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Legal Logic

Goal: To explicate specificity of legal logic in comparison with general, or formal, logic. To study specifiicity of legal argumentation, especially quantitative evaluation of legal argument. To evaluste some prospects of complete e-justice.

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Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
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Tiaglo, O. V. Logic of Legal Reasoning. This article deals with general problem of connection between legal reasoning, legal argumen-tation and, on the other hand, logic. Although this connection seems obvious since ancient times, its nature is still the subject of non-trivial discussions. The purpose of my study is to explore one important aspect of this connection, namely, is general, or formal, logic necessary and sufficient to determine relevant form of legal reasoning and argumenta-tion? To reach this purpose, method of comparative analysis is employed both synchronically and dia-chronically. First, in order to prove importance of the issue, a diachronic comparison of several basic approaches is carried out (G.W. von Leibniz, O.W. Holmes, Jr., etc.). Then a comparative analysis of the views of some contemporary experts is carried out, especially Ilmar Tammelo and Stephen Toul-min. It is argued, in the field of law there is a special legal validity that differs significantly from the formal-logical validity. The legal validity is determined directly and mainly by the value of the right not by the value of formal or material truth. It is not the subject of formal logic, but of a special legal logic and, more broadly, informal logic. Therefore, formal logic does not determine relevant form of legal reasoning and argumentation, since, first of all, there is the essential difference between the formal-logical validity and the legal validity. It is argued, formal logic is neither sufficient nor necessary to think like a jurist. In this regard, it is shown that the formal-logical standard of proof is not sufficient to determine the relevant form of valid legal proof. There are at least three standards of legal proof-proof without reasonable doubt, proof by clear and convincing evidence, and proof by preponderance of the evidence. Each of them differs significantly from the formal-logical standard. The conclusion of this research is this: it cannot be said that general logic does not work at all in the УДК 340:16 DOI https://doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2022.02.65 ЛОГІКА ЮРИДИЧНИХ МІРКУВАНЬ Тягло О.В., доктор філософських наук, професор, професор кафедри соціально-гуманітарних дисциплін Харківського національного університету внутрішніх справ, м. Харків http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0721-1153 РОЗДІЛ X. ФІЛОСОФІЯ ПРАВА
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
It is not to say that formal logic is useless in field of law. However, formal logic is neither sufficient nor necessary to reason and argue like a jurist. At the same time, in order to be a successful jurist, one must grasp and use the special legal logic, which belongs to the contemporary informal logic domain. The idea of material logic at all and of the nontrivial legal logic in particular looks like a manifestation of the total nowadays movement to make logic, so to speak, less transcendental, more empirical.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Key words: legal reasoning, legal argumentation, legal logic, informal logic, formal logic. Ключові слова: юридичні міркування, юридична аргументація, юридична логіка, неформальна логіка, формальна логіка.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
It is not to say that formal logic is useless in the field of law. However, formal logic does not determine the relevant form of legal thinking and argumentation completely, because there is the essential difference between formal-logical validity and legal validity. In other words, formal logic is neither sufficient nor necessary to think like a jurist. At the same time, in order to think and argue like a successful jurist, one must grasp and use special legal logic without any exceptions. Legal logic belongs to the contemporary informal logic domain. Нельзя сказать, что формальная логика бесполезна в поле права. Однако она не детерминирует релевантную форму юридического мышления и аргументации полностью, поскольку существует существенное различие между формально-логической валидностью и юридической валидностью. Другими словами, формальная логика не является ни достаточной, ни необходимой для того, чтобы мыслить как юрист. Вместе с тем , чтобы мыслить и аргументировать как успешный юрист, необходимо овладеть особенной юридической логикой и использовать ее без каких-либо исключений. Юридическая логика принадлежит домену современной неформальной логики.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Тягло А.