ArticlePDF AvailableLiterature Review

Cues to Deception

February 2003
Psychological Bulletin 129(1):74-118

DOI:10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74

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PubMed

Authors:

Bella DePaulo

University of California, Santa Barbara

James J Lindsay

American Institutes for Research

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Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit. Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger when lies were about transgressions.

Cues to Deception Based on Objective and Subjective Measures Cue Measurement Q T (df) Q B (1) Objective Subjective

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Cues to Deception

Bella M. DePaulo

University of Virginia James J. Lindsay

University of Missouri—Columbia

Brian E. Malone

University of Virginia Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton, and

Harris Cooper

University of Missouri—Columbia

Do people behave differently when they are lying compared with when they are telling the truth? The

combined results of 1,338 estimates of 158 cues to deception are reported. Results show that in some

ways, liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, and they tell less compelling tales. They also make a

more negative impression and are more tense. Their stories include fewer ordinary imperfections and

unusual contents. However, many behaviors showed no discernible links, or only weak links, to deceit.

Cues to deception were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed, especially when the

motivations were identity relevant rather than monetary or material. Cues to deception were also stronger

when lies were about transgressions.

Do people behave in discernibly different ways when they are

lying compared with when they are telling the truth? Practitioners

and laypersons have been interested in this question for centuries

(Trovillo, 1939). The scientific search for behavioral cues to

deception is also longstanding and has become especially vigorous

in the past few decades.

In 1981, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal published the first

comprehensive meta-analysis of cues to deception. Their search

for all reports of the degree to which verbal and nonverbal cues

occurred differentially during deceptive communications com-

pared with truthful ones produced 159 estimates of 19 behavioral

cues to deception. These estimates were from 36 independent

samples. Several subsequent reviews updated the Zuckerman et al.

(1981) meta-analysis (B. M. DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985a;

Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1986; Zuckerman & Driver,

1985), but the number of additional estimates was small. Other

reviews have been more comprehensive but not quantitative (see

Vrij, 2000, for the most recent of these). In the present review, we

summarize quantitatively the results of more than 1,300 estimates

of 158 cues to deception. These estimates are from 120 indepen-

dent samples.

We define deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead others.

Falsehoods communicated by people who are mistaken or self-

deceived are not lies, but literal truths designed to mislead are lies.

Although some scholars draw a distinction between deceiving and

lying (e.g., Bok, 1978), we use the terms interchangeably. As

Zuckerman et al. (1981) did in their review, we limit our analysis

to behaviors that can be discerned by human perceivers without the

aid of any special equipment. We also limit our review to studies

of adults, as the dynamics of deceiving may be markedly different

in children (e.g., Feldman, Devin-Sheehan, & Allen, 1978; Lewis,

Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Shennum & Bugental, 1982).

Predicting Cues to Deception: Previous Approaches

Ekman and Friesen (1969)

In 1969, Ekman and Friesen published the first influential the-

oretical statement about cues to deception. They described two

broad categories of cues, leakage cues and deception cues. Leak-

age cues reveal what the liars are trying to hide—typically, how

they really feel. Anticipating the self-presentational perspective

that would become important later, Ekman and Friesen (1969)

noted that the operation of display rules (i.e., culturally and so-

cially determined norms for managing facial expressions of emo-

tions) can result in leakage cues. For example, when deceivers try

to squelch the facial expression of an emotion they are trying to

conceal, the resulting expression—a micro affect display—may be

briefer than it is ordinarily, but the nature of the affect may still be

identifiable. If instead the facial expression is so brief that the

Bella M. DePaulo and Brian E. Malone, Department of Psychology,

University of Virginia; James J. Lindsay, Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charl-

ton, and Harris Cooper, Department of Psychology, University of Missou-

ri—Columbia.

Bella M. DePaulo is now a visiting professor at the Department of

Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara. James J. Lindsay is

now at the Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Twin

Cities Campus. Kelly Charlton is now at the Department of Psychology,

University of North Carolina at Pembroke.

This article was reviewed and accepted under the editorial term of

Nancy Eisenberg. We thank Barry Schlenker for providing many insightful

suggestions and Charlie Bond, Tim Levine, and Aldert Vrij for answering

countless questions about their data and ideas. Many others also responded

to our inquiries about theoretical or empirical issues, including Jack

Brigham, Mark deTurck, Paul Ekman, Tom Feeley, Klaus Fiedler, Howard

Friedman, Mark Frank, Dacher Keltner, Randy Koper, Bob Krauss, Steve

McCornack, Maureen O’Sullivan, Ron Riggio, Jonathon Schooler, and

June Tangney.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bella M.

DePaulo, P.O. Box 487, Summerland, California 93067. E-mail:

depaulo@psych.ucsb.edu

2003, Vol. 129, No. 1, 74–118 0033-2909/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74

emotion cannot be discerned, then the resulting micro affect dis-

play functions as a deception cue. Deception cues indicate that

deception may be occurring, without indicating the nature of the

information that is being concealed. Almost all of the cues that

have been reported in the literature are deception cues.

Ekman and Friesen (1969) described various conditions under

which liars would be especially likely to succeed in their deception

attempts (e.g., perhaps by evidencing fewer or less obvious cues).

Their formulation was based on the psychology of both the liars

and the targets of lies as they relate to each other. For example,

they predicted that success is more likely when the salience of

deception is asymmetrical such that the liars are focused on getting

away with their lies while the issue of deception is not salient to

the targets or that the liars are focusing primarily on deceiving

while the targets are simultaneously trying to deceive and detect

deceit.

Zuckerman et al. (1981)

Zuckerman et al. (1981) began their formulation with the widely

accepted premise that no one behavior or set of behaviors would

ever be found that always occurs when people are lying and never

occurs any other time. Instead, they argued, the search should be

for the kinds of thoughts, feelings, or psychological processes that

are likely to occur more or less often when people are lying

compared with when they are telling the truth and for the behav-

ioral cues that may be indicative of those states. They then delin-

eated four factors that could be used to predict cues to deception:

generalized arousal, the specific affects experienced during decep-

tion, cognitive aspects of deception, and attempts to control be-

havior so as to maintain the deception.

Arousal

Citing the research and theory available at the time on the

psychophysiological detection of deception, Zuckerman et al.

(1981) proposed that liars may experience greater undifferentiated

arousal than truth tellers. That arousal could be evidenced by liars’

greater pupil dilation, increased blinking, more frequent speech

disturbances, and higher pitch. However, Zuckerman et al. (1981)

also acknowledged that autonomic responses that seem character-

istic of deception may be explained by the specific affects expe-

rienced while lying without invoking the notion of diffuse arousal.

Feelings While Lying

To the extent that liars experience guilt about lying or fear of

getting caught lying, behaviors indicative of guilt and fear are

shown more often by liars than truth tellers. Zuckerman et al.

(1981) suggested that liars might fidget more than truth tellers, and

they may also sound more unpleasant. They also suggested that

guilt and anxiety could become apparent in liars’distancing of

themselves from their deceptive communications. Drawing from

Wiener and Mehrabian’s (1968; see also Mehrabian, 1972) ac-

count of the verbal and nonverbal cues indicative of distancing

(which they called nonimmediacy), Zuckerman et al. (1981) pre-

dicted that liars would communicate in more evasive and indirect

ways than truth tellers and that they would maintain less eye

contact with their interaction partners.

Cognitive Aspects of Deception

Zuckerman et al. (1981) conceptualized lying as a more cogni-

tively complex task than telling the truth. Liars, they claimed, need

to formulate communications that are internally consistent and

consistent with what others already know. The greater cognitive

challenges involved in lying (relative to truth telling) were pre-

dicted to result in longer response latencies, more speech hesita-

tions, greater pupil dilation, and fewer illustrators (hand move-

ments that accompany and illustrate speech).

Attempted Control of Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviors

Liars’attempts to control their behaviors so as to maintain their

deception can paradoxically result in cues that instead betray it.

For example, liars’behaviors may seem less spontaneous than

truth tellers’. Also, liars’inability to control all aspects of their

behavior equally effectively could result in verbal and nonverbal

discrepancies.

Ekman (1985/1992)

Ekman (1985/1992) described two major categories of cues,

thinking cues and feeling cues. Liars who prepare their deceptions

inadequately or who cannot keep their stories straight produce

inconsistencies that betray their deceits. Those who overprepare

produce stories that seem rehearsed. If liars need to think carefully

about their lies as they tell them, they may speak more slowly than

truth tellers. These are all thinking cues.

Ekman’s (1985/1992) more important contribution, however,

was his conceptualization of the role of emotions in deceiving. By

understanding the emotions that liars are experiencing, Ekman

argued, it is possible to predict behaviors that distinguish liars from

truth tellers. For example, the cues indicative of detection appre-

hension are fear cues. These include higher pitch, faster and louder

speech, pauses, speech errors, and indirect speech. The greater the

liars’detection apprehension, the more evident these fear cues

should be. For example, liars should appear more fearful as the

stakes become higher and the anticipated probability of success

becomes lower.

Similarly, liars who feel guiltier about their lies, such as those

who are lying to people who trust them, should show more

behavioral indicators of guilt. Ekman (1985/1992) noted that guilt

cues have not been clearly determined, but they could include cues

to sadness such as lower pitch, softer and slower speech, and

downward gazing.

Liars’feelings about lying are not necessarily negative ones.

Ekman (1985/1992) suggested that liars sometimes experience

“duping delight,”which could include excitement about the chal-

lenge of lying or pride in succeeding at the lie. This delight could

become evident in cues to excitement such as higher pitch, faster

and louder speech, and more use of illustrators. The duping delight

hypothesis has not yet been tested.

Ekman (1985/1992) pointed out that emotions become signifi-

cant not only when liars feel apprehensive, guilty, or excited about

their lies but also when liars are experiencing emotions that they

are trying to hide or when they are faking emotions that they are

not really experiencing. The particular cues that signal lying de-

pend on the particular emotions that the liars are experiencing and

CUES TO DECEPTION

simulating. For example, people who are only pretending to be

enjoying a film would show fewer genuine enjoyment smiles and

more feigned smiles than people who really are enjoying a film.

These differences in smiling would not be predicted if the feelings

that people really were experiencing or just pretending to experi-

ence were, for example, feelings of pain instead of enjoyment.

From this perspective, cues to emotions that liars are trying to hide

or to simulate cannot be combined across all studies in the liter-

ature. Instead, the relevant subset of studies must be selected (e.g.,

only those in which liars are hiding or simulating enjoyment). This

is also a perspective that eschews the notion of undifferentiated

arousal and instead argues for the study of specific emotions

(Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, &

Friesen, 1990).

Buller and Burgoon (1996)

From a communications perspective, Buller and Burgoon (1996)

argued that to predict the behavior of deceivers, it is important to

consider not just individual psychological variables such as moti-

vations and emotions but also interpersonal communicative pro-

cesses. Reiterating Ekman and Friesen’s (1969) point about the

importance of multiple roles, Buller and Burgoon noted that when

people are trying to deceive, they are engaged in several tasks

simultaneously. They are attempting to convey their deceptive

message, and at the same time, they are continually monitoring the

target of their deception for signs of suspiciousness and then

adapting their behavior accordingly. Although these multiple de-

mands can prove challenging at first, compromising effectiveness

at maintaining credibility, “these difficulties should typically dis-

sipate over time as participants acquire more feedback, attempt

further repairs, and gain greater control over their performance”

(Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 220). They therefore predicted that

“deceivers in interactive contexts should display increasing imme-

diacy and involvement, pleasantness, composure, fluency, and

smooth turn taking over the course of the interaction”(Buller &

Burgoon, 1996, p. 220). They also noted that patterns of behavior

vary with factors such as the deceivers’expectations, goals, mo-

tivations, and relationship with the targets and with the targets’

degree of suspiciousness, so that there would be no one profile of

deceptive behaviors.

One of the moderator variables for which Buller and Burgoon

(1996) made predictions is deceivers’motivations. A number of

taxonomies of motivations for deceiving have been proposed (e.g.,

Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, Kirk-

endol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996; Hample, 1980; Lippard, 1988;

Metts, 1989; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975), and some are

quite complex. For example, Metts (1989) described four catego-

ries of motives (partner focused, teller focused, relationship fo-

cused, and issue focused) and 15 subcategories. Buller and Bur-

goon considered three motivations: instrumental, relational (e.g.,

avoiding relationship problems), and identity (e.g., protecting the

liar’s image). They predicted that liars would experience more

detection apprehension when motivated by self-interest than by

relational or identity goals. As a result, instrumentally motivated

liars exhibit more nonstrategic behaviors (unintentional behaviors

that Buller & Burgoon, 1996, have described as arousal cues).

Those liars were also predicted by Buller and Burgoon to engage

in more strategic behaviors, which are behaviors used in the

pursuit of high level plans.

The Present Approach to Predicting Cues to Deception:

A Self-Presentational Perspective

In 1992, B. M. DePaulo described a self-presentational perspec-

tive for understanding nonverbal communication. Her formulation

was not specific to the communication of deception. In this sec-

tion, we further articulate her perspective, incorporating subse-

quent research and theory and specifying the implications of a

self-presentational perspective for the prediction of cues to decep-

tion. We begin with a review of the incidence and nature of lying

in everyday life and a comparison of the lies people typically tell

in their lives with the lies studied in the research literature on

deception.

Lies in Social Life

Lying is a fact of everyday life. Studies in which people kept

daily diaries of all of their lies suggest that people tell an average

of one or two lies a day (B. M. DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; B. M.

DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996; Kashy & DePaulo, 1996; see also

Camden et al., 1984; Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002; Hample,

1980; Lippard, 1988; Metts, 1989; Turner et al., 1975). People lie

most frequently about their feelings, their preferences, and their

attitudes and opinions. Less often, they lie about their actions,

plans, and whereabouts. Lies about achievements and failures are

also commonplace.

Occasionally, people tell lies in pursuit of material gain, per-

sonal convenience, or escape from punishment. Much more com-

monly, however, the rewards that liars seek are psychological

ones. They lie to make themselves appear more sophisticated or

more virtuous than they think their true characteristics warrant.

They lie to protect themselves, and sometimes others, from disap-

proval and disagreements and from getting their feelings hurt. The

realm of lying, then, is one in which identities are claimed and

impressions are managed. It is not a world apart from nondeceptive

discourse. Truth tellers edit their self-presentations, too, often in

pursuit of the same kinds of goals, but in ways that stay within

boundaries of honesty. The presentations of liars are designed to

mislead.

There are only a few studies in which people have been asked

how they feel about the lies they tell in their everyday lives (B. M.

DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996;

Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). The results suggest that people regard

their everyday lies as little lies of little consequence or regret. They

do not spend much time planning them or worrying about the

possibility of getting caught. Still, everyday lies do leave a

smudge. Although people reported feeling only low levels of

distress about their lies, they did feel a bit more uncomfortable

while telling their lies, and directly afterwards, than they had felt

just before lying. Also, people described the social interactions in

which lies were told as more superficial and less pleasant than the

interactions in which no lies were told.

Interspersed among these unremarkable lies, in much smaller

numbers, are lies that people regard as serious. Most of these lies

are told to hide transgressions, which can range from misdeeds

such as cheating on tests to deep betrayals of intimacy and trust,

76 DEPAULO ET AL.

such as affairs (B. M. DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden,

2002; see also Jones & Burdette, 1993; McCornack & Levine,

1990; Metts, 1994). These lies, especially if discovered, can have

serious implications for the liars’identities and reputations.

Lies in Studies of Cues to Deception

In the literature on cues to deception, as in everyday life, lies

about personal feelings, facts, and attitudes are the most common-

place. Participants in studies of deception might lie about their

opinions on social issues, for example, or about their academic

interests or musical preferences. Sometimes emotions are elicited

with video clips, and participants try to hide their feelings or

simulate entirely different ones. The literature also includes lies

about transgressions, as in studies in which participants are in-

duced to cheat on a task and then lie about it. There are a few

studies (Hall, 1986; Horvath, 1973; Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley,

1994) of lies about especially serious matters, such as those told by

suspects in criminal investigations, and one study (Koper & Sahl-

man, 2001) of the truthful and deceptive communications of peo-

ple whose lies were aired in the media (e.g., Richard Nixon, Pete

Rose, Susan Smith).

Self-Presentation in Truthful and

Deceptive Communications

The prevalence of self-presentational themes in the kinds of lies

that people most often tell and in their reasons for telling them

suggests the potential power of the self-presentational perspective

for predicting cues to deception. Following Schlenker (1982, 2002;

Schlenker & Pontari, 2000), we take a broad view of self-

presentation as people’s attempts to control the impressions that

are formed of them. In self-presenting, people are behaving “in

ways that convey certain roles and personal qualities to others”

(Pontari & Schlenker, 2000, p. 1092). From this perspective, all

deceptive communications involve self-presentation—so do all

truthful communications.

Fundamental to the self-presentational perspective is the as-

sumption, based on our understanding of the nature of lying in

everyday life, that cues to deception ordinarily are quite weak.

There are, however, conditions under which cues are more appar-

ent. As we explain, such moderators of the strength of deception

cues can be predicted from the self-presentational processes in-

volved in communicating truthfully and deceptively.

The Deception Discrepancy

Lies vary markedly in the goals they serve and in the kinds of

self-presentations enacted to achieve those goals. Yet this vast

diversity of lies is united by a single identity claim: the claim of

honesty. From the friend who feigns amusement in response to the

joke that actually caused hurt feelings to the suspect who claims to

have been practicing putts on the night of the murder, liars succeed

in their lies only if they seem to be sincere.

However, this claim

to honesty does not distinguish liars from truth tellers either. Truth

tellers fail in their social interaction goals just as readily as liars if

they seem dishonest. The important difference between the truth

teller’s claim to honesty and the liar’s is that the liar’s claim is

illegitimate. From this discrepancy between what liars claim and

what they believe to be true, we can predict likely cues to deceit.

Implications of the Deception Discrepancy

Two implications of the deception discrepancy are most impor-

tant: First, deceptive self-presentations are often not as convinc-

ingly embraced as truthful ones. Second, social actors typically

experience a greater sense of deliberateness when their perfor-

mances are deceptive than when they are honest. These predictions

are the starting point for our theoretical analyses. There are also

qualifications to the predictions, and we describe those as well.

Deceptive Self-Presentations Are Not as Fully Embraced

as Truthful Ones

The most significant implication of the deception discrepancy is

that social actors typically are unwilling, or unable, to embrace

their false claims as convincingly as they embrace their truthful

ones (cf. Mehrabian, 1972; Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968). Several

factors undermine the conviction with which liars make their own

cases. First, liars, in knowingly making false claims, may suffer

moral qualms that do not plague truth tellers. These qualms may

account for the faint feelings of discomfort described by the tellers

of everyday lies (B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996). Second,

even in the absence of any moral misgivings, liars may not have

the same personal investment in their claims as do truth tellers.

When social actors truthfully describe important aspects of them-

selves, their emotional investment in their claims may be readily

apparent (B. M. DePaulo, Epstein, & LeMay, 1990). Furthermore,

those self-relevant claims are backed by an accumulation of

knowledge, experience, and wisdom that most liars can only

imagine (Markus, 1977). Liars may offer fewer details, not only

because they have less familiarity with the domain they are de-

scribing, but also to allow for fewer opportunities to be disproved

(Vrij, 2000).

In sum, compared with truth tellers, many liars do not have the

moral high ground, the emotional investment, or the evidentiary

basis for staking their claims. As a result, liars relate their tales in

a less compelling manner, and they appear less forthcoming, less

pleasant, and more tense.

Deceptive Self-Presenters Are Likely to Experience a

Greater Sense of Deliberateness Than Truthful Ones

Cues to deliberateness. When attempting to convey impres-

sions they know to be false, social actors are likely to experience

a sense of deliberateness. When instead people are behaving in

ways they see as consistent with their attitudes, beliefs, emotions,

and self-images, they typically have the sense of “just acting

We could have described our theoretical formulation as impression

management rather than self-presentation. Impression management in-

cludes attempts to control the impressions that are formed of others, as well

as impressions formed of oneself (e.g., Schlenker, 2002). We chose self-

presentation because of the central role in our formulation of the impres-

sion of sincerity conveyed by the actor. Even when people are lying about

the characteristics of another person, the effectiveness of those lies depends

on their own success at appearing sincere.

