Making Sense of Loss and Benefiting from the Experience: Two Construals of Meaning
Abstract
Theoretical models of the adjustment process following loss and trauma have emphasized the critical role that finding meaning plays. Yet evidence in support of these models is meager, and definitions of meaning have been too broad to facilitate a clear understanding of the psychological process involved. Using a prospective and longitudinal study of people coping with the loss of a family member, we differentiate 2 construals of meaning--making sense of the event and finding benefit in the experience--and demonstrate that both independently play roles in the adjustment process following the loss. Results indicate that making sense of the loss is associated with less distress, but only in the 1st year postloss, whereas reports of benefit finding are most strongly associated with adjustment at interviews 13 and 18 months postloss.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1998,
\bl. 75, No. 2, 561-574
Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
O022-3514/98/$3.0O
Making Sense of Loss and Benefiting From the Experience:
T\vo Construals of Meaning
Christopher G. Davis and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema
University of Michigan
Judith Larson
Stanford University
Theoretical models of the adjustment process following loss and trauma have emphasized the critical
role that finding meaning plays. Yet evidence in support of these models is meager, and definitions
of meaning have been too broad to facilitate a clear understanding of the psychological processes
involved. Using a prospective and longitudinal study of people coping with the loss of a family
member, we differentiate 2 construals of meaning—making sense of the event and finding benefit
in the experience—and demonstrate that both independently play roles in the adjustment process
following the loss. Results indicate that making sense of the loss is associated with less distress, but
only in the 1st year postloss, whereas reports of benefit finding are most strongly associated with
adjustment at interviews 13 and 18 months postloss.
Several prominent theorists have proposed that an important,
if not critical, task of resolving loss is the development of an
understanding of the event and its implications (e.g., Frankl,
1959/1984; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Moos & Schaefer, 1986;
Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Taylor, 1983). For example, Parkes and
Weiss (1983) argued that bereaved widows must establish a
rationale for their loss and make sense of it if they are to recover
successfully. Similarly, Craig (1977) and Miles and Crandall
(1983) maintained that, following the loss of a child, an essential
part of griefwork is resolving the meaninglessness of the death.
Such a process has been discussed within the context not only
of bereavement but of a wide range of other traumatic life events
as well (Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Bulman & Wortman, 1977;
Silver, Boon, & Stones, 1983; Taylor, 1983; Thompson, 1985).
Some researchers have described this process as "finding mean-
ing" (e.g., Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Moos & Schaefer, 1986).
Others have referred to it as "explaining" the event (e.g., Bur-
Christopher G. Davis and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Department of
Psychology, University of Michigan; Judith Larson, Department of Psy-
chology, Stanford University.
This study was supported by U.S. Public Health Grant 1 R01 43760.
Preparation of this article was supported in part by a Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada postdoctoral fellowship.
We thank the following hospices and health care agencies for recruit-
ing participants into this study: Hospice of Contra Costa, Hospice Caring
Project of Santa Cruz County, Hospice of Marin, Hospice of the Valley,
Lifesource of Larkspur and Mountain View, Mills-Peninsula Hospital,
Mission Hospice, Vesper Hospice, Visiting Nurse Association of San
Jose,
and Visiting Nurses and Hospice of San Francisco. We thank
Darrin Lehman and Frederick Rhodewalt for their insightful comments
on a draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Chris-
topher G. Davis, who is now at Department of Psychology, St. Francis
Xavier University, P.O. Box 5000, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada,
B2G 2W5, or Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Department of Psychology, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 525 East University, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-
1109.
Electronic mail may be sent to cgdavis@stfx.ca or
nolen@umich.edu.
gess & Holmstrom, 1979) or "account-making" (e.g., Harvey,
Orbuch, Chwalisz, & Garwood, 1991), while still others have
emphasized the importance of intellectually or cognitively ac-
cepting the event (e.g., Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Weiss, 1988).
Two Conceptualizations of Meaning
Although these theorists agree on the psychological impor-
tance of finding meaning, their conceptualizations of what con-
stitutes meaning differ substantially. Some theorists and re-
searchers have focused on the individual's appraisal of the sig-
nificance of the event for his or her sense of life goals and life
purpose, and refer to finding meaning as one's ability to develop
new goals and a new, perhaps wiser sense of self (e.g., Helm-
rath & Steinitz, 1978; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). For in-
stance, Taylor
(1983,
1989) has suggested that people coping
with severe negative events find meaning by considering positive
implications, or benefits, of the event for one's life, thus min-
imizing or mitigating the negative implications. For example,
people who have suffered the loss of a loved one sometimes
report that as a result of the loss they have a new appreciation
for life, that they place greater value on relationships, or that
they have changed for the better in other ways because of the
event (e.g., Lehman et al, 1993; Miles & Crandall,
1983;
Park &
Cohen, 1993; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). Such a pursuit for
the "silver lining" to adversity we will refer to as the benefit-
finding construal of meaning.
Others have focused on the bereaved's ability to develop a
relatively benign explanation for the loss, or to make sense of it
within their existing fundamental schemas or worldviews (e.g.,
Horowitz, 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze,
1983;
Mclntosh, Silver, & Wortman, 1993; Parkes & Weiss,
1983;
Tait & Silver, 1989). For instance, people sometimes re-
port making sense of loss by attributing it to God's will, by
assuming a degree of personal responsibility for the event's
occurrence, or by attributing the loss to the lifestyle or behaviors
of the deceased that make the death more understandable (e.g.,
smoking for several years prior to the onset of lung cancer).
561
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562
DAVIS,
NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, AND LARSON
We refer to this notion of meaning as sense making. Although
benefit-finding and sense-making construals of meaning are not
exhaustive, they represent two of the most frequently cited no-
tions of meaning in the trauma and coping literatures (e.g.,
Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Mclntosh et al, 1993; Silver et al.,
1983;
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996).
Many researchers and theorists, however, have not made dis-
tinctions between these two construals of meaning, assuming
that they both reflect the same underlying issue and involve the
same psychological processes. Indeed, the very imprecision of
the construct as it has been expounded by its original proponent
(Frankl, 1955/1986, 1959/1984) has limited researchers' abil-
ity (or willingness) to study the phenomenon scientifically (e.g.,
Reker, 1994). Recent theorizing, however, has sharpened the
distinction between these two construals of meaning (e.g., Af-
fleck & Tennen, 1996; Davis, Lehman, & Wortman, 1997). Ja-
noff-Bulman and Frantz (1997), for instance, have suggested
that a distinction be drawn between meaning-as-comprehensibil-
ity and meaning-as-significance. Meaning-as-comprehensibility
refers to the extent to which the event makes sense, or fits with
one's view of the world (for example, as just, controllable, and
nonrandom) whereas meaning-as-significance refers to the value
or worth of the event for one's life. Janoff-Bulman and Frantz
(1997) suggested that success in recovering from traumatic
events hinges to a large degree on the survivor's ability to shift
an initial concern with the former to a concern with the latter.
That is, Janoff-Bulman and Frantz proposed that successful ad-
aptation involves first trying to make sense of the event, and
then finding some benefit or value in the experience for one's
life.
The two conceptualizations of meaning suggested by
Janoff-
Bulman and Frantz (1997) are very similar to the distinctions
that we draw between benefit finding ("meaning-as-signifi-
cance") and sense making ("meaning-as-comprehensibility").
Deriving benefit from loss or trauma is a key means of assigning
positive value or significance to the event for one's own life.
Learning about one's strength in the face of adversity, or gaining
insight into the meaning of life or the importance of relation-
ships,
may help to mitigate the feelings of loss or helplessness
at the passing of a loved one. Such perceptions may preserve
or restore the notion that one's own life has purpose, value, and
worth, and several theorists have suggested that the perception
that one's life has goals and purpose is critical to self-esteem
and well-being (Antonovsky, 1987; Frankl, 1955/1986;
Janoff-
Bulman, 1992; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Thompson & Janigian,
1988).
In contrast, meaning as sense-making refers to the issue of
whether a particular event fits into one's conception of how the
world is assumed to work. At least in Western cultures, people
by and large tend to believe that the momentous events in their
lives are controllable, comprehensible, and nonrandom (e.g.,
Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972). People tend to assume that negative
events are not distributed randomly, that people get what they
deserve, and that justice will prevail (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Ler-
ner, 1980). Here the emphasis is on perceiving one's social
environment as predictable, ordered, and benign (if not
benevolent).
