ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TRANSNATIONALISM, YOUTH AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Yunas Samad and Kasturi Sen

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Introduction

ISLAM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TRANSNATIONALISM, YOUTH AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Yunas Samad

The role of and position of Muslims communities in Western Europe has received increasing social and political contemplation in recent times along with the general interest on Muslim societies and Islam. Attention that starts with the Iranian revolution, generating momentum with the Rushdie controversy, the head scarf affair, the reverberations spawned by the Gulf Wars and reaches it apogee with September 11. The study of Muslim societies and communities has changed from an esoteric interest of the select and incestuous few, mainly academics, to become a major concern of policy makers, the media and the public at large. Lamentably the predominant interest was from a security paradigm and Muslims were perceived as a threat from within and without; a bridgehead for Islamic terror emanating from the turmoil in Muslim countries. The neo-orientalist perspective, exemplified by Samuel Huntington and 'The Clash of Civilizations' (1998) thesis, was influential in policy circles both in Europe and the United States. This perspective is challenged in this volume by locating Muslims

communities in their social and policy context, particularly the youth, and exposing the biases that exist in studies on them.

While in the popular consciousness of Europeans Muslims have just popped up their presence pre-dates contemporary interest. They have been established in most European countries for nearly fifty years and in France and Britain their presence goes back to the nineteenth century as a by-product of empire. However social scientists and policy makers had, until the 1980s, investigated Muslim migration and settlement within migration paradigms. Muslims were represented either as nationals of third world countries or as racial and ethnic minorities. Prior to the 1960s Islam was alien, there were few mosques and settlers and it was during the 1950s-1960s that Muslim labour migration and settlement either as guest workers or economic migrants took place. With the recession of the mid-1970s immigration policy to Western Europe changed and primary migration came to a halt. However the size of Muslim communities continued to grow as a consequence of family reunification. Today the highest Muslim presence as a percentage of the total population is found in France (it also has the largest population in absolute numbers followed by Germany and then the UK) while the lowest rate is found in Great Britain (see Pedziwiatr's chapter)[1]

[1] There are a number of problems associated with statistic across Europe. In France collecting data on religion is illegal, in Germany the data is for non-citizens and in the United Kingdom only in the 2001 census was the religion category included. In the

The transformation of migrant labour into settled communities with a growing population born in Europe saw the beginning of explicit political participation. As citizens educated with a European mindset political activity by Muslims for Muslims was not surprising. It was generally believed that the secularisation thesis (in its various forms) would, over time, result in these minorities losing their religious distinctiveness and become assimilated into the secular norm of European civil society. However like other religious groups, evangelical Christians and Hindu nationalists, religious identification has increased in the era of globalisation. In Western Europe a number of organisations (Muslim Council of Britain, Conseil Francais du Cult Musulman, Zentralrat für die Muslime in Deutschland, Muslim Council of the Netherlands, L'Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique and Förenade Islamiska Församlinger i Sverige) emerged representing Muslim interest on the national level. The ground realities also indicated an increasing conspicuousness of Islam represented by the proliferation of halal food outlets, mosques, graveyards, Islamic bookshops and charities, and demands within education for Islamically acceptable practices and norms. In some sense, the reunion of families and the transformation of migrant labour, consisting entirely of men, into mixed gender communities with multiple generations naturally brought new demands

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Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden the Muslim population are estimates drawn from the number of foreigners resident

on the social context that they were now living in. It was the needs of families and the emergence of a younger generation that made Muslims more prominent in their diasporic location. These internal developments resonated with external ones, where political Islam becomes much more active in the Muslim world; in Turkey, Iran, Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Trinidad, Islamic movements challenged the regimes. With the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, Muslim entities emerged from the reconstitution of the socialist bloc. In the USSR, Uzbekistan and other central Asian states emerged as independent nations, but where nationalities were denied nationhood, there were separatist movements as in Chechnya. Similarly, with the break-up of Yugoslavia, Muslim political entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo emerged. However the intrusion of international events into domestic politics exemplified by 9/11 extenuated cultural differences between Muslims and the society they settled in resulting in a backlash against them.

The Other Within

There are two parallel debates, the security paradigm and the discussion on European identity that problematizes Muslims. The former argument is well rehearsed and will be covered briefly. In the post-cold-war era, academics, such as Samuel Huntington (1998), Bernard Lewis (1990) and Gilles Kepel (2002) argued that a new paradigm was needed to

understand the changing realities. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the old certainties of the left-right dichotomy that was dividing the world and societies was replaced by new antagonisms with Islam versus the West. For Kepel, the Rushdie controversy in the United Kingdom and the headscarf affair in France were indicative of the activation of political Islam among the diaspora, as Khomeini attempted to extend his influence from Muslim countries to Europe. Huntingdon, pursuing a similar approach on a much grander scale, argued that the demise of the cold war meant that the new antagonism would be based on culture, and he conceptionalised this 'brave new world' into culturally differentiated areas. For him and Lewis, Islam, and not simply 'fundamentalism', was irreconcilable with western values, and were destined to collide. 11 September reinforced the increasing insecurity that western states felt about Muslims, and invigorated the perspective that this minority had to be viewed from a security paradigm. The unjustifiable fear that Islamic 'fundamentalism' was establishing itself among Muslim minorities in Europe was reinforced by the knowledge that a jihadi cell involved in 9/11 was based in Europe. There was a knee-jerk reaction that was even reflected by prominent social scientists: Ralph Darehndof argued for the defence of western values against terrorism; Anthony Giddens wrote that governments needed to clamp down on immigration flows so that they did not give sustenance to extreme right-wing parties (see Kamali's chapter). In the moment of crisis, Muslims became the new folk devils,

vilified by the great and the good. There was an assumption that Islamic radicalism was establishing itself in the European context through a top-down process whereby jihadis were being parachuted into the fertile terrain of inner city ghettos. This whole perspective of viewing minorities from a security paradigm will be questioned thoroughly, and alternative perspectives for understanding the social processes, particularly among young Muslims, will be looked at.

The second policy theme that intercepts with the security issue is the question of the emerging European identity. This issue has been implicit in the evolution of the European community to European Union, and has now become explicit with expansion, which brought in a number of Eastern European countries. The whole issue of expansion has raised explicitly the question of how and what shape will this identity take that will provide a common sense of belonging to a disparate collection of nationalities. It raises the question about where the construction of boundaries of 'us' and 'them' should be located. With Muslim minorities being the largest minority group within the European Union, estimates ranging between 10 and 15 million (Glavanis, 1999), the blurring of these boundaries of 'us' and 'them' and the construction of the 'other' become extremely pertinent and relevant. Clearly a security perspective in relation to Muslims would construct them as the 'other'

within and, would lead to substantial numbers of people being excluded from this new European identity.

