Article

A Bird's Eye View: Biological Categorization and Reasoning Within and Across Cultures

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Abstract

Many psychological studies of categorization and reasoning use undergraduates to make claims about human conceptualization. Generalizability of findings to other populations is often assumed but rarely tested. Even when comparative studies are conducted, it may be challenging to interpret differences. As a partial remedy, in the present studies we adopt a 'triangulation strategy' to evaluate the ways expertise and culturally different belief systems can lead to different ways of conceptualizing the biological world. We use three groups (US bird experts, US undergraduates, and ordinary Itza' Maya) and two sets of birds (North American and Central American). Categorization tasks show considerable similarity among the three groups' taxonomic sorts, but also systematic differences. Notably, US expert categorization is more similar to Itza' than to US novice categorization. The differences are magnified on inductive reasoning tasks where only undergraduates show patterns of judgment that are largely consistent with current models of category-based taxonomic inference. The Maya commonly employ causal and ecological reasoning rather than taxonomic reasoning. Experts use a mixture of strategies (including causal and ecological reasoning), only some of which current models explain. US and Itza' informants differed markedly when reasoning about passerines (songbirds), reflecting the somewhat different role that songbirds play in the two cultures. The results call into question the importance of similarity-based notions of typicality and central tendency in natural categorization and reasoning. These findings also show that relative expertise leads to a convergence of thought that transcends cultural boundaries and shared experiences.

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... En cambio, las personas con una experiencia más íntima y extensa con la naturaleza muestran no solo sistemas taxonómicos, sino también sistemas que resaltan las relaciones ecológicas entre las entidades de su entorno natural (ej. Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006). Tal es el caso de los pueblos indígenas, quienes históricamente y, aún en nuestros días, viven en un contacto cotidiano con la naturaleza y su relación con el mundo natural es bien diferente al de poblaciones urbanas apartadas de este (Escobar, 1998). ...
... Finalmente, se indagó en los cambios de la organización conceptual de los animales de monte a través del desarrollo, teniendo en cuenta tres grupos de edad: niñxs de 5-6 años, niñxs de 10-11 años y adultxs. Se trabajó con una tarea de clasificación en base a la utilizada en estudios previos Bailenson et al., 2002;Coley et al., 1997;López et al., 1997;Lynch et al., 2000;Medin et al., 1997Medin et al., , 2002Medin et al., , 2006, adaptada a la perspectiva cultural y a la lengua wichí. Los participantes agruparon fotografías de los tshotoy (ver Figura 1) de acuerdo a cómo pensaban que estaban juntos por naturaleza, en numerosas rondas de clasificación, tantas veces como quisieran, y justificaron el motivo de cada agrupamiento. ...
... Estos hallazgos son consistentes con trabajos anteriores que han desafiado el supuesto de que los animales están universal y prioritariamente organizados en clases taxonómicas estructuradas principalmente alrededor de correlación de atributos similares (ej. Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006). Sin embargo, las clasificaciones de lxs wichí van un paso más adelante en dos sentidos. ...
... En cambio, las personas con una experiencia más íntima y extensa con la naturaleza muestran no solo sistemas taxonómicos, sino también sistemas que resaltan las relaciones ecológicas entre las entidades de su entorno natural (ej. Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006). Tal es el caso de los pueblos indígenas, quienes históricamente y, aún en nuestros días, viven en un contacto cotidiano con la naturaleza y su relación con el mundo natural es bien diferente al de poblaciones urbanas apartadas de este (Escobar, 1998). ...
... Finalmente, se indagó en los cambios de la organización conceptual de los animales de monte a través del desarrollo, teniendo en cuenta tres grupos de edad: niñxs de 5-6 años, niñxs de 10-11 años y adultxs. Se trabajó con una tarea de clasificación en base a la utilizada en estudios previos Bailenson et al., 2002;Coley et al., 1997;López et al., 1997;Lynch et al., 2000;Medin et al., 1997Medin et al., , 2002Medin et al., , 2006, adaptada a la perspectiva cultural y a la lengua wichí. Los participantes agruparon fotografías de los tshotoy (ver Figura 1) de acuerdo a cómo pensaban que estaban juntos por naturaleza, en numerosas rondas de clasificación, tantas veces como quisieran, y justificaron el motivo de cada agrupamiento. ...
... Estos hallazgos son consistentes con trabajos anteriores que han desafiado el supuesto de que los animales están universal y prioritariamente organizados en clases taxonómicas estructuradas principalmente alrededor de correlación de atributos similares (ej. Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006). Sin embargo, las clasificaciones de lxs wichí van un paso más adelante en dos sentidos. ...
... In turn, according to Cellier et al. (1997) experts have more complete representations of the task domains, a more global and functional view of a situation and take a wider range of data into account in diagnosis. Research shows that experts differ from laymen in both the amount and type of information they have, and different types of experiences with a taxonomic category influence the internal structure of the category (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002). ...
