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What young children think you see when their eyes are closed

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Abstract

The common assumption that young children egocentrically believe you cannot see them when their own eyes are closed was investigated in two studies. It was found that 2.5-4-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds and adults, would indeed often give negative reply to the experimenter's question “Do I see you?” when their eyes were closed and covered with their hands. However, they would also correctly reply that the experimenter did see their arm and an object placed in front of them and did not see their eyes and back, indicating that they were making veridical, nonegocentric inferences about the experimenter's visual experience. In addition, their eyes being visible to the experimenter did not prove to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for their judgment that the experimenter could see “them” (“you”). It was concluded that, in this context, adults take “you” to mean their whole body while young children take it to mean primarily their face region. Speculations were made as to how young children could have acquired this meaning, and about possible similarities and differences between the self conceptions of young children and adults.

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... In a series of four experiments, we begin by replicating Flavell, Shipstead and Croft's (1980) finding that many children between 2 and 4 years of age will affirm the invisibility both of themselves and of others --but not of the body --when the person's eyes are closed. We also render explicit certain trends in the Flavell et al work: that invisibility of the eyes is the crucial factor, not lack of a subject's visual experience, and that young children assume that the eyes must be visible if there is visual experience. ...
... Does this mean that they believe that doing this makes the body literally invisible? A landmark study by Flavell and colleagues (Flavell, Shipstead & Croft, 1980) showed that they do not. This is because their 2.5-to 4 year old children, while denying that the experimenter could see them when they had their eyes closed, would affirm that parts of their body were visible. ...
Article
In a series of four experiments, the authors begin by replicating Flavell, Shipstead, and Croft's (19807. Flavell , J. H. , Shipstead , S. G. , & Croft , K. ( 1980 ). What young children think you see when their eyes are closed . Cognition , 8 , 369 – 387 . [CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®]View all references) finding that many children between 2 and 4 years of age will affirm the invisibility both of themselves and of others—but not of the body—when the person's eyes are closed. The authors also render explicit certain trends in the Flavell et al. work: that invisibility of the eyes is the crucial factor, not lack of a subject's visual experience, and that young children assume that the eyes must be visible if there is visual experience. They show that children of this age often explicitly judge that hiding by covering the eyes is an appropriate thing to do and that this error is not rooted in problems with understanding that seeing leads to knowing. In their final study, they report that a clear majority of children who equate personal invisibility with eye occlusion also judge that people whose eyes are open, but who are not making eye contact with the viewer, are not visible to the viewer. They argue that these data can be explained on the hypothesis that young children's natural tendency to acquire knowledge intersubjectively, by joint attention, leads them to undergo a developmental period in which they believe the self is something that must be mutually experienced for it to be perceived.
... The figure could potentially be facing the child, facing the observer or facing neither. Flavell, Shipstead, & Croft, 1980) found that 2-and 3-year-olds said that they could not be seen when they faced away (1808) from an observer. Extending these findings to the Flavell et al. (1978) task, we would expect children to respond correctly if the dog was oriented towards the observer and perform poorly if the figure was oriented away from the observer. ...
... This may explain the common observation that young children sometimes cover their eyes in order to avoid being 'seen' or seem to believe themselves to be hidden although part of their body remains visible. Flavell et al. (1980) found that 2-and 3-yearold children said that an observer could not see them when they covered their eyes or when they turned 1808 away from the observer. In the case of a human target (including themselves), children may misconstrue 'see' as mutual engagement. ...
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Children aged 2 and 3 years were tested for a previously neglected form of knowledge about visual perception; namely, whether an observer can see a figure that is partially occluded. The results indicate that for children of this age the visibility of a figure's face is crucial for judging visibility, whereas the visibility of the legs is not. This phenomenon is limited to human-like figures. Results are explained in terms of engagement, a precursor to a mature understanding of attention.
... Indeed, it may not be until about 2'/2 years or so that children localize the eyes as a separate attentional channel (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Esterly, 1995;Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977;Povinelli & Eddy, 1996b). Furthermore, between 3 and 5 years of age, children develop the even deeper folk understanding that visual perception is a process through which information about the external world is imported into the mind (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981;Flavell, Shipstead, & Croft, 1978;Gopnik & Graf, 1988;O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991;Pillow, 1989;Pratt & Bryant, 1990;Ruffman & Olson, 1989;Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). ...
