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Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events

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With each eye fixation, we experience a richly detailed visual world. Yet recent work on visual integration and change direction reveals that we are surprisingly unaware of the details of our environment from one view to the next: we often do not detect large changes to objects and scenes ('change blindness'). Furthermore, without attention, we may not even perceive objects ('inattentional blindness'). Taken together, these findings suggest that we perceive and remember only those objects and details that receive focused attention. In this paper, we briefly review and discuss evidence for these cognitive forms of 'blindness'. We then present a new study that builds on classic studies of divided visual attention to examine inattentional blindness for complex objects and events in dynamic scenes. Our results suggest that the likelihood of noticing an unexpected object depends on the similarity of that object to other objects in the display and on how difficult the priming monitoring task is. Interestingly, spatial proximity of the critical unattended object to attended locations does not appear to affect detection, suggesting that observers attend to objects and events, not spatial positions. We discuss the implications of these results for visual representations and awareness of our visual environment.
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1 Introduction
``It is a well-known phenomenon that we do not notice anything happening in our surround-
ings while being absorbed in the inspection of something; focusing our attention on a
certain object may happen to such an extent that we cannot perceive other objects placed
in the peripheral parts of our visual field, although the light rays they emit arrive completely
at the visual sphere of the cerebral cortex.''
Rezso
«Ba
¨lint 1907 (translated in Husain and Stein 1988, page 91)
Perhaps you have had the following experience: you are searching for an open seat in
a crowded movie theater. After scanning for several minutes, you eventually spot one and
sit down. The next day, your friends ask why you ignored them at the theater. They were
waving at you, and you looked right at them but did not see them. Just as we sometimes
overlook our friends in a crowded room, we occasionally fail to notice changes to the
appearance of those around us. We have all had the embarrassing experience of failing
to notice when a friend or colleague shaves off a beard, gets a haircut, or starts wearing
contact lenses. We feel that we perceive and remember everything around us, and we take
the occasional blindness to visual details to be an unusual exception. The richness of our
visual experience leads us to believe that our visual representations will include and
preserve the same amount of detail (Levin et al 2000).
The disparity between the richness of our experience and the details of our repre-
sentation, though `well known' to Ba
¨lint in 1907, has been studied only sporadically in
the psychological literature since then, and many of the most striking results appear
to have been neglected by contemporary researchers. Although the past 20 years have
seen increasing interest in the issue of the precision of visual representations, a series
of studies from the 1970s and 1980s using dynamic visual displays provides some of
the most dramatic demonstrations of the importance of attention in perception (see
Neisser 1979 for an overview). In these studies, observers engage in a continuous task
that requires them to focus on one aspect of a dynamic scene while ignoring others.
Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness
for dynamic events
Perception, 1999, volume 28, pages 1059 ^ 1074
Daniel J Simons, Christopher F Chabris
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA;
e-mail: dsimons@wjh.harvard.edu
Received 9 May 1999, in revised form 20 June 1999
Abstract. With each eye fixation, we experience a richly detailed visual world. Yet recent work
on visual integration and change direction reveals that we are surprisingly unaware of the details
of our environment from one view to the next: we often do not detect large changes to objects
and scenes (`change blindness'). Furthermore, without attention, we may not even perceive
objects (`inattentional blindness'). Taken together, these findings suggest that we perceive and
remember only those objects and details that receive focused attention. In this paper, we briefly
review and discuss evidence for these cognitive forms of `blindness'. We then present a new study
that builds on classic studies of divided visual attention to examine inattentional blindness for
complex objects and events in dynamic scenes. Our results suggest that the likelihood of noticing
an unexpected object depends on the similarity of that object to other objects in the display and
on how difficult the priming monitoring task is. Interestingly, spatial proximity of the critical
unattended object to attended locations does not appear to affect detection, suggesting that
observers attend to objects and events, not spatial positions. We discuss the implications of these
results for visual representations and awareness of our visual environment.
DOI:10.1068/p29 52
At some point during the task an unexpected event occurs, but the majority of observers
do not report seeing it even though it is clearly visible to observers not engaged in the
concurrent task (Becklen and Cervone 1983; Littman and Becklen 1976; Neisser 1979;
Neisser and Becklen 1975; Rooney et al 1981; Stoffregen et al 1993; Stoffregen and
Becklen 1989). Although these studies have profound implications for our understand-
ing of perception with and without attention, and despite their obvious connection to
more recent work on visual attention (eg change blindness, attentional blink, repetition
blindness, inattentional blindness), the empirical approach has fallen into disuse. One
goal of our research is to revive the approach used in these original studies of `selective
looking' in the context of more recent work on visual attention.
Over the past few years, several researchers have demonstrated that conscious per-
ception seems to require attention. When attention is diverted to another object or task,
observers often fail to perceive an unexpected object, even if it appears at fixation
ö
a phenomenon termed `inattentional blindness' (eg Mack and Rock 1998).
(1)
These
findings are reminiscent of another set of findings falling under the rubric of `change
blindness'. Observers often fail to notice large changes to objects or scenes from one
view to the next, particularly if those objects are not the center of interest in the scene
(Rensink et al 1997). For example, observers often do not notice when two people in a
photograph exchange heads, provided that the change occurs during an eye movement
(Grimes 1996; see Simons and Levin 1997 for a review). Such studies suggest that
attention is necessary for change detection (see also Scholl 2000), but not sufficient,
as even changes to attended objects are often not noticed (Levin and Simons 1997;
Simons and Levin 1997, 1998; Williams and Simons 2000). For example, observers who
were giving directions to an experimenter often did not notice that the experimenter
was replaced by a different person during an interruption caused by a door being carried
between them (Simons and Levin 1998).
Both areas of research focus on two fundamental questions. (i) To what degree are
the details of our visual world perceived and represented? (ii) What role does attention
play in this process? We will review recent evidence for inattentional blindness to provide
a current context for a discussion of earlier research on the perception of unexpected
events. We then present a new study examining the variables that affect inattentional
blindness in naturalistic, dynamic events, and consider the results within the broader
framework or recent attention research, including change blindness.
1.1 Inattentional blindness
Studies of change blindness assume that, with attention, features can be encoded
(abstractly or otherwise) and retained in memory. That is, all of the information in the
visual environment is potentially available for attentive processing. Yet, without atten-
tion, not much of this information is retained across views. Studies of inattentional
blindness have made an even stronger claim: that, without attention, visual features of
our environment are not perceived at all (or at least not consciously perceived)
ö
observers may fail not just at change detection, but at perception as well.
Recent work on the role of attention in perception has explored what happens to
unattended parts of simple visual displays (Mack and Rock 1998; Mack et al 1992;
Moore and Egeth 1997; Newby and Rock 1998; Rock et al 1992; Rubin and Hua 1998;
Silverman and Mack 1997). In traditional models of visual search, features are often
assumed to be processed preattentively if search speeds are unaffected by the number
(1)
Mack and Rock (1998) draw a distinction between conscious perception and implicit perception.
Consistently with this distinction, when we use the term `perceive' (or `notice' or `see') in this paper,
we mean that observers have at some point had a conscious experience of an object or event.
However, it is important to note that even when observers do not perceive an object, it may still
have an implicit influence on their subsequent decisions and performance (eg Chun and Jiang
1998; Moore and Egeth 1997).