CUES TO DECEPTION

naturally.”They are presenting certain roles and personal qualities

to others, and they expect to be seen as truthful, but they do not

ordinarily experience this as requiring any special effort or atten-

tion. Our claim is not that people acting honestly never experience

a sense of deliberateness. Sometimes they do, as for example,

when the thoughts or feelings they are trying to communicate are

difficult to express or when the stakes for a compelling perfor-

mance are high; however, the focus of their deliberateness is

typically limited to the content of their performance and not its

credibility. Liars usually make an effort to seem credible; truth

tellers more often take their credibility for granted (B. M. DePaulo,

LeMay, & Epstein, 1991).

Deliberate attempts to manage impressions, including impres-

sions of credibility, are attempts at self-regulation, and self-

regulation consumes mental resources (Baumeister, 1998). Social

actors who are performing deceptively may experience greater

self-regulatory busyness than those who are performing honestly.

Even when the attempted performance is the same (e.g., conveying

enthusiasm), the self-regulatory demands may be greater for the

liar. Enthusiasm flows effortlessly from those who truly are expe-

riencing enthusiasm, but fakers have to marshal theirs. Liars can be

preoccupied with the task of reminding themselves to act the part

that truth tellers are not just role-playing but living.

Other thoughts and feelings could also burden liars more than

truth tellers (Ekman, 1985/1992). These include thoughts about

whether the performance is succeeding, feelings about this (e.g.,

anxiety), and feelings about the fabricated performance (e.g., guilt)

or about discreditable past acts that the liar is trying to hide.

To the extent that liars are more preoccupied with these intru-

sive mental contents than are truth tellers, their performance could

suffer. For example, they could seem less involved and engaged in

the interaction, and any attempts at cordiality could seem strained.

People busy with self-regulatory tasks, compared with those who

are not so busy, sometimes process concurrent information less

deeply (Gilbert & Krull, 1988; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988;

Richards & Gross, 1999) and perform less well at subsequent

self-regulatory tasks (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice,

1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). One potential impli-

cation of this regulatory depletion may be that liars fail to notice

some of the ways in which the targets of their lies are reacting (cf.

Butterworth, 1978). (This is contrary to Buller & Burgoon’s, 1996,

assumption that liars monitor targets closely for feedback.) An-

other implication is that liars’busyness could compromise their

attempts to generate detailed responses of their own.

One likely response to the offending thoughts and feelings liars

experience is to try to control them. For example, liars can try not

to think about their blemished past or the insincerity of their

ongoing performance. However, attempts at thought suppression

can backfire, resulting in even greater preoccupation with those

thoughts (Wegner, 1994). Attempts to regulate emotional experi-

ences can also augment rather than dissipate the targeted feelings

(e.g., Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993) and increase physiological

activation (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993; Richards &

Gross, 1999).

The primary target of liars’efforts at self-regulation, though, is

probably not their thoughts and feelings but their overt behaviors.

In theory, liars could adopt the goal of trying to appear honest and

sincere, which in some instances could involve trying to behave in

the generally positive and friendly way that they believe to be

more characteristic of truth tellers than of liars (Malone, DePaulo,

Adams, & Cooper, 2002). Especially confident and skilled liars

may do just that, and succeed (cf. Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995).

However, it may be more commonplace for people who are mis-

leading others to adopt the defensive goal of trying not to get

caught (e.g., Bell & DePaulo, 1996; B. M. DePaulo & Bell, 1996).

Liars pursuing this strategy may try to avoid behaving in the ways

that they think liars behave. One risk to this strategy is that some

of their beliefs about how liars behave may be wrong. For exam-

ple, social perceivers typically believe that liars cannot stay still;

they expect them to fidget, shift their posture, and shake their legs

(Malone et al., 2002; Vrij, 2000). In trying to avoid these move-

ments (either directly or as a result of the higher level goal of

trying not to give anything away), liars may appear to be holding

back. A sense of involvement and positive engagement would be

lacking.

Deliberate attempts by liars at controlling expressive behaviors,

such as attempts to control thoughts and feelings, can be the seeds

of their own destruction (e.g., B. M. DePaulo, 1992; B. M. De-

Paulo & Friedman, 1998). One route to failure is to try to regulate

expressive behaviors, such as tone of voice, that may not be so

amenable to willful control (e.g., Scherer, 1986). It is possible, for

example, that people’s attempts not to sound anxious would result

in an even higher pitched and anxious sounding tone of voice than

would have resulted if they had not deliberately tried to quiet the

sounds of their insecurity. Another path to self-betrayal is to direct

efforts at expressive control at the wrong level (Vallacher &

Wegner, 1987; Vallacher, Wegner, McMahan, Cotter, & Larsen,

1992). For example, social actors who ordinarily convey convinc-

ing impressions of sincerity and friendliness may instead seem

phony if they deliberately try to smile and nod. In focusing on

specific behaviors, they may be unwittingly breaking apart the

components of the well-practiced and established routine of acting

friendly (e.g., Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). The process may be

akin to what happens to experienced typists who try to focus on the

location of each of the characters on the keyboard instead of typing

in their usual un-self-conscious way. Finally, if some behaviors are

more controllable than others, or if liars only try to control some

behaviors and not others, discrepancies could develop.

In sum, we predicted that to the extent that liars (more than truth

tellers), deliberately try to control their expressive behaviors,

thoughts, and feelings, their performances would be compromised.

They would seem less forthcoming, less convincing, less pleasant,

and more tense.

Moderators of the strength of cues to deliberateness. As the

motivation to tell a successful lie increases, liars may redouble

their deliberate efforts at self-regulation, resulting in an even more

debilitated performance (B. M. DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; B. M.

Certain deceptive exchanges are so often practiced that they, too,

unfold in a way that feels effortless (e.g., looking at the baby picture

proffered by the proud parents and exclaiming that the bald wrinkled blob

is just adorable). Lies told in these instances may be guided by what Bargh

(1989) described as goal-dependent automaticity. Although they may not

feel like deliberate lies, the critical intent to mislead is clearly present. The

flatterer would feel mortified if the parents realized he or she thought the

baby was hideous. It is in part because the sense of deliberateness is critical

to people’s sense of having lied that these exchanges are so often unrec-

ognized as lies.

78 DEPAULO ET AL.

DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien, 1988; B. M. DePaulo,

Stone, & Lassiter, 1985b; see also Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, in press).

We tested this proposed moderator of cues to deception by com-

paring the results of studies in which inducements were offered for

success at deceit with studies in which no special attempts were

made to motivate the participants.

As we have noted all along, identity-relevant concerns are

fundamental to deceptive and nondeceptive communications. They

appear even in the absence of any special motivational induction.

Such concerns can, however, be exacerbated by incentives that are

linked specifically to people’s identities and images. In the liter-

ature we are reviewing, identity-relevant motivators include ones

in which skill at deception was described as indicative of people’s

competence or of their prospects for success at their chosen ca-

reers. Other identity-relevant motivators raised the self-

presentational stakes by informing participants that their perfor-

mances would be evaluated or scrutinized. Compared with other

kinds of incentives such as money or material rewards, identity-

relevant incentives are more likely to exacerbate public self-

awareness, increase rumination, and undermine self-confidence.

All of these factors can further disrupt performance (e.g., Baumeis-

ter, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1981; B. M. DePaulo et al., 1991;

Wicklund, 1982; Wine, 1971; see also Gibbons, 1990). Conse-

quently, tellers of identity-relevant lies seem especially less forth-

coming, less pleasant, and more tense. They also tell tales that

seem less compelling.

In sum, our predictions were that cues to deception would be

stronger and more numerous among people who have been moti-

vated to succeed in their self-presentations than for those who have

not been given any special incentive. This predicted impairment

would be even more evident when incentives are identity relevant

than when they are not.

Qualifications. There are two important qualifications to our

discussion of the effects of deliberate attempts at self-regulation.

One is that an increase in self-regulatory demands does not always

result in a decrement in performance. When attempts at self-

regulation shift the focus of attention away from negative self-

relevant thoughts (Pontari & Schlenker, 2000) or from the indi-

vidual components of the task (Lewis & Linder, 1997),

performance can improve.

The second is that the self-regulatory demands of lying do not

always exceed those of telling the truth. For example, honest but

insecure actors may be more preoccupied with thoughts of failure

than deceptive but cocky ones. In addition, for most any social

actor, the telling of truths that impugn the truth teller’s character or

cause pain or harm to others may pose far greater self-regulatory

challenges than the telling of lies about the same topics.

Finally, it is important, as always, to bear in mind the nature of

the lies that people tell in their everyday lives. Most are little lies

that are so often practiced and told with such equanimity that the

self-regulatory demands may be nearly indistinguishable from the

demands of telling the truth. Therefore, we expected the conse-

quences of deliberate self-regulation that we have described to be

generally weak and that stronger effects of attempted control

would be evident in studies in which participants were motivated

to get away with their lies, particularly if the motivations were

identity relevant.

The Formulation of Deceptive and

Nondeceptive Presentations

The self-regulatory demands we have just described are those

involved in executing the deceptive and nondeceptive perfor-

mances. Earlier descriptions of deceptive communications focused

primarily on the processes involved in formulating lies. We con-

sider those next. As we elaborate below, we reject the argument

that lies are necessarily more difficult to construct than truths. Still,

we predicted that lies would generally be shorter and less detailed

than truths. In doing so, we drew from the literatures on the use of

scripts as guides to storytelling, the differences between accounts

of events that have or have not been personally experienced, and

lay misconceptions about the nature of truthful communications.

Cues to the Formulation of Lies

Previous formulations have typically maintained that it is more

difficult to lie than to tell the truth because telling lies involves the

construction of new and never-experienced tales whereas telling

the truth is a simple matter of telling it like it is (e.g., Buller &

Burgoon, 1996; Miller & Stiff, 1993; Zuckerman et al., 1981; but

see McCornack, 1997, for an important exception). We disagree

with both assumptions—that lies always need to be assembled and

that truths can simply be removed from the box. When the truth is

hard to tell (e.g., when it would hurt the other person’s feelings),

then a careful piecing together of just the right parts in just the

right way would be in order. But even totally mundane and

nonthreatening truths can be conveyed in a nearly infinite variety

of shapes and sizes. For example, in response to the question “How

was your day?”on a day when nothing special happened, the

answer could be “Fine,”a listing of the main events (but, what

counts as a main event?), or a description of a part of the day. Even

in the latter instance, there is no one self-evident truth. As much

work on impression management has indicated (e.g., Schlenker,

1980, 1985), presentations are edited differently depending on

identity-relevant cues, such as the teller’s relationship with the

other person and the interaction goals. Yet all of this editing can

occur within the bounds of truthfulness.

Truths, then, are not often prepackaged. But lies can be. A

teenage girl who had permission to spend the night at a girlfriend’s

home but instead went camping with a boyfriend may have no

difficulty spinning a tale to tell to her parents the next morning. For

example, she can easily access a script for what spending the night

at a girlfriend’s home typically involves. Or, she could relate her

best friend’s favorite story about an evening at the home of a

girlfriend. Lies based on scripts or familiar stories are unlikely to

be marked by the signs of mental effort (described below) that may

characterize lies that are fabricated. The teller of scripts and of

familiar stories may also be less likely to get tangled in contradic-

tions than the liar who makes up a new story.

Even prepackaged lies, however, may be shorter and less de-

tailed than truthful answers. Liars working from scripts may have

only the basics of the scripted event in mind (e.g., Smith, 1998),

and liars who have borrowed their stories have at hand only those

details they were told (and of those, only the ones they remember).

All lies, whether scripted, borrowed, or assembled anew, could

be shorter and less detailed than truthful accounts for another

reason: The truthful accounts are based on events that were actu-

CUES TO DECEPTION

ally experienced, whereas the lies are not. The literature on reality

monitoring (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981) suggests ways in which

memories of past experiences or perceptions (i.e., memories based

on external sources) differ from memories of experiences that were

imagined (i.e., memories based on internal sources). This perspec-

tive can be applied to the prediction of cues to deception only by

extrapolation, because reality monitoring describes processes of

remembering whereas deception describes processes of relating

(Vrij, 2000). In relating a story, even a truthful one, people often

fill in gaps and in other ways create a more coherent tale than their

memories actually support. Nonetheless, deceptive accounts may

differ from truthful ones in ways that weakly parallel the ways in

which memories of imagined experiences differ from memories of

externally based experiences. If so, then truthful accounts would

be clearer, more vivid, and more realistic than deceptive ones, and

they would include more sensory information and contextual cues.

Deceptive accounts, in contrast, should be more likely to include

references to cognitive processes such as thoughts and inferences

made at the time of the event.

The conventional wisdom that lies are more difficult to formu-

late than truths is most likely to be supported when liars make up

new stories. Lies that are fabricated mostly from scratch are likely

to be shorter and more internally inconsistent than truths and to be

preceded by longer latencies. Signs of mental effort may also be

evident. These could include increases in pauses and speech dis-

turbances (Berger, Karol, & Jordan, 1989; Butterworth &

Goldman-Eisler, 1979; Christenfeld, 1994; Goldman-Eisler, 1968;

Mahl, 1987; Schachter, Christenfeld, Ravina, & Bilous, 1991;

Siegman, 1987), more pupil dilation (E. H. Hess & Polt, 1963;

Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman & Beatty, 1967; Kahneman, Tursky,

Shapiro, & Crider, 1969; Stanners, Coulter, Sweet, & Murphy,

1979; Stern & Dunham, 1990), decreased blinking (Bagley &

Manelis, 1979; Holland & Tarlow, 1972, 1975; Wallbott &

Scherer, 1991), and decreased eye contact (Fehr & Exline, 1987).

People who are preoccupied with the formulation of a complex lie

may appear to be less involved and expressive, as well as less

forthcoming.

Unfortunately, in the literature we are reviewing, liars were

almost never asked how they came up with their lies, and truth

tellers were not asked how they decided which version of the truth

to relate (e.g., a short version or a long one). In the only study we

know of in which liars were asked about the origins of their lies

(Malone, Adams, Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1997), the most

common answer was not any we have considered so far. More than

half the time, liars said that they based their lies on experiences

from their own lives, altering critical details. With this strategy,

liars may be just as adept as truth tellers at accessing a wealth of

details, including clear and vivid sensory details.

Still, even the most informed and advantaged liars may make

mistakes if they share common misconceptions of what truthful

accounts really are like (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). For example,

if liars believe that credible accounts are highly structured and

coherent, with few digressions or inessential details, their accounts

may be smoother and more pat than those of truth tellers. The

embedding of a story in its spatial and temporal context and the

relating of the specifics of the conversation may provide a richness

to the accounts of truth tellers that liars do not even think to

simulate. Liars may also fail to appreciate that memory is fallible

and reporting skills are imperfect even when people are telling the

truth and that truth tellers who are not concerned about their

credibility may not be defensive about admitting their uncertain-

ties. Consequently, truth tellers may express self-doubts, claim

they do not remember things, or spontaneously correct something

they already said, whereas liars would scrupulously avoid such

admissions of imperfection. The stories told by liars, then, would

be too good to be true.

Liars can also fail if they know less than their targets do about

the topic of the deceit. The babysitter who claims to have taken the

kids to the zoo and relates how excited they were to see the lion,

would be undone by the parent who knows that there are no lions

at that zoo. The man suspected of being a pedophile who points to

his service as leader of his church’s youth group may believe he is

painting a picture of a pillar of the community, whereas instead he

has unwittingly described just the sort of volunteer work that is a

favorite of known pedophiles (Steller & Kohnken, 1989; Un-

deutsch, 1989; Yuille & Cutshall, 1989).

Moderators of Cues to the Formulation of Lies

Factors that alter the cognitive load for liars are candidates for

moderators of cognitive cues to deception. We consider two such

moderators in this review: the opportunity to plan a presentation

and the duration of that presentation.

Liars who have an opportunity to plan their difficult lies, relative

to those who must formulate their lies on the spot, may be able to

generate more compelling presentations (e.g., H. D. O’Hair, Cody,

& McLaughlin, 1981; Vrij, 2000). Because they can do some of

their thinking in advance, their response latencies could be shorter

and their answers longer. However, mistakes that follow from

misconceptions about the nature of truthful responses would not be

averted by planning and may even be exacerbated.

We think that, in theory, cues to deception could occur even for

the simplest lies. For example, when just a “yes”or “no”answer

is required, a lie could be betrayed by a longer response latency in

instances in which the truth comes to mind more readily and must

be set aside and replaced by the lie (Walczyk, Roper, & Seeman,

in press). However, we believe that the cognitive burdens gener-

ally would be greater when a short answer would not suffice and

that cues to deception would therefore become clearer and more

numerous as the duration of the response increases. For example,

lies may be especially briefer than truths when people are expected

to tell a story rather than to respond with just a few words. Also,

Statement Validity (or Reality) Analysis was developed initially by

Undeutsch (1989) to assess the credibility of child witnesses in cases of

alleged sexual abuse. The overall assessment includes an evaluation of the

characteristics and possible motives of the child witness. It also includes a

set of 19 criteria to be applied to transcripts of statements made by the

witness (Steller & Kohnken, 1989). This analysis of witness statements,

called Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), was subsequently applied

to the analysis of statements made by adults in other kinds of criminal

proceedings and in experimental research (e.g., Yuille & Cutshall, 1989).

All of the characteristics discussed in this section of our review, from the

excessive structure and coherence of accounts to the typical characteristics

of criminals or crimes related by people who do not realize their signifi-

cance, are drawn from CBCA, though some of the interpretations are our

own. The use of CBCA to analyze statements made by adults is contro-

versial (e.g., Vrij, 2000).

80 DEPAULO ET AL.

liars who are experiencing affects and emotions that they are trying

to hide may be more likely to show those feelings when they need

to sustain their lies longer (cf. Ekman, 1985/1992).

The Role of Identity-Relevant Emotions in Deceptive and

Nondeceptive Presentations

People experience the unpleasant emotional state of guilt when

they have done something wrong or believe that others may think

that they have (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Even

more aversive is the feeling of shame that occurs when people fail

to meet their own personal moral standards (Keltner & Buswell,

1996; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; see also Scheff,

2001). Some lies, especially serious ones, are motivated by a desire

to cover up a personal failing or a discreditable thought, feeling, or

deed (e.g., B. M. DePaulo, Ansfield, et al., 2002). Yet those who

tell the truth about their transgressions or failings may feel even

greater guilt and shame than those whose shortcomings remain

hidden by their lies. If the behavior of truthful transgressors was

compared with that of deceptive transgressors, cues to these self-

conscious emotions would be more in evidence for the truth tellers,

if they distinguished them from the liars at all. In most studies,

however (including all of the studies of transgressions included in

this review), liars who had transgressed were compared with truth

tellers who had not. For those comparisons, then, we expected to

find that liars, compared with truth tellers, showed more shame

and guilt cues.

There is no documented facial expression that is specific to

guilt; therefore, we expected to find only more general cues to

negativity and distress (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Keltner &

Harker, 1998). Shame, however, does seem to have a characteristic

demeanor that includes gaze aversion, a closed posture, and a

tendency to withdraw (Keltner & Harker, 1998).

Lies about transgressions, though, are the exceptions, both in

everyday life and in the studies in this review. The more common-

place lies cover truths that are not especially discrediting. For

example, people may not feel that it is wrong to have an opinion

that differs from someone else’s or to hide their envy of a cowork-

er’s success. In most instances, then, we did not, on the basis of the

hidden information alone, expect to find more guilt cues in liars

than in truth tellers.

By definition, though, there is a sense in which all liars are

candidates for experiencing guilt and shame, as they all have done

something that could be considered wrong: They have intention-

ally misled someone. Truth tellers have not. It is important to note,

however, that liars do not always feel badly about their lies, and

truth tellers do not always feel good about their honesty. In fact,

liars often claim that in telling their lies, they have spared their

targets from the greater distress that would have resulted had they

told the truth (B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996).

Guilt and shame are not the only emotions that have been

hypothesized to betray liars. Fear of being detected has also been

described as responsible for cues to deception (e.g., Ekman, 1985/

1992). We believed fear of detection would also vary importantly

with factors such as the nature of the behavior that is covered by

the lie. Liars would fear detection when hiding behaviors such as

transgressions, which often elicit punishment or disapproval. But

the more typical liars, those who claim that their movie preferences

match those of their dates or who conceal their pride in their own

work, would have little to fear from the discovery of that hidden

information.

