Climate change, cultural homogenization and the nation-state

Il punto di partenza di questo libro è che il cambiamento climatico in atto è epocale, e se non venisse fermato i rischi sarebbero incommensurabili. I negoziati internazionali sul clima, però, si concludono spesso con un fallimento, o al limite con il raggiungimento di traguardi parziali, e a tante parole pronunciate sul tema corrispondono raramente azioni concrete. Dopo aver delineato i vari aspetti della crisi planetaria in atto usando dati scientifici recenti, Daniele Conversi esplora le difficoltà inerenti all'adozione delle politiche necessarie ad uscirne, mettendo in evidenza come l'orizzonte entro cui dovranno essere prese le più importanti decisioni sul nostro futuro sia ancora limitato dalla morsa degli Stati-nazione e, quindi, del nazionalismo. Il volume si sviluppa lungo due linee parallele, ognuna articolata a sua volte in due capitoli. La prima parte analizza il problema da diverse angolazioni, inclusa quella delle scienze sociali, illustrando alcune delle conseguenze epistemologiche e metodologiche sorte dal convergere di varie discipline intorno ai recenti sviluppi scientifici. La seconda prende una direzione nuova, affrontando il problema della divisione geopolitica in Stati-nazione e dei loro nazionalismi incrociati che hanno impedito finora azioni concertate per fermare la crisi, influenzando tutti gli accordi internazionali sul clima-inclusi quelli che hanno avuto un successo relativo. Il quarto capitolo, in particolare, si interroga su come gestire questa pervasività del nazionalismo e su come cooptarlo verso una causa per cui non era stato inizialmente concepito, cioè la lotta al cambiamento climatico. "Mentre la ricerca scientifica continua a confermare le conseguenza sempre più rovinose dell'inazione", scrive l'autore, "la necessità di costruire reti e alleanze globali sotto la bandiera del «cosmopolitismo di sopravvivenza» non può escludere a priori tutte le forme di nazionalismo. L'emergenza climatica e le relative crisi sono così ampie e onnicomprensive che nulla dovrebbe essere escluso a priori nello sforzo comune di cercare una via d'uscita dalla possibile catastrofe".

When Ernest Gellner began writing on nationalism, anthropogenic climate change had not yet been fully identified as a major global crisis and a threat to human survival. But by 1983, when his most famous and highly cited book 'Nations and Nationalism' appeared in print, the prospect of climate change was already being considered across a variety of scientific disciplines. This chapter begins with an observation: while Gellner emphasized industrialization and industrialism as the matrix of nationalism, he also fully identified the former with the beginning of the modern age—the industrial society that slowly replaced agricultural society as the inaugurator and hallmark of modernity. In Gellner’s theory industrialization and industrialism led to the expansion of nationalism. Yet, industrialization eventually brought about something more drastically life-changing than industrialism itself: an increasing reliance on fossil fuel consumption for economic growth, inaugurating what Andreas Malm defines as ‘fossil capitalism’. While for Gellner the rise of industrial society propelled the entrance into modernity, it simultaneously paved the way for a precipitous exit from it—even though we are only just beginning to be aware of the trend today after decades of interdisciplinary scientific research. The notion of the Anthropocene signals this radical historical shift, a highly traumatic transition that may be incomprehensible within the classical modernist Weltanschauung. This chapter seeks to answer two core existential questions. First, if the effects of the passage from agricultural to industrial society were so all- pervasive, which consequences can be envisaged in a forced exit from modernity due to its own short-circuit? Second, if industrial expansion has led to both nationalism and climate change, and their pairing has become particularly pernicious, how could a Gellnerian perspective enlighten us as we are being pushed arbitrarily towards a new time- frame, which might well turn out to be the shortest historical age ever. We have now entered an era of extreme uncertainty in which revolutionary, rather than radical, solutions are required. This chapter speculates on how Gellner might have responded to such an existential question, as we begin envisaging the utmost fringes of a self- destructive modernity devoid of all eschatological meanings. I will focus on two aspects of Gellner’s thought: the role of industrialism (and industrialization) and the critique of postmodernism. Of the two, the first is the most consequential in terms of creating a possible new theoretical approach for the upcoming times. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CITE AS : Conversi, D., 2022. 'Gellner in the Anthropocene: Modernity, Nationalism and Climate Change'. In P. Skalník (eds) Ernest Gellner’s Legacy and Social Theory Today. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 155-184.

Ci troviamo davanti a una serie di mutazioni senza precedenti nella storia umana. Finora i cambiamenti storici e geologici si era-no avvicendati con una lentezza che copriva un intervallo di millenni o al massimo secoli. Spesso, c'è stato il tempo di adattarsi. Il passaggio dalla società agricola a quella industriale, dalle certezze-incertezze divinamente preordinate dell'età premoder-na all'orgogliosa arroganza dell'egemonia modernista, è spes-so concepito come uno spartiacque. La Rivoluzione industriale può essere ancora considerata come il più grande cambiamento sociale a partire dalla Rivoluzione agricola. Ma l'impatto delle trasformazioni in corso pone dei limiti talmente alti all'azione umana che passaggi ben più drastici in tempi molto più ristretti si profilano all'orizzonte. Questo è quanto ho cercato di spiegare nei Capitoli 1 e 2. Nei Capitoli 3 e 4 ho considerato i principali ostacoli alle politiche di contenimento dei consumi, non soltanto energetici, necessarie per gestire il cambiamento. Ho identificato un ostacolo importan-te nella persistente pervasività del nazionalismo e della competi-zione inter-statale, che ha reso irrealizzabili le riforme più urgenti messe sul tavolo dei vari accordi falliti (COP, Conference of the Parties), sia prima che dopo l'Accordo di Parigi (2015). Il libro si è sviluppato lungo due linee parallele ognuna arti-colata, a sua volta, nelle due parti di cui si compone: nella pri-ma parte ho illustrato alcune delle conseguenze epistemologiche e metodologiche sorte dal convergere di varie discipline intorno a recenti sviluppi scientifici che coinvolgono tutte le società. Tali scoperte si riferiscono ad eventi planetari in corso che investo-no, e investiranno sempre di più, ogni aspetto della nostra vita.

