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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1991,
Vol.
61,
No.
1,132-140
Copyright
1991
by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514/91/S3.00
Personality and Susceptibility to Positive and Negative Emotional States
Randy
J.
Larsen and Timothy Ketelaar
University of Michigan
Gray's (1981)
theory suggests that extraverts and neurotics are differentially sensitive
to
stimuli that
generate positive and negative affect, respectively. From this theory it was hypothesized that effi-
cacy of a standard positive-affect induction would be more strongly related to extraversion than to
neuroticism scores, whereas efficacy of a standard negative-affect induction would be more
strongly related to neuroticism
scores.
Positive and negative affect
was
manipulated in a controlled
setting, and the effectiveness of the mood induction was assessed using standard mood adjective
rating
scales.
Results are consistent with the hypothesis that neurotic
Ss
(compared with stable
Ss)
show heightened emotional reactivity to the negative-mood induction, whereas extraverts (com-
pared with intraverts) show heightened emotional reactivity to the positive-mood induction. Re-
sults corroborate and extend previous findings.
With personality psychology undergoing a "decade of ac-
complishment" (Buss & Cantor, 1989) during what has also
been called the "decade of emotion" (Tomkins, 1981), it is not
surprising that studies of
the
relationship between personality
and emotion now form an identifiable subdiscipline of re-
search. Several relatively strong and consistent findings have
accumulated in this area. Among the most consistently repli-
cated findings are the relationships between extraversion and
average levels of positive affect and between neuroticism and
average levels of negative affect. For example, Costa and
McCrae (1980) found that extraversion traits correlate strongly
with positive affect and that neuroticism traits correlate
strongly with negative affect. These same relationships were
also found in a follow-up study by Costa and McCrae (1980),
with extraversion predicting levels of positive affect 10 years
later and with neuroticism predicting
levels
of negative affect
10
years
later.
These
authors concluded that
"extraversion.
.
.
pre-
disposes individuals toward positive affect, whereas neuroti-
cism predisposes individuals toward negative affect" (Costa &
McCrae, 1980,
p.
673).
Very similar conclusions about the rela-
tionship between extraversion and positive affect, the relation-
ship between neuroticism and negative affect, or both have
been drawn
by
many other researchers
(e.g.,
Diener
&
Emmons,
1984;
Emmons
&
Diener,
1985;
Hotard, McFatter, McWhirter,
& Stegall, 1989; Kendell, Mackenzie, West, McGuire, & Cox,
1984;
Kirkcaldy, 1984; Meyer
&
Shack, 1989; OTVialley & Gil-
lett, 1984; Thayer, 1989; Thayer, Takahashi, & Pauli, 1988;
Warr, Barter, & Brownbridge, 1983; Watson, 1988; D. G. Wil-
liams,
1981).'
This research was supported by Research Scientist Development
Award KO1-MH00704 and Grant RO1-MH42057 from the National
Institute of Mental Health to Randy
J.
Larsen.
We
thank H. J. Eysenck,
S.
B.
G. Eysenck, Tony
Gale,
Irene Martin,
Ed Diener, and Stephan Ahadi for helpful discussions before conduct-
ing this experiment. We also thank Greta "fork for her help as a research
assistant.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Randy
J.
Larsen, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan,
580 Union Drive, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1346.
The blending of personality and affective dimensions
is
high-
lighted by Tellegen's (1985) recent work. Tellegen viewed cer-
tain personality dimensions and certain affective tendencies to
be so intermingled that he termed two of the most powerful
second-order dimensions to emerge from his program of per-
sonality scale construction as positive and negative emotional-
ity.
Positive
emotionality consists of extraversion-sociability
traits
(e.g.,
social potency, surgency, and activity) that appear to
promote positive emotional experiences.
Negative emotionality
is associated with a number of primary neurotic traits, such as
stress reaction, alienation, and self-descriptions of worry, anxi-
ety, feeling victimized, and resentfulness. Such a neurotic trait
cluster appears to foster
negative
emotional
experiences.
In
dis-
cussing extraverted and neurotic trait clusters
as
representing a
"preparedness
to
respond" (Tellegen,
1985,
p.
697) with
specific
emotional reactions, Tellegen (1985) stated that "jointly these
descriptive and conceptual schemes
stress a
view of personality
...
as
reflecting the influence of distinctive and pervasive posi-
tive
and negative affective
systems
that give rise
to
[italics added ]
both intra-individual variations in emotional state and inter-in-
dividual differences in emotionality" (p. 706).
The implication of the just-mentioned quotes from Costa
and McCrae
(1980)
and Tellegen
(1985)
and implicit in much
of
the work in this area is the assumption that extraversion traits
represent an inherent susceptibility to positive-affect states and
neuroticism traits represent an inherent susceptibility to nega-
tive-affect states.2 This implicit assumption was made explicit
1 Other personality dimensions have also been examined in relation
to emotion, such as irrational beliefs (Cash, Rimm, & MacKinnon,
1986;
Vestre, 1984), internal-external locus of control (Benassi,
Sweeney,
&
Defour,
1988;
Lefcourt, Miller,
Ware,
&
Sherk,
1981),
and
Type A behavior pattern (Strube, Turner, Patrick, & Perrillo, 1983).