People may fear detection not only because of the nature of the

behavior they are hiding but also because of the implications of

being perceived as dishonest (Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher,

2001). The blemishes in perceived and self-perceived integrity that

could result from a discovered deception depend on factors such as

the justifiability of the deceit and are often quite minimal. But even

utterly trivial lies told in the spirit of kindness, such as false

reassurances about new and unbecoming hairstyles, have identity

implications if discovered. For instance, the purveyors of such

kind lies may be less often trusted when honest feedback really is

desired.

Across all of the lies in our data set, we expected to find weak

cues to anxiety and negativity. For example, liars may look and

sound more anxious than truth tellers (Slivken & Buss, 1984) and

speak less fluently (Kasl & Mahl, 1965; Mahl, 1987) and in a

higher pitch (Kappas, Hess, & Scherer, 1991; Scherer, 1986). They

may also blink more (Harrigan & O’Connell, 1996), and their

pupils may be more dilated (Scott, Wells, Wood, & Morgan, 1967;

Simpson & Molloy, 1971; Stanners et al., 1979). Relative to truth

tellers, liars may also make more negative statements and com-

plaints, sound less pleasant, and look less friendly and less attrac-

tive. In a moderator analysis comparing lies about transgressions

with other kinds of lies, we expected to find more pronounced

distress cues in the lies about transgressions.

Convergent Perspectives on the Strength

of Cues to Deceit

Our self-presentational perspective has led us to reject the view

that lie telling is typically a complicated, stressful, guilt-inducing

process that produces clear and strong cues. Instead, we believe

that most deceptive presentations are so routinely and competently

executed that they leave only faint behavioral residues. Fiedler and

Walka (1993) offered a similar point of view. They argued that

ordinary people are so practiced, so proficient, and so emotionally

unfazed by the telling of untruths that they can be regarded as

professional liars. Therefore, they also expected to find mostly

only weak links between verbal and nonverbal behaviors and the

telling of lies. Bond, Kahler, and Paolicelli (1985), arguing from

an evolutionary perspective, drew a similar conclusion. Any bla-

tantly obvious cues to deceit, they contended, would have been

recognized by human perceivers long ago; evolution favors more

flexible deceivers.

Methodological Implications of the

Self-Presentational Perspective

Our self-presentational perspective suggests that social actors

try to convey particular impressions of themselves, both when

lying and when telling the truth, and that social perceivers rou-

tinely form impressions of others. We have conceptualized the

ways in which lies could differ from truths in terms of the different

impressions that deceptive self-presentations could convey. For

example, we hypothesized that liars would seem more distant than

truth tellers. One way to assess differences in distancing is to code

the many behaviors believed to be indicative of nonimmediacy,

such as the use of the passive rather than the active voice, the use

CUES TO DECEPTION

of negations rather than assertions, and looking away rather than

maintaining eye contact. This approach, which is the usual one, has

the advantage that the behaviors of interest are clearly defined and

objectively measured. However, for many of the kinds of impres-

sions that social actors attempt to convey, the full range of behav-

iors that contribute to the impression may be unknown. For ex-

ample, Wiener and Mehrabian (1968; Mehrabian, 1972) have

described a precise set of behaviors that they believed to be

indicative of verbal and nonverbal immediacy and have reported

some supportive data. However, others who have discussed im-

mediacy and related constructs have included other cues (e.g.,

Brown & Levinson, 1987; Fleming, 1994; Fleming & Rudman,

1993; Holtgraves, 1986; Searle, 1975). This raises the possibility

that social perceivers, who can often form valid impressions even

from rather thin slices of social behavior (e.g., Ambady &

Rosenthal, 1992), can discriminate truths from lies by their sub-

jective impressions of the constructs of interest (e.g., distancing)

just as well, if not better, than can objective coding systems (cf.

B. M. DePaulo, 1994; Malone & DePaulo, 2001). To test this

possibility, we used objective and subjective measurement as

levels of a moderator variable in analyses of cues for which

multiple independent estimates of both levels were available.

Summary of Predictions

Predicted Cues

The self-presentational perspective predicts five categories of

cues to deception. First, liars are predicted to be less forthcoming

than truth tellers. The model predicts they will respond less, and in

less detail, and they will seem to be holding back. For example,

liars’response latencies would be longer (an indication of cogni-

tive complexity in the Zuckerman et al., 1981, model) and their

speech would be slower (a thinking cue in Ekman’s, 1985/1992,

formulation). Second, the tales told by liars are predicted to be less

compelling than those told by truth tellers. Specifically, liars

would seem to make less sense than truth tellers (e.g., there would

be more discrepancies in their accounts), and they would seem less

engaging, less immediate, more uncertain, less fluent, and less

active than truth tellers. Zuckerman et al. (1981) predicted that

discrepancies would occur as a result of attempted control, and

Ekman (1985/1992) regarded them as a thinking cue. Less imme-

diacy (more distancing) was described as a possible cue to detec-

tion apprehension and guilt by Ekman (1985/1992) and Zucker-

man et al. (1981), and it was regarded as a strategic behavior by

Buller and Burgoon (1996).

The self-presentational perspective also predicts that liars will

be less positive and pleasant than truth tellers, as is also suggested

by the description of cues to guilt and apprehensiveness put forth

by Ekman (1985/1992) and Zuckerman et al. (1981). The fourth

prediction of the self-presentational perspective is that liars will be

more tense than truth tellers. Some cues to tension, such as higher

pitch, have sometimes been conceptualized as indicative of undif-

ferentiated arousal (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1981). Finally, the

self-presentational perspective alone predicts that liars will include

fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual contents in their stories

than will truth tellers.

Predicted Moderators

A number of perspectives, including the self-presentational one,

maintain that cues to deception, when combined across all lies,

will be weak. However, several factors are predicted to moderate

the strength of the cues. From a self-presentational point of view,

cues to negativity and tension should be stronger when lies are

about transgressions than when they are not. The self-presentation

formulation also maintains that cues will be clearer and more

numerous when told under conditions of high motivation to suc-

ceed, especially when the motivation is identity relevant. Buller

and Burgoon (1996), in contrast, predicted stronger cues when the

liars’motives are instrumental. They also predicted more pleas-

antness, immediacy, composure, and fluency with increasing

interactivity.

The self-presentation model predicts that for social actors who

have an opportunity to plan their performances, compared with

those who do not, response latency will be a less telling cue to

deception. Also, as the duration of a response increases, cues to

deception will be more in evidence. Finally, the model predicts

that cues assessed by subjective impressions will more powerfully

discriminate truths from lies than the same cues assessed

objectively.

A predicted moderator of cues to deception can be tested only if

the moderator variable can be reliably coded from the information

that is reported and if multiple estimates of the relevant cues are

available for each of the levels of the moderator. Some of the

predictions generated by the perspectives we have reviewed could

not be tested, and that obstacle limited our ability to evaluate each

of the perspectives comprehensively. The self-presentational per-

spective, for example, points to the potential importance of a

number of moderators we could not test, such as the communica-

tor’s confidence and focus of attention and the emotional impli-

cations of the truths or lies for the targets of those messages. The

self-presentational perspective, as well as the formulations of

Ekman (1985/1992) and Buller and Burgoon (1996), all suggest

that the liar’s relationship with the target may be another important

moderator of cues to deception (see also Anderson, DePaulo, &

Ansfield, 2002; Levine & McCornack, 1992; Stiff, Kim, &

Ramesh, 1992). However, the number of studies in which the liars

and targets were not strangers was too small to test this moderator.

Method

Literature Search Procedures

We used literature search procedures recommended by Cooper (1998) to

retrieve relevant studies. First, we conducted computer-based searches of

Psychological Abstracts (PsycLIT) and Dissertation Abstracts Interna-

tional through September of 1995 using the key words deception,deceit,

lie, and detection and combinations of those words. Second, we examined

the reference lists from previous reviews (B. M. DePaulo et al., 1985a;

Zuckerman et al., 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Third, we reviewed

the reference lists from more than 300 articles on the communication of

deception from Bella M. DePaulo’s personal files and the references lists

from any new articles added as a result of the computer search. Fourth, we

sent letters requesting relevant papers to 62 scholars who had published on

the communication of deception. We also asked those scholars to continue

to send us their papers in the coming years. We repeated our computer

search in October of 1999. No other reports were added after that date.

82 DEPAULO ET AL.

Criteria for Inclusion and Exclusion of Studies

We included reports in which behavior while lying was compared with

behavior while telling the truth. Behaviors that were measured objectively,

as well as those based on others’impressions (e.g., impressions that the

social actors seemed nervous or evasive), were all included. Physiological

indices with no discernible behavioral manifestation (e.g., galvanic skin

response, heart rate) were not included, nor were senders’(i.e., social

actors’) reports of their own behaviors. We excluded reports that were not

in English and reports in which the senders were not adults (i.e., under 17

years old). We included data from adult senders in reports of children and

adults if we could compute effect sizes separately for the subset of the data

in which both the senders and the judges were adults. We excluded reports

in which senders role-played an imagined person in an imagined situation

because we were concerned that the imaginary aspects of these paradigms

could sever the connection between social actors and their self-

presentations that is important to our theoretical analysis.

There were several reports from which we could not extract useful data.

For example, Yerkes and Berry (1909) reported one experiment based on

just one sender and another based on two. Studies comparing different

kinds of lies without also comparing them with truths (e.g., di Battista &

Abrahams, 1995) were not included. Studies describing individual differ-

ences in cues to deception that did not also report overall differences

between truths and lies (e.g., Siegman & Reynolds, 1983) were also

excluded. A series of reports based on the same independent sample (e.g.,

Buller, Burgoon, Buslig, & Roiger, 1996, Study 2) were excluded as well.

(For a detailed explanation, see B. M. DePaulo, Ansfield, & Bell, 1996).

Determining Independent Samples

Our final data set consisted of 120 independent samples from 116 reports

(see Table 1). Of those 120 samples in our review, only 32 were included

in the Zuckerman et al. (1981) review.

Most often, the behaviors of a particular sample of senders were de-

scribed in just one report. For example, Bond et al. (1985) coded 11

different cues from 34 different senders. The behaviors of those 34 senders

were not described in any other report. Therefore, we considered the

sample of senders from that study to be an independent sample. Sometimes

senders were divided into different subgroups (e.g., men and women,

Jordanians and Americans, senders who planned their messages and dif-

ferent senders who did not), and cues to deception were reported separately

for each of those subgroups. In those instances, we considered each of the

subgroups to be an independent sample. For example, Bond, Omar, Mah-

moud, and Bonser (1990) coded 10 different cues separately for the 60

Jordanian senders and the 60 American senders. Therefore, the Jordanian

senders were one independent sample and the Americans were another.

In 11 instances, data from the same senders were published in different

reports. For example, Hadjistavropoulos and Craig (1994) coded 11 cues

from 90 senders, and Hadjistavropoulos, Craig, Hadjistavropoulos, and

Poole (1996) coded two cues from the same 90 senders. Therefore, the

samples described in those two reports were not independent. In Table 1,

they have the same letter code in the column labeled “Ind. sample code.”

Most samples listed in Table 1 have no letter code in that column; all of

those samples are independent samples.

All estimates of a particular cue were included in the analyses of that

cue. We used independent sample codes, not to exclude data, but to

estimate degrees of freedom properly and to weight estimates appropri-

ately. As we explain in more detail below, multiple estimates of the same

cue that came from the same independent sample were averaged before

being entered into the analyses.

Cue Definitions

Within the sample of studies, 158 different behaviors or impressions,

which we call cues to deception, were reported. These are defined in

Appendix A. We categorized most of the 158 cues into the five categories

that followed from our theoretical analysis. To determine whether liars are

less forthcoming than truth tellers, we looked at cues indicative of the

amount of their responding (e.g., response length), the level of detail and

complexity of their responses, and the degree to which they seemed to be

holding back (e.g., pressing lips; Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, &

Monarch, 1998). To explore whether liars tell less compelling tales than

truth tellers, we examined cues indicating whether the presentations

seemed to make sense (e.g., plausibility), whether they were engaging (e.g.,

involving), and whether they were immediate (e.g., eye contact) instead of

distancing. Self-presentations that fell short on characteristics such as

certainty, fluency, or animation may also seem less compelling, so we

included those cues, too. In the third category, we included cues indicating

whether liars are less positive and pleasant than truth tellers, and in the

fourth, we collected behaviors indicating whether liars are more tense than

truth tellers. Finally, in the last category, we determined whether deceptive

self-presentations included fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual con-

tents than truthful ones by examining cues such as spontaneous corrections

and descriptions of superfluous details.

For clarity, we assigned a number, from 1 to 158, to each cue. Cue

numbers are shown along with the cue names and definitions in Appendix

A. The last column of Table 1 lists all of the cues reported in each study

and the number of estimates of each.

Variables Coded From Each Report

From each report, we coded characteristics of the senders, characteristics

of the truths and lies, publication statistics, and methodological aspects of

the studies (see Table 2). In the category of sender characteristics we coded

the population sampled (e.g., students, suspects in crimes, patients in pain

clinics, people from the community), the senders’country, and the rela-

tionship between the sender and the interviewer or target of the commu-

nications (e.g., strangers, acquaintances, friends). We also coded senders’

race or ethnicity and their precise ages, but this information was rarely

reported and therefore could not be analyzed.

To test our predictions about the links between senders’motivations and

cues to deception, we determined whether senders had identity-relevant

incentives, instrumental incentives, both kinds of incentives, or no special

incentives. Coded as identity-relevant were studies in which senders’

success was described as indicative of their competence at their chosen

profession or reflective of their intelligence or other valued characteristics.

Also included were studies in which senders expected to be evaluated or

scrutinized. Studies in which senders were motivated by money or material

rewards were coded as primarily instrumental. Studies in which both

incentives were offered to senders were classified separately.

The characteristics of the messages that we coded included their duration

and whether senders had an opportunity to prepare. If senders had an

opportunity to prepare some but not all of their messages, but behavioral

differences were not reported separately, we classified the study as having

some prepared and some unprepared messages. In other studies, the mes-

sages were scripted. For example, senders may have been instructed to give

a particular response in order to hold verbal cues constant so that investi-

gators could assess nonverbal characteristics of truths and lies more

precisely.

We also coded the experimental paradigm used to elicit the truths and

lies or the context in which they occurred. In some studies, senders lied or

told the truth about their beliefs or opinions or about personal facts. In

others, senders looked at videotapes, films, slides, or pictures and described

(text continues on page 89)

There were three unpublished reports (describing results from four

independent samples) in the Zuckerman et al. (1981) review that we were

unable to retrieve for this review.

CUES TO DECEPTION

Table 1

Summary of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis

Report NNo. of

effect sizes No. of

cues Ind. sample

code

Mot

Trans

Msg Int

Cues

Alonso-Quecuty (1992) P

Unplanned messages 11 5 5 0 0 001, 005, 037, 076, 085

Planned messages 11 5 5 0 0 001, 005, 037, 076, 085

Anolli & Ciceri (1997) 31 36 12 0 0 L 1 001 (8), 004 (2), 010 (6), 032 (2), 039 (2),

063 (2), 094 (2), 097 (2), 110 (2), 112

(2), 113 (2), 140 (4)

Berrien & Huntington (1943) 32 1 1 2 1 1 155

Bond et al. (1985) 34 11 11 2 0 1 003, 022, 027, 035, 038, 044, 045, 046,

052, 058, 068

Bond et al. (1990)

Jordanians 60 10 10 0 0 L 1 001, 027, 037, 038, 045, 046, 052, 058,

066, 068

Americans 60 10 10 0 0 L 1 001, 027, 037, 038, 045, 046, 052, 058,

066, 068

Bradley & Janisse (1979/1980) 60 1 1 0 0 L 1 065

Bradley & Janisse (1981) 192 1 1 2 1 1 065

Buller & Aune (1987) 130 17 15 0 0 1 016, 018, 026, 027, 028, 044 (2), 053, 054

(2), 055, 064, 067, 068, 069, 105, 119

Buller et al. (1996) 120 4 4 A 0 0 L 1 021, 022, 023, 101

Buller et al. (1989) 148 18 16 0 0 L 1 001 (2), 009, 017, 018, 027 (2), 034, 037,

040, 044, 055, 058, 067, 068, 069, 111,

119

Burgoon & Buller (1994) 120 4 4 A 0 0 1 026, 053, 054, 061

Burgoon, Buller, Afifi, et al. (1996) 61 8 5 0 0 1 001, 015 (4), 064, 104, 106

Burgoon, Buller, Floyd, & Grandpre

(1996)

Interactants 18 11 8 0 0 1 004, 015 (2), 025 (2), 026, 031, 049, 061,

115 (2)

Observers 10 11 8 0 0 1 004, 015 (2), 025 (2), 026, 031, 049, 061,

115 (2)

Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, et al. (1996) 40 4 2 0 0 1 004, 025 (3)

Burns & Kintz (1976) 20 2 1 0 1 1 027 (2)

Chiba (1985) 16 4 2 0 0 L 1 033 (2), 066 (2)

Christensen (1980) 12 6 3 0 0 1 016 (2), 049 (2), 061 (2)

Ciofu (1974) 16 1 1 2 0 1 063

Cody et al. (1989) 66 85 17 B 2 0 P 1 001 (5), 004 (5), 009 (5), 010 (5), 018 (5),

021 (5), 022 (5), 027 (5), 038 (5), 039

(5), 041 (5), 046 (5), 055 (5), 058 (5),

066 (5), 070 (5), 119 (5)

Cody et al. (1984) 42 54 8 0 0 P 1 001 (6), 004 (27), 007 (3), 009 (3), 010

(3), 035 (3), 039 (6), 041 (3)

Cody & O’Hair (1983)

Men 36 8 4 C1 0 0 1 009 (2), 018 (2), 048 (2), 069 (2)

Women 36 8 4 C2 0 0 1 009 (2), 018 (2), 048 (2), 069 (2)

Craig et al. (1991) 120 28 13 0 0 L 1 033 (2), 056 (2), 057 (2), 059 (2), 060 (2),

066 (2), 129 (4), 130 (2), 131 (2), 132

(2), 133 (2), 146 (2), 148 (2)

Cutrow et al. (1972) 63 3 3 3 0 1 009, 066, 144

B. M. DePaulo et al. (1992) 32 2 2 1 0 0 015, 051

B. M. DePaulo et al. (1990) 96 3 3 D 1 0 1 001, 004, 016

B. M. DePaulo, Jordan, et al. (1982) 8 1 1 0 0 L 0 014

B. M. DePaulo et al. (1983) 32 2 2 1 0 1 061, 091

B. M. DePaulo et al. (1991) 96 1 1 D 1 0 1 012

B. M. DePaulo & Rosenthal (1979a) 40 1 1 E 0 0 L 0 014

B. M. DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, &

Rosenkrantz (1982) 40 4 3 E 0 0 L 0 014 (2), 061, 090

B. M. DePaulo, Rosenthal,

Rosenkrantz, & Green (1982) 40 16 11 E 0 0 L 0 006 (2), 010 (2), 022, 023, 024 (2), 035,

038, 052 (3), 096, 136, 137

P. J. DePaulo & DePaulo (1989) 14 16 15 2 0 0 001, 004, 010, 014 (2), 021, 034, 035,

039, 044, 049, 052, 055, 066, 070, 091

deTurck & Miller (1985)

Unaroused truth tellers 36 10 10 1 1 1 001, 009, 028, 037, 042, 046, 048, 058,

066, 070

Aroused truth tellers 36 10 10 1 1 1 001, 009, 028, 037, 042, 046, 048, 058,

066, 070

84 DEPAULO ET AL.

Report NNo. of

effect sizes No. of

cues Ind. sample

code

Mot

Trans

Msg Int

Cues

Dulaney (1982) 20 20 10 0 1 1 001 (2), 004, 007 (3), 009, 019 (6), 020

(3), 022, 024, 042, 139

Ekman & Friesen (1972) 21 3 3 F 1 0 1 034, 069, 070

Ekman et al. (1988) 31 2 2 F 1 0 L 1 117, 118

Ekman et al. (1976) 16 1 1 F 1 0 1 034

Ekman et al. (1985) 14 40 20 0 0 1 011 (2), 044 (2), 045 (2), 056 (2), 057 (2),

059 (2), 060 (2), 088 (2), 129 (2), 130

(2), 131 (2), 132 (2), 133 (2), 146 (2),

147 (2), 148 (2), 149 (2), 156 (2), 157

(2), 158 (2)