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By 2 Ɖ years of age, human infants appear to understand how others are connected to the external world through the mental state of attention and also appear to understand the specific role that the eyes play in deploying this attention. Previous research with chimpanzees suggests that, although they track the gaze of others, they may simultaneously be unaware of the underlying state of attention behind gaze. In a series of 3 experiments, the investigators systematically explored how the presence of eyes, direct eye contact, and head orientation and movement affected young chimpanzees' choice of 2 experimenters from whom to request food. The results indicate that young chimpanzees may be selectively attracted to other organisms making direct eye contact with them or engaged in postures or movements that indicate attention, even though they may not appreciate the underlying mentalistic significance of these behaviors.
... Most preschoolers younger than 5 years deny that they can see a person whose eyes are covered (Flavell, Shipstead, & Croft, 1980;McGuigan, 2009;Moll, Arellano, Guzman, Cordova, & Madrigal, 2015;Russell, Gee, & Bullard, 2012). When facial areas other than the eyes are covered, children acknowledge that the person is visible (Bridges & Rowles, 1985;McGuigan & Doherty, 2006). ...
Article
Typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 often deny that they can see a person whose eyes are covered (e.g., Moll & Khalulyan, 2017). This has been interpreted as a manifestation of their preference for reciprocal interactions. We investigated how 3- to 4-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, n = 12) respond in this situation. Because a lack of interpersonal connectedness and reciprocal communication are core features of this disorder, we predicted that young children with ASD will not make mutual regard a condition for seeing another person and therefore acknowledge being able to see her. Against this prediction, children with ASD gave the same negative answers as a group of TD (n = 36) age-mates. Various interpretations are discussed, including the possibility that some children with ASD are capable of relating to others as second persons.
... That is, when do they understand seeing-asattention? In an impressive series of studies spanning over a decade, John Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977;Flavell, Shipstead, & Croft, 1978;FIaveIl, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1980;Flavell, Everett, Croft, 6c Flavell, 1981;Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1,989). However, they have distinguished two levels at which seeing can be understood mentalistically (see Figure 3.3A). ...
... When very young, a child talks and acts as if what he or she knows, all people know. (For example, a very young child may "hide" by closing her eyes, as if because she cannot see, others cannot see either [Flavell, Shipstead, and Croft 1980].) The toddler learns, in short, to infer that someone else has a mind: that what they know is not identical to what the toddler knows but depends on what has happened to them and how they make sense of those events. ...
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This article argues that there is an epistemological style associated with much American evangelical Christianity that is strikingly different from that found in never-secular Christianities. This epistemological style is characterized by a playful, self-consciously paradoxical framing of belief-claims in which God’s reality is both clearly affirmed and qualified. One can describe this style as using an “epistemological double register” in which God is described as very real—and as doubted, in some way. The representation of God generated by this complex style is a magically real or hyper-real God, both more real than everyday reality and in some way fictive. The article goes on to argue that these epistemological features can be understood as generated by and generative of particular theories of mind. The article argues for the development of an anthropological theory of mind in which at least four dimensions are important: boundedness, interiority, sensorium, and epistemic stance.
... Although infants seem to follow pur- poseful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being based on the mere presence of others at set points within an event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective appreciation of another's perspective has been demonstrated across the third year ( Moll et al. 2011;O'Neill 1996), extending into early childhood ( Flavell et al. 1980;McGuigan & Doherty 2006). Such findings suggest that knowledge of what others have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others. ...
... Although infants seem to follow purposeful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being based on the mere presence of others at set points within an event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective appreciation of another's perspective has been demonstrated across the third year (Moll et al. 2011;O'Neill 1996), extending into early childhood (Flavell et al. 1980;McGuigan & Doherty 2006). Such findings suggest that knowledge of what others have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others. ...
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In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach.
... Although infants seem to follow purposeful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being based on the mere presence of others at set points within an event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective appreciation of another's perspective has been demonstrated across the third year (Moll et al. 2011;O'Neill 1996), extending into early childhood (Flavell et al. 1980;McGuigan & Doherty 2006). Such findings suggest that knowledge of what others have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others. ...
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A second-person neuroscience, as an emerging area of neuroscience and the behavioral sciences, cannot afford to avoid a bottom-up, subcortical, and conative-affective perspective. An example with canid social play and a modern motivational behavioral neursocience will illustrate our point.
