented (e.g., Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;Fassbender et al., 2014;Magen et al., 2014;Radu et al., 2011;Read et al., 2005). For example, presenting the delay in an intertemporal choice task in the form of calendar dates (e.g., 17 November) instead of in the corresponding duration of days (e.g., 14 days) has been shown to increase the number of large/late choices (date-delay effect; e.g., DeHart & Odum, 2015;Dshemuchadse et al., 2013;Read et al., 2005). Internal contexts pertain to inner states of people that might impact the decision-making process. ...
Intertemporal choices (i.e., the choice between a sooner available but smaller reward and a later available but larger reward) were initially thought to reflect stable preferences for immediate or delayed rewards. However, recently it has been shown that intertemporal choices are influenced by factors such as context variables and attentional processes. Here, we investigate if another factor, the choice repetition bias, affects decision making and attentional processes in intertemporal choice. The choice repetition bias is characterised by the tendency to repeat previous choices and to be slower when switching to an alternative choice. In a series of two experiments (including a pre-registered, eye-tracking study), we find that the choice repetition bias exists in intertemporal choice, but that it is not reflected in attentional biases towards the previous choice option or corresponding attributes. This finding raises interesting questions about the cognitive processes underlying the choice repetition bias. In addition, we successfully replicate other attentional effects from the intertemporal choice literature (e.g., more fixations on monetary dimension, gaze cascade effect).
... Manipulating the language involved in a hypothetical discounting task can alter the context of time, the saliency of the future event, or variability in how alternatives are interpreted. This can result in a change in responding even with seemingly minor word alterations Klapproth, 2012;Magen et al., 2008;Radu et al., 2011;Read et al., 2005). For example, if choices are presented with specific dates (e.g., would you prefer $800 now or $1,000 on July 10th) rather than the usual generic language (i.e., would you prefer $800 now or $1,000 in 1 month), people are more likely to choose the delayed option (money at a specific date; Klapproth, 2012;Read et al., 2005). ...
... This can result in a change in responding even with seemingly minor word alterations Klapproth, 2012;Magen et al., 2008;Radu et al., 2011;Read et al., 2005). For example, if choices are presented with specific dates (e.g., would you prefer $800 now or $1,000 on July 10th) rather than the usual generic language (i.e., would you prefer $800 now or $1,000 in 1 month), people are more likely to choose the delayed option (money at a specific date; Klapproth, 2012;Read et al., 2005). Similarly, if the smaller-sooner versus larger-later format of questions is replaced with smaller-sooner-and-nothing-later versus nothing-sooner-and-larger-later (explicit zero), preference again has been shown to shift toward the delayed (nothing-sooner and larger-later) alternative Magen et al., 2008;Radu et al., 2011, but also see Naudé et al., 2018). ...
Addictive behaviors involve patterns of impulsive choices. Discount functions are a useful means of describing the behavioral contingencies involved in those impulsive choices. Although monetary discounting tasks have proven useful, most impulsive behaviors of interest involve nonmonetary consequences. Objective: Developing effective commodity discounting tasks is critical for assessing how delay (and other variables) influences choice with respect to meaningful real-world commodities (e.g., high-calorie foods, alcohol, opioids, and other drugs). Method: Identifying the obstacles specific to nonmonetary commodity discounting and evaluating solutions to those obstacles. Results: Those obstacles include (1) real versus hypothetical commodities, (2) framing, (3) commodity indivisibility, (4) diminishing marginal utility, and (5) variations in economic context. Conclusions: Solutions are presented and evaluated for each of these five obstacles, including the following: (1) assessing relevant experiences and explicitly stipulating transportation and storage issues, (2) systematic analyses across various wordings and holding wording constant across commodities, (3) using an adjusting delay procedure with only whole commodities, (4) assessing value for different commodity amounts (without delay) and adopting quantitative models of discounting that include marginal utility, and (5) controlling for motivating operations, accounting for individual histories, and using closed economies.
... A fixed-sequence choice titration has been used in TP experiments (Andersen et al. 2008;Hardisty and Weber 2009;Harrison et al. 2004;Read et al. 2005). In this approach, Page 7 of 29 Marini Govigli et al. ...
Malnutrition poses significant challenges to African food systems. Addressing these challenges requires synergistic strategies informed by a comprehensive understanding of consumers' food preferences and characteristics, which necessitates the identification of more homogeneous consumer groups. To help reach this objective, this article presents a novel segmentation of African urban food consumers from nine cities across Kenya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Tanzania. The segmentation is based on diet quality indicators and behavioural traits, gathered through structured surveys combined with incentivized in-lab behavioural experiments. Subsequent cluster analyses identified four primary consumer groups characterized by shared behavioural patterns, diet quality, and propensity to food change. These groups serve as the basis for tailored nutritional recommendations aimed at providing policymakers with practical solutions to reinforce the nutritional capacity of local food systems.
... To illustrate this point: There have been many reports of anomalies and biases in intertemporal choice that cannot be accounted for by traditional delay discounting models, including findings of subadditive discounting (Read, 2001), query-order effects (Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989;Weber et al., 2007), date/delay effects (Read et al., 2005), similarity effects (Rubinstein, 2003), and delay/ speedup asymmetry (Loewenstein, 1988). These anomalies suggest that intertemporal choice, as a process, is not well-described by either exponential or hyperbolic delay discounting models. ...
Intertemporal choice tasks are used to measure how people make decisions between outcomes occurring at different time points. Results from these tasks are typically used to study impulsivity and self-control, concepts central in theories and empirical research concerning addiction, criminology, psychopathology, and organizational behavior, among many. Accordingly, preferences for smaller rewards received sooner, over larger rewards received later, have been linked to higher impulsivity and less self-control. This article is a critique of that approach. We first provide a historical overview of research on time preferences tracking the origins of the theoretical link between intertemporal choice, impulsivity, and self-control. Our subsequent conceptual analysis reveals that impulsivity concerns a lack of reflection on one’s choices, not a lack of concern with the future, and self-control concerns internal conflict due to temptation, rather than future-orientedness. We draw attention to the fact that people may, and do, use self-control to choose a “smaller-sooner” reward or impulsively select a “larger-later” reward. We also address technical limitations about intertemporal choice tasks’ reliability and external and predictive validity. We conclude that impulsivity and self-control cannot be measured using a standard intertemporal choice task. We canvass possible future directions for decision-making models in this area, providing the basis for a new understanding of how impulsivity, self-control, and time preferences influence behavior across different domains. We suggest that to study impulsivity and self-control in a temporal context, more information is needed about agents’ motivation, affect, and deliberative process.
... Put simply, participants estimated greater temporal distance for day-framed delays, a finding observed to a lesser extent among participants who completed the date-framed discounting task. That delays framed as dates were viewed as less temporally distant may provide conceptual support for the date-delay discounting literature wherein participants have exhibited lower discounting rates when tasks present delays as yoked calendar dates (DeHart & Odum, 2015;Naudé et al., 2018;Read et al., 2005; see also Rung & Madden, 2018). These data also support the notion that the acute effect of date-framed delays, as viewed on a discounting task, may carry forward to some extent. ...
