added 3 research items
Many optimists believed that the “Arab Spring” was a ripe moment for regional radiant Turkey with its pro-active stance that could trigger “demonstrative effect” and transform the conflict-ridden Middle Eastern (in) security complex into a pluralistic security community. However, those expectations on Turkey’s capabilities to transform the region have fallen short as Middle East re-entered into turmoil. In this light, the article aims to conduct an academic inquiry into the reasons that curtailed Turkey of priming the pump for a regional security community in the region. It argues that international system (structural), sub-systemic (regional), and finally that of agential factors (Turkey’s own domestic embodiment) hindered Turkey’s efforts to transform the Middle East into security community. It concludes that three main hindrances (that of systemic, sub-systemic and domestic) which altogether, but particularly the latter, render Turkey to fall short in restoring peace and stability back to the Middle East at the time of Arab uprisings.
Why do riparian states of the Eastern Mediterranean seemingly fight over fossil resources down at the sea bottom, miles and miles away, instead of developing joint projects accelerating optimum use of their renewable energy resources, that are also compatible with the climate act. Analytical tools that are used in the discussions over the concept of “security” in the International Relations (IR) literature might be instructive for being able to answer this thorny question.
İklim değişikliğinin etkilerini yakından hisseden ve yenilenebilir enerji potansiyeli yüksek bir bölge olan Doğu Akdeniz’de karar alıcıların sürdürülebilir enerji politikaları benimsemesi beklenirdir. Hâlbuki Türkiye ile Yunanistan deniz yetki alanları paylaşımı ihtilafı bulunan Kıbrıs açıklarındaki fosil yakıtların kontrolü için jeopolitik rekabet içerisindedir. Buradan hareketle ilgili çalışma öncelikle farklı enerji güvenliği yaklaşımlarını (liberal piyasalar/ticaret, jeopolitik ve çevresel) irdeleyecektir. Bu yaklaşımların ışığında, çalışma çeşitli güvenlik dinamiklerinin etkisindeki Doğu Akdeniz’deki egemen enerji jeopolitiği yaklaşımından, çevresele geçişin nasıl mümkün olabileceğinin izini sürecektir.
At a time of critical geopolitical economic changes, Russia has been pursuing different foreign policy lines on the two sides of the Eurasian landmass. On the one hand, it has been intensifying its economic ties with Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, it pursues an assertive policy against the interests of the West (e.g. in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria). In this light, the chapter aims to explain this foreign (economic) policy duality of Russia. Adopting a neoclassical realist approach and the concept of geopolitical economy, it argues that at a time of profound global changes, the Russian elites' perceptions regarding their country’s role in the Eurasian landmass have created such a duality. It concludes that Russian elites’ sense of geopolitical exposure and economic policy preferences have not only prompted this discrepancy in Russia's foreign (economic) policy but also undermined the country’s great power prospects in the twenty- first century.
The chapter aims to examine the reasons why those energy discoveries have failed to help bring peace to Cyprus. Drawing on Regional Security Complex Theory and Securitization Theory , it argues that the Eastern Mediterranean's peculiar regional characteristics, particularly those of Turkey, have created the political conditions for the securitization of these energy discoveries and their proposed export routes.
From an offensive realist theoretical approach, this paper assumes that great powers are always looking for opportunities to attain more power in order to feel more secure. This outlook has led me to assert that the main objective of the US grand strategy in the twenty-first century is primacy or global hegemony. I have considered the US grand strategy as a combination of wartime and peacetime strategies and argued that the Caspian region and its hinterland, where I call the Eurasian Heartland, to use the term of Sir Halford Mackinder, has several geo-strategic dimensions beyond its wide-rich non-OPEC untapped hydro-carbon reserves, particularly in Kazakhstan. For my purposes, I have relied on both wartime strategy (US-led Iraq war) and peacetime strategy of supporting costly Baku-Tbilis-Ceyhan (BTC) to integrate regional untapped oil reserves, in particular Kazakh, into the US-controlled energy market to a great extent. This pipeline's contribution to the US grand strategy is assessed in relation to potential Eurasian challengers, Russia and China. The article concludes with an evaluation of the prospects of the US grand strategy in the twenty-first century.
Notwithstanding the fomenting global recession of the date, the world still experiences a shortage of energy supply. The energy prices, as result of this supply failure, chronically stands at their pre–crisis level. It is even more alarming in case of a quick global economy recovery, which, whenever occurs, will further expand already excessive oil/gas demands. All these developments are harbinger of an upcoming energy crisis. Under such bleak scenario, even new energy field discoveries will likely no longer function as a cushion. To ensure, the highest possible, efficient development of the remaining untapped energy reservoirs, such as those abundant in Iran, and their uninterrupted export to the world energy markets may not remove the entirety of the problem. But, still, it could still help smoother the transition from the present oil–based economy to a whole new one based on nuclear energy, or else. However, Iran is inflicted upon a cluster of severe (energy) sanction for its alleged nuclear–power program. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that the nuclear crisis will have three main implications on net energy importer Turkey pursuing civilian nuclear program: diversifying energy suppliers, economic costs, and establishment of international nuclear fuel bank oligopoly.
The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is likely to bolster Turkish two energy targets: meeting its growing energy interests and becoming an energy hub. Moreover, considering its scalability, the SGC will contribute the EU's ambition to diversify away from Russia and enable Azerbaijan to enter into the Western Balkan Energy Market. In order for those prospects to materialize, several risks associated with the SGC should be addressed: the volume of gas and security concerns.
At a time of critical geopolitical economic changes (i.e. power shift and new energy (dis)order), Russia has been pursuing different foreign policy lines in two sides of the Eurasian landmass: Lockean in its east and Hobbesian in its west. On the one hand, Russia has been intensifying its economic (i.e.energy) ties with Asia-Pacific, particularly with the rising great power China; on the other hand, it has been pursuing aggressive policy against Western powers' interests in its west (i.e. Georgia, Ukraine, Syria). How do we explain this discrepancy of Russian foreign policy? How do those geopolitical economic changes interact with aspiring great power energy giant Russia's foreign policy orientations? Is there any role for leader level perceptions on the country past and future? In order to answer those daunting, but complementary questions requiring different levels of analyses, this paper draws on a neoclassical realist perspective bridging the divide between domestic-international (spatial), ideational-material (cognitive), and temporal (part-present-future). In this light, it argues that at a time of profound global changes, Russian elites' geopolitical economic perceptions of their country's role in the Eurasian landmass have been causing this duality in its foreign policy. The paper concludes that Rus-sian elites' sense of geopolitical exposure and their economic mismanagement have not only prompting discrepancy in Russia's foreign policy, but also undermining its great power status in the 21st century.