Content uploaded by Raul Gomez
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Raul Gomez on Oct 26, 2014
Content may be subject to copyright.
This is an Author's Manuscript of an article whose final and definitive form, the Version of Record, has
been published in Party Politics 18(3): 667-685, first published on March 21, 2011
doi:10.1177/1354068810389636
Factionalism in multi-level contexts:
When party organisation becomes a device
Tània Verge and Raul Gomez
ABSTRACT
This article provides a dynamic framework through which factionalism can be
examined and the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts.
We discuss the interaction between factionalism and party structure by setting out a
model of factional organisation dependent on the tolerance of host parties towards
dissent and their degree of vertical integration, their combination yielding four possible
strategies for opposition factions: centralised, interlayered, multilayered and
decentralised. We also consider what implications there are for the party’s dominant
coalition in episodes of high factionalism. These act as a catalyst for the modification of
party rules that regulate dissent and vertical distribution of power. The hypotheses
developed are tested on four Spanish political parties which differ on the autonomy of
regional branches and factions, the competitive position in the party system and
factionalism type – more policy or more patronage-oriented.
Key words
Political parties, party factionalism, federal, Spain
1
Introduction
Factionalism has been poorly developed in the study of political parties and it is
still orphan of conceptual approaches and hypotheses. This is so despite most parties
passing through periods of unity and dissent according to particular external or internal
circumstances such as electoral performance or changes in leadership (Hine, 1982: 48).
Indeed, factionalism is ubiquitous in political parties (Harmel et al., 1995: 7). The study
of factionalism is thus not confined to the understanding of party politics but to the
comprehension of politics at large (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 549).
Parties are composed of sub-coalitions or groups of activists who might disagree
over the goals and how to pursue them (Kitschelt, 1989: 47). The group that controls
skills and knowledge, recruitment, finances and communications is the dominant
coalition (Panebianco, 1988: 37). However, it is often the case that dominant coalitions
are fragmented. When dominant coalitions are heterogenous they become coalitions of
factions made of governing and opposition factions (Key, 1956). The party’s governing
or dominant faction is then the coalition component which is better equipped to impose
its ideological or organisational preferences (Harmel and Tan, 2003: 411).
Hine (1982: 38-39) identifies three dimensions of intra-party group conflict: the
issues dimension, coverage and organisational solidity. Regarding the first, conflict
consists of either a policy or a strategy axis, or a combination of the two. Yet, party
conflict can also be motivated by patronage incentives such as power, career and spoils
(Sartori, 1976: 76). Most often the two types of factionalism interrelate (Janda, 1993).
Second, coverage comprises the number of arenas in which conflict occurs. Katz and
Mair (2002) suggest that in the modern catch-all party conflict is mainly played out in
the central office, so factions are expected to settle in this face (Carty, 2005: 5). As to
organisational solidity, scholarly disagreement denotes the existence of a continuum
2
from highly organised factions (Rose, 1964; Zariski, 1978), to loose and uncohesive
tendencies (Hine, 1982: 39; Key, 1952).
Intra-party actors, including both the dominant and the opposition factions,
perform ‘cost-benefit calculations on a continuous basis, making strategic decisions
designed to fulfill their basic objective’ (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Strategies are
shaped by different institutional and organisational incentives (Boucek, 2005: 6). In
multi-level contexts two types of organisational incentives come into play. Besides
party rules regulating internal dissent, political decentralisation provides new incentives
for intra-party actors (Duverger, 1964; Hennessey, 1968: 12; Panebianco, 1988; Houten,
2009). State decentralisation processes impact on the most relevant dimensions of party
organisation, namely distributional conflicts over resources, the definition of platforms,
and electoral and governing strategies (Deschower, 2006; Downs, 1998; Hopkin, 2003;
Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Biezen and Hopkin, 2006).
The degree of ‘self rule’ regional branches have and the type of ‘shared-rule’
between party levels determine a party’s vertical integration, that is the degree of
organisational and programmatic autonomy allocated to sub-state branches and the
strength of joint decision-making structures within party organisations (Detterbeck and
Hepburn, 2010). Different combinations of both ‘rules’ might determine from what
territorial level the opposition faction’ strategies are built. Alternatively, the central
dominant coalition might have a minority status at one or various regional branches. So,
factional conflict is potentially aggravated by territorial conflict between party levels.
Therefore, we argue that in compounded states party factionalism should be
examined taking into account these two types of organisational incentives: party vertical
integration and the regulation of intra-party dissent. These are precisely the incentives
dominant coalitions will try to act on in moments of high factional conflict in order to
3
counteract opposition factions. Abstracting out different characteristics and forms of
organisation, we will build upon broadly inclusive definitions, considering factions as
intra-party groups that act collectively in order to achieve common goals (Zariski, 1960:
33; Belloni and Beller, 1978: 447; Bouceck, 2009: 14).
As Köllner and Basedau (2005: 19) suggest, it is often unclear whether
factionalism results from a particular way of organising or whether the causality runs
the other way round. In other words, factionalism is intrinsically endogenous and must
be studied in a dynamic perspective (Boucek, 2009: 25). Although one has to be
cautious when drawing connections between factionalism and intra-party organisational
arrangements, we suggest that this relationship can be established if factionalism is
simultaneously examined both as dependent and independent variable and if external
factors (i.e. formal institutions, party system characteristics, socio-economic, cultural
and political features) are kept constant.
This article provides a framework through which factionalism can be examined
and the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts. It aims to
identify what factional strategies can arise in these settings according to certain party
organisational arrangements. We start by exploring in the first section the dynamic
connections between factionalism and party structure and set out a model of factional
organisation according to the degree of party vertical integration and the tolerance of
host parties towards dissent. We also consider the dominant coalition’s strategic choices
in episodes of intense factionalism. The second section applies the hypotheses
developed to four Spanish political parties in which the autonomy of their regional
branches and factions differ. The third section discusses the main findings and the last
section concludes.
4
Factionalism and party organisation in multi-level settings
In order to contextualise the development of factionalism and to analyse its course of
action we need to study it as both dependent and independent variable. In the first case,
we need to focus on the determinants of factional activity which stem from a particular
party organisation whereas in the second case we consider how factionalism might
produce party change.