... Por ello, la mayoría de los estudios que evalúan la relación directa entre estos entrenamientos y la reducción de las tasas de descuento encuentran resultados inconsistentes o poco significativos(Scholten et al., 2019).Las manipulaciones, por el contrario, van dirigidas directamente a cambiar la tasa de descuento de recompensas y por lo general involucran una sola sesión(Rung et al., 2019;Scholten et al., 2019). Ejemplos de ellas son las manipulaciones que involucran factores sociales (e.g.,Senecal et al., 2012), las de encuadre (e.g.,Dehart y Odum, 2015;Read et al., 2005), señalamiento (e.g.,Berry et al., 2014;Dixon y Holton, 2009) y las orientadas a futuro (e.g.,Snider et al., 2016). La mayoría de los estudios que implementan estas manipulaciones muestran que pueden disminuir significativamente las tasas de descuento de recompensas(Scholten et al., 2019). ...
... One manipulation concerns the framing of a scenario or outcome (see Koffarnus et al., 2013 for a review). That is, the way scenarios are framed can result in different discounting patterns despite no actual change to the parameters of the scenario (e.g., DeHart & Odum, 2015;Harman, 2021;LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005). For example, DeHart and Odum (2015) and Harman (2021) found that participants are more likely to wait for delayed outcomes when delays are framed in terms of calendar dates (e.g., April 26, 2029) as opposed to calendar units (e.g., 5 years). ...
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent to which blocking episodic future thinking (EFT) through competing verbal tasks (Experiment 1), or response latency contingencies (Experiment 2) affected measures of delay discounting. Participants responded to delay-discounting scenarios using the fill-in-the-blank method. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to wait 30 s before providing their response. During the 30-s wait interval, participants were instructed to sit quietly, engage in EFT, or list as many English words that start with a given consonant. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible. Area under curve measures were calculated and compared across conditions for each experiment and across experiments. The results of the current study provide support for the role of verbal behavior in mediating the effects of EFT in delay discounting contexts.
... Although the timing of some landmarks cannot be changed, the way it is framed and communicated matters. For instance, research has found that framing the same delayed reward at a precise date (October, 27 st ) rather than using time frames (in 6 months) decreases the discount magnitude (even if October, 27 st is in 6 months) (Read et al. 2005). ...
... There is a possibility that subjects compare the attributes of each option separately, which means they choose an option after comparing the timing of receipts and the amount of reward separately (Scholten and Read, 2006;Kinari et al., 2009). Such a comparison method is related to the attention-focusing hypothesis (Read et al., 2005). This hypothesis is that an evaluation depends on the attention allocated to the amount of reward versus the timing of receipts, with the amount of reward relatively more attention under a date than a delay description. ...
This paper reveals the process of solving a time discounting task with eye tracking. There is a hypothesis that time discounting anomalies such as present bias result not from calculating present discount values of smaller-earlier and larger-later rewards, but from separately comparing attributes such as the timing of receipts and the amounts of rewards. However, our eye movement data show that the proportion of saccades when comparing each option holistically, which implies subjects calculate present discount values, is significant large and is nearly equal to that of saccades when comparing attributes separately. The saccade comparing an earlier option holistically is initially a high likelihood, and then the saccades gradually combine the saccades comparing each option holistically with the saccades comparing attributes separately at the same likelihood. Combining our experimental results and previous research, we support the attention-focusing hypothesis, which implies that when the timing of receipts is written as a delay, subjects are more prone to calculate the discounting rate than when it is written as a date.
... Gilbert et al. (2002) suggested that decisions are frequently based upon predictions of the hedonic implications of future occurrences and that such predictions are made by envisioning the event without temporal context. The "date/delay effect" was a brand-new aberration in intertemporal choice that Read et al. (2005) attempted to explain. Sternad and Kennelly (2017) attempted to explain how managers include long-term thinking in decision-making processes. ...
Purpose
This study aims to conduct a bibliometric analysis on “intertemporal choice” behavior of individuals from journals in the Scopus database between 1957 and 2023. The research covered the data on the said topic since it first originated in the Scopus database and carried out performance analysis and content analysis of papers in the business management and finance disciplines.
Design/methodology/approach
Bibliometric analysis, including science mapping and performance analysis, followed by content analysis of the papers of identified clusters, was conducted. Three clusters based on cocitation analysis and six themes (three major and three minor) were identified using the bibliometrix package in R studio. The content analysis of the papers in these clusters and themes have been discussed in this study, along with the thematic evolution of intertemporal choice research over the period of time, paving a way for future research studies.
Findings
The review unpacks publication and citation trends of intertemporal choice behavior, the most significant authors, journals and papers along with the major clusters and themes of research based on cocitation and degree of centrality and relevance, respectively, i.e. discounting experiments and intertemporal choice, impulsivity, risk preference, time-inconsistent preference, etc.
Originality/value
Over the past years, the research on “intertemporal choice” has flourished because of the increasing interest of researchers and scholars from different fields and the dynamic and pervasive nature of this topic. The well-developed and scattered body of knowledge on intertemporal choice has led to the need of applying a bibliometric analysis in the intertemporal choice literature.
... For instance, substance misusers and sleep-deprived subjects, known to have large discount rates, have prolonged time perception (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004). Third, behavioral economists reported that if the time of receiving a delayed reward is presented in the form of a calendar date (instead of time durations of delay length until receipt) the functional form of their temporal discounting has became exponential, rather than hyperbolic (Read, Frederick, Orsel, & Rahman, 2005). This "delay/ date effect" can be explained by considering that the presentation of a calendar date may reduce the nonlinearity of perception of delay length. ...
Intertemporal choice has drawn attention in behavioral economics, econophysics, and neuroeconomics. In recent studies in mainstream economics, inconsistency in intertemporal choice (dynamic inconsistency) has mainly been focused; whereas in behavioral economics of addiction, impulsivity/impatience in intertemporal choice has been extensively studied. Recent advances in neuroeconomic and econophysical studies on intertemporal choice have made it possible to study both impulsivity and inconsistency in intertemporal choice within a unified framework. In this paper, I propose the new frameworks for investigations into neuroeconomics of intertemporal choice. The importance of studying neurochemical and neuroendocrinological modulations of intertemporal choice and time perception (e.g., serotonin, dopamine, cortisol, testosterone, and epinephrine) is emphasized.
... Our results suggest that the latter might lead to the delays being perceived as especially lengthy, with corresponding diminution of people's willingness to wait. There is evidence for such an effect (Monga & Bagchi, 2012;Siddiqui et al., 2017), although it does not always emerge (LeBoeuf, 2006;Read et al., 2005) and seems to depend on the nature of the delayed outcome and the participant's "mind set" (Monga & Bagchi, 2012;Siddiqui et al., 2017). ...