... Typicality reflects how representative an exemplar is for a category (Hampton, 2007). The attribution of typical features to a given specimen depends on the experience of the individual (Murphy & Medin, 1985) and the level of expertise (Bailenson et al., 2002). In this study we used the method of determining typicality, which consists in presenting the participants with the referent of the category and instructing them to evaluate goodness-of-example (GOE), delineated in Rosch and Mervis, 1975. ...
... The significant influence of expertise in the categorization process was confirmed (Bailenson et al., 2002). We found similarities and differences between ITP and NP in mental representing of AI both in terms of the hierarchy of AI designates and the dimensions of their grouping. ...
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The aim of the presented research was to define the differences between information technology (IT) professionals (ITP) and non-professionals (NP) in the way of understanding artificial intelligence (AI). The research was designed in the tradition of categorization research. In an online study participants were asked to make typicality and familiarity judgments for 50 AI exemplars. Two types of analyses were carried out, which made it possible to identify and compare the hierarchy of AI designates (graded structure) and the dimensions of their groupings. We have found that “invisible AI” exemplars were highly rated by ITP, but “visible AI” by NP. Expert knowledge allows ITP to systematize AI exemplars based on both structural and functional elements. On the other hand, laymen indicate the functions that AI-driven products perform, rather than their structures. For ITP, they are primarily algorithmic systems, while for NP they are systems that emulate the functions of living organisms.
... Si bien la idea de que las representaciones conceptuales se organizan en teorías con poder explicativo y compromiso ontológico se encuentra extendidamente aceptada, diversos desarrollos antropológico-culturales recientes cuestionan fuertemente la universalidad de las teorías intuitivas o dominios del conocimiento (Medin et al., 2013(Medin et al., , 2015. Evidencia intercultural extensa con un enfoque particular en las comunidades indígenas y no indígenas (Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006;Ojalehto et al., 2017a, b;Unsworth et al., 2012;Waxman et al., 2007;Winkler-Rhoades et al., 2010) ha comenzado a mostrar que la división en dominios pretendidamente universales -por ejemplo, física intuitiva, psicología intuitiva, biología intuitiva (Wellman y Gelman, 1992)-sería arbitraria y occidental, y que existen otros dominios de conocimiento en los que las fronteras ontológicas no se corresponden con las documentadas en niños/as de cultura mayoritaria. Por ejemplo, los pueblos indígenas tienden a privilegiar las relaciones entre una extensión mayor de entidades -incluyendo organismos biológicos (plantas, mamíferos, aves, etc.), entidades físicas (tierra, piedras, agua) y entes espirituales-a través de teorías ecológicas intuitivas compartidas (e.g., Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006 Esta evidencia es respaldada por el enfoque que entiende la cultura como un ecosistema (Medin et al., 2013). ...
... Evidencia intercultural extensa con un enfoque particular en las comunidades indígenas y no indígenas (Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006;Ojalehto et al., 2017a, b;Unsworth et al., 2012;Waxman et al., 2007;Winkler-Rhoades et al., 2010) ha comenzado a mostrar que la división en dominios pretendidamente universales -por ejemplo, física intuitiva, psicología intuitiva, biología intuitiva (Wellman y Gelman, 1992)-sería arbitraria y occidental, y que existen otros dominios de conocimiento en los que las fronteras ontológicas no se corresponden con las documentadas en niños/as de cultura mayoritaria. Por ejemplo, los pueblos indígenas tienden a privilegiar las relaciones entre una extensión mayor de entidades -incluyendo organismos biológicos (plantas, mamíferos, aves, etc.), entidades físicas (tierra, piedras, agua) y entes espirituales-a través de teorías ecológicas intuitivas compartidas (e.g., Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006 Esta evidencia es respaldada por el enfoque que entiende la cultura como un ecosistema (Medin et al., 2013). Desde esta perspectiva se cree, como ocurre con algunas especies dentro de un ecosistema, que ciertas ideas o representaciones estructuradas en teorías pueden desarrollarse en determinadas ecologías mejor que en otras, logrando perpetuarse en una distribución más amplia. ...
... This finding is consistent with prior evidence that sighted adults living in industrialized societies rely heavily on surfacelevel information (e.g., visual appearance) when making within category similarity judgments about living things. By contrast, experts and members of cultural groups that live in closer contact with nature tend to rely more on abstract causal information, such as behavioral and ecological patterns (Boster & Johnson, 1989;López et al., 1997;Proffitt, Coley, Medin, 2000;Bailenson et al., 2002;Medin & Atran, 2004). Therefore, we might predict more similar judgments among blind and sighted bird experts. ...