... Although infants seem to follow purposeful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being based on the mere presence of others at set points within an event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective appreciation of another's perspective has been demonstrated across the third year (Moll et al. 2011;O'Neill 1996), extending into early childhood (Flavell et al. 1980;McGuigan & Doherty 2006). Such findings suggest that knowledge of what others have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others. ...
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Though it draws on the grammatical metaphor of person (first, third, second) in terms of representations, Schilbach et al.'s target article does not consider an orthogonal line of evidence for the centrality of interaction to social cognition: the many grammatical phenomena, some widespread cross-linguistically and some only being discovered, which are geared to supporting real-time interaction. My commentary reviews these, and the contribution linguistic evidence can make to a fuller account of social cognition.
... Although infants seem to follow purposeful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being based on the mere presence of others at set points within an event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective appreciation of another's perspective has been demonstrated across the third year (Moll et al. 2011;O'Neill 1996), extending into early childhood (Flavell et al. 1980;McGuigan & Doherty 2006). Such findings suggest that knowledge of what others have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others. ...
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In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could - paradoxically - be seen as representing the "dark matter" of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really "go social"; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.
... Although infants seem to follow purposeful reaches (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), they also make simple perceptual errors in such tasks, with inferences being based on the mere presence of others at set points within an event (Sodian & Thoermer 2008). This lack of an objective appreciation of another's perspective has been demonstrated across the third year (Moll et al. 2011;O'Neill 1996), extending into early childhood (Flavell et al. 1980;McGuigan & Doherty 2006). Such findings suggest that knowledge of what others have (and have not) experienced continues to be framed in terms of engagement with, and dis-engagement from, others. ...
Article
Based on mirror neurons' properties, viewers are emotionally engaged when observing others - even when not actively interacting; therefore, characterizing non-participatory action-viewing as isolated may be misleading. Instead, we propose a continuum of socio-emotional engagement. We also highlight recent developmental work that uses a second-person perspective, investigating behavioral, physiological, and neural activity during caregiver-infant interactions.
... In an extensive series of experiments, Flavell and his colleagues have characterized at least two levels of young children's understanding of seeing as a mentalistic act (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981;Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1980;Flavell, Shipstead, & Croft, 1978;Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977;Masangkay, 1974). At the simplest level, their research has demonstrated that 2-year-old children can answer questions about what another person can or cannot see, and furthermore can produce the set of conditions necessary to prevent or allow an object to be seen by someone (e.g., nonegocentrically hiding an object behind a screen). ...
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Seven chimpanzees were tested for their understanding of the intentional aspect of visual perception at 5 – 6 years of age and again at 7 years of age. They appeared not to understand that they should use a species-typical, visually based begging gesture in front of someone who could see them, as opposed to someone who could not. Four experiments that were conducted when these same subjects were adolescents are reported here. The results suggest that there was no development between 5 and 9 years of age in the animals' understanding of visual perception as an internal state of attention. The subjects appeared to learn procedural, stimulus-based rules related to the frontal orientation, the face, and the eyes of the experimenters. Even subjects most adept at these tasks appeared to rely on stimulus-based rule structures, not an attribution of “seeing.”
... For humans, seeing is a quintessentially mentalistic act. A number of years ago, John Flavell and his colleagues identified at least two developmental transitions (or levels) in how children understand seeing (see Masangkay et al., 1974;Flavell, Flavell, Green & Wilcox, 1980;Flavell, Shipstead & Croft, 1978;Lempers, Flavell & Flavell, 1977;Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981). Their work suggested that by 2 years of age or so, 512 POVINELLI, BERING, AND GIAMBRONE children appear to realize that visual perception connects people to objects or events in the external world. ...
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Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at work. In this paper. we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second-order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states.
... 5 There is some indirect evidence to suggest that, in fact, children at this age do have intuitions about the location of the self. In a 1980 study investigating children's egocentrism, Flavell et al. 6 found that when 2.5-to 4-year-old children had their eyes covered, they judged that an experimenter could not see them. However, they acknowledged that the experimenter could see their arm, despite the fact that the child themselves could not, suggesting that they were capable of taking the experimenter's perspective at least some of the time. ...
Article
Here, what might be considered a universal belief in dualism is integrated with developmental perspectives on the emergence of identifying the mental and physical components of the self. Additionally, work to "localize" the self is introduced.