1060 D J Simons, C F Chabris
of distracter items in the display (ie the feature `pops out' effortlessly). Preattentive
processing of some features would allow for rapid perception of more complex objects
that are built by combining such sensory primitives. However, visual search tasks may
not truly assess the processing of unattended stimuli because observers have the expec-
tation that a target may appear
ö
observers know that they will have to search the
display for a particular stimulus. Hence, they may expect to perceive these features,
which would allow their visual/cognitive system to anticipate the features. The inatten-
tional-blindness paradigm developed by Mack, Rock, and colleagues avoids this potential
confound of knowledge of the task (eg Mack and Rock 1998), allowing a more direct
assessment of the perception of unattended stimuli. In a typical version of their task,
observers judge which of two arms of a briefly displayed large cross is longer. On the
fourth trial of this task, an unexpected object appears at the same time as the cross. After
this trial, observers are asked to report if they saw anything other than the cross. After
answering this question, observers view another trial, now with the suggestion that
something might appear. This allows an assessment of perception under conditions of
divided attention. Last, subjects complete a final, full-attention trial in which they
look for and report the critical object but ignore the cross. Performance on the critical,
unattended trial is compared with that on the divided-attention and full-attention trials
to estimate the degree to which attention influences perception. The difference in the
proportion of subjects noticing on the full-attention and critical trials is the amount
of inattentional blindness.
Several clear patterns emerge from this body of research (see Mack and Rock 1998
for an overview). (i) About 25% of subjects are inattentionally blind when the cross is
presented at fixation and the unexpected object is presented parafoveally (subjects
typically detect the critical stimulus on divided-attention and full-attention trials).
(ii) About 75% of subjects are inattentionally blind when the cross is presented para-
foveally and the unexpected object is presented at fixation, suggesting an effortful shift
of attention away from fixation to the cross and possible inhibition of processing at the
ignored fixation location. (iii) These levels of detection are no different for features
thought to be preattentively processed (eg color, orientation, motion) and those thought
to require effort. (iv) Although objects composed of simple visual features are not easily
detected, some meaningful stimuli are. Observers typically notice their own name or a
smiley face even when they did not expect it. Note, however, they do not tend to notice
their own name if one letter is changed (see also Rubin and Hua 1998). Observers do not
consciously perceive the visual features, but they do perceive the meaning. (v) Observers
seem to focus attention on particular locations on the screen. Objects that appear
inside this zone of attention are more likely to be detected than those appearing out-
side (Mack and Rock 1998; Newby and Rock 1998), suggesting that attention is focused
not on the object or event itself, but on the area around that object.
1.2 `Selective looking'
These recent studies of inattentional blindness used simple, brief visual displays under
precisely controlled timing conditions, in the vein of work on visual search and related
attention paradigms that were largely designed to examine how we select and process
features and objects. The paradigm was designed to be a visual analogue of dichotic-
listening studies conducted during the 1950s and 1960s (Cherry 1953; Moray 1959; Treisman
1964), and largely succeeded in replicating the classic auditory effects with visual stimuli.
Although relatively little unattended information reaches awareness, some particularly
meaningful stimuli do. Despite the similarity of these theoretical conclusions, they are
fundamentally different in an important way. Almost by necessity, dichotic-listening
tasks involve dynamic rather than static events. Listening studies reveal a degree of
`inattentional deafness' that extends over time and over changes in the unattended stimulus.
Gorillas in our midst 1061
In that sense, the computer-based inattention paradigm is not a true analogue of dichotic-
listening tasks. Although the theoretical conclusions match our experience of not seeing
friends in a crowded theater (and hearing our own name spoken at a noisy party), the
experimental paradigm may not fully capture all aspects of that natural situation
[see Neumann et al (1986) for a discussion of the difficulties of equating auditory and
visual divided-attention tasks]. However, an earlier series of studies by Neisser and his
colleagues did use dynamic events to address many of the same questions.
In an initial study (Neisser and Becklen 1975), observers viewed a display which
presented two overlapping, simultaneous events. (The superimposition was achieved by
showing both of the separately recorded events on an angled, half-silvered mirror.)
One of the events was a hand-slapping game in which one player extended his hands
with palms up and the other player placed his hands on his opponents hands with
palms down. The player with palms up tries to slap the back of the other player's
hands, and the other player tries to avoid the slap. The second event depicted three
people moving in irregular patterns and passing a basketball. Subjects were asked to
closely monitor one of the two events. If they monitored the hand game, they pressed
a button with each attempted slap. If they monitored the ball game, they pressed the
button for each pass. Each subject viewed a total of ten trials. The first two trials
showed each of the games alone. On the 3rd and 4th trials, both events were presented
simultaneously, but subjects were asked to follow only one of them. On the 5th and
6th trials, subjects attempted to respond to both events, using one hand to respond to
each (only twenty actions per minute rather than forty occurred in these two and
subsequent trials). On the last four trials, subjects responded to only one of the events,
but an additional unexpected event occurred as well. In trial 7, the two hand-game players
stopped and shook hands. On trial 8, one of the ball-game players threw the ball out of
the game and the players continued to pretend to be passing the ball. The ball was
returned after 20 s of fake throws. On trial 9, the hand-game players briefly stopped their
game and passed a small ball back and forth. On trial 10, each of the ball-game players
stepped off camera and was replaced by a woman and, after 20 s, the original men
returned in the same fashion.
The results of this study are largely consistent with the findings of computer-based
inattention studies. In the initial trials, subjects could easily follow one event while
ignoring another event occupying the same spatial position. [This was true even when
subjects were not allowed to move their eyes; see Littman and Becklen (1976).] Not
surprisingly, they had much greater difficulty simultaneously monitoring both events.
More importantly, in the initial trial with an unexpected event, only one of twenty-four
people spontaneously reported the hand shake, and three others mentioned it in post-
experiment questioning. None of the subjects spontaneously reported the disappearance
of the ball, three spontaneously reported the ball pass in the hand game, and three
reported the exchange of women for men on the final trial. Subjects who noticed one
of the unusual events were more likely to notice subsequent unusual events, much as
subjects in the divided-attention conditions in inattentional-blindness studies typically
reported the presence of the previously `unexpected' object (Mack and Rock 1998).
In total, 50% of Neisser and Becklen's (1975) subjects showed no indication of having
seen any of the unexpected events, and even subjects who did notice typically could
not accurately report the details of them.
In a more recent version of this sort of divided-visual-attention task, observers
viewed superimposed videotapes of two of the ball games described above (Becklen,
Neisser, and Littman, discussed in Neisser 1979).
(2)
The players in one game wore
(2)
Many of the `selective-looking' studies conducted by Neisser and his colleagues were never
published in complete empirical reports. In such cases, as here, we have cited unpublished or
in-preparation manuscripts on the basis of their descriptions in other, published materials.
1062 D J Simons, C F Chabris
black shirts and the players in the other game wore white shirts. This change made
the attended and ignored events more similar, and therefore more difficult to discrim-
inate. Nevertheless, observers could successfully follow one game while ignoring the
other even when both teams wore the same clothing (in fact, the same three players
appeared in each video stream).
In subsequent studies of selective looking, Neisser and his colleagues used this
`basketball-game' task [see Neisser (1979) for a description of several different versions].
In the most famous demonstration, observers attend to one team of players, pressing a
key whenever one of them makes a pass, while ignoring the actions of the other team.
After about 30 s, a woman carrying an open umbrella walks across the screen (this video
was also superimposed on the others so all three events were partially transparent; see
figure 1). She is visible for approximately 4 s before walking off the far end of the screen.
