Article

Der Game Designer als Regisseur II – Der Weg für den Lead Game Designer

January 2007

Authors:

Mediadesign Hochschule Düsseldorf

Bhatty defines the new role of the game designer as leading author and director, a creative-leading 'spearhead' of development, orienting at the structures of the New-Hollywood-Cinematographers.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.

Article

Evolving players that use selective game-tree search with genetic programming

July 2012

We present the application of genetic programming (GP) to evolving game-tree search in board games. Our work expands previous results in evolving board-state evaluation functions for multiple board games, now evolving a search-guiding evaluation function alongside it. Our system implements strongly typed GP trees, explicitly defined introns, and a selective directional crossover method.

Conference Paper

Evolving board-game players with genetic programming

July 2011

We present the application of genetic programming (GP) to zero-sum, deterministic, full-knowledge board games. Our work expands previous results in evolving board-state evaluation functions for Lose Checkers to a 10x10 variant of Checkers, as well as Reversi. Our system implements strongly typed GP trees, explicitly defined introns, and a selective directional crossover method.

Article

Loss Aversion Equilibrium

August 2000 · International Journal of Game Theory

Jonathan Shalev

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better predictor of behavior than expected utility. In particular, loss aversion is an important element of such utility ... [Show full abstract] functions. We extend games to include loss aversion characteristics of the players. We define two types of loss-aversion equilibrium, a solution concept endogenizing reference points. The two types reflect different procedures of updating reference points during the game. Reference points emerge as expressions of anticipation which are fulfilled. We show existence of myopic loss-aversion equilibrium for any extended game, and compare it to Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that an increase in loss aversion of one player can affect her and other players' payoffs in different directions.

Conference Paper

Propositional game logic

December 1983 · Foundations of Computer Science, 1975., 16th Annual Symposium on

Rohit Parikh

We define a propositional logic of games which lies in expressive power between the Propositional Dynamic Logic of Fischer and Ladner [FL] and the µ-calculus of Kozen [K]. We show that the logic is decidable and give a very simple, complete set of axioms, one of the rules being Brouwer's bar induction. Even though decidable, this logic is powerful enough to define well orderings. We state some ... [Show full abstract] other results, open questions and indicate directions for further research.

Article

DAG-width - Connectivity measure for directed graphs

January 2006

Jan Obdržálrk

Tree-width is a very useful connectivity measure for undirected graphs. We propose a new definition, called DAG-width, for directed graphs which measures how close a graph is to a directed acyclic graph. In addition we define a cops-and-robber game and show that this game characterises exactly the class of graphs of bounded DAG-width. A comparison of DAG-width with tree-width and directed ... [Show full abstract] tree-width follows. Finally we show that NP-complete problems can be solved in polynomial time on graphs of bounded DAG-width.

Chapter

Games in General

September 2011

Cameron Browne

Combinatorial games make an ideal test bed for the Ludi project as they typically involve simple, well-defined rule sets but complex play. A simple means-play-ends model of game play is presented, then combinatorial games and the elements or ludemes that make them up are described in this context. While it is simple to recombine the elements of a game into novel configurations that define new ... [Show full abstract] games, it is much more difficult to identify those that actually produce a good result. This chapter describes some of the factors involved and how to distinguish new games from mere variants.

Article

The Myerson value for directed graph games

February 2020 · Operations Research Letters

A directed graph game consists of a cooperative game with transferable utility and a digraph which describes limited cooperation and the dominance relation among the players. Under the assumption that only coalitions of strongly connected players are able to fully cooperate, we introduce the digraph-restricted game in which a non-strongly connected coalition can only realize the sum of the worths ... [Show full abstract] of its strong components. The Myerson value for directed graph games is defined as the Shapley value of the digraph-restricted game. We establish axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value for directed graph games by strong component efficiency and either fairness or bi-fairness.

Article

A Recursion Principle for Linear Orderings

March 1992 · Journal of Symbolic Logic

Juha Oikkonen

The idea of this paper is to approach linear orderings as generalized ordinals and to study how they are made from their initial segments. First we look at how the equality of two linear orderings can be expressed in terms of equality of their initial segments. Then we shall use similar methods to define functions by recursion with respect to the initial segment relation. Our method is based on ... [Show full abstract] the use of a game where smaller and smaller initial segments of linear orderings are considered. The length of the game is assumed to exceed that of the descending sequences of elements of the linear orderings considered. By use of such game-theoretical methods we can for example extend the recursive definitions of the operations of sum, product and exponentiation of ordinals in a unique and natural way for arbitrary linear orderings. Extensions coming from direct limits do not satisfy our game-theoretic requirements in general. We also show how our recursive definitions allow very simple constructions for fixed points of functions, giving rise to certain interesting linear orderings.

Article

Size direction games over the real line. I

June 1973 · Israel Journal of Mathematics

Two related infinite two person games of perfect information are defined and studied.

Article

Directed tree-width examples

September 2007 · Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series B

Isolde Adler

In (1) Johnson, Robertson, Seymour and Thomas define the notion of directed tree-width dtw(D) of a directed graph D. They ask whether dtw(D) ≥ k −1 implies that D has a haven of order k. A negative answer is given. Furthermore they define a generalisation of the robber and cops game of (3) to digraphs. They ask whether it is true that if k cops can catch the robber on a digraph, then they can do ... [Show full abstract] so robber-monotonely. Again a negative answer is given. We also show that contraction of butterfly edges can increase directed tree-width.

Article

The Socially Acceptable Solution of a Team and Stability Analysis

July 1993 · IFAC Proceedings Volumes

In this paper, the socially acceptable solution of a team system is defined and discussed. We find that the socially acceptable solution of a team system is in the core of a team and show how a team system may be interprete.d as a game. This, in turn, will lead to a general formulation of a game. The core existence for a class of team system is proved. Finally, the stability of the acceptable ... [Show full abstract] state of a team discuss It is proved that the necessary and sufficient condition for the acceptable state being coalitionally stable is that it is in the core of the system. The results of this paper give a direction to design the decision rules and coordination method for various types of team systems

Article

Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Models

June 1982 · Journal of Mathematical Economics

Roger Myerson

The general principal–agent problem is formulated, in which agents have both private information and private decisions, unobservable to the principal. It is shown that the principal can restrict himself to incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms, in which agents report their information to the principal, who then recommends to them decisions forming a correlated equilibrium. In the ... [Show full abstract] finite case, optimal coordination mechanisms can be found by linear programming. Some basic issues relating to systems with many principals are also discussed. Non-cooperative equilibria between interacting principals do not necessarily exist, so quasi-equilibria are defined and shown to exist.

Der Game Designer als Regisseur II – Der Weg für den Lead Game Designer

Abstract

No full-text available

Recommended publications

Evolving players that use selective game-tree search with genetic programming

Evolving board-game players with genetic programming

Loss Aversion Equilibrium

Propositional game logic

DAG-width - Connectivity measure for directed graphs

Games in General

The Myerson value for directed graph games

A Recursion Principle for Linear Orderings

Size direction games over the real line. I

Directed tree-width examples

The Socially Acceptable Solution of a Team and Stability Analysis

Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Models