Strategy

#India #Pakistan rivalry-Interview with Dr Tariq Rehman-Renowned Scholar-Pakistani mindset , #Taliban , #HafizSaeed , Maulana #MasoodAzhar, #Afghanistan , #India #kashmir #terrorism

COMMENTS ---KARTARPUR CORRIDOR: DIVERGENT DIMENSIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON PAKISTAN AND INDIA

MAJOR A.H  AMIN (RETIRED)

1- while i do not agree that punjab was land of peace this is a brilliant article.

2- communal harmony in punjab was destroyed by mughal kings who hunted sikhs like they were some animals and this continued for some 100 years from 1650s to 1750s-finally sikhs defeated the mughals- in last phase punjab was partitioned due to obstinacy and stupidity of punjabi hindus who as early as 1921-22 foolishly demanded that if punjabi muslims got their due majority punjab must be partitioned --3-- finally punjab became victim of british manipulation in drawing an uncertain and questionable boundary line and witnessed worst communal riots in which half a ,million to one million people were killed - more muslims were killed than non muslims-the riots were initiated by muslims from rawalpindi as early as january 1947 --4--- punjab was also delivered worst political stab by muslim league at lucknow pact where mr jinnah destroyed muslim majority from 54 % to 50 % ---bengali muslims were stabbed in the back more cruelly at lucknow pact and their majority of 52 % reduced to 40 % as a result of which bengali muslims remained politically unstable till 1947--5--- punjab was ham handedly treated by both neru and jinnah who were non punjabis --5---- punjabi sikhs were further damaged wen pakistans military usurper zia incited insurgency in indian punjab--- an insurgency that pakistan could not support with its conventional army--- sikhs were severely damaged --- but they recovered ---6--- kartarpur is a good attempt but there are many questions attached like pakistan armys role is not neutral and there was too much of general bajwa in the event ---- while kartarpur is a good initiative -- much more hard work is needed--- both india and pakistan are dominated by hawks bearing scars of 1947 ---7---- in pakistan the army and ISI is overwhelmingly punjabi while in india also punjabi sikhs and hindus are in SIGNIFICANT number in the military , civil service and Intelligence services---- both are deeply distrustful of each other

Respected colleage Dr Akhtars analysis is brilliant and commendable - however i have added my one cent as ex military officer of pakistan army .

In Pakistan things will always remain complicated as generals will destroy the peace process while india also as a hawkish group that dominates decision making .

My 2013 article is also reproduced below and i think it takes a long view :--

Lastly 44 Indian para military were killed recently -Peace remains fragile and elusive. If Pakistani military allows civilians to work peace can be achieved and my heart is wit Dr Akhtar. But who will bell the cat .

Can India and Pakistan make Peace – Agha.H.Amin , Major (r)

Source Link

The recent sudden angelic desire on part of the Pakistani establishment to make peace with India has nothing to do with any major shift in Pakistans foreign policy written in the Pakistani military headquarters popularly known as the GHQ.

The Pakistani apparent shift is merely a tactical response to extreme confrontation with the US over perceived US view that Pakistan is playing a double game in Afghanistan.

This is similar to Musharrafs flirtation with India from 2000 to 2007 which in reality was a gambit to prevent a two front war with Afghanistan occupied by the USA and a hostile India in the east.

The real picture of true intentions of the Pakistani military will emerge when the US withdraws from Afghanistan.

This will be the time when the Russians ,Iranians and Indians will have no choice but to support the Northern Alliance against Pakistan sponsored Taliban who regard all Shias, Ismailis,Non Pashtuns,moderate Pashtuns as infidels who deserve to be massacred.

The Pakistani politicians are a compromised manipulated lot who are under firm control of the Pakistani military thanks to the politicians own massive financial corruption.They will do what the Pakistani generals tell them whether it is the PPP, PML or any new party like Imran Khans Tehrik i Insaaf.

Pakistan will remain the same state run by an army rather than a state with an army.The Pakistani generals will control Pakistans politics and foreign policy and Pakistan India relations will remain a mix of an uneasy and an unpredictable peace.

Pakistan will remain embroiled in an ever continuous civil unrest.Baloch will be gunned down by the Pakistani military while Pakistans politicians will remain the puppets of the military that they have been since 1977.

Terrorism will remain a tool of foreign policy while the Pakistani military runs the Pakistani state under a facade of PPP or PML or Tehrik i Insaaf.

By that time Pakistani military will be hoping to achieve all its objectives–

1. An extremist dominated Afghanistan.

2. A Balochistan fully fragmented and crushed.

3. A Pakistani political party leading Pakistan fully subservient to the Pakistani military.

4. A renewed infiltration in Kashmir.

5. A brinkmans nuclear policy with India .

6. A greater Chinese vassal with far greater Chinese interests in Pakistan.

There is no doubt that Pakistan will be a semi autonomous Chinese province by 2030 or so.Its relations with India will be run on two basis , Pakistani military retaining its nuisance value based on the much trumped and misused Indian threat and secondly Pakistan as a Chinese pawn acting as Chinas western bastion in West Asia.Pakistani Balochistan by 2030 would be a completely Chinese run show while Pakistans military and corrupt politicians will control Pakistans corrupt par excellence economy.

Manmohan Singh will remain dupes that they always were.The region will remain unstable because instability is custom made to suit the Pakistani elite both military and civilian.

Indias budding middle class wants to make peace with the Pakistani establishment because they want to have a good time.

Manmohan Singh is a cheap social climber with no strategic vision.This means that the common man in both India and Pakistan will both come to grief.

Pashtuns and Baloch will remain pawns of Pakistani establishment with Baloch regarded as Red Indians and Pashtuns regarded as good cannon fodder to be launched like fools in the name of Islam.Pakistans economy will remain centred to serve the good of Pakistan elite and prosperity will remain confined to the triangle Pindi Multan Lahore and Karachi-Hyderabad.

The Pakistani supreme court will remain an arm of the Pakistani elite who turns a blind eye when any one challenges Pakistani military in the courts.

Pakistan shall remain a mirage which serves a 5 % elite and the region will remain unstable and a hostage to nuclear brinkmanship.

Pakistans pensioners will die like stray dogs ! Pakistans youth will be gunned down by the corrupt Pakistani police for money ! Pakistani intelligence will continue the kill and dump policy all over Pakistan and specially in Balochistan !

This is not about Islam ! This is not about Pakistan ! This is all about a 5 or 10 % establishment that has controlled Pakistan since 1948.

All that this elite wants is to preserve their unfair advantage ! These are the new Banias,the new Muslim Banias of Pakistan !

In 1947 Muslims of Pakistan got rid of Hindu Banias but the idea of the Muslim elite was that the Muslim masses need to be buggered not by the Hindu Banias but by Muslim Banias from Gujerat,Chiniot,Khotian (later Saigal Abad) and the elite feudals who had joined the Muslim League by the 1946 elections.

Third rate Pakistani lower middle class young men will continue to pass the CSS exam and join Police,FBR and DMG to become billionaires with phenomenal corruption of all types with houses in posh DHA Karachi or Lahore within ten years of passing the CSS exam !

Pakistan does not have hawks with aristocratic backgrounds like ZA Bhutto nor visionary generals ! It is run by carpetbaggers,robber industrial barons,arch intriguer feudals and generals who are NCOs sons and are just simply ambitious !

This means that Pakistans political economy of exporting terrorism as a foreign policy tool,massive corruption at home and the resultant ever growing reservoir of economically deprived youngsters who will fill ranks of extremists and suicide bombers will continue.

We salute the age of West Asian strategic anarchy !Posted by Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM(Retd) at 00:35  

VERY INTERESTING PODCAST ON INDO PAK AFGHAN MILITARY HISTORY india pakistan military history podcast on Brown Pundits

india pakistan military history podcast on Brown Pundits

#india #pakistan #military #history #british #sikhs #marathas #indianarmy #pakistanarmy #britishindianarmy #firstworldwar #secondworldwar

#CHINA HEAVILY RELIANT ON #USA AND ITS SATTELLITES #SOUTHKOREA #TAIWAN AND #SINGAPORE FOR IMPORT OF #Semiconductors CONDUCTORS SO THIS IS WHERE PRESIDENT #TRUMP IS HITTING

CHINAS PATHETIC POSITION IN SEMI CONDUCTORS

STRATEGIC INCOMPETENCE- AND NOT EVEN TACTICALLY SOUND !

Manhole in Pakistan army maintained and owned DHA Lahore not repaired since last 6 years- these johnnies cannot maintain dha Lahore , how on earth they can dominate Afghanistan as they claim !