Nevertheless, the greatest volume of research, as well
as
the most con-
sistent corpus of
findings,
have been generated on the relation between
extraverted traits and positive affect and the relation between neurotic
traits and negative affect.
2 This assumption could only hold if positive and negative affect are
approximately orthogonal, a finding that is supported by recent re-
search (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
132
PERSONALITY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EMOTIONAL STATES133
in a recent article by McCrae and Costa (1991) in which a dis-
tinction was made between a temperamental and an instru-
mental view of the relation between personality and emotion.
The
temperamental
view holds that certain personality traits
(i.e.,
extraversion and neuroticism) represent endogenous differ-
ences in sensitivity or response magnitude to positive- or nega-
tive-emotion stimuli, resulting in differences in long-term posi-
tive or
negative
affect. The instrumental
view,
on
the
other hand,
holds that certain personality dimensions foster the creation of
specific life circumstances and that these lifestyle differences,
in
turn,
promote differential levels of long-term positive or nega-
tive affect. In the instrumental view, affective differences asso-
ciated with personality are due to the indirect influence of per-
sonality through lifestyle differences, not inherent differences
in sensitivity or response magnitude to positive- or
negative-af-
fect stimuli. The temperamental view, on the other hand, im-
plies a direct influence of personality on the magnitude of pha-
sic affective response to emotion-eliciting stimuli.
McCrae and Costa (1991) suggested that extraversion and
neuroticism most likely play a temperamental
(i.e.,
direct) role
in fostering positive and negative affect, respectively, whereas
other traits (e.g., conscientiousness and agreeableness) most
likely play an instrumental (i.e., indirect) role in fostering the
creation of life circumstances that, in turn, promote positive
affect and minimize negative affect. However, because of the
correlational nature of evidence generated so far, research re-
ported to date on extraversion, neuroticism, and differential
levels
of positive and
negative
affect cannot distinguish the tem-
peramental versus instrumental relation between personality
and affect. What is necessary is an experimental approach to
this question. The temperamental view of extraversion and neu-
roticism, if
true,
would imply that, when exposed to identical
levels
of positive- or negative-affect stimuli in a controlled labo-
ratory setting, the magnitude of emotional response to these
stimuli should be predictable from extraversion and neurotic-
ism measures, respectively.
The purpose of the present study was to provide just such a
test using experimental rather than correlational procedures.
We hypothesized that extraversion (more than neuroticism)
would be associated with an increased responsitivity to con-
trolled inductions of positive (but not negative) affect. We fur-
ther hypothesized that neuroticism (more than extraversion)
would be associated with an increased responsivity to con-
trolled inductions of negative (but not positive) affect. Before
describing the details of our procedures, however, we first de-
scribe the theoretical foundation of these hypotheses.
Positive and negative affect emerge
as
separate dimensions accounting
for the majority of variance in factor analyses of cross-sectional
as
well
as longitudinal studies of emotion (Tellegen,
1985;
Zevon
&
Tellegen,
1982).
The recent revision of the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist
(Zuckerman
&
Lubin,
1985)
now provides separate
positive-
and nega-
tive-affect scale scores. It appears that positive and negative affect,
especially when assessed over longer time periods (Diener
&
Emmons,
1984),
are orthogonal
dimensions.
As such, positive and negative affect
can correlate differentially (not simply with opposite
sign)
with external
variables such as personality, social activities, and physical symptoms
(Watson,
1988;
Watson & Tellegen, 1985).
Gray's Theory of Personality and Emotion
Beyond
a
description of the temperamental relation between
personality and affect, an important theoretical question re-
mains
as
to
why
extraversion should be related to positive-affect
reactivity and
why
neuroticism should
be
related to
negative-af-
fect reactivity? The work of Gray
(1971,
1981, 1987) offers a
theoretical rationale for predicting differential emotional sus-
ceptibility on the part of extraverts and neurotics. Gray con-
tended that there are two neurologically based motivational
systems responsible for many of the observed behavioral and
emotional differences between extraverts and
neurotics.
One of
these neuronal
systems,
the behavioral
activation system
(BAS),
is thought to regulate behavior in the presence of signals of
reward. The other system, the
behavioral inhibition
system
(BIS),
is thought to regulate behavior in the presence of signals
of punishment. Gray suggested that individuals differ in the
relative strengths of these two signal-sensitivity systems, with
extraversion relating to a strong sensitivity to signals of reward
and neuroticism relating to a strong sensitivity to signals of
punishment. Other researchers have also conceptualized these
signal-sensitivity systems in traitlike terms (Gorenstein
&
New-
man,
1980;
Larsen
&
Ketelaar,
1989;
Newman,
1987;
Newman,
Widom,
&
Nathan,
1985;
Zuckerman,
1987)
or
as
having behav-
ioral consequences that represent trait dimensions (Fowles,
1980,1987; Zuckerman, 1987).