According to theory, trauma and loss have the potential to
threaten both one's sense of meaning in life (i.e., they may
threaten significant aspects of one's self-concept), as well as
the assumptions one holds about the comprehensibility and
meaningfulness of events (one's assumptive world; Janoff-Bul-
man, 1992). For instance, the loss of a loved one not only may
render unobtainable or unimportant goals (or possible selves)
toward which one was striving or force one to reevaluate one's
values and commitments but also may expose as illusory key
assumptions about justice, fairness, control, and the benevolence
of the world. In fact, data from a number of studies indicate
that people who have experienced traumatic or loss events tend
to report less positive
self-
and worldviews relative to matched
control respondents who have not experienced such events (e.g.,
Florian, 1990; Gluhoski & Wortman, 1996; Janoff-Bulman,
1989;
Schwartzberg & Janoff-Bulman, 1991). R>r example,
Norris and Kaniasty (1991) found that not only do people who
experienced criminal assault report lower self-esteem than those
who had not had such an experience, they also report a greater
sense of vulnerability.
Coping With Meaning Threats
Threats to one's sense of self and threats to one's view of
the world as meaningful represent distinct issues that call for
coping. Taylor
(1983,
1989; Taylor & Armor, 1996; Taylor,
Wood, & Lichtman, 1983) has argued that threats to one's sense
of self are often assuaged by selectively perceiving the event as
a "wake-up call" that one's priorities and goals are not as one
might want them to be. From this point of view, the reordering
of priorities and the revision of life goals are part of
a
reappraisal
of the event as an opportunity for growth rather than only as a
loss (e.g., Park, Cohen, & Murch, 1996; Tedeschi & Calhoun,
1996),
and this reappraisal has been conceived of as a coping
strategy that helps to shore up self-esteem (Taylor, 1983; Tay-
lor & Armor, 1996). Aside from serving as the catalyst for the
review of one's goals and priorities, and so on, the event is
not the central focus; rather, the emphasis is more directly on
understanding the self in the context of adversity. That is, the
question is
*
'What has the experience taught me about myself
and about my relationships with others in my life?"
If people perceive benefits following negative life events in
an effort to cope with threats to their self-concept, as opposed
to coping with the event directly, then benefit finding may not
be directly tied to characteristics of the event per se. Rather,
whether one will perceive benefits is likely to be influenced more
strongly by an individual's characteristic ways of responding to
stress.
One such individual difference variable likely to be rele-
vant is dispositional optimism-pessimism. Optimists have more
favorable expectations for their future and thus should be more
inclined than pessimists to respond to stress by seeking positive
(i.e.,
less self-threatening) reinterpretations. Consistent with this
view, many studies have reported significant associations be-
tween dispositional optimism-pessimism and the tendency to
report benefits, or positive life changes, following trauma or loss
(e.g., Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Park et al., 1996; Tedeschi &
Calhoun, 1996).
On the other hand, to cope with threats to one's view of the
world as meaningful, just, and controllable, one is faced with
the task of attempting to fit the experience into an existing
cognitive schema or worldview by perceiving the event as com-
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LOSS AND MEANING
563
prehensible, nonrandom, or perhaps to some extent justified.
When one suggests that an event does not make sense, one
is indicating that the event is inconsistent with one's implicit
assumptions about why and when such events are supposed to
happen, if at all. With regard to bereavement, one factor that is
likely to influence the extent to which people are able to make
sense of their loss is their religious or spiritual beliefs (Dull &
Skokan, 1995; P. C. Smith, Range, & Ulmer, 1992). Belief in
an afterlife, or spiritual-religious beliefs more generally, may
mitigate the senselessness of events by suggesting that the loss
is comprehensible, at least in a spiritual sense. In support of
this,
Mclntosh et al. (1993) demonstrated in a sample of parents
coping with the loss of their child to sudden infant death syn-
drome that stronger religious beliefs related to parents' ability
to make sense of their loss.
Although the possession of religious or spiritual beliefs may
facilitate making sense of loss, meaning may be obtained by
other means. One may make sense of a loss by perceiving the
loss as predictable (e.g., as an end to a long battle with cancer)
or as in some way justified (e.g., as consequence to some behav-
ior, such as smoking). The age of the deceased is likely also to
influence the ease with which one is able to make sense of loss.
Several bereavement researchers have suggested that relative to
the passing of the elderly, the loss of children and young adults
is more likely to violate our assumptions about the natural order
of life: that the old should die before the young (de Vries, Dalla
Lana, & Falck, 1994). In fact, a number of researchers have
suggested that the loss of a child is particularly difficult relative
to other losses to recover from specifically because such losses
are more often perceived to be senseless (e.g., Craig, 1977; de
Vries,
Davis, Wortman, & Lehman, 1997; Miles & Crandall,
1983;
Rubin, 1993; Sanders, 1980).
Whereas the discussion of sense-making so far has focused
on efforts to assimilate the data of a loss into existing schemas
or worldviews, an alternative strategy for making sense of loss
is to revise one's worldview (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). For in-
stance, one can make sense of a loss by acknowledging the
fragility or brevity of life or by acknowledging that sometimes
bad things happen to good people. The suggestion has been
made that revising one's worldview is the more arduous and
distressing task and is only attempted when the data of the loss
cannot be assimilated (Janoff-Bulman, 1992).
The Role of Meaning in Adjustment
Regardless of the conceptualization of meaning adopted, the
adaptive significance of making sense or finding benefit in loss
has been accepted despite a paucity of clear evidence for this
hypothesis. Although there are several published studies re-
porting no significant association between finding meaning and
adjustment to an adversity (e.g., Fromm, Andrykowski, & Hunt,
1996;
Lehman et al., 1993; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996), some
researchers have reported small to moderate cross-sectional as-
sociations between meaning (conceptualized either as making
sense of the event or as benefit finding) and adjustment to an
adversity (typically an absence of psychological distress or
symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder; e.g., Aldwin, Leven-
son, & Spiro, 1994; Curbow, Somerfield, Baker, Wingard, &
Legro, 1993; Mclntosh et al., 1993; Silver et al., 1983; Taylor,
Lichtman, & Wood, 1984). Though supporting data are fre-
quently interpreted as evidence for the importance of meaning,
these significant associations between meaning and adjustment
obviously are open to several alternative interpretations. For
instance, with respect to the construal of meaning as finding
benefit, the observed correlations may be attributable to trait
differences in dispositional optimism-pessimism (Scheier &
Carver, 1985). Prior research suggests that optimists are more
likely to perceive benefits or report positive life changes follow-
ing stressful life events (see e.g., Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996),
to use more effective coping strategies (Carver, Scheier, & Wein-
traub,
1989), and to be less distressed by adversity (Scheier &
Carver, 1992; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) relative to pessi-
mists.
Pessimists, because they do not expect positive outcomes,
presumably are less inclined to seek the silver lining following
adversity. Such individuals are more likely to use less effective
coping strategies and generally report greater negative affect
(e.g., Scheier et al., 1994; T.W. Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, &
Poulton, 1989). Thus, the personality dimensions of optimism-
pessimism may fully account for any cross-sectional relation
of finding benefit to psychological well-being.
Similarly, the observed correlations between making sense of
the event and adjustment may be attributable to prior levels of
emotional distress. It is well documented that the depressed
display a tendency to use a negativistic, self-deprecating think-
ing style which may impede attempts to develop benign explana-
tions for the event that has befallen them (Peterson & Seligman,
1984).
If it is a relative freedom from distress that leads to
finding meaning, and not the opposite, then the implications are
grave for theoretical models that give meaning a central role in
overcoming adversity (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1992; McCann &
Pearlman, 1990; Taylor, 1983).
The Present Research
The purposes of the present research are (a) to illustrate that
efforts to make sense of loss and reports of benefits represent
two distinguishable construals of meaning and (b) to evaluate
the joint and independent effects on the adjustment process of
finding meaning in loss by (1) making sense of the death and (2)
finding benefit in the experience. We illustrate the distinctions
between these two construals of meaning by demonstrating (a)
that questions commonly used to elicit these meanings from
respondents yield quite different explanations and (b) that they
have different antecedent predictors. We hypothesized that pre-
loss indicators of optimism-pessimism would predict benefit
finding, whereas age of the deceased at death and the respon-
dent's religious or spiritual beliefs would predict the respon-
dent's ability to make sense of the event. We anticipate that
higher levels of prior psychological distress are likely to impede
making sense of the loss and also may predict an inability to
report benefits.