В. О ПОНИМАНИИ ДОКАЗАТЕЛЬСТВА В АНГЛО-АМЕРИКАНСКОМ ПРАВЕ. С целью осмысления нового для права Украины понятия доказательства вне разумного сомнения исследовано общее понимание доказательства в англо-американском праве. Для этого проведен компаративный анализ родственных фрагментов ряда изданий юридического словаря Блэка (1891 – 2009). Установлена основная часть кластера терминов (и соответствующих понятий), в которых выражается (и понимается) юридическое доказательство. Показано, что этот кластер сформировался и эволюционирует по меньшей мере в трех измерениях: логическом, юридическом и риторическом. При этом наблюдается усиление значения содержимого риторического измерения за счет частичного вытеснения логического. Ключевые слова: доказательство, юридическое доказательство, логическое доказательство, стандарт доказательства, доказательство вне разумного сомнения, англо-американское право, «Юридический словарь Блэка». Тягло О.В. ПРО РОЗУМІННЯ ДОВЕДЕННЯ В АНГЛО-АМЕРИКАНСЬКОМУ ПРАВІ. З метою осмислення нового для права України поняття доведення поза розумним сумнівом досліджене загальне розуміння доведення в англо-американському праві. Для цього проведений компаративний аналіз споріднених фрагментів низки видань юридичного словника Блека (1891 – 2009). З’ясована основна частина кластера термінів (і відповідних понять), в яких висловлюється (і розуміється) юридичне доведення. Показано, що цей кластер сформувався й еволюціонує щонайменше у трьох вимірах: логічному, юридичному та риторичному. При цьому спостерігається підсилення значущості вмісту риторичного виміру за рахунок часткового витискування логічного. Ключові слова: доведення, юридичне доведення, логічне доведення, стандарт доведення, доведення поза розумним сумнівом, англо-американське право, «Юридичний словник Блека». Tiaglo, Alexander V. ON COMPREHENSION OF PROOF IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW. Concept of proof beyond reasonable doubt was introduced to the Ukrainian law in 2012 only. In order to grasp and use this innovation properly, evolution and current state of general comprehension of proof in Anglo-American law is studied. For this, a comparative analysis of similar fragments from several Black's Law Dictionary editions (1891 - 2009) is performed. Cluster of terms (and relevant concepts), by which proof in law, or judicial proof, is expressed (and comprehended), includes now «proof» and «evidence», «to prove» and «to evidence», «burden of proof», «standard of proof», «standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt», «standard of proof by preponderance of evidence», «standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence», as well «truth» and «belief» coupled with «conviction», «to convince», «to persuade», and so on. This cluster was formed and has been evolving all time in at least three dimensions: logical, juridical, and rhetorical. At that, the rhetorical dimension significance has been rising through partial extrusion of the logical one. Respectively, although concept of the judicial proof remains akin to its analogue in logics yet, but it has been moving increasingly away from it. On this way, the judicial proof concept lost – as necessary components of its content – immanent features of the logical proof, namely, truth of evidence in premises and necessary logical connection between whole body of the evidence and conclusion. Concept of standard of proof undergone significant change as well: now it divides into three main species concepts that depend on the cases nature. Even that concept, which corresponds to criminal cases and supposes the most difficult requirements, do not require truth or absolute certainty of the belief induced, agreeing only on absence of reasonable doubt, which by nature is subjective and practically never avoid some rhetorical influence. The judicial proof was transformed from activity purposed by essence at formally correct establishment of truth, which in principle does not require more than one thinking person, into organized legal communication of two or more persons, principal purpose of which is to induce desirable belief in minds of the persons to whom relevant conviction is addressed. The proof has been evolving all time in at least three variable dimensions: logical, juridical, and rhetorical. Key words: proof; judicial proof; logical proof; standard of proof; proof beyond reasonable doubt; Anglo-American law; Black's Law Dictionary.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Two main approaches to understand juristic logic are analyzed. In accordance with the first approach, called trivial, juristic logic is the application of general, or formal, logic in field of law (I. Tammelo, H. Kelsen, etc.). However, some remarks by Kant, Heidegger, or Toulmin help to derive that along with general logic special, or material, logics exist. These material logics are determined not only by frames of their fields of application but also by essential contents of these diverse fields, i.e., they are content-of-field-dependent. Juristic logic is one of the material logics: this approach to understand it is called nontrivial. In other words, a specifically juristic logic does exist as the material logic of field of law. An essential feature of the nontrivial understanding of juristic logic is that it does not limited by recognition of formal validity and material validity but takes into account special pragmatic – juristic – validity, which has priority in correct legal reasoning. The idea of material logic at all and of the nontrivial juristic logic in particular looks like a manifestation of informal logic, of the total nowadays movement to make logic more empirical. Key words: juristic logic; legal reasoning; pragmatic validity; juristic validity; formal logic; informal logic; Ilmar Tammelo