The European Convention (2003), which considered the European constitution, is a very good example of the issues that are at stake, and how this process of construction of a European identity is taking place. There are some influential voices that are arguing that Christianity is a core characteristic in the make-up of the European identity, and President Chirac's comments serve to reinforce this view. The Catholic Church lobbied the European Convention that the constitution should have a role for God, and is preparing a major rolling campaign of seminars and presentations to press home its point (THES, 2003). Valéry Giscard d'Estaing omitted any explicit reference to Christianity in the document that was presented to the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003. This reflected the influence of the northern states that wanted a more secular approach that resonated with their civil societies, over the southern states that were more sympathetic to the approach of the Vatican. The draft treaty referred to the traditions of democracy in Greek antiquity, and elaborated on the values of the enlightenment. Equality, freedom and respect for reason were the guiding principles that were drawn from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance from Europe's past. There is obviously a tension between the kinds of values that are celebrated as European and their

historical baggage. Clearly the presence of Muslims has implications in terms of the construction of European identity; the construction of Muslims as the 'other' within has implications in terms of social policy in general. These biases are disentangled by challenging assumptions that are central to the arguments of both the neo-orientalists and European identity.

Europe and modernity

European identity has been inextricably linked with the emergence of modernity, and this conflation is not something that is merely apparent in the debates around identity within the European Union, but also among social scientists. Gerard Delanty (1995) asks which Europe we are talking about. His analysis clearly points out that there have been multiple Europes throughout history, and these different Europes have had centres that have changed over time. The ancient Greeks provide the intellectual source for much of European thought. However, for the Greeks, their notion of identity was that there were Greeks and barbarians, and these barbarians could be found in those areas that we today call Asiatic or European. It is also difficult to differentiate Greek intellectual flowering from the knowledge of the ancient world that was transmitted from Babylon and ancient Egypt. The dichotomy of Orient and Occident is also highly problematic in antiquity; for the Greeks, the Occident was based in Asia Minor, and the Orient consisted of

territories that were beyond that. The Romans did not view themselves as a European power. They had an Empire that was based firmly in the eastern half in the Mediterranean basin, and was more oriental than western. Hence, ancient Rome and Greece are problematic bases for constructing a European identity. The idea of Europe emerges much later in the Dark Ages, when the Mediterranean fell under the control of Islam, and the Occident began to embrace the north-west of the continent. The idea emerged when Europe was under siege and suffered military defeats by Islam in the south. The acceptance of Christianity by the northern tribes from the Franks to the Vikings allowed for the ascendancy of Charlemagne who styled himself as the father of Europe. It was with the abandonment of the Mediterranean for the Baltic that the identity of Europe emerged.

Christianity was inextricably associated with this European idea. However, there is a question to be raised: which Christianity are we talking about, Roman or Byzantine? Rome had Europeanised an Asiatic cult, Christianity, in the eighth century, and during the evolution of the Christian church it bifurcated into one that was based in Rome and the other that was based in Constantinople. The Greek Orthodox Church became orientalised while the church that was based in Rome was adopted as the identity of Western Europe. This tension between the two churches was explicitly demonstrated during the Crusades. For medieval

Europe, the Crusades galvanised an identity around Christianity, even though the Crusades only captured Jerusalem for a short while before the forces of Islam retook it. It is pertinent to note that in the course of this conflict the European Crusaders sacked Constantinople, the centre of the Byzantine church, and hastened its demise. The Normans, the ascendant power in Europe, annexed the remaining Byzantine cities that were located in Italy (Delanty, 1995).

The final point about the multiplicity of Europe is related to Islam. As Bryan Turner (1994) points out, when Islam initially emerged it was viewed as a Christian sect, and for a substantial period of time it occupied parts of southern Europe, Spain, Sicily and the Balkans. It is difficult to make a case that Islam was not part of what we see today as Europe. In the nineteenth century, Turkey was seen as a European power, hence the adage, 'the sick man of Europe' that was common in Victorian parlance. There are multiple Europes that have existed over different historical periods, and contemporary notions of Europe are a product of shifts in balances of power that took place in the early modern period, between the West and the Rest.

The alternative is to link European value to modernity, and this is the approach that the Convention (2003) took. The Enlightenment was a multi-faceted phenomenon with positive and negative legacies that need

to be examined critically. Positive aspects are the emergence of democracy, secularism, scientific reasoning, equality for citizens, and freedoms and rights. These are the notions celebrated as those European values that can be considered traceable back to the Enlightenment. There is a dark side of enlightenment that is associated with scientific racism, colonialism and the Holocaust. Giddens (1990) has persuasively argued that modernity produced a state structure that was more efficient at fighting wars than empires and kingdoms. This efficiency in war translated into colonial empires, and was a defining factor in the construction of the West. The term, 'the West' simplifies complexities that disguise the fact that not all of Europe is the West, and not all of the West is Europe. The West is modern, includes Western Europe, North America and Japan and is juxtaposed with the Rest, which is traditional. The idea of the West is a concept central to the enlightenment, and is a characteristic that helps to define 'us'. The Rest assists in the definition of the West through the construction of the 'other'. Neither term is homogeneous, and both constructions change over space and time, but these are important concepts that are formed in enlightenment, and influence the enlightenment process as well (Hall, 1992).

Orientalism promotes this division between the West and the Rest: it reinforces the idea that Europe, the West and USA are in opposition to the Orient, the East and the 'other'. Orientalism has multiple meanings,

and can be used geographically to look primarily at Asia. Edward Said's (1978) use of orientalism was specifically related to the Middle East and Islam. Orientalism was the defining 'other' that assisted in constructing modernity. Classical social scientists' Eurocentric theoretical observations were in opposition to orientalism. Weber's Protestant work ethic juxtaposed the diligent and economically rational Occident with the lazy, licentious and superstitious Orient. Marx argued that Oriental society was inherently despotic, and hence not conducive to the development of capitalism.