When considering factionalism a dependent variable, we look at how party rules
encourage factions to develop particular organisational strategies. Belloni and Beller
(1976: 548) defined the organisational characteristics which may invite the formation of
factions as the ‘permissiveness of the parent body’. As Hine (1982: 38) also noted ‘a
group’s need for organisation will depend on the rules and conventions governing party
life’. In multi-level contexts, two organisational variables determine what shape internal
conflict will adopt: the autonomy of factions and the autonomy of regional branches.
Factions, be it formally structured or loosely articulated, help individuals in
different party levels to coordinate decisions (Carty, 2004: 15). The capacity to do so
depends on the ‘internal market for consent’ – i.e. party pluralism, party sharing and the
representation of sub-party interests (Hine, 1982: 42-3). Hence, intra-party democracy
might maximise the influence of opposition factions (Boucek, 2005: 21).
Multi-level dynamics add complexity to the inherent (permanent or temporary)
lack of unity within parties. The balance of power between the central and the territorial
levels of the party over organisational resources, the definition of platforms, and
electoral and governing strategies can be measured through a continuum that defines its
vertical integration, ranging from extremely weak linkages to highly integrated
structures. From weakest to highest, the categories included in the continuum are:
truncated, bifurcated, confederal, integrated and unitary parties (see Thorlakson, 2001,
5
2006; Carty, 1988; Dyck, 1991; Smiley, 1987). Vertical integration is thus defined by
the degree of sub-national party influence (the representation of party branches at the
central level) and sub-national party autonomy on candidate selection and on the
management of the party structure and discipline (Thorlakson, 2009).
Previous research has stated that centralised parties are likely to discourage
factionalism and to induce opposition groups to concentrate at the central level
(Duverger, 1964; Zariski, 1960; Beller and Belloni, 1978; Köllner and Basedau, 2005).
We argue that further theoretical refinements are required. We assume factions will use
all the organisational resources available to deploy their strategies without putting in
jeopardy their own survival, regardless of whether their motivation is more policy or
office-seeking. Given that organisational resources are conditioned by party rules,
different combinations of these will lead factions to follow distinct strategies. Hence,
our first hypothesis claims that in multi-level contexts both vertical integration and
factional autonomy will come into play, their combination yielding four likely strategies
for opposition factions, as Table 1 illustrates.
i. Centralised strategy. If factions are tolerated by party rules but regional branches
have limited autonomy (i.e. the federal bodies have the capacity to impose
decisions to the lower levels), concentrating factional activity at the sub-national
level is a hazardous strategy as it could be easily counteracted by the centre. It is
then likely that in highly integrated parties opposition factions will put their efforts
at the national level and compete with the dominant coalition for party patronage.
ii. Interlayered strategy. Factions are not tolerated or restrictively recognised and the
centre is very strong so it can easily intervene in any regional branch. Possibilities
6
for organisation and access to party resources are limited in this case. Minority
factions cannot exclusively develop at either the national or the sub-national level.
Instead, they are likely to be loosely organised, with leaders having to retain
power at the two levels in order to survive. Without one of these pillars, their
chances to mount an effective opposition will be scarce.
iii. Multilayered strategy. When party rules admit factions and regional branches
enjoy high levels of autonomy, factionalism can develop at either the central or the
regional level. Given that factions may need to follow distinct sub-national
strategies, they will most likely be heterogeneous at the central level. They could
present different degrees of coordination, and alliances are likely to shift at
different levels. Territorialised strategies might be more relevant in some
occasions, whereas in others centralised factional activity may prevail.
iv. Territorialised strategy. If factionalism is not allowed but vertical integration is
weak, minority factions will be more effective if they organise at the regional
level, being able to fight for organisational, political and economic resources in
certain areas the centre has difficulties controlling. Hence, factions are likely to act
under the umbrella of the territories trying to increase their power within the party
structure. This shall grant their survival as well as offer them valuable means to
confront the central (dominant faction’s) leadership.
–TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE–
7
It should be noted that this framework only applies to parties where cross-level
decision-making and strategies exist, thus excluding truncated, bifurcated, or extremely
stratarchical parties.
We have presented how rules might shape the opposition factions’ strategies.
However, we should also analyse the dominant factions’ possible responses. More
precisely, how factional conflict can act as a catalyst for the modification of party rules.
In this case, factionalism is considered as an independent variable.
Although factions’ and territories’ autonomy might provide structural incentives
for intra-party conflict, these are not static factors. Our second hypothesis posits that
dominant factions may make a strategic use of the party’s rules to counteract opposition
factions and thus retain control of the party. In other words, the party organisation may
become a device aimed at restraining factionalism.
Regarding regulation of dissent, extreme factionalism will lead the dominant
faction to revise intra-party democracy (i.e. the voting system to elect decision-making
bodies) and formal recognition of dissent, including access to party resources.
With respect to the party’s vertical integration, the dominant faction’s responses
are likely to vary according to the level opposition factions concentrate at. When
factionalism is found at the central level, the dominant faction will tend to loose vertical
integration so that allied regional branches can implement the goals which remain
blocked at the central level by opposition factions. This possibility will depend on the
rules for leadership selection, the support dominant factions can orchestrate among the
regional branches, and the selective incentives the former can offer in exchange.
Conversely, when critical factions organise their opposition from the territories, the
dominant faction will seek to increase the party’s vertical integration in order to reduce
8
the influence of hostile regional branches. This strategy is more likely to be
implemented the more homogeneous the federal dominant faction is.
An empirical evaluation of multiphaceted factionalism: The Spanish case
Spain’s decentralisation and democratisation processes occurred concurrently.
The previous unitary state gave way to a multi-level polity divided into seventeen
regions, namely Autonomous Communities, each of them with its own representative
and executive institutions (Aja, 2003). Both established and recently formed political
parties had to adapt their organisation to the new territorial dimension.
Whereas political decentralisation has clearly shaped parties’ electoral and
governing strategies and they all organise according to the structure of the state, their
internal decentralisation has remained to a great extent isolated from the broad statewide
process of institutional change. Indeed, the degree of political decentralisation of the
state is greater than intra-party decentralisation (Montero, 2005: 68). Alternatively,
variation on the degree of intra-party decentralisation is explained by incumbency at the
central and regional levels, ideological tradition, party competitive strategies and party
dissent. Generally speaking, governing parties feel more pressure to centralise, left-wing
parties define themselves as advocates of federalism, and some parties may see electoral
payoffs in presenting their organisation as the only one granting coherence across
territories. Yet, the presence of intra-party struggle may produce either more
decentralisation or more centralisation (Fabre and Méndez-Lago, 2009: 115–16).
