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Platform taxation

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Paul Belleflamme
added a research item
We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax.
Paul Belleflamme
added 2 research items
We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax increase on its prices. Adding price competition, we study next how the tax affects profits. Because of the strategic implications of the cross-side external effects, the tax increase may end up increasing the profit of the taxed platform (lucky break) or, conversely, reducing it twice (double jeopardy). JEL-Codes: D430, L130, L860, O320.
Article publié sur The Conversation (https://theconversation.com/dans-leconomie-du-partage-il-faut-comprendre-que-les-taxes-aussi-sont-partagees-58016)