Masoud Kamali (2003), in his chapter, argues that the dichotomy between the West and the Orient is false. There are multiple routes to modernity, and there is a need to challenge Eurocentric assumptions of modernity that see it as a single, universal and homogeneous process. Hall (1992) reiterates this point, arguing that there is no master narrative for modernity. Kamali examines the relationship of Islam and modernity in the case of Turkey and Iran. It is the impact of military defeat on the Ottoman and Persian Empires that initiates a process searching for alternative paths to modernity. Taking Giddens argument that a modern state was excellent at waging war, it forced elements within these pre-modern formations to respond by modernising the state and producing new model armies. In this search for alternative paths to modernity, to resist primarily British and Russian imperialism, elites from Turkey and

Iran were impressed by German and Italian fascism. The process of modernisation was looking for alternative routes that were emerging from less powerful European nations. Democracy was also an important aspect of this development and important social groupings in both of these countries were promoting democratic reforms. While modernisation of the state, explicitly the formation of modern armies, was more successful, the democratisation of society was not so successful due to the intervention from the West. Demand for democracy in Iran in the 1950s led to US intervention and the downfall of the Mossadeq government and, in the case of Turkey, the Kemalists, supported by NATO, kept the religious parties from coming to power. In the case of Iran this ultimately led to the fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini, and in the case of Turkey, we see numerous military coups removing legitimately elected governments, the most recent example being the fall of Demirel.

This interconnection and intimacy between alternative paths of modernity and Islam are recreated in recent times with the emergence of jihadi Islam. Ian Talbot persuasively argues that Europe and the USA played a major role in the construction and emergence of jihadi Islam as a new political force. This goes back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the use of guerrillas to fight a covert action against the occupation. The USA persuaded Pakistan to become a front-line state,

and used its considerable influence to get Saudi support for the operation. Saudi Arabia matched dollar for dollar US contributions to the war. The USA and its western allies supplied arms, and turned a blind eye to the production and smuggling of drugs to the West that funded covert action, acts of misogyny and savagery carried out by their allies. Peshawar became the grand meeting place for Islamicists from all over the world. They came from all over the globe, encouraged to do so by the USA and its allies, to train, form networks, provide resources, set up charities and generally exchange ideas on the prosecution of Jihad in different parts of the world. What emerges is a transnational social movement that transforms the meaning of jihad, which is primarily understood to be a spiritual struggle, into its secondary meaning of physical conflict. Once this transformation had taken place it was possible for those who conducted their local jihad in different parts of the world to rally to the calls of Osama Bin Laden and his global jihad against the USA. The first Gulf War was the crucial turning point, where groups who were acting as proxy for the USA and the West began to turn against their former masters. Even though Bin Laden declared Jihad against the 'Jews and Crusaders' in 1992, the USA was still using jihadis as their proxies in the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo (ICG, 2001).

The construction of the West and the Rest is based on a notion of European identity that draws on Islam as 'other'. This occurred in various ways in the past with the construction of European identity around Christianity, it is deeply embedded in the enlightenment process and is reflected in the way that Eurocentric theories are constructed by classical social scientists. It is also reflected in the way that Europe and the West intervene in Muslim countries by derailing democratic processes, and in the construction of jihadi groups. The reality is that the West is inextricably, and on multiple levels, inseparable from the Rest, and these dichotomies have little substance in either history or policy.

Delanty (2000, p. 65) has argued that the alternative is to develop post-national citizenship and identity that overcomes the dichotomy of 'us' and 'them', inclusion and exclusion etc. He refers to a 'reflexive transformation of existing national conceptions of group membership', built primarily on the recognition of shared sovereignty where significant inroads into national sovereignty have taken place on the supranational and sub-national level. National citizenship is based on birth and descent while post-national citizenship is based on residence. European citizenship as adopted by the Maastricht Treaty is an example of post-national citizenship. Delanty develops Jurgen Habermas' (1998) argument of 'constitutional patriotism' where identification is with normative principles of the constitution. This form of citizenship and

identity is not anchored in the state, territory, cultural heritage or shared conceptions of community. European expansion is developing a post-national society based on a European-wide political, public sphere embedded in shared political culture: a shared political culture founded on civil society, not national culture, represented by interest groups, non-governmental organisations and citizen-based movements and initiatives. Constitutional post-nationalism for Delanty has to be rooted in civic communities, which are discursively constituted. European civil society does not exist but a transnational civic community, a virtual community, is being realised.

Globalisation, transnationalism and fundamentalism

Muslim communities in Western Europe are undergoing considerable social change and a far more useful explanatory approach is to locate it within wider process of social transformation taking place, rather than attributing it to developments within the Islamic world. With the postmodern term there has been an increasing engagement with micro sociology accompanying the demise of the meta-narratives. Lyotard's incredulity to the meta-narrative of progress, development, science, class etc. led him to embrace the postmodern condition of uncertainty and rhetorical play (Hall et al, 1992). The focus of micro-narratives, in part, was to investigate cultural identifications as free-flowing dramaturgical processes resulting in hybrid formations unhindered by

structure. The smorgasbord approach to cultural identifications was criticised by Lash and Urry (1994) in their writings. Their critical concern was the absence of structure in postmodern theory, and argued for the continued salience of institutions in understanding contemporary social change. The changing nature of work or the lack of work due to post-Fordist development in flexible production and mobile labour has had a considerable impact. The process of social change in work was reinforced by globalisation and the translocation of production processes to the Pacific Rim.

Deindustrialisation as a consequence of globalisation and the changing nature of work are major factors in the decline of the meta-narrative and the emergence of a European underclass, an underclass that is primarily populated by ethnic minorities, who in Europe are mainly Muslim. These populations suffer lower rates of employment (52.7 % employment rate compared to 64.4 % employment for European citizens), more so for women. Ethnic minorities are over-represented in risky sectors of employment, the grey economy and are exposed to health risks. Well-educated and skilled migrants are often unable to find work appropriate to their level of skill, and accept employment with lower skill requirements and less pay (CEC 2003). Here, the focus is upon micro-narratives that are circumscribed by marginality and exclusion with specific reference to Muslim minorities, the product of a

specific type of migration, which are over-represented in the deindustrialised zones. At the European level, the underclass, whether in Britain, France, the Netherlands or Germany, is populated largely by Maghrebians, Turks and South Asians, who are predominantly of Muslim origin.

Postmodernity has been complemented by globalisation, which has led to the collapse of time and space resulting in the disembedment of cultural products from their spatial origins. Deterritorialisation of cultural products results in transnational flows of people, finance, ideology, images and technology that sidestep boundaries of nation-states (Appaduri, 1990). There are a number of aspects of transnationalism that are pertinent to understanding the social change-taking place among Muslims settled in Europe. Transnationalism, the movement and flow of cultural artefacts, specifically relates to a number of areas pertinent to ethnic minorities in Europe. Vertovec (1999) indicates that transnationalism, as the spanning of the borders, has transformed ethnic diasporas from classical understanding of people dispersed into people who are situated ‘here and there’, simultaneously connected by strong networks spanning the globe. The old diasporas of yesterday have become the transnational communities of today, and Muslims have strong networks both as ethnic and religious communities.

