Truth Demystified

I would propose reverting of the popular strategy: when we identify some significant distinction in the human cognition, then the real thing is this very distinction, and not its correspondence to our intuitions. Identify a significant distinction, name it as XYZ, and prove that XYZ is more significant than the possibly corresponding mystical intuition!

The barometer explaining the storm? Moreover, what about the idea that the storm is CAUSED by a falling barometer? The motion of planets is caused by the Newtonian gravitation force acting instantly at a distance. Really? Shouldn't these two theses be set on a par - except that the second one was more productive in history?

Of the substantial work done in the philosophy of modeling by Vaihinger (1876), Craik (1943), Rosenblueth and Wiener (1945), Apostel (1960), Minsky (1965), Klaus (1966) and Stachowiak (1973), only Vaihinger’s work has gained some recognition in the mainstream literature. However, the work of all these thinkers seems to contain original ideas worth discussing. For example, the diverse functions of models in science can be better structured as follows: in fact, models perform only a single function – they are replacing their target systems but for different purposes. Or, the idea that all of cognition is cognition in models or by means of models: even perception can be best analyzed as modeling. Or, the idea that the possibility of modeling is built into the structure of the physical universe: it contains recurrent patterns that can play the roles of models and target systems. The paper presents an analysis of the above-mentioned neglected work. [[[[[]]]]] Published in Baltic Journal of Modern Computing, 2018, 6(3), 279-303.

A comment on the paper: Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter, and Stephan Hartmann. Understanding (With) Toy Models. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2016

A comment on the paper: Francesca Pero and Mauricio Suárez. Varieties of Misrepresentation and Homomorphism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 6(1), October 2015. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282593826_Varieties_of_Misrepresentation_and_Homomorphism]

First deposited as https://philarchive.org/rec/PODEAU. [[[[]]]] This article is an experiment. Consider a minimalist model of cognition (models, means of model-building and history of their evolution). In this model, explanation could be defined as a means allowing to advance: production of models and means of model-building (thus, yielding 1 st class understanding), exploration and use of them (2 nd class), and/or teaching (3 rd class). At minimum, 3 rd class understanding is necessary for an explanation to be respected. [[[[]]]] Final version of https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318489893_Understanding_Demystified_a_Radically_New_Version

What is true, will not change in the future (for some time, at least). Else, how could we benefit from knowing the truth? However, is truth any nobler than “something that will not change in the future”? I will show that we do not need it to be any nobler – if one adopts an appropriate model of cognition – the model-based model of cognition (MBMC). How could we recognize truth, if we only have models, means of model-building, and the history of their evolution? In MBMC, we are inspired to define truths as more or less persistent invariants of successful evolution of models and means of model-building. What is true will not change in the future (for some time, and for some of us, at least). This position could be called demystified realism (or, demystified theory of truth) – a kind of realism based on a minimum of metaphysical assumptions.

Do quarks “really exist”, or are they only an “indirect” entity introduced by physicists? For the current purposes, this construct works fine, but will this situation continue in the future? If not, quarks will be removed from the picture just as flogiston and aether were removed. But what if quarks will be retained as a construct in all future physical theories? Do physicists need more than this kind of invariance to claim the “real existence” of quarks and believe in having a “direct representation” of them?

My general impression: despite many brilliant insights, generated by philosophers for many years, the field (philosophy of cognition) remains unordered for too long a time. If it’s true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn’t we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way, couldn’t we obtain a unified and more productive picture—a model-based model of cognition?

Preprint, deposited in PhilSci Archive, 5475 (2010). ///// Superseded by: Demystified theory of truth and understanding, Feb. 2017. ///// Main ideas published in: K. Podnieks, The Dappled World Perspective Refined. The Reasoner, Vol. 8, N 1, January 2014, pp. 3–4. ///// First, I propose a new argument in favor of the Dappled World perspective introduced by Nancy Cartwright. There are systems, for which detailed models can't exist in the natural world. And this has nothing to do with the limitations of human minds or technical resources. The limitation is built into the very principle of modeling: we are trying to replace some system by another one. In full detail, this may be impossible. Secondly, I'm trying to refine the Dappled World perspective by applying the correct distinction between models and theories. At the level of models, because of the above-mentioned limitations, we will always have only a patchwork of models each very restricted in its application scope. And at the level of theories, we will never have a single complete Theory of Everything (or, a complete pyramid of theories) allowing, without additional postulates, to generate all the models we may need for surviving in this world.