Project

Permissions, Information and Institutional Dynamics, Obligations, and Rights -- PIOTR

Goal: Exercising one’s rights, or acting on one’s permission can generate obligations for others. Contract law and international law provide examples. Debtors are obligated to comply when their creditors exercise their right to request payment. Free­trade agreements place their signatories under the obligation not to pass protectionist regulations. A similar phenomenon holds for permissions stemming from morality or rationality. Others ought not infringe my individual right to dignity. In negotiation, one party making a permissible offer might put the other under the (rational) obligation to accept it.

When exactly, then, do permissions and rights generate obligations? Is there a general structure common to these examples? How are such obligations distributed between the parties involved, be they individual or institutional actors? Are the generated obligations strict or could they be overridden, even when they stem from inalienable rights?

These are fundamental questions regarding the dynamic and social or multi­agent aspects of obligations, permissions and rights. Deontic logic, viz. the logical study of obligations and permissions, has long been concerned with the relation between permissions and obligations. Usually, however, the relation is understood the other way around. Obligations imply permissions, or permissions constrain the promulgation of further obligations. However, the dynamic generation of obligations by rights and permissions has received comparatively little attention. The project will fill this gap by focusing on three essential aspects of obligations generated from permissions and rights. First, we will study how explicit permissions generate a dynamics of obligations, and compare it to case where permissions are weak, i.e. the mere absence of prohibitions. Second, we will consider how permissions and rights issued by high­level legal authority generate obligations on its constituents, especially in complex organizations. Finally, we will study the defeasible character of obligations stemming from permissions. Obligations generated from rights and permissions are central to German and Polish law, and these will provide the main sources of “data” for the analysis in this project.