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF PHILLIP II-Geoffrey Parker- Yale University Press-Connecticut-1998- ISBN Number-0-300-07540-5

#navy #britain #spain #strategy #books #bookreview #military #leadership #decisionmaking

ISI ASSESSED BY A UNITED STATES PROFESSOR

Journal of Book Reviews-Intelligence Directorate Covert action and internal ops-converted

#INTELLIGENCE #isi #books #history #bookreview #pakistan #usa

MATTIS ASSESSED MORE THAN AN YEAR AGO

MATTIS ASSESSED MORE THAN AN YEAR AGO Mattis is strategically clueless more naieve than naievest milkmaid by @TXCONSULTANTS https://www.slideshare.net/AAmin1/mattis-is-strategically-clueless-more-naieve-than-naievest-milkmaid via @SlideShare

#usa #trump #afghanistan Review: MOST DISGRACEFUL FLIGHT AND ABJECT SURRENDER IN US MILITARY HISTORY

Chances of Success of the Counter Offensive

There has been too much rhetoric about the Pakistani Counter Offensive that was never launched.In the first place once the war started the counter offensive was already late by one month as Candeth stated.

Secondly the objectives of the counter offensive i.e Bhatinda or some say even Ludhiana were unrealistic if we keep in mind the pathetic performance of Pakistani armour in 1965 despite having achieved total strategic surprise and having relatively better equipment.

This scribes father had been GSO 2 Operations of 16 Division in East Pakistan till October 1971.In October 1971 he was promoted to command 6 Engineer Battalion transferred to West Pakistan from East Pakistan.This battalion first laid the three strips of minefield in Shakargarh Bulge in September November 1971 and was then transferred to the 2 Coros for making the assault bridge for 7 Divsion bridge head.

As C0 6 Engineers this scribes father saw that none in 7 Division took any interest in the planning for bridging . A similar disinterest was prevalent in 1st Armoured Division.The only man who took interest in the bridging operation was CO 12 Cavalry Lieut Colonel Shah Rafi Alam who on his own accompanied my father to see the site and to his horror found it to be boggy ! It was then slightly changed .This illustrates the passive mindset in the 7 Division and 1st Armoured Division at least at the staff officer level.7 Division had Colonel E.H Dar , while 1st Armoured Divisions colonel staff was Colonel K.M Arif .

Those who know Shah Rafi Alam will understand this point that I am making !

Thirdly while in 1965 Pakistan’s armoured division was only opposed by a weak infantry division and later by a weak tank brigade, here was a situation where the Indian armoured division was already well poised and waiting for the attack. The result would have been a clash of armour in almost equal strength with both sides getting bloody noses and achieving nothing on the strategic plane.

True that the Pakistanis may have had a free run till Gong Canal or even a little to its east but East Pakistan was already lost and by the time Pakistan Army was across the Gong Canal it would have been facing the first additional Indian corps arriving from East Pakistan. That is if the counter attack was to be launched on 16 December as planned.

There was a chance of achieving some success in case the counter offensive had been launched on 4th or 5th December, but then Pakistani Higher Command was against it.No tribute to their strategic acumen!

Analysis of Casualties

An analysis of casualties prove that the bulk of the fighting was done firstly by 23 Division at Chamb which suffered almost half of the casualties sustained in the Western Theatre. Similarly this division inflicted the heaviest number of casualties on the Indians.

Second as per this scale was 105 Brigade at Sulaimanke which suffered second highest casualties on Indians despite having no superiority in numbers. Third position may be assigned to the forces opposite Poonch.

The Indians opposite 105 Brigade lost more men than opposite 8 Division at Sialkot. The magnitude may be imagined from the fact that while the Indians lost some 67 Killed and 90 wounded at Hilli from 23rd November to 11 December, 39 at Sulaimanke they lost something like 190 Killed and 196 Missing most of whom were killed or prisoners and 425 wounded.42

📷

I HAVE BEEN MEMBER OF US SOCIETY OF MILITARY HISTORY SINCE 1995. THEY ASKED US TO SUBMIT PAPERS FOR THEIR 2018 MEETING AND I SUBMITTED ONE WHICH TOUCHED MAJOR US MILITARY FAILURES.

TRUE TO TRADITIONS OF THE SOCIETY OF BEING GROSSLY INTELLECTUALLY DISHONEST THEY REFUSED THE PAPER WHICH WAS MOST RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT OF THE CONFERENCE.

THE SOCIETY IN THE PAST HAS REPEATEDLY SHOWN GROSS INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY IN PUBLISHING CRITICISM:--

1. REFUSED TO PUBLISH MY ARTICLE ON CHILLIANWALLAH BATTLE SINCE IT WAS A CLASSIC CASE OF BRITISH INCOMPETENCE AND THE SOCIETYS IDEOLOGY IS TO PROJECT ANGLO SAXONS.

2. REFUSED TO PUBLISH MY CRITICISM OF PROFESSOR TAN TAI YONGS ACRTICLE PUBLISHED IN SOCIETYS JOURNAL.

3. PARTIALLY PUBLISHED MY LETTER ON KAUSHIK ROYS DISTORTIONS IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN SOCIETYS JOURNAL AFTER TWO YEARS AND IN WHICH KAUSHIK ROY MISERABLY FAILED TO ANSWER MY CORE CRITICISM OF HIS ARTICLE.

4. SHOWED REMARKABLE INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY IN NOT PUBLISHING REVIEW OF MY BOOK SEPOY REBELLION BY US ACADEMIC DON MARTIN IN 2006-7 AFTER INITIALLY AGREEING TO PUBLISH IT.

NOTABLE WAS US RETIRED OFFICER PETE MANSOOR WHO IS A KNOWN PETRAEUS SYCOPHANT IN REJECTING THIS PAPER.HE IS A KNOWN PETRAEUS INTELLECTUAL SUCKING EXPERT AND SOPHISTICATED IN ARTS OF FLATTERY AND APPEASEMENT.

SO THIS IS HOW THE BUREAUCRACY WORKS IN USA

SMH 2019--Response to Proposal

Trash

x

Marion Dorsey via eventrebels.com 

Fri, Nov 30, 9:50 PM (12 hours ago)

to me

Dear Agha H,             The Program Committee for the upcoming 2019 Society for Military History has reviewed the more than 180 proposals that were submitted for the upcoming conference.  I regret to inform you that your proposal, “Failure of US Embassy and Military officials to establish an effective mechanism to monitor Pakistani military deployment in support of US operations in Afghanistan on Pakistan Afghanistan Border,” is not among those that we were able to accept for inclusion in the program.             We very much appreciate your submission and hope that you will submit a proposal for the next conference in 2020.             If you are interested in volunteering to serve as a chair or a commentator, please send your name, areas of expertise, and a one-page CV to Molly Dorsey (marion.girard.dorsey) by the end of January.  The Program Committee will ascertain if there are panels or Young Scholars panels that need chairs and commentators in your fields.  You will be informed by February 14, 2019, about the name of the panel if there is a match and you have been assigned to a panel.  Please note that you must be a member of the Society for Military History though the dates of the conference to participate in a panel.  If you are not a member or have allowed your membership to lapse, please visit the Society for Military History website for information on memberships and renewals.

Sincerely, Molly Dorsey                                                        and                 Pete Mansoor SMH 2019 Program Committee Chair                                        SMH 2019 Conference Organizer

10:38 AM (0 minutes ago)

to Lynne, JMHSMH, Marion

THANKS FOR YOUR INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY FOR WHICH AMERICANS ARE WELL KNOWN .

GOD BLESS YOU

AGHA

Data IF IRAN AND TURKEY HAD UNITED

IF IRAN AND TURKEY

HAD UNITED

A.H AMIN

(1) if iran and ottoman turkey had united , russia would have been overrun- but sectarian differences were major issue - just like catholic france and protestant britain were enemies

(2) efforts were made to unite iran and turkish ottomans but failed due to sectarian issues.

(3) in india also sectarian rivalry was one reason for downfall of mughals.

(4) interestingly both kings fathers and sons babar and humayun sought refuge in iran , became shias and afterwards again became sunnis for political reasons.

(5) sect remains the golden strategic asset of foreign powers to destroy asia- by invading iraq in 2003 USA has created a sectarian rivalry which will destabilise the region for next 100 to 200 years.

this is brilliant work and highest professional regards to the eminent authors

AN ATTACK WITH NO RATIONALE ALTHOUGH IN ACTUAL EXECUTION IT TURNED OUT TO BE A GRAND STRATEGIC LEVEL SPOILING ATTACK THAT THREW INTO WINDS INDIAN ATTACK PLAN ON RAHIMYARKHAN

RATIONALE OF THE LONGANEWALA JAISALMER ATTACK

Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan who wrote Pakistan Armys first official sanctioned account in 1973 had a totally different opinion from ZA Khans views expressed as late as 1999 :--

“In the overall plan the mission of the division was defensive by virtue of the paucity of resources compared to its task.It seems, however, that at a later stage the Army Chief of Staff, on a visit to the formation, somewhat peremptorily and without due process of staff study,conceived the idea of an offensive mission for this division as well.What purpose was to be achieved by this offensive is not clear.If the idea was to keep the Indian forces in that area fixed,this could have been done by other methods.In any case the time and space factors would not have enabled the Indian troops deployed in this area being withdrawn in time to influence the battle in the plains of Punjab.In the event this decision turned out to be an unfortunate one, as the division, with a brigade detached as it was to look after the Khokhropar Umarkot approach, was not equal to the allotted task of capturing Ramgarh 40 miles deep in enemy territory, leave alone aspiring to capture Jaisalmer, another 40 miles away.”