The process of transnationalism also produces cultural hybridisation of identity free from kinship and territory (Cohen, 1997). Hall has argued that in the diaspora, cultural identities are reformulated, resulting in new ethnicities, which are linked to new ethnic and new religious movements (Hall, 1996; Gillroy, 1987). There is also the world economy, where strong identities and global networks of mutual trust operate. While there has been considerable focus on global corporations, small economic players also need to be accounted for, and are probably more relevant when considering the Muslim underclass. The flow of remittances, and financial institutions, ranging from banks and money changers to informal banking networks have come under increasing scrutiny post 9/11 for their linkage to jihadi groups. Transnational political activity, the intersection of the global and the local, encompassing both cosmopolitan and essentialised identifications, introduce the politics of the homeland as well as movements with wider agendas. The case of Muslim mobilisation against Salman Rushdie, the Gulf War, the spillover of Islamic upsurge in Algeria and the support among some European Muslims for the al-Qaeda network are examples of transnational politics in the European context. The disjuncture between territory, subjectivity and collective social action has also seen the rise of virtual communities, virtual politics and networks. The internet has become the home of ethnic and religious mobilisation

representing a range of opinion among Muslims (Vertovec, 1999). It is clear that transnationality is an integral and recognisable feature of Muslim minorities in Europe (Samad, 1998). Among Muslims, there are a plethora of transnational networks and associations, both in consumption and production of media, politics, religious activity, cultural artefacts, economic activity, fashion and food. Transnational identifies are cultivated and supported by a variety of 'ethnic institutions' in Europe, often solidifying in resistance to racism and religious bigotry, renewed and reinvented through contacts with the country of origin and other members of the diaspora (Raj, 2000; Glavanis, 1999).

Barber (2003) theorises the process of globalisation as being a collision between the forces of aggressive economic and cultural globalisation, McWorld, versus the forces of tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism, Jihad. For him, the issue is not about Islam. It is about militant fundamentalism and the dialectical interdependence of these two oppositional sets of forces. The process of McDonaldisation and Coca-Colaisation, the cultural and economic homogenisation of the global economy results in cosmopolitan identifications that revel in hybridity and postmodern irony and play. Meeting resistance from essentialist forms of identification, ethnic, nationalist or religious, which contest this homogenising process by emphasising authentic diversity.

Barber's choice of metaphor is problematic; there are numerous debates about how fundamentalism can be defined. Turner (1994) argues that it is not useful to conflate all religious traditions as fundamentalist, and uses the term specifically to consider where religion enters into politics. Globalisation of religion actually increases fundamentalism but the collapsing of conservative with modernist variations in Islam is unproductive. Political Islam is Janus-faced, castigating traditional Islam as deviant from the true path and simultaneously challenging the West with alternative strategies of modernity. It does this by entering the realm of politics, which is a clear departure from the practices and behaviour of traditional Islam. The real threat to all religious faith comes from postmodern consumer lifestyles with their cut-and-paste approach that undermines faith-based belief systems (Turner, 1994). There are serious questions concerning meta-theory and its empirical verification on the ground. A number of writers in this collection challenge these arguments by examining the process from the bottom up, and this will be covered later in the introduction.

Robertson has questioned the top-down approach to globalisation driven by trans-national corporations homogenising culture, and instead argues that there is a reverse process that simultaneously has a heterogenising effect. The inter-reaction of the global only develops significance when it intersects with micro-processes in the locale (Robertson, 1992). The

global/local inter-reaction results in the hybrid cosmopolitan identifications and new ethnicities as argued by Stuart Hall (1992) and Paul Gillroy (1987). Kaldor (2003) and Samad (1998) argue that simultaneously essentialised identifications are being produced in the locale which are hybrid and new. Muslims are reconstructing identity as an interaction between trans-national and local processes; a development more advanced among the youth of the Muslim population.

Youth, gender and multiculturalism

As pointed out, identifications are constructed in the locale and are mediated by social policy. Multiculturalism has become the policy of choice to deal with diversity, and in the process has become globalised and, in turn, mediated in the locale by place and space (Jackson and Penrose, 1993), resulting in various relationships between structure and power (Hall, 1992). Clearly there is considerable variation in multiculturalism, policy adopted to govern difference which is different from those which are multicultural – plural societies that are cultural heterogeneous (Hall 2000) Overall multiculturalism predominates in Europe and three different approaches emerged in the incorporation of Muslim minorities. While a number of European countries – Sweden, UK, Belgium and Holland – have, with varying degrees, adopted group rights (recognising different aspects, some religious, other ethnic

difference) as the basis of managing minorities, other countries, in particular France, have resisted this approach and emphasised individual rights to be paramount. However, even in France there has been some movement in recent times towards the recognition of group rights in an implicit manner. The final category is represented by Germany where minorities are treated as guest workers, and policies and practices are based on the assumption that they are non-citizens and without political rights but have social rights only. It is important to qualify the differences in national experience in terms of legislation and policy, which has a significant influence on the conceptualisation and operation of multiculturalism. Thus, there are considerable variations in multiculturalism in Europe and, ironically, the results are strikingly similar, with minorities across the board being marginalised and excluded, and forming a major part of the European underclass. Muslims are concentrated in temporary and insecure work, with rates of unemployment ranging from two and half times to five times the unemployment rate of the indigenous population and low rates of health cover (see Pedziwiatr's chapter).

Multicultural policy acts directly or indirectly as a mediator for trans-national influences and gives it a degree of authenticity and legitimacy. The common themes that emerge, in spite of the local variations, are the essentialisation of identifications, the gendered and generational

representations of community and the emphasis on authenticity, resulting in older, male religious leaders emerging as community representatives. Multiculturalism from this perspective silences the voice of the young, women and gays. Anti-essentialist approaches to multiculturalism argue that community is a contested terrain and can be deconstructed along the lines of gender, class, generation, sexuality and political allegiance. Collective identification is a multi-vocal dialogue between different aspects shifting over time, space and place (Hall, 1996; Ranger, 1996).

Youth is also a fraught and ambivalent category where young people actively negotiate cultural process, not simply react to them, forming hybrid and new identifications from standard cultural artefacts (Amit-Talai & Wulff, 1995). Youth are at the forefront in the negotiation of tradition and postmodernity in a globalised world, levering open spaces to negotiate generational differences, generating new forms of social constructions. Spaces that are being denied by countervailing influences of elder generations and society attempting to re-culturalate or assimilate them (Samad, 1997). The emergence of essentialist hybrid identifications has been linked to processes of social exclusion, racism and xenophobia (Hall, 1996; Gillroy, 1987; Samad, 1997). The search for purity and authenticity among young Muslims is resulting in a fractured and disarticulated politics of identity that results in the

emergence of hybrid Islamic identification: a fractured identification divorced from Islamic tradition and practices, an inventive process whereby Islam is re-imagined and reconstructed in the diaspora as a vehicle for assertion of the self and being as well as acts of violence and crime (Samad, 1998; McLoughlin, nd). The significance being that Muslims is a youthful population in comparison to the White population and while comprative figures are problematic and scarce it is indicative that in the United Kingdom fifty percent of Muslims are under 25 while in Belgium thirty five percent are under 18 (see Pedziwiatr's chapter).