... Children around the age of two and a half to three are at least capable of Stage I thinking. Flavell further argues that around this same age children understand that for another person to see a target four conditions must be fulfilled(Flavell, Shipstead & Croft, 1980):• a: At least one of the person's eyes must be open • b: The person's line of sight must be aiming towards the target • c: Their line of sight must be unimpeded (i.e. no barriers in the way) • d : What the child can see has no influence over what the other person can seeAround this same age, children are able to move an object behind a barrier in order to hide it from a viewer, but have some difficulty in being able to move a barrier to hide an object(Lempers et al., 1977;McGuigan & Doherty, 2002). ...
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Previous research into children’s understanding of line of sight has led to differing conclusions as to when and how children become able to appreciate that their view of an object will be different from another persons’ view of the same object. This is probably due to the diversity of response methods required from the children as well as different types of tasks and settings being used between the experiments. The aim of the present thesis is to investigate systematically how children will fare across various settings and whether their comprehension of line of sight can be biased by the task’s setting. The first experiment assessed children’s understanding of line of sight through a tube that was bent to varying degrees of curvature and whether their response pattern would change when feedback was provided. Results showed that children have great difficulty performing correctly on this task, especially when the degree of curvature is small. The older children corrected their response pattern when feedback was provided but the younger children tended to persevere in their response pattern regardless of contradictory feedback. The second experiment looked at children’s performance when walls were used - half the walls were smooth gradual curves while the other half was walls made up of two segments that met to form an angle. Again the children were asked to predict if two dolls placed at opposite ends of each wall would be able to see each other. Results showed that though even young children have no trouble in performing correctly on the “angled” walls, performance on the curved walls was significantly poorer with the older children performing better than the younger children. The third experiment sought to quantify the point at which children deemed line of sight became possible. To do this we used a single “U” shaped trench with the children being asked if one doll could see another in various configurations. The results showed a strong bias towards over estimating visibility. The fourth experiment repeated the second experiment but used wooden trenches instead of walls but also sought to quantify the “switchover” point at which the children deem vision becomes possible between the two dolls. The difference between angles and curves was once again replicated as was the age difference. The fifth experiment compared children’s appreciation of line of sight through/along tubes, trenches and walls. This performance level varied strongly depending on the type of task the child was asked to perform upon with the tube proving to be the most difficult and the angled trench the easiest. The overall findings of the experiment pointed to a context-dependent performance, implying a piece-meal development of childrens’ comprehension of line of sight.
... Other researchers have investigated young children's knowledge about visual perception specifically, asking at what age children understand what others can and cannot see. In a series of reports, John Flavell and his colleagues demonstrated that children of 21/2 years and older can accurately judge whether another person can see an object and can even produce situations that result in depriving others of visual contact with an object on request (Flavell et al., 1981;Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1980;Flavell, Shipstead, & Croft, 1978;Lempers et al., 1977). Lempers et al. (1977) conclude that by 21/2 years of age children appear to understand the role of another's eyes in seeing. ...