When choosing between immediate and future rewards, how do people deal with uncertainty about the value of the future outcome or the delay until its occurrence? Skylark et al. (2020) suggested that people employ a delay-reward heuristic: the inferred value of an ambiguous future reward is a function of the stated delay, and vice-versa. The present paper investigates the role of this heuristic in choice behaviour. In Studies 1a–2b, participants inferred the value of an ambiguous future reward or delay before the true value was revealed and a choice made. Preference for the future option was predicted by the discrepancy between the estimated and true values: the more pleasantly surprising the delayed option, the greater the willingness to choose it. Studies 3a–3c examined the association between inference and preference when the ambiguous values remained unknown. As predicted by the use of a delay-reward heuristic, inferred delays and rewards were positively related to stated rewards and delays, respectively. More importantly, choices were associated with inferred rewards and, in some circumstances, delays. Critically, estimates and choices were both order-dependent: when estimates preceded choices, estimates were more optimistic (people inferred smaller delays and larger rewards) and were subsequently more likely to choose the delayed option than when choices were made before estimates. These order effects argue against a simple model in which people deal with ambiguity by first estimating the unknown value and then using their estimate as the basis for decision. Rather, it seems that inferences are partly constructed from choices, and the role of inference in choice depends on whether an explicit estimate is made prior to choosing. Finally, we also find that inferences about ambiguous delays depend on whether the estimate has to be made in “days” or in a self-selected temporal unit, and replicate previous findings that older participants make more pessimistic inferences than younger ones. We discuss the implications and possible mechanisms for these findings.
... Moreover, people show ambiguous time aversion in choices involving the future, preferring options with exact delays (after week 3) over ambiguous inter-period options (2-3 weeks from now) [22]. Also, when specifying a future date, such as "July 3", rather than "three months from now", the discount rate will be perceived lower [45]. Similarly, thinking about future choices in a more precise background can reduce the time discount rate. ...
Abstract: Intertemporal choices are very common in daily life, such as insurance
investments, membership cards, and health behavior advocacy. Prior literature on
intertemporal decision-making mainly focused on economics. Discounted utility
model and hyperbolic model are used to describe people’s preference for intertemporal
decisions, and discount rate k is the indicator of people’s patience. As the research turns to people’s behavioral and psychological mechanisms, the gain-loss asymmetry received attention. Researchers began to study the effects of differences in decision makers’ risk preferences, cognitive differences, attention allocation, and affect on intertemporal decision making. The paper reviews current research in intertemporal decision making from three dimensions: time perception, attentional resources, and affect, also emphasizes the studies using techniques such as fMRI and ERPs in neuroscience, providing a more comprehensive understanding of how the brain makes decisions. In addition, the paper takes the social attributes into account, fully considering the complexity of decision-makers. Future research could explore the effects of visual features on time perception and intertemporal decision making such as color; people’s decision preferences in states of complex emotions and new emotions such as loneliness and FOMO; in-depth studies of brain decision-making mechanisms using techniques such as ERPs in neuroimaging.
Keywords: Decision making , Time delay , Attentional resources , Emotion , ERPs
... To illustrate this point: there have been many reports of anomalies and biases in intertemporal choice that cannot be accounted for by traditional delay discounting models, including findings of subadditive discounting (Read, 2001), query-order effects (Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989;Weber et al., 2007), date/delay effects (Read et al., 2005), similarity effects (Rubinstein, 2003), and delay/speedup asymmetry (Loewenstein, 1988), suggesting that intertemporal choice is not well described by either exponential or hyperbolic delay discounting models. ...
Impulsivity and self-control are central in theories and empirical research concerning addiction, substance use, psychopathology, organisational behaviour, among many. Despite their importance, researchers disagree about the definition and measurement of these constructs. A common method for measuring impulsivity or self-control is inspired by time preferences. Accordingly, preferences for smaller rewards received sooner, over larger rewards received later, have historically been linked to impulsivity and self-control. This paper investigates whether impulsivity and self-control are measured by time preference parameters obtained through intertemporal choice paradigms. We first provide a historical overview of research on time preferences tracking the theoretical link between intertemporal choice, impulsivity and self-control. Conceptualising impulsivity and self-control building on various disciplines, we consider whether impulsivity and self-control concern time preferences. Using these insights, we suggest a possible direction for formal models of impulsivity and self-control. Our conceptual analysis reveals that impulsivity concerns a lack of reflection on one’s choices, not a lack of concern with the future, and self-control concerns deliberation versus temptation, rather than future-orientedness. People may, and do, use self-control to choose a ‘smaller-sooner’ reward or impulsively select a ‘larger-later’ reward. This implies these constructs cannot be measured using standard intertemporal choice parameters. We suggest that to study impulsivity and self-control in a temporal context, more information is needed about agents’ motivation and deliberation. We propose a future direction for decision-making models with a separate causal role for impulsivity and self-control, providing the basis for a new understanding of how they influence choices across different domains of behaviour.
... In the fields of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics, delayed gratification is also known as delay discounting (Kirby and Maraković, 1996), time discounting (Frederick, Loewenstein and O'donoghue, 2002) and temporal discounting (Read et al., 2005). Even though there is different terms for delayed gratification, they all follow the same principle of resisting the urge to claim a reward immediately and potentially gaining a better reward with more benefits in the future (Cheng, Shein and Chiou, 2012). ...
The impact of contemporary urbanisation on health has been studied extensively but the study into to the origin and influences of care during prehistoric periods has created debate among scholars. This paper uses the bioarchaeology of care to explore the presence of care in Neolithic Europe and analyses the relationship between the adoption of a sedentary lifestyle that utilises agriculture and pastoralism and the advancements of health-related caregiving such as new medicines and surgeries. Studies have argued that kinship plays a significant role in determining the provision of care and supports why individuals in a subsistence economy expended the time and resources to prolong an individual’s life. I also use a case study from three Neolithic Linearbandkeramik (LBK) sites in Central Germany to demonstrate how the poor nutrition obtained from the change in dietary patterns, has also been linked to a reduced immune system and in turn, makes individuals more prone to infections. The Index of Care is applied to three case studies of varying pathologies and quantity of skeletal remains: Neolithic amputation (Burial 416 at Buthiers-Boulancourt, France); skeletal dysplasia (Burial 9 at Schweizersbild, Switzerland); Neolithic trepanation (Eira Pedrinha). The application of the Index of Care in this paper shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the program. The Index of Care provides a universal methodology for the determination of care provision in human remains but can only be accurately applied to articulated remains. The case study of Neolithic trepanation from Eira Pedrinha proves this.
... Moreover, people show ambiguous time aversion in choices involving the future, preferring options with exact delays (after week 3) over ambiguous inter-period options (2-3 weeks from now) [22]. Also, when specifying a future date, such as "July 3", rather than "three months from now", the discount rate will be perceived lower [45]. Similarly, thinking about future choices in a more precise background can reduce the time discount rate. ...