Four Spanish political parties have been selected for the analysis on the basis of
their different levels of vertical integration and tolerance of dissent. They also diverge
on their ideologies, competitive position in the party system and type of factionalism
experienced (policy or patronage-oriented).
9
The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party [Partido Socialista Obrero Español,
PSOE] and the Popular Party [Partido Popular, PP] are the largest politywide parties
which alternate in government at the federal level since 1982. Although the PSOE was
founded in 1879, it was strongly restructured during the transition to democracy.
Organisationally, it became a successful catch-all party with a rapid increase in size,
resources and members. Ideologically, the party abandoned Marxism and fully
embraced social democracy (Méndez-Lago, 2000). The PP was born in 1976 (Popular
Alliance [Alianza Popular] at the time) as a coalition of seven minor conservative
parties whose members had been linked to the Francoist regime. The party stood very
radical in their right-wing stances until the mid 1980s when it gradually moved to the
centre-right (Montero, 1988). By then, all the founding parties along with other liberal
and Christian-democratic parties had dissolved into a single entity. The PP led the
central government between 1996 and 2004. United Left [Izquierda Unida, IU] is the
third largest statewide party. It was formed in 1986 as a coalition led by the Communist
Party of Spain [Partido Comunista de España, PCE] along with other minor left-wing
parties as a means to counteract the electoral crisis of communism (Ramiro-Fernández,
2004). Due to a majoritarian twist in the electoral system, IU has little governing
potential at the national level. The Basque Nationalist Party [Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea–
Partido Nacionalista Vasco, EAJ-PNV] is a centre-right non state-wide party founded
in 1895 and based in the Basque Country and Navarre. Since 1980 until April 2009 it
governed the Basque Country (Pablo and Mees, 2005).
In the following empirical analysis we are not interested in providing an
exhaustive diachronic description of factional activity but in examining those episodes
of deep factionalism the four parties have gone through in the recent democratic period
under a decentralised state structure. A permanent tension between unity and dissent
10
exists but only occasionally we see the dominant and opposition factions clearly
fighting each other for control over policy, strategy or party resources. These episodes
help us illustrate the opposition factions’ strategies defined in the previous section and
the response provided by the dominant faction. To do so, we have carefully analysed
party statutes in order to trace relevant changes affecting both recognition of dissent and
vertical integration. Thus, we are interested in concluded factional episodes, which
allow us to examine factionalism from a dynamic perspective identifying the variables
which explain it and considering it as an explanatory variable for party change.
Centralised factionalism
Since 1979 PSOE was dominated by Felipe González (secretary-general) and Alfonso
Guerra (deputy secretary-general). They managed to end internal dissent and the 1982
landslide victory ultimately favoured cohesion (Gillespie, 1995). González became
Spain’s Prime Minister and, although Guerra occupied relevant offices, including that of
deputy Prime Minister, he focused on expanding control over the party. This triggered
one of the most well-known episodes of factionalism in recent Spanish party politics.
At the time, PSOE combined tolerant rules towards factionalism with low levels
of regional autonomy. Although informal factions had always existed, factional activity
was only formally admitted in 1984. Factions could not have their own symbols,
organisational structure and vote discipline, although the latter two aspects could be
easily achieved through informal arrangements. They should restrict their activity to
fostering debate and providing input on platforms and policy within the party. Access to
party documents and communication means was limited. Rules concerning the election
of party boards were modified to help minorities: All groups reaching 20 per cent of the
vote were entitled 25 per cent of offices (Verge, 2007: 340).
11
The regional party structure was developed by the centre after the transition to
democracy. So, the party organisation very soon matched the state structure. Regional
branches’ were allocated low influence and autonomy. The federal bodies monitored,
controlled and could veto the decisions adopted by regional branches regarding
candidate selection, manifestos, finances, platforms and alliances choice. Coordination
of public policy across territories was assigned to the federal level. Besides, the
presence of regional leaders within the highest executive boards was insignificant
during the 1980s (Méndez-Lago, 2000).
Although informal factionalism was common since the mid 1980s and the
1990s, factions have often been reluctant to apply for formal recognition –with the
exception of Socialist Left/Izquierda Socialista, which has never been a threat in terms
of effective opposition and membership support.
The factional episode we examine here initially opposed the party in public
office, whose economic policies were inspired by orthodox liberal ideas and developed
by a group of ministers directly appointed by González (later on called renovadores),
and the party in central office led by the left-winger Guerra and his followers
(guerristas). However, the reason was not only ideological, since the guerrista’s power
was based on an extensive patronage network. Although guerristas did never directly
attack the popular leader González, they criticised the liberal ministers’ economic
policies and accused them of having provoked the 1988 general strike. Liberal ministers
were also accused of populating political posts with technocrats from outside the party.
Rising levels of division finally resulted in a clear, and sometimes public, deterioration
of party-government relations (Gillespie, 1989).
Guerra and his supporters used the central party as a stronghold. Delegates in
party conferences were elected by provincial delegations, whose local leaders were
12
mostly controlled by the party apparatus. In fact, as provincial delegations voted in
block in party conferences, the guerristas enjoyed a great deal of influence within the
decision-making bodies vis-à-vis the renovadores (Maravall, 2003: 145). The strict way
in which Guerra managed the party along with a limited regional autonomy clearly
favoured the position of his faction at the centre.
Internal conflict hastened during the 1990s. Tensions between regional
powerholders, increasingly supportive of the renovadores sector (Gangas, 1995: 169),
and the party in central office, in the hands of guerristas, emerged. Simultaneously, as
the country’s decentralisation process consolidated, regional leaders had access to more
resources, several of them governing the regional institutions with a wide majority.
González did then try to reduce the power of the guerristas by giving more room
to the regional leaders. Although the guerrista sector controlled the central office,
González used his position as Prime Minister to hold regular meetings with the regional
leaders and presidents of the regions governed by the PSOE who had also attained a
prominent role due to the enhanced position of the Autonomous Communities, which
had been transferred a significant number of competences from the state. According to
some party officers, these meetings became more relevant than executive bodies
(Méndez-Lago and Orte, 2010).