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Previous experimental research has suggested that chimpanzees may understand some of the epistemological aspects of visual perception, such as how the perceptual act of seeing can have internal mental consequences for an individual's state of knowledge. Other research suggests that chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates may understand visual perception at a simpler level; that is, they may at least understand seeing as a mental event that subjectively anchors organisms to the external world. However, these results are ambiguous and are open to several interpretations. In this Monograph, we report the results of 15 studies that we conducted with chimpanzees and preschool children to explore their knowledge about visual perception. The central goal of these studies was to determine whether young chimpanzees appreciate that visual perception subjectively links organisms to the external world. In order to achieve this goal, our research incorporated three methodological objectives. First, we sought to overcome limitations of previous comparative theory of mind research by using a fairly large sample of well-trained chimpanzees (six to seven animals in all studies) who were all within 8 months of age of each other. In contrast, previous research has typically relied on the results of one to four animals ranging widely in age. Second, we designed our studies in order to allow for a very sensitive diagnosis of whether the animals possessed immediate dispositions to act in a fashion predicted by a theory of mind view of their psychology or whether their successful performances could be better explained by learning theory. Finally, using fairly well-established transitions in preschool children's understanding of visual perception, we sought to establish the validity of our nonverbal methods by testing predictions about how children of various ages ought to perform. Collectively, our findings provide little evidence that young chimpanzees understand seeing as a mental event. Although our results establish that young chimpanzees both (a) develop algorithms for tracking the visual gaze of other organisms and (b) quickly learn rules about the configurations of faces and eyes, on the one hand, and subsequent events, on the other, they provide no clear evidence that these algorithms and rules are grounded in a matrix of intentionality. Particularly striking, our results demonstrate that, even though young chimpanzee subjects spontaneously attend to and follow the visual gaze of others, they simultaneously appear oblivious to the attentional significance of that gaze. Thus, young chimpanzees possess and learn rules about visual perception, but these rules do not necessarily incorporate the notion that seeing is "about" something. The general pattern of our results is consistent with three different possibilities. First, the potential existence of a general developmental delay in psychological development in chimpanzees (or, more likely, an acceleration in humans) leaves open the possibility that older chimpanzees may display evidence of a mentalistic appreciation of seeing. Second, chimpanzees may possess a different (but nonetheless mentalistic) theory of attention in which organisms are subjectively connected to the world not through any particular sensory modality such as vision but rather through other (as-of-yet unspecified) behavioral indicators. Finally, a subjective understanding of visual perception (and perhaps behavior in general) may be a uniquely evolved feature of the human lineage.
... However, one concern is that the existing results may underestimate infants' abilities, because the adult's head and eyes turn in different directions, thereby indicating two contradictory places in space at the same time. Brooks and Meltzoff (2002) designed an alternative gaze-following procedure, suitable for infants, based on findings that older children distinguish between what a person would see with open eyes versus closed eyes (Flavell, Shipstead & Croft, 1980;Lempers, Flavell & Flavell, 1977;O'Neill, 1996; see also . Brooks and Meltzoff reasoned that turning with open versus closed eyes provides a crucial infant test, because it controls for head motion. ...
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We examined the ontogeny of gaze following by testing infants at 9, 10 and 11 months of age. Infants (N = 96) watched as an adult turned her head toward a target with either open or closed eyes. The 10- and 11-month-olds followed adult turns significantly more often in the open-eyes than the closed-eyes condition, but the 9-month-olds did not respond differentially. Although 9-month-olds may view others as 'body orienters', older infants begin to register whether others are 'visually connected' to the external world and, hence, understand adult looking in a new way. Results also showed a strong positive correlation between gaze-following behavior at 10-11 months and subsequent language scores at 18 months. Implications for social cognition are discussed in light of the developmental shift in gaze following between 9 and 11 months of age.
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In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach.
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Schilbach et al.'s model assumes that the ability to “experience” minds is already present in human infants and therefore falls foul of the very intellectualist problems it attempts to avoid. We propose an alternative relational, action-based account, which attempts to grasp how the individual's construction of knowledge develops within interactions.
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Self‐knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different ‘self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species‐specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or ‘self‐concept’ draws its meaning from a network of socially‐based assumptions and theories about human nature in general and ourselves in particular. Although these selves are rarely experienced as distinct (because they are held together by specific forms of stimulus information), they differ in their developmental histories, in the accuracy with which we can know them, in the pathologies to which they are subject, and generally in what they contribute to human experience.
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Conducted 3 studies with 51 3-yr-olds to test the hypothesis that there is a development in early childhood from a less advanced (Level 1) to a more advanced (Level 2) form of knowledge and thinking about people's visual experiences. Study 1 replicated and further validated a finding by Z. S. Masangkay et al (see record 1977-02937-001) that 3-yr-olds perform very well on tasks that call for Level 1 knowledge but very poorly on those that require Level 2 knowledge. Study 2 showed that Ss did not perform better when critical aspects of Level 2 tasks were designed to be familiar to them and similar to what they might encounter in everyday life. Study 3 showed that most of the Ss who performed poorly on Level 2 tasks in Study 2 continued to perform poorly on a retest given 2–19 wks later. In addition, a brief training period following the retest proved largely unsuccessful in inducing Level 2 knowledge and thinking in these children. Results of the studies appear to provide strong support for the Level 1–Level 2 developmental hypothesis. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Children with varying visual abilities (totally blind, visually impaired, normally sighted) participated in a longitudinal study of the development of the ability to infer what is seen by another. The children were asked to hide themselves, a toy, and specific parts of their bodies from a sighted observer. After each hiding the observer asked, “Can I see you?” to determine whether the children associated self-exposure with what was hidden. The totally blind children were not as successful at hiding as the other children. The totally blind children associated hiding with being in contact with an obstacle but did not necessarily understand that the covering obstacle had to completely block the observer's view of what was hidden or that covering was not necessary if other obstacles already blocked the observer's view. The totally blind children and one visually impaired child associated self-exposure with exposure of the mouth, whereas the other children who associated self-exposure with a particular body part associated self-exposure with exposure of their eyes. Results suggest that lack of direct visual experience impedes blind children's understanding of what constitutes a barrier to vision, which affects their ability to infer what others see. Implications of the findings for understanding the development of the self in blind children are discussed.
