The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly large language models exhibiting increasingly sophisticated cognitive and communicative behaviors, has intensified speculation about machine consciousness and spurred calls for methods to assess consciousness-like capabilities. However, this paper argues that attempting to directly "measure" or reliably infer subjective phenomenal consciousness in current AI systems faces fundamental, potentially insurmountable epistemological and methodological dilemmas, rooted in the philosophical "hard problem" of consciousness, the challenge of cross-substrate comparison, and the inherent limitations of third-person assessment methods. Traditional approaches like the Turing test are demonstrably inadequate, failing to probe beyond behavioral imitation and ignoring potential ontological differences. This paper undertakes a deep, critical reflection on the severe challenges encountered when attempting to assess even the functional simulation of complex capabilities often associated with consciousness (e.g., information integration, adaptive learning, complex value responsiveness). It systematically analyzes difficulties including the uncertainty and underspecification of consciousness theories, the profound gaps in operationalizing theoretical constructs into measurable indicators, and the intractable problem of validating such indicators without a 'gold standard' for consciousness itself. Critically, drawing upon foundational analyses within the Existential Symbiosis Theory (EST)-specifically concerning computational limits and likely substrate dependence of consciousness argued via IBE in Kwok (2025P), and the concepts of Existential Redundancy (ER) and the Authenticity Gap between AI simulation and human experience grounded in biology and phenomenology (Kwok, 2025F)-this paper argues that these factors pose principled obstacles to inferring genuine subjective states from AI behavior or computational structure alone. Taking the author's proposed Consciousness Integration and Adaptability Test (CIAT) framework as a central, self-critical case study, this paper analyzes its design philosophy-which attempts to address known challenges through employing multiple theoretical perspectives heuristically and emphasizing mechanism sensitivity via the mandatory integration of Explainable AI (XAI) and systematic adversarial testing. It then emphatically reveals CIAT's own profound methodological limitations (including its necessary disconnection from the known biological roots of consciousness highlighted by Kwok (2025P) and Kwok (2025F), the inherent limits of verifying internal mechanisms even with XAI/adversarial tools, the principled difficulties and extreme ethical risks in assessing Complex Value Response Simulation [CVRS], significant feasibility and scalability questions potentially linked to power dynamics (Kwok, 2025H)) and associated ethical risks (e.g., misinterpretation leading to harmful anthropomorphism). This paper stresses unequivocally that CIAT is intended strictly as an exploratory research program and a critical reflective platform. Its aim is solely to assess the quality, robustness, and potential risks of AI's functional simulation of complex capabilities, never to determine the presence or absence of subjective phenomenal consciousness, the possibility of which in non-biological computational systems remains highly speculative and currently lacks robust empirical or theoretical support beyond functionalist assumptions contested within EST (Kwok, 2025P). Ultimately, the paper advocates for cultivating a culture of extreme caution, epistemological humility, radical transparency about limitations, and unwavering ethical responsibility in assessing and discussing advanced AI capabilities. It aims to provide critical methodological guidance for future research in this challenging area while acknowledging the profound unknowns and the significant implications for developing effective AI governance (Kwok, 2025I, Kwok, 2025H), including recognizing the inherent politics of assessment itself.