Economic nationalism has often thrived in moments of broader economic liberalization, more recently under the auspices of neoliberal globalization. A century before Brexit and Trumpism, the Long Depression --following the previous expansion of industrialisation-- already reverberated in policies centred on economic nationalism, as Karl Polanyi (1944) masterfully analysed, However, the stakes are now monumentally higher, as economic nationalism does not seem to be able to address a series of upcoming vital threats spanning the globe, vastly beyond human societies. We have now entered the Anthropocene, defined by geologists, stratigraphers, chemists, nuclear physicists, and other scientists as a new geological epoch distinct from the Holocene and characterized by the already irreversible impact of human behavior and action on the Earth’s surface. Given the ineffectiveness or inability of the market to self-restrain and regulate itself, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is now pushing the world toward environmental annihilation: the Sixth IPCC report (IPCC 2021), a distillation of thousands of research articles and papers from the latest findings in all scientific fields, has sounded a louder alarm bell than previous reports. This chapter asks whether economic nationalism is compatible with the dramatic transformations and changes urgently required at the supranational coordination level in order to address a series of global threats and crises spearheaded by climate change and biodiversity loss. The chapter situates economic nationalism within the newly proposed geological epoch of the Anthropocene, which stands out as the ultimate emanation of the modern age, but also its traumatic overcoming (Latour 2018).

What can theories of nationalism and the nation-state tell us about climate change? Much of the available literature, including works by prominent thinkers Ulrich Beck and Bruno Latour, identify it as a collective global challenge rather than a local and national one. But is it really so? This article develops an original theoretical framework integrating the theory of “reflexive modernity”, theories of nationalism, and case studies of green nation-states. The goal is to change the observation point and search for original solutions to the climate crisis. Building on this theoretical framework, this study puts forward the following claims: (1) climate change is undeniably a global phenomenon, but its causes are national. It can be traced back to a small number of top polluting nation-states (the US, China, Russia, India, Japan and EU28) whose historical share of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, the main cause for global warming, surpasses 74%; (2) Most of these nation-states are entrenched in Resource Nationalism (RN), a form of nationalism that sees the environment as a resource to exploit; (3) there exist forms of sustainable nationalism, which this study conceptualizes as Reflexive Green Nationalism (RGN); (4) the solution to climate change is local rather than global. It depends on top polluters' capacity to re-modernize and develop RGN; and (5) according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, if emissions are not reduced by 43% by 2030, the world is likely to cross the tipping point into a global climate catastrophe. Therefore, updating these nation-states and their ideology to more sustainable forms is humanity's best shot at halting the climate crisis.

This chapter shows how the idea of citizenship has been vastly transformed since it was first conceived of in classical antiquity. The French Revolution provided the watershed event between premodern and modern notions of citizenship. The concept used today derives largely from the postrevolutionary attempt to implement the principle set down in the “universal” declaration of rights. Once Westphalian sovereignty became nationalized, the state was transformed into a nation-state. Citizenship was simultaneously redesigned to fit the nation-state, a goal largely achieved through the ideology of nationalism. The French revolutionary idea of citizenship subsequently expanded across the world, very often associated with essentialist, uniform, exclusivist, gender-centric tropes, from which the majority of the population was de facto excluded: youth, women, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples were often debarred from enjoying full citizenship rights. As the notion of citizenship has changed – and continues to evolve – one can venture into possible future developments. Emerging forms of environmental, ecological, agricultural, global, and activist citizenship contrast with traditional state-bound citizenship – providing insights for our understanding of nationalism. In particular, existing notions of citizenship are coming heavily under attack as unprecedented inequalities related to disruptive lifestyles and environmental cataclysm loom ahead. The interlinked crises of biodiversity loss, pandemics, human waste, overpopulation, and, most of all, climate change, jointly pose the most far-reaching challenge ever experienced by humankind as a whole and, consequently, to both inclusive citizenship and nationhood. Climate change accompanies the end of existential certainties. While environmental insecurity radically threatens inclusive forms of nationhood, global citizenship emerges in new ways, including ecological and "Gaia citizenship" (Tully), while critical scholars and indigenous thinkers begin conceiving new citizenship models and philosophies. Yet even if supported by robust legal tools, ecological citizenship may not be comprehensive and radical enough to tackle the unprecedented challenges ahead, which may also need substantial lifestyle changes, stern political action, and a new vision of the future. Daniele Conversi, ‘Citizenship and nationhood: From Antiquity to Gaia citizenship’, in Aviel Roshwald, Matthew D' Auria and Cathie Carmichael (eds) Cambridge History of Nationhood and Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Vol. II, 2023, pp. 485-502

This article poses, and attempts to answer, two correlated questions: (1) Is nationalism, the dominant ideology in our world of nation-states, compatible with the struggle to halt or minimize climate change and related environmental catastrophes? and (2) Which form(s) of government, whether or not informed by nationalist ideology, could better address the most serious threat to human life that currently appears on the horizon? This article puts forward the claim that while the former question has only recently begun to be explored in a few essays and articles devoted to analyzing the linkages between nationalism and climate change, the latter remains unexplored. Attempting to fill this gap, we investigate case studies of exemplary nation-states that periodically scored the highest in the Environmental Performance Index (EPI) and the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI): Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark), Switzerland, and Germany. Their cities received environmental awards (i.e., the European Green Capital Award) and registered the highest levels in terms of citizen satisfaction. The goal is to identify factors and (pre)conditions that make forms of "green nationalism" possible.

'Mantenir l’antropos al panorama: nacionalisme, canvi climàtic i antropocè', Revista d' Etnologia de Catalunya, 45, pp. 45-64. ISSN: 1132-6581

This article argues that we need to look at living examples provided by non-state communities in various regions of the world that are, perhaps unwittingly, contributing to the maintenance of the Earth’s optimal thermal balance. These fully sustainable communities have been living outside the mainstream for centuries, even millennia, providing examples in the global struggle against the degradation of social–ecological systems. They have all, to varying degrees, embraced simple forms of living that make them ‘exemplary ethical communities’ (EECs)—human communities with a track record of sustainability related to forms of traditional knowledge and the capacity to survive outside the capitalist market and nation-state system. The article proceeds in three steps: First, it condenses a large body of research on the limits of the existing nation-state system and its accompanying ideology, nationalism, identifying this institutional–ideological complex as the major obstacle to tackling climate change. Second, alternative social formations that could offer viable micro-level and micro-scale alternatives are suggested. These are unlikely to identify with existing nation-states as they often form distinct types of social communities. Taking examples from hunter-gatherer societies and simple-living religious groups, it is shown how the protection and maintenance of these EECs could become the keystone in the struggle for survival of humankind and other forms of life. Finally, further investigation is called for, into how researchers can come forward with more examples of actually existing communities that might provide pathways to sustainability and resistance to the looming global environmental catastrophe.