Transnational processes intervene in these developments taking place in the locale. Ideologically, Islam appears to be well placed to take advantage of globalisation and transnationalism. It conceives the Muslim community as a world community not recognising nation states as legitimate in religious terms. The theoretical arguments suggest that the Islamic concepts of ummah would make Muslims more susceptible to transnational Islamic movements, which would have a profound societal impact, generally and specifically. As Paul Lubeck (2003) argued, contemporary Islamic activism is neither local nor bounded by nationality, but is multifaceted and potentially global. The ummah is a transnational ideology, which is grounded and reinforced by pilgrimage and Sufi and religious networks. These characteristics are reformulated by information revolution, providing for new networks to emerge.

The long-term consequences of such arguments, if supported by evidence, would exacerbate racism and xenophobia impacting on general relations between different communities. Godfried Engbersen, in his paper, challenges this simplistic understanding of transnationalism and 'fundamentalism' in the European locale. His evidence suggests that high degrees of social integration of Muslims result in strong ethnic identities and weak transnational influences; conversely, unemployment leads to greater affiliation to transnational influences emanating from the country of origin. He demonstrates clearly the inter-reaction of transnational influences with underlying factors, particularly marginalisation and social exclusion, which encourage or depress transnationalism.

The second consideration is the discourse of the search for essentialist and authentic identification among the youth. Impressionistic formulations suggest that 'fundamentalism' is appearing on the ground. However, evidence collected by Cesari and Samad have a strong contra-factual effect for this argument. The ethnicisation of religion, where Islam becomes an identity marker, a source of pride and simultaneously a sign of integration, is a different phenomenon from increasing religiosity and the rise of Islamic 'fundamentalism'. Young Muslims are losing rapidly their ability to speak Arabic, Farsi, Punjabi, Turkish or

Urdu, and are more familiar in the language of their adopted country, and this is an indication of the degree that they have become Europeanised. The shift in identity is also reinforced by the way that Islam is represented in the media and by neo-orientalist discourse. The two are complementing each other in producing this shift, and combine the engagement of young Muslims with popular culture. Rap songs, tattoos and graffiti, essential aspects of popular culture, are reinterpreted through Islamic metaphors and idioms. Young Muslims, like other young people in their rebellious phase, adopt Islamic rhetoric to remain within the outer boundaries of community, which is circumscribed by discrimination, racism and xenophobia and yet present a provocative and challenging imagery to mainstream society.

Gender is an important variable in this process, with young women adopting Islamic modes to challenge gender-oppressive community practices and gain control over their bodies and lives. Islam is considered to be a liberating ideology from the conservative cultural practices of their elders, and allows women to make life choices in relationship to education, employment and marriage. The wearing of the veil has become a highly complex and political activity; complex in that there are numerous considerations that are involved in the veiling of women, ranging from misogynist practices to liberation theology (Naguib, 2002). Some young women see the wearing of the veil as a

political response to mainstream society, demonstrating their authenticity and identity. There is little evidence to suggest that young men or women's identity shift is actually being influenced by transnational processes. It is primarily a generational issue where young people are trying to redefine their identification vis à vis their elder generation within a context of marginalisation and exclusion. Overwhelmingly, identity politics reflects social change through migration rather than that of resistance to the corrosive influence of postmodernity and globalisation.

Social class is an extremely important variable, having significant impact on life trajectories and responses of young Muslims. In the European context, young Muslims are the descendants of labour migrants and have low educational attainments and relatively low degrees of professionalisation. In parallel with their white counterparts, they have become part of the working class culture that is slipping into the grey/black economy and criminal activity. Violence, riots and ghetto-isation and other social problems associated with Muslims are indicative of the marginalisation that impacts upon them and are over represented in the prison population (in France and Germany there is a 5:1 ratio of Muslims to local populations and in the Netherlands and Belgium there is 6 and 8:1 ratio respectively) (see Pedziwiatr's chapter). Aminah Mohammad-Arif's case study of South Asian Muslim youth in

the USA clearly brings out this variable. With US immigration controls acting as a filter, allowing only professionals to enter, South Asian Muslim youth are highly educated and have high aspirations that make them have the same aspirations, desires and attainments of their middle class counterparts; the representation of them is not as rioters, gangs or as segregated communities.

Islamophobia

The emergence of Muslim identity is misrepresented by the media who whip up moral panic and xenophobia about the globalisation of Islamic fundamentalism: a moral panic that intersects and reinforces existing racist outlooks and xenophobic discourses, forming new combinations of discrimination. Huntingdon's thesis, 'The Clash of Civilizations' (1998), is a typical but flawed example of the reworking of orientalist ideologies that reinforce the tropes of folk devils and demonisation of Muslims. In the era of globalisation, new orientalist ideologies are refashioned, continuing to demonise Islam rather than exploring conditions that generate marginalisation and social exclusion. Consequently, Islamic groups in many European countries argue that a new phenomenon has emerged, Islamophobia, in the post-cold war world: a negative stereotype of Muslims that justifies their oppression and violence at multiple levels.

Racism and orientalism have a long historical legacy intimately tied to the formation of modernity but reconstituted over different historical periods in various ways. Islamophobia's historical legacy is found in orientalism; there are multiple strands that juxtapose Christian Europe versus Islam, and the process of otherisation is also found in the construction of modernity. Huntingdon's argument simply resurrects these orientalist discourses in the context of a post-cold war world. The categories, racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism are common terms but Islamophobia is a more recent coinage, which only emerged in print in 1991 in the USA. It is the reformulation and reimagining of orientalist discourse in a new context. Not the most elegant of terms, it was defined by The Runnymede Trust's report as 'useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam – and therefore to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims' (Runnymede, 1997, p1). The phenomenon has become much more explicit in the last 20 years. Islamophobia belongs to a family of racisms that include anti-black, anti-Asian, anti-Turk, anti-Arab, anti-Irish, anti-Jewish and anti-Roma forms of racism.

There are, however, two strands that are common in the family of racisms. One strand, visible difference, focuses on pigmentation, body and hair type and differentiates around notions of racial differences. The other strand highlights cultural differences, religion, language, dress, and kinship patterns, and emphasises these differences as a way of

framing differentiation and hierarchy (Gilroy, 1987; Wieworka, 1995; Barker, 1981). The postmodern turn increasing sensitivity to cultural identity makes the emphasis on cultural difference a reference point for discrimination consistent with contemporary trends in social change.

