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Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty

American Psychological Association
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
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Abstract

Notes that a major difference between historical and nonhistorical judgment is that the historical judge typically knows how things turned out. 3 experiments are described with a total of 479 college students. In Exp I, receipt of such outcome knowledge was found to increase the postdicted likelihood of reported events and change the perceived relevance of event-descriptive data, regardless of the likelihood of the outcome and the truth of the report. Ss were, however, largely unaware of the effect that outcome knowledge had on their perceptions. As a result, they overestimated what they would have known without outcome knowledge (Exp II), as well as what others (Exp III) actually did know without outcome knowledge. It is argued that this lack of awareness can seriously restrict one's ability to judge or learn from the past. (16 ref)
... Underestimating how much one has to learn is a form of overconfidence that could, in the extreme, lead to a seemingly surprise-free past portending a surprise-full future. Fischhoff (1975) introduced tasks for studying the extent, causes, and consequences of the bias, along with initial evidence using historical vignettes. Subsequent studies have found the bias in a wide variety of experimental and real-world settings. ...
... The discipline of the heuristics-and-biases research program requires a normative standard for claims of bias (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983). Fischhoff (1975) introduces tasks applying two standards for hindsight bias 3 : (a) retrospective, people exaggerate how much foresight they would have had, had they been asked; and (b) projective, people exaggerate how much foresight other people should have had. Another section of the dissertation applies a third standard: (c) remembered-reconstructed, people believe that they had greater foresight than was the case. ...
... The stimuli in Fischhoff (1975) were paragraph-length descriptions of four events, each with four possible outcomes. Study 1 established that each outcome seemed more likely in hindsight, when it was reported to have happened, than in foresight, when all four outcomes were possible. ...
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Hindsight bias arises when people do not realize how extensively observing an event has changed their perception of the world. As a result, the event appears more likely than it actually was, in foresight. Underestimating how much one has to learn is a form of overconfidence that could, in the extreme, lead to a seemingly surprise-free past portending a surprise-full future. Fischhoff (1975) introduced tasks for studying the extent, causes, and consequences of the bias, along with initial evidence using historical vignettes. Subsequent studies have found the bias in a wide variety of experimental and real-world settings. Psychologists have linked the bias to research on cognitive, social, perceptual, and emotional processes. Other disciplines have implicated it in practical problems including clinical diagnosis, patent evaluation, legal adjudication, historical analysis, and safety engineering. Warning people about the bias has no discernible effect. Helping people to reconstruct past perspectives might help. After describing how the research program came about, the article briefly summarizes studies that the author especially likes and which have abundant references to studies in the diverse research areas that either study hindsight bias or use it to study other phenomena.
... The retrospective assessment of the pre-values should also be criticised because it is assumed that there must have been an improvement due to the completion of training. This phenomenon is also referred to as a look-back error [38]. Furthermore, the subjectivity of self-assessments should be supplemented and compared with objective measures such as external assessment, checklists or video feedback [39]. ...
... Auch die retrospektive Einschätzung der Prä-Werte ist kritisch anzumerken, da durch die Absolvierung eines Trainings davon ausgegangen wird, dass es eine Verbesserung gegeben haben muss. Dieses Phänomen wird auch als Rückschaufehler bezeichnet [38]. Weiterhin sollte die Subjektivität der Selbsteinschätzung durch objektive Maße wie beispielsweise Fremdeinschätzung, Checklisten oder Video-Feedback ergänzt und verglichen werden [39]. ...
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Aim The aim of this study is to test and evaluate a one-time communication training session. Methods The focus of the evaluation is on the self-assessed communicative self-efficacy (SE-12) of students in the undergraduate degree programme in psychology before and after completing the communication training in the skills lab, during which simulated patients were used. The communication training was also evaluated by the students, and both positive feedback and suggestions for improvement were recorded. To do this, a quantitative study with a quasi-experimental design and a retrospective pre-post measurement (then-test) was conducted. The sample consists of 16 students in the undergraduate psychology programme at the SRH University of Applied Sciences Campus Gera (age: M=20.9, SD=1.7; 87.5% female). The available data was analysed descriptively and using t-tests. Results The results show that students who completed the communication training report significantly higher communicative self-efficacy than prior to the communication training (t(15)=-6.04, p<.001, d=.75). Furthermore, the students rated the communication training positively. Conclusion From the results, it can be concluded that simulation-based communication training can positively influence psychology students' communicative self-efficacy and that they rate the training positively. Communication training can be viewed as an important means to implement the mandated teaching of professionally relevant skills to psychology students in order to prepare them for professional participation in the labour market.