In evaluating the joint and independent effects on the adjust-
ment process of our two construals of finding meaning, we focus
on a composite of three indicators of adjustment. Consistent
with most prior research, we use a standard indicator of de-
pressive symptomatology. However, as several authors (e.g., Sil-
ver & Wortman, 1980; Weiss, 1988) have cautioned against
the use of symptoms of depression as one's only indicator of
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564
DAVTS,
NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, AND LARSON
adjustment following loss,
we
also
use
indicators
of
positive
affect and symptoms
of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Second, overcoming
a
significant limitation
of
most previous
research,, the present study
is
prospective
and
longitudinal.
Not
only
do we
take into account preloss variables that might
ac-
count
for the
presumed effects
of
meaning
on
adjustment,
we
also examine
the
links between each construal
of
meaning
and
adjustment
at two
points
in
time following
the
loss.
To
date,
little
is
known
of
the time-course
for
the acquisition
of
meaning.
With regard to the making sense construal of
meaning,
Wortman,
Silver,
and
Kessler (1993) have suggested that those
who are
going
to
make sense
of
their event will
do so
within
the
first
few months.
On
the other hand,
it
may take somewhat longer
to
develop new goals
and
perspectives
or to
realize
the
benefits
of
such changes
in
goals
and
perspectives
(see
also Janoff-Bul-
man
&
Frantz, 1997).
Method
Respondents and Procedure
Respondents were recruited through 11 hospices
in
the San Francisco
Bay area. Hospice personnel provided in-home care
on an
as-needed
basis.
Their functions included providing information, palliative care,
24-hour consultation
and
assistance, counseling
and
support services,
and bereavement services.
To
reduce sampling bias,
a
letter explaining
the study
was
included
in the
hospice information packets, which were
given
to
families when they first engaged
the
hospice.
The
letter stated
that their participation would
be
completely voluntary
and in no way
connected
to
receiving hospice services.
The
hospice nurse, social
worker,
or
volunteer
who
first explained
the
hospice services
to the
family pointed out the letter and asked
if
the study team could call them
to explain
the
study further.
If
the family member expressed interest
in
the study, they were contacted
by a
member
of
the study
staff.
Approxi-
mately 80%
of
those contacted agreed
to
participate.
In-person interviews were conducted
by
trained clinical psychology
graduate students,
and the
structured interviews covered
a
variety
of
issues only some
of
which
are
included
in
this report
(for
further infor-
mation, see Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson,
in
press; Nolen-Hoeksema, Par-
ker,
&
Larson, 1994).
All of the
terminally
ill
family members were
living
at
home
at the
time
the
respondents entered
the
study,
and
most
died
at
home.
Of the 455 people who agreed
to be in the
study, 328 participated
in
a preloss interview
on
average
3
months
(SD =
4.1) before their family
member's death, 362 participated
in an
interview 1 month postloss,
360
participated
in a
6-month postloss interview,
313
participated
in a 13-
month postloss interview,
and 280
participated
in a
18-month postloss
interview.
The present report uses data from 205 respondents
who
participated
in
the
preloss interview,
as
well
as the 6- and
13-month postloss inter-
views.
We are not
using data from
the
1-month
postloss interview
for
two reasons. First, much
of the
open-ended data with respect
to the
two construals
of
meaning were unavailable. Second, from reviewing
transcripts
of
those that were available,
it was
noted that many more
respondents
at
this point
in
time
did not
sufficiently articulate their
meanings
for
reliable coding
or
indicated merely that they were still
"working
on it."
Half of those excluded (51%) from the original sample were excluded
because they could
not be
interviewed prior
to the
death
of
their loved
one.
A
further 25%
of
those excluded
did
not participate
in
any postloss
interviews
for a
variety
of
reasons, including that
the
loved one
had not
yet died
by the end of the
study
or
that
the
respondent could
not be
located
or had
chosen
not to
participate further
in the
study.
A
further
8% participated
in
only one postloss interview,
and
14% were excluded
because
one of
the postloss interviews could
not be
scheduled within
the specified time parameters. Typical reasons given
by
respondents
for
not participating
in a
particular interview included that
the
respondent
was too busy, the interview was too painful,
and
the respondent felt that
he
or
she was too
ill or
injured
to
participate.
A
final 2% were excluded
because
an
interview had
to
be ended prematurely, prior to the questions
on meaning, because
of the
respondent's schedule. Those respondents
excluded appeared
to be no
different than
the
included respondents
on
any
of
the variables
of
interest except distress. Those included were less
distressed
at
preloss, r(325)
=
3.00,
p <
.01,
and
marginally less
dis-
tressed
at 6
months postloss, *(357)
= 1.76, p < .10.
There were,
however,
no
differences
in
distress between chose included
and
those
excluded
at
subsequent interviews
(?s < 1).
We
do
report some data, however, from
the
18-month postloss inter-
view but do not include the 18-month interview data in the main analyses
because
the
attrition
at
this interview
was
greater than
at any
other
interview, owing largely
to the
fact that
the
study
had to be
concluded
before
the
last interview could
be
scheduled
for
some individuals.
Of
the 205
participants
in
this report,
74%
were female. Mean
age
of respondents
was 51.2
years
(SD = 14.1
years). Median level
of
education
was
"some college,
1
'
and
median annual income
was in the
range
of
$30,000
to
$35,000 (assessed preloss). Most respondents were
White (81%), 6% were Mexican-American, 5% were African American,
and the remainder were
of
other ethnicities. Just over 50% of the respon-
dents were
the
primary caregiver
for the ill
loved
one.
Seventy-two percent
of the
respondents were losing
a
loved
one to
cancer,
14%
were losing
a
loved
one to
AIDS,
and the
remainder
to
other causes (e.g., heart disease)
or
causes unknown
to the
respondent.
Forty-four percent
of
respondents were losing
a
parent, 35% were losing
a spouse
or
partner,
9% a
child,
7% a
sibling,
and 5%
another relative
or very close friend. At the time
of
the preloss interview, the mean length
of
the
loved one's illness
was
approximately
one
half year
(SD = 53
months). The mean
age of
the deceased
at
his
or
her time
of
death
was
63.7 years
(SD =
16.8).
Interview Protocol
Adjustment. Indicators
of
psychological adjustment were obtained
approximately midway through each interview. Distress
was
measured
with
the
self-report Inventory
to
Diagnose Depression (IDD; Zimmer-
man
&
Coryell, 1987).
The
IDD
is a
symptom inventory similar
to the
Beck Depression Inventory,
but is
based
on
Diagnostic
and
Statistical
Manual
of
Mental Disorders—Third Edition—Revised {DSM—H1-R;
American Psychiatric Association, 1987) criteria
for
diagnosing major
depression. Zimmerman
and
colleagues have reported data indicating
that
the
instrument
is
both valid
and
reliable (Zimmerman
&
Coryell,
1987;
Zimmerman, Coryell, Corenthal, & Wilson, 1986). The time frame
for symptoms
in the
present version
is
"past week."
For
present
pur-
poses,
we
report
the sum of the
ratings
for the 22
items. Coefficient
alphas
for the
scale ranged from .83
to .88
over
the
four interviews.
Positive affect
was
measured with positively valenced items from
state version
of
Spielberger, Gorsuch, and Lushene's (1970) State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory. Respondents rated the extent
to
which they currently
felt each
of
the 10 mood descriptors (e.g., "relaxed," "contented,"
and
' 'at ease'')
on a
4-point scale ranging from
not at all to
very much
so.
Within each wave, scores
for
positive affect were obtained
by
averaging
the
10
items. Coefficient alphas
for the
scale ranged from
.91 to .93
across
the
four waves.
Finally,
a
measure
of
PTSD symptomatology
was
obtained
at
each
wave. This instrument, generated
for
this study, contained items
re-
flecting feelings
of
numbness (e.g.,
"1 am
unable
to
feel
at all") and
preoccupation with thoughts (e.g.,
"I am
preoccupied with thoughts
of
's (illness/death), even when
I try to
think
of
other things" ).
