Content uploaded by Keith E Stanovich
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Keith E Stanovich on Jul 30, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
Dysrationalia A New Specific Learning Disability
Abstract
The concept of selective deficit is the foundation of most conceptual definitions of learning disability. Such definitions have tended to implicate the construct of intelligence in the conceptualization of learning disability and have led to the use of IQ test scores to operationalize the notion of aptitude-achievement discrepancy. The learning disabilities field is only beginning to grapple with the implications of its reliance on the concept of psychometrically defined intelligence. For example, discrepancy-based definitions of learning disabilities guarantee that such disabilities will become more or less prevalent depending on the comprehensiveness of the set of skills assessed on IQ tests. Unlike the vernacular concept of intelligence--which is quite broad--psychometric operationalizations reflect only a thin slice of the mental domain that might be considered cognitive. Thus, it is possible that we have not exhausted the potential set of discrepancy-based disabilities. As a demonstration proof, a new discrepancy-based disability category is proposed and defended in this paper. The disability is one that may force more careful consideration of the role that intelligence plays in conceptual and operational definitions of learning disabilities.
... For many years, we have argued that professional inertia and psychologists' investment in IQ testing have prevented us from realizing that our science had developed enough to allow us to develop a parallel RQ test (Stanovich, 1993(Stanovich, , 2009Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008). With the development of the CART, our research group has turned this prediction into reality . ...
There are individual differences in rational thinking that are less than perfectly correlated with individual differences in intelligence because intelligence and rationality occupy different conceptual locations in models of cognition. A tripartite extension of currently popular dual-process theories is presented in this chapter that illustrates how intelligence and rationality are theoretically separate concepts. Thus, individual differences in the cognitive skills that underlie rational thinking must be studied in their own right because intelligence tests do not explicitly assess rational thinking. We close the chapter by describing our attempt to develop the first prototype of a comprehensive test of rational thought, the Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking (CART). With the CART, we aim to draw more attention to the skills of rational thought by measuring them systematically and by examining the correlates of individual differences in these cognitive skills.
This chapter poses some of the principal questions that will confront the future of intelligence research. Among these questions are (1) What is the role of the brain in intelligence and of intelligence-enhancing drugs upon the brain? (2) Does culture affect what intelligence is or just what it is conceived of as being? (3) What are the genetic bases of intelligence? (4) Can intelligence of individuals be meaningfully increased by environmental interventions? (5) Is high intelligence having negative as well as positive effects on the world, and what is to be done about it? (6) Will artificial intelligence ultimately be dangerous to the world? (7) What effects are social media and the Internet more generally having on both individual and collective intelligence? (8) Why are people who are so intelligent at times so lacking in rational and wise thinking? (9) Are there noncognitive (e.g., emotional, attitudinal, motivational) aspects of intelligence and, if so, what are they? (10) What kinds of environmental factors inadvertently decrease intelligence?
En lo que sigue buscaré responder a la pregunta sobre la posibilidad de la integración de dos programas de investigación distintos sobre la racionalidad humana: por un lado, algunos programas filosóficos de corte cognitivista (Stanovich, 2002, 2009, 2016) y por el otro, programas de investigación sobre el razonamiento lógico de agentes humanos y criterios de normatividad (Harman, 1984; Morado, 2003; Aliseda, 2004). Mi respuesta a tal cuestionamiento será afirmativa. Para defenderla, procederé de la siguiente manera: primero, en la sec. 2 ofreceré los antecedentes y características de la noción cognitivista de “inteligencia” que cuenta con mayor aceptación en la actualidad, la teoría general de la inteligencia, también conocida como factor g. A lo largo de la sec. 3 expondré los elementos por los cuales se ha considerado que si bien factor g logra evaluar satisfactoriamente el fenómeno de la inteligencia, soslaya características relevantes desde la perspectiva de lo que se ha considerado racionalidad (Sternberg, 1985; Stanovich, 2009). Luego, en la sec. 4, presentaré algunas nociones de “racionalidad” disponibles en la literatura de filosofía de la lógica (Harman, 1984; Morado, 2003; Aliseda, 2004) y evaluaré cuáles son los elementos distintivos de cada una de estas caracterizaciones. En la sec. 5 defenderé que es posible mejorar la comprensión que tenemos de los estilos cognitivos a partir de los elementos de filosofía de la lógica expuestos en la sección cuatro.