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Two main approaches to understand juristic logic are analyzed. In accordance with the first approach, called trivial, juristic logic is the application of general, or formal, logic in field of law (I. Tammelo, H. Kelsen, etc.). However, some remarks by Kant, Heidegger, or Toulmin help to derive that along with general logic a row of special, or material, logics exist. These material logics are determined not only by frames of their fields of application but also by essential contents of these diverse fields, i.e., they are content-of-field-dependent. Juristic logic is one of the material logics: this approach to understand it is called nontrivial. In other words, a specifically juristic logic does exist as the material logic of field of law. An essential feature of the nontrivial understanding of juristic logic is that it does not limited by recognition of formal validity and material validity but takes into account special pragmatic – juristic – validity, which has priority in correct legal reasoning. The idea of material logic at all and of the nontrivial juristic logic in particular looks like a manifestation of informal logic, of the total nowadays movement to make logic more empirical.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
The basic purpose of this article is to explicate understanding and verbal expression of the burden of proof in AngloAmerican law. For this, the method of comparative analysis of few analogous fragments from different editions of Black’s Law Dictionary is used. As a result, firstly, the set of concepts and corresponding terms by which the burden of proof is understood and expressed is found out. In a first approximation, omitting analogous ones, it is appropriate to restrict the subset of terms, on the one hand, by "(legal) truth", "belief", "burden of persuasion", "risk of nonpersuasion" and, on the other hand, "burden of production" or "burden of going forward with the evidence", "prima facie case", "order of proof". Secondly, understanding and expression of the burden of proof vary greatly depending on recognition of one or the other legal standard of proof. Thirdly, understanding of the burden of proof has evolved and is currently functioning in the following principal dimensions: legal, rhetorical, and logical. These ones complement dimensions of space and time that are natural for any human activity. Fourthly, it seems possible to extrapolate the conclusion about legal-rhetorical-logical multidimensionality of concept of the burden of proof to entire cluster of concepts (and terms) which grasps legal proof, including concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, any attempt to reduce definitions of elements of this cluster, in particular – of concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to pure logical definitions will be unsuccessful in general case. The conclusion is that the multidimensionality of concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt seems to be an actual source of well-known difficulty of unification of practical explanation and using of standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Key words: proof; legal proof; burden of proof; proof beyond a reasonable doubt; Anglo- American law; Black’s Law Dictionary
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Ключові слова: юридична логіка, формальна логіка, неформальна логіка, юридичні міркування, прагматична валідність, Ілмар Таммело. Ключевые слова: юридическая логика, формальная логика, неформальная логика, юридические рассуждения, прагматическая валидность, Ілмар Таммело. Key words: legal logic, formal logic, informal logic, legal reasoning, Ilmar Tammelo.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Comparative analysis of few editions of Black's law dictionary finds that understanding of true and false in Anglo-American law is structured for different bases. Initial basis here is nature of the reality to which characteristic of being either true or false is attributed. First of all, true and false-untrue might be understood as some characteristics of knowledge, that is, in purely cognitive sense-par excellence according to the correspondence theory of truth. The essential specificity of implementation of this theory in field of law, in general case, is that the supposed correspondence of knowledge to knowable reality does not pretend to absolute accuracy or necessity. By this reason, the knowledge found, while remaining in its nature hypothetical , or probable, acquires the status of legal truth only after and due to a court verdict in accordance with commonly accepted convention. Under this condition, not every legal truth is recognized as truth in the strict sense of the correspondence
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