Intertemporal choices are very common in daily life, such as insurance investments, membership cards, and health behavior advocacy. Prior literature on intertemporal decision-making mainly focused on economics. Discounted utility model and hyperbolic model are used to describe people’s preference for intertemporal decisions, and discount rate k is the indicator of people’s patience. As the research turns to people’s behavioral and psychological mechanisms, the gain-loss asymmetry received attention. Researchers began to study the effects of differences in decision makers’ risk preferences, cognitive differences, attention allocation, and affect on intertemporal decision making. The paper reviews current research in intertemporal decision making from three dimensions: time perception, attentional resources, and affect, also emphasizes the studies using techniques such as fMRI and ERPs in neuroscience, providing a more comprehensive understanding of how the brain makes decisions. In addition, the paper takes the social attributes into account, fully considering the complexity of decision-makers. Future research could explore the effects of visual features on time perception and intertemporal decision making, such as color; people’s decision preferences in states of complex emotions and new emotions such as loneliness and FOMO; in-depth studies of brain decision-making mechanisms using techniques such as ERPs in neuroimaging.KeywordsDecision makingTime delayAttentional resourcesEmotionERPs
... In another study, Dang et al. (2021), across three studies, replicated the hidden-zero effect and found it generalizable; they did not find any difference in this case between Chinese and Swedish participants. Although most of the studies on intertemporal choice focus on money as an outcome (Read et al., 2005;Read et al., 2013), opportunity cost is not restricted to only financial decisions. Research shows that consumers react to time and money differently (Aaker et al., 2011;DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007, 2011Mogilner, 2010;Zauberman & Lynch Jr, 2005). ...
Human beings have countless desires but bounded resources, and this limitation makes them choose between alternatives. Consumers are encouraged to be aware of the best alternative use of a resource (e.g., money, and time), which is known as the opportunity cost of their choice. The current systematic review addresses existing debates and ambiguities surrounding opportunity cost consideration by consumers. We review the origins, different definitions, antecedents, associated decisions, and outcomes of opportunity costs consideration through a detailed examination of the relevant literature from multiple disciplines such as marketing, psychology, and economics. The SPAR‐4‐SLR protocol is used to conduct the review and the ADO (Antecedents, Decisions, Outcomes) framework is used to organize our findings. We highlight and reconcile two different perspectives on the conceptualization of opportunity cost as the forgone value (by considering willingness to pay) versus the physical market value of the second‐best alternative. Different antecedents of opportunity cost consideration are categorized into three categories: Individual differences, Situational variables, and Information processing method. We discuss when and why consumers tend to neglect the opportunity cost, in which situations they are more likely to overestimate the opportunity cost, and what is the difference between consideration of opportunity cost of time and money. Results show that despite what the economics literature suggests, opportunity cost consideration does not always lead to positive outcomes. Based on the literature of regret theory, and differences between maximizers and satisficers, we discuss how opportunity cost considerations might lead to choice discomfort, regret, and dissatisfaction. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Purpose
Service costs are often presented as estimates rather than exact costs. This research presents an interesting new framing effect associated with the framing of service cost estimates. Specifically, the authors hypothesize and provide evidence for the upper-limit framing effect: framing the upper limit of a cost estimate as “less than X” (vs “no more than X”) results in different expectations of the underlying costs.
Design/methodology/approach
A series of eight studies, involving everyday consumption contexts, diverse populations and incentive compatible and hypothetical scenario-based designs, were conducted to test the underlying hypotheses.
Findings
A series of eight studies demonstrate that when estimates are small, less than (vs no more than) framing results in contracted cost perceptions, and that the reverse emerges in the context of large cost estimates. Furthermore, these effects are driven by processing fluency, and systematically influence downstream consumption choices.
Research limitations/implications
Future research can further examine our effects manipulating “small” versus “large” not by the magnitude of the cost, but by the type of individual or consumption context. In addition, future research could test how specific individual differences moderate the effects.
Practical implications
This research presents substantial managerial implications. Given that marketers interchangeably use less than and no more than framing to express the upper limit of a service cost estimate, this study provides an important insight that the framing of the upper limit can influence perception of the underlying service cost, and that the nature of the effect depends on the size of the estimate.
Social implications
This research suggests implications for communicating public policy as it provides insights to regulators and policymakers regarding how to frame communication involving federally mandated guidelines. For example, when communicating outcomes, public policymakers should consider the magnitude of the outcome when determining how to frame the message.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research is perhaps the first to study the influence of cost framing on perception of service cost estimates. In addition, this research makes substantial contributions to the literatures on negation, framing and consumer cost perception.
Agents help consumers make decisions. While agents have traditionally been human (e.g., sales associate, real estate agent, financial advisor), artificial intelligence (AI) agents are becoming more prevalent. We find that the type of agent, AI versus human, has an influence on intertemporal judgment. Specifically, when an agent is identified as AI, the concept of fast processing becomes more accessible, which makes time delays seem subjectively longer and encourages impatient behavior. These results have implications for how to conceptualize the influence of AI agents on judgment, the impact of time perception on intertemporal choices, and the sources of impatient behavior.
Previous research has questioned the validity of Samuelson’s Discounted Utility model, revealing certain anomalies in intertemporal choice processes. This theoretical–empirical study investigates the date–delay effect, which suggests that individuals make less impulsive monetary decisions when time is framed as calendar dates rather than as delay terms. First, we propose a theoretical definition of this anomaly, assuming the property of non-separability. Next, we conduct an empirical analysis by using data obtained from a questionnaire distributed to Spanish university students ( N=155 N = 155 ). The results confirm the presence of the date–delay effect and its association with demographic (e.g., country of origin, age), academic and behavioral variables (e.g., sport practice, obesity), as well as the non-separability property in both date and delay scenarios. These results highlight the importance of further exploring the interplay between temporal framing and individual characteristics, offering valuable insights for future research and practical applications.
“Understanding and improving decision-making” is considered to be a major priority for researchers in behavioral decision-making. Investigating framing effects can simultaneously serve both goals. Currently, framing effects are extensively studied and applied in the fields of multi-attribute and risky decision-making, with relatively less attention given to intertemporal and spatial decision-making, despite their common occurrences in real-life scenarios. Given the interchangeable nature of time and space (i.e., distance = time × velocity, where the velocity is a constant), the same decision problem can be described either as a spatial decision problem using spatial framing or as an intertemporal decision problem using temporal framing. The scientific questions addressed in this study are as follows: (1) Whether there exists a phenomenon called the "time-space framing effect" in spatiotemporal decision contexts? Specifically, this effect refers to changes in people's decision preferences when the same decision problem is described using either a time or space frame. (2) If this effect indeed exists, what are its underlying psychological mechanisms? (3) Can the time-space framing effect be used to nudge people’s decision-making behavior in real life? To address the proposed question, this study will examine the phenomenon of the time-space framing effect (Study 1), unravel its psychological mechanisms (Studies 2 and 3), and ascertain its practical implications for nudging behavior (Study 4) by employing multiple methods, such as cognitive-behavioral approaches, eye-tracking techniques, and field experiments.