... The tendency to see past events as more predictable than they were after they have happened [57] The tendency to avoid risks when presented with potential gains but seek risks when faced with potential losses [46] 52 Representativeness COGB-52 ...
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The construction industry’s complexity and high-risk nature present significant decision-making challenges, often resulting in errors that jeopardise health and safety performance. Cognitive biases can further distort risk assessments and influence decision-making, ultimately affecting safety behaviours and outcomes. Although numerous studies have explored cognitive biases in construction, there remains a lack of a comprehensive understanding regarding how these biases interact with key decision factors related to health and safety. This study aimed to advance sustainable health and safety practices within the construction industry by examining the consequences and interplay of cognitive biases and essential decision factors through a systematic literature review. Two hundred and eighty-three articles published between 2018 and 2024 were analysed, with forty-five selected for inclusion. The network analysis findings identify key decision factors, reinforcing loops, and critical paths that affect health and safety performance, illustrating how cognitive biases influence risk perception, decision complexity, and workplace safety behaviours. The insights gained from this study highlight the challenges and the potential for improvement. They serve as a foundation for researchers, construction safety professionals, and policymakers to develop targeted interventions that mitigate cognitive biases, enhance risk perception, and strengthen decision-making frameworks, ultimately improving health and safety performance in the construction sector.
... A classic example of the curse of knowledge bias (sometimes called 'hindsight bias') is when adults who know the outcome of an event (e.g., a sports game, an election, or a battle) overestimate how likely others are to predict that outcome. In contrast, adults who do not know the event's outcome tend to make more accurate estimates of what others will predict (e.g., Blank et al., 2003;Fischhoff, 1975;Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975, for review see Ghrear et al., 2016; for a meta-analyses see Guilbault et al., 2004). Given that the curse of knowledge bias leads individuals to overestimate how common their knowledge is, it regularly impacts communication and social judgments in various ways (e.g., Birch, 2005;Camerer et al., 1989). ...
... One notable limitation of this study is the potential for hindsight bias, as we interviewed the participants in their final phase or after the completion of ST. This timing means that participants' reflections on their experiences and changes might be influenced by their current state and retrospective interpretation through theoretical framework of ST (Fischhoff 1975), potentially affecting their perceptions of the PPM and associated AVHs before ST. Additionally, patients who derived the most benefit from and were highly engaged with ST might have been more likely to participate, potentially introducing selection bias. ...
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Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is often characterized by self‐critical and punitive thoughts, emotions, beliefs and behaviours, conceptualized in schema therapy (ST) as the punitive parent mode (PPM). This mode involves internalized punitive messages from childhood from the behaviour and reactions of significant others, leading to self‐hatred, guilt and self‐denial. Although patients with BPD frequently report auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) as manifestations of the PPM, this phenomenon is often overlooked in ST studies. We conducted semistructured interviews with 16 (ex)patients (63% female) from two Dutch mental health institutions to explore their experiences with the PPM before, during and after ST. An independent, double‐coded systematic content analysis was performed. Approximately half of the participants reported AVHs linked to the PPM before therapy. The patients characterized the PPM by pervasive self‐critical messages, contributing to intense emotional and physical distress and maladaptive coping strategies. Participants reported that ST techniques, including group therapy, imagery rescripting (ImRs) and the empty chair technique (ECT), effectively reduced the power and credibility of the PPM, including AVHs. The self‐reported improvements included more adaptive coping mechanisms, increased social support and a general experience of reduced PPM. This study highlights the prevalence of the PPM as AVHs in individuals with BPD and demonstrates the efficacy of ST in reducing the impact of PPM, including in cases involving AVHs. Clinical implications include the need for relapse prevention plans and further exploration into how ST's effects can be enhanced. Future research should explore the broader spectrum of psychotic experiences in BPD and consider integrating PPM‐related AVHs into the assessment and treatment of BPD.
... Segundo Parton e Otway (1995) (Corby, Millar & Young, 1996 (Fischhoff, 1975 (Diorio, 1992;Dumbrill, 2006 (Mendel, 1974 (Bell, 1999). ...