In order to explicate understanding and verbal expression of the burden of proof in English and American law the comparative analysis of similar fragments from few editions of the Black's law dictionary is fulfilled. First, set of concepts and corresponding terms by which the burden of proof is understood and expressed is found out. Omitting analogous ones, it is appropriate to restrict the subset of terms, on the one hand, by "belief" or "(legal) truth", "burden of persuasion", "risk of nonpersuasion", and, on the other hand, "burden of production" or "burden of going forward with the evidence", "prima facie case" and "order of proof". Second, particular understanding and expression of the burden of proof vary greatly depending on recognition of one or other legal standard of proof. Third, understanding of the burden of proof has evolved and functions now in at least three dimensions: legal, rhetorical, and logical. Fourth, it seems possible to extrapolate the conclusion about legal-rhetorical-logical multidimensionality of concept of the burden of proof to entire cluster of concepts (and terms) which
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Tiaglo, Alexander. To understanding of the burden of proof in English and American law. In order to explicate understanding and verbal expression of the burden of proof in English and American law the comparative analysis of similar fragments from few editions of the Black's law dictionary is fulfilled. First, set of concepts and corresponding terms by which the burden of proof is understood and expressed is found out. Omitting analogous ones, it is appropriate to restrict the subset of terms, on the one hand, by "belief", "(legal) truth", "burden of persuasion", "risk of nonpersuasion", and, on the other hand, "burden of production" or "burden of going forward with the evidence", "prima facie case" and "order of proof". Second, particular understanding and expression of the burden of proof vary greatly depending on recognition of one or other legal standard of proof. Third, understanding of the burden of proof has evolved and functions now in at least three dimensions: legal, rhetorical, and logical. Fourth, it seems possible to extrapolate the conclusion about legal-rhetorical-logical multidimensionality of concept of the burden of proof to entire cluster of concepts (and terms) which grasps legal proof, including concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But if so, then any attempt to reduce definitions of elements of this cluster, in particular – of concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to pure logical definitions will be unsuccessful in general case. The multidimensionality of concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt seems to be a significant source of well-known difficulty to unify practical explanation and use of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Key words: proof, legal proof, burden of proof, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, English and American law, "Black’s Law Dictionary".
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Тягло А.В. О понимании доказательства в англо-американском праве. Ключевые слова: доказательство, логическое доказательство, юридическое доказательство, англо-американское право, юридический словарь Блэка. Tiaglo O. V. On understanding of proof in English and American law. Key words: proof, logical proof, judicial proof, English and American law, Black's law dictionary.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added 2 research items
This paper lies in the general framework of the argumentation that especial legal logic – as one of a set of material logics – exists side by side with general, or formal, logic. In other words, in general case legal logic is not reducible to the use of for-mal logic in legal reasoning. This position has received some support in few previous publications already. In this paper, a comparative analysis of the standards of proof that take place in general logic and in jurisprudence and, therefore, in legal logic is fulfilled. To understand the standard of proof accepted in general logic, it is natural to address, first of all, Aristotle’s intellectual heritage. Relevant ideas of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Cesare Beccaria are analyzed further. The standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" is studied as one of the accepted in jurisprudence (Alfred Thompson Denning et al.). The final conclusion is that the standards of proof in general logic and in legal logic differ significantly. The general logic standard of proof should be recognized as necessary, but not sufficient in jurisprudence. This standard is necessary, in particular, in proving the probabilities of competing conclusions, but a substantiated choice of one of them requires a special legal stand-ard additionally: in this regard, are known standards of moral certainty and proof beyond reasonable doubt, preponderance in evidence... It is pointed out, the urgency of consideration of the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" for our domestic specialists is because it appeared in the Ukrainian legislation just a few years ago – in the Criminal Procedural Code of 2012. It has been borrowed from the Anglo-American legal system. In my opinion, this important innovation demands har-monization of current legislatio. Key words: general logic standard (2) О стандартах доказательства. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324983724_O_standartah_dokazatelstva [accessed May 07 2018].