Pakistans second officially sanctioned historian Major General Shaukat Riza was totally blank, although he had complete access to all archives and had nothing to state about the rationale of Longanewala attack in his book.Thus Shaukat Riza merely stated as follows:--

STRATEGIC REPORT CARD FOR NOVEMBER 2018-USA SAUDIS , ISRAELIS FAILURE AGAINST IRAN IN SYRIA ,IRAQ AND MIDDLE EAST

A marketing strategy is something that brand building should start with - every company should have it, regardless of its size. The strategy is usually a few dozen-page document that tells you what our strengths and weaknesses are, what goals we have to achieve and how to reach our ideal customers. It allows you to indicate the direction of marketing activities that will bring the best results. It's a guide to more sales, greater brand recognition, etc.

The main task of the strategy should be to determine how to communicate the benefits of the company better than the competition does and which target group may need the most service or product. Thanks to this, we will avoid ad hoc activities - buying a different advertisement every week, in the hope that one of them may have an effect

An important part of the strategy is a marketing plan that defines when and how we will achieve the goals set in the strategy. A marketing plan is an "action plan". It can be written on the basis of a period of time, e.g. for half a year, a year, and can take into account the budget we have. This is a specific "to-do" list that allows you to systematically check whether the objectives set in the strategy are implemented.

SEMINAR-WHAT ARE THE US OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN-SEYCHELLES-OCTOBER 2018

WHAT CAVALRY DID IN MYSORE WARS AND BRITISH CROWN FORCED TO RAISE A ROYAL REGIMENT SPECIFICALLY FOR SERVICE AGAINST HYDER ALI

MADRAS ARMY PIONEERED ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANYS CAVALRY AND REAL CAVALRY ACTIONS WERE FOUGHT IN SECOND AND THIRD MYSORE WARS

BOTH HYDER ALI AND TIPU SULTAN WERE DEFEATED BY ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANYS INDIAN PLUS BRITISH UNITS , EXCEPT BATTLE OF POLLLILORE WHERE HYDER ALI ENJOYED OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY.

HOWEVER ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY LOST FIRST

MYSORE WAR BECAUSE OF LACK OF CAVALRY AND THUS THE INABILITY TO PURSUE HYDER OR TIPU AFTER HAVING DEFEATED THEM IN A PITCHED BATTLE.CAVALRY ALSO DENIED LOGISTICS TO ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY.

First Anglo Mysore War -1767-69: The English East India Company Challenged and Humbled

ISBN-10: 1544738331

ISBN-13: 978-1544738338

https://www.amazon.com/First-Anglo-Mysore-War-1767-69/dp/1544738331/ref=sr_1_15?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1536998246&sr=1-15&keywords=MYSORE+WARS+%2C+AGHA+H+AMIN

THE MISERLY DIRECTORS GRUDGINGLY AGREED TO RAISE CAVALRY AND FIRST TASKED NAWAB OF CARNATIC TO RAISE CAVALRY REGIMENTS FOR THEM AT THE TIME OF SECOND MYSORE WAR.

SO HARSH WAS HYDER ALIS IMPACT THAT BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHO WAS UNDER HEAVY DEBT OF ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY WAS FORCED TO RAISE A ROYAL CAVALRY REGIMENT HM 23RD LIGHT DRAGOONS SPECIFICALLY FOR SERVICE AGAINST HYDER ALI IN INDIA ON 24 SEP 1781.IT WAS SENT IMMEDIATELY TO INDIA WHERE HYDER WAS INFLICTING DEFEAT AFTER DEFEAT ON THE COMPANY STRATEGICALLY ALTHOUGH LOSING ALL PITCHED BATTLES. THE REGIMENT ARRIVED IN INDIA TO SERVE SPECIFICALLY AGAINST HYDER IN 1782.LUCKILY FOR THE ENGLISH COMPANY THE BRILLIANT HYDER ALI WHOSE GENIUS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY BRITISH DIED IN DECEMBER 1782.HE WAS SUCCEEDED BY HIS BRAVE BUT STRATEGICALLY INCOMPETENT SON TIPU SULTAN WHO FAILED TO DEFEAT THE COMPANY IN SECOND MYSORE WAR WHICH ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY AS BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY MADE PEACE IN EUROPE.

Second Anglo Mysore war 1780-84: A Vast Military and Naval Struggle from Europe to South India-status quo ante bellum

ISBN-10: 154473834X

ISBN-13: 978-1544738345

HM 23RD LIGHT DRAGOONS WAS RENUMBERED 19 LIGHT DRAGOONS IN 1786 AND THIS REGIMENT AND ITS COMMANDANT BRIG GEN FLOYD (FATHER IN LAW OF FUTURE PREMIER CANNING) PLAYED DECISIVE ROLE IN THIRD MYSORE WAR AS WELL AS IN FOURTH MYSORE WAR AND SECOND MARATHA WARS.FLOYD WAS EVEN SHOT THROUGH BOTH JAWS AT SIEGE OF BANGALORE BUT SURVIVED THE WOUND .HIS CAVALRY HAD FLED WHEN THEY SAW HIM HIT AND FLED THE BATTLE FIELD. HOWEVER FLOYD REGAINED CONSCIOUSNESS , WAS SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATED AND LIVED ON TO FIGHT MANY MORE WARS.

THUS SECOND ANGLO MYSORE WAR WAS INCONCLUSIVE AND A DRAW.

LORD CORNWALLIS WHO ARRIVED IN INDIA WISELY UNDERSTOOD THE CAVALRY FACTOR AND ALSO IMPROVED CAVALRY UNITS OF MADRAS CAVALRY AS WELL AS ENGAGED NIZAM AND MARATHAS WHO HAD COMBINED CAVALRY OF SOME 70,000 TO 80,000 TROOPS.

TIPU MEANWHILE HAD NEGLECTED CAVALRY THE STRATEGIC ARM OF VICTORY WHICH HAD ENABLED HYDER ALI TO DEFEAT THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN FIRST MYSORE WAR.

THUS TIPU WAS DEFEATED IN THIRD MYSORE WAR AND FORCED TO SEND HIS SONS AS HOSTAGES AND LOST A MAJOR PART OF HIS TERRITORY.

THUS TIPU SULTANS CAVALRY WAS OVERWHELMED BY SHEER NUMBER OF NIZAM AND MARATHAS CAVALRY ALTHOUGH BOTH WERE QUITE USELESS IN QUALITY. LOGISTICS WAS THUS DENIED TO TIPU AND AVAILABLE TO THE COMPANY AS A RESULT OF WHICH TIPU SULTAN HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO SURRENDER IN 1792 AND LOSE A LARGE PART OF HIS KINGDOM.LORD CORNWALLIS WAS MAGNIMOUS WITH TIPU IN PEACE TERMS AND WAS MUCH CRITICISED IN BRITISH CIRCLES.

FOURTH ANGLO MYSORE WAR WAS TOTALLY ONE SIDED AS ENGLISH COMPANYS SUPERIORITY WAS OVERWHELMING.THE REAL ARCHITECT

OF TIPUS DEMISE WAS LORD CORNWALLIS WHO HAD STRATEGICALLY ELIMINATED MYSORE AS A SERIOUS PLAYER IN 1792. THE LAST MYSORE WAR WAS A CASE OF TIPU LOSING AS A FOREGONE CONLUSION.THE REAL OUTCOME WAS SETTLED BY LORD CORNWALLIS – MAJOR A.H AMIN (RETIRED)

#books #book reviews #yuval #noah #harari #yuvalnoaf #21century #futuristics #journalofbookreviews #economist #israel #jerusalem #jerusalemuniversity #oxford #oxforduniversity #uk #britain #philosophy #sweeping #broadbrush

we had an opportunity in a SIGINT contract in Syria in 2015 and foresaw Syrian State Victory as early as October 2015

A massive discussion on csio about syrian war

These are just primers for further study .

One major reason why western powers failed was because of massive corruption in Intelligence Contracts. Although the US and western tax payer was fleeced.

Syrian Proxy war needs to be investigated .Failure of the west was not inevitable.

Western failures were strategic , operational and technical.

1- HOW SYRIA DEFEATED THE FOUR STATE PROXIES

2- HOW RUSSIA BROKE THE BACK OF THE FOUR STATE PROXIES IN SYRIA

3- HOW RUSSIA WILL DOMINATE THE MIDDLE EAST

4- WHY ARAB ARMIES FAILED IN WAR

HOW TO LOSE A TRADE WAR -COMMENTS OF A VERY DEAR FRIEND AND AMERICAN ACADEMIC

comments from my dear friend and co author Dr Andre De Georges

Major Amin – as a follow-up see the attached article. I’m no economist, but it seems to me whether it is a tariff on final products produced overseas and imported into the USA, or on parts made in China, etc., imported and used in U.S. production for sale in the U.S. & elsewhere – the consumer will pay more. 