Updates
0 new
0
Recommendations
0 new
0
Followers
0 new
21
Reads
2 new
338

Project log

Piotr Kulicki
added a research item
The paper tackles the problem of the relation between rights and obligations. Two examples of situations in which such a relation occurs are discussed. One concerns the abortion regulations in Polish law, the other one - a clash between freedom of expression and freedom of enterprise occurring in the context of discrimination. The examples are analysed and formalised using labelled transition systems in the nC+ framework. Rights are introduced to the system as procedures allowing for their fulfilment. Obligations are based on the requirement of cooperation in the realisa-tion of the goals of the agent that has a right. If the right of an agent cannot be fulfilled without an action of another agent, then that action is obligatory for that agent. If there are many potential contributors who are individually allowed to refuse, then the last of them is obliged to help when all the others have already refused. By means of formalisation this account of the relation under consideration is precisely expressed and shown consistent.
Michael P. Musielewicz
added 2 research items
In this paper, we propose virtue ethics as a metaethical theory for autonomous cars, as an alternative to the utilitarian and deontological paradigms. We believe that this theory is more suitable for situations when the mechanisms behind the steering of the car are based on machine learning techniques rather than rule based algorithms. We present the main idea of this solution and discuss some virtues that can be applied to cars, namely: justice, benevolence and courage. We also investigate the way ethics can be incorporated into the learning procedures for cars and how deontic logic can contribute to this endeavour.
Recent technological advances in autonomous vehicles have brought their introduction to commercial markets into the near future. However, before they hit the sales lots, various governments and inter-governmental governing structures have taken interest in laying down a regulatory framework prior to their introduction into the markets. One regulatory institution looking at this issue is the European Union. In a 2016 report, by the Policy Department of the European Parliament, it was noted that there is a lack of harmonization in liability rules within the European Union. This problem was also addressed in a press release in 2017. The goal of this essay is to provide a sketch of the problems related to liability and its legal framework as found within the European Union and to examine one solution (among others) currently under examination by officials in the EU, that is the possibility of legal personhood for autonomous vehicles. I will first concur the current regulatory field is lacking, and then contrast the advantages and disadvantages of such a scheme. To do this, I will first provide a brief overview of the liability regimes in the European Union. Secondly, I will explore the sort of legal personhood and offer a critique of a current EU document concerning this issue. Finally, I will pose some difficulties that sort of legal personhood has when placed into the regulatory schemes.
Piotr Kulicki
added a research item
Autonomous cars are one of the emerging technologies that will have a significant impact on society in the upcoming years. Although the predictions estimate that the traffic safety will be significantly improved, many people are afraid and prefer a human driver's control over vehicles or at least human driver's possibility to take control over the car. One of the reasons is that people want to be sure that in case of hazardous situation or accident a self-driving car will behave in a proper way. What does it mean "proper way"? There are several levels that can be considered, but at the end there is a level of values, especially moral values. In this paper we move towards a formal ethics for autonomous vehicles, which will allow people to understand the values influencing a self-driving car. To accomplish this, we first address philosophical concerns for the possibility of ethics for driverless cars, by paying particular attention to the issue of their capacity of being a normative agent. We then discuss a formal ontology for these vehicles and the possibility of the use of such an ontology as a basis for a normative system. The lack of expressive power of ontological tools leads to the conclusion that the formal ethics for autonomous cars requires a more powerful logic. The logic should be able to take into account norms on actions and states, and handle normative conflict and preferences on norms. A special thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
Piotr Kulicki
added a project reference
Piotr Kulicki
added 3 research items
Multivalued setting is quite natural for deontic action logic, where actions are usually treated as obligatory, neutral or forbidden. We apply the ideas of multivalued deontic logic to the phenomenon of a moral dilemma and, broader, to any situation where there are conflicting norms. We formalize three approaches towards normative conflicts. We present matrices for the systems and compare their tautologies. Finally, we present a sound and complete axiomatization of the systems.
This paper extends the results presented in [22,20] and explores how new paradoxes arise in various substructural logics used to model conditional obligations. Our investigation starts from the comparison that can be made between monoidal logics and Lambek's [17] analysis of substructural logics, who distinguished between four different ways to introduce a (multiplicative) disjunction. While Lambek's analysis resulted in four variants of substructural logics, namely BL1, BL1(a), BL1(b) and BL2, we show that these systems are insufficient to model conditional obligations insofar as either they lack relevant desirable properties, such as some of De Morgan's dualities or the law of excluded middle, or they satisfy logical principles that yield new paradoxes. To answer these concerns, we propose an intermediate system that is stronger than BL1 but weaker than BL1(a), BL1(b) and BL2.
This is the second paper of the series of papers dealing with access control problems in cloud computing by adopting quantum techniques. In this paper we study the application of quantum encryption and quantum key distribution in the access control problem. We formalize our encryption scheme and protocol for key distribution in the setting of categorical quantum mechanics (CQM). The graphical language of CQM is used in this paper. The quantum scheme/protocol we propose possesses several advantages over existing schemes/protocols proposed in the state of the art for the same purpose. They are informationally secure and implementable by the current technology.
Huimin Dong
added 2 research items
