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The Critique of Pure Reason
... Scholars have offered various definitions and interpretations of "stupidity" with no consensus. Previous research has associated stupidity with negative connotations such as cognitive failure (Golob, 2019) and failure of judgment (Kant, 1998) and foolishness and ignorance (Karimi-Ghartemani et al., 2020). Generally, stupidity is negatively linked to an individual's competence and chance of success (Aczel et al., 2015). ...
... Previous research often associates stupidity with negative connotations (e.g. Kant, 1998). However, some studies mention the positive effects Table 1 Definitions and descriptions related to "stupid" ...
Purpose-In social interactions, facial stupidity has been found to be negatively related to communication success. This research aims to examine the positive impact of product anthropomorphic stupidity on consumers' perceived cuteness and their purchase intentions. Design/methodology/approach-Four experiments were conducted to achieve the research objectives. Data were collected using online survey platforms and at a local university. The analysis was performed using SPSS 26.0. Findings-The results indicate that a high (vs low) level of product facial stupidity can significantly increase consumers' purchase intentions by promoting perceived cuteness. Furthermore, the brand relationship norm has a moderating effect. Specifically, under a communal relationship norm, consumers perceive greater cuteness from a product's facial stupidity, whereas under an exchange relationship norm, the perceived cuteness is reduced. Originality/value-To the best of the authors' knowledge, this research is among the first explorations focusing on the concept of product stupidity, systematically examining the external features and internal mechanisms associated with product facial stupidity. It offers a novel perspective on product anthropomorphism and enriches the existing literature on stupidity. In addition, it provides practical guidelines for companies seeking to leverage anthropomorphic designs in their products.
... If we imagine a state of consciousness that does not create any modifications, i.e. a state of "transparent, pure consciousness (for example Kantian noumenal knowledge [37], Buddhist enlightenment [38]), which arise through mechanisms of quantum resonance [39,40] or some other synchronized vibrations [41], or in some other way (this is not important now), when being and consciousness are completely symmetrical, where cognition is existence itself, without interpretation, without projections, without distortions) taking it as 1 (this is not an arithmetic value, but an ontological state), we obtain pure, transparent, unrefracted cognition of reality, in which the operator of consciousness acts as an identical function (transparent existence): ...
This article proposes a new theoretical model that combines spatial and temporal dynamics, which has a normalized form of the basic equation: v c 2 + u t 2 = 1 where: c is the invariant speed c, commonly associated with light propagation in vacuum, is reinterpreted here as a fundamental bound representing the completeness of an existential state. Its constancy reflects preserving existential integrity, independent of local spacetime variations or temporal symmetry violations. As such, c defines the upper norm of the existential motion vector, beyond which no evolution can occur. u t is the temporal velocity; u t introduced in this model, emerges from quantum localization and defines a dimensionless scalar confined to the interval [0,1]. v is the spatial component of motion; v is normalized by the invariant speed c, yielding the dimensionless ratio v c. In conjunction with the dimensionless temporal metricu t , this framework preserves unit consistency and formally integrates spatial and temporal domains into a single invariant relation. In this model, the emergence of complexity in the Universe results from the local stabilization of the temporal metric u t. Stable structures arise in regions whereu t t maintains coherence within defined thresholds, allowing the formation of molecules, cells, and higher-order material organizations. Coherence inu t enables resonance among system components, serving as a fundamental condition for structural sustainability. Critically, the model extends this framework to consciousness, proposing that u t underlies its formation. The reciprocal embedding of consciousness and u t provides the basis for the following formalization. r = C (R, H, u t) where C is a modification operator described as C (r) = K (r, ξ, t, u t) where: A PREPRINT-MAY 9, 2025 • R (Reality): the objective substrate of existence. • K (Kernel of Transformation): an integral operator that transforms subjective knowledge based on the current state of consciousness and contextual variables ξ, time t, and temporal velocity u t ; formally, K(r, ξ, t, u t). • ξ: a vector of contextual parameters, including sensory input, associative states, and cultural priors; i.e., K (r, ξ, t, u t)-the core that models the influence of a specific context ξ on the processing of subjective knowledge r; • r (Reflection of reality): the subjective representation of R. • C (Consciousness): a nonlinear operator acting on contextual fields, modulating the system's trajectory within a potential landscape H. • H (Chaos): a field of potential trajectories (structured uncertainty) that enables optimization of temporal participation through contextual resonance; chaotic fluctuations play the role of a "sensory space" that allows the system to adapt and refine itself u t by changes in the environment constantly. • t: the local temporal parameter defining the point of integration in conscious transformation. • u t (Temporal Velocity): a dimensionless scalar regulating the epistemic relevance of knowledge at the moment of cognition. The proposed model reconceptualizes time not as the fourth coordinate of classical space-time or a mere quantitative axis (e.g., elapsed seconds) but as the intensity of existential presence. Through the temporal metric u t , time acquires a functional role in determining the degree to which a system particularly a conscious one-participates in being. Rather than passively measuring duration, time operates as a dynamic parameter in realising existence. This framework extends conventional physical theory by integrating cognitive dimensions into space-time structure, offering a unified account of temporality and consciousness. The model further outlines potential applications in artificial intelligence, medicine, and biology. SUMMARY. Time is reinterpreted as a form of velocity u t , quantifying the degree of existential participation in physical reality rather than measuring abstract duration. The model unifies motion, cognition, and structured chaos within an ontological framework anchored in observable reality and bounded by physical invariants.