This paper lies in the general framework of the argumentation that especial legal logic – as one of a set of material logics – exists side by side with general, or formal, logic. In other words, in general case legal logic is not reducible to the use of formal logic in legal reasoning. This position has received some support in few previous publications already. In this paper, a comparative analysis of the standards of proof that take place in general logic and in jurisprudence and, therefore, in legal logic is fulfilled. To understand the standard of proof accepted in general logic, it is natural to address, first of all, Aristotle’s intellectual heritage. Relevant ideas of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Cesare Beccaria are analyzed further. The standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" is studied as one of the accepted in jurisprudence (Alfred Thompson Denning et al.). The final conclusion is that the standards of proof in general logic and in legal logic differ significantly. The general logic standard of proof should be recognized as necessary, but not sufficient in jurisprudence. This standard is necessary, in particular, in proving the probabilities of competing conclusions, but a substantiated choice of one of them requires a special legal standard additionally: in this regard, are known standards of moral certainty and proof beyond reasonable doubt, preponderance in evidence... It is pointed out, the urgency of consideration of the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt" for our domestic specialists is because it appeared in the Ukrainian legislation just a few years ago – in the Criminal Procedural Code of 2012. It has been borrowed from the Anglo-American legal system. In my opinion, this important innovation demands harmonization of current legislation. Key words: general logic standard of proof; standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"; general logic; legal logic
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added 2 research items
Key words: standards of proof, legal logic, formal logic
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
В учебнике (2-е издание, переработанное и дополненное) в свете современных требований к высшему образованию юристов подан материал из общей логики и юридической логики. Рассмотрены не только нормы и стандарты правильного мышления, но и типичные ошибки и уловки: это должно способствовать выработки у учащихся умений предотвращать дефекты собственных рассуждений и убедительно критиковать попытки обмана со стороны нечестных оппонентов. Учебник непосредственно предназначен будущим специалистам в сфере правоведения. Вместе с тем, он будет полезен и многим другим – будущим политикам и бизнесменам, менеджерам и журналистам, всем, кто уже сегодня стремится повысить эффективность своего мышления и достигать успеха в критической коммуникации.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Часть коллективной монографии "От коммуникативного действия к практикам деконструкции в современном образовании" (под общ. ред. Е. В. Батаевой (2017)). Наличные сегодня трудности в развитии и преподавании логики проанализированы в рамках подхода Гиббонса-Новотны. Обосновано утверждение, что перспективы развития науки логики и повышения ее общественного статуса связаны с имманентной науке общества Моды 2 контекстуализацией, касающейся не только производства знаний, но и их содержания, а также логического образования.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
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Показано, что специфика юридической логики существенно определяется особенными нормами построения и оценки рассуждений и коммуникации в поле права. Обычно эти нормы основываются на соединении признания ценности истины с признанием ценности человека и законности. Юридическая логика является одним из видов неформальной логики, где образцом становится не демонстративный, а вероятностный аргумент. Поэтому обостряется проблема вычисления силы вероятностных аргументов разного рода.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added 2 research items
Матеріали Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції присвячені 250-річчю праці «Про злочини та покарання» видатного італійського правника, філософа, гуманіста, реформатора кримінального права Чезаре Беккаріа. У збірнику представлені наукові повідомлення більше п'ятидесяти вчених, фахівців з кримінального права, кримінології, філософії, соціології, психології, присвячені проблемам протидії злочинності та боротьби з нею, удосконалення національного законодавства, його наближення до кращих європейських стандартів через призму уявлень італійського вченого. До збірника включений текст мого повідомлення "К вопросу о статусе истины в поле права" (с. 202-207).