Cambio climático, nacionalismo y cosmopolitismo de superviviencia

Over the last 10 years, political science has produced a vast amount of research on the impact of climate change and related existential disasters on existing political institutions. Hundreds of articles and books have been written on the environmental state, the green state, environmental governance, ... Over the last 10 years, political science has produced a vast amount of research on the impact of climate change and related existential disasters on existing political institutions. Hundreds of articles and books have been written on the environmental state, the green state, environmental governance, sustainable institutions and so on. However, no research in this field can prosper without a strong input from other disciplinary areas, particularly the natural sciences. Climate change is a complex and challenging set of interlinked events, phenomena and resulting problems and so it defies the usual disciplinary boundaries. The only way to progress and tackle these is by harnessing the entire apparatus of human knowledge and going beyond the frontiers of what we already know, while envisioning new scenarios and institutional forms. This Research Topic is dedicated to addressing whether trans-disciplinarity and Good Governance is possible in cataclysmic times. It centers on the redefinition and re-articulation of political science, converging around a series of interlinked existential crises that cannot be tackled solely by political scientists. These changes signal the entrance into the Anthropocene, which an increasing number of natural and social scientists are identifying as a new epoch geologically and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene. A vast number of interdisciplinary endeavors have arisen in this quest and history and other social science disciplines are already doing interdisciplinary work. The aim is to bring political science in line with other disciplines across the humanities and social sciences around a topic that can only be addressed from a robust and comprehensive cross-disciplinary perspective. The geographical spectrum is global and includes both so-called ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries. We aim to raise a set of related questions: 1. How can we identify new tools and perspectives from which to address the multiple and mutually reinforcing problems accumulating around climate change? 2. What is the role of the nation-state in the necessary transitions? Is it too controlled by vested interests for these transitions to be effective and up to the task? 3. Can the nation-state survive these existential challenges? If it can, how and in what forms can it survive? 4. Is the nation-state’s further shrinking desirable or is it another death knell for coordinated action to stop climate change? 5. What are the likely consequences of the nation-state’s incapacity to manage the approaching catastrophes? 6. What alternative institutions need to be created or empowered if the nation-state fails to tackle such complex problems? Is this a two-way process – how institutions need to reshape in the face of climate change? and how they can help to solve the problem? 7. Will politics by itself be able to provide an answer, if not a solution? If not, how can we think outside the political box? 8. Should we begin by changing our individual lifestyles while we wait for the state to provide the means and the legal framework needed for change? 9. What will be the impact of the crisis on democracy and human rights? 10. Could alternative communities, like eco-villages, transition towns, subsistence groups, sustainable communities, isolated tribes etc., acquire a juridical persona and become constitutionally enshrined as central institutional actors in the ecologic and energetic transitions? 11. Should the promotion and defense of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), recently recognized as a central component of ecological transition and sustainability, be implemented at the political level as well? 12. How can notions of biodiversity and bio-cultural diversity be better conceptualized in relationship with Anthropocene governance? These are only some of the possible questions raised in this Research Topic. They all point to the need to advance knowledge beyond the traditional frontiers of political science. Although we do not aim to respond to all these questions, each contribution will aspire to address at least one of them. https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/22178/beyond-the-frontiers-of-political-science-is-good-governance-possible-in-cataclysmic-times

Revista d'Etnologia de Catalunya, Special issue on ‘Identities and national demands in a global world’ (ed. by Montserrat Clua), 2021 — in press

With the support of Earth Sciences research, this chapter argues that the spread of US-inspired mass consumerism represented the moment that pushed the Earth into a new stage of disequilibrium distinct from the Holocene epoch. After locating the 1960s to 1980s as the quantitative threshold for the onset of the Anthropocene, the chapter explores a hidden dimension in the fight for climate and related crises, namely nationalism in a geopolitically fragmented world of nation-states. To square the circle, the latter is dominated by interest groups tied to the mass consumption industries, led by fossil fuels corporations. Geoethics, therefore, needs to come to terms with the dominant form of geopolitical division of the world, supported mainly by the ideology of nationalism. The chapter questions why the social sciences and humanities have delayed tackling the origins of climate change and related cataclysmic events, including pandemics. It identifies a couple of exemplary social critics in philosophy and literature, Herbert Marcuse and Pier Paolo Pasolini, considering how quickly they were forgotten precisely when their analytical insights were most dramatically needed. It concludes with a call to identify alternative forms of community-making and communities not necessarily grounded on nationality, ethnicity and putative descent

This article argues that we need to look at living examples provided by non-state communities in various regions of the world that are, perhaps unwittingly, contributing to the maintenance of the Earth's optimal thermal balance. These fully sustainable communities have been living outside the mainstream for centuries, even millennia, providing examples in the global struggle against the degradation of social–ecological systems. They have all, to varying degrees, embraced simple forms of living that make them ‘exemplary ethical communities’ (EECs) – human communities with a track record of sustainability related to forms of traditional knowledge and the capacity to survive outside the capitalist market and nation-state system. The article proceeds in three steps: First, it condenses a large body of research on the limits of the existing nation-state system and its accompanying ideology, nationalism, identifying this institutional–ideological complex as the major obstacle to tackling climate change. Second, alternative social formations that could offer viable micro-level and micro-scale alternatives are suggested. These are unlikely to identify with existing nation-states as they often form distinct types of social communities. Taking examples from hunter-gatherer societies and simple-living religious groups, it is shown how the protection and maintenance of these EECs could become the keystone in the struggle for survival of humankind and other forms of life. Finally, further investigation is called for, into how researchers can come forward with more examples of actually existing communities that might provide pathways to sustainability and resistance to the looming global environmental catastrophe.

Climate change is arguably the single most important political issue in the world today. As yet, however, there has been little research on the relationship between climate change and nationalism. In this contribution we investigate the possible existence of a ‘green nationalism’ among progressive and social democratic sub-state nationalist parties in minority nations. We identify an uncharted rhetorical and ideological continuity between how climate issues are perceived and championed among minority nations across time. This is a clear instance of ‘frame bridging’, where seemingly disparate policy elements are combined and reinforce one another. We show how sub-state political actors actively seek to use this link with climate-related environmental issues to bridge policy issues. We conclude by cautioning that it is unclear whether this sub-state ‘green nationalism’ might survive an ascent to statehood, in which state-building and other forms of realpolitik might trump and eclipse environmental concerns.