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Using their previously demonstrated gaze-following abilities, juvenile chimpanzees (and 3-year-old human children) were tested to determine if they interpreted seeing as the mental state of attention. The studies tested predictions generated by a low-level model of chimpanzee gaze-following which assumes that chimpanzees do not understand attention as an unobservable, internal mental state, and a high-level model which assumes that they do. In Expts 1 and 2, chimpanzees were first trained to respond to a cup to which an experimenter pointed, and then tested on probe trials to determine if they could respond correctly when the experimenter either oriented his or her whole head toward the correct cup, or just looked with the eyes. In Expt 1 these cues were static, whereas in Expt 2 the experimenter actively moved his or her head and/or eyes back-and-forth form the subjects’ faces to the correct cup as they were attempting to make their choice. Expt 3 validated the logic of Expts 1 and 2 by demonstrating that 3-year-old human children responded in a manner predicted by the high-level model. The results of the experiments converged on supporting the predictions of the low-level model of juvenile chimpanzees’ understanding of seeing.
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In this article we propose an account of the early development of children's knowledge about the mind and report two studies designed to test a part of it. According to this “connections-representations” account, young children begin their discovery of the mental world by learning that they and other people have internal experiences or mental states that connect them cognitively to external objects and events-experiences such as seeing them, hearing them, and wanting them. Later, they realize that the same object can be seriously (other than in pretense) mentally represented in different, seemingly contradictory ways: for example, as A in appearance, B in reality, C according to their perceptual or conceptual perspective, and D according to another person's. The results of both studies confirmed the prediction that 3-year-olds would perform well on appearance-reality and perceptual perspective-taking tasks requiring only an understanding of cognitive connections, but perform poorly on tasks requiring an understanding of seemingly-contrary-to-fact mental representations. To illustrate, children of this age had little difficulty determining that they could hear but could not see a noise-making object located on the experimenter's side of a barrier, and that the experimenter could see it (connections-level tasks). In contrast, they were largely unable to say, for instance, that a toy bear held behind a large elephant mask and emitting a cat sound looked like an elephant, sounded like a cat, and really was a toy bear (representations-level tasks)—even though the experimenter had actually told them previously what it looked like, sounded like, and really was. The article concludes with speculations about the possible origins of connections and representations knowledge and observations about the significance of these acquisitions for the child's development.
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Where are we? In three experiments, we explore preschoolers' and adults' intuitions about the location of the self using a novel method that asks when an object is closet to a person. Children and adults judge objects near a person's eyes to be closer to her than objects near other parts of her body. This holds even when considering an alien character whose eyes are located on its chest. Objects located near the eyes but out of sight are also judged to be close, suggesting that participants are not using what a person can see as a proxy for what is close to her. These findings suggest that children and adults intuitively think of the self as occupying a precise location within the body, at or near the eyes.
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Previous studies have shown that young preschool children are highly sensitive to mutual engagement and struggle to diagnose the visibility of a figure when their facial area is occluded. The present study aimed to explore the specificity of engagement by varying (a) the orientation of a figure relative to an observer and (b) the visible area of the figure's body. Results indicated that young children are sensitive to the orientation of the figure and the presence of a salient barrier over the figure's eyes. These results paint a more complex picture of the development of percept diagnosis skills than those that J. H. Flavell, S. G. Shipstead, & K. Croft (1980)8. Flavell , J. H. , Shipstead , S. G. and Croft , K. 1980. What young children think you see when their eyes are closed. Cognition, 8: 369–387. [CrossRef], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®]View all references outlined.