Tariffs on final export products from the USA to China, etc. – will likely result in less demand and thus less jobs, adversely impacting our GDP. (GDP refers to and measures the domestic levels of production in a country.) 

And don’t forget – many of the companies in China making goods sold in the USA and elsewhere are American companies and tariffs will hurt them and thus our GNP (GNP measures the levels of production of all the citizens or corporations from a particular country working or producing in any country.

Seems like the U.S. Govt makes out in the short-run collecting tariffs, but in the long-run we all lose – costs to the consumers go up, domestic production decreases, jobs decrease and the tax base for the government ultimately decreases. 

Yes – as I said below – the time to have stopped the outflow of jobs and technologies from the U.S. into China, etc. – was back in the 1960s.  Now it’s too late – but then I ain’t an economist. Time will tell!

Regards Andre

The Chinese GDP is presently 70 % of USA GDP and will rise to 90 % of USA GDP in 2024- President Trump's anti china sanctions are well conceived but 10 years too late .USA was first sold by Nixon to Chinks .The only way to take china back is a massive calamity which may not be easy to fabricate -centre for study of intelligence operations assessment- here in this photo historic visit of Chinese Intel chief to Pakistan from July to October 1979 to assess Chinese strategy in Afghanistan ,at khunjerab pass ,491 Engineers group organised a quick tea break reception #china #usa #trade #trump #gdp #geopolitics #pakistanarmy #khunjerab #xingjiang #uighurs #lowintensityconflict #wto #csio #intel #intelligence #perception #assessment #tea #chinks #nixon #betrayal #myopia #fauxpas #history  https://www.instagram.com/p/BlzhfyyFCKN/?taken-by=logistics___

No positive theory of war is possible - reasons why no theory of war is possible #vomkriege #karlvonclausewitz#carlvonclausewitz #clausewitz #military#theory #militarytheory #artofwar

No positive theory of war is possible - reasons why no theory of war is possible #vomkriege #karlvonclausewitz#carlvonclausewitz #clausewitz #military#theory #militarytheory #artofwar

Second peculiarity why theory can be formed is living reaction -No positive theory of war is possible - reasons why no theory of war is possible #vomkriege#karlvonclausewitz #carlvonclausewitz#clausewitz #military #theory #militarytheory#artofwar

Third peculiarity - uncertainty of all data No positive theory of war is possible - reasons why no theory of war is possible #vomkriege #karlvonclausewitz#carlvonclausewitz #clausewitz #military#theory #militarytheory #artofwar

Great simplification of the knowledge required No positive theory of war is possible - reasons why no theory of war is possible #vomkriege #karlvonclausewitz#carlvonclausewitz #clausewitz #military#theory #militarytheory #artofwar

TIPUS OBSESSION WITH INSIGNIFICANT PLACES WHILE IGNORING LARGER OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC MATTERS-WAZEER QAMAR UD DIN KHAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN TASKED TO RAID BARAMAHAL RATHER THAN BACKWATERS LIKE COIMBATOOR ? THIS REALLY HELPED LORD CORNWALLIS ! COLONEL WILKES BRILLIANTLY NOTED TIPUS NEGLECT AND IGNORANCE OF USE OF CAVALRY, THE ARM THAT HAD ENABLED HYDER ALI TO DEFEAT THE ENGLISH COMPANY IN FIRST ANGLO MYSORE WAR- MAJOR A.H AMIN (RETIRED)

WHEN GENERAL MEDOWS MARCHED NORTH FROM SOUTHERN THEATRE IN DECEMBER 1790 MAJOR CUPPAGE WAS COMMANDING THE COMPANYS FORCE AT COIMBATOOR AND PALGHAUTCHERRY COMPRISING 14 AND 16 MADRAS NATIVE INFANTRY, SOME ARTILLERY , TOPASSES AND A TRAVANCORE STATE BATTALION.MAJOR CUPPAGE ASSESSED THAT COIMBATOORE FORT WAS NOT TENABLE AND WITHDREW ALL FORCE FROM HERE EXCEPT 120 TOPASSES AND 200 TRAVANCORE STATE SEPOYS UNDER LIEUTENANT CHALMERS.MAJOR CUPPAGE RETAINED AT PALGHAUTCHERRY 5TH AND 16TH MADRAS INFANTRY AND SENT 14TH MADRAS INFANTRY IN FEBRUARY 1791 TO ASSIST SIR ABERCOMBYS OPERATIONS IN MALABAR.TIPU DECIDED TO RECAPTURE COIMBATOORE AND BESIEGED IT WITH 2000 REGULAR TROOPS AND LARGE NUMBER OF IRREGULARS ON 13 JUNE 1791.LIEUTENANT CHALMERS REFUSED OFFER TO SURRENDER . SIEGE BEGAN AND MYSOREAN FORCES ASSAULTED THE FORT ON 11 AUGUST 1791 BUT WERE REPULSED.MAJOR CUPPAGE WITH A FORCE OF 16 MADRAS INFANTRY AND 35O POLYGARS ARRIVED ON SAME 11 AUG AND CAPTURED THE PETTAH FROM THE MYSOREANS FORCING THEM TO FLEE NORTHWARDS.THEREAFTER REINFORCING THE GARRISON AND INCREASING IT TO 700 SOLDIERS MAJOR CUPPAGE RETURNED TO PALGHAUTCHERRY.TIPOO SENT A STRONGER 8500 MAN FORCE UNDER WAZEER QAMR UD DEEN KHAN WHICH ARRIVED AT COIMBATOOR ON 6 OCTOBER 1791 AND RECAPTURED THE PETTAH (CITY) OF COIMBATOORE.THE WAZEER LAID SIEGE TO COIMBATOORE AND SET UP BATTERIES BETWEEN 15 AND 23 OCTOBER 1791. MAJOR CUPPAGE MARCHED TO RELIEVE COIMBATOORE. QAMRUDDIN ALSO MARCHED 7 MILES WEST OF COIMBATOORE WHERE BOTH CLASHED AT MUDGERRY . THE WAZEER WAS REPULSED BUT MAJOR CUPPAGE ALSO WITHDREW AS HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SECIRITY OF A SUPPLY CONVOY FOR ABERCOMBYS TROOPS COMING FROM DINDIGUL TO PALGHAUTCHERRY.WAZEER QAMRUDDIN RENEWED THE SIEGE AND THE GARRISON SURRENDERED ON 3RD NOVEMBER 1791 AS THEIR AMMUNITION HAD FINISHED. QAMRUDDIN KHAN VIOLATED TERMS OF SURRENDER BY ARRESTING LIEUTENANT CHALMERS AND NASH. LORD CORNWALLIS ORDERED FINANCIAL REWARD FOR BOTH ARRESTED OFFICERS AND CENSURED MAJOR CUPPAGE FOR ABANDONING THE COIMBATOORE GARRISON, ALTHOUGH HE PRAISED MAJOR CUPPAGE FOR INFLICTING THE REPULSE ON WAZEER QAMRUDDEEN KHAN AT MUDGERRY.

Thursday, July 12, 2018 THE POWER OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN IN WAR-

ON 14 MAY 1791 LORD CORNWALLIS PLANS TO OUT FLANK SULTAN STIPPO SAHIBS POSITION BY A NIGHT MARCH WITH 12 INDIAN BATTALIONS SIX BRITISH BATTALIONS AND FIVE CAVALRY REGIMENTS (ONE BEING BRITISH) – HE COMMENCES THE NIGHT MARCH ON 14 MAY 1791 AND A HEAVY RAIN STORM BREAKS OUT- AFTER FIVE MILES OF NIGHT MARCH HE DISCOVERS THAT HE IS ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY ONE INFANTRY COMPANY WHILE REST OF HIS 18 BATTALIONS HAVE LOST THE WAY AND DISPERSED DUE TO BAD WEATHER AND TERRAIN. THE WHOLE NIGHT IS SPENT LOCATING HIS LOST BATTALIONS AND SURPRISE IS TOTALLY LOST BY THE NEXT MORNING WHEN TIPU SUCCESFULLY RE-DEPLOYS HIS TROOPS AND EVADES CERTAIN DEFEAT BY CARRYING OUT AN ORDERLY RETREAT , WHILE LORD CORNWALLIS LOSES HIS GOLDEN CHANCE TO TOTALLY DEFEAT HIM.

#weather #terrain #cornwallis #military #mysore #tipu #war #maps #india #british #britisharmy #madrasarmy #bengalarmy

Third Anglo Mysore War - Tipu Sultan blunders and loses half of Mysore-1790-92: Dangers of bad assessments

ISBN-13: 978-1722031091 ISBN-10: 1722031093

The Pakistani military simply white washed its failures when books were written by official historians. The picture painted was that due to numerical superiority failure was inevitable and all the failure occurred because of Z.A Bhutto and Yahya Khan , whereas the failure was much deeper.It was a collective strategic failure of Pakistan armys leadership including Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan now hailed as a great strategist and Gul Hassan Khan who was strategically naieve.