This article adopts and endorses the new historical chronology of the Anthropocene, signalling that we have now entered a new geological epoch – not merely a historical era – as a world-transforming process. The social sciences, including anthropology, still need to come to terms with this set of highly complex and vital challenges. I begin by noting that anthropology was initially situated in a prime position to tackle the issue of climate change and accompanying crises, but its lack of connection with other disciplines, including the ‘hard’ sciences, has delayed the process. I then argue that nationalism, embodied in the persistence of a gridlock of nations states grounded in nationalist ideology, provides a serious obstacle on the road to ecological recovery. As I argue, nationalism is now the second major obstacle to climate change mitigation after corporate lobbying. Astoundingly, the relationship between nationalism and the defining crisis of our time, climate change, has only recently begun to be explored in nationalism studies. This article explores the missing links between climate change and nationalism, while indicating possible paths through which anthropological research can contribute to the unprecedented interdisciplinary challenge, which the pioneering anthropologist Margaret Mead identified as a necessary paradigmatic shift. I then propose a possible distinction between two forms of nationalism that I identify as ‘resource nationalism’ and ‘green nationalism’. I insist that, despite its well-known limitations, the notion of Anthropocene remains useful across disciplinary lines. Moreover, because it encompasses humankind as a whole, it also testifies to the limits of nationalism and the nation-state system. These limitations can be overcome through acts of border-crossing between disciplinary areas and national spaces. The notion of Anthropocene pushes anthropology towards new horizons of interconnectedness in which visions of what I identify as survival cosmopolitanism can frame a new understanding of the way the nation-state’s territorial trap can be overcome. I go on to suggest that anthropology as a discipline is well equipped to map, theorise and narrate the practical on-the-ground consequences of climate change, as well as identify paths to overcome it. By the same token, I conclude, it is equally well equipped to study the correlation, links and associations between climate change and nationalism.

‘Hacia un futuro incierto. Cambio climático, nacionalismo y cosmopolitismo de superviviencia’, in Francis Javier Moreno-Fuentes y Eloísa del Pino (eds). Las Transformaciones Territoriales y Sociales del Estado en la Edad Digital. Madrid: CIS/CEPC (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales), 2020, pp. 99-122.

The coronavirus pandemic has prompted many countries to adopt drastic and draconian measures. This article attempts to answer a question: is it at all desirable to return to the status quo ante once most economic activities fully resume? I propose here to reconnect the ‘debatable’ with the ‘debated’, that is, what was discussed in some sectors until the day before the pandemic erupted: The climate marches of September 2019 mobilized millions of people throughout the world and already contained national and international renaissance programs aimed at abandoning fossil fuels for a realistically sustainable development. Considering that the pandemic was caused by environmental factors, in addition to the mobility of elites, this raises the urgency of accelerating the energy, economic and cultural transition necessary to slow down ongoing climate change, the consequences of which can be immensely more devastating than any pandemic.

The chapter explores the intense changes at every level of politics and society since the inception of nationalism. It discusses the advent of modernity, arising from the combination of industrialization, science and the French Revolution, which merges the economic, cultural, and political spheres. The chapter explores the uncertain age of neoliberal globalization when culture, politics, and economics merge and combine in an ill‐defined mix. Accurate dating is important in the study of history. Dating the Anthropocene implies prioritizing causality and broad understanding over the study of the effects and consequences; it is hence about the location of agency and sociopolitical responsibility. The chapter discusses the rapidly approaching and fast moving age of the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch shaped by human agency and intervention on an unprecedentedly massive and disruptive scale. The Anthropocene spells the actually possible death of nations, in all their human, cultural and historical components. ------ The key question considered in this chapter is not rhetorically intended: What is the future of nationalism? Rather than venturing into hard to prove conjectures, the chapter explores the intense changes at every level of politics and society since the inception of nationalism. It is organized into three chronological sequences: 1. the advent of modernity, arising from the combination of industrialisation, science and the French Revolution, therefore merging the economic, cultural and political spheres; 2. the uncertain age of neoliberal globalisation when, again, culture, politics and economics merge and combine in an ill-defined mix; and, finally, 3: the rapidly approaching and fast moving-in age of the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch shaped by human agency and intervention on an unprecedentedly massive and disruptive scale. At each stage the role and repositioning of nationalism is assessed. Overall, the chapter looks at the changes and persistence of nationalism and what it means for the future of politics – and for humankind.

The left/right divide is a constitutive aspect of modern politics, shaped by the French Revolution, the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant political force and the conflict-ridden advent of democratic politics. Since the Revolution, the left has remained symmetrically opposed to the right in the shaping of parliaments and other representative institutions. While those positioned on the left originally identified themselves as patriots, the cult of la Patrie (the Fatherland) was slowly appropriated by the right. Around 130 years after the Revolution, this appropriation culminated in the rise of the authoritarian and fascist regimes between World War I and World War II. Since then, the association has remained almost unshakable. Despite some interludes, like the rise of anti-colonialism, post-colonialism and stateless nationalism, nationalism and patriotism have remained a prerogative of the right, although it should not necessarily be so. This chapter explores the gradual evolution of the left/right dichotomy and its shifting relationship with nationalism, speculating on how new constellations of power at the edges of modernity are drastically altering notions of left and right.

Corporate lobbies, business interests and neoliberal ideology are usually identified as the main culprits for the governmental incapacity to adopt urgent measures and legislation to stem the global threat of climate change. However another, more powerful , ideology should be considered as playing an increasingly crucial part in this mesmerising lack of action: nationalism. Nationalism has long been recognised as the dominant ideology of the modern age. Climate change has remained virtually untouched in nationalism studies. As a boundless and uncontainable phenomenon, it ignores class, geographic and ethnonational boundaries. As such, it can hardly be comprehended within the limits of a nationalist world vision. Bringing together recent climate change research and the subdiscipline of nationalism studies, this paper reassesses this intuition, by focusing on the situational and adaptive plasticity of nationalism, characterised by its notorious Janus-faced adaptability. I first identify and address a methodological stumbling block which precludes scholars in some areas of the humanities and social sciences – specifically nationalism studies – from conceptualising, and grappling with, this unfolding reality. Second, I advance a typology which can work as a conceptual grid for studying similar problems that emerge at the intersection of environmental politics, climate change and nationalism studies. I suggest two ways in which the nation and national narratives have been and are being mobilised, to make sense of, contrast, reject and incorporate new life-changing trends. I identify these, respectively, under the umbrella terms of 'resource nationalism' and 'green nationalism'. I conclude by emphasising the continuing relevance of nationalism in plans for ongoing global energy transitions, thus stressing the importance of connecting the field of nationalism studies to climate change.