The games then continue for another 25 s before the tape is stopped. Of twenty-eight
naive observers, only six reported the presence of the umbrella woman, even when
questioned directly after the task (Neisser and Dube, cited in Neisser 1979). Interestingly,
when subjects had practice performing the task on two similar trials before the trial with
the unexpected umbrella woman, 48% noticed her. When subjects just watched the
screen and did not perform any task, they always noticed the umbrella woman, a result
consistent with the inattentional-blindness findings reviewed earlier (and with work
on saccade-contingent changes; see Grimes 1996; McConkie and Zola 1979).
Interestingly, Neisser (1979) mentioned an additional study in which the umbrella
woman wore the same-color shirt as either the attended or the unattended team.
Apparently, this feature-similarity manipulation caused little difference in the rate of
noticing. Also, when the unexpected character was a small boy rather than the umbrella
woman, fewer subjects noticed him, and when the umbrella woman stopped her motion
and performed a little dance, more subjects noticed. These latter two findings suggest
that properties of an unattended stimulus can capture attention, even though similarity
to attended stimuli seemed to make little difference. However, these findings must be
evaluated tentatively, because the details of the experimental paradigm were not presented
by Neisser (1979).
Figure 1. A single frame captured from a late-generation video of the umbrella-woman sequence
used by Neisser and colleagues (eg Neisser 1979). The woman is in the center of the image and
her umbrella is white.
Gorillas in our midst 1063
In one of the few published empirical reports with this paradigm, Becklen and
Cervone (1983) examined the effect of eliminating the delay between the umbrella-
woman's appearance and the questioning of subjects. They found no difference in
noticing rates when the entire video was shown (35%) and when the video ended
immediately after the umbrella woman left the scene (33%). Furthermore, performance
was substantially worse when the video ended as the umbrella woman was halfway
across the court (7%), even though that meant that the last image subjects saw
included the umbrella woman. These subjects provided accurate descriptions of the
scene, including details of the player locations, but did not mention an umbrella
woman. Neisser and Rooney (cited in Becklen and Cervone 1983) addressed the same
question by interrupting the action as the umbrella woman was two-thirds of the way
across the screen. Immediately after the interruption, a split screen appeared with the
umbrella woman on one side and a boy holding a soda can on the other; subjects
were asked to pick which they had seen. When the results were corrected for guessing,
only 30% of observers had noticed the umbrella woman, a level comparable to that
shown in postexperiment interviews.
These findings provide important evidence against the notion of `inattentional
amnesia', an alternative account of findings of inattentional blindness and change
blindness. According to this view (Wolfe 1999), the unexpected event is consciously
perceived, but immediately forgotten. Hence, the failure to report its appearance reflects
a failure of memory rather than of perception. In this case, however, even though subjects
are tested immediately after the event, they are no better at detecting it. Further-
more, when people notice the unexpected event in this task, they sometimes smile or
laugh; nonnoticers show no outward signs of detection. The forgetting would have
to be so rapid as to be inseparable from the act of perception to allow any sort of
amnesia to explain these findings.
This early work on selective looking raised a number of questions needing further
study. What role does similarity between the unexpected and attended events play in
detection? Are particularly unusual events more or less likely to be detected? Does task
difficulty increase or decrease detection? Perhaps the most important question left
unanswered in this early work is what role the unusual superimposition of the events
played in causing inattentional blindness. Most cognitive psychologists we have talked
to found these results interesting, but were somewhat less convinced of the importance
of the failures to notice unexpected events. After all, the video superimposition gives
the displays an odd appearance, one not typically experienced in the real world and
one in which the players and the umbrella woman are not as easy to see as they would
be without superimposition.
One more recent study has looked at performance when all of the actors and
the umbrella woman are shot from a single video camera, with no superimposition
(Stoffregen et al 1993). Under these conditions, the players and umbrella woman
occluded each other and the balls. If failures to notice the umbrella woman in earlier
studies resulted from the unnatural appearance of the superimposed version of the
display, performance might be much better with a `live' version. Subjects performed
the task for approximately 30 s before the umbrella woman appeared and walked
across the screen. The camera angle used for this film was much wider than in earlier
studies
ö
it showed an entire regulation basketball court. Consequently, the umbrella
woman was visible for a longer time (12 s) and the players and the umbrella woman
were substantially smaller on screen than in earlier studies. Another notable difference
is that only twelve passes occurred during the 60-s video (rather than 20 ^ 40 as in
earlier studies). Even in this live version of the study, only three of twenty normal
subjects tested reported the presence of the umbrella woman. Although this finding
does suggest that visual superimposition was not the cause of failures of noticing, it did
1064 D J Simons, C F Chabris
not match the stimulus conditions of the other studies and did not directly compare
performance with and without superimposition. The difference in camera angle (and
consequent character size) alone may well have affected detection rates, so this study is
not a well-controlled test of the generalizability of inattentional-blindness phenomena
to more natural stimulus conditions.
Despite the importance of all the unanswered questions raised by these studies, to our
knowledge the findings reviewed above are the only published reports using dynamic,
naturalistic events to study the detection of unexpected objects.
(3)
Taken together, these
studies lead to a number of striking conclusions, some consistent and others inconsis-
tent with findings with simple displays. Unlike the computer-based studies (eg Mack
and Rock 1998; Newby and Rock 1998), the video studies demonstrate that inatten-
tional blindness does not result from attention being focused elsewhere in the display.
In the superimposed version of the display, the umbrella woman occupied exactly the
same spatial position as the attended players and balls. In fact, the balls even passed
through the umbrella woman. This finding is inconsistent with the computer-based
result that detection was better when the unexpected object appeared within the region
defined by the attended object (Mack and Rock 1998). Several factors might account
for this difference. First, there were simply more objects to attend to in the video displays,
so attention may not have stayed on any one location for long. Second, the dynamic
display may have captured and held attention more effectively than the cross task.
Third, the video task may simply have been harder, leaving fewer attentional resources
available to process unanticipated events. These video studies do show that a form of
inattentional blindness can last much longer than the brief exposure times used in recent
static-display studies. Subjects missed ongoing events that lasted for more than 4 s.
Although these differences between the computer-based and video studies are
important, the general similarity of the conclusions is striking. In both cases, observers
often do not see unanticipated objects and events. The video studies suggest that these
findings can help explain real-world phenomena such as our inability to see our friends
in a crowded movie theater or airplanes on an approaching runway when our attention
is focused on a different goal. Both change blindness and inattentional blindness show
that attention plays a critical role in perception and in representation. Without atten-
tion, we often do not see unanticipated events, and even with attention, we cannot
encode and retain all the details of what we see.
Although these video studies of inattentional blindness help to generalize findings
from simple displays to more complex situations, the original reports do not fully examine
all of the critical questions. For example, there is a hint that the visual similarity of
the unexpected object to the attended ones makes no difference, but the details of
that study were never published. Furthermore, the experiments did not systematically
consider the role of task difficulty in detection. Perhaps most importantly, no direct
comparisons were made between performance with the superimposed version of the
display and with the `live' version. In the studies reported here, we attempt to examine
each of these factors. We also consider the nature of the unusual event. To combine
all of these factors orthogonally within a single consistent paradigm, we filmed several
video segments with the same set of actors in the same location on the same day. We
then asked a large number of naive observers to watch the video recordings and later
answer questions about the unexpected events.
(3)
Haines (1989) did address this topic as part of a larger human-interface study. Pilots attempted
to land a plane in a flight simulator while using a head-up display of critical flight information
superimposed on the `windshield'. Under these conditions, some pilots failed to notice that a
plane on the ground was blocking their path. In addition, Mack and Rock (1998) report several
studies in which the unexpected object moved stroboscopically across part of the display, often
without being detected during the 200 ms viewing period.