The theoretical and practical implications of this study are primarily reflected in three aspects: Firstly, the approach to frame manipulation in this study differs from that of previous studies. Previous studies typically focused on manipulating frames within the same dimension, such as the attribute framing effect in the multi-attribute decision-making and the classic gain-loss framing effect in the risky decision-making. These studies usually involve changes in the positivity or negativity of attributes or outcomes within the same dimension, which can be categorized as a "qualitative" manipulation within the domain. In the domains of intertemporal and spatial decision-making, frame manipulation within the monetary/time/space unit effects entails altering numerical units within the same outcome dimension or the time/space dimension, which can be categorized as a "quantitative" manipulation within the domain. However, the manipulation of the time-space frames in this study spans across the domains of intertemporal and spatial decisions (i.e., frame manipulation within different dimensions), thus representing an exploration of a novel, cross-domain "qualitative" framing manipulation.
Secondly, investigating the time-space framing effect and its mechanisms provides a new perspective and paradigm for understanding intertemporal and spatial decisions. This study integrates theories concerning the convertible relationship between time and space, psychological distance theory, construal-level theory, and theories concerning two broad classes of decision models regarding intertemporal and spatial decisions (i.e., the utility comparison models and the attribute-comparison models). It attempts to propose a theoretical hypothesis model that can simultaneously integrate the "binary choice" and the "single option" decision contexts to explain the mechanisms underlying the time-space framing effect. Furthermore, multiple research methods, including static behavioral outcome tests and dynamic eye-tracking techniques, are employed to examine the decision-making processes when people face spatiotemporal decision contexts and the underlying reasons leading to changes in decision preferences.
Finally, while previous research has been limited to investigating the spatiotemporal framing effect in laboratory or virtual contexts, this study will conduct a series of field quasi-experiments to provide tangible evidence and relevant recommendations for examining the nudging effects of the time-space framing effect in real-world contexts.
In sum, the findings of this study are expected to provide a new paradigm and theoretical contribution for understanding intertemporal and spatial decision-making, while offering some psychological insights to nudge individuals and organizations toward making more judicious decisions.
We conduct an experiment to examine how the attitude toward time preference changed when there was a time-related occasion, specifically the Lunar New Year. We anticipated that individuals would be more patient as measured by a battery of questions after the New Year. However, we find that individuals only appear more patient when those questions pose the amount of time they have to wait in year increments rather than other units of time. More experimentation is necessary to identify the peculiarities of framing questions around this “New Years Effect.”
Repetidamente las personas toman decisiones que eventualmente afectarán su bienestar. Decidir entre obtener un beneficio inmediato o esperar por un beneficio de mayor magnitud representa un ejemplo de situación que ocurre diariamente y en diversos escenarios. Así, una persona puede preferir un beneficio demorado en un momento, pero cambiar dicha preferencia en situaciones similares en el futuro. En otros casos, las personas pueden ser consistentes al sistemáticamente optar por beneficios inmediatos, o bien por beneficios futuros, con excepciones ocasionales. El balance en el conjunto de decisiones a lo largo del tiempo suele estar determinada por las habilidades para demorar la gratificación: cuando estas habilidades no están desarrolladas las personas con frecuencia prefieren recompensas inmediatas, aunque estas sean de menor magnitud o impliquen pérdidas en el futuro; la habilidad para demorar la gratificación suele favorecer que las personas prefieran mayores beneficios en el futuro, aunque ello implique perder una recompensa inmediata.
Adolescence is characterised by a peak in sensation seeking accompanied by gradually developing self-control skills. Adolescents typically show steeper delay discounting performance than other age groups; a feature that is transdiagnostically related to a variety of mental health disorders. However, delay discounting performance is not a singular mental process but involves both risk/reward and future orientation elements, usually operationalised as probability/risk and time discounting tasks, respectively. To clarify the specific relations between the risk/reward and future orientation elements of delay discounting and different types of mental health problems, two bi-factor models and a series of structural equation models (SEMs) were fitted to multi-informant (parent and adolescent self-reported) mental health data from a large UK study. A transdiagnostic promotive role of future orientation was found using bi-factor modelling to separate general and dimension-specific mental health variation; however, this was limited to parent reports. In addition, future orientation was negatively associated with conduct problems and ADHD symptoms, but positively associated with emotional problems. Risk aversion was negatively associated with conduct problems, but positively associated with emotional and peer problems. The findings highlight that risk/reward and future orientation elements of delay discounting play partly distinct roles in different mental health problems and can serve both promotive and risk roles during adolescence. Findings also illuminate which elements of delay discounting should be intervention targets for different mental health concerns.
We present and expand existing theories about why individuals may assess positive outcomes differently from negative outcomes in intertemporal choices. All of our theories—based on utility or cost considerations – predict a conventional magnitude effect for positive outcomes, that is, a negative relation between outcome size and subjective discount rates. For negative outcomes, however, implications are different for utility‐ and cost‐based approaches. We argue that the relevance of utility‐based aspects is strengthened in a money frame, leading to a conventional magnitude effect even for negative outcomes, whereas cost‐based considerations gain in importance in an interest rate frame, implying, in contrast, a “reverse” magnitude effect, that is, higher discount rates for (absolutely) higher outcome size. A web‐based experiment with 676 participants confirms our theoretical findings: the conventional magnitude effect prevails for positive outcomes in the money and the interest rate frame and negative outcomes in the money frame. However, there is a reverse magnitude effect for negative outcomes in the interest rate frame. Our results might help to better understand prevailing magnitude effects in practical applications and might also be apt to derive suggestions for better designing of intertemporal decision problems.
Psychologists have been observing and interpreting economic behaviour for at least fifty years, and the last decade, in particular, has seen an escalated interest in the interface between psychology and economics. The Cambridge Handbook of Psychology and Economic Behaviour is a valuable reference resource dedicated to improving our understanding of the economic mind and economic behaviour. Employing empirical methods – including laboratory experiments, field experiments, observations, questionnaires and interviews – the Handbook covers aspects of theory and method, financial and consumer behaviour, the environment and biological perspectives. With contributions from distinguished scholars from a variety of countries and backgrounds, the Handbook is an important step forward in the improvement of communications between the disciplines of psychology and economics. It will appeal to academic researchers and graduates in economic psychology and behavioural economics.