In modo simile al cambiamento climatico, la pandemia ci è apparsa in un primo momento come una grande livellatrice. Sembrava colpire tutti senza discriminazioni. Ma sia il cambiamento climatico, sia la pandemia COVID-19 hanno anche dimostrato come una stessa tragedia colpisca in realtà di più i più vulnerabili. Un rapporto di Oxfam pubblicato poco prima dell’inizio del COVID-19 denunciava come un numero irrisorio di miliardari (2.153) abbia accumulato più ricchezza del 60 per cento della popolazione del pianeta (4,6 miliardi) e come il numero di miliardari sia raddoppiato nell'ultimo decennio. Una disparità che riguarda anche il genere: i 22 uomini più ricchi del mondo (i primi 12 tutti statunitensi, tranne uno) hanno più ricchezza di tutte le donne d’Africa messe insieme. In Italia, tre super-miliardari possiedono più capitale di 6 milioni di italiani, il 10 per cento della popolazione. La situazione in questo periodo è assai peggiorata negli Stati Uniti, dove, tra il 18 marzo e il 10 aprile, mentre il tasso di disoccupazione saliva al 15 per cento (cifra rapidamente aumentata in seguito), la ricchezza combinata della élite iper-miliardaria americana aumentava di circa il 10%, con ben 282 miliardi di dollari in più. Tutte le attività produttive a loro connesse contribuiscono al cambiamento climatico alimentando i consumi di massa e una ossessione per l’acquisto di beni di consumo. Con un aumento del fatturato di circa 25 miliardi di dollari dal 1° gennaio al 15 aprile 2020, l’impennata di ricchezza di Jeff Bezos non ha precedenti nella storia finanziaria moderna. La massiccia chiusura e il collasso dei piccoli negozi e commerci non è quindi unicamente conseguenza della pandemia. Come arginare tale crescente divario prima che raggiunga proporzioni ancora più preoccupanti? Quali politiche di lotta alla disuguaglianza potrebbero essere adottate? Le proposte di Oxfam non sono forse rivoluzionarie: si suggerisce che l’1% più ricco paghi lo 0,5% di tasse in più sulla propria ricchezza nei prossimi 10 anni. Ciò consentirebbe di «creare» 117 milioni di nuovi posti di lavoro.

L''inici de l'focus víric del COVID-19 va ser la província central xinesa de Hubei, altament interconnectada, globalitzada, amb una intensa infraestructura de comunicació que inclou l'ús extensiu de 5G, gratacels, molts automòbils i un nivell de contaminació atmosfèrica entre els més alts del món.. La capital Wuhan s'ha hiperurbanizado en els últims temps i els seus habitants són persones procedents del món rural que s'han 'globalitzat' intempestivament provocant conurbacions d'alta densitat demogràfica (Cheng and Masser 2003). Les esmentades condicions d'urbanització globalitzada i de congestió demogràfica com brou de cultiu ideal per l'explosió d'un brot epidèmic devastador i brutal com ha passat amb el coronavirus. Segons David Quammen (2012), l'spillover (efecte vessament per desbordament) és un procés durant el qual un patogen d'una espècie es mou a una altra espècie, mutació que pot provocar un brot letal (vegeu també Quammen 2015; 2019). D'on va sorgir el coronavirus? Un equip d'investigadors de diversos països va analitzar l'evolució del genoma del virus i va excloure categòricament que pugui haver-se derivat d'una elaboració en un laboratori a vitro, ia més s'ha pogut comprovar el seu origen animal (Andersen, Rambaut, Lipkin et al. 2020). Altres interpretacions han recorregut a les tesis conspiratòries que els responsables malèvols de la seva extensió mundial podrien haver estat Estats Units i fins a la mateixa Xina, mentre altres acusen

El inicio del foco vírico del COVID-19 fue la provincia central china de Hubei, altamente interconectada, globalizada, con una intensa infraestructura de comunicación que incluye el uso extensivo de 5G, rascacielos, muchos automóviles y un nivel de contaminación atmosférica entre los más altos del mundo. Su ciudad de Wuhan se ha hiperurbanizado en los últimos tiempos y sus habitantes son personas procedentes del mundo rural que se han ‘globalizado’ intempestivamente provocando conurbaciones de alta densidad demográfica. Ya en el año 2012, el científico divulgativo estadounidense David Quammen, describía muy vívidamente esa perspectiva en Spillover. ¿De dónde surgió el coronavirus? Un equipo de investigadores de varios países analizó la evolución del genoma del virus y excluyó categóricamente que pueda haberse derivado de una elaboración en un laboratorio en vitro, y además se ha podido comprobar su origen animal. Otras interpretaciones han recurrido a las tesis conspiratorias de que los responsables malévolos de su extensión mundial podrían haber sido Estados Unidos y hasta la misma China, mientras otras acusan a Rusia. Como nos recuerda George Monbiot, la crisis ataca todo el modelo económico que nos ha empujado hacia una alteración radical de las relaciones entre sociedades humanas y su entorno natural. Mucho antes de que el virus se detectase, ya se alumbraban otras amenazas más radicales: el declive de la biodiversidad y la sexta extinción de masas, con millones de especies de animales y plantas desaparecidas para siempre; la erosión de los suelos como consecuencia de la preponderancia de la agricultura intensiva; la invasión del mar por el plástico y el microplástico (Conversi y Moreno); y una miríada de otras amenazas asociadas con el nominado desarrollo económico neoliberal.

Climate change has rapidly expanded as a key topic of research across disciplines, but it has remained virtually untouched in nationalism studies. Climate change is a boundless, uncontainable phenomenon that ignores class, geographic, and ethnonational boundaries. As such, it can hardly be comprehended within the limits of a nationalist world vision. This article reassesses this intuition by focusing on the situational and adaptive plasticity of nationalism, characterized by its notorious Janus-faced adaptability. I first identify and address a methodological stumbling block that precludes scholars in some areas of the humanities and social sciences—specifically nationalism studies—from conceptualizing and grappling with this unfolding reality. Second, I advance a typology that can work as a conceptual grid for studying similar problems that emerge at the intersection of environmental politics, climate change, and nationalism studies. I suggest two ways in which the nation and national narratives have been and are being mobilized to make sense of, contrast, reject, and incorporate new life-changing trends. I identify these, respectively, under the umbrella terms resource nationalism and green nationalism. I conclude by emphasizing the continuing relevance of nationalism in plans for ongoing global energy transitions.

Within the now vast literature on nationalism, no study has yet explored its relationship with climate change, the defining crisis of our time. This is surprising, given the fact that a strong connection has existed, to date, between climate change denial and nationalism – as observed in the USA, Russia and a few other countries. This article connects the dots by exploring the missing links between climate change and nationalism. After introducing recent scientific evidence, I propose a possible distinction between two forms of nationalism that may address the issue from contrasting, perhaps incompatible, perspectives: One of them I identify as ‘resource nationalism’, the second I define as ‘green nationalism’. I go on to suggest that anthropology as a discipline is well equipped to identify, describe, theorise and narrate the practical on-the-ground consequences of climate change. I conclude by arguing that, by the same token, it is equally well equipped to study the correlation, links and associations between climate change and nationalism.