The relevance of Gray's theoretical work to understanding
differences in emotional susceptibility was also pointed out by
Tellegen
(1985).
Tellegen suggested that Gray's concepts of
"re-
ward-signal sensitivity and punishment-signal sensitivity ap-
pear to be quite consistent with respectively, the higher order
Positive Emotionality and Negative Emotionality dimensions"
(p.
699). It is thus consistent with Gray's theory to hypothesize
that positive affect and negative affect are the state manifesta-
tions of reward-signal sensitivity and punishment-signal sensi-
tivity,
respectively.
When exposed to signals of
reward,
one
expe-
riences positive affect, and when exposed to signals of punish-
ment, one experiences negative affect. It seems plausible that
individual differences in susceptibility to positive and negative
affect could
be
the result of underlying individual differences in
sensitivity to signals of reward and punishment.
Gray's theory
is
actually an expansion of Eysenck's
(e.g.,
H. J.
Eysenck, 1967) prior work on extraversion and neuroticism.
H. J. Eysenck has long held that extraverts are likely to experi-
ence more positive affect than introverts and that neurotic indi-
viduals are likely to experience more negative affect than stable
individuals (cf. H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985, p. 141). More
recently, M. Eysenck (1987) suggested that extraversion repre-
sents susceptibility to positive affect and neuroticism represents
susceptibility to negative affect. M. Eysenck cited Gray's work
as a theoretical basis for this hypothesis. However, M. Eysenck
offered no empirical work to support the hypothesis of differ-
ential susceptibility to positive and
negative
affect on the part
of
extraverts and neurotics.
A
similar theoretical formulation of the relation between af-
fect and personality was provided by Strelau (1987). Strelau
hypothesized that, because signals of reward are the source of
positive affect, and because extraverts are more sensitive to sig-
nals of reward, extraverts should
be
more susceptible to positive
134
RANDY
J.
LARSEN
AND
TIMOTHY KETELAAR
affect than should introverts. Similarly, because signals of pun-
ishment are the source of negative affect, and because neurotics
are sensitive to signals of punishment, neurotics should there-
fore be more susceptible than stable or nonneurotic individuals
to negative affect.
This hypothesis of differential susceptibility to positive and
negative affect was never actually tested by Strelau (1987). If
true,
this hypothesis would account for the correlational find-
ings that extraverts report more naturally occurring positive
affect (but about the same amount of negative affect) than do
introverts and that neurotics report more naturally occurring
negative affect (but about the same amount of positive affect)
than do stable subjects. The hypothesis of differential suscepti-
bility to positive and negative affect goes further than simply
predicting a correlation between personality dimensions and
the frequency of specific affective states. Gray's theory implies
that the tendency to experience differential levels of positive or
negative affect depends on individual differences in specific
neurological structures
(i.e.,
the
BAS
and the
BIS).
These biolog-
ically based individual differences
are
the underlying hypotheti-
cal cause of both the affective states (positive and negative) and
the personality dimensions (extraversion and neuroticism). If
this hypothesis is indeed true, then extraverts should be more
responsive than introverts to positive-affect inductions,
whereas neurotics should be more responsive than stable indi-
viduals to negative-affect inductions. Stated differently, extra-
verts and introverts should show differential sensitivity to posi-
tive but not negative affect, whereas neurotics and stable indi-
viduals should show differential sensitivity to negative but not
positive affect.
In the present study, we tested the just-stated hypotheses us-
ing an experimental rather than a correlational
design.
We
used
a standard laboratory mood induction procedure (guided imag-
ery) to manipulate positive, neutral, or negative affect. We as-
sessed emotional responsivity using a standard mood adjective
rating task. If the affective implications of Gray's theory are
correct regarding differential susceptibility to affective states,
then we would find that extraversion is associated with a sensi-
tivity to inductions of positive (but not negative) affect and that
neuroticism is associated with a sensitivity to inductions of nega-
tive (but not positive) affect. In other
words,
the strength of our
negative-affect induction should be more strongly related to
neuroticism scores than extraversion scores, whereas the
strength of our positive-affect induction should be more
strongly related to the extraversion scores than to the neuroti-
cism scores.
Method
Subjects
Subjects in this study were 359 undergraduate students
who
partici-
pated in partial fulfillment
of
requirements
for their introductory psy-
chology course. Participants were
run
through this study
in
small
groups that ranged from
6 to
12 persons each. Each session lasted
approximately
1
hr.
Personality Measure
We
began the experimental session
by
having subjects complete sev-
eral personality questionnaires, which took approximately 30 min
to
complete. This
was
done in part to equate subjects' experiences imme-
diately before the mood inductions. That is, we wanted to control
for
differences between subjects
in
terms of arousal states
at
the time of
the mood inductions by having them all sit quietly and complete per-
sonality questionnaires for
30
min.
The personality measure of interest
in
this
study
was
the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
(H.
J.
Eysenck
& Eysenck, 1972). This 90-item true-false questionnaire has been ex-
tensively validated and widely used in personality
research.
It provided
the extraversion and neuroticism scores used in our analyses.