Post-9/11 Islamophobia has become intensified with the fear of terrorism conflating with general unease with Muslim populations settled in Europe. Evidence collated by European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia post-9/11 shows that there has been an increase in low levels of physical violence in most EU countries, and verbal abuse, harassment and aggression has become more widespread. Muslim women, particularly those who wear hijab, asylum seekers and others who appear to look like Muslims or Arabs have been subjected to threats and violence, and mosques and Islamic cultural centres have been targeted. Neo-Nazi and far right groups have increased their activity in a general context where xenophobic sentiments have increased. While most politicians have attempted to engage in inter-faith and inter-community dialogue, some have attempted to gain political capital, particularly where concerns with terrorism conflate with immigration. It was also noted that sensationalism of stereotypical representation of Muslims increased in the media (Allen & Nielsen, 2002).

Claire Alexander demonstrates that Muslims have become the new folk devil, and representations of them seamlessly portray terrorists, rioters and criminal gangs resulting in moral panic. The moral panic triggers neo-orientalist discourses in social policy where conceptions of culture that privilege religion become the dominant mode of understanding by media and policy makers. A triple demonisation of Muslims has taken place, particularly in the UK, where a conflation of religious militancy and cultural misogyny merges with ghetto masculinity and criminalisation. Islamophobia's impact in social policy is resulting in an inability to see violence as a social phenomenon emerging from social exclusion and economic marginalisation. The impact of moral panic and the construction of Muslims as new folk devils leads to them being demonised as terrorists, rioters and criminal gangsters.

Discrimination Legislation

Comparative approaches to central issues of governance and citizenship indicate specific social policy issues that need to engage with Muslims, and youth in particular. Tufyal Choudhury's paper shows that there are difficulties in investigating comparative social policy on the European level for a number of reasons. The issue of statistical evidence is clearly a difficulty that still has to be engaged with. Statistical comparability is an issue because data is collected in terms of immigrant and citizen does not necessarily compare like with like. In the case of Germany,

citizenship is exceedingly difficult to acquire even when younger generations of migrants are born there, while in the UK and France, citizenship is acquired much more easily. Ethnicity is recorded in the UK, but only in the 2001 census was religion included. In the case of Italy, there are no statistics on ethnicity, and this has been used as a defence by the authorities against accusations of discrimination. Germany has legislation that prevents the collection data on ethnicity. In France religious data is illegal, and in Spain it is mainly due to lack of political will. Without statistical data, it is difficult to gauge the degree of discrimination and its significance.

Discrimination legislation also varies. There is no comprehensive legislation on discrimination in Germany or Spain. In Italy, constitutional anti-discrimination provision is complemented by legislation dealing with direct and indirect discrimination, but low public awareness has resulted in little use of this protection. France has a comprehensive discrimination law that is framed within the Republican principle of equality for individuals. Muslim claims challenge this notion of equality, and France does not recognise minorities or group rights, but this position is slowly changing with the establishment of a Muslim council by the authorities. The legislation includes direct discrimination, but this is not clearly defined as it clashes with Republican ideals. In the case of the United Kingdom, there is no

comprehensive anti-discrimination act except in Northern Ireland. The Race Relation Act does not cover religion or incitement to religious hatred, though some minorities, Sikhs and Jews, are covered through indirect legislation. The MacPherson Report defined institutional racism, but it has the same weakness as the Race Relation Act in that it does not cover religion. Similarly, in Belgium, religion is not included in the legislation, and this lacuna has been exploited. The General Act on Equal Treatment in the Netherlands, however, covers religious discrimination and has been actively used, resulting in case-law (Open Society Institute, 2002; Glavanis, 1999).

Tufyal Choudhury's paper argues that there is a clear need for EU legislation on discrimination which includes religious discrimination. There is at present an EC directive covering employment, but its scope needs to be widened and made more extensive. This recommendation follows the US example that has introduced a Freedom of Religion Act. The motives for implementing the FRA were dubious at best: it was designed to capture the moral high ground, allowing the USA to pontificate on religious freedom to third world countries and, in particular, to Muslim states. The act comprehensively covers Muslims, and there have been a number of cases, mainly in employment, around the issue of wearing beards and hijab that have successfully used the

legislation in a court of law (Moore, 2002). At present the act has been temporarily suspended because of the War on Terrorism.

Terrorism legislation, according to Les Levidow, has had a pernicious impact on Muslims, resulting in the criminalisation of Islamic 'fundamentalists', refugees and asylum seekers, and creating moral panic. The Terrorism Act of 2000 in the UK had a broad definition that stigmatised community networks and community activists. The Terrorism Act of 2001 in the UK created further difficulties for Muslims; the Act unilaterally produced a UK definition of terrorism for which there is no international consensus. The international community is divided by the debate that one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist, but the UK definition was open-ended and made to apply globally. Its intention, according to some writers, was to frighten people and curtail their right of freedom of speech. The Terrorism Act of 2001 extended police powers, allowing arrests, mainly of Muslims, for indefinite periods. So far 562 arrests have been made under the Act but only 97 have been charged and 14 convictions (there are some large cases pending) (Guardian 5/8/2004), it was also used to make collective arrests, where the families of individual suspects were also taken in for questioning by the police. Ordinary illegal activity now became portrayed as terrorist plots, such as the ricin poison case. Imran Khan raises the key question, 'On what ground and what circumstances

should the state be able to criminalize the activity of its citizens?' – a question raised by legal experts. The unease with the legislation has been reflected in the upper echelons of the judicial hierarchy, and Lord Woolf reminded the establishment that they should avoid making the mistakes of World War II and the rounding up of aliens. Such scenarios are permissible with the Act that affects asylum seekers, refugees and foreigners.

Levidow's paper suggests that Britain has attempted to influence the European Union and make them adopt similar draconian legislation on terrorism. Under UK influence the EU's War on Terrorism has led to the banning of a number of Muslim groups and the increased regulation of refugees and asylum seekers. The EU council redefined terrorism in a similar style to the United Kingdom. This has resulted in group approaches to policing and punishment becoming permissible across Europe, resulting in entire communities being treated with suspicion and hostility and threatened their economic resources through the freezing of property, cash and business accounts, all in the name of terrorism. Formal and informal banking networks in the Muslim communities have been subject to intense scrutiny or have been shut down and Muslim charities have been adversely affected. It is resulting in a failure to differentiate between legitimate political activity and terrorism – an increasingly worrying development as many refugees and asylum

seekers are political activists who have been persecuted in their countries of origin. The moral panic has led to the stereotyping of Muslim parties and organisations as a source of insecurity and concern. Consequently, there has been a blurring of the distinction between political activity, community networks, immigration issues and organised violence. Muslim communities are treated as dangerous, and their networks are under suspicion for having links to terrorism. Human rights activists are arguing that anti-terror legislation is an attack on democracy per se, and needs to be changed. Human rights should not be sacrificed on the altar of security.