Review of: "Il pensiero ecologico" by Edgar Morin. Firenze: Hopeful Monster, 1988, in La Critica Sociologica, 84, 1988.

Aludían los viejos romanos al Mare Nostrum como referente geográfico de su acción económica, política y social. En realidad, el Mediterráneo ya se había convertido en el basamento fundacional de los actuales valores civilizatorios del hemisferio occidental. Ahora el Mare Nostrum es escenario de un proceso convulso de deterioro ambiental y testigo de un gran drama humano. Considérese la pronunciada disminución de las precipitaciones y la ausencia de lluvia en algunas zonas, especialmente durante el período estival. Y ello es precisamente así porque la variabilidad interanual aumenta dramáticamente durante el verano, cuando se alcanzan temperaturas cada vez más extremas. Los ominosos síntomas se multiplican y el cambio climático los hará cada vez más vulnerables, con un impacto brutal en los recursos hídricos de la cuenca mediterránea; ya se manifiestan en nuestro 'pequeño océano' con la transformación de las faunas marinas y el aumento de especies invasivas. La rápida desertificación de amplias superficies del Norte de África se está extendiendo a la Europa del Sur, especialmente a zonas meridionales españolas y, en particular, a Andalucía. Recuérdese que, con unas 4.000 plantas autóctonas, la biodiversidad de la región andaluza es una de las mayores de Europa. Los estudios de Juergen Scheffran y otros colegas suyos indicaban, ya en 2012, que las precipitaciones en el Norte de África disminuirían entre un 10% y un 20% para el año 2050, con un aumento consiguiente de las temperaturas de entre 2° y 3°. Las consecuencias serían agudas en la zona noroccidental de África septentrional, al combinarse el cataclismo climático con un fuerte crecimiento demográfico, lo que haría inevitable un masivo desplazamiento migratorio hacia Europa en su flanco sur. [Con la colaboración de Red Eléctrica de España] La crisis climática empuja a un número creciente de habitantes magrebíes a abandonar sus territorios en dirección a la orilla septentrional del Mare Nostrum. Y es aquí donde, de nuevo, incide el fenómeno de las migraciones contemporáneas. Las cifras de los inmigrantes fallecidos en su búsqueda de una vida mejor en el Viejo Continente, muchos de ellos atravesando la cuenca mediterránea, son aterradoras. A fecha de 5 de mayo de 2018, y según 'The List', se habían registrado documentalmente 34.361 migrantes muertos. Son cifras que, sin embargo, podrían palidecer ante la amenaza letal del cambio climático en el Mediterráneo. La potencial mortalidad para los seres humanos por causas medioambientales no se producirá a corto plazo en modo tan impactante como el de la inmigración, pero sus efectos podrían ser más devastadores para todo el ecosistema viviente. A ambas orillas del Mediterráneo, los incendios forestales inciden dramáticamente sobre el cambio climático y son la principal causa de la pérdidas de bosques en la cuenca mediterránea, a lo que contribuye poderosamente la emisión de los gases de efecto invernadero producidos por la combustión de biomasa. La deforestación es la segunda mayor fuente antropogénica de CO2 a la atmósfera, después de los combustibles fósiles.

The proposal is articulated around a central question: Which is the relationship between nationalism and climate change? I have searched some of the top ranking nationalism studies journals (Nations and nationalism, SEN -Studies of ethnicity and nationalism, Nationalism and ethnic politics, Ethnicities, Ethnopolitics) and couldn't find any article even touching the complex relationship between nationalism and climate change. I have only found a small number of mostly circumstantial (casual) mentions of climate change according to the following distribution: Nations and Nationalism: 8 mentions (including a roundtable, book reviews and an introductory piece written by me). Ethnopolitics: 3 mentions (one political theory article, two case studies) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics: 3 mentions (all case studies) Ethnicities: 2 mentions (2 theoretical articles) Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: 2 mentions (including a 2009 article) Even more worryingly, I have found no mentions of the geo-historical concept of Anthropocene, nor any of its more controversial derivates (Capitalocene, Occidentalocene, Consumerocene, and so on), despite the fact that these have been introduced and debated in nearly all the social sciences. Considering that there is a vast emerging political science literature on this concept and associated ones, like the 'environmental state', 'greening the state' and ecopolitics, this is rather puzzling . Here is the Anthropocene breakdown : Nations and Nationalism: 0 mentions Nationalism and Ethnic Politics: 0 mentions Ethnopolitics: 0 mentions Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: 0 mentions Ethnicities: 0 mentions Given the fact that many ultranationalists are, or have been, climate change deniers, I find this lack of attention within the nationalism studies scholarship quite astonishing. We may simply pause and consider how the new chronology can be antithetical to Ernest Gellner's stress on the modernity-nationalism linkage and its potential for a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian tradition. It is therefore a topic which deserves urgent attention., Daniele Conversi

The Left/Right divide is a constitutive aspect of modern politics, shaped by the French Revolution, the ascent of the bourgeoisie as the dominant political force and the conflict-ridden advent of democratic politics. Since the Revolution, the Left has remained symmetrically opposed to the Right in the shaping of parliaments and other representative bodies. While those positioned on the Left originally identified themselves as patriots, the cult of la Patrie was slowly appropriated by the Right. Around 130 years after the Revolution, this appropriation culminated in the rise of the authoritarian and Fascist regimes between WWI and WWII. Since then, the association has remained almost unshakable. Despite some brief interludes, like the rise of anti-colonialism (Harris 1993), post-colonialism (Chatterjee 1993) and stateless nationalism in the developed west (Nairn 1977), nationalism has remained a prerogative of the Right, although it should not be necessarily so. This chapter explores the gradual evolution of this dichotomy and its shifting relationship with nationalism, speculating on how new constellations of power at the edges of modernity are drastically altering notions of Left and Right.

Anthropogenic climate change poses the possibility of total human extinction. Subsistence societies, however, have been threatened with extinction ­primarily as a consequence of systemic development ­ for a very long time. Recent genocide scholarship, more particularly in relation to indigenous peoples, has engaged with some of these issues, even while terminologies such as ethnocide, cultural genocide, and indigenocide may suggest a restricted field of vision. Here, we argue that the very nature of a neoliberal globalisation and concomitant nation-state building makes all subsistence societies vulnerable to what amounts to structural genocide. But how does climate change exacerbate or complicate this bleak picture? The political economy of ‘business as usual’ in its dialectical relationship with the biosphere (expressed in the rising concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions) poses an acceleration of subsistence society vulnerability with catastrophic potential for extreme violence. But another scenario also presents itself. The very ongoing, seemingly impossible existence of non-marketised societies in direct relationship with nature, poses the possibility of their resilience in the face of climate change rather than those operating according to standard globalised norms. In conclusion, we propose that the crisis of anthropogenic climate change directly challenges not only assumptions about the ‘inevitable’ trajectory of globalisation with its supposed cast of survivors and victims but more precisely the purposefulness of ‘techno-rational’ epistemologies as set against those which might help humanity recover the possibility of a ‘moral economy’.