As a result of the coordinated action between González and the regional leaders
along with an increasing dissatisfaction with how Guerra managed the corruption
scandals involving party members, by 1994 the presence of renovadores and regional
leaders in the federal executive bodies had enormously increased and the guerristas had
been cornered within the government too. Finally, the indirect block vote by provincial
heads of delegation was substituted by an individual and secret vote by all delegates
thus eroding one of Guerra’s main tools to control the party (Méndez-Lago, 2000: 117).
13
Besides, norms regulating the election of party boards were modified too: the most
voted list in party conference would be entitled the majority of seats, allocating the rest
proportionally among any other candidature reaching 20 per cent of the delegates’ vote
(Verge, 2007: 341).
Interlayered factionalism
The organisational penetration of the PP began with the sub-regional level, the
provinces, which are the electoral constituencies in national and regional elections. The
regional organisation was only fully set up in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the party
structure was designed in an extremely centralised and hierarchical fashion (the
president of the party accumulating numerous functions), and factionalism was
forbidden and sanctioned with the expulsion (Gangas, 1995: 156). All sub-national
branches were obliged to follow the instructions of the national level, which approved
the lists of candidates for all elections. Due to the party’s deep presidentialism,
coordination was often carried out between the sub-national and the national leaders. As
regional branches increased their competences, new bodies were created to enhance
control over them such as a national electoral committee and a body in charge of
coordinating the activity of the party in public office at all tiers of government. As
opposition factions could only be informally organised, they had to settle at both levels
of the party organisation in order to survive, so they were encouraged to deploy an
interlayered strategy.
The factional conflict we analyse arose between 1982 and 1989 within the
national leadership as well as between national and sub-national leaders. It can mainly
be considered as a career-oriented case of factionalism. On the one hand, the once
uncontested party leader Manuel Fraga was increasingly seen as an electoral liability by
14
the secretary-general and many sub-national leaders, especially after the strategy of
focusing exclusively on right-wing voters collapsed in 1986 when it became clear that
the median voter was located in the centre-left (López Nieto, 1995). Fraga thought that
open lists for the election of decision-making bodies would help soften the conflict, but
they only empowered provincial leaders by facilitating their coordination to obtain more
central posts (see García-Guereta, 2001: 139).
On the other hand, there was a latent conflict between the regional and the
central organisation. The federal level aimed to renew the provincial and regional
executive boards and candidates to make the party more competitive by introducing
moderate and reformist leaders with a view to gain a hold on more segments of the
electorate and to help forge coalitions with moderate regionalist parties in various
Autonomous Communities. Many of the newcomers belonged to the liberal party the PP
had formed a coalition with (the Democrat Popular Party/Partido Democráta Popular,
PDP). Sub-national organisations were very unhappy with what they considered an
excessive representation of coalition partners and many sub-national leaders felt they
had been displaced (Gangas, 1995: 168).
Eventually Fraga resigned and called a conference to decide on his succession.
Exceptionally in the party’s past and future history, two candidates competed for the
post: Miguel Herrero de Miñón, the leader of the parliamentary group and the man
Fraga had transferred the presidential powers to until a new leader was elected, and
Antonio Hernández Mancha, the president of the regional branch of Andalusia. The
latter won the ballot with the vote of 72 per cent of the party delegates, thanks to the
support he managed to galvanise among the sub-regional (provincial) delegates of the
largest regions, one sector of the federal leadership and the party’s youth organisation
(Baón, 2001: 775).
15
The defeated faction did then exert pressure at both the regional and the national
levels, fighting for the inclusion of their candidates in the party lists for the local and
regional elections of 1987, while opposing the new leader from the party in public
office, which they controlled (Gangas, 1995: 211).
In order to shut the conflict down, Fraga finally announced in 1989 his
nomination as party leader, finding no competition. Once back, he commanded a
transition which led to the party’s refoundation and was completed by José María
Aznar, elected party president in 1990 (see García-Guereta, 2001). The party changed
its ideological position towards the centre, augmented the president’s competences1, and
culminated the definition of the territorial structure in two directions: one, the provincial
branches were put under the strict control of the regions, then adjusting to the state
territorial architecture; and, two, although the party apparently decentralised towards the
regions, the latter became strictly supervised by the federal level. Electoral and
disciplinary committees are only found at the regional level and they are monitored by
the centre. Party delegates are since then elected at the local level, diminishing too the
power of the provinces. Besides, it is the national executive board, and not party
delegates, which ratifies the highest party officers (secretary-general, president of the
electoral commission etc.). Finally, open lists have never been used again.
Between 1989 and 1991 nine regional leaderships were removed from the centre
and by 1993 all regional branches but Galicia, which Fraga controlled, had been
renewed. Regional party leaders did not become members of the national executive
board until 1999, although presidents of the regional governments ruled by the party
incorporated in 1989. Nevertheless, regional representatives only account for 25 per
cent of this board (Astudillo, 2010). The disciplinary regime is also controlled by the
centre, which can dissolve unruly regional branches. All sub-national conferences must
16
be held in cascade following the federal conference, thus installing a stronger control
over the territories. Since 1989 regions cannot request the celebration of an
extraordinary conference. They can establish their rules but candidates’ lists for all
elections require federal approval. Severe incompatibilities between territorial and
parliamentary representation were introduced too, limiting regional influence on the
party in public office at the federal level (Verge, 2007: 313).
Multilayered factionalism
Since its creation in 1986 IU has gone through two significant episodes of factionalism.
The first occurred in the period 1991–97 and the second from 2000 to 2008. In both
occasions factions developed at the two levels of the party organisation and mounted
opposition to the dominant faction through a multilayered strategy fostered by policy
and strategy differences. In this case, the country’s decentralisation had been basically
established.
By the beginning of the 1990s IU was suffering from an increasing internal
strife. The multi-party left-wing coalition dominated by the Communist Party of Spain
(PCE) was divided on several issues. Regarding organisational politics, although most
of the leadership had once supported PCE’s dissolution into the new party, when some
leaders claimed in 1991 that the moment had arrived, the majority of communist leaders
opposed fearing members’ rejection and arguing that electoral progress diluted
pressures to get rid of the party (Ramiro-Fernández, 2004: 18). Confrontation over the
degree of policy radicalism the party should defend was also present. Finally, alliances
and strategy towards PSOE generated the most acute division.