... What one might call the "sickness of human reason" involves a final loss of one's foothold in reality and a meta-conceptual confusion of the forms of universalization of the concepts of experience. At this point in his writing, Kant does not speak much of reason as a separate faculty of the mind or of a need to criticize its power and reach, limiting it to the strict realm of human experience (recall that the Essay was written in 1764), yet it is still possible for readers of Kant's mature work to detect here something of an anticipation of the doctrines that would later be established in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998). ...
This paper deals with a poorly understood text written by Immanuel Kant at the beginning of his academic career: the Essay on the Maladies of the Head (Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes, 1764). In it, commenting on a sojourn by a religious fanatic and a boy in his hometown whilst elaborating upon some insights drawn from Rousseau’s philosophy, Kant views the development of mental illness as resulting from the process of “civilization,” on the one hand, and from the malfunctioning of our mental faculties, on the other. Following a careful analysis of the text, I conclude that Kant viewed mental illness as arising from the constraints of civilization and the very existence of mentally ill people in shared social life as providing a clue as to the origin and formation of modern civilization. Put differently, the specificities of mental derangement provide evidence of previous phases of human history and thus offer valuable insights into the genesis and transformation of society.
This chapter investigates why Kant repeatedly refers to “poetry” alone among the arts as “a mode of thinking” (“Denkungsart”) rather than “pleasing” artform. It closely examines Kant’s accounts of “what the poets do” that distinguishes their art from all other art forms, before comparing these to directly related formulations in Wordsworth’s “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” and other writings on poetics. Finally this chapter closely examines individual poems and critical passages in Wordsworth’s poetic corpus that bring the activity that he, like Kant, calls “thinking” into relief, so as to explore the following questions: Is such thinking specific to poetry, and if so, what are its characteristics? What distinguishes its vocabulary and syntactic shape? And does the poetic production of thinking, or poetic thinking, described in Kant’s Critique of Judgment and theorized and practiced by Wordsworth imply that thinking may itself depend, both actively and historically, upon poetry-making?
Drawing on Kleist’s pedagogical devices and their narrative implications, this chapter analyzes the various manners in which Kant presents the “historical a priori” of science in the Second Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason. The argument is that he develops a carefully nuanced continuum of different conceptual-narrative versions of the “Copernican revolution” within various sciences including, finally, metaphysics. While mathematics allows for a degree zero of narration in the statement constituting its becoming science, the experimental sciences call for increasingly more detailed histories of how they have undergone their respective turns to science. After an aside on the contemporary thinker and scientist, G. Chr. Lichtenberg, and his concept of “paradigms” of sciences, which seems to anticipate Kuhn’s famous conceptualization, the chapter returns briefly to Kleist for its conclusion, this time highlighting instances of quasi-“transcendental” turning points in his novellas. In most instances the moment of the dawning light is marked by a transition from narrative past to present. In the case of Kleist’s novellas the question is whether the given narrative focuses on just one or many moments of the breaking light and in which way these moments function as turning points familiar from the novella form since the Renaissance and confirmed by Goethe. While focusing on concept and narrative in Kant, the chapter thus offers also a new perspective on Kleist’s “Kant Crisis.”
This chapter reexamines the philosophical paradoxes of reading arising from the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding” of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason from the literary perspective of Yoko Tawada’s novella “Das Bad” (The Bath)/うろこもち (Scales). It reads how Tawada’s novella responds to Kant’s vision of “subjectivity” by creating a self-ethnicizing, first-person narrator who doubts the possibility of saying “I” as a means of self-reference and just as soon habitually lies about “who” she “is.” The chapter begins with a brief account of Kant’s struggles in writing the transcendental deduction and then turns to a close reading of the two versions of the transcendental deduction to consider the senses in which it and its pitfalls also describe the scene of reading. It argues that the transcendental deduction’s philosophical “failure” turns not on a failure of Kant’s system itself but on the act of writing out Ich denke, words that, strictly speaking, cannot even be read according to Kant’s own definition of it as a “representation” unaccompanied by any other representation, that is, a sign without a referent. It then turns to a close reading of Tawada’s “Das Bad”/うろこもち to trace how it linguistically ironizes Kant’s propositions on the possibility of thoroughgoing, stable “identity.” Tawada’s ironic response to Kant shows that Kant’s philosophical problem in the transcendental deduction turns, not on a philosophical “fallacy,” but on the “literary” dimension of his own language.
