Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing

Abstract

The authors argued that emotions characterized by certainty appraisals promote heuristic processing, whereas emotions characterized by uncertainty appraisals result in systematic processing. The 1st experiment demonstrated that the certainty associated with an emotion affects the certainty experienced in subsequent situations. The next 3 experiments investigated effects on processing of emotions associated with certainty and uncertainty. Compared with emotions associated with uncertainty, emotions associated with certainty resulted in greater reliance on the expertise of a source of a persuasive message in Experiment 2, more stereotyping in Experiment 3, and less attention to argument quality in Experiment 4. In contrast to previous theories linking valence and processing, these findings suggest that the certainty appraisal content of emotions is also important in determining whether people engage in systematic or heuristic processing.

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ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION
Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of
Specific Emotions on Information Processing
Larissa Z. Tiedens and Susan Linton
Stanford University
The authors argued that emotions characterized by certainty appraisals promote heuristic processing,
whereas emotions characterized by uncertainty appraisals result in systematic processing. The 1st
experiment demonstrated that the certainty associated with an emotion affects the certainty experienced
in subsequent situations. The next 3 experiments investigated effects on processing of emotions
associated with certainty and uncertainty. Compared with emotions associated with uncertainty, emotions
associated with certainty resulted in greater reliance on the expertise of a source of a persuasive message
in Experiment 2, more stereotyping in Experiment 3, and less attention to argument quality in Experi-
ment 4. In contrast to previous theories linking valence and processing, these findings suggest that the
certainty appraisal content of emotions is also important in determining whether people engage in
systematic or heuristic processing.
An extensive and growing body of research has examined the
effects of emotions, moods, and affect on judgment and informa-
tion processing (for reviews, see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway,
1994;
Fiedler, 1988, 2000; Forgas, 1995; Martin, 2000; Rusting,
1998;
Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
Although some studies document the influences of affect that are
relevant to the target of emotion, (i.e., integral affect), most studies
have sought to understand the influence of irrelevant, or incidental,
affect on cognition. Investigations of incidental affect have mainly
examined the effects of moods induced in one situation on cogni-
tion in another situation using a dual process framework (e.g.,
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In
general, participants in these studies are induced to feel positive or
negative affect and then are given a task in which their depth of
processing can be inferred. The majority of findings within this
domain suggest that people engage in more systematic processing
when in negative emotional states or moods, whereas people in
positive moods or emotional states engage in more heuristic pro-
cessing (Batra & Stayman, 1990; Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, &
Strack, 1990; Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992; Mackie &
Worth, 1989, 1991; Murray, Surjan, Hirt, & Surjan, 1990;
Larissa Z. Tiedens and Susan Linton, Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University.
This research was supported by the Stanford Graduate School of Busi-
ness.
Many thanks go to Javier Barraza, Sandra Berg, Arthur Lauer, and
Joanna Leavitt for their assistance with data collection. We are also grateful
to Dacher Keltner, Colin Leach, Jennifer Lerner, Norbert Schwarz, Maia
Young, and Eileen Zurbriggen for helpful comments.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Larissa
Z.
Tiedens, Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford
University, Stanford, California 94305-5015. Electronic mail may be sent
to tiedens_larissa@gsb.stanford.edu.
Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz et al., 1991; Sinclair, 1988; Sinclair &
Mark, 1992; Worth & Mackie, 1987; however, see Isen, 1993;
Parrott & Sabini, 1990; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995, for
exceptions).
Existing explanations for the incidental mood and processing
findings, which include those based on capacity, motivation, and
information, stipulate that the information processing conse-
quences arise from the valence of the affective state. Capacity
explanations are based on associative network theories and suggest
that because positive affect is associated with so many conceptual
nodes,
it creates a state of cognitive busyness (Mackie & Worth,
1991).
Motivational explanations focus on the desire to avoid
negative states, arguing that systematic and careful thinking is
necessary to find the means to reduce negative experiences (Bless
et al., 1990; Clark & Isen, 1982; Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener
et al., 1995). Informational explanations posit that people use their
affective states as signals about the current situation or about their
judgment. The "affect as information" approach argues that the
experience of negative affect indicates a threat to the achievement
of desired goals and, thus, that the situation calls for systematic
and attentive processing, whereas positive affect signals that the
situation is safe and, thus, general knowledge constructs are a
sufficient basis for judgment (Bless, 2000; Bless et al., 1996;
Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Similarly, the "mood as
input" approach contends that positive affect signals that one has
sufficient information to make a judgment. Thus, when a person's
goal is accurate judgment or decision making, that person will look
to his or her mood as an indicator of whether he or she knows
enough (Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996; Martin,
Abend, Sedikides, & Green, 1997; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer,
1993).
Although these approaches postulate different mechanisms,
they all stipulate that the valence (i.e., the subjective positivity or
negativity associated with the emotion) of the affective state is
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 2001. Vol. 81, No. 6. 973-988
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