Gorillas in our midst 1065
2 Method
2.1 Observers
228 observers, almost all undergraduate students, participated in the experiment. Each
observer either volunteered to participate without compensation, received a large candy
bar for participating, or was paid a single fee for participating in a larger testing
session including another, unrelated experiment.
2.2 Materials
Four videotapes, each 75 s in duration, were created. Each tape showed two teams
of three players, one team wearing white shirts and the other wearing black shirts,
who moved around in a relatively random fashion in an open area (approximately 3 m
deep65.2 m wide) in front of a bank of three elevator doors. The members of each
team passed a standard orange basketball to one another in a regular order: player 1
would pass to player 2, who would pass to player 3, who would pass to player 1, and
so on. The passes were either bounce passes or aerial passes; players would also dribble
the ball, wave their arms, and make other movements consistent with their overall
pattern of action, only incidentally looking directly at the camera.
After 44 ^ 48 s of this action, either of two unexpected events occurred: in the
Umbrella-Woman condition, a tall woman holding an open umbrella walked from off
camera on one side of the action to the other, left to right. The actions of the players, and
this unexpected event, were designed to mimic the stimuli used by Neisser and colleagues.
In the Gorilla condition, a shorter woman wearing a gorilla costume that fully covered
her body walked through the action in the same way. In either case, the unexpected
event lasted 5 s, and the players continued their actions during and after the event.
There were two styles of video: in the Transparent condition, the white team, black
team, and unexpected event were all filmed separately, and the three video streams
were rendered partially transparent and then superimposed by using digital video-editing
software. (Neisser and colleagues achieved similar effects using analog equipment or
a physical apparatus that superimposed separate displays by means of mirrors.) In the
Opaque condition, all seven actors were filmed simultaneously and could thus occlude
one another and the basketballs; this required some rehearsal to eliminate collisions and
other accidents, and to achieve natural-looking patterns of movement. All videos were
filmed with an SVHS video camera (Panasonic AG456U) and were digitized and
edited by using a nonlinear digital-editing system (Media 100LX and Adobe Aftereffects,
running on Power Computing hardware). All editing of the videos was accomplished
after digitization, so the degree of signal loss due to multiple generations of editing
was minimized and also equated across conditions. Stimuli were created by mastering
the digitally edited sequences to VHS format tapes. Thus, as shown in figure 2, videos
were created with the following four display types: Transparent/Umbrella Woman,
Transparent/Gorilla, Opaque/Umbrella Woman, and Opaque/Gorilla. The first of these
was most similar to the conditions tested by Neisser and colleagues.
2.3 Procedures
All observers were tested individually and gave informed consent in advance. Before
viewing the videotape, observers were told that they would be watching two teams of
three players passing basketballs and that they should pay attention to either the team
in white (the White condition) or the team in black (the Black condition). They were told
that they should keep either a silent mental count of the total number of passes made
by the attended team (the Easy condition) or separate silent mental counts of the number
of bounce passes and aerial passes made by the attended team (the Hard condition). Thus,
for each of the four displays, there were four task conditions
ö
White/Easy, White/Hard,
Black/Easy, and Black/Hard
ö
for a total of sixteen individual conditions. Each observer
participated in only one condition.
1066 D J Simons, C F Chabris
After viewing the videotape and performing the monitoring task, observers were
immediately asked to write down their count(s) on paper.
(4)
They were then asked to
provide answers to a surprise series of additional questions. (i) While you were doing
the counting, did you notice anything unusual on the video? (ii) Did you notice any-
thing other than the six players? (iii) Did you see anyone else (besides the six players)
appear on the video? (iv) Did you see a gorilla [woman carrying an umbrella] walk
across the screen? After any ``yes'' response, observers were asked to provide details of
what they noticed. If at any point an observer mentioned the unexpected event, the
remaining questions were skipped. After the questioning, observers were asked whether
they had ever previously participated in an experiment similar to this or had ever
heard of such an experiment or the general phenomenon. (Observers who answered
``yes'' were replaced and their data were discarded.) Last, the observer was debriefed;
this included replaying the videotape on request. Each testing session lasted 5 ^ 10 min.
Twenty-one experimenters tested the observers. To ensure uniformity of procedures,
we developed a written protocol in advance and reviewed it with the experimenters before
they began to collect data. This document specified what the experimenters would say to
(4)
Note that in all the Transparent conditions, the correct counts were identical because the
same passing sequences were used to create both of the Transparent display tapes (Umbrella
Woman and Gorilla). In the Opaque conditions, the correct counts varied because the passing
sequences were filmed separately for each of the unexpected events.
Transparent/Umbrella Woman Transparent/Gorilla
Opaque/Umbrella Woman Opaque/Gorilla
Figure 2. Single frames from each of the display tapes used here. (These tapes and that referred to in
figure 3 were in color. These frames are displayed in color on http://www.perceptionweb.com/
perc0999/simons.html andarchivedontheCDROMsuppliedwithissue12ofPerception.)The
transparentconditions(toprow)werecreatedbysuperimposingthreeseparatelyfilmedeventsby
means of digital video editing. The opaque conditions (bottom row) were filmed as a single action
sequencewithallsevenactors.Thisfigureshowsthedisplayforeachconditionhalfwaythroughthe
unexpected event, which lasted for 5 s of the 75-s-long video.
Gorillas in our midst 1067
each observer, when they would say it, how and when they would show the videotape,
how they would collect and record the data, and how they would debrief observers.
Experimenters used a variety of television monitors, ranging from 13 to 36 inches
(diagonal) in screen size to present the videotapes.
3Results
Data from thirty-six observers were discarded for a variety of reasons: either (i) the
observer already knew about the phenomenon and/or experimental paradigm ( n14),
(ii) the observer reported losing count of the passes (n9), (iii) passes were incompletely
or inaccurately recorded (n7), (iv) the observer's answer could not be clearly inter-
preted (n5), or (v) the observer's total pass count was more than three standard
deviations away from the mean of the other observers in that condition ( n1). The
remaining 192 observers were distributed equally across the sixteen conditions of the
2626262design (twelve per condition).
Although we asked a series of questions escalating in specificity to determine whether
observers had noticed the unexpected event, only one observer who failed to report the
event in response to the first question (``did you notice anything unusual?'') reported
the event in response to any of the next three questions (which culminated in ``did you
see a ... walk across the screen?''). Thus, since the responses were nearly always consistent
across all four questions, we will present the results in terms of overall rates of noticing.
Table 1 shows these results for each of the sixteen conditions.
Out of all 192 observers across all conditions, 54% noticed the unexpected event and
46% failed to notice the unexpected event, revealing a substantial level of sustained
inattentional blindness for a dynamic event and confirming the basic results of Neisser
and colleagues. More observers noticed the unexpected event in the Opaque condition
(67%) than in the Transparent condition (42%); w
2
1
12:084,p50:001;n96 per
condition. However, even in the Opaque case, a substantial proportion of observers
(33%) failed to report the event, despite its visibility and the repeated questions about it.
More observers noticed the unexpected event in the Easy (64%) than in the Hard
(45%) condition (w
2
1
6:797,p50:009;n96 per condition). To confirm that these
monitoring tasks differed in difficulty, we calculated the SD of the total pass counts
reported by observers in each condition; the average SD was 2.71 in the eight
Easy conditions and 6.77 in the eight Hard conditions, indicating that the Hard moni-
toring task was indeed more difficult. Accordingly, the correlation across conditions
between the frequency of noticing (shown in table 1) and the SD of the total pass
count was rÿ0:56. The effect of task difficulty was greater in the Transparent condi-
tions (Easy 56%, Hard 27%; w
2
1
8:400,p50:004;n48 per condition) than in the
Table 1. Percentage of subjects noticing the unexpected event in each condition. Each row corre-
sponds to one of the four video display types. Columns are grouped by monitoring task and
attended team (White or Black). In the Easy task, subjects counted the total number of passes
made by the attended team. In the Hard task, subjects maintained separate simultaneous counts
of the aerial and bounce passes made by the attended team.