The
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LOSS AND MEANING
565
11 items were developed from a description of symptoms in the PTSD
module of the DSM-IH-R and were rated on a 4-point scale ranging
from not at all to very much so. Coefficient alphas ranged from .75 to
.82 across the four waves.
Principal components analyses of the three adjustment summary
scores conducted at each wave consistently suggested a single factor,
accounting for more than 70% of the variance, with the three measures
loading > .80 on this first component. Based on this, a composite
measure of distress was generated by summing the standardized scores
(within each wave) for each of the three measures (after reversing the
positive affect scores). The coefficient alphas ranged from .79 to .82
across the four waves. Although we only report results based on this
single, composite measure of distress, the pattern of results is consistent
across the three measures of adjustment that make up the composite.
Two construals of meaning. Toward the end of each postloss inter-
view, respondents were asked two open-ended questions about meaning.
First, respondents were asked about making sense of the death with the
question: "Do you feel that you have been able to make sense of the
death?"
This question is very similar to the question that others have
used to assess this construal of meaning (e.g., Lehman, Wortman, &
Williams, 1987; Mclntosh et al., 1993; Silver et al., 1983).
Later, respondents were asked about their thoughts on the positive
implications of the loss. This question was posed: "Sometimes people
who lose a loved one find some positive aspect in the experience. For
example, some people feel they learn something about themselves or
others. Have you found anything positive in this experience?" This
question likewise is comparable to what others have used to assess the
benefit-finding construal of meaning (e.g., Affleck, Tennen, Croog, &
Levine, 1987; Affleck, Tennen, & Rowe, 1991; Thompson, 1985).
Responses to each of these questions were coded in two ways. First,
three independent coders categorized each open-ended response as either
"no,"
"yes," "ambiguous or partly," or "respondent not interested
in the issue." Ambiguous responses generally were statements by the
respondent that confirmed that the issue was under consideration, but
gave no indication whether it had been resolved. For instance, one re-
spondent said,
What I can tell you is that the part of the death that I had a hard
time making sense of was—here was a woman who spiritually had
a God that she believed in very strongly . . . Why she suffered as
she did, and why she had to experience death in a very slow, painful
way was the thing I couldn't accept. It deepened my questioning
of spiritual
belief,
whether there really is any spirit that's out there
looking over you, taking care of you. He certainly didn't do it for
her. But, as one of my friends said, "%u never question God." So
we'll have to rely upon that.
As a measure of intercoder agreement, Kappa (Cohen, 1960) was
calculated. The Kappas obtained suggested good agreement among raters
(for "make sense," K = .85 and .87 at 6 months and 13 months postloss
respectively; for "benefit finding," K = .90 and .87). Disagreements
were resolved in most cases by going with the majority (when two of
the three raters agreed) or by the first author. Coding responses coded
as "no" as 0, "partly or ambiguous" as 0.5, and "yes" as 1.0, test-
retest correlations were computed for sense making and benefit finding
(6 months to 13 months postloss). In both cases, the variables showed
good reliability considering that some change was anticipated (r for
sense making = .58, and for benefit finding, r = .54, ps < .001).
Second, responses to the two questions were categorized in terms of
the specific meaning reported by the respondent. After reviewing several
transcripts at different waves, a coding scheme was developed that in-
cluded eight categories for the make-sense question and seven categories
for the benefit-finding question. One of the response categories to the
finding benefit question ("better that it is over"), endorsed by 10% of
the respondents reporting finding benefit at 6 months postloss, and 3%
of respondents reporting finding benefit at 13 months postloss, did not
seem to represent a benefit as here conceptualized. So as not to introduce
further confusion regarding the concept of finding benefit, we recoded
those respondents offering this response as their only benefit (n = 6)
as "ambiguous" on the issue of whether they had found something
positive in the experience. Table I provides a list of the categories and
sample responses given by respondents.
Consistent with previous research (Davis et al., 1997), there was
very little overlap between the responses to the two questions. That is,
statements of benefit or growth were given rarely in response to the
make-sense question, and statements that explained how the respondent
had made sense of the loss were offered rarely in response to the finding
benefit question. Moreover, the response categories we developed from
these data were comparable to the response categories that others have
culled from their data (e.g., Affleck et al., 1991; Lehman et al., 1993).
Although the categories for each question were mutually exclusive, re-
spondents who offered multiple explanations were coded into each of
the relevant categories. Two coders categorized the data, and Kappas
were determined to establish the degree of intercoder agreement. Though
agreement was considerably better than chance, Kappas were somewhat
low (' 'make sense'': K = .62 at 6 months and .64 at 13 months postloss;
"finding benefit": K = .82 at 6 months and .73 at 13 months, ps <
.0001).
Disagreements were resolved by the first author.
Optimism—pessimism. The Life Orientation Test (LOT; Scheier &
Carver, 1985) was used as an indicator of optimism-pessimism at each
interview. The LOT contains eight items of the sort,' 'In uncertain times,
I usually expect the best," each of which is rated on a 5-point scale
(range: strongly disagree to strongly agree). Because two of the opti-
mism items ("I always look on the bright side of things" and "I'm a
believer in the idea that 'every cloud has a silver lining' ") might be
considered as overlapping too closely with the construct of benefit find-
ing, these items were dropped (see Affleck & Tennen, 1996). The re-
sulting six-item scale yielded coefficient alphas in the range of .77 to
83.
Pessimism items were reverse scored so higher scores reflect higher
degrees of optimism.
1
Other measures. Demographic information, such as dates of birth
of the respondent and the terminally ill loved one, the type and length
of illness, and the respondent's relationship to the loved one, was ob-
tained at the first (preloss) interview.
2
Respondents were also asked at
this interview if they considered themselves to be religious or had a
spiritual interest. Those responding in the affirmative (81%) were asked
if they considered themselves Catholic (28%), Jewish (4%), Protestant
(30%),
New Age (2%), or other (36%). Relative to those who did not
consider themselves religious, or had no spiritual interests, those who
responded in the affirmative reportedly were more likely to go to a
church, synagogue, or temple "occasionally" (34% vs. 23%) or "regu-
larly" (39% vs. 3%), *
2
(2, N = 197) = 34.2, p <
.0001.
1
Factor analysis of the LOT by other researchers suggests that opti-
mism and pessimism represent distinguishable factors and not opposite
poles of a unitary construct (e.g., Marshall, Wortman, Kusulas, Her-
vig, & Vickers, 1992; Mroczek, Spiro, Aldwin, Ozer, & Bosse, 1993).
Using the eight-item scale, we also obtained evidence for a two-factor
solution, with factors correlating approximately r
—
—.50. Given that we
are eliminating two of the optimism items, thus reducing the optimism
subscale to two items, we elected to keep the scale unitary. However,
in the analyses that follow, it may be of interest to readers that when
the two subscales were entered separately rather than combined, the
more powerful factor was pessimism, even when the two dropped items
were included in the Optimism subscale.
2
In 10 cases, date of birth for the loved one was unknown. Imputations
were made in these cases by using the date of birth of the respondent,
plus or minus the average difference in ages between the remainder of
die sample who lost a like relative.
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566
DAVIS,
NOLEN-HOEKSEMA,
AND
LARSON
Table
1
Categories of Response for Making Sense of the Loss and Finding Something Positive in the Experience
6 months 13 months
Category (%) (%)
Making sense of the loss
Predictable 22
B
23
e.g., "It always made sense to me. I mean, he smoked for years. It's perfectly sensible to me."
Accept it/part of life cycle 20 18
e.g., "My basic attitude to life was that there's a beginning and an end, and it's going to happen to one or the other
of us sooner or later, and you have to cope with it. That's all. There's nothing you can do to prevent these things
from happening. They're part of life,"
God/fate 9 10
e.g., "I think that my father's illness was meant to be, and that was God's plan. He Uved a really long life, and
everybody has their way to go from this world, and that was his way, . . ."
Patient accepted death 9 I
e.g., "He was very much at peace with his dying. I think that helped me become more at peace. And he could talk
very freely about his dying . . . ."
Just happens 3 5
e.g., "It makes sense, but I hate it. I don't understand why cancer has to be, but it just is."
Expected it/prepared for it 3 5
e.g., "I accepted that I was going to lose him before he ever passed away, and I really was prepared for his death."