Ekman et al. (1991) 31 2 2 F 1 0 L 1 018, 063

Elliot (1979) 62 4 4 2 0 L 1 012, 049, 050, 115

Exline et al. (1970) 34 2 2 2 1 1 027, 061

Feeley & deTurck (1998)

Unsanctioned liars 58 15 14 0 1 1 001 (2), 009, 010, 022, 024, 027, 035,

037, 038, 044, 046, 048, 058, 068

Sanctioned liars 68 15 14 0 1 1 001 (2), 009, 010, 022, 024, 027, 035,

037, 038, 044, 046, 048, 058, 068

Fiedler (1989)

Study 1 23 1 1 0 0 1 012

Study 2 64 1 1 0 0 012

Fiedler et al. (1997) 12 8 6 0 0 1 001, 004 (3), 008, 012, 016, 061

Fiedler & Walka (1993) 10 10 10 0 0 L 1 010, 012, 014, 015, 016, 039, 045, 063,

068, 118

Finkelstein (1978) 20 14 10 E 0 0 L 0 017, 043, 045 (3), 046 (2), 047 (2), 051,

058, 064, 067, 068

Frank (1989) 32 12 12 3 0 0 001, 009, 018, 027, 034, 040, 044, 045,

048, 058, 066, 068

Gagnon (1975)

Men 16 11 9 2 0 1 001 (2), 010, 027, 040 (2), 044, 045, 046,

047, 048

Women 16 11 9 2 0 1 001 (2), 010, 027, 040 (2), 044, 045, 046,

047, 048

Galin & Thorn (1993) 60 26 12 0 0 L 0 011 (4), 033 (2), 056 (2), 059 (2), 060 (2),

066 (2), 129 (2), 130 (2), 132 (2), 133

(2), 147 (2), 149 (2)

Goldstein (1923) 10 2 1 2 0 1 009 (2)

Greene et al. (1985) 39 45 15 0 0 P 1 001 (3), 009 (3), 018 (3), 027 (3), 034 (3),

044 (3), 045 (3), 046 (3), 048 (3), 055

(3), 058 (3), 067 (3), 068 (3), 069 (3),

119 (3)

Hadjistavropoulos & Craig (1994) 90 24 11 G 0 0 L 1 011 (2), 033 (2), 056 (2), 057 (2), 059 (2),

060 (2), 066 (2), 129 (4), 130 (2), 131

(2), 132 (2)

Hadjistavropoulos et al. (1996) 90 2 2 G 0 0 L 1 054, 088

Hall (1986) 80 3 3 3 1 1 010, 032, 063

Harrison et al. (1978) 72 2 2 0 0 L 1 001, 009

Heilveil (1976) 12 1 1 0 0 1 065

Heilveil & Muehleman (1981) 26 9 9 0 0 1 001, 009, 027, 037, 040, 046, 048, 055,

058

Heinrich & Borkenau (1998) 40 6 1 0 0 L 0 014 (6)

Hemsley (1977) 20 13 10 0 0 1 008, 009, 027 (2), 029, 042, 043, 044, 058

(2), 066, 068 (2)

Hernandez-Fernaud & Alonso-Quecuty

(1977) 73 12 4 2 0 1 004 (9), 005, 076, 083

U. Hess (1989) 35 5 4 H 0 0 0 011 (2), 057, 117, 132

U. Hess & Kleck (1990)

Study 1 35 2 2 H 0 0 0 089, 150

Study 2 48 2 2 H 0 0 0 089, 150

U. Hess & Kleck (1994) 35 3 3 H 0 0 0 029, 058, 066

Hocking & Leathers (1980) 16 25 21 1 0 1 009, 010, 018, 027 (2), 036, 037 (2), 038,

044, 045, 048 (2), 054, 058, 061 (2),

062, 069, 070, 107, 108, 109, 144, 145

Horvath (1973) 100 11 8 3 1 1 002, 025, 027, 049, 050, 052 (3), 061 (2),

121 (table continues)

CUES TO DECEPTION

Table 1 (continued)

Report NNo. of

effect sizes No. of

cues Ind. sample

code

Mot

Trans

Msg Int

Cues

Horvath (1978) 60 1 1 0 0 1 062

Horvath (1979) 32 1 1 2 0 L 1 062

Horvath et al. (1994) 60 6 4 3 1 1 025, 050, 064 (3), 090

Janisse & Bradley (1980) 64 1 1 0 0 L 1 065

Kennedy & Coe (1994) 19 10 8 0 0 1 027, 056, 058, 064, 066, 120, 122 (3), 129

Knapp et al. (1974) 38 32 23 2 0 L 1 001 (3), 002, 003, 004, 007, 018, 020 (2),

021 (2), 022 (2), 023, 024 (2), 027 (2),

030 (2), 036, 037, 038, 048, 052, 055,

058, 070, 126 (2), 138

Kohnken et al. (1995) 59 19 18 0 0 1 004, 013, 041, 071, 072, 073 (2), 074,

077, 078, 079, 080, 082, 123, 124, 127,

128, 142, 143

Koper & Sahlman (2001) 83 37 27 3 1 L 001, 009, 012, 014, 015 (2), 017, 018, 025

(2), 028, 031 (3), 035, 039, 043, 044,

054, 055, 058, 061 (3), 062, 066, 067,

068, 104, 105 (2), 119, 134 (4), 153

Krauss (1981)

High arousal, face to face 8 11 11 I1 1 0 L 1 001, 009, 027, 031, 042, 046, 051, 061,

086, 089, 093

High arousal, intercom 8 11 11 I2 1 0 L 0 001, 009, 027, 031, 042, 046, 051, 061,

086, 089, 093

Low arousal, face to face 8 11 11 I3 0 0 L 1 001, 009, 027, 031, 042, 046, 051, 061,

086, 089, 093

Low arousal, intercom 8 11 11 I4 0 0 L 0 001, 009, 027, 031, 042, 046, 051, 061,

086, 089, 093

Kraut (1978) 5 9 9 1 0 L 1 001, 004, 009, 012, 014, 040, 044, 058,

068

Kraut & Poe (1980) 62 14 14 2 1 1 001, 003, 008, 009, 018, 025, 028, 031,

035, 044, 058, 061, 064, 068

Kuiken (1981) 48 1 1 0 0 0 019

Kurasawa (1988) 8 1 1 0 0 L 0 092

Landry & Brigham (1992) 12 14 13 0 0 L 0 004, 013, 072, 073, 074, 075, 076, 077

(2), 078, 079, 080, 082, 083

Manaugh et al. (1970) 80 2 2 0 0 1 006, 009

Marston (1920) 10 1 1 0 0 1 009

Matarazzo et al. (1970)

Discuss college major 60 4 4 0 0 1 006, 009, 027, 119

Discuss living situation 60 4 4 0 0 1 006, 009, 027, 119

McClintock & Hunt (1975) 20 5 5 0 0 1 018, 027, 044, 058, 070

Mehrabian (1971)

Study 1

Men, reward 14 11 10 2 0 0 001, 010, 026, 035, 044, 046, 048 (2),

054, 055, 064

Men, punishment 14 11 10 1 0 0 001, 010, 026, 035, 044, 046, 048 (2),

054, 055, 064

Women, reward 14 11 10 2 0 0 001, 010, 026, 035, 044, 046, 048 (2),

054, 055, 064

Women, punishment 14 11 10 1 0 0 001, 010, 026, 035, 044, 046, 048 (2),

054, 055, 064

Study 2

Men 24 10 9 2 0 0 001, 010, 026, 029, 046, 048 (2), 054,

055, 064

Women 24 10 9 2 0 0 001, 010, 026, 029, 046, 048 (2), 054,

055, 064

Study 3 32 13 12 2 1 1 001, 002, 010, 026, 032, 044, 046, 048

(2), 054, 055, 064, 070

Miller et al. (1983) 32 10 10 3 0 P 1 001, 007, 009, 029, 036, 037, 038, 046,

048, 070

Motley (1974) 20 3 3 0 0 1 001, 032, 063

D. O’Hair & Cody (1987) P

Men 21 2 1 2 0 1 062 (2)

Women 26 2 1 2 0 1 062 (2)

D. O’Hair et al. (1990) P

Men 36 2 1 B1 2 0 1 062 (2)

Women 25 2 1 B2 2 0 1 062 (2)

86 DEPAULO ET AL.

Table 1 (continued)

Report NNo. of

effect sizes No. of

cues Ind. sample

code

Mot

Trans

Msg Int

Cues

H. D. O’Hair et al. (1981) 72 22 11 C 0 0 P 1 001 (2), 009 (2), 018 (2), 027 (2), 034 (2),

044 (2), 048 (2), 055 (2), 058 (2), 069

(2), 070 (2)

Pennebaker & Chew (1985) 20 2 2 0 0 1 029, 089

Porter & Yuille (1996) 60 18 18 2 1 1 001, 004, 007, 008, 013, 022, 030, 038,

071, 072, 073, 078, 079, 080, 081, 083,

103, 141

Potamkin (1982)

Heroin addicts 10 6 6 2 0 L 1 018, 044, 048, 070, 151, 152,

Nonaddicts 10 6 6 2 0 L 1 018, 044, 048, 070, 151, 152

Riggio & Friedman (1983) 63 12 11 0 0 L 0 010, 027, 029, 035, 038, 044, 045, 046,

048, 058, 068 (2)

Ruby & Brigham (1998) 12 16 15 0 0 0 001, 004, 013, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075,

076, 077 (2), 078, 079, 080, 081, 083

Rybold (1994) 34 4 4 3 0 1 001, 010, 035, 039

Sayenga (1983) 14 24 16 2 0 1 001 (2), 004 (2), 006 (3), 009 (2), 010 (2),

020, 022, 032 (2), 036, 037, 038, 041,

052, 062 (2), 063, 102

Scherer et al. (1985) 15 2 2 F 1 0 L 1 053, 062

Schneider & Kintz (1977)

Men 14 2 2 0 0 1 048, 154

Women 16 2 2 0 0 1 048, 154

Sitton & Griffin (1981) 28 1 1 0 0 1 027

Sporer (1997) 40 22 17 0 0 0 001 (2), 004, 005, 006, 013, 071, 076 (3),

077 (2), 078, 079, 080, 082, 083 (2),

087, 098, 099, 100

Stiff & Miller (1986) 40 19 16 2 1 1 001 (2), 004, 009, 012, 022, 023, 024,

037, 040, 044, 046, 048, 058, 066, 068,

134 (3)

Streeter et al. (1977)

High arousal, face to face 8 1 1 I1 1 0 L 1 063

High arousal, intercom 8 1 1 I2 1 0 L 0 063

Low arousal, face to face 8 1 1 I3 0 0 L 1 063

Low arousal, intercom 8 1 1 I4 0 0 L 0 063

Todd-Mancillas & Kilber (1979) 37 11 9 2 0 1 001 (3), 002, 004, 007, 020, 021, 022,

023, 052

Vrij (1993) 20 1 1 J 2 1 L 1 046

Vrij (1995) 64 11 11 J 2 1 L 1 018, 028, 035, 038, 044, 045, 048, 058,

068, 095, 114

Vrij et al. (1997) 56 1 1 0 1 L 1 114

Vrij & Heaven (1999) 40 6 4 0 0 1 004, 030, 035 (2), 038 (2)

Vrij et al. (1996) 91 3 1 1 1 L 1 043 (3)

Vrij & Winkel (1990/1991) 92 11 10 0 1 L 1 010, 027, 035, 038, 044 (2), 045, 046,

058, 070, 094

Vrij & Winkel (1993) 64 1 1 J 2 1 L 1 001

Wagner & Pease (1976) 49 1 1 0 0 0 019

Weiler & Weinstein (1972) 64 13 8 2 0 1 004 (2), 008, 016, 027, 031, 116 (4), 123,

135 (2)

Zaparniuk et al. (1995) 40 18 16 0 0 1 004, 013, 071, 072, 073, 074, 075, 077

(2), 078, 079, 080, 081 (2), 082, 083,

124, 125

Zuckerman et al. (1979) 60 6 5 0 0 L 0 016, 031 (2), 053, 054, 063

Zuckerman et al. (1982) 59 1 1 K 0 0 L 0 014

Zuckerman et al. (1984) 59 1 1 K 0 0 L 0 084

Note. N ⫽number of senders; Ind. ⫽independent; Mot ⫽motivation of the senders; Trans ⫽transgression; Msg ⫽message; Int ⫽interactivity; P ⫽

compared cues to deception for planned messages with cues to deception for unplanned messages; L ⫽length (duration) of the messages was reported.

Samples with the same letter code report data from the same senders; that is, they are not independent. All samples without a letter code are independent

samples.

Motivation of the senders; 0 ⫽none; 1 ⫽identity-relevant; 2 ⫽instrumental; 3 ⫽identity-relevant and instrumental.

Transgression: 0 ⫽

lie is not about a transgression; 1 ⫽lie is about a transgression.

Interactivity: 0 ⫽no interaction between sender and target; 1 ⫽interaction.

Cue

numbers are of the cues described in the current article. The number in parentheses indicates the number of estimates of that cue (if more than one). The

cue names corresponding to the cue numbers are shown in Appendix A.

CUES TO DECEPTION

Table 1 (continued)

Table 2

Summary of Study Characteristics

Characteristic kCharacteristic k

Senders

Population sampled

Students 101

Suspects 3

Community members and students 3

Patients in a pain clinic 2

Community members 2

Immigrants to United States 2

Salespersons and customers 1

Travelers in an airport 1

Shoppers in a shopping center 1

Heroin addicts (and nonaddicts) 1

Publicly exposed liars 1

Unable to determine from report 2

Country

United States 88

Canada 9

Germany 7

England 4

Spain 3

Japan 2

Immigrants to United States 2

Jordan 1

Italy 1

Romania 1

The Netherlands and England 1

The Netherlands and Surinam 1

Relationship between sender and interviewer or target

Strangers 103

Acquaintances 2

Acquaintances or friends and strangers 2

Friends 1

Intimates, friends, and strangers 1

No interviewer 9

Unable to determine from report 2

Motivation for telling successful lies

None 68

Identity relevant 13

Instrumental 31

Identity and instrumental 8

Truths and lies

Length of messages

Under 20 s 14

20–60 s 14

More than 60 s 8

Unable to determine from report 84

Message preparation

No preparation 44

Messages were prepared 43

Some prepared, some unprepared 18

Messages were scripted 7

Unable to determine from report 8

Paradigm

Described attitudes or facts 44

Described films, slides, or pictures 16

Cheating 8

Mock crime 8

Card test or guilty knowledge test 8

Includes correlational measures as well as percentage of agreement (divided by 100).

Number of estimates (not number of independent estimates).

Truths and lies (continued)

Paradigm (continued)

Person descriptions 7

Simulated job interview 6

Described personal experiences 5

Naturalistic 4

Responded to personality items 3

Reactions to pain 3

Other paradigms 7

Unable to determine from report 1

Lies were about transgressions

No 99

Yes 21

Publication statistics

Year of report

Before 1970 3

1970–1979 34

1980–1989 46

1990–2000 37

Source of study

Journal article 96

Dissertation, thesis 10

Book chapter 4

Unpublished paper 3

Multiple sources 7

Methodological aspects

Sample size (no. of senders)

5–20 41

21–59 43

60–192 36

Experimental design

Within-sender (senders told truths and lies) 78

Between-senders (senders told truths or lies) 42

In between-senders designs, no. of liars

Fewer than 20 15

20–32 16

More than 32 11

In between-senders designs, no. of truth tellers

Fewer than 20 15

20–32 13

More than 32 14

No. of messages communicated by each sender

121

2–459

More than 4 40

Degree of interaction between sender and interviewer or target

No interaction 12

Partial interaction 83

Fully interactive 8

No one else present 12

Unable to determine from report 4

Reliability of measurement of cues

Under .70 36

.70–.79 43

.80–.89 251

.90–1.00 239

Unable to determine from report 769

88 DEPAULO ET AL.

what they were seeing truthfully or deceptively. In cheating paradigms,

senders were or were not induced to cheat and then lie about it. Mock crime

paradigms included ones in which some of the senders were instructed to

“steal”money or to hide supposed contraband on their persons and to then

lie to interviewers about their crime. Some paradigms involved card tests

(in which the senders chose a particular card and answered “no”when

asked if they had that card) and guilty knowledge tests (in which senders

who did or did not know critical information, such as information about a

crime, were asked about that information); most of these were modeled

after tests often used in polygraph testing. In person-description paradigms,

senders described other people (e.g., people they liked and people they

disliked) honestly and dishonestly. Some paradigms were simulations of

job interviews; typically in those paradigms, senders who were or were not

qualified for a job tried to convince an interviewer that they were qualified.

In other paradigms, participants described personal experiences (e.g., times

during which they acted especially independently or dependently; trau-

matic experiences that did or did not actually happen to them). Naturalistic

paradigms were defined as ones in which the senders were not instructed

to tell truths or lies but instead did so of their own accord. These included

interrogations of suspects later determined to have been lying or telling the

truth (Hall, 1986; Horvath, 1973; Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994) and a

study (Koper & Sahlman, 2001) of people who made public statements

later exposed as lies. In another paradigm, senders indicated their responses

to a series of items on a personality scale, then later lied or told the truth

about their answers to those items. In a final category, senders who really

were or were not experiencing pain sometimes expressed their pain freely

and other times masked their pain or feigned pain that they were not

experiencing. A few other paradigms used in fewer than three independent

samples were assigned to a miscellaneous category.

We recoded the paradigms into two categories to test our prediction that

lies about transgressions would produce clearer cues than lies that were not

about transgressions. The lies about mock crimes or real crimes, cheating,

and other misdeeds were categorized as lies about transgressions, the others

as lies that were not about transgressions.

The two publication statistics that we coded were the year of the report

and the source of the report (e.g., journal article, dissertation, thesis). In

some instances, the same data were reported in two places (typically a

dissertation and a journal article); in those cases, we coded the more

accessible report (i.e., the journal article).

The methodological aspects of the studies that we coded included the

sample size and the design of the study. The design was coded as within

senders if each sender told both truths and lies or between senders if each

sender told either truths or lies. This determination was based on the

messages that were included in the analyses of the behavioral cues. For

example, if senders told both truths and lies, but the cues to deception were

assessed from just one truth or one lie told by each sender, the design was

coded as between senders. For each between-senders study, we coded the

number of liars and the number of truth tellers. For all studies, we coded

the total number of messages communicated by each sender.

We also coded the degree of interaction between the sender and the

interviewer or target person. Fully interactive paradigms were ones in

which the senders and interviewers interacted freely, with no scripts. In

partially interactive paradigms, the senders and interviewers interacted, but

the interviewers’behavior was typically constrained, usually by a prede-

termined set of questions they were instructed to ask. In noninteractive

paradigms, an interviewer or target person was present in the room but did

not interact with the sender. In still other paradigms, the senders told truths

and lies (usually into a tape recorder) with no one else present.

We categorized each cue as having been either objectively or subjec-

tively assessed. Behaviors that could be precisely defined and measured

(often in units such as counts and durations) were coded as objectively

assessed. Cues were coded as subjectively assessed when they were based

on observers’impressions.

Behavioral cues were usually coded from videotapes, audiotapes, or

transcripts of the truths and lies. If reliabilities of the measures of the cues

were reported (percentages or correlations), we recorded them.

We attempted to compute the effect size for each cue in each study. To

this end, we indicated whether the effect sizes were (a) ones that could be

precisely calculated (which we call known effects), (b) ones for which only

the direction of the effect was known, or (c) effects that were simply

reported as not significant (and for which we were unable to discern the

direction).