In 1992, founding parties ceased to enjoy representation quotas in executive
boards and conferences. Internal conflict was also regulated by admitting the creation of
17
currents of opinion at the federal level as far as they were established in at least four
regional party branches – they could also form within regional branches. Factions could
not impose vote discipline to their members or present candidates’ tickets in internal
elections. Opposition factions soon emerged and one of them, New Left/Nueva
Izquierda, obtained the status of federal faction. Increasing divisions forced the party to
be more generous with factional activity. Constraints for their creation were eased as the
required presence at the regional level was reduced to three regions. Factions were also
granted access to party publication and communication means. In 1994 factions were
allowed to present their candidates in internal elections but the pure proportionality
principle was modified: Seats in decision-making bodies would be allocated by
consensus among the competing lists obtaining at least 10 per cent of the delegates’
vote in the party conference.
Whereas New Left was the minority faction at the federal level, it managed to
become the dominant faction in seven regions. This way it could deploy a multilayered
strategy combining its opposition in the federal party boards with coordination with the
regional branches it controlled. The regional branches led by New Left challenged the
IU leadership by establishing local coalition governments with PSOE, which totally
confronted the party’s strategy to radically oppose the main left-wing party.
However, the dominant factions’ advantage was the control of the party’s
territorial structure due to federal vertical integration. It used its preeminence in the
federal bodies to increase the control over the territories. In 1997 when one of the party
branches reached an agreement with PSOE for the regional election, the national
dominant faction created a new regional branch. The other regional units which had
supported the unruly branch saw their executive boards dissolved and their membership
purged (Paniagua and Ramiro-Fernández, 2003).
18
The dominant leadership gradually tightened up control of the territorial
structure. In 1994, the statutes established that the federal level should ratify the
candidate lists and platform for legislative elections. It was also specified that alliances
with nationwide parties or with regional branches of nationwide parties are a federal
competence. In 1997 the statutes clarified that the competence to decide on alliances at
any level affecting the coherence of the federal project corresponded to the centre.
Besides, the capacity to sanction regional branches if they contravened federal decisions
was strengthened by reducing the required votes (Pérez-Nievas and Ramiro-Fernández,
2010). Although still far away from the levels of PP and PSOE, vertical integration
clearly increased. With regards to rules of dissent, PCE, the main actor within IU,
imposed its members the prohibition to join factions which contravened the party’s
position.
The second episode of high factionalism emerged soon after the previous one
had just been resolved. The main actor behind internal conflict was not one of the
recognised factions but the very same PCE, which has been increasingly acting as an
opposition faction at both levels of the party organisation since 2000.
The severe electoral defeat in the 1999 local and European elections and in the
2000 legislative elections led to major change within the dominant coalition. The new
leadership sought to deradicalise the traditional communist discourse by relaunching the
organisation as a post-communist ecosocialist party as a means to recover votes. A more
pragmatic position towards PSOE and towards office was introduced too. Since 2003
several regional branches have reached government coalitions with a broad array of
parties, including PSOE, and later on in March 2004, when the PSOE went back in a
minority government, IU accepted to support the government’s investiture, its most
important legislative initiatives in exchange of certain policy concessions.
19
Nonetheless, leadership replacement was only partial as the new elected leader
received just one more vote than his rival in the internal ballot and the minority faction
rejected this more policy-seeking strategy. PCE considered the new ecosocialist
discourse as a threat to the organisation’s core ideological identity and a betrayal of the
party’s communist past, and strongly rejected the party-of-government role at the
regional level and support to PSOE in the national lower house (Verge, 2010).
As the distribution of seats in the highest party executive board is strictly
proportional to the votes obtained by competing lists, the losing candidate who
represented PCE’s majority faction (actually PCE’s secretary-general) retained
considerable influence within IU’s dominant coalition, thus making it difficult to
implement party change2. Besides, as the dominant faction did not command the
support of three-fifths of the vote at the executive board, it risked losing votes affecting
conflict between the federal level and unruly regional branches.
However, the multi-level setting allowed the dominant coalition to turn the
regional arena into its advantage and use the party meso-level to circumvent
factionalism. Whereas the opposition faction was still strong at the federal level, its
control over regions had weakened. The dominant faction used this decline to
orchestrate a coalition of support at this layer which came along with an empowering of
regional leaders in the national leadership selection process – regional leaders were
enfranchised as members of the selectorate3. Regional party branches also obtained an
increased autonomy in sub-national issues, including the capacity to unilaterally decide
whether to enter an electoral or a government coalition. Those regional party branches
facing stronger confrontation from the opposition faction were also granted looser
integrative linkages, establishing a confederal vertical integration for those territories
(Ştefuriuc and Verge, 2008).
20
Decentralised factionalism
Factionalism in the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV henceforth) has traditionally divided
those who pursue a pragmatic nationalism which demands devolution but compromises
with Spanish politics and those who defend a more radical nationalism which advocates
the independence of the Basque Country and excludes collaboration with non-
nationalist forces (de Pablo and Mees, 2005). However, career-seeking motives have
often been claimed to go hand in hand with the ideological claims of factions in the
PNV (Pérez-Nievas, 2002). Although both ‘souls’ have always coexisted, intense
factional conflicts have come about occasionally. Of the two consecutive conflicts that
originated between the 1970s and the 1980s, we will only focus on the second as the
first does not fall under our period of analysis. Party rules forbid members to belong to
any political or socio-political association, trade union, or entity at odds with the party
ideology. All members are required to obey the party stances and discipline both at the
federal and regional level. Non compliance can lead to expulsion.
As the PNV is a non-state wide party, the party federal level corresponds in this
case to the central leadership of the Basque region and the regional level to the sub-
national party structure, namely the three provinces which constitute the Autonomous
Community of the Basque Country (Alava, Guipuscoa and Biscay) and Navarre, which
is a separate region4.
In the period under study, regional branches enjoyed high levels of autonomy,
matching the high degree of decentralisation which is found within the Basque Country.