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Vision provides a key source of information about many concepts, including ‘living things’ (e.g., tiger ) and visual events (e.g., sparkle ). According to a prominent theoretical framework, neural specialization for different conceptual categories is shaped by sensory features, e.g., living things are neurally dissociable from navigable places because living things concepts depend more on visual features. We tested this framework by comparing the neural basis of ‘visual’ concepts across sighted (n=22) and congenitally blind (n=21) adults. Participants judged the similarity of words varying in their reliance on vision while undergoing fMRI. We compared neural responses to living things nouns (birds, mammals) and place nouns (natural, manmade). In addition, we compared visual event verbs (e.g., ‘sparkle’) to non-visual events (sound emission, hand motion, mouth motion). People born blind exhibited distinctive univariate and multivariate responses to living things in a temporo-parietal semantic network activated by nouns, including the precuneus (PC). To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that neural selectivity for living things does not require vision. We additionally observed preserved neural signatures of ‘visual’ light events in the left middle temporal gyrus (LMTG+). Across a wide range of semantic types, neural representations of sensory concepts develop independent of sensory experience. Significance Statement Vision offers a key source of information about major conceptual categories, including animals and light emission events. Comparing neural signatures of concepts in congenitally blind and sighted people tests the contribution of visual experience to conceptual representation. Sighted and congenitally blind participants heard ‘visual’ nouns (e.g., ‘tiger’) and verbs (e.g., ‘sparkle’), as well as less visual nouns (e.g., ‘barn’) and verbs (e.g., ‘squeak’) while undergoing fMRI. Contrary to previous claims, both univariate and multivariate approaches reveal similar representations of animals and light emission verbs across groups. Across a broad range of semantic types, ‘visual’ concepts develop independent of visual experience. These results challenge theories that emphasize the role of sensory information in conceptual representation.
... we ask how Wichi children (5-year-olds; 10-year-olds) and adults conceptually organize the animals of the Chaco Forest, tshotoy . All of them were asked to do a sorting task 2 used in previous studies (Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006), adapted to the native perspective and the Wichi language. The participants, after identifying each animal, had to group the 41 photographs of tshotoy (see Fig.3) in numerous rounds of classification; according to how they thought and argued "the animals were in nature". ...
Chapter
The Cartesian-Split-Mechanistic framework has worked as the standard Epistemic Paradigm within developmental science. However, two pervasive limitations have been pointed out: (a) the predominant focus on the individual child split from their context/culture, and (b) the over-representation of only one cultural group: Anglo-speaking children of middle-class European–American descendants. This chapter formulates a bidirectionally epistemological–methodological strategy to address these gaps: under the umbrella of the relational paradigm on the one hand and from population evidence—indigenous evidence—which often happen to exhibit epistemological orientations aligned with the foundations of relational thinking, on the other. To accomplish this, first we present cognitive and language development patterns from the Wichi, an indigenous group living in the Chaco region in South America. Second, and based on this evidence, we describe the ecological–relational paradigm, which brings relationshipism front and center. By focusing on developmental evidence coming from non-dominant populations, such as the indigenous Wichi, we expect to contribute to enlarging the agenda of the ecological–relational paradigm as a comprehensive conceptual framework in developmental science.KeywordsRelational–ecological paradigmConceptsLanguageDevelopmentWichi population
... we ask how Wichi children (5-year-olds; 10-year-olds) and adults conceptually organize the animals of the Chaco Forest, tshotoy 2 . All of them were asked to do a sorting task used in previous studies (Bailenson et al., 2002;López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 2006), adapted to the native perspective and the Wichi language. The participants, after identifying each animal, had to group the 41 photographs of tshotoy (see Fig.3) in numerous rounds of classification; according to how they thought and argued "the animals were in nature". ...
Chapter
The Cartesian-Split-Mechanistic framework has worked as the standard Epistemic Paradigm within developmental science. However, two pervasive limitations have been pointed out: a) the predominant focus on the individual child splited from their context/culture, and b) the over-representation of only one cultural group: Anglo-speaking children of middle-class European-American descendants. This chapter formulates a bidirectionally epistemological-methodological strategy to address these gaps: under the umbrella of the relational paradigm on the one hand and from population evidence-indigenous evidence-which often happen to exhibit epistemological orientations aligned with the foundations of relational thinking, on the other. To accomplish this, first we present cognitive and language development patterns from the Wichi, an indigenous group living in the Chaco region in South America. Secondly, and based on this evidence, we describe the ecological-relational paradigm, which bring relationshipism front and center. By focusing on developmental evidence coming from non-dominant populations, such as the indigenous Wichi, we expect to contribute to enlarge the agenda of the ecological-relational paradigm as a comprehensive conceptual framework in developmental science. We would like to especially thank our colleagues and native speakers from Wichi Lawet community (Formosa, Argentina), Aurelia Pérez, Élida María Pérez, María Segundo, Modesto Palma and Luisa Pérez, for their valuable commitment to the project. We are also grateful to children, and their families for their willingness and for sharing their native language and cultural knowledge.