Experienced growth 3 3
e.g., "It's a very meaningful experience. My goodness, everyone should go through that. [One learns] so much
about life and about themselves, about the person that's dying—a very important process to understand, because
they're going to go through it too. . . ."
Other 12 13
No elaboration provided by respondent 25 28
Finding something positive in the experience
Growth in character 42
C
41
e.g., "Yes, [I found] a growth and a freedom to give fuller expression to my feelings, or to assert
myself,
to do
things that I want to do.''
Gained perspective 32 29
e.g., "In that having your health and living life to its fullest is a real blessing. I appreciate my family, friends,
nature, life in general. I see a goodness in people. ... It made me more mature."
Brought family together 24 30
e.g., "We definitely learned a lot about ourselves and about each other within the family circle. There was a
rallying of support, and a camaraderie that I think only shows itself . . . when something like this happens."
Support from others positive 11 H
e.g., "I have learned and seen a lot of positive things in people—they just glowed. It was nice to get that blessing
in disguise. The people who rallied around were wonderful."
Others will benefit 3 3
e.g., "It has caused me to desire to be more knowledgeable and aware of AIDS. I've become more active with the
gay community in support of healthier lifestyles and safer sex."
Better that it is over" 10 3
e.g., "H was an end to her suffering."
Other 8 8
No elaboration provided by respondent 1 3
a
Percentages represent the percentage of respondents reporting at least partly making sense of the loss who endorsed the category. Percentages do
not add up to 100 because respondents sometimes offered more than one explanation.
b
To examine the validity of the responses given by participants who simply answered "yes" when asked if they had been able to make sense of
tlie loss but did not elaborate on the way in which they had made sense of it, two one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted comparing
these respondents with those who indicated that they had not made sense of it and those who made sense and provided an explanation. Dependent
variables were levels of distress at 6 and 13 months postloss. The results of both ANOVAs indicated that those not elaborating on how they had
made sense of the loss were no different on their mean level of distress from those who made sense and elaborated on an explanation, and both of
these groups were less distressed than those indicating that they had not made sense at 6 months postloss. This suggests that the "made sense but
did not elaborate" group in fact had some meaning, but chose not to elaborate on it
c
Percentages represent the percentage of respondents reporting at least partly finding something positive in the experience who endorsed the category.
Percentages do not add up to 100 because respondents sometime offered more than one explanation.
d
Respondents who endorsed this category as their only benefit were recorded with respect to whether they had found something positive as
"ambiguous."
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LOSS
AND
MEANING
567
Table 2
Regressions of Making Sense and Finding Benefit 6 Months Postloss on Preloss Optimism-
Pessimism, Distress, Religious-Spiritual Beliefs, and Age of the Deceased at Death
Varible
Optimism
-
pessimism
Distress
Age
at
death
Religious-spiritual beliefs
R
Making
0
-.00
-.13t
24***
3T
sense
95%
CI for 0
-.14,
.15
-.28,
.02
.11,
.38
.06,
.33
Finding
0
.22**
.02
-.01
-.05
.21
b
benefit
95%
CI for 0
.07.
.38
-.13..18
-.15.
.13
-.19,
.09
Note. "Making sense"
and
"finding benefit" were quantified on
a
0 (no)
to
1
(yes) scale, with ambiguous-
partly responses coded
as .5.
Five respondents
not
interested
in
making sense
of the
loss were excluded
from
the
"making sense" regression. Religious-spiritual beliefs were coded
as 0 (no) and 1
iyes).
All
other variables were continuous measures.
CI =
confidence interval.
a
F(4.
195) =
7.51,
p <
.0001.
b
F(4,
200) =
2.37,
p < .06.
t/>
< .10
(marginally significant).
**p <
.01. ***p
< .001.
Age
of the
loved
one at
time
of
death
was
strongly related
to the
respondent's relationship to the loved one,
F(4, 200) =
47.1,p
<
.0001.
Deceased parents were oldest
(M
=
73.4 years
of
age
at
death), followed
by spouses
(M = 63.4
years), "others"
(M =
56.8 years), siblings
(M
=
44.8
years),
and
children
(M = 36.2
years). Because
age of the
deceased
at
death essentially captures
the
age-appropriateness
of the
loss with
a 1
degree
of
freedom test
(as
opposed
to the
relationship
to
the deceased variable, which
is a 4
degree
of
freedom test
and
includes
some cells with
few
cases),
we
report results involving this variable.
Results
Factors Predicting the Acquisition of Meaning
at 6 Months Postloss
At the 6-month postloss interview, 68% of respondents re-
ported that they had made sense of the death; 19% were unable
to make sense of it; 10% were coded as ambiguous or that the
person had partly made sense of it; and 2% reported being
uninterested in this issue of meaning. With regard to benefit
finding,
73%
reported at 6 months postloss that they had found
something positive in the experience; 21% were unable to report
anything positive coming from the experience at this time; and
6% were coded as ambiguous. Among those coded "yes" or
"no"
to both of these questions (i.e., excluding those coded
*'ambiguous/partly" or "not interested in the issue"), there
was no association between being able to make sense of the
loss and reporting benefits, x
2
(U
N
= 168) = 0.70, p > .25.
For each of the questions addressing our two construals of
meaning, responses were scaled such that "no" responses were
coded as 0, "ambiguous-partly" responses were coded as 0.5,
and "yes" responses were coded as 1.0. The few respondents
who reported at the 6-month postloss interview that they were
not interested in the issue were excluded. A pair of multiple
regression analyses were then conducted to predict being able
to make sense of the death and finding benefit. Independent
variables were preloss measures of optimism-pessimism,
symptoms of distress, the dichotomous measure of religious-
spiritual beliefs, and the age at death of
the
decreased (see Table
2).
Consistent with expectations, variables that significantly
predicted sense making were age of the deceased at death (0
= .24, p < .001), religious or spiritual beliefs (0
—
.19, p <
.01),
and preloss level of distress, (/? =
-.13,
p < .10).
3
Those
who were most able to make sense of the death were those who
lost an older relative, described themselves (preloss) as having
religious or spiritual beliefs and exhibited less distress at the
preloss interview.
With regard to the benefit-finding construal of meaning, the
only significant predictor was level of optimism-pessimism (p
= .22, p < .01). Those highest in dispositional optimism were
most likely to report finding benefits following the loss of their
loved one. Note in Table 2 that each of the 95% confidence
intervals for the significant betas does not include the association
of that variable with the other construal of meaning, indicating
that each of the predictors was related to one of the construals
of meaning to a significantly greater degree than it was to the
other.
Very few of the demographic variables related to either of the
construals of meaning. Those who were the primary caregiver to
the terminally ill loved one were more likely than those who
were not to make sense of the loss (r = .25, p = .001) but were
not more likely to find something positive in the experience (r
= -.09, p > .15). hunger respondents and those with more
education were more likely to report finding something positive
in the experience (r = -.19, p < .01; r = .ll,p = .12, respec-
tively),
but these variables were not significantly related to mak-
ing sense of the loss (r = .09; r =
-.01,
ps > .15). Covarying
these variables did not appreciably change the betas reported in
Table 2.
Relations of Adjustment to Making Sense of the Loss
and Benefit Finding
Multiple regressions were conducted predicting psychological
distress at 6 and 13 months postloss from whether respondents
had (a) made sense of the loss and (+) found something positive
3
There were
no
significant differences
in
likelihood
of
making sense
between
any of the
religious groups
to
which respondents belonged
(Catholics, Protestants, Jews,
New
Age, Others).
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568
DAVIS, NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, AND LARSON
Table 3
Regressions of Psychological Distress at 6 and 13 Months Postloss on
Making Sense and Finding Benefit, 6 Months Postloss
Step
0
1
1
R
2
increment for step
Variable
Distress preloss
Making sense
Finding benefit
Distress at 6 months
postloss
0
62***
-.11*
.044"
95%
CI for 0
.51,
-.07,-
-.01,-
.73
-.28
-.22
Distress at 13 months
postloss
0
.60***
-.10t
-.14*
.03 l
b
95%
CI
•49,
.01,-
-.03,-
fOT0
.71
.21
.25
Note. "Making sense" and "finding benefit" were quantified on a 0 (no) to
1
(yes) scale, with ambiguous-
partly responses coded as .5. Five respondents not interested in making sense of the loss were excluded
from the regressions. CI = confidence interval.
a
F{2, 196) = 7.56, p < .001.
b
F(2, 196) = 5.03, p < .01.
t/> < .10 (marginally significant). *p < .05.