Simulation is being applied in many very important projects and often it is a vitally important infrastructure for them. Several types of computational intelligence techniques have been part of the abilities of simulation. An important aspect of intelligence is the ability to understand. Agent-directed simulation (ADS) is a comprehensive paradigm to cover all aspects of synergy of software agents and simulation and our approach is to develop agents with understanding abilities. After a brief review of ADS, our paradigms of machine understanding is presented. The article clearly indicates types of misunderstandings that might occur. Our research plans are to avoid some of the misunderstandings which could occur and especially to have self-attesting abilities in our applications to document which types of misunderstandings are avoided.
The production effect—whereby reading words aloud improves memory for those words relative to reading them silently—was investigated in two experiments with 7‐ to 10‐year‐old children residing in Brisbane, Australia. Experiment 1 (n = 41) involved familiar printed words, with words read aloud or silently appearing either in mixed‐ or blocked‐list formats in a within‐subject design. Recognition for words read aloud was better than for those read silently, an effect consistent across both list formats. These results were confirmed in Experiment 2 (n = 40) using longer lists of printed novel nonwords. Final analyses indicated that the production effect was comparable for words and nonwords. Findings are discussed in relation to the distinctiveness account and the use of production as a mnemonic in children.
Author’s involvement and witnessing the advancements of modeling and simulation over 50 years are highlighted. Some concepts are outlined: inputs, data, quality and failure avoidance in simulation, ethics, machine understanding, synergies of simulation with several disciplines, intelligence and simulation, agent-directed simulation, simulation terminology, modeling and simulation body of knowledge, big picture of simulation, bigger picture of similarity, and some of the aspirations of the author for the future of simulation.
Despite the widespread social harm that human irrationality causes, irrationality is not considered to be a social problem. This article explores why this is so, argues why irrationality is unlikely to be considered a social problem, and suggests that the best hope for reducing the social harms caused by human irrationality lies with the educational system.
Wisdom is such an elusive psychological construct that few people have considered it a viable field, though many are fascinated by the topic. Well-known psychologist Robert J. Sternberg of Yale University, perceiving the growth of interest in wisdom as a field, saw a need to document the progress that has been made in the field since the early '80s and to point the way for future theory and research. The resulting comprehensive and authoritative book, Wisdom: Its Nature, Origins and Development, is a well-rounded collection of psychological views on wisdom. It introduces this concept of wisdom, considers philosophical issues and developmental approaches, and covers as well folk conceptions of the topic. In the final section, Professor Sternberg provides an integration of the fascinating and comprehensive material.
What is intelligence? Can it be increased by teaching? If so, how, and what difference would an increase make? Before we can answer these questions, we need to clarify them. Jonathan Baron argues that when we do so we find that intelligence has much to do with rational thinking, and that the skills involved in rational thinking are in fact teachable, at least to some extent. Rationality and Intelligence develops and justifies a prescriptive theory of rational thinking in terms of utility theory and the theory of rational life plans. The prescriptive theory, buttressed by other assumptions, suggests that people generally think too little and in a way that is insufficiently critical of the initial possibilities that occur to them. However these biases can be - and sometimes are - corrected by education.
I, for one, was very happy to see the publication by Arthur Jensen, Bias in Mental Testing (1980), not for the reason, as some have suggested, that it provides a “final definitive answer” to the critics of standardized IQ tests. I am happy because Bias in Mental Testing, as Jensen’s attempt to be comprehensive, actually covers so much territory that the soft underbelly of key arguments in support of IQ testing in general and IQ testing for “minority populations” in particular is easily exposed. Presumably, this book is Arthur Jensen’s tour de force. He has done a distinct service to education measurement by his articulation of common practice in test construction, experimental design, and statistical methodology. I can think of few references that treat these topics quite so clearly and comprehensively. On the other hand, Arthur Jensen has listed most of the major criticisms in the IQ-testing controversy but has failed to deal with the data that are presented in support of the criticisms by others. Jensen has claimed that he has made an exhaustive review of all the literature that pertains to the IQ argument. In this critique, we will look precisely at that claim.
Theories of cognition can be classified as being of two kinds: explicit and implicit. Explicit theories of cognition are constructions of psychologists or other scientists that are based, or at least tested, on data collected from people performing tasks presumed to measure cognitive functioning. For example, a battery of cognitive tests might be administered to a large group of people and the data from these tests analyzed to isolate the proposed sources of cognitive functioning in test performance. Implicit theories of cognition are constructions of people (psychologists or laypersons) that reside in the minds of these individuals. Such theories need to be discovered rather than. invented because they already exist, in some form, in people’s heads. The goal in research on implicit theories is to find out the form and content of people’s informal theories of cognition. Thus, one attempts to reconstruct already existing theories rather than to construct new theories. The data of interest are people’s communications regarding their notions about the nature of cognition or its aspects. For example, a survey of questions regarding the nature of cognition might be administered to a large group of people and the data from this survey analyzed in order to reconstruct people’s belief systems.