... However, these differences are unlikely to be due solely to cultural factors, as similar effects have been found in North American experts (Bailenson et al., 2002;Proffitt et al., 2000;Shafto & Coley, 2003), and diversity effects have been found in non-Western samples (Choi et al., 1997;Li et al., 2009). Instead, Itzá and expert reasoners have more specific knowledge about the animals in the arguments. ...
Article
The diversity principle—the intuitive notion that diverse evidence is, all else equal, more persuasive, suggestive, confirmatory, or otherwise better than less varied sets of evidence—is a clear component of scientific practice and endorsed by scientists and philosophers alike. A great body of psychological research on people’s understanding and application of the diversity principle exists, yet it remains divided into multiple, distinct research communities, which often come to conflicting conclusions. One reason for this is that the range of tasks and domains investigated is appropriately wide. Without a common understanding of what it means for evidence to be diverse, however, it is hard to compare what are at times diverging results. To address this, I review three perspectives from philosophy on what makes diverse evidence valuable. I will use the perspectives to frame results from psychology and assess whether people understand the value of diverse evidence on both an intuitive and explicit level. My conclusions have a leveled optimism: While people are generally aware of the value of diverse evidence, they often struggle to apply what they know. I argue this is because people do not assess the diversity of their evidence as a matter of course but rely on its intuitive diversity as a cue to its evidential diversity. When this cue is absent, people can overlook otherwise obvious problems with their evidence. This has potential consequences for how people seek out, evaluate, and understand evidence from a variety of domains, but leaves open the possibility that various interventions—such as education or reminders to attend to the quality of evidence—may increase people’s application of what they know.’
... Other differences in knowledge may simply reflect differences in exposure. For example, it is not surprising that U. S. bird experts are better at naming North American birds than Central American birds (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002). These and other cross-cultural differences in knowledge represent differences in the availability of information stored in memory. ...
Article
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General Audience Summary Culture contributes to what people believe, how they interpret information, and what they claim to know. Here, we ask a novel question about knowledge and culture: Can activating one’s cultural identity affect the likelihood that culturally-relevant information comes to mind? That is, rather than focusing on cultural differences in what people know, we focus on whether culture affects when information is retrieved. To test this, we examined the recall of the 50 U. S. states, knowledge for Americans that is well-known and unlikely to be associated with a specific learning context. Participants who wrote about their cultural identities as Americans—relative to their self identities, family identities, or no particular identity at all—recalled more U. S. states in a brief 2 min period. Another study suggests that writing about one’s American identity speeds retrieval of culturally-relevant knowledge: Participants who wrote about their American identities—relative to their self identities—recalled more states when recall was limited to 2 min, but not when recall time was unlimited or when recall was extended to 7 min. Our findings suggest that activating one’s cultural identity has consequences beyond influencing certain social behaviors in that it also affects the accessibility of culturally-relevant knowledge. Phonological and/or semantic cues are typically used to cue knowledge, but our results suggest a novel retrieval cue that influences knowledge accessibility and highlights the role of social context.
... 13 Medical anthropologists have used the method to explore intracultural variation among physicians 10 and patients. 14,15 Other researchers have used the method to explore variation among, for example, experts and novices, 16,17 women and men, 18,19 target populations for marketing research, 20 and parentteacher interactions. 21 We use this method to measure whether a subgroup of engineering educators, specifically those who place a high value on teaching, can be considered a cultural group. ...
... Therein, experts demonstrate greater conceptual flexibility, presumably due to the availability of a wider range of knowledge about relations among marine species (Shafto and Coley, 2003). This and other work (e.g., López et al., 1997;Medin et al., 1997;Bailenson et al., 2002;Ross et al., 2003;Medin et al., 2006) suggest that experience in nature may influence the flexible ability to reason about biology based on multiple types of relations. ...
Article
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Living things can be classified in many ways, such as taxonomic similarity (lions and lynx), or shared ecological habitat (ducks and turtles). The present studies used card-sorting and triad tasks to explore developmental and experiential changes in conceptual flexibility–the ability to switch between taxonomic and ecological construals of living things–as well as two processes underlying conceptual flexibility: salience (i.e., the ease with which relations come to mind outside of contextual influences) and availability (i.e., the presence of relations in one’s mental space) of taxonomic and ecological relations. We were also interested in the extent to which salience and availability of taxonomic and ecological relations predicted inductive inferences. Participants were 452 six to ten-year-olds from urban, suburban, and rural communities in New England. Across two studies, taxonomic relations were overwhelmingly more salient than ecological relations, although salience of ecological relations was higher among children from rural environments (Study 1) and those who engaged in unstructured exploration of nature (Study 2). Availability of ecological relations, as well as conceptual flexibility, increased with age, and was higher among children living in more rural environments. Notably, salience, but not availability, of ecological relations predicted ecological inferences. These findings suggest that taxonomic categories (i.e., groups that share both perceptual similarities and rich underlying structure) are a salient way to organize intuitive biological knowledge and that, critically, environmental richness and relevant experience contribute to the salience and availability of ecological knowledge, and thereby, conceptual flexibility in biological thinking. More generally, they highlight important linkages between domain-specific knowledge and domain-general cognitive abilities.