Проведен компаративный анализ представлений о ценности истины в книге Беккариа "О преступлениях и наказаниях" и в современном украинском поле права. Показано, что сегодня понятие истины исчезает из законодательства, в частности из Уголовного процессуального кодекса 2012 г., что свидетельствует об изменении ее статуса как базовой ценности.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
В статье разносторонне проанализированы вопросы существования и особенностей юридической логики. Аргументировано, что юридическая логика существует, во-первых, in re – как особый строй правильных рассуждений в поле права, устоявшийся в неких временных или культурных границах; во-вторых, post rem – как часть современной науки логики, ближайшим образом «полуформальной», которая исследует этот особый строй и учит, как его воплощать, то есть сознательно строить юридически правильные рассуждения, избегать ошибок или критиковать их. Утверждение ценности человека и законности в современном цивилизованном мире порождает нормы правильности юридических рассуждений, отличные от норм традиционной формальной логики, соответствующей «математической модели». Ключевые слова: юридическая логика, юридические рассуждения, нормы правильности рассуждений, полуформальная логика.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Adaptation of critical thinking to the Ukrainian system of education is necessary because of different factors including necessity to change mentality of Ukrainian people, especially young, in accordance with basic democratic values and norms. This great task should be solved, among other things, by means of “interbreeding” of course in critical thinking typical in North America with typical in Ukrainian universities basic course in logic. As a result, we should get at least two principal “descendants”: logic with elements of critical thinking and critical thinking on base of logic. Two decades practice in leading Kharkiv universities verifies that the first course is quite suitable for university freshmen; the second one is relevant for the senior students, especially majored in humanities, social sciences, pedagogic, management and law.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Общее состояние и проблемы преподавания логики в университетах исследованы на основе подхода Гиббонса – Новотны. Эксплицировано основное содержание этого подхода и показано, что сейчас наука логики по существу отвечает "условиям Моды 1", тогда как перспективы ее развития связаны с адаптаций к "условиям Моды 2". Одним из моментов такой адаптации должна быть контекстуализация науки логики, касающаяся не только процесса производства знаний, но отчасти и их содержания и преподавания. Ключевые слова: наука логики, наука Моды 2, общество Моды 2, общая логика, материальная логика.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
Quantitative apparatus for assessing strength of an argument was improved in the article. A probative generalisation and verification of the R.Yanal's algorithm to calculate convergent argument were proposed. The generalization obtained deals with both quantity (or number) and quality (or truth-values) of the argument's reasons.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a research item
У монографії розглянуто можливості рецепції концепцій комунікативної дії Ю. Хабермаса і деконструкції Ж. Дерріда в контексті сучасної теорії освіти; представлено критичний аналіз процесів інструменталізації освітніх практик; проаналізовано особливості коммунікатівізації сучасної освіти; розглянуто умови формування критичного мислення в сучасній науці.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added 2 research items
Two different approaches to assess legal argument quantitatively on base of logic probability concept are analyzed: Leibnizian approach and objective Bayesianism. Specificities and ranges of application of these approaches are elucidated. In frame of the Leibnizian approach, some formulas, which permit under given initial data to calculate argument strength, were introduced already. However, in nontrivial cases, assigning of the initial data is a matter of human intuition partially, and this intuition seems irreducible today. This circumstance challenges certainty and accuracy of the qualitative assessment, firstly. Secondly, any complete electronic justice prospect must demand a completion of artificial intelligence by artificial intuition, which will not yield up to natural one at least. Key words: legal argument, logical probability, Leibnizian approach, objective Bayesianism, intuition, complete electronic justice. Проаналізовано два різних підходи у кількісній оцінці юридичного аргументу, що базуються на понятті логічної ймовірності: Ляйбніцев підхід і об"єктивний байєсіонізм. Прояснено особливості й області застосування цих підходів. У межах Ляйбніцева підходу певні формули, котрі дозволяють за відомими вихідними даними обрахувати силу аргументу, вже знайдені. Проте у нетривіальних випадках встановлення потрібних даних виявляється почасти справою людської інтуїції, і ця інтуїція сьогодні видається неусувною. Дана обставина, по-перше, проблематизує достовірність і точність виконуваної кількісної оцінки. По-друге, будь-який проект повного електронного правосуддя повинен вимагати доповнення штучного інтелекту штучної інтуїцією, котра, щонайменше, не поступається за силою природній. Ключові слова: юридичний аргумент, логічна ймовірність, Ляйбніцев підхід, об'єктивний байєсіонізм, інтуїція, повне електронне правосуддя. Проанализированы два различных подхода в количественной оценке юридического аргумента, базирующиеся на понятии логической вероятности: Лейбницев подход и объективный байесионизм. Прояснены особенности и области применения этих подходов. В рамках Лейбницева подхода некоторые