Coding decisions were initially made by James J. Lindsay, Laura

Muhlenbruck, and Kelly Charlton, who had participated in standard train-

ing procedures (discussion of definitions, practice coding, discussion of

disagreements) before beginning their task. Each person coded two thirds

of the studies. Therefore, each study was coded by two people and

discrepancies were resolved in conference. For objective variables such as

the year and the source of the report, the percentage of disagreements was

close to zero. The percentage ranged as high as 12 for more subjective

decisions, such as the initial categorization of paradigms into more than 12

different categories. However, agreement on the two levels of the paradigm

variable that were used in the moderator analysis (transgressions vs. no

transgressions) was again nearly perfect. Bella M. DePaulo also indepen-

dently coded all study characteristics, and any remaining discrepancies

were resolved in consultation with Brian E. Malone, who was not involved

in any of the previous coding. A meta-analysis of accuracy at detecting

deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2002) included some of the same studies that

are in this review. Some of the same study characteristics were coded for

that review in the same manner as for this one. Final decisions about each

characteristic were compared across reviews. There were no discrepancies.

Meta-Analytic Techniques

Effect Size Estimate

The effect size computed for each behavioral difference was d, defined

as the mean for the deceptive condition (i.e., the lies) minus the mean for

the truthful condition (i.e., the truths), divided by the mean of the standard

deviations for the truths and the lies (Cohen, 1988). Positive ds therefore

indicate that the behavior occurred more often during lies than truths,

whereas negative ds indicate that the behavior occurred less often during

lies than truths. In cases in which means and standard deviations were not

provided but other relevant statistics were (e.g., rs,

␹

s, ts, or Fs with 1 df)

or in which corrections were necessary because of the use of within-sender

designs (i.e., the same senders told both truths and lies), we used other

methods to compute ds (e.g., Hedges & Becker, 1986; Rosenthal, 1991).

With just a few exceptions, we computed effect sizes for every compar-

ison of truths and lies reported in every study. For example, if the length

of deceptive messages relative to truthful ones was measured in terms of

number of words and number of seconds, we computed both ds. If the same

senders conveyed different kinds of messages (e.g., ones in which they

tried to simulate different emotions and ones in which they tried to mask

the emotions they were feeling) and separate ds were reported for each, we

computed both sets of ds. We excluded a few comparisons in cases in

which the behavior described was uninterpretable outside of the context of

the specific study and in which an effect size could be computed but the

direction of the effect was impossible to determine. Also, if preliminary

data for a particular cue were reported in one source and more complete

data on the same cue were reported subsequently, we included only the

more complete data.

If the difference between truths and lies was described as not significant,

but no further information was reported, the dfor that effect was set to

zero. If the direction of the effect could be determined, but not the precise

magnitude, we used a conservative strategy of assigning the value ⫹0.01

when the behavior occurred more often during lies than truths and ⫺0.01

when it occurred less often during lies than truths. This procedure resulted

in a total of 1,338 effect sizes. Of these, 787 could be estimated precisely,

CUES TO DECEPTION

396 were set to zero, and 155 were assigned the values of ⫾0.01. Twenty-

seven (2%) of the effect sizes (ds) were greater than ⫾1.50 and were

windsorized to ⫾1.50.

Estimates of Central Tendency

The most fundamental issue addressed by this review is the extent to

which each cue is associated with deceit. To estimate the magnitude of the

effect size for each cue, we averaged within cues and within independent

samples. For example, within a particular independent sample, all estimates

of response length were averaged. As a result, each independent sample

could contribute to the analyses no more than one estimate of any given

cue. Table 1 shows the number of effect sizes computed for each report and

the number of cues assessed in each report. If the number of effect sizes is

greater than the number of cues, then there was more than one estimate of

at least one of the cues.

The mean dfor each cue within each independent sample was weighted

to take into account the number of senders in the sample.

Sample sizes

ranged from 5 to 192 (M⫽41.73, SD ⫽31.93) and are shown in the

second column of Table 1. Because larger samples provide more reliable

estimates of effect sizes than do smaller ones, larger studies were weighted

more heavily in the analyses. For within-sender designs, we weighted each

effect size by the reciprocal of its variance. For between-senders designs,

we computed the weight from the formula: [2(n

⫹n

]/ [2(n

⫹n

)

⫹(n

)]. A mean dis significant if the confidence interval does not

include zero.

To determine whether the variation in effect sizes for each cue was

greater than that expected by chance across independent samples, we

computed the homogeneity statistic Q, which is distributed as chi-square

with degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent samples (k)

minus 1. The plevel associated with the Qstatistic describes the likelihood

that the observed variance in effect sizes was generated by sampling error

alone (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).

Moderator Analyses

We have described several factors that have been predicted to moderate

the size of the cues to deception: whether an incentive was provided for

success, the type of incentive that was provided (identity relevant or

instrumental), whether the messages were planned or unplanned, the du-

ration of the messages, whether the lies were about transgressions, and

whether the context was interactive. All of the moderator variables except

planning were ones that could be examined only on a between-studies

basis. For example, it was usually the case that in any given study, all of

the senders who lied were lying about a transgression or they were all lying

about something other than a transgression. Conclusions based on those

analyses (e.g., that the senders’apparent tension is a stronger cue to lies

about transgressions than to lies that are not about transgressions) are open

to alternative interpretations. Any way that the studies differed (other than

the presence or absence of a transgression) could explain the transgression

differences.

Stronger inferences can be drawn when the levels of the moderator

variable occur within the same study. Seven independent samples (indi-

cated in Table 1) included a manipulation of whether senders’messages

were planned or unplanned.

For each cue reported in each of these studies,

we computed a dfor the difference in effect sizes between the unplanned

and planned messages. We then combined these ds in the same manner as

we had in our previous analyses.

Of the remaining moderator variables, all except one (the duration of the

message) were categorical variables. For the categorical moderator vari-

ables, we calculated fixed-effect models using the general linear model

(regression) program of the Statistical Analysis System (SAS Institute,

1985). The model provides a between-levels sum of squares, Q

, that can

be interpreted as a chi-square, testing whether the moderator variable is a

significant predictor of differences in effect sizes. A test of the homoge-

neity of effect sizes within each level, Q

, is also provided. For the

continuous moderator variable (the duration of the messages), we also used

the general linear model (leaving duration in its continuous form) and

tested for homogeneity (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). A significant Q

indicates

that duration did moderate the size of the effect, and the direction of the

unstandardized beta (b) weight indicates the direction of the moderation.

Results

Description of the Literature

Characteristics of the Senders

As indicated in Table 2, the senders in most of the studies were

students from the United States who were strangers to the inter-

viewer or target of their communications. In 52 of the 120 inde-

pendent samples, incentives for success were provided to the

senders.

Characteristics of the Truths and Lies

The duration of the messages was 1 min or less for 28 of the 36

samples for which that information was reported. The number of

samples in which senders were given time to prepare their com-

munications was about the same as the number in which they were

not given any preparation time.

In 44 of the 120 samples, senders told truths and lies about their

attitudes or personal facts. In 16 others, they looked at films,

slides, or pictures and described them honestly or dishonestly. All

other paradigms were used in fewer than 9 samples. In 21 of the

samples, senders told lies about transgressions.

Publication Statistics and Methodological Aspects

Table 2 also shows that only 3 of the 120 independent samples

were published before 1970. Most reports were journal articles.

In 84 of the samples, there were fewer than 60 senders. The

samples included a mean of 22.4 male senders (SD ⫽24.6) and a

mean of 19.2 female senders (SD ⫽19.2). In 25 samples, all of the

senders were men, and in 15 samples, all were women. In 16

samples, the sex of the senders was not reported.

Within-sender designs (in which senders told truths and lies)

were nearly twice as common as between-senders designs (in

which senders told truths or lies). In the between-senders designs,

the number of liars was typically the same as the number of truth

tellers. Senders usually communicated between one and four

messages.

Only weighted mean ds are reported, and all estimates of a given cue

are included in each mean. A table of all 1,338 individual effect sizes is

available from Bella M. DePaulo. The table includes the weights for each

effect size and information about the independence of each estimate. The

table also indicates whether each estimate was a known effect (i.e., the

magnitude could be determined precisely) or if only the direction of the

effect or its nonsignificance was reported. Therefore, the information in

that table can be used to calculate weighted effect sizes for each cue that

include only the known estimates or to compute unweighted means that

include all effect sizes or only the precisely estimated ones.

We did not include studies in which planning was confounded with

another variable (e.g., Anolli & Ciceri, 1997).

90 DEPAULO ET AL.

In most studies, there was some interaction between the sender

and the interviewer or target. In 24 of the 120 samples, there was

no interaction or there was no one else present when the senders

were telling their truths or lies.

When the reliability of the measurement was reported, the

reliability was usually high (see Table 2). Of the 1,338 estimates of

the 158 cues to deception, 273 (20%) were based on the subjective

impressions of untrained raters.

Meta-Analysis of the Literature

Overview

We first present the combined effect sizes for each individual

cue to deception. The individual cues to deception are grouped by

our five sets of predictions. Cues suggesting that liars may be less

forthcoming than truth tellers are shown in Table 3; cues suggest-

ing that liars may tell less compelling tales than truth tellers are

shown in Table 4; cues suggesting that liars communicate in a less

positive and more tense way are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respec-

tively; and cues suggesting that liars tell tales that are too good to

be true are shown in Table 7. Any given cue is included in Tables

3–7 only if there are at least three independent estimates of it, at

least two of which could be calculated precisely (as opposed to

estimates of just the direction of the effect or reports that the effect

was not significant). All other cues are reported in Appendix B.

Five of the 88 cues that met the criteria for inclusion in the tables

but did not fit convincingly into any particular table are also

included in Appendix B (brow raise, lip stretch, eyes closed, lips

apart, and jaw drop).

The placement of cues into the five different categories was to

some extent arbitrary. For example, because blinking may be

indicative of anxiety or arousal, we included it in the “tense”

category (see Appendix A). However, decreased blinking can also

be suggestive of greater cognitive effort; therefore, we could have

placed it elsewhere. Rate of speaking is another example. We

included that cue under “forthcoming”because people who are

speaking slowly may seem to be holding back. However, faster

speech can also be indicative of confidence (C. E. Kimble &

Seidel, 1991); thus, we could have included it under “compelling”

(certainty) instead.

In Table 8, we have arranged the 88 cues (the ones based on at

least three estimates) into four sections by the crossing of the size

of the combined effect (larger or smaller) and the number of

independent estimates contributing to that effect (more or fewer).

We also present a stem and leaf display of the 88 combined effect

sizes in Table 9. The results of our analyses of the factors that

might moderate the magnitude of the differences between liars and

truth tellers are presented in subsequent tables.

Individual Cues to Deception

Are liars less forthcoming than truth tellers? Table 3 shows

the results of the cues indicating whether liars were less forthcom-

ing than truth tellers. We examined whether liars had less to say,

whether what they did say was less detailed and less complex, and

whether they seemed to be holding back.

We had more independent estimates of the length of the re-

sponses (k⫽49) than of any other cue, but we found just a tiny

and nonsignificant effect in the predicted direction (d⫽–0.03).

When amount of responding was operationalized in terms of the

percentage of the talking time taken up by the social actor com-

pared with the actor’s partner, then liars did take up less of that

time than did truth tellers (d⫽–0.35). The entire interaction

tended to terminate nonsignificantly sooner when 1 person was

lying than when both were telling the truth (d⫽–0.20).

Our prediction that liars would provide fewer details than would

truth tellers was clearly supported (d⫽–0.30). Extrapolating from

reality monitoring theory, we also predicted that there would be

less sensory information in deceptive accounts than in truthful

ones. There was a nonsignificant trend in that direction (d⫽

–0.17). The finding that liars pressed their lips more than truth

Table 3

Are Liars Less Forthcoming Than Truth Tellers?

Cue Nk

dCI Q

Amount of responding

001 Response length 1,812 49 26 ⫺0.03 ⫺0.09, 0.03 92.1*

002 Talking time 207 4 3 ⫺0.35* ⫺0.54, ⫺0.16 8.1

003 Length of interaction 134 3 2 ⫺0.20 ⫺0.41, 0.02 0.7

Detailed, complex responses

004 Details 883 24 16 ⴚ0.30* ⫺0.38, ⫺0.21 76.2*

005 Sensory information (RM) 135 4 3 ⫺0.17 ⫺0.39, 0.06 13.2*

006 Cognitive complexity 294 6 3 ⫺0.07 ⫺0.23, 0.10 0.9

007 Unique words 229 6 3 ⫺0.10 ⫺0.26, 0.06 6.2

Holding back

008 Blocks access to information 218 5 4 0.10 ⫺0.13, 0.33 19.8*

009 Response latency 1,330 32 20 0.02 ⫺0.06, 0.10 112.4*

010 Rate of speaking 806 23 14 0.07 ⫺0.03, 0.16 21.7

011 Presses lips 199 4 3 0.16* 0.01, 0.30 30.9*

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. N⫽total number of participants in the studies; k

⫽total number of

independent effect sizes (ds); k

⫽number of ds that could be estimated precisely; CI ⫽95% confidence

interval; Q⫽homogeneity statistic (significance indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity of ds);

RM ⫽reality monitoring.

*p⬍.05.

CUES TO DECEPTION

tellers did (d⫽0.16) was the only cue in the “holding back”

subcategory that was statistically reliable.

In sum, the most reliable indicator (in terms of the size of the

effect and the number of independent estimates) that liars may

have been less forthcoming than truth tellers was the relatively

smaller number of details they provided in their accounts. The

directions of the cues in Table 3 tell a consistent story: All except 1

of the 11 cues (rate of speaking) was in the predicted direction,

indicating that liars are less forthcoming than truth tellers, though

usually nonsignificantly so.

Are deceptive accounts less compelling than truthful ones? To

determine whether deceptive accounts were less compelling than

truthful ones, we asked whether the lies seemed to make less sense

than the truths and whether they were told in a less engaging and

less immediate manner. We also asked whether liars seemed more

uncertain or less fluent than truth tellers and whether they seemed

less active or animated. The results are shown in Table 4.

By all three of the indicators, the lies made less sense than the

truths. They were less plausible (d⫽–0.23); less likely to be

structured in a logical, sensible way (d⫽–0.25); and more likely

to be internally discrepant or to convey ambivalence (d⫽0.34).

For the four cues to the engagingness of the message, the results

of two were as predicted. Liars seemed less involved verbally and

vocally in their self-presentations than did truth tellers (d⫽

Table 4

Do Liars Tell Less Compelling Tales Than Truth Tellers?

Cue Nk

dCI Q

Makes Sense

012 Plausibility 395 9 6 ⴚ0.23* ⫺0.36, ⫺0.11 13.1

013 Logical structure 223 6 6 ⴚ0.25* ⫺0.46, ⫺0.04 21.5*

014 Discrepant, ambivalent 243 7 3 0.34* 0.20, 0.48 14.3*

Engaging

015 Involved, expressive (overall) 214 6 4 0.08 ⫺0.06, 0.22 23.3*

016 Verbal and vocal involvement 384 7 3 ⴚ0.21* ⫺0.34, ⫺0.08 5.8

017 Facial expressiveness 251 3 2 0.12 ⫺0.05, 0.29 9.6*

018 Illustrators 839 16 10 ⴚ0.14* ⫺0.24, ⫺0.04 23.9

Immediate

019 Verbal immediacy (all categories) 117 3 2 ⴚ0.31* ⫺0.50, ⫺0.13 2.4

020 Verbal immediacy, temporal 109 4 3 0.15 ⫺0.04, 0.34 2.3

021 Generalizing terms 275 5 3 0.10 ⫺0.08, 0.28 1.7

022 Self-references 595 12 9 ⫺0.03 ⫺0.15, 0.09 30.1*

023 Mutual and group references 275 5 4 ⫺0.14 ⫺0.31, 0.02 4.4

024 Other references 264 6 5 0.16 ⫺0.01, 0.33 5.6

025 Verbal and vocal immediacy (impressions) 373 7 4 ⴚ0.55* ⫺0.70, ⫺0.41 26.3*

026 Nonverbal immediacy 414 11 3 ⫺0.07 ⫺0.21, 0.07 6.9

027 Eye contact 1,491 32 17 0.01 ⫺0.06, 0.08 41.1

028 Gaze aversion 411 6 4 0.03 ⫺0.11, 0.16 7.4

029 Eye shifts 218 7 3 0.11 ⫺0.03, 0.25 43.8*

Uncertain

030 Tentative constructions 138 3 3 ⫺0.16 ⫺0.37, 0.05 12.5*

031 Verbal and vocal uncertainty (impressions) 329 10 4 0.30* 0.17, 0.43 11.0

032 Amplitude, loudness 177 5 3 ⫺0.05 ⫺0.26, 0.15 2.2

033 Chin raise 286 4 4 0.25* 0.12, 0.37 31.9*

034 Shrugs 321 6 3 0.04 ⫺0.13, 0.21 3.3

Fluent

035 Non-ah speech disturbances 750 17 12 0.00 ⫺0.09, 0.09 60.5*

036 Word and phrase repetitions 100 4 4 0.21* 0.02, 0.41 0.5

037 Silent pauses 655 15 11 0.01 ⫺0.09, 0.11 18.5

038 Filled pauses 805 16 14 0.00 ⫺0.08, 0.08 22.2

039 Mixed pauses 280 7 3 0.03 ⫺0.11, 0.17 3.6

040 Mixed disturbances (ah plus non-ah) 283 7 5 0.04 ⫺0.14, 0.23 7.0

041 Ritualized speech 181 4 3 0.20 ⫺0.06, 0.47 2.3

042 Miscellaneous dysfluencies 144 8 5 0.17 ⫺0.04, 0.38 13.9

Active

043 Body animation, activity 214 4 4 0.11 ⫺0.03, 0.25 11.7*

044 Posture shifts 1,214 29 16 0.05 ⫺0.03, 0.12 14.1

045 Head movements (undifferentiated) 536 14 8 ⫺0.02 ⫺0.12, 0.08 9.4

046 Hand movements 951 29 11 0.00 ⫺0.08, 0.08 28.0

047 Arm movements 52 3 3 ⫺0.17 ⫺0.54, 0.20 3.5

048 Foot or leg movements 857 28 21 ⫺0.09 ⫺0.18, 0.00 20.5

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. N⫽total number of participants in the studies; k

⫽total number of

independent effect sizes (ds); k

⫽number of ds that could be estimated precisely; CI ⫽95% confidence

interval; Q⫽homogeneity statistic (significance indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity of ds).

*p⬍.05.

92 DEPAULO ET AL.

–0.21). They also displayed fewer of the gestures used to illustrate

speech (d⫽–0.14).

The set of immediacy cues includes three composite measures

and a number of individual immediacy measures. The individual

cues were the ones described by Mehrabian (1972) that were

reported separately in several studies or other cues that seemed to

capture the immediacy construct (e.g., Fleming, 1994). The com-

posite measures were verbal immediacy (all categories), verbal and

vocal immediacy, and nonverbal immediacy. The verbal immedi-

acy composite is an index consisting of all of the linguistic cate-

gories described by Wiener and Mehrabian (1968). They are all

verbal constructions (e.g., active vs. passive voice, affirmatives vs.

negations) that are typically coded from transcripts. The verbal and

vocal immediacy measure is based on raters’overall impressions

of the degree to which the social actors seemed direct, relevant,

clear, and personal. The nonverbal immediacy measure includes

the set of nonverbal cues described by Mehrabian (1972) as indices

of immediacy (e.g., interpersonal proximity, leaning and facing

toward the other person).

The verbal composite and the verbal and nonverbal composite

both indicated that liars were less immediate than truth tellers (d⫽

–0.31 and –0.55, respectively). Liars used more linguistic con-

structions that seemed to distance themselves from their listeners

or from the contents of their presentations, and they sounded more

evasive, unclear, and impersonal. The nonverbal composite was

only weakly (nonsignificantly) suggestive of the same conclusion

(d⫽–0.07).

The results of other individual indices of immediacy were

inconsistent and unimpressive. It is notable that none of the mea-

sures of looking behavior supported the widespread belief that liars

do not look their targets in the eye. The 32 independent estimates

of eye contact produced a combined effect that was almost exactly

zero (d⫽0.01), and the Qstatistic indicated that the 32 estimates

were homogeneous in size. The estimates of gaze aversion were

Table 5

Are Liars Less Positive and Pleasant Than Truth Tellers?