Delay discounting (DD) is a well-established method for evaluating behavioral impulsivity. It has been implemented extensively over the past few decades to identify associations between impulsivity and numerous psychopathologies. A valuable aspect of the DD task is its flexibility, allowing more targeted investigations of specific populations or disorders and several methodological factors may be manipulated by the researcher to maximize its utility. This chapter describes the precise methods through which our lab administers the DD task, including computer setup, instructions for participants, and a step-by-step explanation of trial processes which generate indifference points across several delays. Several different elements of the task are also considered, including the use of real or hypothetical rewards, the type of task used, and framing of questions. Each of these factors plays a significant role in the type of data acquired, the population best evaluated, and how it should be interpreted.Key wordsDelay discountingAdjusting amounts
Real rewards
Hypothetical rewards
Framing
Methods
Inconsistency in consumer time preferences has been well-established and used to explain seemingly short-sighted behaviors (e.g., failures of self-control). However, prior research has conflated time-inconsistent preferences (discount rates that vary over time) with present bias (greater discounting when outcomes are delayed specifically from the present, as opposed to from a future time). This research shows that time-inconsistent preferences are reliably observed only when choices are substantially delayed (e.g., months into the future), which cannot be explained by present bias. This seeming puzzle is explained by a novel cross-period discounting framework, which predicts that consumers are more impatient when choosing between options occurring in different subjective financial periods. As a result, they display inconsistent time preferences and are less willing to wait for an equally delayed outcome specifically when a common delay to both options moves the larger-later option into a subsequent financial period. Six studies and multiple supplementary studies demonstrate that sensitivity to subjective financial periods accounts for time-inconsistent consumer preferences better than current models of time discounting based on present bias.
Impulsive choice is preference for a smaller-sooner (SS) outcome over a larger-later (LL) outcome when LL choices result in greater reinforcement maximization. Delay discounting is a model of impulsive choice that describes the decaying value of a reinforcer over time, with impulsive choice evident when the empirical choice-delay function is steep. Steep discounting is correlated with multiple diseases and disorders. Thus, understanding the processes underlying impulsive choice is a popular topic for investigation. Experimental research has explored the conditions that moderate impulsive choice, and quantitative models of impulsive choice have been developed that elegantly represent the underlying processes. This review spotlights experimental research in impulsive choice covering human and nonhuman animals across the domains of learning, motivation, and cognition. Contemporary models of delay discounting designed to explain the underlying mechanisms of impulsive choice are discussed. These models focus on potential candidate mechanisms, which include perception, delay and/or reinforcer sensitivity, reinforcement maximization, motivation, and cognitive systems. Although the models collectively explain multiple mechanistic phenomena, there are several cognitive processes, such as attention and working memory, that are overlooked. Future research and model development should focus on bridging the gap between quantitative models and empirical phenomena.
A time interval can be presented as a duration (e.g., 10 days) or a calendar date (e.g., May 10). This study examines the influence of time descriptions on task scheduling. Results of 10 studies (N = 2,129) present evidence that people tend to schedule their tasks earlier when the time interval is described as a duration than a date. This time description effect is accounted for by different mindsets. People tend to have an implemental mindset when time is described as a duration (vs. date) because of stronger feelings of being inside the time frame. This mindset affects decisions on scheduling when to initiate future tasks.
We consider the intertemporal trade-off between obtaining a small amount soon or a large one later. To solve this trade-off, we propose a general model of a multi-attribute heuristic that is rooted in exponential discounting and contains several models discussed in the literature as special cases. First, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for time-consistent behavior. Second, we show that level effects lead to behavior as if discounting hyperbolically. Finally, we show that the imputed discount factors – based on the presumption of exponential discounting – can over- as well as underestimate the true discount rate.
This study investigated how intertemporal choices made for others differed from those made for oneself, and how attention directed to specific attributes of the choice problem contributed to such differences. Moderating effects of components of trait empathy, chronic construal-level, and personal sense of power were examined. Thirty-five participants performed a money choice task where they made choices for themselves and on behalf of an acquaintance, during which their eye movements were tracked. Results showed that lower scores on the fantasy component of empathy predicted decreased delay discounting while making decisions for others, while higher empathic concern favoured less impulsive choices for both self and others. Higher sense of power favoured less impulsive choices for both self and others. While making decisions for others, higher power biased more attention towards the reward attribute of the choice, which in turn predicted less delay discounting. Results are discussed from a construal-level perspective.
Preference can be inferred from direct choice between options or from a matching procedure in which the decision maker adjusts one option to match another. Studies of preferences between two-dimensional options (e.g., public policies, job applicants, benefit plans) show that the more prominent dimension looms larger in choice than in matching. Thus, choice is more lexicographic than matching. This finding is viewed as an instance of a general principle of compatibility: The weighting of inputs is enhanced by their compatibility with the output. To account for such effects, we develop a hierarchy of models in which the trade-off between attributes is contingent on the nature of the response. The simplest theory of this type, called the contingent weighting model, is applied to the analysis of various compatibility effects, including the choice-matching discrepancy and the preference-reversal phenomenon. These results raise both conceptual and practical questions concerning the nature, the meaning and the assessment of preference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Normative economic models assume that delay-discounting rates for future rewards are independent of the amount of, and delay to, a reward. These assumptions were tested in 3 experiments in which participants were asked to bid their own money on delayed monetary rewards in a sealed, second-bid auction. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants made their bids without feedback about the bids of other participants. In Experiment 3, half of the participants received such feedback. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants adjusted their bids until they were indifferent between the bid and the delayed reward. Participants' bids violated both normative assumptions: Discounting rates decreased with increases in amount for 62 of 67 participants, and a function in which the rate decreases with increases in delay (hyperbolic) fit the bids better than did a normative function (exponential) for 59 of 67 participants. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Conducted 4 experiments with a total of 156 undergraduates and 17 staff members. Ss were asked to choose between pairs of alternatives that they had previously equated in value. Within each pair, one alternative was superior on an important dimension but so inferior on a lesser dimension that this disadvantage canceled its advantage. The majority of Ss resolved these choices by consistently selecting the alternative that was superior on the more important dimension. This result supports the contention that choices are determined by mechanisms that are easy to explain and justify to oneself and to others. Some practical implications of this contention are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Time delay and uncertainty are deeply interrelated though the nature of the interaction between these two constructs remains equivocal. The immediacy and the certainty effects provide an easy access to study the relationship between time delay and uncertainty. Three experiments are described which examine the effect of uncertainty on the immediacy effect and the effect of time delay on the certainty effect. We also present analytical arguments that lead to the tentative conclusion that immediacy is more likely to be a derivative of certainty than the reverse. It is further proposed that laboratory experiments may undermine the importance of uncertainty underlying time delays as demonstrated in experiment 4. Theoretical and methodological intricacies associated with separating uncertainty and time delay are discussed.