формулы, позволяющие при известных исходных данных рассчитать силу аргумента, уже найдены. Однако в нетривиальных случаях установление нужных исходных данных отчасти является делом человеческой интуиции, и эта интуиция сегодня представляется неустранимой. Данное обстоятельство, во-первых, проблематизирует достоверность и точность выполняемой количественной оценки. Во-вторых, всякий проект полного электронного правосудия должен требовать дополнения искусственного интеллекта искусственной интуицией, которая, по меньшей мере, не уступает в силе естественной. Ключевые слова: юридический аргумент, логическая вероятность, Лейбницев подход, объективный байесионизм, интуиция, полное электронное правосудие. Once upon a time Michel de Montaigne, who had relevant education and practice in law, noted a quite interesting observation: "I have heard tell of a judge who, when he come across a sharp conflict between Bartolus and Baldus, or some matter debated with many contradictions, used to put in the margin of his book, "Question for my friend"; that is to say, that the truth was so embroiled and disputed that in a similar cause he could favor whichever of the parties he saw fit. It was only for lack of wit and competence that he could not write everywhere: "Question for my friend"…" [1, p. 439]. More then four centuries have gone since then but who will dare to insist that the situation is much better today? Even if such individuals exist, who can object categorically that a lot of investigation versions are put forward and some sentences are elaborated on verisimilar not certainly true grounds? On the contrary, competent experts will agree that till now in all fields of social space numerous situations exist when it is impossible to avoid non-demonstrative reasoning with verisimilar data  because of complexity of reality, lack of time or other resources, limitation of perception, memory, will, intellect of human beings after all. In field of law these situations are natural, firstly, on the stage of investigation of nontrivial crimes especially at the beginning, when information is incomplete, inaccurate or even contradictory: this creates ground for many different or even mutually
Бандурка А. М., Тягло А. В. К обоснованию особенной юридической логики. Статья посвящена экспликации и сравнительному анализу двух основных подходов в понимании природы юридической логики. Согласно первому пониманию – тривиальному – юридическая логика сводится к локальному приложению формальной логики в поле права. В такой связи критически обсуждены взгляды Илмара Таммело, практически неизвестные специалистам Молдовы и Украины. Второе – нетривиальное – понимание восходит к Г. В. фон Лейбницу. Согласно ему, юридическая логика представляется как особенная, существующая наряду с формальной логикой и отличающаяся от нее не только областью определения, но и содержанием. Ключевые слова: юридическая логика, формальная логика, формальная валидность, прагматическая валидность, Илмар Таммело.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added an update
Исследование критического мышления и его преподавание в высшей школе. Критическое мышление и логика. Критическое мышление, творческое мышление и основы композиции.
 
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added 3 research items
Образование в современном «быстром мире» не может быть успешным без сильного инструментального ядра. Оно должно включать, в частности, пару взаимосвязанных университетских дисциплин: «Логика с элементами критического мышления» (уровень бакалавриата) и «Критическое мышление на осно- ве логики» (уровень магистратуры). Подчеркнуто, что обучение критическому мышлению само по себе не достаточно, оно должно быть дополнено взращиванием творческого мышления и навыков рациональной коммуникации. Ключевые слова: «быстрый мир», высшее образование, логика, критическое мышление, творческое мышление, рациональная коммуникация. Under conditions of contemporary «fast world» education cannot be successful without powerful instrumental core. This core must include, among other things, a couple of interconnected university disciplines: «Logic with elements of critical thinking » (on the Bachelor Degree level) and «Critical thinking on base of logic» (on the Master Degree level). It is pointed out that training in critical thinking in itself is insufficient and therefore must be completed by growing of creative thinking and rational communication skills. Keywords: «fast world», higher education, logic, critical thinking, creative thinking, rational communication.
Speificity and ranges of application of the Leibnizian and Baesian approaches to evaluate an argument's strenght are discussed.
Prospect of complete electronic justice is analyzed in the light of ability to assess legal arguments quantitatively which is grounded on the logical probability concept. Specificity and range of application of the Leibnizian approach to the assessment are elucidated in comparison with the “objective Bayesianism”. A fundamental drawback that challenges any attempt to fulfil complete electronic justice today is pointed out: this one is generated by essential role of human intuition in assigning of the initial data necessary to assess legal arguments quantitatively. Presumably, final completion of electronic justice will demand not only objective and powerful artificial intelligence but relevant artificial intuition as well. Key words: logical probability, legal argument, intuition, complete electronic justice.
Oleksandr V. Tiaglo
added a project goal
To explicate specificity of legal logic in comparison with general, or formal, logic. To study specifiicity of legal argumentation, especially quantitative evaluation of legal argument. To evaluste some prospects of complete e-justice.