Stmmary.-The critical thinking ability of 13 believers and 13 nonbelievers in paranormal phenomena was examined in two studies. In the fine study, believers and skeptics were given Watson and Glaser's (1964) Critical Thinking Appraisal Scale as well as Trodahl and Powell's (1965) Dogmatism Scale. Skeptics showed a significantly higher level of critical thinking ability than believers and were significantly less dogmatic than believers. A second study was carried out to evaluate the critical thinking ability of believers and skeptics on a task dealing with the paranormal. 18 believers and 17 skeptics were asked to evaluate critically either a research article on a paranormal phenomenon (psychokinesis) or an almost identical article on a nonparanormal phenomenon (pain tolerance). It was anticipated that believers would show a bias in favor of the paranormal article; however, results indicated that believers and nonbelievers were equally critical of the paranormal article. Several recent surveys have attested to the high degree of acceptance of the reality of paranormal phenomena by undergraduate and graduate university students (Ocis, 1979; Pasachoff, Cohen, & Pasachoff, 1970; Salter & Routledge, 19712). This research focussed on whether or not such belief is related to critical thinking ability. It is possible, for example, that those students who believe in the paranormal are less capable of detecting the flaws in experimental design and execution that mar many demonstrations of paranormal forces. We were also interested in the extent to which believers and skeptics demonstrate dogmatism or "close-mindedness." Believers and skeptics at the level of professional researchers often accuse each ocher of being overly dogmatic in their belief, co the extent that they cannot fairly evaluate evidence which runs to the contrary.
This article addresses the role of quantitative evidence and methods in trials. Major arguments against the introduction of explicit computation information are considered and contrasted with findings about the characteristics of the unaided human decision maker. Emphasis is given to behavioral decision theory and the heuristic biases it reveals. Consideration is given to the symbolic versus "truth-finding" functions of trials, mathematical models (especially linear) of decision making, advocacy tactics that follow from what has been learned about how humans process information, the diagnostic value of aggregate probabilities, the notion of particularistic proof, and the evaluation of witness credibility. We conclude that unaided human decision making embodies certain normal and lawful errors, and that the exclusion of mathematical guides to aid a fact finder, while avoiding some problems, exposes the fact-finding process to the heuristic biases of intuitive decision making.
The role of genetic and environmental factors in the expression of religious interests, attitudes, and values was examined using data from adult twins reared apart and adult twins reared together. The Religious Values scale of the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values, a Religious Interest scale from the Strong Campbell Interest Inventory, the Wiggins Religious Fundamentalism scale from the MMPI, a Leisure Time Religious Interest scale, and a second measure of Occupational Religious Interest were administered to 53 identical and 31 fraternal twin pairs who had been reared apart. The Leisure Time Religious Interest Scale and the second measure of Occupational Religious Interest were also administered to 458 identical and 363 fraternal twin pairs who had been reared together. Biometric model fitting indicated that approximately 50% of the observed variance of all five measures is genetically influenced.
This study investigated the asserted differences in reasoning between adults and second, fourth, and sixth graders in a manipulation-of-variables task using common everyday situations. It is proposed that hypothesis-testing skills used in this task do not necessarily develop from an understanding of the logic of classes. These skills may develop through experience in manipulating elements in those naturally occurring situations where it is desirable to eliminate negative outcomes or reproduce positive outcomes. Subjects were given 8 multivariate stories with different outcomes, either good or bad, and asked to choose a test to determine which element caused the outcome. Subjects were expected to choose a test systematically on the basis of sensible considerations of the outcome value of any situation, not on purely logical grounds. For all age groups the general pattern of responses was the same. A logical disconfirming test (vary only the hypothesized variable) was preferred in bad-outcome situations, and a logically inappropriate confirming test (repeat the hypothesized variable in a different context) was preferred in good-outcome stories. The main developmental trend was a shift in choice of strategy to eliminate the hypothesized variable in bad-outcome stories. There was no relation between children's performance on class-inclusion problems and their story-problem solutions. These results are discussed in terms of "sensible" reasoning and problem-solving skills.