Cue Nk

dCI Q

049 Friendly, pleasant (overall) 216 6 3 ⫺0.16 ⫺0.36, 0.05 11.3

050 Cooperative (overall) 222 3 3 ⴚ0.66* ⫺0.93, ⫺0.38 11.2*

051 Attractive (overall) 84 6 3 ⫺0.06 ⫺0.27, 0.16 3.1

052 Negative statements and complaints 397 9 6 0.21* 0.09, 0.32 21.5*

053 Vocal pleasantness 325 4 2 ⫺0.11 ⫺0.28, 0.05 1.4

054 Facial pleasantness 635 13 6 ⴚ0.12* ⫺0.22, ⫺0.02 25.1*

055 Head nods 752 16 3 0.01 ⫺0.09, 0.11 1.5

056 Brow lowering 303 5 4 0.04 ⫺0.08, 0.16 9.0

057 Sneers 259 4 3 0.02 ⫺0.11, 0.15 38.1*

058 Smiling (undifferentiated) 1,313 27 16 0.00 ⫺0.07, 0.07 18.3

059 Lip corner pull (AU 12) 284 4 3 0.00 ⫺0.12, 0.12 1.9

060 Eye muscles (AU 6), not during positive emotions 284 4 4 ⫺0.01 ⫺0.13, 0.11 3.6

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. N⫽total number of participants in the studies; k

⫽total number of

independent effect sizes (ds); k

⫽number of ds that could be estimated precisely; CI ⫽95% confidence

interval; Q⫽homogeneity statistic (significance indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity of

effect sizes); AU ⫽facial action unit (as categorized by Ekman & Friesen, 1978).

*p⬍.05.

Table 6

Are Liars More Tense Than Truth Tellers?

Cue Nk

dCI Q

061 Nervous, tense (overall) 571 16 12 0.27* 0.16, 0.38 37.3*

062 Vocal tension 328 10 8 0.26* 0.13, 0.39 25.4*

063 Frequency, pitch 294 12 11 0.21* 0.08, 0.34 31.2*

064 Relaxed posture 488 13 3 ⫺0.02 ⫺0.14, 0.10 19.6

065 Pupil dilation 328 4 4 0.39* 0.21, 0.56 1.1

066 Blinking 850 17 13 0.07 ⫺0.01, 0.14 54.4*

067 Object fidgeting 420 5 2 ⫺0.12 ⫺0.26, 0.03 4.0

068 Self-fidgeting 991 18 10 ⫺0.01 ⫺0.09, 0.08 19.5

069 Facial fidgeting 444 7 4 0.08 ⫺0.09, 0.25 7.7

070 Fidgeting (undifferentiated) 495 14 10 0.16* 0.03, 0.28 28.2*

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. N⫽total number of participants in the studies; k

⫽total number of

independent effect sizes (ds); k

⫽number of ds that could be estimated precisely; CI ⫽95% confidence

interval; Q⫽homogeneity statistic (significance indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity of ds).

*p⬍.05.

CUES TO DECEPTION

equally unimpressive (d⫽0.03). Estimates of eye shifts produced

just a nonsignificant trend (d⫽0.11).

The one cue that was consistent with our prediction that liars

would seem less certain than truth tellers was verbal and vocal

uncertainty (as measured by subjective impressions); liars did

sound more uncertain than truth tellers (d⫽0.30). One other

behavior unexpectedly produced results in the opposite direction.

More often than truth tellers, liars raised their chins (d⫽0.25). In

studies of facial expressions in conflict situations, a particular

facial constellation, called a plus face, has been identified (Zivin,

1982). It consists of a raised chin, direct eye contact, and medially

raised brows. People who show this plus face during conflict

situations are more likely to prevail than those who do not show it

or who show a minus face, consisting of a lowered chin, averted

eyes, and pinched brows (Zivin, 1982). That research suggests that

raising the chin could be a sign of certainty.

Mahl and his colleagues (e.g., Kasl & Mahl, 1965; Mahl, 1987)

have suggested that the large variety of disturbances that occur in

spontaneous speech can be classified into two functionally distinct

categories: non-ah disturbances, which indicate state anxiety

(Mahl, 1987), and the commonplace filled pauses such as “ah,”

“um,”and “er,”which occur especially often when the available

options for what to say or how to say it are many and complex

(Berger, Karol, & Jordan, 1989; Christenfeld, 1994; Schachter et

al., 1991). Of the non-ah disturbances, the most frequently occur-

ring are sentence changes, in which the speaker interrupts the flow

of a sentence to change its form or content, and superfluous

repetitions of words or phrases. The other non-ah disturbances are

stutters, omissions of words or parts of words, sentences that are

not completed, slips of the tongue, and intruding incoherent

sounds.

Most studies reported a composite that included all non-ah

disturbances, or one that included non-ahs as well as ahs. When

individual disturbances were reported separately, we preserved the

distinctions. In the fluency subcategory, we also included silent

pauses, mixed pauses (silent plus filled, for studies in which the

two were not reported separately), ritualized speech (e.g., “you

know,”“well,”“I mean”), and miscellaneous dysfluencies, which

were sets of dysfluencies that were not based on particular systems

such as Mahl’s (1987).

Results of the fluency indices suggest that speech disturbances

have little predictive power as cues to deceit. The categories of

disturbances reported most often, non-ah disturbances, filled

pauses, and silent pauses, produced combined effect sizes

of 0.00, 0.00, and 0.01, respectively. Only one type of speech

disturbance, the repetition of words and phrases, produced a sta-

tistically reliable effect (d⫽0.21).

Under the subcategory of “active,”we included all movements

except those defined as expressive (i.e., illustrators were included

in the subcategory of “engaging”cues) and those believed to be

indicative of nervousness (i.e., forms of fidgeting, included in the

tense category). There were nearly 30 independent estimates of

posture shifts (d⫽0.05), hand movements (d⫽0.00), and foot or

leg movements (d⫽–0.09), but we found little relationship with

deceit for these or any of the other movements.

In sum, there were three ways in which liars told less compelling

tales than did truth tellers. Their stories made less sense, and they

told those stories in less engaging and less immediate ways. Cues

based on subjective impressions of verbal and vocal cues (typically

rated from audiotapes) were most often consistent with predic-

tions. Specifically, liars sounded less involved, less immediate,

and more uncertain than did truth tellers.

Are liars less positive and pleasant than truth tellers? All of

the cues that assessed pleasantness in a global way produced

results in the predicted direction, although some of the effects were

small and nonsignificant (see Table 5). A small number of esti-

mates (k⫽3) indicated that liars were less cooperative than truth

tellers (d⫽–0.66). Liars also made more negative statements and

complaints (d⫽0.21), and their faces were less pleasant (d⫽

–0.12).

Table 7

Do Lies Include Fewer Ordinary Imperfections and Unusual Contents Than Truths?

Cue Nk

dCI Q

071 Unstructured productions 211 5 4 ⫺0.06 ⫺0.27, 0.15 24.8*

072 Spontaneous corrections 183 5 5 ⴚ0.29* ⫺0.56, ⫺0.02 3.8

073 Admitted lack of memory 183 5 5 ⴚ0.42* ⫺0.70, ⫺0.15 18.7*

074 Self-doubt 123 4 3 ⫺0.10 ⫺0.42, 0.21 5.1

075 Self-deprecation 64 3 3 0.21 ⫺0.19, 0.61 0.9

076 Contextual embedding 159 6 6 ⫺0.21 ⫺0.41, 0.00 21.5*

077 Verbal and nonverbal interactions 163 5 4 ⫺0.03 ⫺0.25, 0.19 8.6

078 Unexpected complications 223 6 5 0.04 ⫺0.16, 0.24 2.2

079 Unusual details 223 6 5 ⫺0.16 ⫺0.36, 0.05 9.5

080 Superfluous details 223 6 5 ⫺0.01 ⫺0.21, 0.19 11.0

081 Related external associations 112 3 3 0.35* 0.02, 0.67 2.1

082 Another’s mental state 151 4 4 0.22 ⫺0.02, 0.46 7.2

083 Subjective mental state 237 6 6 0.02 ⫺0.18, 0.22 8.1

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. All of the cues in this table were coded using the Criteria-Based Content

Analysis system that is part of Statement Validity Analysis (e.g., Steller & Kohnken, 1989). N⫽total number

of participants in the studies; k

⫽total number of independent effect sizes (ds); k

⫽number of ds that could

be estimated precisely; CI ⫽95% confidence interval; Q⫽homogeneity statistic (significance indicates

rejection of the null hypothesis of homogeneity of ds).

*p⬍.05.

94 DEPAULO ET AL.

Table 8

Cues With Larger and Smaller Effect Sizes Based on Larger and Smaller Numbers of Estimates

Larger effect size (d⬎兩0.20兩)dk Smaller effect size (dⱕ兩0.20兩)dk

Larger no. of estimates (k⬎5)

025 Verbal and vocal immediacy (impressions) ⫺0.55* 7 042 Miscellaneous dysfluencies 0.17 8

014 Discrepant, ambivalent 0.34* 7 070 Fidgeting (undifferentiated) 0.16* 14

004 Details ⫺0.30* 24 049 Friendly, pleasant ⫺0.16 6

031 Verbal and vocal uncertainty (impressions) 0.30* 10 024 Other references 0.16 6

061 Nervous, tense (overall) 0.27* 16 079 Unusual details ⫺0.16 6

062 Vocal tension 0.26* 10 018 Illustrators ⫺0.14* 16

013 Logical structure ⫺0.25* 6 054 Facial pleasantness ⫺0.12* 13

012 Plausibility ⫺0.23* 9 029 Eye shifts 0.11 7

063 Frequency, pitch 0.21* 12 007 Unique words ⫺0.10 6

052 Negative statements and complaints 0.21* 9 048 Foot or leg movements ⫺0.09 28

016 Verbal and vocal involvement ⫺0.21* 7 069 Facial fidgeting 0.08 7

076 Contextual embedding ⫺0.21 6 015 Involved, expressive (overall) 0.08 6

010 Rate of speaking 0.07 23

066 Blinking 0.07 17

026 Nonverbal immediacy ⫺0.07 11

006 Cognitive complexity ⫺0.07 6

051 Attractive ⫺0.06 6

044 Posture shifts 0.05 29

040 Mixed disturbances (ah plus non-ah) 0.04 7

034 Shrugs 0.04 6

078 Unexpected complications 0.04 6

001 Response length ⫺0.03 49

022 Self-references ⫺0.03 12

039 Mixed pauses 0.03 7

028 Gaze aversion 0.03 6

009 Response latency 0.02 32

045 Head movements (undifferentiated) ⫺0.02 14

064 Relaxed posture ⫺0.02 13

083 Subjective mental state 0.02 6

027 Eye contact 0.01 32

068 Self-fidgeting ⫺0.01 18

055 Head nods 0.01 16

037 Silent pauses 0.01 15

080 Superfluous details ⫺0.01 6

046 Hand movements 0.00 29

058 Smiling (undifferentiated) 0.00 27

035 Non-ah speech disturbances 0.00 17

038 Filled pauses 0.00 16

Smaller no. of estimates (kⱕ5)

050 Cooperative (overall) ⫺0.66* 3 041 Ritualized speech 0.20 4

073 Admitted lack of memory ⫺0.42* 5 003 Length of interaction ⫺0.20 3

065 Pupil dilation 0.39* 4 005 Sensory information ⫺0.17 4

002 Talking time ⫺0.35* 4 047 Arm movements ⫺0.17 3

081 Related external associations 0.35* 3 011 Presses lips 0.16* 4

019 Verbal immediacy (all categories) ⫺0.31* 3 030 Tentative constructions ⫺0.16 3

072 Spontaneous corrections ⫺0.29* 5 020 Verbal immediacy, temporal 0.15 4

033 Chin raise 0.25* 4 023 Mutual and group references ⫺0.14 5

082 Another’s mental state 0.22 4 067 Object fidgeting ⫺0.12 5

036 Word and phrase repetitions 0.21* 4 017 Facial expressiveness 0.12 3

075 Self-deprecation 0.21 3 043 Body animation, activity 0.11 4

053 Vocal pleasantness ⫺0.11 4

008 Blocks access to information 0.10 5

021 Generalizing terms 0.10 5

074 Self-doubt ⫺0.10 4

132 Lips apart (AU 25) ⫺0.08 5

071 Unstructured productions ⫺0.06 5

131 Eyes closed ⫺0.06 3

032 Amplitude, loudness ⫺0.05 5

056 Brow lowering 0.04 5

130 Lip stretch (AU 20) ⫺0.04 4

077 Descriptions of verbal and nonverbal interactions ⫺0.03 5

057 Sneers 0.02 4

129 Brow raise (AU 1) 0.01 5

060 Eye muscles (AU 6), not during positive emotions ⫺0.01 4

133 Jaw drop (AU 26) 0.00 5

059 Lip corner pull (AU 12) 0.00 4

Note. AU ⫽facial action unit (as categorized by Ekman & Friesen, 1978).

*p⬍.05.

CUES TO DECEPTION

Each of the more specific cues to positivity or negativity (e.g.,

head nods, brow lowering, sneers) produced combined effects very

close to zero. The most notable finding was that the 27 estimates

of smiling produced a combined effect size of exactly zero. The

measures of smiling in those studies did not distinguish among

different types of smiles. Ekman (1985/1992) argued that for

smiling to predict deceptiveness, smiles expressing genuinely pos-

itive affect (distinguished by the cheek raise, facial action unit 6

[AU; as categorized by Ekman & Friesen, 1978], produced by

movements of the muscles around the outside corner of the eye)

must be coded separately from feigned smiles. Because our review

contained only two estimates of genuine smiling and two of

feigned smiling, the results are reported in Appendix B with the

other cues for which the number of estimates was limited. The

combined effects tend to support Ekman’s position. When only

pretending to be experiencing genuinely positive affect, people

were less likely to show genuine smiles (d⫽–0.70) and more

likely to show feigned ones (d⫽0.31). There were no differences

in the occurrence of the cheek raise for liars versus truth tellers in

studies in which the participants were not experiencing or faking

positive emotions (d⫽–0.01; e.g., studies of the expression and

concealment of pain). Also as predicted by Ekman, the easily

produced lip corner pull (AU 12) did not distinguish truths from

lies either, again producing a combined effect size of exactly zero.

Are liars more tense than truth tellers? Except for two types

of fidgeting, the results of every cue to tension were in the

predicted direction, though again some were quite small and non-

significant (see Table 6). Liars were more nervous and tense

overall than truth tellers (d⫽0.27). They were more vocally tense

(d⫽0.26) and spoke in a higher pitch (d⫽0.21). Liars also had

more dilated pupils (d⫽0.39).

In studies in which different kinds of fidgeting were not differ-

entiated, liars fidgeted more than truth tellers (d⫽0.16). However,

the effect was smaller for facial fidgeting (e.g., rubbing one’s face,

playing with one’s hair; d⫽0.08), and the results were in the

opposite direction for object fidgeting (e.g., tapping a pencil,

twisting a paper clip; d⫽–0.12) and self-fidgeting (e.g., scratch-

ing; d⫽–0.01). The best summary of these data is that there is no

clear relationship between fidgeting and lying.

Do lies include fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual con-

tents than do truths? The people who made spontaneous correc-

tions while telling their stories were more likely to be telling truths

than lies (d⫽⫺0.29). This is consistent with our prediction that

liars would avoid behaviors they mistakenly construe as under-

mining the convincingness of their lies (see Table 7). Liars also

seemed to avoid another admission of imperfection that truth

tellers acknowledge: an inability to remember something (d⫽

–0.42). There were also indications that liars stuck too closely to

the key elements of the story they were fabricating. For example,

like good novelists, truth tellers sometimes describe the settings of

their stories; liars were somewhat less likely to do this (d⫽–0.21

for contextual embedding), and they provided nonsignificantly

fewer unusual details (d⫽–0.16). However, liars did mention

events or relationships peripheral to the key event (d⫽0.35 for

related external associations) more often than truth tellers did.

Summary of individual cues to deception. The most compel-

ling results in this review are the ones based on relatively large

numbers of estimates that produced the biggest combined effects.

In Table 8, the 88 cues are arranged into four sections according to

the number of independent estimates and the size of the combined

effects. On the top half of the table are the cues for which six or

more independent estimates were available. These were the 50

cues that were above the median in the number of estimates on

which they were based (see also Field, 2001). On the bottom half

are the 38 cues for which just three, four, or five estimates were

available. In the first column are the 23 cues with combined effect

sizes larger than |0.20|. In the second column are the 65 effect sizes

equal to |0.20| or smaller. The value of |0.20| was selected based on

Cohen’s (1988) heuristic that effect sizes (d) of |0.20| are small

effects. Within each section, cues with the biggest effect sizes are

listed first; within cues with the same effect sizes, those based on

a larger number of estimates (k) are listed first.

Twelve cues are in the larger dand ksection. These cues were

based on at least six independent estimates and produced com-

bined effects greater than |0.20|. Half of these cues were from the

compelling category, including all three of the cues in the subcat-

egory “makes sense.”The effects for those three cues indicate that

self-presentations that seem discrepant, illogically structured, or

implausible are more likely to be deceptive than truthful. Verbal

and vocal immediacy, from the “immediacy”subcategory, tops the

list. Verbal and vocal uncertainty, from the subcategory “uncer-

tain,”is in this section, as is verbal and vocal involvement, a cue

in the subcategory “engaging.”

The larger dand ksection also includes one of the cues in the

forthcoming category (details) and one from the “positive, pleas-

ant”category (negative statements and complaints). There are also

three cues from the tense category (overall tension, vocal tension,

and pitch) and one from the category of “ordinary imperfections

and unusual details”(contextual embedding).

In the larger dand smaller ksection of Table 8 are cues that

produced relatively bigger effects but were based on smaller

numbers of estimates. For example, a handful of estimates suggest

that liars were less cooperative than truth tellers, were less likely

to admit that they did not remember something, and had more

dilated pupils.

Table 9

Stem and Leaf Plot of Combined Effect Sizes (ds) for Individual

Cues to Deception

Stem Leaf

0.6 6

0.6

0.5 5

0.5

0.4

0.4 2

0.3 559

0.3 0014

0.2 55679

0.2 0011111123

0.1 5666666777

0.1 000011122244

0.0 5566677778889

0.0 0000001111111222223333344444

Note. Included are the 88 cues for which at least three independent effect

size estimates were available (at least two of which could be computed

precisely).

96 DEPAULO ET AL.

Some of the cues in the smaller dand larger ksection of Table 8

are noteworthy because the very tiny cumulative ds were based on

large numbers of estimates. For example, response length, re-

sponse latency, and eye contact were all based on more than 30

independent estimates, but they produced cumulative effect sizes

of just –0.03, 0.02, and 0.01, respectively.

Table 9 is a stem and leaf display of the absolute values of

the 88 effect sizes. The median effect size is just |0.10|. Only two

of the effect sizes meet Cohen’s (1988) criterion of |0.50| for large

effects.

Moderators of Cues to Deception

In Tables 3–7, in which we present the combined results of the

estimates of individual cues to deception, we included cues only if

they were based on at least three effect sizes, at least two of which

were precise estimates. In our moderator analyses, we needed to

use a more stringent criterion to have a sufficient number of

estimates at each level of the moderator variables. We began by

considering all cues for which we had at least 10 precise estimates.

Eighteen cues met that criterion: response length, details, response

latency, rate of speaking, illustrators, eye contact, non-ah speech

disturbances, silent pauses, filled pauses, posture shifts, hand

movements, foot or leg movements, smiling (undifferentiated),

nervous, pitch, blinking, self-fidgeting, and fidgeting (undifferen-

tiated). Our initial analyses that combined across all estimates (as

reported in Tables 3–7) indicated that for some of these cues, the

estimates were homogeneous. Because our predictions were theo-

retically driven, we proceeded to test the moderator variables for

all 18 of the cues. Four of the cues for which the estimates were

homogeneous—illustrators, posture shifts, smiling (undifferenti-

ated), and hand movements—produced no significant effects in

any of our moderator analyses, indicating that the size of the

effects was also homogeneous across levels of the moderators.

For the moderator analyses, we report three homogeneity statistics

for each moderator. The Q

statistic indicates the variability among all

of the estimates of the cue included in the analysis. The Q

statistic

indicates between-groups variation. Significant between-groups ef-

fects indicate that the size of the effects differed across the levels of

the moderator. The Q

statistic indicates variability within each level

of the moderator variable; a significant value indicates additional

variability that has not been explained.