Article
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Questions on early sapiens cognition, the cognitive abilities of our ancestors, are intriguing but notoriously hard to tackle. Leaving no hard traces in the archeological record, these abilities need to be inferred from indirect evidence, informed by our understanding of present-day cognition. Most of such attempts acknowledge the role that culture, as a faculty, has played for human evolution, but they underrate or even disregard the role of distinct cultural traditions and the ensuing diversity, both in present-day humans and as a dimension of past cognition. We argue that culture has exerted a profound impact on human cognition from the start in a dual manner: It scaffolds cognition through both development and evolution, and it thereby continually diversifies the form and content of human thinking. To unveil early sapiens cognition and retrace its evolutionary trajectories, this cognitive diversity must be considered. We present two strategies to achieve this: large-scale extrapolation and phylogenetic comparison. The former aims at filtering out diversity to determine what is basic and universal versus culturally shaped (illustrated for theory of mind abilities). The latter capitalizes on the diversity to reconstruct evolutionary trajectories (illustrated for religious beliefs). The two methods, in combination, advance our understanding of the cognitive abilities of our early sapiens ancestors and of how these abilities emerged and evolved. To conclude, we discuss the implications of this approach for our insights into early cognition itself and its scientific investigation.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
Chapter
This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents growth points in reasoning research, drawing connections to pragmatics, cross-cultural studies, emotion and evolution.
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Memes are hypothetical cultural units passed on by imitation; although nonbiological, they undergo Darwinian selection like genes. Cognitive study of multimodular human minds undermines memetics: unlike in genetic replication, high-fidelity transmission of cultural information is the exception, not the rule. Constant, rapid "mutation" of information during communication generates endlessly varied creations that nevertheless adhere to modular input conditions. The sort of cultural information most susceptible to modular processing is that most readily acquired by children, most easily transmitted across individuals, most apt to survive within a culture, most likely to recur in different cultures, and most disposed to cultural variation and elaboration.
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Results indicate that the same taxonomic rank is cognitively privi-leged for biological induction in two diverse populations: people raised in Michi-gan, and Itzaj Maya of the Peten rainforest. This is the generic species -the level of oak and robin -which is coextensive with Berlin's folkgeneric rank but with a distinct theoretical sense. The findings are unaccounted for by similarity-based models of category formation and induction because such models cannot simul-taneously yield different measures of privilege. For example, Rosch and her col-leagues suggest that life forms -the level of tree and bird -rather than folkgenerics comprise the "basic level" for many Americans. Rosch, like Berlin, advances such domain-general models of similarity to account for privileged cat-egories as maximally informative clusters of perceptual attributes that best repre-sent"objective discontinuities" in nature. However, this favors cross-cultural dif-ferences in the rank privileged in induction as a function of differences in famil-iarity with the natural environment. Although our data indicate some relative downgrading of knowledge to a higher rank among industrialized Americans and upgrading to a lower rank among silvicultural Maya, these differences are clearly a second-order effect. To account for the absolute privilege of generic spe-cies in diverse cultures, a domain-specific view of folkbiology is offered. It favors the idea of the generic-species level as a partitioning of the ontological domains of plant and animal into causal essences. The attribution of essence, and the bio-logical expectations that go with it, is in part independent of actual experience or degree of perceptual familiarity with the kind in question. This reflects a cogni-tive division of labor between domain-general perceptual heuristics and domain-specific learning mechanisms, which may be an evolutionary design. 18 ATRAN, ESTIN, COLEY and MEDIN Vol. 17, No.1 RESUMEN.-Nuestros resultados indican que el mismo rango taxonomico es privilegiado cognoscitivamente en dos poblaciones diferentes: gente que crecio en Michigan, en los Estados Unidos de Norteamerica, y Mayas Itzaj de la selva tropical del Peten en Guatemala. Este rango taxonomico es la especie generica -el nivel del encino y el petirrojo -que coincide con 10que Berlin llama el nivel generico 'folk' pero tiene un sentido teorico distinto. Los modelos de formaci6n de categorias e induccion basados en la similitud no pueden dar cuenta de estos resultados porque tales modelos no pueden producir simultaneamente diferentes medidas de privilegio. Por ejemplo, Rosch y sus colegas sugieren que son las formas de vida -el nivel al que pertenecen arbol y pajaro -mas que los genericos I folk' las que comprenden el "nivel basico" para muchos norteamericanos. Rosch, al igual que Berlin, propone tales modelos de similitud, generales a todo dominio, para explicar las categorias privilegiadas como conjuntos, maximamente informativos, de atributos perceptuales que mejor representan las II discontinuidades objetivas" de la naturaleza. Esto, sin embargo, favorece las diferencias entre culturas en el rango privilegiado en la induccion como funcion de las diferencias en familiaridad con el medio ambiente. Si bien nuestros datos indican cierta disminucion relativa del conocimiento hacia rangos superiores en-tre los norteamericanos industrializados, y un aumento del conocimiento hacia rangos inferiores entre los silvicultores mayas, estas diferencias son claramente un efecto de segundo orden. Para responder al privilegio absoluto de la especie generica en diversas culturas, ofrecemos una perspectiva especifica de dominic de la biologia 'folk'. Esta perspectiva favorece la idea del nivel de la especie generica como una division de los dominios ontologicos planta y animal en esencias causales. La atribuci6n de esencia, y las expectativas biol6gicas que conlleva, son independientes en parte de la experiencia real 0 el grade de familiaridad percep-tual con la clase en cuestion, Esto refleja una division cognoscitiva del trabajo entre la heuristica perceptual de dominic general y los mecanismos de aprendizaje de dominic especifico, division que puede ser un disefio evolutivo.