Indian military failure against English East India Company was in Operational strategy – failure to modify existing plans against pressures of actual war- Battle of Delhi as an Example-1-

GENERAL DEPLOYMENT OF DELHI FIELD FORCE OPPOSITE DELHI – IN MILITARY TERMS THIS WAS NOT REALLY A SIEGE BUT A PARTIAL BLOCKING POSITION-JUNE TO SEPTEMBER 1857

Native accounts written after the mutiny state that had the British attacked Delhi shortly after Battle of Badli, they could have captured Delhi. But the British were too exhausted to do so283.

The Governor General Lord Canning and Chief Commissioner of Punjab John Lawrence were goading Bernard to capture Delhi as soon as he could. But Barnard felt that he was not strong enough to do so284.

The sepoys launched various attacks on the British position but all these were direct attacks and were beaten off. On 23 June the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Plassey the sepoys launched a very deliberate attack on the ridge. This, however, also made no success since the Britishers had been forewarned. The Najafgarh Drain flowing to the west of the Ridge gave the British rear considerable protection285.After the blowing of Bussye Bridge west of the city on 8th of July286 it became increasingly difficult for the rebels to take artillery guns across the Drain for providing fire support while raiding British communications with Punjab. However its obstacle value is rarely mentioned in any British account!

The British meanwhile were also getting reinforcements from Punjab287: -

a. 23 June: - 800 men

b. 1st July : - Wing 61 Foot

c. 2nd July: - 1st Punjab Infantry (800)

Meanwhile severely pressurised by the Governor General, General Barnard drew up a plan to capture Delhi by coup de main (surprise attack) rather than through conventional siege warfare288. The two city gates nearest to the ridge ( i.e. the Mori Gate and the Kabul Gate) were to be blown up by assault parties using ladders and gunpowder. Two columns were to assault and enter the city through the two blown up gates and to turn left and right outwards along the inner side of the walls capturing the successive bastions. A third column subsequently sent from the ridge was to enter through the Kashmir Gate which by then was to have been opened by the column which had entered the city from Mori Gate from the inside. This third column was to attack and capture the citadel i.e. 'The Red Fort' . This plan to be carried out on 13 June was however abandoned at the last stage289. Barnard as a matter of fact at the last moment lost the resolution to carry it out. Most probably if carried out this plan may have seriously jeopardized the British position at Delhi.

Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted Paperback – October 10, 2012

by Agha H. Amin (Author)

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STRATEGIST AND DIPLOMAT PAR EXCELLENCE – HYDER ALI-UNLIKE HIS SON HYDER ALI IS BETRAYED BY HIS OWN BROTHER IN LAW WHO JOINS THE MARATHAS WITH A COMPLETE DIVISION OF HYDERS ARMY-SEPTEMBER 1768

First Anglo Mysore War -1767-69: The English East India Company Challenged and Humbled

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Naval Power and Finances in Mysore wars

The contest between Hyder and the company was a narrow one.

But Hyder's main problem as we have already seen was naval power.

Even if he militarily defeated the Company's Madras Army,which he as a matter of fact successfully did twice (in September 1780 and December 1782),the Company reinforced its troops in Madras by sea from Bombay and Bengal,thereby making Hyder's task impossible.

In any case the economic centre of gravity of the Company was the rich province of Bengal,with whose revenues they paid all their armies.

Hyder could not attack Bengal since he did not have the naval capability to so the Second Mysore War in which Hyder came very close to defeating the English Company at least in South India remains a totally neglected campaign in Pakistani schools.Few people in today's world,where it is not really important and in today's Pakistan,where it is most important; know that Mysore came very close to annihilating the East India Company at Cuddalore (8th to 13th February 1781) when in the words of Fortescue the official historian of the British Army "Every road to to southward was beset by Hyder's detatchments,and not a grain of rice was to be procured.Unless the French Squadron (blockading the Army of the East India Company under Eyre Coote in the Bay of Bengal) could by a miracle be removed,and the sea thrown open for transport of supplies,Coote and the whole of his army were doomed men.For five days he remained in suspense,when to his unspeakable relief he saw the French Squadron sail away to eastward,removed in the nick of time by the miraculous folly of its commander. Thus by happy fortune the British Army and the British Empire in India were saved". (20)

From, now onwards the pendulum of history started moving in favour of the English. Even Admiral Mahan the famous naval historian discussed this battle in detail.

No one to this day exactly knows why Admiral D Orves withdrew (21) , but this folly finally led to the exit of the French from India and to the final destruction ofMysore in 1799.

Hyder was convincingly defeated by General Eyre Coote at Porto Novo (1st July 1781) in a battle where Coote dislocated Hyder's Army by an oblique order march in the fashion of Frederick the Great,and by a narrow margin at Pollilore (27th August 1781).

These battles were more decisive in the sense that they frustrated Hyder's attempts to totally destroy the English East India Company in South India.

On the other hand these victories still did not enable the English East India Company to defeat Mysore;something which was beyond the Company's capability till at least 1782.

The key to the issue however was the fact that using the revenue of Bengal the East India Company could economically sustain as well as rapidly expand its army much more rapidly than any native power in India including Mysore.

Diplomatically the East India Company succeeded in isolating Mysore by 1785 and from 1790 onwards the balance of power was no longer in Mysore's favour.

There is an interesting parallel here. A recent book by an American also cites poor diplomacy or , "New European Diplomatic abilities to gang up" in words of a reviewer,who I heard at one forum, recently as one of the principal reasons of failure of the Ottoman Turks in defeating European powers in the period 1500-1700. (22)

France shaken by the French Revolution of 1789 was in no position to any longer effectively aid Mysore by its naval power.

Thus by I792 the East India Company was able to successfully contain the Muslim state of Mysore,which was their principal opponent in India from 1767 to 1792.

The part which native troops played in the Siege of Seringapatam of 1792 as a result of which Mysore was reduced to a secondary power may be gauged from the fact that out of the total East India Company force of 30,991 men 21,899 were natives. (23) How the English East India Company Conquered India Paperback – November 2, 2012

by Agha H. Amin https://www.amazon.com/English-East-India-Company-Conquered/dp/1480234834/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1527923123&sr=1-1-fkmr0&keywords=how+the+british+conquered+india%2C+amin

CHANGEZ FORCE AND 1 CORPS CONCEPT OF BATTLE AS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED VERSUS HARSH REALITY CHANGEZ FORCE WAS TASKED TO DELAY INDIAN ATTACK FROM FIRST MINEFIELD LAYER TO THIRD MINEFIELD LAYER FOR 72 HOURS DURING WHICH 8 INDEPENDENT ARMOURED BRIGADE AND 6 ARMOURED DIVISIONWERE TO ATTACK INDIAN 54 DIVISION STRUCK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MINEFIELD LAYER. CHANGEZ FORCE  DELAYED  INDIAN ATTACK FROM FIRST MINEFIELD LAYER TO THIRD MINEFIELD LAYER FOR  288  HOURS BUT COMMANDER 1 CORPS REMAINED PARALYSED BY INDECISION VACCILLATION AND PROCRASTINATION WHILE INDIAN 54 DIVISION WAS STUCK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MINEFIELD LAYER FOR 5 DAYS.WHEN HE RECOVERED HIS SENSES IT WAS TOO LATE WHEN 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE WAS MOST INEPTLY AT BARAPIND.

Atlas of Changez Force Battle and Shakargarh Bulge Battles-1971Paperback – July 27, 2017

Product details

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CHANGEZ FORCE AND 1 CORPS CONCEPT OF BATTLE AS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED VERSUS HARSH REALITY

CHANGEZ FORCE WAS TASKED TO DELAY INDIAN ATTACK FROM FIRST MINEFIELD LAYER TO THIRD MINEFIELD LAYER FOR 72 HOURS DURING WHICH 8 INDEPENDENT ARMOURED BRIGADE AND 6 ARMOURED DIVISIONWERE TO ATTACK INDIAN 54 DIVISION STRUCK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MINEFIELD LAYER.

CHANGEZ FORCE  DELAYED  INDIAN ATTACK FROM FIRST MINEFIELD LAYER TO THIRD MINEFIELD LAYER FOR  288  HOURS BUT COMMANDER 1 CORPS REMAINED PARALYSED BY INDECISION VACCILLATION AND PROCRASTINATION WHILE INDIAN 54 DIVISION WAS STUCK BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MINEFIELD LAYER FOR 5 DAYS.WHEN HE RECOVERED HIS SENSES IT WAS TOO LATE WHEN 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE WAS MOST INEPTLY AT BARAPIND.