Kant introduced critique not just as a concept to describe his project that has become paradigmatic for the way we think about philosophy in modernity. With the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant also presents the first iteration of a literary genre whose impact proved seminal for the way successive philosophical practice conceives of presentation as constitutive for thought itself. This chapter first examines the affinity to Montaigne’s project of the essay that resonates with Kant’s own approach to rely on writing as medium for critical reflection. Montaigne’s traces in Kant are a reminder of the importance of the mode of the essay for the emergence of critique as a new literary mode. It then examines how Kant’s pre-critical essays advance themes that prove central to the literary mode of critique as a particular form of writing. The chapter shows how the Critique of Pure Reason articulates its project whose architectonics bears not just conceptual but also literary significance, representing itself part of an argument whose literary construction cannot simply be separated from its “content” or conceptual make-up. Rather, critique emerges in Kant as a specific mode of reasoning that reflects form as constitutive to content. It then discusses the way Kant highlights the function of critique as Enlightenment and how the Enlightenment publicist as its “depositary” represents the cause as a literary mandate. The chapter concludes with a brief outlook on formative impact of the literary legacy of Kant’s critique from Marx to Critical Theory and Derrida.
Kant’s own philosophy has seemed to some to contain a tragic dimension, since reason cannot avoid posing questions it cannot answer, and since we must hold ourselves to a moral standard which we rarely if ever reach. However, in his remarks on tragic drama, Kant expresses several concerns about the effects of watching tragedies, and these remarks indicate that he is hostile to what he regards as the portrayal of virtue and vice in such dramas. The argument of this chapter is that Kant’s resistance to there being anything of general philosophical significance in “the tragic point of view” is of broader significance than a matter of aesthetic taste. Tragedy is a notion deeply foreign to him, not because of some peculiarity of Kant’s personality, or even all that much as a result of his moral theory and critical philosophy, but because tragedy, understood broadly, deeply, and rightly, is foreign to philosophy as traditionally conceived, at least up until Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. Various dimensions of the opposition between tragedy and moral philosophy are then explored and comparisons with Hegel Schiller, Bernard Williams, and others about the moral status of tragedy are suggested.
This chapter presents an account of the philosophical framework Coleridge worked out to explain the relationship between the diverse physical configurations of matter and the eternal, immaterial, hierarchically ordered powers he held to determine the fundamental features of the material world. It traces the development of Coleridge’s theory of matter through an examination of his extensive critical commentary on Kant’s seminal Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, the starting point for the ‘dynamical’ account of matter favoured by the Naturphilosophen. I focus on Coleridge’s search for a set of terms that would make clear and consistently maintain the ontological distinctions between (i) matter, material substance, and body, and (ii) the ‘fundamental forces’ or ‘spiritual powers’ whose divinely grounded causal activity is necessarily manifested through all such physical entities. I argue that this aspect of Coleridge’s view results from his engagement with the concepts of ‘substance’ and ‘appearance’ initially put forward by Kant and subsequently refined by Coleridge in Opus Maximum and related marginalia and manuscript fragments.
This chapter explores the relation between mind and matter, spirit and nature, in Schelling’s and Hegel’s Naturphilosophie, framed through and against J. H. Green’s concept of ‘physiogony’ and Coleridge’s complication of this idea. Physiogony escalates Schelling’s hypothesis of the Stufenfolge, or graduated stages of nature, in the First Outline, into an aspirational discipline, and aptly describes Hegel’s desire in the Philosophy of Nature to trace an a priori logic of nature wherein each stage (following Kant) is cause and effect of itself, resolving the contradictions of the previous stage. However, a newly dynamical sense of matter renders this logic impossible and makes this impossibility generative. For Both Hegel’s text (despite itself) and Schelling’s radically experimental First Outline (more deliberately) break open the idealist binding of the volatile, organismic forces of nature, and disclose a dynamic interfolding of mind and matter, in which nature, rather than following the dictates of mind, generates new forms of thought.
Iris Murdoch’s Wild Imagination returns to the land to focus more intently on Murdoch’s depictions of key moments of human interaction in landscape. With reference to The Good Apprentice, chapter 5 begins by charting Murdoch’s fascination, as a young philosopher, with the role of the body and sensory awareness as essential precursors to thought. It considers Murdoch’s early interest in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and examines the degree to which his ontology of ‘wild being’ might be applied in any practical or meaningful sense. It assesses interactions between character and animistic landscape in the novel in order to scrutinize the collision of agential forces that seems to occur at these powerful moments. Murdoch’s portrayals of such interactions are suggestive of the affective experience of body in landscape that is recognized as critically significant by today’s affect theorists. An associated theoretical discourse, adopted by practitioners of material ecocriticism, constitutes vegetal agency which asserts the agential force of nature. Such notions of vegetal agency inform discussions of how Murdoch often pictures spaces, neglected or abandoned by their human inhabitants, that take on an overwhelming sense of rewilding, constituting an agentive force: the vegetal on the creep.
Can we learn from imagination? This article surveys a thread from an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and brings it into dialogue with Proclus's notion of mathematical imagination. Imagination for Proclus mediates between intellect and perception and reveals a unique level of reality borne by “intelligible matter.” By contrast, the contemporary debate, focused on concepts such as instructive versus transcendent imagining and propositional versus doxastic justification, is primarily epistemic in nature and seems not to require the fifth‐century Platonist's commitment to a distinctive level of imaginal reality. Even so, I argue that Proclus could converse fruitfully with the contemporary debate on questions about whether there is evidence accessible only to imagination and irreducible to other sources and about whether imagination is situationally responsive and able to inform belief.