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Children's solutions to spatial problems pose an intriguing puzzle in development. For some time, difficulties with such tasks have been thought to index a pervasive characteristic of children's thought, called “egocentrism,” but recent research has shown clearly that at least by 2 years of age, children are not egocentric in the sense of not knowing that other people see displays differently. This chapter provides the argument that perspective-taking tasks and other spatial problems, such as mental rotation, are difficult for reasons that include the demands the particular problem makes on the usual form of representation of space. From at least 5 years of age, and perhaps earlier, this representation seems to be one in which small movable targets are encoded in relation to a framework of fixed landmarks, rather than in relation to each other. Such coding makes ecological sense, because movable items, almost by definition, make poor reference points for the location of other objects. Thus, spatial coding does not seem to change across middle childhood in the fashion discussed by Piaget. What remains for the future is to explore whether frameworks of landmarks are used soon after the beginning of free locomotion, and how location coding changes, if it does, in the first few years of life.
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A key acquisition in the child's developing knowledge of the mind is the subjective-objective distinction, which includes a clear understanding that things may appear to be other than the way they really are (appearance-reality distinction) and may present different appearances to self and others (Level 2 perspective-taking). Previous studies using tasks involving visual appearances have found that most children do not show such understanding until 4 or 5 years of age. However, a conceptual analysis of tactile as compared to visual and other perceptual experiences suggested the hypothesis that this understanding might appear earlier if the appearances the child must identify are tactile rather than visual. This hypothesis was supported by the results of 3 studies. In Studies 1 and 2, 3-year-old subjects could correctly indicate, for example, that an ice cube they were feeling with a heavily gloved finger did not feel cold to that finger (tactile appearance for the self), did feel cold to the experimenter's ungloved or thinly gloved finger (tactile appearance for another person), and was a cold ice cube, really and truly (reality). In contrast, and consistent with previous research findings, they were much poorer at distinguishing between real and visually apparent object identity, number, and color. Similarly, in Study 3 they tended to perform better on tactile appearance-reality tasks involving the properties of number, wetness, and intactness than on visual appearance-reality tasks that involved these same properties.
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A cross-sectional and a longitudinal study of 2-year-old children was performed to investigate the developmental relationship between understanding differences in spatial point of view and correct comprehension and production of I/you pronouns. In Study I only those children who demonstrated understanding that individuals' points of view can differ had begun to master speaker's point of view, as shown by correct use of some of the pronouns. Only children with complete understanding of points of view were able to use all I/you pronouns without errors. In Study 11 no child used the set of I/you pronouns without errors until s/he had complete understanding of points of view. Across children, a given pronoun tended not to be free of errors until the child understood that points of view can differ. Results are interpreted to support the hypothesis that understanding spatial points of view is a cognitive prerequisite to understanding speaker's point of view, which governs the pragmatics of 11 you pronouns.
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By 2 1/2 years of age, human infants appear to understand how others are connected to the external world through the mental state of attention and also appear to understand the specific role that the eyes play in deploying this attention. Previous research with chimpanzees suggests that, although they track the gaze of others, they may simultaneously be unaware of the underlying state of attention behind gaze. In a series of 3 experiments, the investigators systematically explored how the presence of eyes, direct eye contact, and head orientation and movement affected young chimpanzees' choice of 2 experimenters from whom to request food. The results indicate that young chimpanzees may be selectively attached to other organisms making direct eye contact with them or engaged in postures or movements that indicate attention, even though they may not appreciate the underlying mentalistic significance of these behaviors.
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Describes recent ideas and research findings on the developmental aspects of social cognition, in particular the child's ability to endow others with inner psychological properties. 2 qualitative models of phenomena in this area are discussed: (a) an information-processing characterization of 4 classes of knowledge used to make inferences about another's inner properties and (b) an ability to represent and predict the visual acts and experiences of another. (4 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Presents a review of studies on the development of social inferences and factors involved in making such inferences. Interrelationships of social cognitive abilities, the relation of social cognition to other cognitive abilities, correlational and training studies of peer interactions and family variables, and methodological and theoretical considerations are discussed. (71/2 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Children of ages 2 1/2, 3, and 3 1/2 years were tested for their understanding of object hiding, believed to reflect an early developmental level of knowledge about visual perception. Even the youngest subjects could nonegocentrically hide an object by placing it on the opposite side of a screen from another person, even though placing it there necessarily left it unhidden from themselves. In contrast, there was a significant increase with age in the ability to achieve the same physical end state by placing the screen between the other person and the object. Most subjects at each age level correctly indicated that the other person could see the object when the experimenter interposed the screen between the child and the object but that the other person could not see the object when she placed the screen between the other person and the object. These and other recent findings indicate that children of this age can be both nonegocentric and skillful at estimating what other people do and do not see under various viewing conditions.