Mood Induction Procedure
After completing
the
personality measures, subjects engaged
in a
task designed to influence their mood
states.
Imagery tasks were used
as mood-induction procedures. This form of affect induction is com-
mon in studies involving laboratory mood manipulations
(e.g.,
Delp &
Sackeim, 1987; Larsen, Sinnett, & Kasimatis, 1988; Salovey & Birn-
baum,
1989;
J.
M.
G. Williams,
1980;
Wright
&
Mischel,
1982).
Usinga
between-subjects design,
we
used three mood-induction conditions:
positive, negative,
and
neutral affect. Each induction condition
in-
volved having subjects read two written scenarios designed to induce
the intended affect.
We
asked subjects to create a vivid image of them-
selves
in
each situation described
by the
scenarios.
The
written
in-
structions asked subjects in the positive-affect condition to either imag-
ine themselves winning
$50,000
in a lottery and then taking a vacation
to Hawaii
or
imagine themselves relaxing and feeling healthy and
re-
freshed after
a
pleasant exercise session and then taking
a
walk on
a
beautiful day and finding
a
$5
bill. For the negative-affect condition,
the written instructions asked subjects
to
either imagine themselves
being expelled from school in an embarrassing manner and then hav-
ing a
close
friend die from a painful and incurable disease or
to
imagine
themselves being frustrated
by
having
to sit
through
a
boring
and
tedious lecture and then being sick in bed with the
flu.
Subjects in the
neutral induction were asked
to
imagine visiting
a
supermarket and
then taking an automobile trip on
a
highway.
We
told subjects that the experiment concerned memory and person-
ality.
Before they read the affective
scenarios,
we
told subjects that they
would
be
asked
to
recall parts
of
the scenarios later and that
if
they
could actually
"get
into
the
feeling"
of
each scene
as
they read
and
imagined
it,
then they should have better recall. Subjects were
in-
structed to do the following:
Imagine the situation as vividly
as
you
can.
Picture the event hap-
pening to you. Try to imagine all the details of the situation. Pic-
ture
in
your "mind's
eye"
the surroundings as clearly as possible.
See
the
people
or
objects; hear the sounds; experience the event
happening
to
you.
Think the thoughts you would actually think in
this situation. Feel the same feelings you would feel in this situa-
tion. Let yourself react as
if
you were actually there.
After we gave them these instructions, we presented
the
subjects
with
a
written description of one of the just-stated scenarios and gave
them 4 min to read it,
relax,
close their
eyes,
and imagine being in that
situation. We then gave the subjects the second scenario
of
the
same
hedonic tone (positive, negative,
or
neutral)
to
read
and
imagine
for
another
4
min. Subjects were randomly assigned
to
one
of
the three
possible mood-induction conditions:
positive,
negative,
or
neutral.
The
only constraint on our randomization scheme was to assign approxi-
mately twice as many subjects to the hedonic conditions (positive and
negative) than
to
the neutral condition, so that we could compare the
effectiveness of the different hedonic images for inducing the intended
affective state. Each subject received either
two
positive-affect
sce-
narios,
two
negative-affect
scenarios,
or two neutral
scenarios.
Because
we were able to administer the inductions using written scenarios, we
were able
to
randomize individual subjects across conditions and ex-
PERSONALITY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EMOTIONAL STATES135
perimenters. There
were two
experimenters, each running an identical
proportion of positive-, negative-, and neutral-induction conditions.
The negative-affect condition included
145
subjects, the neutral condi-
tion included 70 subjects, and the positive-affect condition included
144 subjects.
Mood Measure
After they completed the imagery
tasks,
we gave
the subjects a rating
sheet that contained mood adjectives and asked them to "indicate how
much of each mood you are feeling right now." The adjectives were
selected to represent the domain of self-reported emotion
as
presented
in Russell (Russell, 1978,1980), Watson and Tellegen (1985), and Ze-
von and Tellegen (1982). For the purposes of this study, we used six
adjectives to measure negative affect
(distressed,
fearful,
nervous,
jit-
tery,
anxious,
and annoyed) and
six
adjectives to measure positive affect
(enthusiastic,
excited,
elated,
peppy,
euphoric,
and
lively).
These adjec-
tives
represent subsets of adjective
sets
used
as
measures of positive and
negative affect by other researchers
(e.g.,
the Positive Affect and Nega-
tive Affect Schedule,
PANAS;
Watson,
1988;
Watson et al,
1988).
Posi-
tive and negative affect are the dimensions of mood most frequently
associated with the personality dimensions of extraversion and neu-
roticism in correlational research. Subjects rated each adjective on a
7-point
unipolar response scale, with 0 anchored with not at
all,
1
an-
chored with
very
slight,
2 with
somewhat,
3 with
moderate
amount,
4
with
much,
5
with very
much,
and
6
with extremely
much.
This response
scale is similar to the
5-point
unipolar response scale used on the
PANAS and is almost identical to the
7-point
unipolar response scale
recommended by Mayer and Gaschke (1988) for the assessment of
momentary positive and negative affect.