Is homogenising nationalism a consequence of industrialisation? This view has been most forcefully and systematically advanced by Ernest Gellner. The article contests this approach by focusing instead on militarism and militarisation. It therefore identifies the key role of the mass army as presaging the era of mass nationalism and cultural homogenisation. Drawing on a range of authors from history, sociology and political science, the relationship is found to be reciprocal and symbiotic. A preliminary exploration on the possibility of early modern (or pre-modern) forms of cultural homogenisation is preceded by a critical assessment of Gellner's interchangeable use of the terms culture, language and ethnicity.

Over twenty years after his death, Gellner’s impact still remains unparalleled, but not unchallenged. Gellner’s weight has been exerted both directly and indirectly, pressing other scholars either to acknowledge his contribution or to attempt alternative explanations. Gellner famously begins by defining nationalism as ‘primarily a principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent’ (p. 1). This is the only clear-cut and unambiguous definition given in his most famous book, Nations and Nationalism. All other concepts, from culture to industrialisation, from equality/egalitarianism to modernity, are used in a notoriously generic fashion as catch-all concepts. Work continued here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227545232_Homogenisation_nationalism_and_war_Should_we_still_read_Ernest_Gellner

Equality/inequality and nationalism have been ambiguous and controversial bedfellows since the French Revolution. This paper explores the historical incongruities between nationalism's egalitarian rhetoric and its link with regimes founded on capital accumulation and concentration. It explores the intense changes since the modern dawn of nationalism, focusing on its relationship with social inequality. It does so through three historical stages of often deepening inequality according to a tripartite chronological sequence: 1. The advent of modernity and the modern age, in which the egalitarian–nationalist tandem became a hallmark of political legitimacy. This asymmetrical relationship emerged, I argue, from the blend of industrialisation, scientific knowledge and the French Revolution —thus fusing the political, cultural and economic spheres. It led, among other things, to the building of nationally-based welfare states whose redistribution policies were often founded on citizenship as variously defined according to ethnic or 'civic' criteria – with several drawbacks. 2. The transitional, thus uncertain, age of neoliberal globalisation when, again, culture, politics and economics intermingled and combined in dismantling several institutions, including the welfare system of capital redistribution. 3. The rapidly approaching, fast moving age of radical inequality identified as the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch shaped by human agency on an unprecedentedly massive and disruptive scale. During this stage, if the current global neoliberal capitalist regime is not challenged, inequality becomes so all-pervasive that it leads to the impossibility of any redistribution politics and the conceivable collapse of any form of welfare. At each stage, the relationship between nationalism and inequality and their mutual repositioning is assessed.

The chapter explores the intense changes at every level of politics and society since the inception of nationalism. It discusses the advent of modernity, arising from the combination of industrialization, science and the French Revolution, which merges the economic, cultural, and political spheres. The chapter explores the uncertain age of neoliberal globalization when culture, politics, and economics merge and combine in an ill‐defined mix. Accurate dating is important in the study of history. Dating the Anthropocene implies prioritizing causality and broad understanding over the study of the effects and consequences; it is hence about the location of agency and sociopolitical responsibility. The chapter discusses the rapidly approaching and fast moving age of the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch shaped by human agency and intervention on an unprecedentedly massive and disruptive scale. The Anthropocene spells the actually possible death of nations, in all their human, cultural and historical components. ------ The key question considered in this chapter is not rhetorically intended: What is the future of nationalism? Rather than venturing into hard to prove conjectures, the chapter explores the intense changes at every level of politics and society since the inception of nationalism. It is organized into three chronological sequences: 1. the advent of modernity, arising from the combination of industrialisation, science and the French Revolution, therefore merging the economic, cultural and political spheres; 2. the uncertain age of neoliberal globalisation when, again, culture, politics and economics merge and combine in an ill-defined mix; and, finally, 3: the rapidly approaching and fast moving-in age of the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch shaped by human agency and intervention on an unprecedentedly massive and disruptive scale. At each stage the role and repositioning of nationalism is assessed. Overall, the chapter looks at the changes and persistence of nationalism and what it means for the future of politics – and for humankind.

http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/antropocene-il-nuovo-mondo-che-finisce/

Cambio climático

Published in H-Net & H-Nationalism as introduction to the “The Left and Nationalism Monthly Series” (ed. Emmanuel Dalle Mulle), 10-20-2017. URL: https://networks.h-net.org/node/3911/discussions/588345/left-and-nationalism-monthly-series-left-and-nationalism

The Anthropocene is a new geological epoch related to the human impact on the Earth's geology. Climate change is the result of an idea of progress leading to social and environmental catastrophe. A brief analysis of the economic neo-liberalism tenets seeks to explain the causes of a systematic exploitation of geological resources and its asocial and uncompassionate effects. The prevalent ideology of consumerism has been promoted by a possessive individualism based upon self-interest and utility maximization. We ponder whether the current «Bronze Age of welfare» is just a prelude to the return to the prehistory of social protection. Concluding remarks point to the great responsibility that social and political sciences have to provide approaches which could overcome the inevitability of the social and environmental darkest night. The preservation of a socio-economic model respectful of sustainable development and effective in reducing poverty is crucial for the maintenance of collective well-being. El Antropoceno es una nueva era geológica provocada por la acción de los seres humanos. El cambio climático es consecuencia de una idea de progreso abocada a la catástrofe socioambiental. El examen del neoliberalismo pretende desentrañar las causas de una degradación sistemática de los recursos geológicos y de sus efectos asociales e insolidarios. La prevalente ideología consumista ha sido auspiciada por la promoción de un individualismo posesivo basado en el cálculo personal e interesado. Se pondera si la presente «Edad de Bronce del welfare» es el preludio de una vuelta a la prehistoria de la protección social. En las conclusiones se señala la gran responsabilidad de las ciencias sociales y políticas para proveer enfoques superadores de la inevitabilidad del desastre socioambiental. La preservación de un modelo socioeconómico que respete un desarrollo sostenible y evite la pobreza es crucial para el mantenimiento del bienestar social.