**
p < .01. *** p < .001.
in the experience by 6 months postloss. These analyses con-
trolled for distress at preloss. The two predictor variables (mak-
ing sense of
the
loss and finding something positive in the experi-
ence) were evaluated simultaneously in each regression. Table
3 illustrates the results. The data indicate that both making sense
of the loss and finding something positive in the experience were
associated with lower levels of distress at 6 months postloss
(making sense: /? = —.17,/? < .01; finding positive: /? = —.11,
p < .05) and 13 months postloss (making sense: /? =
—
.10,
p
< .08; finding positive:
(3 —
—
.14,
p < .05). The multiplicative
interaction of making sense and finding something positive, en-
tered on a subsequent step, did not approach significance in
either set of analyses.
4
To examine whether certain specific explanations provided
by respondents for (a) how they had made sense of the loss and
(b) what they had found to be positive might differentially relate
to adjustment, regressions similar to those reported in Table 3
were conducted, except that dummy variables representing each
of the make-sense and finding-positive categories (except those
with fewer than five endorsements) were entered as predictors
of distress. Although the two sets of dummy variables each
accounted for variance in distress comparable to that accounted
for by the overall make-sense and finding-benefit variables pre-
sented in Table 3, neither set of dummy variables yielded a
statistically significant R
2
increment (Fs < 1.80, p > .10).
None of the particular meanings that respondents reported re-
lated more strongly to adjustment than the others. Instead, it
appeared to be the case that what mattered was whether or not
one had made sense of or found something positive from the
experience.
Making Sense of the Loss and Finding Benefit
at 13 Months Postloss
At the 13-month postloss interview, very nearly the same
percentage of respondents reported making sense of the loss
(68%) and reported finding something positive in the experience
(80%) as was found at 6 months postloss. However, this does
not mean that there was little change between the two interviews.
Whereas between the 6-month and the 13-month postloss inter-
views 68% of respondents reported no change as to whether
they were able to make sense of the loss, 32% of respondents
were observed to have changed:
11%
of respondents were coded
as
(
'sense gainers" (i.e., reported at the 13-month postloss inter-
view that they were able to make sense of the loss when at 6
months they were coded as having not made sense, that they
had partly made sense, or had been coded as ambiguous); 7%
of respondents were coded as "sense losers" (i.e., reported that
they were unable to make sense of the loss at 13 months postloss,
whereas at 6 months they had been coded as having made sense,
as having partly made sense, or as ambiguous); 11% of re-
sponses were coded as "ambiguous-partly" at this time; and
a further 2% were coded as not interested in the issue of making
sense of the loss.
With regard to finding something positive in the experience,
80%
of respondents reported no change between the 6 months
and the 13 months postloss. Those whose responses changed
included 13% termed "benefit gainers" (i.e., respondents who
reported at the 13-month postloss interview that they were able
to find something positive in the experience whereas at 6 months
they were coded as being unable or as "ambiguous-partly")
and 6% termed "benefit losers" (i.e., they were unable to find
something positive at 13 months postloss when at 6 months they
had been coded as having found something or had been coded
as "ambiguous-partly"). The remaining 1% were coded as
"ambiguous-partly" at 13 months postloss.
Among those coded ' 'yes'' or
*
'no'' to both of these questions
(i.e.,
excluding those coded "ambiguous-partly" or "not inter-
ested in the issue"), there was no association between being
able to make sense of the loss and reporting finding something
positive, x
2
U. N = 179) = 0.11, ns.
To evaluate the effect of finding or losing meaning on adjust-
ment, parallel hierarchical regressions were conducted, pre-
dicting adjustment at 13 months and 18 months postloss from
whether respondents had made sense of the loss or found some-
4
In terms of their level of distress, the five respondents reporting at
6 months postloss that they were uninterested in the issue of making
sense of the loss most closely resembled those who had made sense of
it; they reported the lowest levels of distress.
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LOSS AND MEANING
569
Table 4
Regressions of Psychological Distress at 13 and 18 Months Postloss on
Making Sense and Finding Benefit, 13 Months Postloss
Step
0
0
0
1
1
R
2
increment
for step
Variable
Distress preloss
Making sense 6 months postloss
Finding benefit 6 months postloss
Making sense 13 months postloss
Finding benefit 13 months postloss
Distress at 13 months
0
57***
-.10|
-.14*
-.04
-.18**
.023
a
postloss
95%
CI for 0
.46,
.01,-
-.03,-
-.18,
-.05,-
.68
-.21
-.25
.11
-.31
Distress
I
0
-.02
-.09
-.03
-.26**
.042
b
>
at 18 months
jostloss
95%
CI for 0
.36,
-.36,
-.23,
-.20,
-.09,-
.62
.11
.04
.14
-.42
Note. "Making sense" and "finding benefit" were quantified on a 0 (no) to
1
(yes) scale, with ambiguous-
partly responses coded as .5. Respondents not interested in making sense of the loss are excluded from the
regressions. CI = confidence interval.
a
F(2,
189) = 3.61, p < .05.
b
F(2, 158) = 4.70,/? < .01.
fp < .10 (marginally significant).
*
p < .05.
**
p < .01. *** p < .001.
thing positive in the experience at 13 months postloss, control-
ling preloss distress and whether they had been able to make
sense or find something positive in the experience at 6 months
postloss. As above, respondents who were not interested in mak-
ing sense of the loss were excluded from the analyses, and those
coded as "ambiguous-partly" were coded as 0.5. The results,
detailed in Table 4, indicate that whereas making sense of the
loss at 13 months postloss was not reliably associated with
adjustment at 13 or 18 months postloss, finding something posi-
tive in the experience at 13 months postloss was consistently
associated with better adjustment at both the 13- and 18-month
postloss interviews (y3s = -.18 and -.26, ps < .01 for adjust-
ment at 13 and 18 months postloss, respectively).
5
When we look more closely at those who gained and those who
lost each construal of meaning between the two interviews, an
interesting pattern emerges. In terms of benefit finding, those who
gained between the two interviews changed in their mean level of
distress from levels comparable to those other respondents who
reported no benefits at the 6-month postloss interview to levels of
distress comparable to those who continued to report rinding bene-
fit across the two interviews. Those who lost the benefit they
reported at 6 months postloss conversely changed in their levels
of distress from a low level of distress at 6 months postloss (when
they reported benefit) to relatively high levels of distress at 13
months postloss (when they reported no benefit). This crossover
interaction is depicted in Panel A of Figure 1.
Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the comparable pattern of
results for changes in making sense of the loss. In terms of level
of distress, both those who gained sense and those who lost
sense appeared no different from each other and were doing
better than those who reported at both interviews that they were
unable to make sense of the loss and less well than those who
were able to make sense at both interviews. This suggests that
the meanings that sense-losers possessed at 6 months postloss
and the meanings that sense-gainers reported at 13 months post-
loss were not particularly comforting. Reviewing the open-ended
explanations provided by respondents, we see some evidence
that this is the case, particularly among those who gained sense
at 13 months postloss. Although cell sizes are quite small, those
who gained sense at 13 months postloss were more likely to
state that they had made sense of the loss by accepting the loss
as part of life (26% vs. 17% of those who had made sense of
the loss at both interviews) or that they had made sense by
accepting that these events
'
'just happen' '(17% vs. 3% of those
who had made sense of
the
loss at both interviews). Characteris-
tic of this latter category is the following explanation given by
one respondent at the 13-month postloss interview:
The sense of his death is that there is no sense. Those things just
happen. . . . The sense of his death for me is "get ready to die."
Don't be surprised when it happens. Don't think that somehow
you're going to be exempt from it. ... There's no underlying
sense of order in the sense that things progress in an expectable
pattern. Well, the pattern is that you're bom and you die.
In summary, the data suggest that those people who come to
make sense of their loss later in the process tend not to experience
the reprieve from distress that those who were able to make sense
earlier report. And in many cases, the meanings that these people
report seem relatively less benign and comforting to the view of
the world as one in which events are comprehensible and nonran-
dom. They tend to suggest that such losses are unpredictable and
that one has little control over whether and when such events may
occur. On the other hand, people who report finding benefit later
in the process do show a reprieve from
distress.