This article aims to contribute to the literature by demonstrating the relevance and applicability of Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and appearances within the framework of wave-particle duality. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section clarifies two conceptions of appearances: as representations and as objects of representations. It also raises three key questions: (1) How can we access knowledge of the existence of things in themselves, if at all? (2) What roles do things in themselves play in Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics? (3) What, if anything, is lost if things in themselves are omitted from Kant’s system? The second section provides an in-depth analysis of the two-aspect interpretation of Kant’s distinction, focusing on the works of van Cleve, Westphal, and Langton, and examines the phenomenological, ontic, and epistemic dimensions of the distinction. The third section introduces key concepts of quantum mechanics, such as superposition and the uncertainty principle, in a way that is accessible to non-experts and in relation to Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. The study concludes that, in the tercentenary of his birth, Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and appearances continues to offer profound insights in the context of quantum mechanics.
Reading Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, it is easy to conclude that Kant had no sense of psychology as a separate scientific discipline. In fact, he was very clear that it had to be removed from metaphysics. But on the other hand, his last thesis was Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. This was his original contribution to psychology. The challenge, however, was that he had problems with the term “psychology.” The far more decisive factor, however, was the prehistory of psychology, having been incorporated into metaphysics by Christian Wolff earlier in the eighteenth century.
This chapter takes as its starting point the prehistory of this close connection between philosophy and psychology in order to examine more closely why Kant speaks so disapprovingly of psychology. The methodological approach to this is a classic hermeneutic spiral, in which his Critique of Pure Reason forms the textual starting point, but whereas his other critiques, his lectures on metaphysics, and psychology, and not the least his treatise on anthropology, form the supplementary and elaborating texts.
The findings presented in this chapter show first and foremost that Kant not only had a close relationship with psychology throughout this critical period, but that he also constructed a psychological model of thinking that forms the basis of his theory of cognition. In brief, this model consists of the elements of sensation, intuition, representation, reflection, understanding, and reason. Kant constructed this model on the basis of his need to uncover the mental capabilities needed to show that human beings actually have the prerequisites for arriving at valid philosophical conclusions, namely the 12 categories of understanding. The latter are not of interest to psychology but are crucial to ontology and thus philosophy. These categories of understanding were important to Kant, which is why he aimed to create a sharp distinction between psychology and philosophy, despite basing his entire reasoning on a psychological model of thinking.
The concept of equity is indispensable to Kantian morality. This claim is controversial given Kant’s labelling of equity as an unenforceable right and his reputed moral absolutism. A need for equity, however, can be elicited from within his writing. For Kant, human dignity constitutes the basis of duty. Conscience demands conformity with duty. Our duties to positively serve humanity are indeterminate. The need for equity arises, therefore, to guide conscientious deliberations in applying moral principles appropriately toward that end in particular situations. This is especially pronounced when one strives to support the dignity of others consistently with one’s own dignity.
Symbolic activity and agency are interconnected processes that underlie the human ability to act freely and independently of external conditions. Symbols, as a key element of this activity, enable humans to transcend immediate reality by operating with hypothetical and abstract events. This becomes possible through the transformation of S-R (stimulus-response) associations, where symbolic activity liberates the subject from direct dependence on external stimuli, creating the basis for free and purposeful behavior. Important aspects of symbolic activity may include the processes of pleromatization and schematization. Pleromatization is associated with the expansion of the sign field, where sign-vehicles are abstracted from objects, forming a field of possible meanings and interpretations. This field creates the basis for multiple action variants and alternative paths to achieving goals. Schematization, in turn, organizes this field by forming specific routes through the creation of point-like signs. The interaction of field-like signs and point-like signs allows the subject to transition from possible events to actual actions, thereby facilitating the manifestation of agency. Field-like signs represent potential possibilities, while point-like signs represent concrete paths for their realization. Two-stage models of free behavior help to understand how symbolic activity overcomes the rigid determinism of S-R relationships. In the first stage, action variants are generated, where the subject evaluates various possibilities based on field-like signs. In the second stage, one of the variants is selected and realized through point-like signs. These models demonstrate how internal motives arising from symbolic activity can replace external causes, creating a sense of freedom while maintaining internal determinism. Thus, agency does not exclude determinism but relies on internal motives rather than external stimuli.
Can formal logic make pure chance intelligible? This paper examines how pure chance, understood as what lies beyond probability and determination, both disrupts and extends formal reasoning. Drawing on Jean Ladrière, we explore how logic, despite its reliance on determinate structures, must engage with an irreducible indeterminacy that conditions its very operation. Pure chance serves as both the origin of logical structures-providing the space for determinations-and their unattainable horizon, toward which reason asymptotically moves. Through Ladrière’s concept of reducing purification, we analyze how logic progressively abstracts from determinations to approach pure existence. Examining five modes of abstraction, from individual objects to logic as a discipline, we show that this movement is inherently eschatological: logic strives toward totalization while never achieving full closure. Parallels with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Kant’s self-expanding reason reinforce that logic’s engagement with chance reflects a deeper structure of intelligibility, not a failure of formalization. Ultimately, we argue that hope (espérance) is inscribed in the structure of reason itself. Rather than resolving indeterminacy, logic participates in an intelligibility that always exceeds its grasp, revealing that reason’s fulfillment is always beyond reach, yet always already at work.