Results
Reliability and Intercorrelation of Mood Measures
Scale means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities for
the mood measures are presented in Table
1.
The reliabilities of
the positive- and negative-affect scales were satisfactory and
comparable to the reliabilities obtained by other researchers
using
similar
sets
of adjectives designed to measure positive and
negative affect (Watson et
al.,
1988).
Because positive and nega-
tive affect are assumed to be
90°
apart on the circumplex struc-
ture of self-reported emotion, the measurement model de-
mands that the correlation between these scales be approxi-
mately
0. Across
the
entire
sample,
the
intercorrelation between
positive and negative affect was
.23.
This relatively small corre-
Table
1
Descriptive Statistics
for
Affect Scores Within Conditions
Induction
Positive
PA
NA
Neutral
PA
NA
Negative
PA
NA
M
9.62
5.18
5.10
5.98
4.55
9.45
SD
8.12
4.42
5.51
5.65
5.27
6.37
n
144
144
70
70
145
145
Range
0-32
0-27
0-23
0-25
0-23
0-22
Alpha
.89
.76
.86
.80
.93
.60
Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect.
lation implies that our adjective
sets
that
were
designed to mea-
sure positive and negative affect approach the level of orthogo-
nality demanded by the circumplex model of self-reported af-
fect. This
is
not surprising given that our adjectives are a subset
of adjectives used
by others
to
assess
positive and
negative
affect
as orthogonal constructs (Watson et al., 1988).
Effectiveness of Mood Induction Procedures
To assess whether the affective imagery tasks produced the
intended effect on subjects' moods, we conducted a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the three mood induction
conditions.
This was done
separately for
positive
affect and then
negative affect as the dependent variables. Mean levels of posi-
tive and negative affect in each of the three induction condi-
tions are also presented in Table 1. The ANOVA on positive
affect revealed a significant main effect for mood induction
condition, F(2, 353) = 25.72, p <
.001.
This was followed up
with planned comparisons, using the Schefle multiple range
test, to examine whether the main effect was due to a large
effect in a single condition. The planned comparisons revealed
that, in terms of the positive-affect measure, subjects in the
positive-affect induction condition scored significantly (p <
.05) higher than subjects in the neutral-affect induction condi-
tion but that the negative-affect induction subjects were not
significantly different from the neutral-affect induction sub-
jects.
This implies that the positive-affect measure is sensitive
mainly
to changes
in positive affect,
as
would
be
predicted from
the circumplex measurement model of affect (Larsen
&
Diener,
in press). This sensitivity or discriminant validity of positive
affect as a measure of positive (but not negative) affect is desir-
able for an adequate test of the differential susceptibility hy-
pothesis. Another ANOV\ conducted on negative affect also
revealed a significant main effect for mood induction condi-
tion, .F(2, 353) =
25.41,
p < .001. Planned comparisons re-
vealed that, in terms of the negative-affect measure, subjects in
the negative-affect induction condition scored significantly
higher than subjects in
the
neutral-affect induction condition (p
< .05) but that the subjects in the positive-affect induction were
not significantly different from the subjects in the neutral in-
duction. This implies that the negative-affect measure is sensi-
tive mainly to changes in negative affect, as again would be
predicted from the circumplex model of affect. This sensitivity
or discriminant validity of negative affect
as a
measure of nega-
tive (but not positive) affect
is also
desirable for an adequate test
of the differential susceptibility hypothesis.
Differential Susceptibility to Positive and Negative Mood
Induction Procedures
The major hypothesis under investigation
is
that the strength
or effectiveness of the positive-affect induction should be better
predicted from extraversion scores than neuroticism scores,
whereas the strength or effectiveness of the negative-affect in-
duction should be better predicted from neuroticism scores
than extraversion scores. We computed correlations between
the personality variables (extraversion and neuroticism) and the
self-report of mood after the mood induction procedures. We
computed these correlations separately for the positive-, neu-
136RANDY J. LARSEN AND TIMOTHY KETELAAR
tral-,
and negative-affect induction conditions, and we present
them in Table 2.
The correlations in Table 2 indicate that neuroticism shows
the strongest relationship to affect when negative affect is ma-
nipulated and measured. Extraversion, on the other hand,
shows the strongest relationship to affect when positive affect is
manipulated and measured. In other
words,
the effectiveness
of
the positive- and negative-affect inductions differed depending
on personalities of the subjects; extraversion is associated with
the greater positive-affect reactivity to the positive-affect induc-
tion but not negative-affect reactivity to the negative-affect in-
duction. Neuroticism
is
associated with the greater
negative-af-
fect reactivity to the negative-affect induction but not positive-
affect reactivity to the positive-affect induction. This suggests
that if one wanted to predict the effects of a mood induction
procedure from personality
scores,
one would be better
able
to
predict negative-affect reactivity to a negative-affect induction
from neuroticism rather than extraversion scores, whereas the
positive-affect reactivity to a positive-affect induction would be
better predicted from extraversion rather than neuroticism
scores. This lends some support to the hypothesis that positive-
affect inductions should
be
more effective for extraverts than for
neurotics, whereas negative-affect inductions should be more
effective for neurotics than for extraverts.