Easy task Hard task
White team Black team White team Black team
Transparent
Umbrella Woman 58 92 33 42
Gorilla 8 67 8 25
Opaque
Umbrella Woman 100 58 83 58
Gorilla 42 83 50 58
1068 D J Simons, C F Chabris
Opaque conditions (Easy 71%, Hard 62%; w
2
1
0:750,p50:386;n48 per condition),
suggesting a multiplicative effect on residual attention capacity of tracking difficult-to-
see stimuli and keeping two running counts in working memory.
Next we examined differences in the detection of the two unexpected events. The
Umbrella Woman was noticed more often than the Gorilla overall (65% versus 44%;
w
2
1
8:392,p50:004;n96 per condition). This relation held regardless of the video
type, monitoring task, or attended team, suggesting that the Umbrella Woman was
either a more visually salient event than the Gorilla,
(5)
more consistent with observers'
expectations about situations involving basketballs, more semantically similar to the
attended events, or all three. However, when observers attended to the actions of the
Black team, they noticed the Gorilla much more often than when they attended to
the actions of the White team (Black 58%, White 27%; w
2
1
9:579,p50:002;n48
per condition). By contrast, attending the Black team versus the White team made
little difference in noticing the Umbrella Woman (Black 62%, White 69%; w
2
1
0:416,
p50:519;n48 per condition). The Gorilla was black, whereas the Umbrella Woman
wore pale colors that differed from both the Black and the White team. Thus, contrary to
the suggestion of Neisser (1979), it appears that observers are more likely to notice an
unexpected event that shares basic visual features
ö
in this case, color
ö
with the events
they are attending to. In a sense, this effect is the opposite of the traditional `pop-out'
phenomenon in visual search tasks, which occurs when an item that differs in basic
visual features from the rest of the display is easier to notice and identify.
It is possible that subjects who lost count of the passes would be most likely to notice
the unexpected event. This is unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, subjects who
reported losing count were replaced prior to data analysis. Second, we calculated the
point-biserial correlation rbetween noticing (coded as 1 for reporting and 0 for not
reporting the event) and the subject's absolute deviation from an accurate pass count
(measured as the number of passes above or below the correct range) for each condi-
tion except the Opaque/Umbrella-Woman/White/Easy condition, which engendered
100% noticing. Across these fifteen conditions the correlations averaged to r0:15,
suggesting that noticing was not strongly associated with counting poorly or inattentively.
4 Discussion
Our findings have replicated, generalized, and extended the surprising result first
reported by Neisser and colleagues (Bahrick et al 1981; Becklen and Cervone 1983;
Littman and Becklen 1976; Neisser 1979; Neisser and Becklen 1975; Rooney et al 1981;
Stoffregen et al 1993; Stoffregen and Becklen 1989), and have demonstrated a robust
phenomenon of sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. In particular, we
have shown the following.
(i) Approximately half of observers fail to notice an ongoing and highly salient but
unexpected event while they are engaged in a primary monitoring task. This extends
the phenomenon of inattentional blindness (eg Mack and Rock 1998) by at least an
order of magnitude in the duration of the event that can be missed. To stretch this limit
further, we tested a longer and more salient unexpected event in an additional condi-
tion not reported above. In a separate Opaque-style video recording, the Gorilla
walked from right to left into the live basketball-passing event, stopped in the middle
of the players as the action continued all around it, turned to face the camera,
thumped its chest, and then resumed walking across the screen (this action began
after 35 s and lasted 9 s in a stimulus tape 62 s long; see figure 3 for a still frame).
(5)
Visual salience, here, could refer to the relative distinctiveness of the unexpected objects in
relation to the other players or to the background of the scene. Furthermore, the Umbrella
Woman may have been spatially more distinctive in that her umbrella extended above the heads
of the other players whereas the Gorilla was the same height as the other players.
Gorillas in our midst 1069
Twelve new observers
(6)
watched this video while attending to the White team and
engaging in the Easy monitoring task; only 50% noticed the event. This is roughly the
same as the percentage that noticed the normal Opaque/Gorilla-walking event (42%)
under the same task conditions.
(ii) This sustained inattentional blindness occurs more frequently if the display is trans-
parent, with actors seeming to move through each other (as used in earlier studies),
but observers often miss even fully visible objects appearing in live-action opaque dis-
plays. This latter finding is contrary to the intuitions of researchers who believed that
the original effect was due to the unusual nature of the transparent video, and provides
further evidence that inattentional blindness is a ubiquitous perceptual phenomenon
rather than an artifact of particular display conditions.
(iii) The level of inattentional blindness depends on the difficulty of the primary task;
in principle, inattentional blindness in this paradigm could be continuously varied by
appropriately manipulating the difficulty of the monitoring task.
(iv) Observers are more likely to notice unexpected events if these events are visually
similar to the events they are paying attention to. (On the basis of our results it is
logically possible that dissimilarity to the ignored events is instead the crucial factor.)
(v) Objects can pass through the spatial extent of attentional focus (and the fovea)
and still not be `seen' if they are not specifically being attended. This conclusion is
consistent with Mack and Rock's (1998) finding that observers often fail to notice a
bar or square moving stroboscopically across fixation during a 200 ms display. In
each of our videotapes, the unexpected object more than once crossed the path of the
basketball and/or a player throwing or catching the ball, the observers would have had
to pay attention to both of those elements of the display to perform the monitoring task.
In most respects, the results of this study are consistent with computer-based studies
of inattentional blindness. Observers fail to report unexpected, suprathreshold objects
when they are engaged in another task. Both sets of findings are consistent with the
Figure 3. A single frame from an additional experimental condition in which the gorilla stopped
in the middle of the display, turned to face the camera, thumped its chest, and then continued
walking across the field of view. Subjects performed the Easy monitoring task while attending
to the White team, and the noticing rate was similar to that in the corresponding condition
with the standard (shorter) Opaque/Gorilla event.
(6)
Data from two additional observers were discarded, one because he already knew about the
effect, the other because his answer could not be clearly interpreted.
1070 D J Simons, C F Chabris
claim that there is no conscious perception without attention. The consistency of the
theoretical conclusions that can be drawn from these two radically different paradigms
is reassuring. Whether the unexpected object is flashed for 200 ms in an otherwise empty
display or it moves dynamically across a natural scene for 5 s, observers are unlikely to
notice it if attention is otherwise engaged. This consistency suggests that the results of
computer-based studies of inattentional blindness can and do generalize to situations
closer to our real-world experiences.
The results of our experiments also call to mind recent findings from research on
change blindness. Many studies of change blindness focus on simple displays of letters
or dots to determine how little information is preserved from one view to the next.
More recently, change-blindness research has moved from using simple displays of letters,
dots, and words (eg Pashler 1988; Phillips 1974) to more complex, naturalistic displays
for which more information is available for selection (see Simons and Levin 1997 for
a review). Given the simplicity and relative meaninglessness of the simple displays, the
generalizability of the results to more naturalistic viewing conditions was not certain
(see Simons 2000, for discussion). The recent thrust of work on change blindness has
been to examine whether the inferences drawn from work with simple displays will hold
for more natural displays. One dramatic demonstration was at least partly responsible for
this move toward increased naturalism. When viewing photographs of natural scenes in
preparation for a memory test, people missed large, meaningful changes that occurred
during eye movements (Grimes 1996). For example, observers often failed to notice
when two people in a photograph exchanged hats or even when they exchanged heads.