In fact, the relations
of finding something positive to distress appear to grow stronger
with time. Specifically, if one reviews the standardized regression
coefficients for the relations of perceiving benefit at 6 months
postloss to distress at 6 and 13 months (see Table 3) and those
5
The interaction of making sense and finding something positive at
13 months postloss was weakly associated with adjustment at 13 months
postloss (0 = .30, p < .10), but as this effect was not replicated at 18
months postloss (0 = -.12, ns), we do not place much stock in this
result. The nature of the interaction effect was such that those reporting
having neither meaning were doing somewhat worse than all other
groups.
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570
DAVIS,
NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, AND LARSON
Time Since Loss
-x-
Gained benefit (n = 27)
-m-
Never had benefit (n = 26)
-Always had It (n =139)
-Lost benefit {n * 13)
o
S
1°
° o
-0
-0
-0
13 monthB
Time Since Loss
-x-
Gained sense (n = 23)
-m-
Never made sense (n = 30) •
-Always made sense (n = 128)
-Lost sense (n = 14)
Figure 1. Changes in distress as a function of finding benefit (top)
and making sense of the loss (bottom) at 6-13 months postloss. Distress
scores are composites of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder,
depression, and positive affect (reversed), standardized within time.
Higher positive scores reflect greater distress.
for the relations of perceiving benefit at 13 months to distress at
13 and 18 months postloss (see Table 4), one observes an increas-
ing trend in the magnitude of association (i.e.,
—.11,
—.14, -.18,
and -.26). If one reviews the comparable standardized regression
coefficients for the relations of making sense to distress, one ob-
serves the opposite trend in the magnitude of associations (i.e.,
-.17,
-.10, -.04, -.02).
Testing a Mediational Model
Earlier, we showed that optimism-pessimism, age of death,
and religious-spiritual beliefs predicted whether respondents
made sense of their loss or whether they would find something
positive in their experience. It may be that these variables also
predict distress directly, or possibly may account for the associa-
tion of each construal of meaning with distress. On the other
hand, if making sense and finding benefit maintain their associa-
tions with adjustment when these antecedent variables are statis-
tically controlled, this suggests that making sense and finding
benefit mediate any relation between the antecedent variables
and adjustment. To test the mediational model, a path model
was constructed. The model specified only indirect effects on
distress 6 months postloss of optimism-pessimism, age at
death, and religious-spiritual beliefs, through their effects on
benefit finding and sense making (see Figure 2). The data ade-
quately fit the model,
x
2
(33,
.V = 198) - 27.20, p > .70;
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index =
.95;
Root Mean Square Resid-
ual = .03. A second path model, identical to the first except
that optimism-pessimism, age at death, and religious-spiritual
beliefs were permitted to directly relate to distress at 6 months
postloss, did not significantly improve on the fit of the data to
the model, difference x
2
O) = 4.18, p > .20, and in no case
did a statistically significant path coefficient in the first model
become nonsignificant in the second model. This set of results
suggests making sense of the loss and finding something positive
in the experience mediate the impact of these antecedent factors
on adjustment following loss.
Discussion
Making sense of loss and finding benefit in the experience
are two distinct construals of meaning, distinguishable in terms
of their focus, their antecedents, and their relations to psycholog-
ical adjustment. Those who were able to make sense of their
loss typically did so by seeing the death as predictable or as a
natural condition of life or by suggesting that the death was
comprehensible within the context of their religious or spiritual
beliefs. On the other hand, those who were able to find benefit in
the experience tended to report that they had learned something
important from it, about themselves (e.g., that they had the
strength to cope with the adversity), about others (e.g., the value
of family and relationships), or about the meaning of life (e.g.,
learned what is important in life). The two questions used in
this study to elicit these notions of meaning clearly tapped into
two distinct issues. Not only were the explanations distinct and
nonoverlapping, whether or not one was able to make sense of
the event was consistently unrelated to whether one was able to
find something positive in the experience.
We suggest further that these two construals of meaning likely
involve different psychological processes. We and others (e.g.,
Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Lemer,
1980) have argued that people are motivated to make sense of
negative life events in an effort to maintain their perception,
belief,
or assumption that significant events in one's life should
make sense; such events are presumed to be comprehensible,
predictable, more or less just, and occur for a reason. To the
extent that events that touch one's life do not make sense, they
are believed to leave one vulnerable and highly distressed and
thus motivated to find meaning by making sense of the event
(e.g., McCann & Pearlman, 1990). Following this line of think-
ing, we reasoned that factors that might influence whether one
would be able to make sense of a loss should be those that are
intimately tied to one's worldview (in this case, religious or
spiritual beliefs) as well as contextual features of the loss (such
as the age-appropriateness of the loss). This study offers evi-
dence that bereaved respondents who, prior to the loss, reported
having religious or spiritual beliefs were more likely to have
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LOSS AND MEANING
571
PTSD
Positive
Affect
Depression
PTSD
Positive
Affect
Depression
Figure 2. Path model of effects of meaning and antecedents on adjustment 6 months postloss. Model
X
2
(33,
N = 198) = 27.20, p > .70. Path coefficients are standardized. Not shown are correlated error
terms between preloss and postloss post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and preloss and postloss positive
affect. The effect on the overall model of freeing paths from age at death, religious-spiritual beliefs, and
optimism to distress at 6 months postloss was not significant, difference ^
2
(3, N - 198) = 4.18, p > .20.
Only one path (from age at death to distress) approached significance (fi = -.10). It did not negate any
of the other paths, t P < -10 (marginally significant). * p < .05.
made sense of the loss and those losing a loved one at younger
ages were less likely to make sense of the death than those
losing a loved one of a more advanced age (as current norms
suggest is the "appropriate" age to die).
In contrast, these factors did not predict people's ability to
find something positive in their experience. Instead, as we pre-
dicted, disposition^ optimism-pessimism predicted benefit
finding. Those respondents who reported higher levels of opti-
mism were more likely to report rinding something positive in
the experience, which in turn predicted lower levels of distress
subsequently.
Our data are not the first to demonstrate a link between psy-
chological adjustment and one's ability to make sense of loss
or find benefit in its wake. However, unlike previous studies
which also show a relation of meaning (variously conceptual-
ized) to adjustment, these data take into account a number of
confounding factors that previous research has been in a weak
position to refute. The observed associations between distress
and each of our two construals of meaning are not accounted for
by preloss levels of distress, dispositional optimism-pessimism,
religious belief systems that might make loss more comprehensi-
ble,
or differences in the age-appropriateness of the loss. In fact,
the data suggest that the two construals of meaning largely
mediate the impact of these factors on subsequent adjustment.
Although the potential confounds controlled for in the present
study are far from a complete list, it may be argued that these
are among the most serious.
An additional contribution of this research is that it provides
the first evidence that each of these two construals of meaning
independently relate to both current as well as future adjustment
in a longitudinal design. Making sense of the loss was shown
to relate most strongly to adjustment in the first 6 months after
the loss. In contrast, respondents' reports of benefits were more
strongly related to adjustment 13 and 18 months after the loss.
In addition, changes in people's perception that something posi-
tive had come of the experience appeared to influence adjust-
ment more than changes in people's ability to make sense of
the loss. These trends suggest that, whereas making sense of the
loss is important in the early phases of adjustment to a loss,
perceiving benefit may be a more long-term process that unfolds
over time, affecting adjustment. Even though as many people
report finding benefit at 6 months postloss as report making
sense of the loss, these reports appear to have their greatest
impact on distress somewhat later in the adjustment process. It
is as if these positive changes in one's goals and perspectives
take time to be implemented and integrated into one's daily life.
Limitations and Future Directions
An important strength of this study is its prospective nature.
This feature of the study allowed us to assess factors thought
to affect each construal of meaning prior to the loss of the
loved one. However, such an advantage comes with a cost. Tb
efficiently obtain a sample of people soon to be bereaved means
that one must recruit respondents through organizations that
serve such populations, such as hospices. One consequence of
this selective recruitment procedure is that people losing loved
ones unexpectedly or suddenly will not be represented in the
study. In fact, the unexpectedness or suddenness of the loss may
importantly influence one's ability to make sense of the loss.