Kant's mature teleological philosophy in the Critique of the Power of Judgment is predicated on innovations that address a set of unprecedented challenges arising from within critical philosophy. The challenges are (1) a threat of “transcendental chaos” between sensibility and understanding, emerging from the structure of critical epistemology; (2) a threat of “critical chaos” between determination and reflection, generated by Kant's response to that first threat. The innovations include (a) a transcendental conception of purposiveness, (b) a principle of nature's purposiveness based on that conception, (c) a power of judgment governed by that principle, (d) and so governed in an unusual (self-given and self-governing) way, (e) a view on which nature does make leaps. This Element argues that Kant's mature teleological philosophy – and a fortiori Kant's aesthetics and philosophy of biology – cannot be understood without a fully systematic account of these challenges and innovations, and it presents such an account.
This paper examines the intellectual crises of (post-)modern philosophy, proposing a cosmopolitan philosophy as a remedy for the philosophical fragmentation that has contributed to global intellectual and cultural disintegration. Drawing on the ontological framework of Semyon Frank and enriched by Henry Corbin’s comparative philosophy and phenomenological hermeneutics, the paper establishes a new foundation for constructing a cosmopolitan philosophy within a post-foundationalist framework. Frank’s concept of “All-Unity” offers a metaphysical basis that reconciles the universal with the particular, resolving the antinomies of universality versus singularity and historicity versus non-historicity as foundational conditions of the possibility for this philosophy. Corbin’s focus on intuition and the imaginal realm further deepens this approach, enabling the integration of diverse intellectual traditions while honoring their unique and particular contributions. This paper argues that cosmopolitan philosophy can provide a coherent framework for engaging with the complexities of global thought and diverse intellectual traditions, offering a foundation for mutual understanding and addressing the existential crises of contemporary life.
This paper aims to evaluate the relevance of Kant’s much discussed essentialism and mechanism for present-day philosophy of psychiatry. Kendler et al. (Psychological Medicine 41(6):1143–1150, 2011) have argued that essentialism is inadequate for conceptualizing psychiatric disorders. In this paper, I develop this argument in detail by highlighting a variety of essentialism that differs from the one rejected by Kendler et al. I show that Kant’s essentialism is not directly affected by the argument of Kendler et al. (Psychological Medicine 41(6):1143–1150, 2011), and that Kendler et al.’s (Psychological Medicine 41(6):1143–1150, 2011) argument also does not affect other essentialist positions in psychiatry. Hence, the rejection of essentialism in psychiatry needs more arguments than the one supplied by Kendler et al. Nevertheless, the study of current psychiatry also provides reasons to reject Kant’s essentialism and his transcendental project. I argue that Kant’s theory of mechanical explanation is more relevant for analyzing present-day philosophy of psychiatry, insofar as (a) modern psychiatric research into the causes of psychiatric disorders fits the mechanist paradigm, (b) Kant’s theory of mechanical explanation is importantly similar to modern theories of mechanical explanation applicable to psychiatry, such as those of Bechtel and associates, and (c) Kant’s stance that mechanism constitutes a regulative ideal points to useful arguments for the pursuit of mechanical explanations in psychiatry.
This chapter provides a brief characterization of Immanuel Hermann Fichte’s anthropological and psychological project. After a biographical sketch and an examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte develops his project, this chapter provides a depiction of Fichte’s conception of anthropology and psychology as two different but continuous moments of an empirically founded speculative philosophy of the human soul. It is shown that Fichte conceives of his psychology as a history of the development of consciousness in the thinking, feeling, and willing activities of the human soul.
In this paper, we explore the question of how manipulative interactions may be transformed to healthier non-manipulative ones—or, in Buber’s terms, move from an “I-It” to an “I-Thou” relationship. To address this question, we draw on Heidegger’s viewpoint of pre-reflective practice, particularly his concepts “readiness-to-hand” and “presence-at-hand”, and analyze the manipulative mode of interpersonal interaction through this lens. Building upon this framework while incorporating relevant psychoanalytic theories and case studies, we then identified boundary-setting as a crucial mechanism for navigating beyond interpersonal manipulation. Furthermore, the paper delves into four specific cases of self-other interaction to provide a deeper understanding of intersubjective dynamics and their implications for relational transformation.
This introduction to the special issue Phenomenology and the Limits of Experience explores the complex relationship between phenomenology and the notion of limits. The discussion examines how phenomenology delineates the boundaries of experience while simultaneously encountering methodological, epistemological, and existential limits. The introduction situates limit-phenomena—such as unconscious processes, affectivity, violence, and intersubjective alterity—within phenomenology’s evolving framework, highlighting their role in expanding its methodological horizon.