These findings have been replicated in subsequent work on saccade-contingent changes
(Currie et al 1995; Henderson and Hollingworth, in press; McConkie and Currie 1996).
This change blindness for natural scenes has been extended to a number of other
paradigms. For example, when an original and modified image are presented in rapid
alternation with a blank screen interposed between them, observers have great difficulty
detecting changes (Rensink et al 1997). This `flicker' technique shows that change blind-
ness is not limited to saccade-contingent changes. In the case of saccade-contingent
changes, the blur on the retina caused by the eye movement itself leads to suppres-
sion of visual processing during the change, thereby preventing detection of any local
transients. The blank screen in the flicker study has essentially the same effect, producing
a global change signal that prevents detection of the local one caused by the change.
Similar change blindness has been shown for changes across cuts or pans in motion
pictures (Levin and Simons 1997; Simons 1996), eye blinks (O'Regan et al 2000), and
`mud splashes' (O'Regan et al 1999). As noted earlier, even when one conversation
partner is replaced by a different person during a brief interruption, observers often
fail to notice the change (Simons and Levin 1998).
As in studies of inattentional blindness, the likelihood of change detection depends
on the focus of attention. In studies of inattentional blindness, when observers are
attending to another object or event, they are less likely to notice the unexpected event.
In studies of change detection, people are better able to report changes to attended
than unattended objects. For example, people are faster to detect changes in the flicker
paradigm when the changed object is of central interest in the scene (Rensink et al
1997). Central objects are more likely to garner attentional resources, and if we have
a limited capacity for holding information across views, changes to objects that receive
more effortful processing are more likely to be detected (see Rensink 2000; Scholl 2000).
Just as we often fail to perceive unexpected events, we often fail to notice unexpected
changes to the visual details of our environment
ö
in both cases, this applies even when
attention is focused on the area of the event or change.
Although the theoretical conclusions drawn from real-world studies are not altogether
different from those derived from work with simple displays, they do show that change
Gorillas in our midst 1071
blindness is a general property of the visual system and that it applies to almost all
aspects of visual processing. We apparently do not retain a detailed visual representation
of our surroundings from one view to the next, even for displays with all the richness of
natural scenes. Similarly, studies of sustained inattentional blindness suggest that we
fail to perceive unexpected objects even under naturalistic viewing conditions.
The results of our studies of sustained inattentional blindness, however, do contrast
in an interesting way with those of one recent change-blindness study (Simons et al, in
preparation). In that experiment, a female experimenter dressed in athletic clothing
and carrying a basketball approaches a passerby in public and asks directions to a
gym. During this interaction, a crowd of confederates walked between the two and
surreptitiously took the basketball away. When asked if they noticed anything changed
or anything different about her appearance, a minority of observers reported noticing
that the basketball was gone. But when asked a follow-up question specifically referring
to the basketball, most of the remaining observers `remembered' the basketball and were
able to describe its unusual coloring. Thus, a visual change can be encoded but not
explicitly reported until a specific retrieval cue is provided. In the experiment reported
here, however, not one of the eighty-eight nonnoticers `remembered' the Gorilla or
Umbrella-Woman events when specifically asked about it, and several did not believe
that the event had happened until the videotape was replayed for them.
While there are several important differences between these paradigms that could
account for this difference in behavior, they share the feature that a condition of
inattention was created (by the conversation in the basketball disappearance study or
by the monitoring task here) that apparently prevented many observers from becoming
aware of a salient visual change. Perhaps the crucial difference is that whereas the
conversation simply reduced the observer's attention by drawing it away from the
critical object, the monitoring task in this study required observers to attend to one
event while ignoring another that was happening in the same region of space. This
`directed ignoring' could inhibit perception of not just the ignored event but of all
unattended events, thereby preventing the formation of an explicit memory trace.
Whether inattentional blindness occurs because the target is similar to the intentionally
ignored items or different from the attended items is an open question that would be
relatively difficult to explore by using video-based displays but could be explored by
using more controlled computer-based tasks.
One alternative interpretation of our findings is that subjects did consciously perceive
the unexpected object, however briefly, but immediately forgot they had seen it (Wolfe
1999). Although this inattentional-amnesia explanation can in principle account for our
findings, it seems less plausible that the inattentional-blindness account for a number
of reasons. First, detecting unusual objects or events would be a useful function for a
visual system to have; immediately forgetting them would defeat this purpose. This is
especially true for a prolonged, dynamic event. Given that the unexpected object in
our experiments was available for further examination (something that was less true of
earlier studies with briefly flashed objects), we might expect observers to try to verify
their percept in these studies, thereby leading to a preserved representation. Furthermore,
if observers did consciously perceive and then forget the gorilla, they presumably would
not be particularly surprised when asked if there had been a gorilla in the display. Yet,
observers in our study were consistently surprised when they viewed the display a second
time, some even exclaiming, ``I missed that?!'' It seems more parsimonious to assume that
observers were never aware of the unexpected object than to assume that they saw a
gorilla, then forgot about it, and then were shocked to see it when told to look for it. Last,
as noted earlier, Becklen and Cervone (1983) found no improvement in noticing when the
video was stopped immediately after the unexpected event rather than several seconds
later. However, finding a direct test to distinguish between never perceiving an object and
1072 D J Simons, C F Chabris
immediately forgetting it will be difficult because the inattentional-amnesia proponents
could always argue that the memory test came too late. Thus, it may not be possible to
distinguish empirically between the amnesia and the blindness explanations.
Although our findings suggest that unexpected events are often overlooked, the
question of whether they leave an implicit trace remains open. Unnoticed stimuli in the
static-inattentional-blindness paradigm can lead to priming effects (Mack and Rock
1998). However, those experiments did not require subjects to ignore anything. Neisser
and colleagues found that subjects under the conditions we have described as directed
ignoring were no more likely to select the unexpected object in a two-alternative
forced-choice recognition test than were other subjects when asked to report it directly
(Neisser and Rooney 1982, as cited in Becklen and Cervone 1983). However, forced choice
may not be as sensitive as other implicit memory tests. Future research should explore
the issues of preserved representations and directed ignoring within the sustained-
inattentional-blindness paradigm we have reintroduced here.
Acknowledgements. Many thanks to all of the people who helped with filming the videos or
collecting the data for this study: Jennifer Shephard (Umbrella Woman), Elisa Cheng (Gorilla),
Judith Danovitch, Steve Most, Alex Wong (White team), Amy DeIpolyi, Jason Jay, Megan White
(Black team), Dan Ellard, Samantha Glass, Jeremy Gray, Sara Greene, Annya Hernandez, Orville
Jackson, Latanya James, David Marx, Steve Mitroff, Carolyn Racine, Kathy Richards, Chris Russell,
Laurie Santos, Steve Stose, Ojas Tejani, Dan Tristan, Amy Wiseman, Leah Wittenberg, and Amir
Zarrinpar (data collection, in alphabetical order). Thanks also to M J Wraga for suggesting the
first part of the title of this article, to Brian Scholl for discovering the Ba
¨lint quotation, to Dick
Neisser for inspiration and for giving permission to produce figure 1, to Larry Taylor for helping
to avoid collisions during the filming of the videos, and especially to Jerry Kagan for lending us his
gorilla suit. Additional thanks to Steve Most, Brian Scholl, two anonymous reviewers, and everyone
else who commented on earlier versions of this manuscript and presentations of these results.