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572
DAVIS,
NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, AND LARSON
For instance, in their study of young widows, Parkes and Weiss
(1983) noted that the degree of forewarning predicted whether
widows continued, 2-4 years after their loss, to be concerned
with questions of why their husband died. Whereas 61% of
those with brief or no forewarning continued to ask themselves
why it happened, only 29% with long forewarning were so
concerned. Parkes and Weiss suggested that whereas anticipated
losses are somewhat more explicable, in the sense that they may
be perceived as an end to a process, unanticipated loss is "with-
out context: it has no history, nothing leading up to it" and that
this disjointedness "makes the death inexplicable, no matter
how detailed the account of how it happened" (p. 84). In our
study, where all respondents were reasonably certain that their
loved one's death was imminent, we found a much higher rate
of making sense of the loss (almost twice the rate) than has
been found in studies of the suddenly and unexpectedly bereaved
(e.g., Lehman et al., 1987; Mclntosh et al., 1993).
A second issue that also centers on the representativeness of
the sample concerns the fact that these respondents were re-
cruited through noninstitutionalized hospices. Clearly only a
small percentage of people facing imminent death in the United
States currently use the services of hospice-care organizations,
although this number is growing. Many of the respondents in
this study commented that it was very significant to themselves,
as well as to the terminally ill person, that the loved one was
able to die at home. For several respondents, this experience
reportedly helped them accept the loss and to grow from it (see
also Folkman, Chesney, Collette, Boccellari, & Cooke, 1996).
This limitation, however, does not cast the meat of our results
in doubt. At worst, it suggests that lower rates of making sense
and finding benefit may have been obtained had we recruited
respondents from other organizations such as hospitals. To the
extent that the use of hospices as organizations from which to
recruit may have inflated the number of people making sense
of their loss and finding benefits from their experience and exag-
gerated the rate at which people recovered relative to the rates
that might be observed elsewhere, the results presented here
might be considered conservative estimates of the relations
among these variables as such (perhaps) inflated rates of mean-
ing-making and lower levels of distress would only serve to
attenuate the observed relations.
A third limitation of the study is the reliance on single-item
variables to assess making sense and finding benefit in the expe-
rience. We do note, in defense of our measures, that test-retest
correlations for both construals of meaning (6 months to 13
months postloss) were in excess of r
—
.50. In defense of the
issue of validity that is often raised with regard to the use of
single-item measures, we can say that the open-ended explana-
tions of meaning offered by our participants generally suggested
that they understood the meaning of the questions. Our raters
could easily and reliably categorize the participants' responses
into categories that were coherent and logical given the question
put to them, and the categories of responses culled from these
data are very similar to the categories that other researchers
have culled from their data.
Nevertheless, it useful to ask if multi-item instruments could
be developed to assess these notions of meaning. In fact, several
instruments have been developed over the past few years to
measure benefits or positive life changes (see Affleck et al.,
1991;
Park et al., 1996;Tedeschi &Calhoun, 1996). One telling
finding that has emerged from this research, however, is that it
is not the number of benefits that one reports that is informative,
but rather whether any benefit has accrued (see Affleck et al.,
1991;
Davis et al., 1997). And this makes sense theoretically:
If people seek benefit following loss or trauma in an effort to
assuage threats to their sense of
self,
or to restore a sense of
purpose to their life, then one benefit should be sufficient. There
is no theoretical reason why four benefits are preferable to three,
or three preferable to two.
Multi-item scales have not been developed to measure the
sense-making construal of meaning, owing to the fact that this
is a highly sensitive issue for many people coping with trauma.
People in our study who could not make sense of the loss often
appeared anguished by the senselessness of their loss. Neverthe-
less,
future research might gain important information by prob-
ing gently those aspects of the loss that do not make sense. As
well, we might ask whether there are particular worldviews,
held prior to the loss, that facilitate the acquisition of meaning
or that lead people to be relatively unconcerned with making
sense of their loss. Does a particularly strong belief in a just
world predict subsequent difficulty in making sense of nonnor-
mative losses?
A final issue concerns the meaning of the reports of benefits
offered by our respondents. Are these reports of benefits to be
interpreted as personal growth, or do they represent merely some
form of defensiveness (for a discussion, see Taylor, 1989)
?
Leh-
man et al. (1993) suggested that the case for growth may be
strengthened to the extent that one can demonstrate that reports
of benefits (or positive life changes) relate to changes in relevant
dimensions of personality from preloss to postloss. For instance,
can one show that these reports of changes in life orientation
(such as gaining a new perspective, appreciating family and
friends more) accompany changes in dispositional optimism or
pessimism (or neuroticism)? In subsidiary analyses, we ob-
served that reports of benefit were marginally but consistently
related to changes in optimism-pessimism. Those reporting
finding something positive in the experience became somewhat
more optimistic about life over the course of the study. Although
not conclusive (both measures are still self-report), these data
do strengthen the case that the reports of benefits reported by
our respondents were not merely defensive statements.
Conclusion
Several theorists have argued that finding meaning is critical
to adjustment following loss or trauma. This study provided
support that each of two rather different notions of meaning do
predict adjustment following the loss of a loved one. It also
showed that these two representations of meaning are distinct,
with different antecedents and timelines, and we suggested that
they may involve distinct psychological processes. Demonstrat-
ing the presumed mechanisms by which each construal of mean-
ing influences adjustment is the agenda for future research.
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Received May 27, 1997
Revision received February 12, 1998
Accepted February 26, 1998 •
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- "In the context of Running head: Schemas, meaning making, and complicated grief stressful life events, research on meaning making (i.e., the restoration of meaning, cf. Park, 2010) has primarily been concerned with the concepts of sense-making (integration of the loss) and benefit-finding (e.g., Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Mascaro, 2014). The present study focuses on meaning made or the integration of the loss. "
[Show abstract] [Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Early maladaptive schemas (EMSs) have been proposed as a risk factor for developing complicated grief (CG)—a severe and chronic form of grieving characterized by a host of problematic cognitive, behavioral, and emotional symptoms. Furthermore, it has been hypothesized that the link between EMSs and CG may be largely explained by one’s ability to make meaning of the loss by integrating the experience into some broader understanding of oneself and the world. The present study tested these hypotheses among a sample of 156 bereaved young adults who completed measures of EMSs, meaning made of loss, and CG. Findings suggested that negative EMSs are associated with elevated CG symptoms and greater difficulties integrating the loss. In addition, when all variables were examined simultaneously in a path analysis, those with more negative EMSs in the Rejection and Disconnection domain were found to have greater difficulty finding adaptive ways of making meaning of the loss and in turn experienced more severe CG. These findings underscore the importance of attending to ingrained schemas and negative meanings made of loss when interacting clinically with bereaved individuals.- "Meaning can be defined as " a mental representation of possible relationships among things […] " (Park 2010 referring to Baumeister 1991). These relationships can be found in other notions of meaning, such as: implications, relating something to objective facts (Anderson 1933); symbolic association (Crilly et al. 2004), connecting things mentally; significance, relating to the worth of an event for one's life; and comprehensibility, relating to one's view of the world (Davis et al. 1998). Meaning is " often multidimensional, subtle, concealed, multisensory, dynamic, and contingent on sociocultural and personal contexts " (Mick et al. 2004). "
- "Chun and Lee (2008) noted that although an individual may experience growth and positive life changes resulting from a traumatic event, these positive experiences do not preclude the experience of negative outcomes and psychological distress. From the existing body of literature on posttraumatic growth, a coping process of construing meaning can serve as a facilitator of the posttraumatic growth experience (Davis et al., 1998; Park, 2010). For example, Chun and Lee (2010) argued that perceptions of growth from threatening life events represent active attempts to cope with trauma and reduce feelings of psychological distress. "
[Show abstract] [Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: A growing body of empirical evidence has demonstrated that individuals who experience traumatic and stressful life events can experience positive psychological changes as a result of their struggles with adversity, stress, and trauma. The purpose of the current study is to examine the relationship among five domains (e.g., as relating to others, recognition of new possibilities, a feeling of personal strength, and spiritual change) of posttraumatic growth, happiness, and life satisfaction among Korean individuals with physical disabilities. The results of this study show that three factors (i.e., recognition of new possibilities, experience of spiritual growth, and an appreciation of life) served as predictors of life satisfaction, and two factors (i.e., recognition of new possibilities and personal strength) predicted happiness. This result suggests that certain factors of posttraumatic growth can lead to particular health benefits and influence these benefits to varied extents.
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