Discusses the cognitive and the psychophysical determinants of choice in risky and riskless contexts. The psychophysics of value induce risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The psychophysics of chance induce overweighting of sure things and of improbable events, relative to events of moderate probability. Decision problems can be described or framed in multiple ways that give rise to different preferences, contrary to the invariance criterion of rational choice. The process of mental accounting, in which people organize the outcomes of transactions, explains some anomalies of consumer behavior. In particular, the acceptability of an option can depend on whether a negative outcome is evaluated as a cost or as an uncompensated loss. The relationships between decision values and experience values and between hedonic experience and objective states are discussed. (27 ref)
In a choice among assured, familiar outcomes of behavior, impulsiveness is the choice of less rewarding over more rewarding alternatives. Discussions of impulsiveness in the literature of economics, sociology, social psychology, dynamic psychology and psychiatry, behavioral psychology, and "behavior therapy" are reviewed. Impulsiveness seems to be best accounted for by the hyperbolic curves that have been found to describe the decline in effectiveness of rewards as the rewards are delayed from the time of choice. Such curves predict a reliable change of choice between some alternative rewards as a function of time. This change of choice provides a rationale for the known kinds of impulse control and relates them to several hitherto perplexing phenomena: behavioral rigidity, time-out from positive reinforcement, willpower, self-reward, compulsive traits, projection, boredom, and the capacity of punishing stimuli to attract attention. (31/2 p ref)
This article demonstrates that choices based on similarity judgments will exhibit not only common ratio and reflection effects under uncertainty but also common difference and reflection effects in intertemporal contexts. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
The Adaptive Decision Maker argues that people use a variety of strategies to make judgments and choices. The authors introduce a model that shows how decision makers balance effort and accuracy considerations and predicts which strategy a person will use in a given situation. A series of experiments testing the model are presented, and the authors analyse how the model can lead to improved decisions and opportunities for further research.
We discuss the cognitive and the psy- chophysical determinants of choice in risky and risk- less contexts. The psychophysics of value induce risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The psychophysics of chance induce overweighting of sure things and of improbable events, relative to events of moderate probability. De- cision problems can be described or framed in multiple ways that give rise to different preferences, contrary to the invariance criterion of rational choice. The pro- cess of mental accounting, in which people organize the outcomes of transactions, explains some anomalies of consumer behavior. In particular, the acceptability of an option can depend on whether a negative outcome is evaluated as a cost or as an uncompensated loss. The relation between decision values and experience values is discussed. Making decisions is like speaking prose—people do it all the time, knowingly or unknowingly. It is hardly surprising, then, that the topic of decision making is shared by many disciplines, from mathematics and statistics, through economics and political science, to sociology and psychology. The study of decisions ad- dresses both normative and descriptive questions. The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of rationality and the logic of decision making. The de- scriptive analysis, in contrast, is concerned with peo- ple's beliefs and preferences as they are, not as they should be. The tension between normative and de- scriptive considerations characterizes much of the study of judgment and choice. Analyses of decision making commonly distin- guish risky and riskless choices. The paradigmatic example of decision under risk is the acceptability of a gamble that yields monetary outcomes with specified probabilities. A typical riskless decision concerns the acceptability of a transaction in which a good or a service is exchanged for money or labor. In the first part of this article we present an analysis of the cog- nitive and psychophysical factors that determine the value of risky prospects. In the second part we extend this analysis to transactions and trades. Risky Choice Risky choices, such as whether or not to take an umbrella and whether or not to go to war, are made without advance knowledge of their consequences. Because the consequences of such actions depend on uncertain events such as the weather or the opponent's resolve, the choice of an act may be construed as the acceptance of a gamble that can yield various out- comes with different probabilities. It is therefore nat- ural that the study of decision making under risk has focused on choices between simple gambles with monetary outcomes and specified probabilities, in the hope that these simple problems will reveal basic at- titudes toward risk and value. We shall sketch an approach to risky choice that
Studies of animal and human behavior suggest that discount functions are approximately hyperbolic (Ainslie, Picoeconomics, 1992). Hyperbolic models explain a wide range of empirical anomalies including (1) missing precautionary savings effects, (2) incongruence between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, (3) consumption discontinuities at retirement, (4) variation in patience over the life cycle, (5) consumer self-reports of `undersaving', (6) disproportionate retirement accumulation in illiquid assets, (7) asset-specific marginal propensities to consume, and (8) declining national savings rates in developed countries. Hyperbolic models also provide a new framework for analyzing the welfare gains that come from pro-saving policies like social security and tax-deferred retirement accounts.
A basic stationarity axiom of economic theory assumes stable preference between two deferred goods separated by a fixed time To test this assumption, we offered subjects choices between delayed rewards, while manipulating the delays to those rewards Preferences typically reversed with changes in delay, as predicted by hyperbolic discounting models of impulsiveness Of 36 subjects, 34 reversed preference from a larger, later reward to a smaller, earlier reward as the delays to both rewards decreased We conclude that the stationarity axiom is not appropriate in models of human choice
The axiomatic models of intertemporal choice assume that an individual's rate of time discount is constant. Yet a great deal of anecdotal and hypothetical evidence suggests that the discount rate is instead hyperbolic. Likewise, animal studies have also supported the hyperbolic discount rate. Very little empirical evidence exists using human subjects making salient choices. Using experimental economic methodology, support is found for the stationarity component of the discount rate assumption but not for the linearity component.
This paper presents a problem which I believe has not heretofore been analysed2 and provides a theory to explain, under different circumstances, three related phenomena: (1) spendthriftiness; (2) the deliberate regimenting of one’s future economic behaviour— even at a cost; and (3) thrift. The senses in which we deal with these topics can probably not be very well understood, however, until after the paper has been read; but a few sentences at this point may shed some light on what we are up to.
Intertemporal decisions imply trade-offs between current and future rewards. Intertemporal discounting models formalize these trade-offs by quantifying the values of delayed pay-offs.
It has been suggested that the long-term discount rate for environmental goods should decrease at longer delays. One justification for this suggestion is that human judgments support it. This article presents an experiment showing that judgments concerning discount rates are internally inconsistent. These results point to potential problems with the use of judgments referenda for determining discount rates in cost-benefit analyses.
This study compares time preference in the cases of certainty and risk. We analyze both matching and choice behavior. We find that violations of the stationarity axiom are restricted to matching behavior, both for certainty and risk. We also compare the discounting of certain and risky outcomes as well as the discounting of gains and losses. In matching tasks, certain outcomes are discounted more than risky ones. We could not confirm these results in a choice task. Gains and losses are not found to be discounted at different rates.
Two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 \times 4 \times 4 factorial design: scenario (postponing a receipt, postponing a payment, expediting a receipt, expediting a payment), time delay (0.5, 1, 2, and 4 years), and size of cashflow (40, 200, 5000). Individual discount rates were inferred from the responses, and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates. The classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios, time delays, and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected. A market segmentation approach was found lacking. The results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value, and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position.
Recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed. Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory (Kahneman, D., A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2) 363--391.) explains many of these "framing" effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated. This paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference point concept to intertemporal choice. Three experiments demonstrate that when people choose between immediate and delayed consumption, the reference point used to evaluate alternatives can significantly influence choice. The first study elicited relative preference for immediate and delayed consumption using three methods, each of which differently framed choices between alternatives offering identical end-state consumption. The conventional discounted utility model predicts that the three methods of elicitation should yield similar estimates of time preference, but preferences were found to differ in accordance with a reference point model. The second and third studies extend and replicate the results from the first, the third using real rather than hypothetical choices.