I raise a problem about the possibility of metaphysics originally due to Kant: what explains the fact that the terms in our metaphysical theories (e.g., ‘property’, ‘grounding’) refer to entities and structures (e.g., properties, grounding) in the world? I distinguish a meta‐metaphysical view that can easily answer such questions (‘deflationism’) from a meta‐metaphysical view for which this explanatory task is more difficult (which I call the ‘substantive’ view of metaphysics). I then canvass responses that the substantive metaphysician can give to this Kantian demand for an explanation of reference in metaphysics. I argue that these responses are either inadequate or depend, implicitly or explicitly, on the idea of ‘joint carving’: carving at the joints is part of the explanation of referencefacts quite generally and our metaphysical terms in particular refer because they carve at the joints. I examine Ted Sider's recent work on joint carving and structure and argue that it cannot fill the explanatory gap. I conclude that this is reason ceterus paribus to reject the substantive view of metaphysics. Kant's critique, far from being obsolete, applies to the most cutting‐edge of contemporary meta‐metaphysical views.
This paper explores the intersection of Islamic ethics, the Anthropocene, and transhumanism, focusing on the necessity of integrating responsibility ethics into Islamic thought. It argues that traditional frameworks of deontological, intentional, and virtue ethics, while foundational, are insufficient to address the complex ethical dilemmas posed by globalization, environmental crises, and technological advancements. Drawing on Al-Māturīdī's theological insights, particularly his defense of free will and the concept of the "moment of inner resistance," this study proposes a responsibility ethics framework that complements traditional Islamic teachings. This framework emphasizes human autonomy, the rejection of blind imitation (taqlīd), and the necessity of considering long-term consequences. By reimagining ethical decision-making, this work highlights the potential for Islamic theology to engage with contemporary challenges, fostering a balanced coexistence of technological and spiritual progress.
Law regulates the behaviour of human beings in their interaction with other human beings and the world around them. What Law can or cannot dictate is thus intimately related with the way we conceive our environment. In the present paper I explore the way Kant presents the path leading from sense data to the discursive conceptualization of that sense data, and from that conceptualization to the discursive conceptualization of a moral world—the kingdom of ends—or, more specifically, a juridical world—the civil state. The paper details how the categorical imperative, understood as a test of imperative categoricity, and the typic of practical judgment play a critical role in the thought process required for that conceptual movement. Thus framed, Law finds itself bound by limits imposed by the non-discursive data that allows us to interact with the sensible world, on one side, and by other co-existent conceptualizations of the way we interact with the world around us.
The objective of this contribution is to present a counterargument to the view that religious faith is inherently incompatible with reason due to its lack of scientific evidence. To this end, it will draw upon the insights of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It will be demonstrated that the distinction between the meta-empirical sphere and that of the scientific understanding does not imply the irrationality of the former for Kant. This is because, while reason encompasses understanding, it is not constrained by it. On the contrary, defining the boundaries of the sphere accessible to scientific investigation implies recognising the space outside those boundaries, the definition of which is made possible by the operational instrument of noumenon. While this result does not contradict scientific reason, it does allow the boundaries of the two spheres to be defined in a non-conflicting way and implies that the metaempirical sphere is a legitimate area of endeavor. The result of these considerations is to demonstrate that any stance which, in the name of a misconceived scientificity, denies in principle any possible metascientific or religious perspective on reality, is ultimately unreasonable. Rather, such a stance is based on implicit metaphysical assumptions.
Radical translation consists in finding words for encounters with speakers who talk a different language for which no dictionary or grammar is yet available or, more exactly, a dictionary that is still in the process of being constructed. The example of Eudora Welty’s narrative transfigures the trauma of a cold-blooded assassination into a literary artwork; the reader takes a detour through the radical translation of fiction to attain radical empathy. Radical empathy challenges standard empathy to take empathizing to the next level in confronting experiences that cause empathic distress. Radical translation leads the way to radical empathy in extreme situations. A short “Ted Talk” is provided on trauma and radical empathy. The myth of Perseus-and-the-Medusa and the mirroring intervention of the work of art are witnesses to the empathic transfiguring of trauma. Empathy degree zero (previously introduced) takes on new meaning, and Mann’s Dr Faustus is engaged in this light: The road to hell is paved with radical empathy. Radical translation structures radical empathy: Camus’ The Plague (1947) exemplifies behavior in extreme situation, requiring radical translation of experience through radical empathy. To empathize against empathy until empathy creates out of its own wreck that which it contemplates.
The problem of reality as the foundation of the discourse on subject-matter in psychology originated in history of philosophy. Immanuel Kant’s critique of dogmatism disclosed a debate about the alternatives of realism and idealism. They are possible solutions for the problem, which means that they attend to the onto-gnoseological difference, i.e., the relationship between subject and object, representation and existence, or reason and being. To grasp these concepts, philosophy engages with gnoseology and metaphysics, discussing issues like the epistemic structure of affection or the order of categories. Further philosophical reflections reveal the interdependence of realism and idealism, initiating the search for a mediation, such as Kant’s transcendental idealism which espouses empirical realism. Albeit conceiving the problem, Kant himself did not satisfactorily solve it. His successors would advance the discourse and thereby transform the problem itself.