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This paper presents and tests a formal mathematical model for the analysis of informant responses to systematic interview questions. We assume a situation in which the ethnographer does not know how much each informant knows about the cultural domain under consideration nor the answers to the questions. The model simultaneously provides an estimate of the cultural competence or knowledge of each informant and an estimate of the correct answer to each question asked of the informant. The model currently handles true-false, multiple-choice, andfill-in-the-blank type question formats. In familiar cultural domains the model produces good results from as few as four informants. The paper includes a table showing the number of informants needed to provide stated levels of confidence given the mean level of knowledge among the informants. Implications are discussed.
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Examined and considered developmental changes in the organization of information within the mammal domain within the context of cultural knowledge acquisition. Judgments of similarity among mammals were elicited from 7-yr-olds, 10-yr-olds, and adults by means of a triad task. Analysis addressed both quantitative and qualitative models of development consistent with the A. K. Romney et al (1986) cultural consensus model. Results provided partial support for both models. Ss' responses generally fit the cultural consensus model, whereas systematic patterns of deviation from the model emerged between children and adults because of the emergence of a primate category after age 10. The relationship between these results and S. Carey's (1985) research on the development of biological knowledge is discussed, and implications for the study of expertise acquisition are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Reviews evidence which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Ss are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes. (86 ref)
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The abstract for this document is available on CSA Illumina.To view the Abstract, click the Abstract button above the document title.
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Ethnobiologists debate whether folk biological classifiers are natural historians attending primarily to the morphology of organisms or are pragmatists concerned primarily with utility. We argue that this question is best understood as a problem in intracultural variation: the relative importance of form and function depends on who is asked to judge the similarity of organisms as well as how they are asked to judge it. We find that expert fishermen judge similarities among fish on both functional and morphological criteria, while novices judge on morphological criteria alone and thereby approach the scientific classification of fish more closely than experts. Experts also vary more than do novices, presumably because they control more different kinds of knowledge on which to base a similarity judgment.
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Brent Berlin's proposed “general principles of classification and nomenclature” are examined as they apply to folk biology in Ndumba, a Papua New Guinea highlands society. Focusing on Ndumba folk zoology, supplemented with a previous analysis of their folk botany, Berlin's analytical schema for ethnobiological classification is supported, but principles of nomenclature in ethnobiology appear to be in need of reconsideration. [ethnosemantics, folk biology, language universals, Papua New Guinea]
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Memes are hypothetical cultural units passed on by imitation; although nonbiological, they undergo Darwinian selection like genes. Cognitive study of multimodular human minds undermines memetics: unlike in genetic replication, high-fidelity transmission of cultural information is the exception, not the rule. Constant, rapid "mutation" of information during communication generates endlessly varied creations that nevertheless adhere to modular input conditions. The sort of cultural information most susceptible to modular processing is that most readily acquired by children, most easily transmitted across individuals, most apt to survive within a culture, most likely to recur in different cultures, and most disposed to cultural variation and elaboration.
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Two parallel studies were performed with members of very different cultures - industrialized American and traditional Itzaj-Mayan - to investigate potential universal and cultural features of folkbiological taxonomies and inductions. Specifically, we examined how individuals organize natural categories into taxonomies, and whether they readily use these taxonomies to make inductions about those categories. The results of the first study indicate that there is a cultural consensus both among Americans and the Itzaj in their taxonomies of local mammal species, and that these taxonomies resemble and depart from a corresponding scientific taxonomy in similar ways. However, cultural differences are also shown, such as a greater differentiation and more ecological considerations in Itzaj taxonomies. In a second study, Americans and the Itzaj used their taxonomies to guide similarity- and typicality-based inductions. These inductions converge and diverge crossculturally and regarding scientific inductions where their respective taxonomies do. These findings reveal some universal features of folkbiological inductions, but they also reveal some cultural features such as diversity-based inductions among Americans, and ecologically based inductions among the Itzaj. Overall, these studies suggest that while building folkbiological taxonomies and using them for folkbiological inductions is a universal competence of human cognition there are also important cultural constraints on that competence.
