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Elaborated Political Settlements Framework

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Abel Gaiya
added a research item
Industrial policy in countries characterized by high levels of unproductive and disorganized corruption is, unsurprisingly, also ridden with high levels of corruption. With dispersed distributions of power, it is more difficult to create and maintain pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness to drive successful industrial policy. This is the case in Nigeria. There has, however, been no research into the involvement of its premier anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), in industrial policy enforcement. The article identifies this phenomenon through news reports and proposes avenues for empirical research and policy experimentation. The EFCC has, over years, been involved with development loan recoveries, local content policy enforcement and infrastructure contract enforcement. These have often been at the invitation of the relevant implementing agencies which often display inundation with the enforcement challenge. The breadth, depth and success of the EFCC's involvement are, however, unknown. Nonetheless, its substantial investigative and prosecutorial capabilities acquired from anti-corruption activities in a highly corrupt country have made it a key agency for others to call when help with enforcement is needed. There are some indications of propositions to institutionalize or regularize the EFCC's involvement in local content policy and infrastructure contract enforcement, but no serious attention has been paid to these in the literature or news circles.
Abel Gaiya
added 2 research items
Muslim-populated countries (MPCs) – where there is a very large and vocal, but not majority Muslim population – not only face a premium for their non-Muslims to deepen their understanding of Islamic institutions. They also face an Islamic policy premium for development, fiscal and social policies which diversify the distribution of power, entrench society’s power within the state, and enable greater social democratic solidarity. For Nigeria this pressure arises from Islam’s public-private synthesis, the strength of Northern Nigeria’s Islamic political legacy, potential discomfort of some Muslims with co-rule with non-Muslim Nigerians, and the presence of an implicit adalah pact on the eve of decolonization. With these pressures, development, political and economic crises are more likely to incite khawarijian forces opposing the state and regressive neofundamentalist movements seeking to reassert Islamic criminal law and hudood punishments without first establishing egalitarian economic conditions. Hence the policy premium is necessary for stabilizing MPCs.
Abel Gaiya
added a research item
The political settlements framework has emerged as a powerful tool in understanding the diversity of industrial policy outcomes across countries and within countries and sectors. In sub-Saharan Africa, many countries are characterized by more dispersed distributions of power, weak capitalist and middle classes, and weak technological capabilities of domestic firms. The general weakness of state capacity and growth-enhancing ruling coalitions has necessitated a rethinking of the state towards a conception of “extended statehood”. The corollary of this movement within the industrial policy space, and in light of political settlements insights, is a need to experiment with institutional flexibility and mandate extension of pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness, a need to study subnational variation in elaborated political settlements, and the role of international actors and forces in supporting or inciting growth-enhancing coalitions. After considering the precolonial origins of sub-Saharan political settlements, these experimental avenues within extended statehood are applied to the case of Nigeria.
Abel Gaiya
added a research item
Among other factors, successful industrial policy requires pockets of bureaucratic efficiency to be present. However, there are cases whereby pockets of efficiency are imperfect under competitive clientelist political settlements. As such, adequate resources and organizational capabilities of capitalists could compensate for the deficits in industrial policy tools while being supported by other, "lighter", policy tools. The case of Dangote Group in the Nigerian cement and downstream oil industries is presented to demonstrate this. While the Nigerian state was unable to implement heavier industrial policy tools, it could provide tariffs and fiscal incentives (tax exemptions and holidays). Yet, for most of the Fourth Republic period, only in the cement industry was there such a firm to take advantage of these industrial supports.