The just-mentioned correlations indicate that extraversion
and neuroticism significantly predict emotional reactions
within the mood-induction conditions. Another way to exam-
ine the question of differential susceptibility to affective states
is
to look at personality differences in mean
levels
of emotional
reactivity in the different mood-induction conditions.3
We
cre-
ated high and
low
groups on both the extraversion and neuroti-
cism scales by dividing the sample at the median on these two
dimensions; that is, introverted and extraverted groups were
created by splitting the sample at the median on the extraver-
sion score. Similarly, we created stable and neurotic groups by
splitting the same sample at the median on the neuroticism
score. Because extraversion and neuroticism were correlated at
.09 in this sample, it seemed appropriate to use the medians to
create high and low
groups.
In the comparisons that follow, we
compared the groups created by splitting the sample on the
extraversion scale and then compared the groups created by
Table 2
Correlations Between Personality Scores
and
Mood Within Conditions
Induction
Positive
PA
NA
Neutral
PA
NA
Negative
PA
NA
Extraversion
.32**
.02
.10
-.12
.00
-.18*
Neuroticism
-.19*
.10
-.03
.29**
.13
.34**
splitting
the same sample
on the neuroticism
scale.
Each
subject
in the sample thus appears in both comparisons.
We conducted ANOVAs using a 2 (high vs. low extraver-
sion)
X
3 (positive- vs. neutral- vs. negative-mood induction
condition) factorial design. Positive and negative affect were
entered as dependent variables in separate ANOV\s. For posi-
tive affect, there was a significant main effect for mood induc-
tion condition, F(2,353) = 24.47, p<
.001,
as well as a signifi-
cant main effect for extraversion, F(\, 353) = 8.69, p < .005.
More important to our hypothesis is that the interaction of
extraversion and mood induction condition produced a signifi-
cant effect, F(2, 353) = 3.59, p < .03. Inspection of Figure 1
reveals that this significant interaction effect
is due
to extraverts
showing a greater positive-affect responsiveness than introverts
in the positive-affect induction condition but relatively no
greater responsiveness in the negative-affect induction condi-
tion.
A similar ANCAA. was conducted using neurotic versus
stable as the personality factor, again with positive affect
as
the
dependent
variable.
Again there
was a
main effect for induction
condition,
F(2,
353) = 21.44, p <
.001,
but no significant (p <
.05) effect for neurotic versus stable and no significant interac-
tion term. This suggests that neurotic subjects did not show
differential positive-affect responsivity to the mood-induction
manipulations, relative to the stable subjects.
When we turned to an analysis of negative-affect responsiti-
vity, we found an opposite pattern of results. For
negative
affect
as the dependent variable, the 2
X
3 ANOV\ on the neurotic
versus stable personality factor across the three induction con-
ditions produced significant main effects for both the induction
condition, F(2, 353) =
28.31,
p < .001, and the personality
factor of neurotic versus stable, F(\, 353) =
19.41,
p < .001.
More important, the interaction between the neuroticism fac-
tor and the mood induction factor was also significant, F(2,
353) = 3.28, p < .05. This interaction implies that neurotics
were more negative-affect responsive than stable subjects and
that this was particularly the case in the negative-affect induc-
tion condition.
A similar ANONft. that used extravert versus introvert as the
personality factor, again with negative affect as the dependent
variable, revealed a nonsignificant (p
>
.05) interaction effect.
There was again a main effect for induction condition, F(2,
353) =
23.53,
p
<
.001,
as well as a main effect for extraversion
personality factor, F(l,
353) =
7.40, p
<
.01.
However,
extraverts
(compared with introverts) did not exhibit differential negative-
affect reactivity
as
a function of type of mood-induction condi-
tion.
Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect.
*p<.05.
**p<.01.
3 The within-conditions correlations emphasize the idea of predict-
ing
the strength of the mood-induction effects from personality scores.
However, because the correlations were computed within conditions,
it
is
necessary to use an
ANOVA
to assess the personality differences in
means between the experimental conditions. Testing to see whether
the correlations are significantly different in the different conditions
amounts to the same thing
as
using an ANOVA
to
assess whether there
is
a significant interaction term. Because these
two
analyses are redun-
dant, we did not test for the differences between the correlations.
PERSONALITY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EMOTIONAL STATES137
12-
10-
Positive
Affect 8 -
6-
Extravert
Introvert
Negative
Affect 8
Negative Neutral Positive
Mood Induction Condition
Negative Neutral Positive
Mood Induction Condition
Positive
Affect
12-
10-
8 -
6-
4 -
—•*•--
f
Neurotic
Stable
A
//
12-
•
10-
Negative
Affect 8"
6-
\
\
\ V
\A-
—ft-Neurotic
Stable
A
Negative Neutral Positive
Mood Induction ConditionNegative Neutral Positive
Mood Induction Condition
Figure
1.
Mean positive-affect and negative-affect scores as a function
of personality group and affect induction condition.