The question that comes to mind is what will be the Muslim communities response to the 'war on terror' in the long run? This is primarily a battle of hearts and minds and without their support al-Qaeda and it's allies will not find fertile ground to work in. However media moral panics portrayal Muslims as folk devils leads to misguided, inappropriate and aggressive legislative responses. The banning of the veil in French schools or the excessive use of anti-terrorism laws in Britain carries the risk of alienating Muslims, in particular the youth, who are explicitly conscious of their rights as citizens. Individual European nations as well as the European Union need to provide the space for Muslim communities that allows for their incorporation as citizens based on equality. There needs to recognize that there is an

identity shift taking place, that appearance and essence are different things as Muslim youth become European and what the French see as threatening; Muslim women wearing hijab, can be turned around as in the of the UK, which allow Muslim police officers to wear the hijab. Instead of challenging the law it can become a symbol of law enforcement. This does not necessarily means that all conservative Muslim demands should be met but meeting some of issues allows for the disaggregation of Muslims into a range of opinion and positions. Ultimately for the youth only substantive efforts on central issues of access to the labour market and legislation against and monitoring of discrimination in particular Islamophobia will reassure them that they have place and their contribution is welcomed in the new Europe.

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SECTION 1:

ISLAM IN EUROPE:

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW

The first chapter of this book focuses on demography and representative organisations among Muslim minorities of Europe through careful assessment of demographic and statistical information. It highlights varied histories in the origin and process of migration and its important impact upon the structure and composition of the constituent populations. This in turn has affected the nature of social and political organisation in each of the countries under consideration. This chapter also looks specifically at policies relating to Muslim minorities and their organisations in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden and provides a rich source of background information on these communities. This serves as the contextual basis for the ensuing discussion of diverse Islamic culture and polity in the remainder of the book. In particular the first chapter highlights the demographic youthfulness of Muslim communities and the difficulties experienced in nearly all of the countries in question, for social and political recognition. A similar theme is taken up by Turner in the second chapter, where the image of Muslim culture and polity is described as being historically steeped in 'otherness' in the Western European tradition. This Turner argues is intrinsic to the 'Orientalist' academic tradition, which has so powerfully shaped the dominant paradigm in the study and understanding of Islam as an unchanging, static and regressive force. In turn, this outlook has acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy, reinforcing separation, suspicion and to some extent mutual hostility. Turner sets this perspective in the economic and social dislocation created by neo liberal policies particularly in the social and economic sectors of many European countries. The chapter explores the devastating consequences of the combination of this paradigm as well as the policies, for social cohesion creating at national and global level, an under class that serves as the firm basis for religious revivalism.

1

Muslims in Europe: Demography and Organisation

Konrad Pedziwiatr

Emergence of Muslim communities in Europe

The fact that Islam is the second largest religion in Europe is the result of relatively recent immigration processes. Despite significant differences in the national typology of such processes, one may also point out some common features. One such common factor is an increasing trend towards restriction; following a period of an open door policy, due mainly to the need for cheap labour, immigration laws in most countries of the EU have become increasingly restrictive. They have been narrowed down to the acceptance of new migrants only for family reunification, or refugees fleeing persecution and professionals who have already acquired jobs and finally students wishing to study. Thus, while up to the mid 1970s migrants of Muslims origin, were arriving at large numbers as a complement to the labour force from the mid-1980s onwards, they have been arriving mostly as political refugees.

In France, for example, although migrants from the Muslim world had already begun to settle in the 19th century, they had not arrived in significant numbers until the end of the Second World War. In the 1950s, Muslims who arrived in France were mainly of Algerian origin and were followed by immigrants from Morocco, Tunisia, sub-Saharan West Africa (mainly Senegal and Mali) and Turkey. In response to the economic recession of the mid 1970s French immigration controls were to rapidly tighten and restrictions were introduced. Between 1977 and 1981 for example, France was subsidising migrants to return to their countries of origin. The aim of this policy was to achieve the return of one million people. However, this policy met with little success, and the eventual formal registration of 130 000 clandestine settlers in 1981-2 could be interpreted as a clear admission of its failure (Nielsen 1992).

As in most European countries, the first phase of the migration of Muslims consisted predominantly of males, seeking work. However Algerian migrants had already begun to bring their families over in the 1950s. But the process of the family reunification in the case of the other Muslim groups began much later. Despite differential migration patterns during the earlier phases, various Muslim population groups had reached roughly the same gender distribution by 1982 (ibid.). Although there were numerous immigration barriers, France remained

an attractive destination for many migrants not only from the Maghreb but also the Middle East. A recent Eurostat study has revealed that some 29 per cent of Moroccans and 10 per cent of Turks emigrating from their countries chose to go to France (Eurostat 2001).

Emigration from Turkey and Morocco



Figure 1

Source: Eurostat (2001) Statistics in Focus: Why do People Migrate?

The settlement of the second largest Muslim population in Europe on the territory of Germany began from 1961. It is not a coincidence that the date of the erection of the Berlin Wall, which blocked the entry of East Germans, is also the date when a bilateral recruitment agreement was signed between Turkey and Germany, to ensure a steady supply of cheap labour. A guest worker scheme was also established with other

Muslim countries and recruitment agreements were signed with Morocco in 1963 and with Tunisia in 1965.

The pattern of immigration into Germany was altered during the economic recession in the mid 1970s and during the following decade, when a growing number of refugees from various parts of the world including Turkey, Iran, and Arab countries began to arrive to the country. This form of immigration was further strengthened in the 1990s, with the arrival of the political refugees from the former Yugoslavia, Palestine and Afghanistan. Today the migration flow into Germany remains one of the highest in Europe (see figure 2). Without this immigration however, Germany would have experienced a population loss.