Motivation to succeed at lying. We predicted that cues to

deception would be stronger in studies in which the social actors

were motivated to get away with their lies than in studies in which

no special incentives were provided. Table 10 shows the effect

sizes for each cue for those two kinds of studies. Patterns of eye

contact differed significantly between the motivated senders and

the senders with no special motivation. When social actors were

motivated to succeed, they made significantly less eye contact

when lying than when telling the truth (d⫽–0.15). When no

special incentive was provided to social actors, they made nonsig-

nificantly more eye contact when lying (d⫽0.09).

Two of the fluency cues, non-ah disturbances and filled pauses,

varied with the motivation moderator. In studies in which no

special incentive was provided, there was a small positive effect

for both cues; deceptive self-presentations were nonsignificantly

more likely to include non-ah disturbances (d⫽0.13) and filled

pauses (d⫽0.09) than truthful ones. However, when incentives

were provided, this effect reversed, and deceptive self-

presentations included nonsignificantly fewer non-ah speech dis-

turbances (d⫽–0.10) and filled pauses (d⫽–0.13) than truthful

ones.

Several cues to tension also discriminated cues to deception

under the two motivational conditions. Social actors were more

tense overall when lying compared with when telling the truth, and

this effect was significant only when they were motivated to

succeed (d⫽0.35 vs. 0.15). Also, it was only in the incentive

condition that lies were communicated in more highly pitched

voices than were truths (d⫽0.59 vs. –0.02).

Differences in the magnitude of the effects (absolute values) for

studies in which social actors were or were not motivated to

succeed are also telling. For studies in which there was no special

incentive for succeeding, cues to deception were generally weak.

Overall, the size of the effects increased somewhat when some

incentive was provided.

Identity-relevant motivations to succeed. We had predicted

that across all of the estimates in our data set, we would find that

liars’responses would be shorter than those of truth tellers’, would

be preceded by a longer response latency, and would include more

silent pauses. None of these predictions was supported in the

overall analyses. However, all of these predictions were signifi-

cantly more strongly supported under conditions of identity-

relevant motivation than under no-motivation conditions (see Ta-

ble 11). Within the identity-relevant condition, the effect sizes

were nearly significant for response length (d⫽–0.23) and silent

pauses (d⫽0.38) but not significant for response latency

(d⫽0.36).

In the identity-relevant condition, the voice pitch of liars was

significantly higher than that of truth tellers; the effect size was

significant (d⫽0.67), and it differed significantly from the effect

size in the no-motivation condition (d⫽–0.02). Liars in the

identity-relevant condition also made significantly fewer foot or

leg movements than truth tellers (d⫽–0.28); however, the size of

the effect was not significantly different when compared with the

no-motivation condition (d⫽–0.02).

Instrumental motivations. Table 11 also shows cues to decep-

tion for studies in which the incentives were primarily instrumental

(e.g., financial). Only two cues differed significantly in size be-

tween the studies that provided no incentives to the social actors

and those that provided instrumental incentives. Non-ah distur-

bances (d⫽–0.17) and filled pauses (d⫽–0.14) occurred

nonsignificantly less often in the speech of the liars than of the

truth tellers in the studies that provided instrumental incentives. In

the studies in which no incentives were provided, the speech of

liars included somewhat more non-ah disturbances (d⫽0.13) and

filled pauses (d⫽0.09) than the speech of truth tellers. Within the

instrumental-motivation condition, there were no effect sizes that

differed significantly from chance.

Identity-relevant versus instrumental motivations. The self-

presentational perspective predicts stronger effects when incen-

tives are identity relevant than when they are instrumental. Results

(also shown in Table 11) indicate that the responses of liars tended

to be even shorter than those of truth tellers when the social actors

were motivated by identity-relevant incentives than when they

were instrumentally motivated (d⫽–0.23 vs. –0.05; for the

difference between conditions, p⫽.06). Response latencies were

significantly longer (d⫽0.36 vs. –0.01), and there were some-

CUES TO DECEPTION

what more silent pauses (d⫽0.38 vs. –0.03; for the difference

between conditions, p⫽.07). There were no cues that were

significantly or nearly significantly stronger in the instrumental-

motivation condition.

Unplanned and planned presentations. Seven independent

samples (described in eight reports) included a manipulation of

whether the senders’messages were unplanned or planned. Results

for 33 specific cues were reported by the authors. However, there

were only two cues (response length and response latency) that

met our criterion of being based on at least three independent

estimates (at least two of which were estimated precisely). Table

12 shows the results for those cues as well as several others that

met a less stringent criterion: At least two independent estimates

were available, and at least one was estimated precisely. Those

results should be interpreted with caution.

We computed the effect sizes in Table 12 by subtracting the

effect size for the planned messages from the effect size from the

unplanned messages. Therefore, more positive effect sizes indicate

that the relationship of the cue to deception was more positive for

the unplanned messages than for the planned messages.

As predicted, the combined effect for response latency was

statistically reliable (d⫽0.20). When social actors did not plan

their messages, there was a longer latency between the end of the

question and the beginning of their answer when they were lying

Table 10

Cues to Deception When Incentives for Success Were or Were Not Provided

Cue

Condition

(df )Q

(1)

No motivation Motivation

001 Response length

d(CI) ⫺0.03 (⫺0.15, 0.09) ⫺0.03 (⫺0.14, 0.08) 92.1* (48) 0.0

(k)59.6* (21) 32.5 (28)

009 Response latency

d(CI) 0.04 (⫺0.17, 0.26) 0.00 (⫺0.22, 0.22) 112.4* (32) 0.3

(k)50.1* (18) 62.0* (15)

010 Rate of speaking

d(CI) 0.10 (⫺0.04, 0.25) 0.04 (⫺0.10, 0.17) 21.7 (22) 0.5

(k)8.7 (8) 12.5 (15)

027 Eye contact

d(CI) 0.09 (⫺0.01, 0.19) ⴚ0.15* (⫺0.29, ⫺0.01) 41.1 (31) 9.0*

(k)13.3 (20) 18.8 (12)

035 Non-ah disturbances

d(CI) 0.13 (⫺0.15, 0.41) ⫺0.10 (⫺0.34, 0.14) 60.5* (16) 6.3*

(k)24.6* (7) 29.7* (10)

037 Silent pauses

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.18, 0.15) 0.06 (⫺0.16, 0.29) 18.5 (14) 0.5

(k)7.1 (8) 10.8 (7)

038 Filled pauses

d(CI) 0.09 (⫺0.03, 0.22) ⫺0.13 (⫺0.28, 0.02) 22.2 (15) 6.5*

(k)8.3 (8) 7.4 (8)

048 Foot or leg movements

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.15, 0.11) ⴚ0.13* (⫺0.22, ⫺0.03) 20.4 (27) 1.4

(k)5.0 (9) 14.0 (19)

061 Nervous, tense

d(CI) 0.15 (⫺0.15, 0.44) 0.35* (0.11, 0.58) 37.3* (15) 3.0

(k)10.8 (8) 23.4* (8)

063 Frequency, pitch

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.23, 0.20) 0.59* (0.31, 0.88) 31.2* (11) 18.6*

(k)2.9 (6) 9.7 (6)

066 Blinking

d(CI) 0.05 (⫺0.14, 0.25) 0.09 (⫺0.19, 0.36) 54.4* (16) 0.5

(k)23.9* (9) 30.3* (8)

068 Self-fidgeting

d(CI) 0.08 (⫺0.03, 0.18) ⫺0.12 (⫺0.25, 0.01) 19.5 (17) 5.5*

(k)10.1 (11) 3.9 (7)

070 Fidgeting (undifferentiated)

d(CI) 0.09 (⫺0.33, 0.53) 0.18 (⫺0.08, 0.43) 28.2* (13) 0.3

(k)11.3* (3) 16.6* (11)

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. The Qstatistics are homogeneity statistics; significance indicates rejection of

the hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes (ds). Therefore, bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity. Q

⫽

homogeneity among all estimates for a particular cue; df ⫽degree of freedom; Q

⫽homogeneity between the

two levels of the moderator being compared. CI ⫽95% confidence interval; Q

⫽homogeneity of ds within

the level of the moderator; k⫽number of independent estimates.

*p⬍.05.

98 DEPAULO ET AL.

Table 11

Cues to Deception Under Conditions of No Motivation, Identity-Relevant Motivation, and Instrumental Motivation

Cue

Condition

No motivation (NM) Identity-relevant (IR) Instrumental

(IN) NM vs. IR NM vs. IN IR vs. IN

001 Response length

d(CI) ⫺0.03 (⫺0.17, 0.11) ⫺0.23 (⫺0.48, 0.02) ⫺0.05 (⫺0.21, 0.12)

(k)59.6* (21) 5.0 (8) 12.0 (16)

(df )69.5* (28) 71.6* (36) 20.5 (23)

(1) 4.9* 0.1 3.6

009 Response latency

d(CI) 0.04 (⫺0.15, 0.24) 0.36 (⫺0.11, 0.84) ⫺0.01 (⫺0.43, 0.40)

(k)50.2* (18) 10.1 (6) 2.8 (5)

(df )64.9* (23) 53.2* (22) 17.1 (10)

(1) 4.6* 0.2 4.2*

010 Rate of speaking

d(CI) 0.10 (⫺0.05, 0.26) 0.06 (⫺0.28, 0.40) ⫺0.03 (⫺0.22, 0.17)

(k)8.7 (8) 0.3 (3) 10.0 (10)

(df )9.0 (10) 20.0 (17) 10.5 (12)

(1) 0.1 1.3 0.2

027 Eye contact

d(CI) 0.09* (0.01, 0.17) ⫺0.19 (⫺0.50, 0.12) ⫺0.08 (⫺0.25, 0.09)

(k)13.3 (20) 1.2 (3) 10.3 (7)

(df )16.8 (22) 26.8 (26) 11.9 (9)

(1) 2.3 3.2 0.3

035 Non-ah disturbances

d(CI) 0.13 (⫺0.17, 0.43) ⫺0.17 (⫺0.53, 0.18)

(k)24.6* (7) 16.8* (6)

(df )49.2* (12)

(1) 8.0*

037 Silent pauses

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.16, 0.13) 0.38 (⫺0.01, 0.77) ⫺0.03 (⫺0.36, 0.31)

(k)7.1 (8) 1.8 (3) 4.4 (3)

(df )13.5 (10) 11.5 (10) 9.8 (5)

(1) 4.6* 0.0 3.5

038 Filled pauses

d(CI) 0.09 (⫺0.04, 0.23) ⫺0.14 (⫺0.32, 0.04)

(k)8.3 (8) 6.2 (6)

(df )20.9 (13)

(1) 6.4*

048 Foot or leg movements

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.14, 0.11) ⴚ0.28* (⫺0.51, ⫺0.06) ⫺0.09 (⫺0.22, 0.03)

(k)5.0 (9) 2.6 (5) 9.0 (12)

(df )10.8 (13) 14.6 (20) 13.3 (16)

(1) 3.2 0.6 1.7

061 Nervous, tense

d(CI) 0.15 (⫺0.15, 0.44) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.35, 0.31)

(k)10.8 (8) 3.3 (4)

(df )15.2 (11)

(1) 1.2

063 Frequency, pitch

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.15, 0.11) 0.67* (0.43, 0.92)

(k)2.9 (6) 0.0 (3)

(df )17.0* (8)

(1) 14.1*

066 Blinking

d(CI) 0.05 (⫺0.11, 0.22) 0.05 (⫺0.50, 0.39)

(k)23.9* (9) 0.3 (3)

(df )24.2* (1.1)

(1) 0.0

068 Self-fidgeting

d(CI) 0.08 (⫺0.03, 0.19) ⫺0.09 (⫺0.27, 0.09)

(k)10.1 (11) 1.3 (4)

(df )13.8 (14)

(1) 2.4

070 Fidgeting (undifferentiated)

d(CI) 0.09 (⫺0.43, 0.61) 0.11 (⫺0.43, 0.65) 0.33 (⫺0.12, 0.78)

(k)11.3* (3) 0.6 (4) 10.6 (6)

(df )11.9* (6) 23.8* (8) 12.8 (9)

(1) 0.0 1.9 1.6

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type indicates statistical significance. The Qstatistics are

homogeneity statistics; significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes (ds). Therefore, bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity. Q

⫽

homogeneity among all estimates for a particular cue; df ⫽degree of freedom; Q

⫽homogeneity between the two levels of the moderator being compared. CI

⫽95% confidence interval; Q

⫽homogeneity of ds within the level of the moderator; k⫽number of independent estimates.

*p⬍.05.

than when they were telling the truth, but when the senders

planned their messages, they began responding relatively more

quickly when lying than when telling the truth. There were also

somewhat more silent pauses in the deceptive presentations than

the truthful ones when those presentations were not planned than

when they were planned (d⫽0.57, p⫽.05).

Duration of the presentations. We predicted that if social

actors needed to sustain their presentations for greater lengths of

time, cues to deception would be clearer and more numerous. We

used the mean duration of the messages in each study as an

approximation of the degree to which social actors needed to

sustain their presentations over time. Because duration is a con-

tinuous variable, there are no separate groups. Instead, a significant

statistic indicates that the effect sizes were not homogeneous

(i.e., the moderator was significant), and the unstandardized beta

indicates the direction of the effect.

There were three cues for which at least eight independent

estimates were available: response length (Q

⫽5.4, k⫽13);

response latency (Q

⫽6.1, k⫽8); and pitch (Q

⫽6.6, k⫽8),

and for all three, Q

indicated that the effect sizes were not

homogeneous across message lengths. This means that all three

cues varied significantly with the duration of the presentations.

When presentations were sustained for greater amounts of time,

deceptive responses were especially shorter than truthful ones (b⫽

–0.008), and they were preceded by a longer latency (b⫽0.034).

Lies, relative to truths, were also spoken in an especially higher

pitched voice when the presentations lasted longer (b⫽0.002).

Communications that were or were not about transgressions.

We expected to find stronger cues to negativity and tension in

studies in which social actors lied about transgressions than in

those in which the lies were not about transgressions. As shown in

Table 13, this was an important moderator of cues to deception.

When the lie was about a transgression, compared with when it

was not, liars took longer to begin responding than did truth tellers

(d⫽0.27 vs. –0.01). Once they started talking, they talked

significantly faster than truth tellers (d⫽0.32 vs. 0.01). They also

seemed more tense overall (d⫽0.51 vs. 0.09), and they blinked

more (d⫽0.38 vs. 0.01). A trend suggested that they tended to

avoid eye contact more (d⫽–0.13 vs. 0.04, p⫽.07). There were

also some cues suggestive of inhibition: People lying about trans-

gressions made fewer foot or leg movements (d⫽–0.24 vs.

–0.04), and they fidgeted less (d⫽–0.14 vs. 0.07 for self-

fidgeting, d⫽–0.16 vs. 0.24 for undifferentiated fidgeting). Once

again, the effect for non-ah disturbances was contrary to expecta-

tions: Lies about transgressions included fewer such disturbances

than truths; the lies that were not about transgressions included

relatively more of them (d⫽–0.24 vs. 0.17). Within the trans-

gression condition, the effect sizes for response latency, rate of

speaking, non-ah disturbances, foot or leg movements, tension,

blinking, and self-fidgeting all differed significantly, or nearly so,

from zero. Within the no-transgression condition, only the effect

for undifferentiated fidgeting differed from zero.

Overall differences in the magnitude of the cues to deception for

lies about transgressions compared with lies about other topics are

also noteworthy. For 11 of the 12 cues, the absolute value of the

effect was bigger for the lies about transgressions than for the other

lies. In some instances, however, the direction of the effect was

contrary to predictions (e.g., non-ah disturbances, fidgeting).

Interactivity. Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) formulation pre-

dicts greater pleasantness, fluency, composure, involvement, and

immediacy with increasingly interactive contexts. Effect sizes

differed significantly for interactive paradigms relative to nonin-

teractive ones for three cues: details (Q

⫽4.41), pitch

⫽8.21), and blinking (Q

⫽13.15). Liars offered signifi-

cantly fewer details than truth tellers in interactive contexts (d⫽

–0.33; 95% confidence interval [CI] ⫽–0.51, –0.15; k⫽20); for

noninteractive contexts, the effect was negligible (d⫽–0.06;

CI ⫽–0.51, 0.39; k⫽4). This result does not seem consistent with

Buller and Burgoon’s predictions. Liars in interactive contexts

spoke in a significantly higher pitched voice than did truth tellers

(d⫽0.35; CI ⫽0.07, 0.64; k⫽9); for noninteractive contexts,

there was a very small effect in the opposite direction (d⫽–0.06;

CI ⫽–0.45, 0.33; k⫽3). In that pitch typically rises with stress,

this result is inconsistent with the prediction that liars would show

more composure with increasing interactivity. Finally, liars in

noninteractive contexts blinked significantly more than truth tell-

ers (d⫽0.29; CI ⫽0.03, 0.56; k⫽4); in interactive contexts,

there was little difference (d⫽–0.06; CI ⫽–0.21, 0.80; k⫽12).

In that blinking can be a sign of tension, this result is consistent

with predictions.

Cues measured objectively and subjectively. To test our pre-

diction that cues based on subjective impressions would more

powerfully discriminate truths from lies than cues measured ob-

jectively, we searched the data set for cues that were assessed

subjectively and objectively and that had at least three estimates

per assessment type. Five cues that met the criterion are shown in

Table 14. In addition, we compared the verbal immediacy com-

posite (Cue 019), which is based on the objective scoring of

linguistic forms, with the verbal and vocal immediacy cue (Cue

025), which is based on subjective impressions.

Three of the six comparisons were significant, and all of them

showed that the effect sizes were stronger when the cues were

assessed subjectively than when they were measured objectively.

Impressions of immediacy separated truths from lies more power-

Table 12

Cues to Deception: Differences Between Unplanned and

Planned Communications

Cue k

dCI Q

001 Response length 6 3 0.07 ⫺0.06, 0.20 6.3

009 Response latency 4 1 0.20* 0.07, 0.34 8.7

018 Illustrators 3 1 0.03 ⫺0.18, 0.11 0.4

027 Eye contact 3 1 ⫺0.09 ⫺0.23, 0.06 0.8

037 Silent pauses 2 2 0.57 0.00, 1.14 10.1*

055 Head nods 3 1 ⫺0.11 ⫺0.25, 0.04 3.1

058 Smiling 3 1 0.07 ⫺0.08, 0.22 1.2

070 Fidgeting

(undifferentiated) 32⫺0.03 0.19, 0.14 1.6

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as

indexed in Appendix A. Bold type indicates statistical significance. Effect

sizes (ds) were computed by subtracting the dfor planned messages from

the dfor unplanned messages. Therefore, more positive ds indicate that the

behavior was more positively associated with deception for the unplanned

messages than for the planned ones. k

⫽total number of ds; k

⫽number

of ds that could be estimated precisely; CI ⫽95% confidence interval; Q

⫽homogeneity statistic (significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis

of homogeneity of ds; therefore, bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity).

*p⬍.05.

100 DEPAULO ET AL.

fully than did objective measures of immediacy (d⫽–0.55 vs.

–0.31; only the dfor subjective impressions was significant).

When eye contact was based on subjective impressions, liars

showed somewhat less eye contact than truth tellers (d⫽–0.28);

there was virtually no difference when eye contact was measured

objectively (d⫽0.04). Similarly, subjective impressions of facial

pleasantness indicated that liars were significantly less facially

pleasant than truth tellers (d⫽–0.20), but this did not occur when

facial pleasantness was measured objectively (d⫽0.07).

Discussion

Previous perspectives on cues to deception have pointed to the

predictive value of factors such as the feelings of guilt or appre-

hensiveness that people may have about lying, the cognitive chal-

lenges involved in lying, and the attempts people make to control

their verbal and nonverbal behaviors (e.g., Ekman, 1985/1992;

Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman et al., 1981). Unlike past

formulations, our self-presentational perspective is grounded in

psychology’s growing understanding of the nature of lying in

everyday life. Lying, we now know, is a fact of daily life, and not

an extraordinary event. Lies, like truths, are often told in the

pursuit of identity-relevant goals. People frequently lie to make

themselves (or sometimes others) look better or feel better; they try

to appear to be the kind of person they only wish they could

truthfully claim to be (B. M. DePaulo, Kashy, et al., 1996). Now

that we have recognized the pedestrian nature of most lie telling in

people’s lives, the factors underscored by others assume their

rightful place.