Due to historical reasons, the Basque provinces enjoy high levels of autonomy and hold
competences on issues such as tax collection, health care and infrastructures. Not only
was the central executive branch elected by the regions, but it was also subject to
21
territorial mandate, regional branches deciding on their delegates’ vote. Moreover, the
party defined itself as a confederation, and its central bodies were exclusively formed by
regional delegates. All territories had the same share within the federal bodies, and the
president of the executive board was a mere spokesperson, a primus inter pares.
Regions elected their leaders and candidates and autonomously decided on electoral
platforms and coalitions within their constituency. They had their own disciplinary
bodies, and although appeals to a federal disciplinary commission were possible, all of
its members were regional appointees but the president. It is, therefore, not surprising
that the most belligerent factional conflict was territorialised. Organised dissent was
strictly punished and only the regional umbrella could provide minorities with some
room to manoeuvre.
After the first factional conflict of the 1970s, the dominant faction tried to calm
down internal dissent by giving some space to opposition. Thus, one of its leaders,
Carlos Garaikoetxea was appointed president of the federal executive board in 1977. In
1980, with the triumph of PNV in the regional elections, Garaikoetxea became the
president of the Basque Country. However, due to the strict internal ban on holding
multiple posts, he was replaced as president of the executive board by Xabier Arzalluz,
a loyal member of the majority faction. Once in government, Garaicoetxea tried to
avoid party discipline, which was interpreted as a challenge to the power of the party in
central office (Arzalluz, 2005: 213) and, consequently, to the dominant faction. As a
result, the executive board blocked the approval of several laws in the regional
parliament (Pérez-Nievas, 2002). Garaikoetxea then turned to the regional branches of
Navarre and Guipuscoa to reach his goals, which increased territorial disputes between
both factions (Garaikoetxea, 2002: 214).
22
By that time, the dominant faction reached an agreement with the Popular Party
(PP) which involved supporting a conservative government in Navarre in exchange for
support in all Basque local institutions (Pablo and Mees, 2005). The Navarrese regional
brach, supportive of Garaikoetxea, strongly opposed the pact fearing a decline of
electoral support in the region. The majority faction forced an internal ballot and won.
However, despite its defeat, the Navarrese branch did not vote the PP’s candidate,
arguing regions were autonomous on alliances choice. Failure to comply with party
discipline provided the dominant coalition with a strong argument to purge the
leaderships of the hostile branches and forced the dismissal of Garaikoetxea as president
of the Basque government. As a result, almost all members of Navarre and half the
members of Guipuscoa were expelled (Acha and Pérez-Nievas, 1998), which triggered
the split and subsequent creation of a new party (Basque Solidarity [Eusko
Alkartasuna]) in 1987.
Right after this factional episode, the statutes underwent several modifications in
order to increase the power of the centre vis-à-vis the regional branches. The influence
of regions in federal boards and disciplinary bodies was reduced. Most of their members
–all of them in case of the disciplinary body– are now directly elected by a National
Conference. New federal bodies, such as a quadrennial General Conference, were
introduced, and local branches were empowered with direct consultation mechanisms
which are set up by the federal level. Regional autonomy on finances, platforms,
campaigns and coalitions was cut down and the federal executive board took over the
selection of candidates for all but local elections (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas, 2009).
Discussion of findings
23
Although previous research has claimed that decentralised states promote the
formation of regionally rooted factions and that centralised parties are likely to
discourage factionalism and to induce factions to concentrate at the central level, we
have shown that there are more likely possibilities.
Four Spanish parties were selected to illustrate our hypotheses. Table 2 presents
a summary of our findings. In PNV and IU regional branches enjoyed notable levels of
autonomy. Nevertheless factions’ strategies were far more territorialised in PNV, where
intolerance towards factional activity pushed the opposition faction to fight for the
control of regions. In the PP and the PSOE vertical integration was higher, albeit
factionalism also varied. While in the PSOE factions organised at the federal level, in
the PP collaboration between regional and federal leaders granted their survival.
–TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE–
For each party, we have focused on specific episodes of factionalism and shown
they constitute critical junctures for the party organisation. Factionalism has always
been accompanied by party organisational change in two directions: When faced with
strong factional activity, the dominant faction changes the rules regulating both dissent
and vertical integration as a means to weaken the resources and the arena the opposition
faction is using. Thus, party organisation becomes a device. Two clear responses have
been identified: When the opposition faction’s strategy is centralised, the dominant
faction turns to regional branches to marginalise opposition groups (PSOE); when the
conflict is territorialised vertical integration is tightened up (PNV).
However, when interlayered (PP) and multilayered (IU) factional strategies are
found, the dominant faction’s calculus varies. Whereas in the PP the dominant faction
24
increased the power of the centre, making it more difficult for interlayered factions to
act, in IU both strategies were applied. The first factional episode was solved by
counteracting the minority at both levels, but particularly by restricting the territories’
room to manoeuvre. Conversely, in the second occasion the dominant faction loosened
vertical linkages, granting allied regions more autonomy.
Alternatively, as Table 3 shows, the regulation of dissent has also experienced
important modifications through which the dominant faction has sought to limit the
opposition factions’ influence.
–TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE–
Concluding remarks
Far from being unitary actors, parties consist of competing groups. This article
has addressed the endogeneity problem research on factionalism faces by analysing it as
a dynamic process. This implies studying factionalism as both dependent and
independent variable, while keeping constant external factors, which requires examining
the interaction of dominant and opposition factions’ strategic choices. According to the
theoretical framework we have displayed, knowing about a particular party
organisational model allows us to predict what shape factionalism might adopt in a
party, regardless of ir being more office or policy oriented.
The endogeneity problem is more acute in multi-level settings as party
decentralisation provides extra organisational incentives to factions. To explain how
factions behave in these contexts we need to take into account not only party rules
regulating dissent but also a party’s degree of vertical integration. As more states are
decentralising and current descentralised states are deepening the transference of power
25
to their regions (Rodden, 2004), more parties are exepected to adjust their organisation
to the multi-level competition, so the vertical integration dimension can not be
neglected in the study of party factionalism.
Yet, far from being overdeterministic, we do not claim factional strategies to be
static or isolated from other factors. Given that factionalism is a dynamic process, the
responses crafted by the dominant faction will introduce new incentives and restrictions
on rules and procedures to factional organisation, which, at the same time, can give rise
to factional adjustments and new episodes of conflict.