Miniaturized and abbreviated versions of the videos used in this study are available, in QuickTime
format, via the Internet at: http://coglab.wjh.harvard.edu/gorilla/index.html. No animals were
harmed during the making of the videos.
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ß 1999 a Pion publication
1074 D J Simons, C F Chabris
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... L'attention très focalisée sur un objet, espace ou événement spécifique tend à rendre des stimuli inattendus moins remarquables 23 . Les chercheurs ont étudié le phénomène de cécité inattentionnelle qui se produit lorsqu'une personne accomplit une tâche difficile ou anticipe un stimulus A particulier et ne détecte pas un stimulus B qui se trouve pourtant dans son champ de perception (Mack et Rock, 1998 ;Simons et Chabris, 1999). Plusieurs facteurs interviennent dans ce processus de non-perception : la remarquabilité du stimulus inattendu, la charge cognitive qu'implique la tâche dans laquelle l'individu est engagé, le degré d'anticipation qui prédétermine la focalisation et enfin la capacité d'attention qui varie en fonction de la charge cognitive, de la fatigue, de l'âge, etc. Il est d'autant plus difficile de réaliser ce qui se passe en dehors de notre champ d'attention que nous n'arrivons pas à percevoir les différents éléments d'une scène de manière simultanée, mais nous les identifions les uns après les autres pour ensuite reconstruire la scène (Treisman et Schmidt, 1982). ...
Thesis
L’écriture est une des habiletés les plus complexes à acquérir et repose sur plusieurs processus : psychomoteur, cognitif, sensori-moteur, attentionnel. Sa maîtrise se caractérise par la capacité de tracer de manière fluide et précise des formes graphiques lisibles et rationalisées, les lettres. L’objectif de ce travail de thèse est de comprendre comment l’activité attentionnelle permet au scripteur de diriger, coordonner et moduler les différentes composantes de sa pratique. Plus spécifiquement, nous cherchons à saisir comment l’activité sensori-motrice, l’activité cognitive et l’activité attentionnelle se co-déterminent et permettent au scripteur de vivre sa pratique comme une succession de prises de conscience émergeant de son propre engagement. Pour ce faire, nous adoptons une démarche d’investigation en première personne qui nous permet d’étudier le contenu de l’expérience vécue, au sens où celle-ci constitue une dimension nécessaire à la compréhension des processus cognitifs en général, et de l’activité attentionnelle en particulier. Nous avons adopté les outils théoriques et méthodologiques développés par le programme de recherche « cours d’action » pour interroger le scripteur et collecter des descriptions détaillées de son expérience vécue. L’analyse de ces données nous permet de qualifier l’attention au regard de l’organisation et de la signification d’une pratique, la calligraphie, qui n’est pas simplement exécutée et figée mais qui est continuellement reconstruite, adaptée, redéfinie par l’engagement de l’individu dans une situation prolongeant une histoire et une culture qui lui sont propres. La vision longitudinale que nous développons révèle que l’attention est vécue comme la combinaison d’un ensemble de gestes intérieurs qui permettent au scripteur de mettre en rapport de façon spécifique les différentes composantes de son expérience. La dynamique de ces structures est caractérisée par un processus constant d’hybridation et de ramification de l’activité attentionnelle qui débouche sur la constitution de régularités que l’on peut assimiler à des techniques. La maîtrise du tracé calligraphique repose sur l’émergence de techniques attentionnelles correspondant à un type de savoir-faire.
... Already referred to above (Section 'Selfmodels, language and MR'), change blindness is the failure of individuals to notice stranger substitution in a social interaction (Simons and Levin 1998). A similar and perhaps more dramatic example is the failure to see unexpected but salient objects or stimuli, such as the presence of an individual dressed in a gorilla costume in a task where participants watched a video in which people dressed in either white or black passed around basket balls and the viewer was given the task of counting the number of passes between the participants in white (Simons and Chabris 1999). These outcomes are not associated with vision defects or deficits but result from a verbally directed increase in attentional focus on one aspect of a scene at the expense of other salient aspects. ...
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Recent information technologies such as virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) allow the creation of simulated sensory worlds with which we can interact. Using programming language, digital details can be overlaid onto displays of our environment, confounding what is real and what has been artificially engineered. Natural language, particularly the use of direct verbal suggestion (DVS) in everyday and hypnotic contexts, can also manipulate the meaning and significance of objects and events in ourselves and others. In this review, we focus on how socially rewarding language can construct and influence reality. Language is symbolic, automatic and flexible and can be used to augment bodily sensations e.g. feelings of heaviness in a limb or suggest a colour that is not there. We introduce the term ‘suggested reality’ (SR) to refer to the important role that language, specifically DVS, plays in constructing, maintaining and manipulating our shared reality. We also propose the term edited reality to encompass the wider influence of information technology and linguistic techniques that results in altered subjective experience and review its use in clinical settings, while acknowledging its limitations. We develop a cognitive model indicating how the brain’s central executive structures use our personal and linguistic-based narrative in subjective awareness, arguing for a central role for language in DVS. A better understanding of the characteristics of VR, AR and SR and their applications in everyday life, research and clinical settings can help us to better understand our own reality and how it can be edited.
... However, it can retain information for only a few seconds (Mayer, 2010;Eriksson et al., 2015). Because only information that rises to awareness can enter the domain of the WM, most of the information entering SM vanishes and only a small portion of the sensory information enters the domain of WM (Simons and Chabris, 1999). CLT assumes that WM displays a limited capacity in dealing with complex, novel, and unorganized information elements obtained through SM. ...
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The COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented and highly threatening, constrained, and confusing social and educational environment, we decided to expand the traditional focus of the extraneous load in Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) acknowledging the psychological environment in which learning occurs. We therefore adapted and implemented principles of the CLT to reduce extraneous load for our students by facilitating their educational activities. Given previous empirical support for the principles of CLT, it was expected that the adoption of these principles might enable our students to cultivate attitudes and skills across multiple domains such as online learning and presentation technologies, implementing and maintaining a "classroom atmosphere" in a virtual environment, participating in discussions among large online groups of students, facilitating group work, providing virtual office hours for students, and proactively planning for upcoming semesters.
... Η επιστημονική θέση σχετικά με αυτό που 'αποθηκεύεται' στον εγκέφαλό μας για την κατάσταση των πραγμάτων στον κόσμο σε κάθε στιγμή είναι πως συλλαμβάνουμε μόνο μια ελάχιστη ποσότητα πληροφορίας από το περιβάλλον μας η οποία, εντούτοις, συνήθως είναι επαρκής και κατάλληλη για να φέρουμε σε πέρας το έργο που πρέπει να επιτελεστεί (ο.π.). Αυτός ο λειτουργικός χαρακτήρας της αντίληψης συνδέεται με την προσοχή καθώς, όπως έχουν καταδείξει oι γνωσιακοί επιστήμονες και ψυχολόγοι, η συνειδητή αντίληψη απαιτεί προσοχή, και μάλιστα εστιασμένη (focused attention) (λ.χ., Rensink et al., 1997;Simons & Chabris, 1999). Ταυτόχρονα, όμως, ο 'μηχανισμός' της προσοχής στον οποίο βασίζεται η οπτική αντίληψη εμπλέκει ορισμένους περιορισμούς, καθώς και πλάνες. ...
... A difficult task, such as reading for comprehension, however, requires more cognitive resources and deeper information processing, leaving a limited amount of attention for processing advertisements. Moreover, several studies have reported that viewers whose attention is focused on a relevant task may fail to notice a salient unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus (e.g., Downing, Bray, Rogers, and Childs, 2004;Mack and Rock, 1998;Most et al., 2001;Newby and Rock, 1998;Simons and Chabris, 1999). ...