Psychological research engages with manifold phenomena, including as diverse events as verbal self-descriptions, neural activity, and societal changes. Still, the discipline owns a proper perspective onto being, identifying a genuinely psychological aspect in life. This tacit subject-matter of the discipline has been the topic of recurrent discussions in theoretical psychology, but no ultimate answer could be found. Hence, the problem of subject-matter arises. To face it, theoretical psychology requires not only knowledge about its history but also a systematic approach. This approach encompasses a methodology unlike empirical procedures, consisting of meta-methods, for instance, hermeneutic philosophy of science. Such meta-methods reveal that the problem of subject-matter partakes in a foundational hierarchy of problems which reunites psychology with philosophy. When addressing the problem of subject-matter, it becomes necessary also to explore the problem of reality.
Empathy is defined in terms of empathic receptivity, understanding, interpretation, and responsiveness. Each has characteristic breakdowns, exemplified by emotional contagion, conformity, projection, and communications lost in translation, which, when overcome, promote progress toward a rigorous and critical empathy. In this argument, a rigorous and critical empathy navigates a path between two absurdities—solipsism and merger with the Other, deploying a paradigm of empathy as translation between self and Other, including the puzzling case of self/Other reversal in the folktale of the prince and the pauper. The distinction “philosophical overlay” (Boylan) is defined and elaborated. The intersection of empathy and mimesis is engaged using Paul Ricœur’s reading of mimesis. The model of empathy as translation of experience between oneself and the Other is elaborated. The speech act of storytelling is the performance corresponding to empathic responsiveness, which does not merely pretend to create a community, it actually does so. Empathic responsiveness opens up into (and can be redescribed as) “rhetorical empathy.” Rhetorical empathy clarified. In empathizing the Other is engaged in-person and in-fiction. The intersection of empathy and mimesis is shown. The dynamic of inner imitation (Lipps) is narratively exemplified.
Authors who have focused on the limitations and biases of empathy are reviewed. A critique of the critique of empathy as limited and biased is provided from the perspective of a rigorous and critical empathy. Thinkers engaged include Bloom, Breithaupt, Gaines, Graham, Carpio, Serpall, and Zunshine. The classical philosophical problem of other minds has been replaced with the cognitive task of mindreading—simulating other minds or inventing an account of theory of mind (ToM). ToM is basic to cognitive literary criticism. The relation between cognitive literary criticism and empathy is debated. Cognitive (science) literary criticism is derivative on the folk definition of empathy, taking a walk in the Other’s shoes. Empathy intersects with mimesis, and by engaging mimesis in relation to other minds, a fourth aspect of Ricœur’s threefold mimesis emerges, call it “mimesis4.” “Mimesis of other minds” means “simulating other minds.” In the process, the empathic response to the literary text is completed. In every case, the answer of a rigorous and critical empathy to its critics is to refuse the choice between empathy and compassion, empathy and defeating empire, empathy and enlarged thinking from the perspective of the Other. The world needs expanded empathy as well as more compassion, enlarged thinking, and less empire.
In his magnum opus Temps et Récit, Paul Ricouer diagnoses three aporias of time in Husserl’s phenomenology. Of these, the first aporia is the most decisive, as it serves as the basis for the other two aporias. The first aporia identified by Ricœur refers to the retentional and protentional extension of “now” (jetzt), the present. The aporia of the present has its origin in the contrary conceptions of time by Aristotle and St. Augustine. The Aristotelian world time, as represented chiefly in the harmonious movement of celestial bodies, seems to contradict the Augustinian conception of time, namely the time of soul – as distentio animi. In Husserl’s attempt to extend the punctiform “now” by a retentional and protentional time-consciousness, Ricœur sees the inevitable aporia of a fusion of two modally opposed representations of time, namely, movement and stasis. In my paper I try to show how the first aporia of time identified by Ricœur can be seen not merely as an aporia of the present (Gegenwart), but as the aporia of the presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) of secondary memory, as represented in Husserl's propaedeutic explanation of the retentional extension of a time-object (Zeitobjekt) in subjective time-consciousness. The time-object and its intentional in-existence in consciousness, which is primarily conceived by Brentano in a temporal ‘original association’ and later by Husserl in retentional and protentional extension, is thereby extended in a mnestic and furthermore historical framework. It is primarily an attempt to establish the existential autonomy of the in-existent time-object in consciousness. Memory as an in-existent temporal phenomenon seems to contradict the tacitly assumed primacy of noesis or noetic construction in phenomenology and thus illustrate its equally autonomous presentification in consciousness in the form of a temporal aporia.
In the First Analogy, Kant argues that because we mark the passage of time on the objects of experience, in order to represent the unity of time, we must represent the world as consisting of a single substance that can never be created or destroyed. We must rule out gaps in time's passage, and incommensurable timelines. It is argued here that Mary Shepherd likewise holds that we mark the passage of time on the objects of experience, but that she meets Kant's criteria for representing the unity of time with ontological holism rather than his required monism.