References
Acha, Beatriz and Santiago Pérez-Nievas (1998) ‘Moderate Nationalist Parties in the
Basque Country: Partido Nacionalista Vasco and Eusko Alkartasuna’, in Lieven
de Winter and H. Türsan (eds.) Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, pp.87–104.
London: Routledge.
Aja, Eliseo (2003) El Estado autonómico: federalismo y hechos diferenciales. Madrid:
Alianza.
Appleton, Andrew M. and Daniel S. Ward (1997) ‘Party Response to Environmental
Change. A Model of Organizational Innovation’, Party Politics 3 (3): 341–62.
Arzalluz, Xabier (2005) Así Fue. Madrid: Foca.
Astudillo, Javier (2010) ‘El Partido Popular: un partido regionalizado, no
descentralizado’, in Francesc Pallarés (ed.) Espacios de competición en gobiernos
multinivel: ciudadanos, partidos y elecciones en el Estado de las Autonomías.
Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc (forthcoming).
Baón, Rogelio (2001) Historia del Partido Popular. Madrid: Ibersaf.
26
Belloni, Frank P. and Dennis C. Beller (1976) ‘The Study of Party Factions as
Competitive Political Organizations’, Western Political Quarterly 29 (4): 531–49.
Belloni, Frank. P. and Dennis C. Beller (eds.) (1978) Faction Politics: Political Parties
and Factionalism in Comparative Perspectives. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio
Inc.
Biezen, Ingrid van and Jonathan Hopkin (2006) ‘Party Organization in Multi-level
Contexts’, in Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery (eds.) Devolution and Electoral
Politics: A Comparative Exploration, pp.14–36. Manchester: Manchester:
University Press,
Boucek, Françoise (2005) ‘Why does party dominance end in factionalism and what are
the implications for democracy?’, paper prepared for the ECPR General
Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September 2005.
Boucek, Françoise (2009) ‘Rethinking Factionalism. Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics
and Three Faces of Factionalism’, Party Politics 15 (4):1–31.
Carty, R. Kenneth (1988) ‘Three Canadian Party Systems: An Interpretation of the
Development of National Politics’, in George C. Perlin (ed.) Party Democracy in
Canada, pp. 15–30. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada.
Carty, R. Kenneth (2004) ‘Parties as Franchise Systems: The Stratarchical
Organizational Imperative’, Party Politics 10 (1): 5–24.
Carty, R. Kenneth (2005) ‘Dominance without factions: the Liberal Party of Canada’,
paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September
2005.
Chhiber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman (2004) The Formation of National Party Systems:
Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India and the United
State. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
27
Deschower, Kris (2006) ‘Political Parties as multi-level organizations’, in Richard Katz
and William Crotty (eds.) Handbook of Party Politics, pp. 291–300. London:
Sage.
Detterbeck, Klaus and Eve Hepburn (2010). ‘Party Politics in Multi-level Systems:
party responses to new challenges in European democracies’, in Jan Erk and
Wilfried Swenden (eds.) New directions in federalism studies, London:
Routledge/ECPR.
Downs, William M. (1998) Coalition Government Subnational Style. Columbus: Ohio
State University Press.
Duverger, Maurice (1964) Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State. London: Methuen.
Dyck, Rand (1991) ‘Links between Federal and Provincial Parties and Party Systems’,
in Herman Bakvis (ed.) Representation, Integration and Political Parties in
Canada, pp. 129–77. Toronto: Dundern Press.
Fabre, Elodie, and Mónica Méndez-Lago (2009). ‘Decentralization and Party
Organizational Change: the British and Spanish Statewide Parties Compared’, in
Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens (eds) Territorial Party Politics in Western
Europe, pp. 102–18. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Gangas, Pilar (1995) El desarrollo organizativo de los partidos políticos españoles de
implantación estatal. Madrid: Instituto Juan March.
Garaikoetxea, Carlos (2002) Euskadi: La Transición Inacabada. Barcelona: Editorial
Planeta.
García-Guereta, Elena M. (2001) Factores externos e internos en la transformación de
los partidos políticos: el caso de AP-PP. Madrid: Instituto Juan March.
28
Gillespie, Richard (1989) The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gillespie, Richard (1995) ‘Factionalism, the Left and the Transition to Democracy in
Spain’, Democratization 2 (1): 45–63.
Gómez, Raúl and Santiago Pérez-Nievas (2009) ‘Faccionalismo e integración vertical
en contextos multinivel. El caso del Partido Nacionalista Vasco’, Papers. Revista
de Sociologia 92: 97–117.
Harmel, Robert, Uk Heo, Alexander Tan and Kenneth Janda (1995) ‘Performance,
Leadership, Factions and Party Change: An Empirical Analysis’, West European
Politics 18 (1): 1–33.
Harmel, Robert and Alexander Tan (2003) ‘Party Actors and Party Change: Does
Factional Dominance Matter?’, European Journal of Political Research 42: 409–
24.
Hennessey, Bernard (1968) ‘On the Study of Party Organization’, in William J. Crotty
(ed.) Approaches to the Study of Party Organization, pp. 1–44. Boston: Allyn and
Bacon.
Hine, David (1982) ‘Factionalism in West European Parties: A Framework for
Analysis’, West European Politics 5: 36–53.
Hopkin, Jonathan (2003) ‘Political Decentralization, Electoral Change and Party
Organizational Adaptation: A Framework for analysis’, European Urban and
Regional Studies 10: 227–37.
Houten, Pieter van (2009) ‘Multi-Level Relations in Political Parties. A Delegation
Approach’, Party Politics 15 (2): 137–56.
29
Janda, Kenneth (1993) ‘Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory’, in Ada
W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, pp. 163–91.
Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
Katz, Richard and Peter Mair (2002) ‘The Ascendancy of the Party in Public Office:
Party Organizational Change in 20th-Century Democracies’, in Richard Gunther,
José R. Montero and Juan J. Linz (eds.) Political Parties: Old Concepts and New
Challenges, pp. 113–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Key, Valdimer O., Jr. (1956) American State Politics. New York: Knopf.