This paper considers a number of parallels between risky and intertemporal choice. We begin by demonstrating a one-to-one correspondence between the behavioral violations of the respective normative theories for the two domains (i.e., expected utility and discounted utility models). We argue that such violations (or preference reversals) are broadly consistent with three propositions about the weight that an attribute receives in both types of multiattribute choice. Specifically, it appears that: (1) if we add a constant to all values of an attribute, then that attribute becomes less important; (2) if we proportionately increase all values of an attribute, or if we change the sign of an attribute, from positive to negative, then that attribute becomes more important. The generality of these propositions, as well as the constraints they would impose on separable representations of multiattribute preferences, is discussed.
Individual discount rates are estimated from survey evidence. For gains, they are found to vary inversely with the size of the reward and the length of time to be waited. Rates are found to be much smaller for losses that for gains.
Three models of credit markets - (1) the permanent income model, (2) upward sloping credit supply to individual borrowers, and (3) constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement - are tested using credit market data and an experimental study of individuals' discount rates in south India. The permanent income model is rejected by both the discount rate and the credit market data. The discount rate data are consistent with either of the other two models, while the credit market data are consistent with a combination of these two models. Other explanations are found to be insufficient to explain the results of this study.
Recent models of procrastination due to self-control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self-control problems. We develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self-control problems. This menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones. A person might forgo completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never-to-be-completed option. Hence, providing a nonprocrastinator additional options can induce procrastination, and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This paper provides a new and more robust test of the descriptive validity of the constant rate discounted utility model in medical decision analysis. The constant rate discounted utility model is compared with two competing theories, Harvey's (1986) proportional discounting model and Loewenstein and Prelec's (1992) hyperbolic discounting model. To compare the various intertemporal models, previous studies on intertemporal preferences for health assumed a specific parametric form of the utility function for life-years and no discounting within the time periods that health states are experienced. The present study avoids such confounding assumptions by focusing on the axiomatic structure of the discounting models. The present study further differs by using choices instead of matching to elicit intertemporal preferences. The experimental results provide support for decreasing timing aversion, the condition underlying the proportional and the hyperbolic discounting model, but they violate stationarity, the central condition of the constant rate discounted utility model. There is some ambiguity whether the violations of stationarity are primarily caused by an immediacy effect. The results confirm violations of stationarity in choice-based elicitations tasks, in contrast with the results from Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) which supported stationarity in choices over monetary outcomes. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.
A within-subject design, using human participants, compared delay discounting functions for real and hypothetical money rewards. Both real and hypothetical rewards were studied across a range that included 250. For 5 of the 6 participants, no systematic difference in discount rate was observed in response to real and hypothetical choices, suggesting that hypothetical rewards may often serve as a valid proxy for real rewards in delay discounting research. By measuring discounting at an unprecedented range of real rewards, this study has also systematically replicated the robust finding in human delay discounting research that discount rates decrease with increasing magnitude of reward. A hyperbolic decay model described the data better than an exponential model.
Regret theory predicts that choices over prospects will be systematically influenced by the juxtaposition of outcomes in the payoff matrix. Experiments have found apparent juxtaposition effects of this kind. However, these experiments have not controlled for "event-splitting effects" (ESEs), by which the subjective weight given to an outcome depends on the number of states of the world in which it occurs, as well as on their combined probability. An experiment is reported that tests independently for juxtaposition effects and ESEs. The results suggest that the apparent juxtaposition effects found in previous experiments are largely due to ESEs. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subadditive time discounting means that discounting over a delay is greater when the delay is divided into subintervals than when it is left undivided. This may produce the most important result usually attributed to hyperbolic discounting: declining impatience, or the inverse relationship between the discount rate and the magnitude of the delay. Three choice experiments were conducted to test for subadditive discounting, and to determine whether it is sufficient to explain declining impatience. All three experiments showed strong evidence of subadditive discounting, but there was no evidence of declining impatience. I conclude by questioning whether hyperbolic discounting is a plausible account of time preference. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
The article questions the methodology of "economics and psychology" in its focus on the case of hyperbolic discounting. Using some experimental results, I argue that the same type of evidence, which rejects the standard constant discount utility functions, can just as easily reject hyperbolic discounting as well. Furthermore, a decision-making procedure based on similarity relations better explains the observations and is more intuitive. The article concludes that combining "economics and psychology" requires opening the black box of decision makers instead of modifying functional forms. Copyright 2003 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
This paper discusses the discounted utility (DU) model: its historical development, underlying assumptions, and "anomalies"--the empirical regularities that are inconsistent with its theoretical predictions. We then summarize the alternate theoretical formulations that have been advanced to address these anomalies. We also review three decades of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and discuss reasons for the spectacular variation in implicit discount rates across studies. Throughout the paper, we stress the importance of distinguishing time preference, per se, from many other considerations that also influence intertemporal choices.
The subjective value given to time, also known as the psychological interest rate, or the subjective price of time, is a core concept of the microeconomic choices. Individual decisions using a unique and constant subjective interest rate will refer to an exponential discounting function. However, many empirical and behavioural studies underline the idea of a non-flat term structure of subjective interest rates with a decreasing slope. Using an empirical test this paper aims at identifying in individual behaviours if agents see their psychological value of time decreasing or not. A sample of 243 individuals was questioned with regard to their time preference attitudes. We show that the subjective interest rates follow a negatively sloped term structure. It can be parameterized using two variables, one specifying the instantaneous time preference, the other characterizing the slope of the term structure. A trade-off law called “balancing pressure law” is identified between these two parameters. We show that the term structure of psychological rates depends strongly on gender, but appears not linked with life expectancy. In that sense, individual subjective time preference is not exposed to a tempus fugit effect. We also question the cross relation between risk aversion and time preference. On the theoretical ground, they stand as two different and independent dimensions of choices. However, empirically, both time preference attitude and slope seem directly influenced by the risk attitude.
The subjective value given to time, also known as the psychological interest rate, or the subjective price of time, is a core concept of the microeconomic choices. Individual decisions using a unique and constant subjective interest rate will refer to an exponential discounting function. However, many empirical and behavioural studies underline the idea of a non-flat term structure of subjective interest rates with a decreasing slope. Using an empirical test this paper aims at identifying in individual behaviours if agents see their psychological value of time decreasing or not. A sample of 243 individuals was questioned with regard to their time preference attitudes. We show that the subjective interest rates follow a negatively sloped term structure. It can be parameterized using two variables, one specifying the instantaneous time preference, the other characterizing the slope of the term structure. A trade-off law called “balancing pressure law” is identified between these two parameters. We show that the term structure of psychological rates depends strongly on gender, but appears not linked with life expectancy. In that sense, individual subjective time preference is not exposed to a tempus fugit effect. We also question the cross relation between risk aversion and time preference. On the theoretical ground, they stand as two different and independent dimensions of choices. However, empirically, both time preference attitude and slope seem directly influenced by the risk attitude.
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