Discussion
The purpose of
the
present study was to examine the differ-
ential susceptibility or vulnerability to positive- and negative-
mood induction procedures and how these differences might
relate to the personality dimensions of extraversion and neu-
roticism. Much previous correlational research has found that
extraversion is consistently related to heightened
levels
of posi-
tive affect and that neuroticism
is
consistently related to height-
ened levels of
negative
affect
(e.g.,
Costa
&
McCrae,
1980).
Using
mood adjective rating
tasks,
such correlational research usually
asks subjects how they typically feel. Results of previous re-
search suggest that the extraverted subjects typically report
more positive affect (but about the same amount of negative
affect) than introverts, whereas the neurotic subjects typically
report more negative affect (but about
the
same amount of posi-
tive affect) than stable subjects. The question this correlational
research leaves unanswered is: Are these differential correla-
tions with positive and negative affect on the part of extraver-
sion and neuroticism
due,
in fact, to differential emotional sus-
ceptibility to positive- and negative-affect stimuli? Previous re-
search does not rule out the possibility that
extroverts create
life
circumstances that, in turn, foster frequent positive-affect expe-
riences. For example, extraverts may be more likely than intro-
verts to engage in social
activities,
and engaging in social activi-
ties may be the source of frequent positive affect. Similarly,
neurotics may be more likely than stable individuals to create
life situations that, in turn, foster frequent negative-affect expe-
riences. For example, neurotics are more likely to engage in
self-recrimination, doubt, and thoughts of resentfulness. Such
behaviors may be an indirect source of frequent negative affect.
Extraverts and neurotics may differentially create or choose to
enter into different life situations (Diener, Larsen, & Emmons,
1984;
Snyder, 1981), and it may be these situations that bring
about differential levels of positive or negative affect. Thus, ex-
traversion and neuroticism may not directly promote positive
138RANDY I LARSEN AND TIMOTHY KETELAAR
and negative affect by fostering differential susceptibility or re-
sponsivity to positive- and negative-affect stimuli, respectively,
but rather may indirectly foster positive- and negative-affect
experiences by promoting life situations that, in turn, result in
the frequent experience of
positive
or
negative
affect
(McCrae &
Costa, 1991).
Many researchers in
this
area
(e.g.,
M.
Eysenck,
1987;
McCrae
& Costa,
1991;
Strelau, 1987; Tellegen, 1985) nevertheless as-
sume that extraversion and neuroticism are manifestations of
biologically based
systems
that directly promote differential
sus-
ceptibility or responsivity to positive- or negative-affect stimuli.
If this
is
true,
then, in addition
to the
correlational evidence just
cited, extraversion should predict positive-affect responsivity to
positive
emotional
stimuli,
and neuroticism should predict neg-
ative-affect responsivity to negative emotional stimuli. In other
words, it can be hypothesized that extraversion should be asso-
ciated with a higher probability of experiencing positive-affect
states and neuroticism should be associated with a higher proba-
bility of experiencing negative-affect states during controlled
exposure to positive and negative emotional stimuli, respec-
tively. The notion that extraversion and neuroticism represent
dimensions of differential preparedness to respond to positive-
and negative-affect stimuli, respectively, should be examined
experimentally.
Our hypothesis
has its
theoretical foundation in Gray's (1981)
emotion-based model of
personality.
Gray (1981,1987) postu-
lated the existence of two brain systems (the
BAS
and the BIS)
that control sensitivity to signals of reward and sensitivity to
signals of punishment, respectively. These two systems are as-
sumed to
give rise
to the personality dimensions of extraversion
and neuroticism, respectively. According to this theory, extra-
version is based in a heightened sensitivity to signals of reward
(the
BAS)
and neuroticism
is
based in a heightened sensitivity to
signals
of punishment
(the
BIS).4
One
could further assume that
sensitivity to signals of reward is experientially manifest in
heightened positive emotional reactions, whereas sensitivity to
signals of punishment is experientially manifest in heightened
negative emotional reactions. This assumption has been made
by others (e.g., M. Eysenck, 1987; Strelau, 1987) but has never
been empirically tested. The empirical hypotheses that follow
are that extraverts (compared with introverts) should show
heightened reactivity to positive (but not
negative)
mood-induc-
tion procedures, whereas neurotics (compared with stable indi-
viduals) should show heightened reactivity to induction proce-
dures for negative (but not positive) mood.
In the present study, we examined these hypotheses by ex-
ploring differential reactivity to induction procedures for posi-
tive
and negative mood in
a
controlled laboratory
setting.
Intro-
verts and extraverts were found to differ significantly from each
other in their affective reactivity to the positive- but not the
negative-mood induction. Neurotic and stable individuals dif-
fered from
each
other significantly
only
in their affective reactiv-
ity to the negative- but not the positive-mood induction. We
were thus better able to predict the efficacy of the positive-
mood induction from extraversion rather than neuroticism
scores, whereas
we were
better
able
to predict
the
efficacy of the
negative-mood induction from neuroticism scores rather than
extraversion scores.