Key, Valdimer O., Jr. (1952) Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York:
Crowell.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1989) ‘The Internal Politics of Parties: The Law of Curvilinear
Disparity Revisited’, Political Studies 37: 400–21.
Köllner, Patrick and Matthias Basedau (2005) ‘Factionalism in Political Parties: An
Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies’, Working Papers Global and
Area Studies, No.12. Hamburg: German Overseas Institute (DÜI).
Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996) Making and Breaking Governments:
Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
López Nieto, Lourdes (1995) ‘The Centre-Right in Spain, 1976–82’, Democratization 2
(1): 31–44.
Maravall, José María (2003). El control de los políticos. Madrid: Taurus.
Méndez-Lago, Mónica (2000) La estrategia organizativa del Partido Socialista Obrero
Español, 1975-1996. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
Méndez-Lago, Mónica and Andreu Orte (2010) ‘La organización de partidos en
sistemas multinivel: el caso del PSOE’, in Francesc Pallarés (ed.) Espacios de
30
competición en gobiernos multinivel: ciudadanos, partidos y elecciones en el
Estado de las Autonomías. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc (forthcoming).
Montero, José R. (1988) ‘More than Conservative, Less than Neoconservative: Alianza
Popular’, in Brian Girvin (ed.) The Transformation of the Contemporary
Conservatism, pp.145–63. London: Sage.
Montero, Alfred (2005) ‘The Politics of Decentralization in a Centralized Party System:
The Case of Democratic Spain’, Comparative Politics 38: 63–82.
Pablo, Santiago de and Ludger Mees (2005) El péndulo patriótico. Historia del Partido
Nacionalista Vasco (1895-2005). Barcelona: Crítica.
Panebianco, Angelo (1988) Political Parties: Organisation and Power. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Paniagua, Juan Luis and Luis Ramiro-Fernández (2003) Voz, conflicto y salida. Un
estudio sobre faccionalismo: Nueva Izquierda, 1992-2001. Madrid: Editorial
Complutense.
Pérez-Nievas, Santiago (2002) Modelo de partido y cambio político. El Partido
Nacionalista Vasco en el proceso de transición y consolidación democrática en el
País Vasco. Madrid: Instituto Juan March.
Ramiro-Fernández, Luis (2004) ‘Electoral Competition, Organizational Constraints and
Party Change: The Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and United Left (IU), 1986-
2000’, Journal of Communist and Transition Politics 20(2): 1–29.
Ramiro-Fernández, Luis and Santiago Pérez-Nievas (2010) ‘El impacto de los procesos
de descentralización territorial en la organización de los partidos políticos: el
caso de Izquierda Unida’, in Francesc Pallarés (ed.) Espacios de competición en
gobiernos multinivel: ciudadanos, partidos y elecciones en el Estado de las
Autonomías. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanc (forthcoming).
31
Rodden, Jonathan (2004) ‘Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning
and Measurement’, Comparative Politics 36: 481–500.
Rose, Richard (1964) ‘Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain’, Political Studies
12(1): 33–46.
Sartori, Giovanni (1976) Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Smiley, Donald V. (1987) The Federal Condition in Canada. Toronto: Mc Graw-Hill
Ryerson.
Ṩtefuriuc, Irina and Tània Verge (2008) ‘Small and Divided Parties in Multi-Level
Settings: Opportunities for Government Participation, the Case of Izquierda Unida
in Spain’, South European Society and Politics 13(2): 155–73.
Thorlakson, Lori (2001) ‘Federalism and party organisational adaptation: a cross-
national comparison’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops,
Grenoble, France, April 6 –11.
Thorlakson, Lori (2006) ‘Party Systems in Multi-level Contexts’, in Dan Hough and
Charles Jeffery (eds.) Devolution and Electoral Politics, pp. 37–53. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Thorlakson, Lori (2009) ‘Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in
Seven Federations’, Party Politics 15 (2): 157–77.
Verge, Tània (2007) Partidos y representación política: Las dimensiones del cambio en
los partidos políticos españoles, 1976-2006. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones
Sociológicas.
Verge, Tània (2010) ‘The Spanish United Left – The belated and troublesome transition
from policy-seeking to office-seeking’, in Olsen, Jonathan, Michael Koss and Dan
32
Hough (eds.) Left Parties in National Governments. Houndmills, Basingstoke:
Palgrave (forthcoming).
Zariski, Raphael (1960) ‘Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary
Observations’, Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 (1): 26–51.
33
Endnotes
1 The secretary-general’s functions diminished in favour of the president and the deputy-presidencies
were suppressed in order to avoid that (informal) factional activity could be orchestrated from there.
2 In the 2003 and 2004 party conferences the leadership ballot yielded similar results, mantaining the
correlation of forces of the governing and opposition factions and therefore freezing conflict.
3 The election of the IU leader is a two-step process. Party conference delegates select half the members
of the Federal Political Committee, who will thereafter choose the leader in a separate vote. The other
half, consisting of regional delegates, later joins this committee in ratifying the appointment of the leader.
4 The territories of the so-called French Basque Country only got formal representation in the PNV in
1987.
TABLES
Table 1. Likely opposition factions’ strategies
Autonomy of the territories
+ Vertical integration
- Vertical integration
Autonomy of
factions
+ Tolerance
Centralised strategy
Multilayered strategy
- Tolerance
Interlayered strategy
Territorialised strategy
Table 2. Opposition factions’ strategies in Spain
Autonomy of the territories
+ Vertical integration
- Vertical integration
Autonomy of
factions
+ Tolerance
PSOE: Centralised
strategy (1990s)
IU: Multilayered strategy
(1990s/2000s)
- Tolerance
PP: Interlayered strategy
(1980s)
PNV: Territorialised
strategy (1980s)
34
Table 3. Dominant factions’ strategies in Spain
Party arrangements
Vertical integration
Regulation of dissent
Opposition
factions’
strategies
Centralised (PSOE)
Loosened
Delegation blocked suppressed;
surplus seats for most voted
lists
Interlayered (PP)
Tightened up
Open lists eliminated;
suppression of deputy vice-
presidencies
Multilayered (IU)
Loosened (1990s)/
Tightened up (2000s)
Prohibition to join IU factions if
contravene PCE’s position
(1990s)
Territorialised (PNV)
Tightened up
Direct consultation mechanisms
set up by the federal level