Atlas of Changez Force Battle and Shakargarh Bulge Battles-1971Paperback – July 27, 2017

Product details

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PAKISTAN ARMY SHAUKAT RIZAS OFFICIAL ACCOUNT IS ABSOLUTELY SILENT ABOUT 31 CAVALRY AT MALAKPUR, WHICH SHOWS PATHETICALLY LOW AND MEDIOCRE LEVEL OF MILITARY HISTORY WRITING IN PAKISTANI OFFICIAL CIRCLES - GHQ - IF YOU CAN CALL IT ! Atlas of Changez Force Battle and Shakargarh Bulge Battles-1971 Paperback – July 27, 2017 by Maj Agha H Amin (Ret) (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Atlas-Changez-Battle-Shakargarh-Battles-1971/dp/1973958082/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1527397790&sr=1-1&keywords=CHANGEZ+FORCE%2C+AGHA+H+AMIN #military #militarymaps #strategy #indianarmy #pakistanarmy #indiananarmy #maps #militarymaps #31cavalry #scindehorse #gharota #shakargarh #pakistan #india #ikhlaspur #16lightcavalry #malakpur #bhabra #bissobuzurg #books #militarybooks #changezforce #atlas #cartography

Pearls of Inflated Strategic Nonsense from so called reputed International Think Tank https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325252997_Pearls_of_Inflated_Strategic_Nonsense_from_so_called_reputed_International_Think_Tank

I was posted GSO 2 Operations in end July 1969 and took over Aug 1969 . Major General Nawazish was GOC but left in October 1969.

There were three brigades , 34 Brigade (Brig M Shafi-FF) , 124 Brigade (Brigade Nur-FF) 205 –RYK Brigade (Brig Durrani –FF) , 25 Indep Brigade (Brig Ameer Hamza) ,Sulaimanke .

Major General A.B Awan (Arty/Avn) came end 1969 and left in January Feb 1970 for Comdt Staff College.In the style of those days he came via Kabul driving from Pindi via Torkham.

An exercise was held in Usta Mohd (watermanship trg) .Everyone was supposed to cross Kirthar Branch . An OR drowned.

A.B Awan came to see the exercise. There was no accommodation .We requested the Deputy Commissioner of Jacobadabad DC who asked Mr Mohibullah Shah the assistant commissioner of Usta Mohammad .He vacated his room in a mud house where the GOC slept at night while the divisional staff slept outside.There was simply no concept of air conditioners in those days.

Feb 1970- Maj Gen Sharif commanded 16 Division for three months. Sharif was a forced bachelor as he had some family issues and was not living with his wife.Sharif was deadly weight conscious and only consumed tea in the tea break. Tea break was served only once a week.

People were afraid of him specially GSO 1 Lieutenant Colonel Ejaz (Punjab) , AQ Lt Col EAS Bukhari , while Col Abdullah Saeed was in 303 Tribunal in Pindi.

April 1970 Maj Gen Nazar Hussain Shah 3rd Baluch came from Joint Staff Headquarters Pindi.Col Staff was Abdullah Saeed (IMA-PMA) till Oct 1970 . Later succeeded by Col Akbar (Arty/6 PMA).

GSO 1 Lt Col Ejaz went to Fort Leavenworth and succeeded by Lt Col Ghulam Dastagir.

16 Division staff was sent to Jacobabad for anti Bugti operation against Bugti tribesmen who used to loot crops in Sindh .We were told by the Intelligence that the Bugti tribesmen forcibly had sex with sindhi women and the children born through this affair were called Marata Bugti.We stayed in Circuit House at Jacoababad but the operation was called off by the GOC Major General Sharif as unnecessary .The DC at that time was Fatima surayas brother, later probably sacked in ZA Bhutto tenure.

36 Baluch (R and S ) commanded by Aslam Beg from 1969 to 1970 . Aslam Beg was a good friend and we had shared accommodation as neighbours in Lahores Napier Hotel in 1962-64 where he was a brigade major and I was serving in 4 Engineer Battalion .He was posted to Kharian 9 Div and later went to East Pakistan and later came to 1971 war course.

Army held very fair election in 1970 in Baluchistan and locals really appreciated it.

In Dec 1970 an Ex without troops was held in Muzaffargarh .

General Yahya Khan came and bridge on Chenab was made by 1st Engr Bn comd by Lt Col Syed Jawwad Hussain Naqvi.

Assembly session postponed and strong reaction in east Pakistan commenced . We frequently discussed this issue and most thought thast assembly session must be called with or without Mr ZA Bhuttos agreement.

On 1st Mar 1971 order came from GHQ that 34 Bde (three battalions- 27 FF ,22 Baluch , 4 FF) should move to East Pakistan.Move from Quetta to Karachi by rail and Karachi to dacca by air-Only rifles , company and battalion weapons and wireless were carried.No artillery was taken.

124 Bde stayed in Quetta.35 FF stationed in Chaman.Maj Basit Ali Khan (8 PMA) a very fine officer was BM 205 Bde.

Nasrullah FF-ssg was BM 34 Bde. Jalil Bengali was 25 Bde BM .

Eastern command received us and our arrangements were made at the MNA Hostel which also housed 34 Bde mess. AC did not exist at that time and I am surprised today when I see the amount of ACs being used in the army .

Next day 27 March 1971 we were ordered to go to Rangpur . We travelled in a 5 Seater with ceiling of 8000 feet belonging to plant protection. The GOC , Colonel Staff and myself travelled . The instructions were that Rajshahi division would be under comd 16 div.

At Rangpur we landed on a football field as there was no airfield.

Abdullah Khan Malik Bde Comd 23 Bde received us . 29 C was commanded by Lt col sagheer.Rangpur absolutely calm.

1st April 57 bde (Brig Jahanzeb Arbab) ordered to move to Pabna –Ishaurdi Nator Rajshahi Santahar and come to Bogra.

34 Bde ordered 2nd april to follow 57 Bde. 34 Bde established HQ in Nator .34 Brigade Commander who was a handsome man was sacked for cowardice and replaced by Brig Aslam Niazi famous for being a phenomenally heavy drinker.

25 Punjab CO Lt Col Shafqat Baloch in Rajshahi ( 23 Bde ) was sacked by Mitha for cowardice and replaced by Lt Col Abdullah (7th or 8th PMA) .

There was no transport so I got hold of a civilian Bus which I mysel drove . Diesel was arranged from an abandoned fuel train on the station.

We discovered that whole trains were taken to India including DC of Rajshahi by force . He came back after one month and stayed as DC Rajshahi.

Eastern comd revealed in end August 1971 indian attack plan revealed by eastern comd. The plan was exactly the one executed by Indians with same force ratios.

Pabna fortress , Natore Fortress rajshahi Fortress, Hill Fortress, Dinajpur,Thakurgaon, Rangpur , Bogra stocked with ration and ammunition for at least six weeks.

In june 1971 33 Div was formed and I came to hand them over all secret docs.Staff college instructors requested for briefing as my cousin Lieutenant Colonel Agha Manzur Rauf also a DS informed them.

I was shocked that there was great optimism which I would call misplaced optimism and staff college instructors were CONVINCED that if war starts Pakistan would win.

I briefed staff college instructors about operations—situation under control except that during night mukti bahini was active.

Essence of my briefing was that during war Indian air will knock out dacca airfield on first day of the war so day movement would not be possible due to Indian air and night movement would also be very difficult due to Mukti Bahini and the chances were that East Pakistan would be overrun.

Also 7 engr (8 div) and 8 engr (6 armd div) also took part in minefd laying.

Bridge trg on bangle khudadad on small canal.

Two bridges on eastern sadiqiya canal one at jalwala (7 div)and one at gulab ali on hakra branch for first armd div.

ARMY OP WAS NOT FEASIBLE IN EAST PAKISTAN.

The galaxy of inflated and overrated strategic failures in this exercise include Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan Gul Hassan and Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.

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Area necessary to be captured to support logistics of an army invading Mysore proper marked in red and in slanted lines

Nonsense allegation of Timothy Snyder that USA has been destroyed by Putin #timothysnyder #nonsense #usa #russia #trump #theroadtounfreedom #fantasy #utopia #books #bookreview #polemica #polemics #yarn 

influence of naval power on strategic outcome

#orders #Disobedience #disobey #missionoriented #Germany #germanarmy #philosophy #doctrine #leadership #decisionmaking #military Disobedience and modification of orders in the Wehrmacht https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320306039_Disobedience_and_modification_of_orders_in_the_Wehrmacht

#military #clausewitz #vomkrieg #Germany #philosophy #strategy #book #tactics Chapter 4 -Strategy and Tactics https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320490395_Chapter_4_-Strategy_and_Tactics

Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army failed in 1965 war - Analysis of 1965 War

#strategy #Afghanistan #Military #USArmy THE MOST SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC DECEPTION THAT BENEFITTED PAKISTAN IN THE SHORT RUN BUT MAY/CAN PROVE DIASASTOROUS IN LONG RUN https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324719808_THE_MOST_SUCCESSFUL_STRATEGIC_DECEPTION_THAT_BENEFITTED_PAKISTAN_IN_THE_SHORT_RUN_BUT_MAYCAN_PROVE_DIASASTOROUS_IN_LONG_RUN

Storm in a teacup of Indecision Irresolution and Cowardice - Bad Military Leadership

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324495921_Storm_in_a_teacup_of_Indecision_Irresolution_and_Cowardice_-_Bad_Military_Leadership

Colonel Ochterlony was a firm believer in manoeuvre warfare-The Man from Boston in action against Nepal

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strategic rationale of Kumaon operations https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324121912_strategic_rationale_of_Kumaon_operations

Pakistans leading lawyer

Sees judicial activism as pakistani military pawn.

“Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen”. — Karl Marx

SINCE 2007, a dictator, two elected prime ministers and many members of parliament have been guillotined by an independent judiciary using legal and constitutional means. Three usual explanations are given for this phenomenon. Firstly, there is an alliance between an independent judiciary and the security establishment to control the politicians. Secondly, this is judicial imperialism through which the judiciary misinterprets the Constitution simply to usurp power itself. Thirdly, this is the glorious and continuous rise of the rule of law, which is the panacea for all Pakistan’s ills.

But what if the present judicial actors are not free actors but partial prisoners of circumstances?

2007 — a paradoxical revolution: The earlier transitions to democracy, namely 1968-1971 and 1983-1988 were the result of political struggles dominated by politicians using political ideology and mass mobilisation, with the judiciary having an insignificant role in such a transition. In fact, in 1969 and 1983, it was in collusion with the military. But 2007 was radically different because in order to get rid of Gen Musharraf, the politicians used the lawyers/judicial movement to make the transition to democracy. This had two consequences.

Firstly, the leadership of the democratic transition was handed over to the judiciary. The democratic battles against a dictator were not fought primarily through mass political mobilisation but through the process of law with reliance on judicial adjudication. Moreover, between 2007 and 2018, most political battles between politicians have been fought in court and not in the arena of political ideology, political performance and mass mobilisation. In short, it is politicians themselves who created this judicial empire by their existential dependence on it.

Secondly, the ideology which defeated Gen Musharraf was not socialism or some other political ideology concerning the people’s welfare but rather constitutionalism and human rights as defined by the judiciary. The gap left by the poverty of ideology on the part of the political elite was filled by a triumphant judiciary’s ideology of constitutionalism. Therefore, the success of the 2007 democratic transition is also part tragedy for the political elites because the leadership and ideology of this democratic transition has been handed over to the judiciary.

Judicial empire — historical and global: This expansive judicial power is rooted in our own judicial history and is also an established global phenomenon. Firstly, pre-1972, there was a colonial-minded but independent judiciary as it believed not in the rule of law but rather rule by law. Due to this colonial mindset, neither the 1958 nor the 1969 military takeover was judicially challenged as rule by law was always possible under military or colonial regimes. After the political enactment of Pakistan’s first-ever democratic Constitution in 1973, the slow trend of judicial dissent also began against military rule. In 1981, 2000 and 2007, high court and Supreme Court judges unprecedentedly defied military rule by refusing to take the oath of allegiance to martial law. This judicial dissent trend finally led to the shortest martial law in Pakistan’s history in November 2007, lasting less than two months. The present expansive judicial power is also rooted in this history of dissent. Moreover, the present fascination of the high courts and the Supreme Court with constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 and 184(3) of the Constitution has its roots in the period 1988-90 ie the time of the first suo motu. Since 1988, there has been a steady and continuous increase in judicial adjudication of all kinds of political, economic, social and cultural issues. Thus, the present radical expansion of judicialisation of state and societal issues is deeply rooted in Pakistan’s judicial history since 1988.

Secondly, this trend of ever-accelerating reliance on judicial means for adjudicating core moral issues, public policy questions and political controversies is a global phenomenon. Whether it is South Asian countries like India and Bangladesh, or Latin America countries like Brazil and Costa Rica, or Southeast Asian countries like Korea and the Philippines, or African countries like South Africa or the invention of judicial activism by the American courts, the judicialisation of politics and governance by the judiciary is not a typically Pakistani phenomenon.

Security establishment under constitutional democracy: The democratic and liberal dream was simple: the Constitution and elections would roll back the powerful Pakistani security establishment. But to think that a huge standing army with an existential stake in the budget, a massive intelligence network, a nuclear option under its control, with a vested interest in conflicts in Afghanistan and India, and with huge stakes in the economic and social sphere, could be controlled by the Constitution and elections is nothing but a fantastical delusion.

Once the security establishment realised that it could no longer impose direct military rule because of local resistance and changing global realities, it followed the old advice of all ruling elites that ‘everything needs to change, so everything can stay the same’.

The security establishment has decided not to overthrow constitutional democracy but to reinvent and re-establish itself under it. Two aspects of this reinvention can be elaborated. Firstly, it seems to have ‘forcefully’ convinced both the political elites and judicial elites that for the sake of continuance of democracy and constitutionalism, a strategic silence must be maintained on security-related issues eg silence on alleged human rights violations in operations in Balochistan and on terror, establishment of military courts, and the exemption of military from financial accountability.

The second aspect is the use of perfectly legitimate constitutional means ie legal accountability through the courts, to achieve unconstitutional ends ie military domination. The Memogate and the Panama cases are classic examples of this as both cases involved legitimate legal accountability through legitimate constitutional means but led, unintentionally to domination by the security establishment.

Where constitutionalism weakens civilian rule, where democratic elites perceive an independent judiciary as an enemy and where a powerful security establishment has exempted itself both from democratic and constitutional control, surely Pakistan’s path to constitutional and democratic modernisation will be treacherous and complicated.

President Trump You need to call your advisers and fire them.

Data Pakistans strategic failure in 1971

Wiele dokumentów aspirujących do miana konstytucji rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa okazuje się tylko formą paranaukowej beletrystyki. Analizy są zbyt ogólne, wnioski odnoszą się głównie do bieżących problemów, a cele są mało konkretne. O ile też pod koniec XX wieku można było pokusić się o 30 letnie wyprzedzenie, o tyle w dzisiejszych czasach okres 20 lat będzie sporym osiągnięciem.

The 1971 War An examination of the strategic concept of war https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319058920_The_1971_War_An_examination_of_the_strategic_concept_of_war

Truman was fairly ignorant in foreign affairs and was a product of the Pendergast machine