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This chapter describes recent theory and research in one limited area of social-cognitive development, namely, the childhood acquisition of knowledge about visual perception. The author and his co-workers have hypothesized that there are two developmental levels of such knowledge. At earlier-developing Level 1, the child understands that others as well as the self see objects, and is also able to infer correctly what objects they do or do not currently see if provided with adequate cues. At later-developing Level 2, the child understands not only that people can see objects, but also that they can have differing visual experiences while seeing the same object; most notably, they can have different spatial perspectival views of it when looking at it from different positions. Arguments and evidence for the developmental distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 knowledge are briefly presented in Section I. A more detailed model of Level 1 knowledge is presented in Section II, together with an account of several studies of its development during the first four years of life. During these early years, children appear to learn a great deal about how to produce visual percepts in others (showing and pointing to things), how to deprive others of percepts (hide objects), and how to diagnose the percepts they currently have (follow others' direction of gaze and pointing gestures). Section III similarly reviews recent theory and research on the development of Level 2 perspective-taking knowledge in older children. This work is focused mainly on the acquisition and use of very general perspective-taking rules, such as the rule that two observers who look at an object array from the same spatial position must on that account necessarily have identical perspectival views of the array. Section IV described further developmental research that could be or is being done on Level 2 knowledge, Level 1 knowledge, and on the Level 1-Level 2 distinction.
Article
The purpose of this study of early social-cognitive development was to assess the very young child's behaviorally expressed knowledge of people's visual-attentional acts and abilities. Boys and girls (N = 60) 1, 1 1/2, 2, 2 1/2, and 3 years of age were tested in their homes with their mother's help. Three sorts of tasks were used: 1. Percept production. The child's task was to produce a visual percept in the other. Examples include pointing to objects ("productive pointing") and a wide variety of object-showing problems. 2. Percept deprivation. The opposite, exemplified by a variety of object-hiding problems. 3. Percept diagnosis. The child's task was to determine what the other was already visually attending to, either by looking where his or her finger was pointed ("receptive pointing") or where his eyes were directed. It was found that the majority of 1-year-olds produced and comprehended pointing, and would sometimes hold out a toy to show it, but did little else. The 3-year-olds were at ceiling on virtually all tasks. At 1 1/2 years, children usually showed a picture by holding it flat so that both they and the other could see it. Jrom 2 on, they usually turned it toward the other in the adult fashion. Very few children of any age showed egocentrically--i.e., orienting the picture so only they could see it. By age 2, the children solved what were presumably novel showing problems for them: e.g., successfully showing to another a picture pasted on the inside bottom of a hollow cube. Hiding ability emerged later than showing ability but seemed well established by age 3. The role of the other's eyes in seeing appeared to be quite well understood at least by age 2-2 1/2. As examples, children of this age took the other's hands away from her or his eyes before trying to show her something, and could usually tell where she was looking from her eye orientation alone. These age trends presumably reflect important developments in the area of social interaction and communication, as well as with respect to cognition about percepts.
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3 experiments assessed the ability of 2-5-year-old children to infer, under very simple task conditions, what another person sees when viewing something from a position other than the children's own. Some ability of this genre appears to exist by 2-3 years of age, at least. The data suggest a distinction between an earlier (Level 1) and a later (Level 2) developmental form of visual percept inference. At Level 1, S is capable of nonegocentrically inferring that O sees an object presently nonvisible to S himself. At Level 2, S is also capable of nonegocentrically inferring how an object that both currently see appears to O, that is, how it looks from his particular spatial perspective.
Young children's knowledge about visual percep-tion: lliding objects from others. Child Devel
  • I Laveu
  • I Shipstead
  • S G Croft
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I:laveU, J. [I., Shipstead, S. G., and Croft, I<. (1978) Young children's knowledge about visual percep-tion: lliding objects from others. Child Devel., 39. 1208-121