Analysis and Improvement of an Anonymity Scheme for P2P Reputation Systems

ArticleinIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences 91-A(10):2893-2895 · October 2008with8 Reads
Impact Factor: 0.23 · DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.10.2893 · Source: DBLP

In 2006, Miranda et al. proposed an anonymity scheme to achieve peers' anonymity in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) reputation systems. In this paper, we show that this scheme can not achieve peers' anonymity in two cases. We also propose an improvement which solves the problem and improves the degree of anonymity.

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