Organisation and Warfare Organisation has a deep and direct connection with success or failure in battle. It is agreed by all and sundry that a superior generalship, high morale, sophisticated equipment and logistic stamina do play a major role in battle. Likewise, it is felt with an equal conviction that superiority in organisation from the lowest tactical to operational and strategic levels plays a major role in the performance of an army, a formation, a unit or even a sub-unit in war. In fact, at certain times, the organisational superiority or inferiority has played a crucial role in the victory or defeat of an army. Historically, the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion stand out as examples of battle formations that played an important part in the victories of their armies. Nevertheless, both these organisations had their limitations and thus faced extinction. Again, the Mongol tactics of employment of cavalry were at one time invincible before they too became obsolete. In a later history, Frederick the Great’s revolutionary, Oblique Order tactics also met their fate. Napoleon’s divisional and corps system that formed a guarantee for victory could also not stand the test of time. His opponents' imitation of this model and other calculated organisational counter measures rendered it ineffective with the passage of time. Moltke the Elder introduced a concept of controlling the armies organised under various army/corps commanders in a single theatre, by means of a single general staff system. In these the command and co-ordination was done by means of telegraph, whilst movement was radically improved through railways. Still, within the next four decades his system as well was subjected to organisational modifications. The German Experience in Organisation as a Case Study Moltke's success in the Franco-German war of 1870-71 developed a false feeling of superiority in the German Army. While his campaigns were analysed and elevated to the pedestal of the formula for victory, no effort was made to appreciate that the growth in the size of armies necessitated changes to their organisation. The necessity of a general staff for the control and co-ordination of the Eighth and Ninth Armies that advanced into France as part of the famous Schlieffen Plan was dismissed and allusion made to Moltke’s successes of 1866 and 1870. It was assumed that the two general officers whose armies, trained in like manner, would, when advancing abreast, co-ordinate and function effectively and understand an operational situation in a context larger than their own individual progress. The Battle of Marne fought in 1914 proved the contrary and showed that the two army commanders followed their own personal whims. The reason for this failure was the organisational flaw:- The German General Staff Headquarters located many hundred miles in the rear could not co-ordinate the movement of various armies advancing towards Paris right from the D-Day till the Battle of Marne. Absence of an army group headquarters to co-ordinate the actions of two or three armies advancing side by side led to the following setbacks:- Failure to exploit the opportunities to encircle or outflank the French and British formations. Lack of co-ordination created gaps between the armies only to be exploited by the Franco-British Armies who launched successful counter-strokes. The most notable of this was the fateful battle of Marne of 1914. It has been fashionable to attribute the German failure to defeat France in 1914 to non-adherence of the original Schlieffen Plan. While it is true that Moltke the Younger’s cautious personality, by altering the force ratio, robbed the Schlieffen Plan of its inherent boldness and dynamism, the fact that the Germans missed many opportunities to inflict a decisive defeat on the French during their advance towards Paris stands out as a hard historical reality. Failure to do so was largely organisational. Had the Germans possessed an intermediate headquarters to co-ordinate the operations of two or three armies, they may have been able to encircle one of the French Armies on their way to Paris. They would have then created an operational imbalance that may have seriously jeopardised the stability of French dispositions long before they were able to successfully retreat to the Marne and stabilise the operational situation. The following two examples prove that the presence of an army group headquarters to co-ordinate at least two or three German Armies may have produced a decisive German thrust long before reaching Paris or the line of Marne and Oise Rivers. The Lost Opportunity of 20 August 1914 On 20 August 1914, following was the operational situation:- Lanzearac's 5th French Army was holding a defensive position south of Sambre River and west of Meuse River. Bulows German Army was holding the line of Sambre River north of Lanzearac's 5th French Army. On Bulows right another German Army, i.e. Kluck's Army was facing the numerically much weaker British Expeditionary Force (BEF) which Kluck could easily have outflanked had he wanted to. Another German Army, i.e., Hausen's Army was on Lanzearac French Army's deep southern flank across the Meuse River. This army could also easily have marched westwards and enveloped Lanzearac’s 5th Army from the south. No army commander was, however, interested in co-operating with the other, since the one preferred German emphasis was to reach Paris. There was no army group headquarters to control and co-ordinate the moves of these three armies while the German General Staff Headquarters was more than 150 miles behind at Colbenz. The German Chief, Moltke the Younger, preferred sitting at Colbenz to going personally forward to converge the movement of these three armies to encircle the French 5th Army. Thus a golden opportunity of inflicting a crushing defeat on the French and BEF was lost on 20 August 1914. The simple reason for this failure was again organisational. The Lost Opportunity of 24 August 1914 The situation of 24 August 1914 was as under:- The 5th French Army and the BEF were mauled heavily, were in retreat on 24 August 1914. There was a gap to the south of Lanzearac's 5th French Army between the 4th and 5th French Armies. An area of some 10 to 15 miles between Rocroi and Mezieres was not held strongly by French. General Hausen was aware of this gap and asked the OHL (the General Headquarters) for permission to exploit it. Moltke the Younger hesitated in giving permission and procrastinated, allowing Hausen to exploit this gap only on the morning of 28th August. It was all too late although Hausen did start the projected advance. General Bulow on Hausen's right was a much more cautious and timid commander. He was overly confounded by a corps level counter attack by the exhausted and desperate 5th French Army. He thus sent a very panicky signal to Hausen to help him. In actual fact the situation was not as worse, but Bulow had overreacted. Hausen, not truly knowing Bulow, believed his signal and abandoned his outflanking attack and readjusted northwards to help Bulow Hausen later explained why he had decided to assist Bulow, which forced him to abandon his originally planned attack on Lanzearac’s line of communication. Hausen thus states, one, after all, had the right to suppose that a commander so experienced and of such a reputation as him, at the head of the 2nd Army (Bulow’s Army) would only ask for immediate help in the event of an absolute necessity. Bulow's panic was without any basis since just a few hours later the 5th Army again started retreating. The two above mentioned examples illustrate that the absence of an intermediate army group headquarters stood out as the principal German organisational negligence because of non-existence of which the Germans failed to exploit many fleeting opportunities in 1914 including the two examples cited above. The French and German Organisational Response in World War II The French won the World War I, and as such did not appreciate the necessity of organisational or doctrinal reform in their army. This particular response had a remarkable similarity to the Germans' disposition following Moltke the Elder's victories of 1866 and 1870. On the other hand, the history of the World War I was viewed differently by the German Army since they lost it. The Germans introduced radical changes in their organisation and doctrine. The rise of Hitler to power led to the adoption of a radical organisational model proposed by Guderian for organising tanks into tank corps and tank army groups. Numerically, Allied had more tanks than Germans. However, all German tanks were grouped into some ten German Panzer divisions organised either as Panzer group or Panzer corps. Two Panzer corps were grouped as Panzer Group Kliest, while the others as the corps co-operating with various armies. According to varied estimates, the French had a large number of tanks ranging from 2554 to 3615. Out of these, only 468 tanks were concentrated in the French armoured divisions. The remaining tanks were dished out in penny packets to the French infantry divisions. Thus, because of this very organisational blemish the French could not have launched any meaningful counter-stroke to defeat the German armoured thrust. The French and their allies were confronted with a unique and unprecedented organisational and doctrinal dilemma. Such a grand level envelopment manoeuvre, as that of 1940 had not been successfully accomplished since Ulm. Till 1940, the German doctrine of Blitzkrieg and their organisation, i.e., the Panzer corps and groups were compatible. In 1941, this relationship between organisation and doctrine was again seriously affected by Hitler's decision to increase the number of armoured divisions to 21. This reduced each Panzer division to 160 tanks. Thus while in France, a country much smaller to Russia, a German Panzer division had some 320 tanks; in Russia, contrary to logic, it were to have a paltry 160 tanks. This reduction in strength seriously weakened the operational potential of the German Panzer division. Thus organisationally speaking, the German plan to invade Russia had become intangible long before the actual invasion. In terms of organisation and grouping, the Germans were again unable to resolve many points of confusion. Thus in Army Group Centre, Guderian and Hoth's Panzer Groups were placed under command the infantry army commanders. Since the arrangement was temporary, various conflicts arose and the infantry army commanders kept a pressure on Guderian and Hoth to slow down. In Army Group North the Panzer Group of Hoeppner was not under an infantry army commander but directly under the Army Group North's commander. Another major German organisational mistake in Russia was to assign an independent headquarters to control all the three-army groups under a separate Commander-in-Chief and a Chief of General Staff. Thus Hitler, some 800 to 1000 miles in rear, tried to control operations in the east and west much like a tank commander controlling his driver. This organisational failure doomed the German operations in the east from the beginning. Another serious organisational failure was Hitler’s assumption of the appointment of Army Commander-in-Chief following the Battle of Moscow in 1941. A head of state cannot fully do justice to a job as demanding as that of a Commander-in-Chief. The Indo-Pakistan Experience in organisation 1965 War The Indo-Pakistan Armies were begotten of the same source, i.e., the old British Indian Army. Nevertheless, the Indian and Pakistani response to their organisational problems was different and led to slightly different results. On the Pakistani side, it was thought till 1965 that a division should suffice as the higher level of operational command in most cases. Pakistan had only one corps headquarters in 1965. Years before the war, a need was felt for founding another corps headquarters. The finance ministry jeopardised this perfectly justifiable operational demand. Today, it is fashionable to criticise what happened at Khem Karan in 1965. The fact that an armoured division was launched without any integral infantry division supporting it as a sister formation is largely ignored. Notwithstanding the tactical flaws like poor reconnaissance, lack of co-ordination and a blind adherence to the night-leaguer, the presence of another corps headquarters for close monitoring of the divisions may have led to a better performance in the war. The story was no different on the other side of the border. Lieutenant General Gill, the Indian DMO during 1965 War also cites the organisational imbalance that contributed to a reduced combat efficiency of the Indian Army. Indian armoured division failure in Chawinda despite having a corps headquarters and integral sister infantry divisions to facilitate its operations cannot be attributed to any organisational flaw. In our case, however, the organisational factor played a sufficient role, which now has but a theoretical value. Another aspect generally ignored during the war centres around the faulty employment of armour. This failure is more of a doctrinal nature than organisational one. The tactical timidity on danger of being outflanked, anxiety about some unknown danger on flanks and the concept of night-leaguer in the rear can be cited as causes that led to the under employment of armour. The Indian arrangement of having commands to control various corps were effective to a limited extent as the officer exercising this command could not really co-ordinate the actions of various corps that held very large frontages. Thus their system of having headquarters called commands, to co-ordinate their various corps, though slightly unwieldy, proved organisationally to be a relatively better arrangement. General Harbaksh Singh who was commanding their Western Command in 1965 was an exceptionally gifted commander. He had an extraordinarily sharp operational perception and his intervention in resisting the Indian Chief, General Chaudhri's withdrawal order in response to the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan stands out as a matter of individual military genius and had little to do with his being GOC Western Command. Organisationally, however, the incident vindicates the benefit of having intermediate headquarters.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318827934_Relationship_of_Organisation_to_Doctrine_and_Conduct_of_War_-_Citadel_Journal_of_Command_and_Staff_College_Quetta_Pakistan_Army_Volume_XV_Issue_298

Strategy versus operational strategy

US Army in Afghanistan

HOAX TRAINING CANNOT TRAIN REAL COMMANDERS FOR WAR The Armoured Thrust-Article Based on Experiences as an Umpire

Article The Armoured Thrust- An Operational Analysis

Intangible Forces Behind a Military Manoeuvre: Military Leadership for students and layman readers (The Ideal Clausewitzian Military Commander vs intangible forces) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318900440_Intangible_Forces_behind_a_military_manoeuvrePakistan_Army_Journal_June_1993

Afghanistan the new surge-a great pakistani christian analyst and my great teacher in school of infantry and tactics-october-december 1983

#Military Two Tank Squadrons repulse a tank division https://www.researchgate.net/project/How-History-Moves-Mans-Role-in-history/update/5a71cfe84cde266d5887b61c

Ottoman Turkish Army in First World war