The purpose of this chapter is to bring the practice of a rigorous and critical empathy to the hermeneutics of suspicion. Toril Moi’s account of the hermeneutics of suspicion applies to a clumsy, stereotyped version of the hermeneutics of suspicion, not to Ricœur’s approach. Moi’s version is not suspicion; it is dogmatism. What is “hidden in plain view” is exemplified in Wittgenstein (“surface grammar” from “depth grammar” distinguished) and Tolstoy. Moi quotes Simone de Beauvoir, attributing to reading literature the possibility of giving one a “taste of another life.” This is the empathic moment. Ricœur is not regarded as a philosopher of empathy such as Max Scheler or Edith Stein (though Ricœur’s practice of it as a teacher was at a high empathic level), and the title of this chapter is intended as a provocation to “consider the possibility.” For Ricœur, empathy would not be a mere psychological mechanism. Empathy would be the ontological presence of the self with the Other as a way of being—listening as a human action that is a fundamental way of being in which “hermeneutics can stand on the authority of the resources of past ontologies.” In a rational reconstruction of what a Ricœurian approach to empathy would entail, a logical space is made for empathy to avoid the epistemological paradoxes of Husserl and the ethical enthusiasms of Lévinas. How this reconstruction of empathy would apply to empathic understanding, empathic responsiveness, empathic interpretation, and empathic receptivity is elaborated from a Ricœurian perspective.
In a brane-world context in which our universe would be a four-dimensional brane embedded into a five-dimensional spacetime or bulk, wormhole geometries are induced on branes. In this article, the Morris–Thorne wormhole and the Molina–Neves wormhole are obtained on the brane using the Nakas–Kanti approach, which starts from a regular five-dimensional spacetime to obtain known black hole and wormhole solutions on the four-dimensional brane. From the bulk perspective, these wormholes are five-dimensional solutions supported by an exotic fluid, but from the brane perspective, such objects are wormholes not supported by any fields or particles that live on the four-dimensional spacetime. Thus, the cause of these wormholes is the bulk influence on the brane.
Kant’s position in analytical jurisprudence has not been sufficiently explored. This paper aims to remedy this shortcoming. The main issue in this paper is to which extent Kant’s legal theory is an instance of natural law theory or legal positivism. Robert Alexy is one of the few philosophers who addressed this issue. Alexy believes that Kant defends a version of natural law theory that puts moral limits on legal validity. I show that Alexy’s interpretation is unsuccessful. I argue that Kant defends the positivist separability thesis that norms need not meet moral requirements to qualify as legal norms.
This article argues that Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s
categorial intuition is essential for his interpretation of Kant’s
concepts of intuition and form of intuition. First, I analyze the two
aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl’s categorial
intuition that are relevant to his reading of Kant, namely, his
understanding of categorial intuition as fundamentally
intertwined with sensible intuition and his understanding of the
correlate of such an intuiting as already unthematically
coapprehended in sensible intuition. Second, I show that
Heidegger incorporates these two aspects into his reading of
Kant’s concept of intuition as a “thinking intuition” and into his
interpretation of the Kantian “form of intuition” as something
unthematically intuited in every experience.
Against the backdrop of Rahel Jeaggi’s critique of Harry Frankfurt’s theory of personhood the chapter analyzes the normative import of second-order emotions. The idea is that a disapproving second-order emotional response to a first-order emotional responses that takes us aback, constitutes a moment of normative ambivalence prompted by the unanticipated turn of events that initially gave rise to the first-order response. In view of the crucial role played by normative ambivalation in rational normative self-criticism, to what extent can such moments be sought proactively?
Senior High School students struggle with writing proficiency, which affects their academic performance and future career opportunities. This study examined the writing proficiency of Technical Vocational Livelihood (TVL) Senior High School students, focusing on content, organization, vocabulary, grammar, and mechanics. It also explored students' experiences in enhancing writing skills and identified effective instructional materials to support writing improvement. Using a Sequential Explanatory Mixed Methods design, the study involved 240 students for quantitative assessment, 16 for in-depth interviews, and two focus group discussions (FGDs). Writing proficiency was assessed through an essay task evaluated with rubrics, while structured interviews and FGDs provided qualitative insights. Descriptive statistics analyzed the quantitative data, and thematic analysis was used for the qualitative findings. Results indicated that students scored below the passing threshold in all areas, averaging a "Failed" status across content, organization, vocabulary, grammar and mechanics, highlighting significant challenges in idea development and grammatical accuracy. Qualitative analysis revealed themes such as writing challenges, support and feedback, grammar and language struggles, writing practice, obstacles and distractions, strategies, and collaboration. Both data sets underscored the need for targeted pedagogical strategies. Scaffolded instruction and redesigned curricula, including workshops and structured activities, were recommended to address these foundational areas and improve students' writing skills effectively.
This Element proposes a new understanding of Kant's account of marriage by examining the context and background conversations that shaped its development and by discussing the conception of equality at its core. Marriage as Kant understands it relies on a certain form of equality between spouses. Yet this conception of equality does not precede marriage, and carries important limitations – one of which being its inaccessibility to a significant proportion of the German population at the time. The protections and rights conferred by marriage were thus not accessible to all. Their shared preoccupation with this issue allows the author to put Kant's thoughts in relation with those of eighteenth-century feminist writers Theodor von Hippel and Marianne Ehrmann. Despite these limitations, the author finds that Kant's conception of marriage is compatible with the achievement of certain egalitarian goals, suggesting that it may be able to improve women's lives in a liberal state.
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