The
results
of our study
are
consistent
with
Gray's psychobio-
logical theory, especially as interpreted and elaborated by
Fowles (1980,1987) and Tellegen
(1985).
The
BAS
and the BIS
are
stimulus-sensitivity systems assumed
to
influence
the
proba-
bility of specific affective states. Because Gray's two stimulus-
sensitivity
systems are also
assumed to form
the
biological basis
of extraversion and neuroticism, we suggest that
these
personal-
ity dimensions represent vulnerability or susceptibility to spe-
cific affective
states.
It appears that different persons are differ-
entially prepared to respond with specific emotions when given
the same stimulus conditions. This theoretical position sug-
gests that extraversion is associated with a preparedness to re-
spond with stronger positive than negative affect under the ap-
propriate circumstances, whereas neuroticism is associated
with a preparedness to respond with stronger negative than
positive affect under the appropriate circumstances.
Results from the present experiment, in which laboratory
mood-induction procedures were used, can account for
previous correlational
findings
that extraverts experience more
positive than negative affect in their lives over time, and neu-
rotics experience more negative than positive affect in their
lives over time. Our results thus provide experimental support
for Costa and McCrae's (1980) statement:
Extroverted traits contribute to one's positive enjoyment... al-
though they do not generally
appear
to reduce
the unpleasantness
of
adverse
circumstances.
Neurotic traits predispose one to
suffer
more acutely from one's misfortunes, but they
do
not necessarily
diminish
one's joy
or
pleasures,
(p.
674)
There are theoretical advantages to relating personality traits
to emotion concepts. When specific personality traits are con-
ceptualized as mood-dispositional dimensions, understanding
of the affective organization of
various
personality-relevant
phe-
nomena may
increase.
For example,
the
nature of psychological
well-being may be understood as due to the interacting influ-
ence of the two signal-sensitivity systems. There may be two
routes to maintaining psychological well-being: (a) being rela-
tively insensitive to the disorganizing influence of unpleasant
emotional stimulation, or (b) being especially responsive to
pleasant emotional stimulation. This logic is implicit in the
model of well-being presented
by
Costa and
McCrae (1980)
and
has also been discussed by Meehl (1975) and Tellegen (1985).
Meehl suggested that discrete brain structures are responsible
for controlling
the dual
capacities for pleasure and
pain.
If these
hedonic capacities are orthogonal, as suggested by current re-
search on emotion (Watson, 1988; as well as the results of the
present
study),
then individuals with the highest probability for
obtaining overall psychological well-being are those with a low
capacity for negative affect (nonneurotic or stable individuals)
4 Although Gray's approach is a reformulation of H. J. Eysenck's
(1967)
theory,
the
two
theories make very similar predictions regarding
individual differences in the manifestation of emotional
reactions.
For
example, H. J. Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) argue that extraverts are
prone
to
experience elevated levels of positive affect, whereas neurotics
are prone to experience elevated levels of negative affect
(p.
141). The
major differences between Gray's and H. J. Eysenck's theories involve
the biological mechanisms responsible for these differential emotional
reactions and the precise location of these individual differences in the
two-dimensional space defined by the major personality factors.
PERSONALITY AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EMOTIONAL STATES
139
combined with a high capacity for positive affect (extraverted
individuals). Stable extraverts may thus be biologically
equipped for the highest probability of experiencing psychologi-
cal well-being, given the appropriate circumstances.
Affective states do not exist in a vacuum; that
is,
stimuli with
hedonic potential are necessary to trigger affective reactions. It
is unlikely that even a stable extravert would experience long-
term well-being if no pleasurable stimuli were forthcoming
from the environment. The present results suggest that, given
the appropriate
stimuli,
the personality dimensions of extraver-
sion and neuroticism are related to differential manifestation of
positive and negative affect. Such differential hedonic capaci-
ties may be due to a lowered sensitivity to hedonic stimuli or to
an increased magnitude of hedonic response. That
is,
one ques-
tion raised by the present results is whether the obtained effects
are due to the stimulus sensitivity or the response magnitude
side of the stimulus-response equation. For example, did our
extraverts report more positive-affect response to the positive-
mood induction because they have a lower threshold for plea-
surable stimuli (i.e., are more sensitive to pleasurable events) or
because they are more prepared to manifest a higher magni-
tude positive-affect response to pleasurable events? Similarly,
did our neurotic subjects report more negative-affect response
to the negative-mood induction because they have a lower
threshold for unpleasant stimuli (i.e., are more sensitive to un-
pleasant events) or because they are more prepared to manifest
a higher magnitude negative-affect response to unpleasant
events? In discussing our results, we have used both of these
explanations, and they may in fact both be correct. Future re-
searchers might attempt to disentangle whether the direct per-
sonality effects on emotional reactivity demonstrated in this
study are due more to differential stimulus sensitivity or to dif-
ferential response magnitude. Regardless of this issue, our re-
sults do implicate the personality dimensions of extraversion
and neuroticism as playing direct temperamental roles in fos-
tering differential hedonic capacities. This implication goes
beyond the correlational evidence gathered to date on the rela-
tion between personality and emotion.
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