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Developmental changes in the organization of information within the mammal domain were examined and considered within the context of cultural knowledge acquisition. Judgments of similarity among mammals were elicited from 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults by means of a triad task. Analyses addressed both quantitative and qualitative models of development consistent with Romney, Weller, and Batchelder's (1986) cultural consensus model. Results provided partial support for both models. Ss responses generally fit the cultural consensus model, whereas systematic patterns of deviation from the model emerged between children and adults because of the emergence of a primate category after age 10. The relationship between these results and Carey's (1985) research on the development of biological knowledge is discussed, and implications for the study of expertise acquisition are considered.
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This research explores whether there are systematic cross-national differences in choice-inferred risk preferences between Americans and Chinese. Study 1 found (a) that the Chinese were significantly more risk seeking than the Americans, yet (b) that both nationals predicted exactly the opposite - that the Americans would be more risk seeking. Study 2 compared Americans and Chinese risk preferences in investment, medical and academic decisions, and found that Chinese were more risk seeking than Americans only in the investment domain and not in the other domains. These results are explained in terms of a cushion hypothesis, which suggests people in a collectivist society, such as China, are more likely to receive financial help if they are in need (i.e. they could be cushioned if they fell), and consequently, they are less risk averse than those in an individualistic society such as the USA.
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L'A. tente de fournir un cadre theorique pour explorer la complexite du marquage de genre en itza, une langue qui appartient a la branche yucatec des langues maya. Dans cette optique, il considere les prefixes aj- et ix- utilises par cette langue pour marquer le genre des noms, comme un type particulier de determinants qu'il nomme determinant rigide parce que l'un de ses emplois consiste a introduire des designateurs rigides lies aux noms de personnes, de lieux, de maladies, de plantes et d'animaux. L'A. examine ainsi, dans une 1 e partie, les divers emplois du marquage de genre dans differents domaines non biologiques comme les noms propres et les phenomenes naturels (vent, maladie), et montre, dans une 2 e partie, comment ces emplois s'unifient dans le domaine de la biologie populaire
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the process of socially shared cognition comprises the collective struggles of individuals to learn, interpret, and understand their world / in building their representations of the world, individuals learn both from what they directly experience and from what others teach them / because they vary in their experiences and in their goals in interpreting experience, individuals vary in their understandings / thus the consequence of the process of socially shared cognition is a patterned distribution of cultural knolwedge through a community / we can use this pattern to make inferences about how people learn instead of charting the pattern of production, distribution, and consumption of wealth, one attempts to describe and explain how information is acquired, transmitted, and used / on the basis of this analogy, I have borrowed Roberts' term information economy (1964) to label the model I have been developing to describe and explain the social distribution of knowledge / provide a preliminary sketch of the model / illustrate how it applies to the interpretation of several studies of biological similarity judgment (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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In the Maya lowlands of northern Peten in Guatemala and the southern Yucatan peninsula of Mexico, Maya communities have existed for 2 millennia in a neotropical rain forest that outside forces have, within just a few decades, brought to the edge of extinction. The sudden turn from sustainable to unsustainable forest use suggests differences in how native Maya and immigrant communities conceive of and manage forest resource systems in the same area. This chapter reports the progress of ongoing research into what those differences are. Our design uses detailed case studies and comparisons of the ways such groups structure, communicate, and implement knowledge of common-pool resources (CPRs) over time. Here we present a preliminary assessment of some of the social and cognitive factors affecting the alarming cycle of deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and community breakdown in lowland Mesoamerica. The research centers on 3 questions: (1) what is the structure and content of local ecological knowledge (such as biodiversity) that enables successful commons management; (2) what is the character of communication networks that make possible assimilation, distribution, and implementation of the information; and (3) to what extent is loss of local knowledge and disruption of communication networks related to a breakdown of the commons? Another issue motivating this research, but not subject to direct empirical test, is, what lessons do microlevel approaches to commons systems hold for the future of global commons such as the earth's forests, ranges, water, and air? (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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The quadratic assignment paradigm developed in operations research is discussed as a general approach to data analysis tasks characterized by the use of proximity matrices. Data analysis problems are first classified as being either static or nonstatic. The term "static" implies the evaluation of a detailed substantive hypothesis that is posited without the aid of actual data. Alternatively, the term "nonstatic" suggests a search for a particular type of relational structure within the obtained proximity matrix and without prior statement of a specific conjecture. Although the static class of problems is directly related to several inference procedures commonly used in classical statistics, the major emphases in this paper are on applying a general computational heuristic to attack the nonstatic problem and on using the quadratic assignment orientation to discuss a variety of research tactics of importance in the behavioral sciences and, particularly, in psychology. An extensive set of numerical examples is given illustrating the application of the search procedure to hierarchical clustering, the identification of homogeneous object subsets, linear and circular seriation, and a discrete version of multidimensional scaling. (79 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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This research explores whether there are systematic cross-national differences in choice-inferred risk preferences between Americans and Chinese. Study 1 found(a) that the Chinese were signi®cantly more risk seeking than the Americans, yet(b) that both nationals predicted exactly the opposite Ð that the Americans wouldbe more risk seeking. Study 2 compared Americans' and Chinese risk preferences in investment, medical and academic decisions, and found that Chinese were more risk seeking than Americans only in the investment domain and not in the other domains. These results are explained in terms of a cushion hypothesis, which suggests people in a collectivist society, such as China, are more likely to receive fnancial help if they are in need (i.e. they could be cushioned if they fell), and consequently, they are less risk averse than those in an individualistic society such as the USA.