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Esse estudo teve como objetivo investigar a constituição dessas redes em países avançados em inclusão social, que apresentaram resultados significativos nessa área. Após uma revisão crítica da literatura, buscou-se uma análise comparativa com as redes de proteção no Brasil. Os dados indicaram diferenças expressivas entre as práticas exemplares de proteção e os serviços prestados aos usuários brasileiros. As redes de proteção em países europeus se encontram em um momento de transição paradigmática, no sentido da alteridade. Em nosso país, permanecem os altos índices de violência, agressão, abuso e desamparo de crianças, bem como a desarticulação setorial que prejudica, quando não inviabiliza, o funcionamento das redes.
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Financial literacy plays a crucial role in shaping individual investment decisions by influencing susceptibility to behavioural biases such as heuristics, framing effects, cognitive illusions, and herding mentality. While most existing studies have examined financial literacy as a mediating factor, our study is among the first in the literature to analyse the role of behavioural biases as mediating factors in the relationship between financial literacy and investment decisions. Specifically, we investigate key biases, including overconfidence, herding, disposition effect, self-attribution, anchoring, availability, representativeness, and familiarity. Using purposive sampling, we collected 482 responses through a structured Likert scale questionnaire. The dataset underwent rigorous validation and reliability tests to ensure robustness. We employed Python-based statistical analysis and used Pearson’s correlation and mediation analysis to explore the relationships between financial literacy, behavioural biases, and investment decisions. With the help of these methods, we were able to uncover relationships and causal pathways which further our understanding of the role of behavioural biases in determining the impact of financial literacy on investment behaviour. The findings illustrate a notable positive correlation between investment decisions and financial literacy, implying that people with higher financial literacy levels possess greater and more rational financial decision-making capabilities. Other analyses have revealed that biases have a moderating effect on this relationship, showing another path through which financial literacy impacts behaviour at the level of the investor. By placing behavioural biases as mediating constructs, this research broadens the scope of investor psychology and the body of knowledge in behavioural finance, highlighting the need to change the approach to how financial literacy programs aimed at investors are structured and implemented.
Chapter
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
Article
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
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It is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in psychiatric hospitals. The hospital itself imposes a special environment in which the meanings of behavior can easily be misunderstood. The consequences to patients hospitalized in such an environment—the powerlessness, depersonalization, segregation, mortification, and self-labeling—seem undoubtedly countertherapeutic. I do not, even now, understand this problem well enough to perceive solutions. But two matters seem to have some promise. The first concerns the proliferation of community mental health facilities, of crisis intervention centers, of the human potential movement, and of behavior therapies that, for all of their own problems, tend to avoid psychiatric labels, to focus on specific problems and behaviors, and to retain the individual in a relatively non-pejorative environment. Clearly, to the extent that we refrain from sending the distressed to insane places, our impressions of them are less likely to be distorted. (The risk of distorted perceptions, it seems to me, is always present, since we are much more sensitive to an individual's behaviors and verbalizations than we are to the subtle contextual stimuli that often promote them. At issue here is a matter of magnitude. And, as I have shown, the magnitude of distortion is exceedingly high in the extreme context that is a psychiatric hospital.) The second matter that might prove promising speaks to the need to increase the sensitivity of mental health workers and researchers to the Catch 22 position of psychiatric patients. Simply reading materials in this area will be of help to some such workers and researchers. For others, directly experiencing the impact of psychiatric hospitalization will be of enormous use. Clearly, further research into the social psychology of such total institutions will both facilitate treatment and deepen understanding. I and the other pseudopatients in the psychiatric setting had distinctly negative reactions. We do not pretend to describe the subjective experiences of true patients. Theirs may be different from ours, particularly with the passage of time and the necessary process of adaptation to one's environment. But we can and do speak to the relatively more objective indices of treatment within the hospital. It could be a mistake, and a very unfortunate one, to consider that what happened to us derived from malice or stupidity on the part of the staff. Quite the contrary, our overwhelming impression of them was of people who really cared, who were committed and who were uncommonly intelligent. Where they failed, as they sometimes did painfully, it would be more accurate to attribute those failures to the environment in which they, too, found themselves than to personal callousness. Their perceptions and behavior were controlled by the situation, rather than being motivated by a malicious disposition. In a more benign environment, one that was less attached to global diagnosis, their behaviors and judgments might have been more benign and effective.