We present a dynamic logic for modelling legal competences, and in particular for the Hohfeldian categories of power and immunity. We argue that this logic improves on existing models by explicitly capturing the norm-changing character of legal competences, while at the same time providing a sophisticated reduction of the latter to static normative positions. The logic is shown to be completely axiomatizable; an analysis of its resulting dynamic normative positions is provided; and it is finally applied to a concrete case in German contract law to illustrate how the logic can distinguish legal ability and legal permissibility.
This thesis has studied various formal theories of the taxonomic category of permission in non-monotonic reasoning, examined their particular logical principles, and applied these various notions of permission to concrete cases from natural language and from legislation. In contrast to the singular form of permission in SDL, this formal study has pointed out how important plural views of permission are in building up a normative system in practice. Chapter 2 is a comparative study to argue that free choice permission is a plausible notion about rational recommendations in games. In doing so, it presented a comparison between several existing non-normal modal logics, which share the idea of rational obligation as weakest permission. It provided several translation results regarding their deductive power, and pointed out the theoretical significance of this particular relationship between permission and obligation. They are, respectively, the sufficient and necessary conditions for rationality in games. Chapter 3 is a new solution to the notorious puzzle of the ``free choice permission paradox.'' In doing so, it studied a group of substructural principles for capturing free choice permission in natural language, augmented with a non-monotonic principle. Accordingly, it developed a family of substructural logics with sufficient deductive power. These logics are completely axiomatized, and some satisfy cut-elimination. The key conceptual contribution of this chapter was the interpretation of the conditional connective on action types in terms of ``licensed instances.'' Chapter 4 is a pilot study of applying the well-established logic with lexicographic updates on Hohfeldian dynamic rights. Different than its ancestors, it is a third way to formulate power and immunity. On the one hand, the dynamic logic distinguished the dynamic character of rights from the static ones. On the other hand, as a reductive account, it has a richer set of logical interactions between static and dynamic rights. Indeed, the dynamic logic developed here can be well applied to distinguish the notion of legal ability (rechtliches Können) from that of legal permissibility (rechtliches Dürfen), in a concrete case from the German civil code. Chapter 5 is formal research that studies the defeasible character of actions and permissions in an extension of prioritized default theory, in order to capture two items in Chinese and German Law. The prioritized default theory developed here was based on two extensions: multi-agent and permissive norms. This can then define various independent types of permission. This agent-relative default theory with permissive norms can plausibly capture the case ``Chinese Tax Incentives'' and the ``Rights of Way.'' Comparing the exclusionary default theory, and other extension-based semantics, the prioritized default theory introduced in this chapter can help us understand better these concrete legal situations.
Albert Anglberger
added a research item
The open reading of permission (OR) states that an action α is permitted iff every execution of α is normatively OK. Free Choice Permission (FCP) is the notorious principle turning permission of disjunction into conjunction of permissions P(ϕ ∨ ψ) → Pϕ ∧ Pψ. We start by giving a first-order logic version of OR that defines permission of action types in terms of the legality of action tokens. We prove that implies FCP. Given that FCP has been heavily criticized, this seems like bad news for OR. We disagree. We observe that this implication relies on a debatable principle involving disjunctive actions. We proceed to present alternative views of disjunctive actions which violate this principle, and which so block the undesired implication. So one can have the open reading without free choice and, as we argue towards the end of the paper, there are philosophical reasons why one should.
Michael P. Musielewicz
added a research item
Introduction to my research project in PIOTR. Gives examples of various laws (national, supra-national and local) which have permissions for one agent to require an action from another agent and briefly discusses difficulties using SDL in representation and some prospective logical models to investigate (viz. stit lts or diadic deontic logic).
Piotr Kulicki
added a project goal
Exercising one’s rights, or acting on one’s permission can generate obligations for others. Contract law and international law provide examples. Debtors are obligated to comply when their creditors exercise their right to request payment. Free­trade agreements place their signatories under the obligation not to pass protectionist regulations. A similar phenomenon holds for permissions stemming from morality or rationality. Others ought not infringe my individual right to dignity. In negotiation, one party making a permissible offer might put the other under the (rational) obligation to accept it.
When exactly, then, do permissions and rights generate obligations? Is there a general structure common to these examples? How are such obligations distributed between the parties involved, be they individual or institutional actors? Are the generated obligations strict or could they be overridden, even when they stem from inalienable rights?
These are fundamental questions regarding the dynamic and social or multi­agent aspects of obligations, permissions and rights. Deontic logic, viz. the logical study of obligations and permissions, has long been concerned with the relation between permissions and obligations. Usually, however, the relation is understood the other way around. Obligations imply permissions, or permissions constrain the promulgation of further obligations. However, the dynamic generation of obligations by rights and permissions has received comparatively little attention. The project will fill this gap by focusing on three essential aspects of obligations generated from permissions and rights. First, we will study how explicit permissions generate a dynamics of obligations, and compare it to case where permissions are weak, i.e. the mere absence of prohibitions. Second, we will consider how permissions and rights issued by high­level legal authority generate obligations on its constituents, especially in complex organizations. Finally, we will study the defeasible character of obligations stemming from permissions. Obligations generated from rights and permissions are central to German and Polish law, and these will provide the main sources of “data” for the analysis in this project.