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The notion of taxonomic structure has played a central role in recent descriptions and analyses of folk systems of biological classification. The increasingly apparent inadequacies of that notion as a model of folk classification processes justify a fundamental theoretical reorientation. Reasonably interpretable and formally adequate definitions of inductive classification (Postulate I) and of dissimilarities in a classification space (Postulate II) are more adequate than the taxonomic model for understanding patterns observed in folk biological classification systems. A non-rigorous extension of this “perceptual model” deals with the key problem of taxonomic ranks.
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Since about 1954, modern field research has been carried out by a number of ethnographers and biologists in an effort to understand more fully the nature of folk biological classification. Much of this work has been devoted to studies dealing with the naming and classification of plants and animals in non-Western societies. It has now become apparent that several important and far reaching generalizations can be formulated which promise to throw considerable light on prescientific man's understanding of his biological universe.
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Many accounts of categorization equate goodness-of-example with central tendency for common taxonomic categories; the best examples of a category are average members#x2014;those that are most similar to most other category members. In the present study, we asked 24 tree experts and 20 novices to rate goodness-of-example for a sample of 48 trees and found (1) that the internal structure of the categorytree differed between novices and experts and (2) that central tendency did not determine goodnessof-example ratings for either group. For novices, familiarity determined goodness-of-example ratings. For experts, the “ideal” dimensions of height and weediness, rather than average similarity to other trees, were the primary predictors of goodness-of-example ratings for experts. The best examples oftree were not species of average height, but of extreme height. The worst examples were the weediest trees. We also found systematic differences in predictors of goodness-of-example as a function of type of expertise. We argue that the internal structure of taxonomic categories can be shaped by goal-related experience and is not necessarily a reflection of the attributional structure of the environment. Implications for models of category structure and category learning are discussed.
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Six experiments explored the hypothesis that the members of categories which are considered most prototypical are those with most attributes in common with other members of the category and least attributes in common with other categories. In probabilistic terms, the hypothesis is that prototypicality is a function of the total cue validity of the attributes of items. In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects listed attributes for members of semantic categories which had been previously rated for degree of prototypicality. High positive correlations were obtained between those ratings and the extent of distribution of an item's attributes among the other items of the category. In Experiments 2 and 4, subjects listed superordinates of category members and listed attributes of members of contrasting categories. Negative correlations were obtained between prototypicality and superordinates other than the category in question and between prototypicality and an item's possession of attributes possessed by members of contrasting categories. Experiments 5 and 6 used artificial categories and showed that family resemblance within categories and lack of overlap of elements with contrasting categories were correlated with ease of learning, reaction time in identifying an item after learning, and rating of prototypicality of an item. It is argued that family resemblance offers an alternative to criterial features in defining categories.
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Where do new ideas come from? What is social intelligence? Why do social scientists perform mindless statistical rituals? This vital book is about rethinking rationality as adaptive thinking: to understand how minds cope with their environments, both ecological and social. The author proposes and illustrates a bold new research program that investigates the psychology of rationality, introducing the concepts of ecological, bounded, and social rationality. His path-breaking collection takes research on thinking, social intelligence, creativity, and decision-making out of an ethereal world where the laws of logic and probability reign, and places it into our real world of human behavior and interaction. This book is accessibly written for general readers with an interest in psychology, cognitive science, economics, sociology, philosophy, artificial intelligence, and animal behavior. It also teaches a practical audience, such as physicians, AIDS counselors, and experts in criminal law, how to understand and communicate uncertainties and risks.
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Conducted 5 experiments, using 4 pigeons in each. After being trained on an oak leaf pattern, Ss responded to other oak leaf patterns but not to leaf patterns of other species. Thus, graphic variation among the instances of a species is "transparent" to the visual system. At this taxonomic level, concept formation is spontaneous rather than inductive. It is argued that such immediate generalization may be critical to the survival of the organism. (15 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).