Table 13

Cues to Deception When Senders Did and Did Not Commit a Transgression

Cue

Condition

(df )Q

(1)

No transgression Transgression

001 Response length

d(CI) ⫺0.02 (⫺0.11, 0.08) ⫺0.08 (⫺0.25, 0.10) 92.1* (48) 0.7

(k)74.6* (38) 16.7 (11)

009 Response latency

d(CI) ⫺0.07 (⫺0.24, 0.11) 0.27 (⫺0.02, 0.55) 112.4* (31) 13.7*

(k)67.4* (24) 31.3* (8)

010 Rate of speaking

d(CI) 0.01 (⫺0.08, 0.10) 0.32* (0.13, 0.52) 21.7 (22) 6.6*

(k)8.7 (18) 6.4 (5)

027 Eye contact

d(CI) 0.04 (⫺0.05, 0.14) ⫺0.13 (⫺0.33, 0.07) 41.1 (31) 3.3

(k)24.4 (26) 13.3* (6)

035 Non-ah disturbances

d(CI) 0.17 (⫺0.04, 0.38) ⫺0.24 (⫺0.49, 0.01) 60.5* (16) 19.7*

(k)6.5 (11) 34.3* (6)

037 Silent pauses

d(CI) ⫺0.01 (⫺0.15, 0.14) 0.10 (⫺0.24, 0.43) 18.5 (14) 0.5

(k)11.8 (10) 6.2 (5)

038 Filled pauses

d(CI) 0.01 (⫺0.13, 0.14) ⫺0.03 (⫺0.26, 0.21) 22.2 (15) 0.1

(k)9.5 (11) 12.6* (5)

048 Foot or leg movements

d(CI) ⫺0.04 (⫺0.12, 0.04) ⴚ0.24* (⫺0.38, ⫺0.09) 20.4 (27) 3.8*

(k)11.4 (21) 5.2 (7)

061 Nervous, tense

d(CI) 0.09 (⫺0.11, 0.29) 0.51* (0.28, 0.75) 37.3* (15) 13.9*

(k)15.2 (12) 8.2 (4)

066 Blinking

d(CI) 0.01 (⫺0.14, 0.16) 0.38* (0.03, 0.73) 54.4* (16) 12.2*

(k)40.5* (13) 1.7 (4)

068 Self-fidgeting

d(CI) 0.07 (⫺0.03, 0.17) ⫺0.14 (⫺0.28, ⫺0.00) 19.5 (17) 5.7*

(k)8.2 (12) 5.5 (6)

070 Fidgeting (undifferentiated)

d(CI) 0.24* (0.02, 0.46) ⫺0.16 (⫺0.58, 0.27) 28.2* (13) 6.1*

(k)18.1 (10) 4.1 (4)

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. The Qstatistics are homogeneity statistics; significance indicates rejection of

the hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes (ds). Therefore, bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity. Q

⫽

homogeneity among all estimates for a particular cue; df ⫽degree of freedom; Q

⫽homogeneity between the

two levels of the moderator being compared. CI ⫽95% confidence interval; Q

⫽homogeneity of ds within

the level of the moderator; k⫽number of independent estimates.

*p⬍.05.

101

CUES TO DECEPTION

Previous Perspectives on Cues to Deception

Feelings While Lying

In that the behaviors or feelings that people try to hide with their

lies are usually only mildly discrediting, feelings of guilt should be

mild as well. Similarly, for most lies, the sanctions attendant on

getting caught are minimal; thus, liars should ordinarily seem only

slightly more apprehensive than truth tellers. Perhaps these faint

feelings of guilt and apprehensiveness account for the twinge of

discomfort reported by the tellers of everyday lies. We believe that

the discomfort is also born of the one identity-relevant implication

that is common to all liars: They are willing to make claims they

believe to be untrue.

Two predictions follow from this analysis. First, cues to nega-

tivity and tension will generally be weak. However, when liars

have reason to feel especially guilty about their lies or apprehen-

sive about the consequences of them, as when they are lying about

transgressions, then those cues should be stronger. Consistent with

predictions, we did find some of the expected cues in our analyses

that combined across all studies. For example, liars made more

negative statements than did truth tellers, and they appeared more

tense. When we looked separately at the lies that were and were

not about transgressions, we found that the cues to lies about

transgressions were more plentiful and more robust than the cues

to deception for any level of any of the other moderators we

examined. In contrast, lies that were not about transgressions were

barely discriminable from the truths.

The self-presentational perspective accords importance, not only

to the feelings that liars experience more routinely than do truth

tellers, but also to the feelings that truth tellers genuinely experi-

ence and that liars can only try to fake. When social actors are

truthfully presenting aspects of themselves that are especially

important to them, they have an emotional investment that is not

easily simulated by those who only pretend to have such personal

qualities. They also have the support of a lifetime of experiences

at living the part. Liars’performances, then, would pale in com-

parison. Consistent with this formulation is our finding that liars

were generally less forthcoming than truth tellers, and their tales

were less compelling. For example, liars provided fewer details

than did truth tellers. In contrast, truth tellers sounded more in-

volved, more certain, more direct, and more personal.

Arousal

Pupil dilation and pitch did function as cues to deception and

could be regarded as supportive of the hypothesized importance of

generalized arousal. However, we believe that it is theoretically

and empirically more precise and defensible to interpret these cues

as indicative of particular attentional or information-processing

activities or of specific affective experiences (e.g., Cacioppo,

Petty, & Tassinary, 1989; Ekman et al., 1983; Neiss, 1988; Sparks

& Greene, 1992).

Cognitive Complexities

Several theoretical statements share the assumption that lie

telling is more cognitively challenging than telling the truth (e.g.,

Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Zuckerman et al., 1981). From our

Table 14

Cues to Deception Based on Objective and Subjective Measures

Cue

Measurement

(df)Q

(1)

Objective Subjective

004 Details

d(CI) ⴚ0.27* (⫺0.50, ⫺0.04) ⴚ0.32* (⫺0.58, ⫺0.07) 76.2* (23) 0.3

(k)34.9* (14) 41.0* (10)

019 Verbal immediacy with

025 Verbal, vocal immediacy

d(CI) ⫺0.31 (⫺0.73, 0.10) ⴚ0.55* (⫺0.88, ⫺0.23) 28.7* (8) 3.9*

(k)2.4 (3) 26.3* (7)

026 Nonverbal immediacy

d(CI) ⫺0.08 (⫺0.26, 0.11) ⫺0.07 (⫺0.28, 0.14) 6.9 (10) 0.0

(k)2.2 (7) 4.6 (4)

027 Eye contact

d(CI) 0.04 (⫺0.05, 0.12) ⫺0.28 (⫺0.58, 0.02) 41.1 (31) 5.1*

(k)30.0 (27) 5.9 (5)

054 Facial pleasantness

d(CI) 0.07 (⫺0.18, 0.33) ⴚ0.20* (⫺0.37, ⫺0.03) 25.1 (12) 6.7*

(k)2.3 (8) 16.1* (5)

064 Relaxed posture

d(CI) ⫺0.00 (⫺0.24, 0.24) ⫺0.05 (⫺0.33, 0.23) 19.6 (12) 0.2

(k)0.0 (9) 19.5* (4)

Note. Cue numbers are of the cues described in the current article as indexed in Appendix A. Bold type

indicates statistical significance. The Qstatistics are homogeneity statistics; significance indicates rejection of

the hypothesis of homogeneity of effect sizes (ds). Therefore, bigger Qs indicate less homogeneity. Q

⫽

homogeneity among all estimates for a particular cue; df ⫽degree of freedom; Q

⫽homogeneity between the

two levels of the moderator being compared. CI ⫽95% confidence interval; Q

⫽homogeneity of ds within

the level of the moderator; k⫽number of independent estimates.

*p⬍.05.

102 DEPAULO ET AL.

self-presentational perspective, we instead agree with McCornack

(1997) in questioning that assumption. Because lie telling is so

routinely practiced, it may generally be only slightly more chal-

lenging than telling the truth.

In the overall analyses combining all estimates of a given cue,

we found some indications that liars may have been more preoc-

cupied and more cognitively taxed than truth tellers. The level of

involvement in their words and in their voices, which does not

quite measure up to that of truth tellers, is one such possibility. So,

too, is the impression of uncertainty that they convey. The dis-

crepancies in their self-presentations may also be telling. Some of

the expected cues, such as the longer response latencies, the

shorter responses, and the more hesitant responses, did not emerge

in the analyses that combined results across all studies. However,

moderator analyses show that, as we had predicted, these cues

were more revealing when the self-presentations may have been

more challenging to generate. When social actors could not plan

their presentations, compared with when they could, the response

latencies of deceivers were greater than those of truth tellers, and

their presentations tended to include more silent pauses. When

presentations were sustained for greater lengths of time, liars’

latencies to respond were again greater than those of truth tellers,

and their responses were briefer and spoken in a higher pitch.

Attempted Control

From our self-presentational perspective, liars are attempting to

control not just their behaviors (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1981) but

also their thoughts and feelings. Truth tellers attempt these forms

of self-regulation as well, but liars’efforts are experienced as more

deliberate. Deliberate self-regulatory efforts may be especially

likely to usurp mental resources, leaving liars more preoccupied

than truth tellers. Liars’tales therefore seem less compelling and

less forthcoming. Because so many of the little lies that people tell

require scant self-regulatory effort, the resulting cues generally are

weak. However, when self-regulatory efforts intensify, as when

social actors are highly motivated (especially by identity-relevant

goals) to get away with their lies, then cues intensify, too.

Consistent with our formulation is our finding that motivated

liars (compared with less motivated ones) had even higher pitched

voices than truth tellers, and they seemed even more tense and

inhibited. When the motivation was one that linked success at

deceit to identity and self-presentational concerns, cues became

clearer still. When social actors saw their success as reflective of

important aspects of themselves, compared with when there were

no particular incentives, their lies were betrayed by the time it took

them to begin their deceptive responses (relative to their truthful

ones), the relative brevity of those responses, the silent hesitations

within them, and the higher pitch in which they were spoken.

Incentives that were not self-relevant resulted in cues to deception

that differed less markedly from the cues that occurred when no

special incentive was in place.

Interactivity

In Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) interpersonal model of decep-

tion, the central theoretical construct is the degree of interaction

between the liar and the target of the lies. The model predicts

greater involvement and immediacy with greater interactivity, but

our review found that liars in interactive contexts, relative to

noninteractive ones, provided fewer details than did truth tellers.

Eye contact, a nonverbal immediacy cue, did not differentially

predict deception in interactive versus noninteractive contexts.

Buller and Burgoon’s model predicts greater composure with

greater interaction, but we found that higher pitch—an indicator of

lack of composure—was a cue to deception in interactive contexts

only. Blinking was a more powerful cue to deception in noninter-

active contexts. Other cues to composure, such as nervousness and

fidgeting, did not vary with the interactivity of the context. Their

model predicts greater fluency with increasing interaction, but our

analysis indicates interactivity was not a significant moderator of

any of the cues to fluency (non-ah speech disturbances, silent

pauses, filled pauses).

We think Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) interactivity predictions

failed because their construct is theoretically imprecise (B. M.

DePaulo, Ansfield, & Bell, 1996). Totally noninteractive contexts

(e.g., leaving a lie on a target person’s voicemail) differ from

totally interactive ones (e.g., unscripted face-to-face interactions)

in many important ways. One is the mere presence of the other

person, even apart from any interaction with that person. That

presence has the potential to affect self-awareness, awareness of

the potential impact of the lie on that person, the salience of

self-presentational goals, and feelings of accountability (e.g.,

Schlenker, 2002; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, &

Doherty, 1994; Wicklund, 1982). Interactive exchanges entangle

participants in multiple roles and tasks (Buller & Burgoon, 1996;

Ekman & Friesen, 1969), which can be cognitively challenging.

However, to the extent that interactive exchanges are the more

familiar mode of communication, participants may find them less

challenging than noninteractive communications. From a conver-

sational analysis perspective, the significance of interactive pro-

cesses may lie in the interpretive frame they provide (e.g., Brown

& Levinson, 1987; Grice, 1989; Jacobs, Brashers, & Dawson,

1996; McCornack, 1992). For example, whether a person has

provided too little, too much, unclear, or irrelevant information in

response to an inquiry is more readily assessed within the context

of the conversation than apart from it. To Buller and Burgoon,

what was especially important about interaction is the opportunity

it affords the participants to evaluate the effectiveness of their

attempts (e.g., the liars can determine whether their targets seem

suspicious) and adjust their behavior accordingly.

Some of the ways in which interactive contexts differ from

noninteractive ones may be inconsistent with each other in their

implications for cues to deception. Clarity should follow, not from

Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) approach of enumerating variables

that moderate the effects of interactivity, but from looking sepa-

rately at the important component processes. An example of this

approach is Levine and McCornack’s (1996, 2002) analysis of the

“probing effect,”which is the counterintuitive finding that com-

municators who are probed by their targets are perceived as more

honest than those who are not probed. The initial explanation for

this effect was behavioral adaptation: Probed communicators rec-

ognized the skepticism of their targets, and adapted their behavior

to appear more truthful (e.g., Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Stiff &

Miller, 1986). However, when Levine and McCornack (2002)

manipulated the presence of probes in videotaped interviews in

which the communicators’behavior was held constant (ruling out

103

CUES TO DECEPTION

the behavioral adaptation explanation) the probing effect still

occurred.

The Self-Presentational Perspective on Cues to Deception

Ordinary Imperfections and Unusual Contents

Only the self-presentational perspective predicts that lies are

characterized by fewer ordinary imperfections and unusual con-

tents than truths. Drawing from research and theory on credibility

assessment (e.g., Yuille, 1989), we suggested that liars try to

anticipate the kinds of communications that targets would find

credible and that in doing so, fall prey to their own misconceptions

about the nature of truth telling. Some of our results were consis-

tent with that prediction. People who spontaneously corrected

themselves and who admitted that they could not remember ev-

erything about the story they were relating, were more likely to be

telling the truth than to be lying. It was also truth tellers who were

somewhat more likely to tell stories richer in contextual embed-

ding and unusual details.

The Looks and Sounds of Deceit Are Faint

We found evidence for all five of the categories of cues we

predicted: Deceptive presentations (relative to truthful ones) were

in some ways less forthcoming, less compelling, more negative,

more tense, and suspiciously bereft of ordinary imperfections and

unusual details. Fundamental to the self-presentational perspective

is the prediction that these cues would be weak. In fact, they were.

The median effect size of the 88 cues was just |0.10|. Only 3 of

these cues had effect sizes greater than |0.40|.

Results of the moderator analyses suggest that pronouncements

about the faintness of the signs of deceit are both understated and

exaggerated. Lies told by social actors who have no special mo-

tivation to succeed in their presentations and lies that are not about

transgressions leave almost no discernible cues. Even some of the

cues that did seem promising in the results combined across all

estimates—for example, cues to tension and to pitch—lost a bit of

their luster for self-presentations that were not about transgressions

and that were not driven by any particular incentives. These nearly

cueless lies most closely resemble the deceptive presentations of

self in everyday life. However, when social actors were using their

lies to hide matters that could spoil their identities (such as when

they were lying about transgressions), and when their success at

lying was linked to important aspects of their self-concepts, then

cues to deception were no longer quite so faint.

When Will Cues to Deception Be Clearer?

Using our self-presentational perspective, we were able to pre-

dict some important moderators of the strength of cues to decep-

tion. In this section, we consider five other ways in which the

results of our overall analyses may have underestimated the po-

tential for verbal and nonverbal cues to separate truths from lies.

First, perhaps effect sizes for cues to deception would be more

impressive if they were computed separately for the different

emotions that senders may be trying to conceal or to convey

(Ekman, 1985/1992). There were not enough relevant studies

available to test this possibility adequately in the present review.

Second, in this review, as in most of the studies in the literature, we

tested the predictive power of each behavioral cue individually.

However, the degree to which lies can be discriminated from truths

could potentially be improved if combinations of cues were con-

sidered (e.g., Ekman, O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991; Vrij,

Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000). Third, if the replicability of a set

of cues within a particular context can be established, the impli-

cations could be important even if the particular cues could not be

generalized to different contexts. For example, behavioral cues

believed to be indicative of deceit in the context of polygraph

testing (e.g., Reid & Arthur, 1953) or criminal interrogations (e.g.,

Macdonald & Michaud, 1987) are worth establishing even if some

of them occur infrequently outside of those contexts. Fourth, it is

possible that particular individuals telegraph their lies in idiosyn-

cratic yet highly reliable ways (Vrij & Mann, 2001) that are not

captured by our meta-analytic approach. Finally, our results sug-

gest that truths and lies may be discriminated more powerfully by

using subjective measures rather than objective ones. However,

detailed coding systems that are carefully validated and used to test

theoretically based predictions may enable more precise discrim-

inations than untrained observers could achieve with their subjec-

tive impressions (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Scherer, 1982).

When Truths and Lies Switch Sides

It is important to emphasize that there are exceptions to the

predictions we derived from the self-presentational perspective.

There are times when people more readily embrace their deceptive

presentations than their truthful ones. For example, a man who has

long fantasized about being a war hero and has claimed repeatedly

to have been one may eventually make that false claim more

convincingly than he can describe his actual war-year experiences

teaching in his homeland, which was at peace. There are also times

when truthful presentations are enacted with a greater sense of

deliberateness than are deceptive ones. Self-incriminating truths

are examples of this (cf. Kraut, 1978). When the tables are turned,

the cues are too; it is the truth tellers who seem less forthcoming,

more tense, and more negative, and it is they who tell stories that

sound less compelling.

The behaviors we have described as cues to deception, then,

may be more accurately described as cues to the hypothesized

processes (e.g., attempts to regulate thoughts, feelings, and behav-

iors) and to psychological states (e.g., investment in, and famil-

iarity with, the attempted performance). Experimental research

that directly tests the role of these processes in producing the

predicted cues remains to be done.

Cues to Truths, to Personalities, and to Situations

Our use of the term cues to deception could suggest that we are

describing the ways that liars behave, but in fact we are describing

the ways in which liars act differently than truth tellers. Experi-

mental manipulations and individual differences can be linked to

cues to deception by their implications for the behavior of liars or

truth tellers, or both. For example, in a study in which participants

were selected because they saw themselves as very independent

(B. M. DePaulo et al., 1991), the truthful life stories they told that

showcased their independence were more responsive to the exper-

imental manipulations than were the life stories that were

fabricated.

104 DEPAULO ET AL.

Caution is also in order in interpreting the moderators of cues to

deception. For example, when we say that eye contact is a cue to

deception when senders are motivated to get away with their lies

but not when they are not motivated, we are not necessarily

claiming that liars more often avoid eye contact when they have an

incentive to succeed than when they do not (though they may).

Instead, we are saying that the degree to which liars avoid eye

contact more than truth tellers do is greater when they are moti-

vated to succeed than when they are not. The cues we describe in

our analyses of motivation as a moderator are not cues to motiva-

tion (that is a different question), they are cues to deception under

different levels of motivation.

For example, people telling lies in high stakes circumstances

(e.g., while on trial for murder) may be expected to seem more

nervous than people telling comparable lies when the stakes are

lower (e.g., in traffic court). But truth tellers may also seem more

nervous in the high stakes setting. Nervousness would only be a

cue to deception in the murder trial if liars feel even more nervous

than truth tellers. It would be a stronger cue to deception in the

murder trial than in traffic court only if the degree to which liars

are more nervous than truth tellers is greater in the murder trial

than in traffic court.

To make these important distinctions clearer in future research,

we suggest investigators adopt a reporting style that has rarely

been used in the deception literature: Mean levels of the cues

should be reported separately for truths and lies at each level of the

experimental manipulations and for each of the individual differ-

ence categories. Results could then be analyzed in the familiar

factorial. That would clearly indicate, for example, whether people

seem more nervous when the stakes are high than when they are

low, regardless of whether they are lying or telling the truth;

whether they are more nervous when lying than when telling the

truth, regardless of the stakes; and whether the degree to which

they are more nervous when lying than when telling the truth is

greater when the stakes are high than when they are low.

The implications for our understanding of individual differences

are also important. For example, we claimed above that liars make

an e

Cues to Deception

Abstract and Figures