El monografico intenta conectar dos áreas hasta ahora poco vinculadas: el nacionalismo ligado a la construcción de los «estados-naciones» y los procesos de homogeneización cultural que han acompañado esa construcción. Se trata, en realidad, de un área de investigación interdisciplinaria novedosa a nivel tanto ibérico como internacional. A pesar de la importancia histórica del fenómeno, no se ha producido un enfoque especifico o un cuerpo de literatura unificado, sino sólo una plétora de tra- bajos desconectados, con estudios de casos idiosincrásicos y dispersos entre distintas disciplinas y áreas geográficas. Historiadores internacio- nales que quieren encontrar algo en la misma línea tienen que hacer refe- rencia a la obra de George L. Mosse sobre la «nacionalización de las ma- sas», que se remonta a casi cuarenta años y se refiere principalmente al periodo de entreguerras, además de quedarse largamente limitado al caso alemán (Mosse 1975). Hay también el libro paradigmático, pero exclusi- vamente dedicado al caso francés, de Eugen Weber (Weber 1976). Para abarcar una mirada de más amplio espectro, el historiador tiene que tra- vesar las barreras disciplinarias y adentrarse en terrenos discursivos aje- nos, por ejemplo aprovechando el eclecticismo de una disciplina como relaciones internacionales, gracias al trabajo casi solitario de Heather Rae (Rae 2002). Quienes están familiarizados con la sociología histó- rica, la historia social y sociología política se refieren normalmente a los trabajos de Mann, Tilly, Scott y otros que en gran medida consideran la homogeneización cultural como un epifenómeno de amplios cambios es- tructurales, económicos y socio-políticos (Mann 1993; 2005; Scott 1998; Tilly 1975; 1992). Aun el énfasis primario sea sobre homogeneización de la cultura, al- gunos artículos subrayan la continuidad entre homogeneización cultural y la homogeneización étnica, es decir, las conexiones entre la destruc- ción de la cultura de un pueblo y la eliminación del grupo mismo a través de masacres, desplazamientos y genocidios. Dicho de otra manera, el én- fasis político sobre uniformidad y asimilación (a veces se usa el termino controvertido de «genocidio cultural») puede desembocar en políticas de eliminación física de grupos enteros, particularmente en situaciones ex- tremas como la guerra u otros tipos de conflictos. No sólo permanece el mismo horizonte ideológico que ve en las diferencias étnicas, culturales, lingüísticas, religiosas y incluso de clase, obstáculos hacia el progreso uniformizador, sino las dos formas de destrucción —física y cultural— muchas veces se llevaron a cabo simultáneamente.

Ampliando el concepto de «nacionalización de las masas», el artículo explora los procesos de homogeneización cultural como un patrón recurrente en la formación y expansión del «estado-nación» europeo hasta después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Sostiene que estas prácticas no se pudieron concebir de una manera sistemática antes de la Revolución Francesa y las guerras que la siguieron. De hecho, la homogeneización a gran escala apenas fue posible antes del siglo XX, debido al menor control burocrático y la falta de tecnología militar adecuada. Con París como epicentro mundial, el proceso se extendió radialmente hacia el este a través de ondas progresivas de occidentalización. Identificando el nacionalismo como identidad dominante de la era moderna, el artículo ilustra con gran cantidad de ejemplos sus solapamientos con patrones recurrentes de homogeneización cultural, particularmente una vez que el nacionalismo fue adoptado por el Estado. Sostenemos que las tres condiciones entrelazadas (la homogeneización cultural, el genocidio y el nacionalismo) llegaron a su punto máximo durante las dos guerras mundiales y bajo el régimen totalitario construido sobre los intentos de prolongar los patrones de movilización de masas inducidos por la guerra. En síntesis, el artículo afirma la necesidad de involucrarse en una historia social y política de la homogeneización cultural como un rastreo conjunto de largo alcance de los acontecimientos que afectaron profundamente a casi todos los aspectos de las sociedades modernas.

Various scholars have addressed nationalism as a distinctive political ideology. The majority of them recognize it as a product of modernity and as inseparable from it. This article begins by accepting this view, identifying the spread of nationalism as part of a broader process of Westernization. However, the all-encompassing ideological dimension and common thread hovering above nationalism is identified here as modernism—that is, the sum of ideological discourses, artistic expressions and political practices gravitating around the ‘need to be modern’. Modernist notions like ‘progress’, ‘growth’, ‘advancement’ and ‘development’ have been largely conceived within national frameworks and applied within a world of ‘nation-states’. Moreover, given the selective ways in which ruling elites used the vocabulary of modernity, the very ‘perlocutionary’ effect of labelling opponents as ‘anti-modern’ often became a sufficient condition for their exclusion. The article discusses whether modernism can be identified as an ideology on its own and whether its triumph was indissociable from nationalism. It concludes that nationalism belonged to a broader modernist discourse that thoroughly accompanied the expansion of modernity.

Nationalism and modernity both indulge in practices of classification, definition and delimitation, leading to the simultaneous destruction of old boundaries and the rise of new ones. Focusing on nationalism as a boundary-building practice, this chapter argues that it belongs to a broader ideological discourse that began to prevail with the onset and expansion of modernity that pushed towards the disruption of traditional boundaries and the rising of new ones. The chapter also argues that over the last decades these trends have interacted with neo-liberal globalization, processes which also corrode as well as reinforce existing boundaries. Finally, the chapter examines three cases from different modernization stages that have resulted in boundary changes or consolidation, examining the implications of these shifts. The relationship will be unpacked in the following way: The first section expands on Ernest Gellner’s vision of boundaries as associated with the notion of ‘congruency’. It observes the way boundaries interact with industrial modernity by producing and reproducing expectations of regularity and homogeneity within societies. This is followed by the identification of specific ‘boundary approaches’ and then by a discussion of the modernity or antiquity of ethnic boundaries. The next three sections explore the interaction between state-formed identities and cultural homogenization, first across one of the oldest existing inter-state frontiers, the Franco-Spanish one. Having identified modernity as an era of boundary destruction and demarcation through nationalism and cultural homogenization, the chapter goes on to analyze the cumulative effects of cultural homogenization and the reinforced salience of inter-state boundaries through the lens of Ciudad Juarez under a regime of neo-liberal globalization. The final section explores the notion of ‘natural boundaries’ (both ethnic and state) in East Africa, observing their ongoing collapse as a result of the highly destructive impact of climate change. These boundaries areas are chosen as symptomatic of the three historical moments they represent: the legacy of the nation-state, the effects of neo-liberal globalization and an anticipation of the coming era of climate change. Ethnicity is present throughout these three ‘stages’, yet nationalism is slowly withdrawn from the chapter’s main argument as we pass from the boundaries of modernity to those of globalization and then to climate change’s erosion of natural boundaries.