... This study is designed to use an inattentional blindness (IB) test to explore the location effect in a classroom for teachers' detection of offseat behaviours. The purpose of the IB test is to assess an individual's ability to recognize unexpected events while concentrating on cognitively demanding tasks that need close attention (Mack and Rock, 1998;Simons and Chabris, 1999). The results of the study would increase our understanding of the location effect in classrooms that is related to teachers' attention. ...
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Off-seat behaviour refers to students leaving their seats and walking out of a classroom without the teacher noticing. This behaviour occurs in special education for students with certain special needs, which would lead to serious safety problems. This study carried out an inattentional blindness test to explore whether the location of seats in classrooms would impact teachers’ detection rate regarding off-seat behaviours. The participants were 126 pre-service teachers (Mage = 18.72 ± 0.723; 92% female) who were invited to perform the primary task of counting students raising their hands up whilst the disappearance of one of the students was introduced as an unexpected occurrence. The results show that peripheral seats were more detectable than the central ones for the teachers to notice the “missing student.” Meanwhile, the left and below oriented seats were more likely to be ignored compared to those that were right and upper oriented. These results suggest the existence of a location effect in the classroom that is associated with teachers’ attention regarding off-seat behaviour. This study has implications for classroom management in terms of arranging students’ seats appropriately to assist in increasing teachers’ identification of this hazard.
Chapter
In this chapter, we propose the foundations of a new field, perception engineering, to unify and guide XR research in human perception. The key idea is that designing, creating, implementing, and analyzing perceptual illusions themselves are the engineering focus, rather than devices. Perception engineering follows a dynamical systems approach to the human–XR device pairing by leveraging techniques from mathematical modeling, perceptual psychology, neuroscience, and robotics to better understand how the perceptual experience itself may be engineered. We then give attention to the current state and potential shortcomings of human perception and XR research, and set goals for the field to aspire toward best practices, inclusivity, and open‐source modular technology.
Thesis
The use of magic effects in comparative cognition provides a powerful tool to investigate how diverse species perceive the world around them, by focusing on their shared psychological constraints rather than their cognitive prowess. In this thesis I explore how humans and non-human animals experience these techniques, and some of the nuances moderating this experience. After introducing the Science of Magic and proposing magic as a tool to investigate cognition in non-human animals in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 explore how multifaceted is the human experience of magic effects. In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how experience deceiving others using similar techniques moderate the expectations necessary to be misled by these effects, as expert magicians do not display the same biases when observing sleight of hand effects than typical observers. Chapter 3 shows how the order in which magic effects are presented within a routine moderate how the human audience will perceive the skill of the magician performing it. As a first step towards creating a Comparative Science of Magic, Chapter 4 reviews the similarities and differences in how both human and non-human audiences experience magic effects, evaluates the evolution of the craft by reviewing the deception tactics of non-human animals, and offers insight into the use of magic effects in the lab by reviewing potential candidates for such an endeavour. Chapter 5 takes inspiration from a well-known magic effect and uses it to investigate how Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) experience illusions. Eurasian jays are sensitive to similar illusions that humans are, and this sensitivity is moderated by different nuances such as the type of effect (i.e., either negative or positive), or the social status of the avian observer. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 provide comparisons of how diverse species with dissimilar anatomies and visual systems experience methodologically distinct sleight of hand effects. Both chapters provide evidence that anatomical ability and experience performing an action moderate how the pantomime movement of this action will be perceived. Alongside this, all species tested experienced the effect capitalising on fast motions similarly to each other regardless of their significant differences in their visual system, thus suggesting a convergently evolved blind spot or a product of common decent. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this thesis and discusses the implications for the evolution of these nuances. Overall, the evidence presented in this thesis further reinforces the power and insight that using magic effects in psychology can apport in reference to the innerworkings and evolution of the human and the non-human mind.
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A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-termi-nating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found to be about five items, a value comparable to estimates of attentional capacity. Observers were able to filter out both static and dynamic variations in irrelevant properties. Analysis also indi-cated a memory for previously attended locations. These results support the hypothesis that the process needed to detect change is much the same as the attentional process needed to detect complex static pat-terns. Interestingly, the features of orientation and polarity were found to be han-dled in somewhat different ways. Taken together, these results not only provide evidence that focused attention is needed to see change, but also show that change detection itself can provide new insights into the nature of attentional processing.
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When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided, showing that poor visibility is not the cause of this difficulty. Identification is also faster for objects mentioned in brief verbal descriptions of the scene. These results support the idea that observers never form a complete, detailed representation of their surroundings. In addition, results also indicate that attention is required to perceive change, and that in the absence of localized motion signals it is guided on the basis of high-level interest. To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236170014_To_see_or_not_to_see_The_need_for_attention_to_perceive_changes_in_scenes [accessed Jun 15, 2017].
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In shadowing one of two simultaneous messages presented dichotically, subjects are unable to report any of the content of the rejected message. Even if the rejected message consists of a short list of simple words repeated many times, a recognition test fails to reveal any trace of the list. If numbers are interpolated in prose passages presented for dichotic shadowing, no more are recalled from the rejected messages if the instructions are specifically to remember numbers than if the instructions are general: a specific set for numbers will not break through the attentional barrier set up in this task. The only stimulus so far found that will break through this barrier is the subject's own name. It is probably only material “important” to the subject that will break through the barrier.
Chapter
The ability to detect accurately, recognize, and extract useful information from two superimposed sources of visual information at the same time is of both theoretical and practical interest. The scientific literature in such areas as the psychology of attentional processes, cognitive processing, sensory channel capacity, and other fields contains numerous such studies. Among them are the early auditory perception research of Broadbent (1952, 1958) in which he proposed a single-channel filter theory of information processing, Treisman’s (1960) modified sequential processing model involving a two-stage filter, and Deutsch and Deutsch’s (1963) preattentive parallel processing model. Most past visual research employed simple stimuli (point light sources, simple geometric shapes, etc.). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of information transfer using more complex, real-life stimulus fields demanded further study from the standpoint of helping to design modern instrumentation for commercial turbojet airplane flight.
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This paper describes a number of objective experiments on recognition, concerning particularly the relation between the messages received by the two ears. Rather than use steady tones or clicks (frequency or time‐point signals) continuous speech is used, and the results interpreted in the main statistically. Two types of test are reported: (a) the behavior of a listener when presented with two speech signals simultaneously (statistical filtering problem) and (b) behavior when different speech signals are presented to his two ears.
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When two scenes are alternately displayed, separated by a mask, even large, repeated changes between the scenes often go unnoticed for surprisingly long durations. Change blindness of this sort is attenuated at “centres of interest” in the scenes, however, supporting a theory of change blindness in which attention is necessary to perceive such changes (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). Problems with this measure of attentional selection - via verbally described “centres of interest” - are discussed, including worries about describability and explanatory impotence. Other forms of attentional selection, not subject to these problems, are employed in a “flicker” experiment to test the attention-based theory of change detection. Attenuated change blindness is observed at attended items when attentional selection is realized via involuntary exogenous capture of visual attention - to late-onset items and colour singletons - even when these manipulations are uncorrelated with the loci of the changes, and are thus irrelevant to the change detection task. These demonstrations ground the attention-based theory of change blindness in a type of attentional selection which is understood more rigorously than are “centres of interest”. At the same time, these results have important implications concerning the nature of exogenous attentional capture.