Total immigration in selected European countries

	1996	1997	1998	1999
Belgium	*61 522*	*58 849*		*68 466*
Denmark	*54 445*	*50 105*	*51 372*	*50 236*
France			*100 014*	*57 846*
Germany	*959 691*	*840 633*	*802 456*	*874 023*
Holland	*108 749*	*109 860*	*122 407*	*119 151*
Sweden	*39 895*	*44 818*	*49 391*	*49 839*
UK	*258 000*	*285 000*	*332 390*	*354 077*

Figure 2
Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2003, p.93

Until the beginning of the 1960s, entry into Britain by citizens of British colonies and member countries of the Commonwealth was unrestricted. The first Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 introduced

restrictions on immigration into Britain. Although, it was intended to discourage Pakistanis and people from Commonwealth countries from migrating to the country, it turned out to have the opposite effect. The 'unintended effect' of the 1971 Immigration Act was, that a significant number of Pakistanis and immigrants from other countries entered Britain, in an effort to 'beat the ban' (Shaw 1994). On the other hand, the closing of the gates of labour immigration also generated an inflow of migrants in larger numbers, because of the already existing networks of migration - the 'chains' of migration in which seamen and soldiers acted as the first links. The voucher system, briefly introduced under the 1962 Act (until the end of 1967) further strengthened the existing pattern of migration: that is, migration through the family and kinship networks. From the 1970s onwards, the immigration flow has been restricted mainly to family reunification and asylum migration, which has not taken place without difficulties for immigrants due to the application of strict criteria for entry.

As with the situation of Great Britain and France, Muslim migration to the Netherlands is characterised by post-colonial links. However the flows into the Netherlands have not been as substantial in number as with France and Britain. Among the immigrants arriving to the country after the world war II there were only pockets of Muslims from from Indonesia and the Moluccans (former colonies). More numerous groups

started to arrive from the Dutch Guyana (Surinam) at the end of 1960s and especially so in the years before it proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands (1975).

The arrival of the immigrants who make up today the largest Muslims groups in the country started in the 1960s. The recruitment agreements were signed with Turkey in 1964 and with Morocco in 1969.. In recent decades one has seen the arrival of a growing number of asylum seekers, from specific parts of the Muslim world. In the 1980s they arrived mainly from Iran and Iraq while in the 1990s, the arrivals were mainly from Somalia and Afghanistan reflecting political tensions and crisis in each of those regions (Maréchal 2002:156).

The emergence of a Muslim migrant population in Belgium has similar roots to that of the Netherlands and Germany. The main waves of such migration began in the early 1960s, when agreements were signed with Morocco and Turkey. This was followed at the end of the 1960s with agreements to import workers from Algeria and Tunisia. In contrast to the Netherlands, Belgium had few relations with the Arab Islamic world during colonial days. By 1974, its government had begun to impose strict conditions for the entry of foreign labour. Belgium however continued to remain one of the most liberal countries in Europe as far as policies on family reunification are concerned.

The main inflow of workers from Muslim countries into Sweden began in the mid 1960s; Muslim of Turkish and Yugoslavian origin were the first Muslim groups that settled in the country. These were followed by smaller groups of Moroccans, Pakistanis and Egyptians. As elsewhere, the nature of Muslim immigration changed in the 1970s, towards family reunion, but in Sweden another channel of immigration emerged, namely that of the entry of refugees.

Sweden had been until the late 1980s the country with the most liberal refugee policy in Europe. As a result many Turks, Iranians, Palestinians and Lebanese, refugees, arrived in Sweden. It is important to note though that many migrants coming from the so-called Muslim countries were not Muslims[1]. This is one of the reasons why it is particularly difficult exercise to estimate the actual numbers of Muslims in Sweden.

Family Reunification and Institutionalisation of Islam

The primary motive for migration of people from Muslim countries to Europe was economic as with most other migration processes. Many came with the firm intention of returning in order to enjoy the fruits of

[1] In fact, a large number of Turks arriving to Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s were Syrian Orthodox Christians, equally many Lebanese were Maronites, and some Iranians and Palestinians were of Christian faith.

their labour in retirement. As a matter of fact, many of them did return to their native land, but a significant number did not and the longer they stayed, the more powerful mythology of a future return they built. This perception acted as the rationale for the endurance of hardship in work and in living conditions, in order to generate as much savings as possible and that, which could later be sent to their country of origin. Yet, another function of the ‘myth of return’ was to legitimise continued adherence to the norms and values of their home country, and to condemn assimilation with the culture of their host society (Greaves 1996: 58).

Though, on the whole, the classic myth was fulfilling its functions very efficiently, there were some exceptions; for example, 'single male' migrants in early post-war Britain were partially affected - as many researchers have suggested - by the 'corrupting influences' of host society (Shaw 1994: 41). Apart from the individual daily prayers and 'rites of passage', religious practices hardly existed during this period. There were, no ‘purpose-built’ mosques, nor any organised religious activities as were part of the set up for Muslim immigrants at that time. Muslim migrants to France, Germany and other European countries were not there in order to pray to Allah and proselyte, (to perform *dawah* among the host society) as some ulema (Muslim scholars) would have liked but rather in order to earn money. As 'inter-continental

commuters', they did not care much about religion at this early stage of migration. The practice of religion was 'over there', back home, but not in France, Britain or Germany. Talking about the Pakistanis in Britain, Jones for example notices that 'the migrant lived and worked in Britain on behalf of his family, who, it may be surmised, prayed on his behalf' (Jones 1993:24*)*. The locus of religion was with the family, as it was in the case of migrants from other ethnic groups.

It should not be surprising, then, that the role of Islam as a way of life governing not only religious practice and morality but also social relations, marriage, divorce, kinship, economic and political relations, grew enormously following the arrival of wives and children. Thus, their arrival, which took place mainly in the 1970s, marked a turning point in the establishment of Islam in the countries of EU.

First of all, reunion with family had a strong conservative influence on lifestyles within the Algerian, Pakistani, Turkish and other large Muslim communities in Europe. Shifting from a sojourner status - sustained by the myth of return - to the permanent settlement meant, inter-alia, the end of 'bachelor lifestyles' for many immigrants of the era of single-male worker migration. In Britain, behaviour that would previously pass without comment - as the lonely immigrants sought comfort among local women - began to be regarded as deviant, and hence was frowned

upon (Ballard 1994: 15). Thus, along with the emergence of 'community', through family reunification some of the conventional norms rooted in social relations through the practice of faith Islam began to be established. The lack of social engagement and absence of welfare facilities in the early days of family reunification meant that many gladly turned to faith as solace. This would have been reinforced by, low levels of education as well as the rural origin of many immigrants of all faiths, where religious organisations had played an important welfare function, in the absence of any other public provision.

Secondly, family reunion also widened the scope for interaction among migrants of Muslim origin within host society. As Nielsen has observed, men on their own had interacted only minimally with the wider environment but with the arrival of women and children these interactions became somehow inevitable (Nielsen 2000). Health centres and schools for example were the main institutions in host societies with which the immigrants began to interact. Since the communities were young with a high proportion of women having children, these interactions, once established, were quite frequent.

With the increasing interaction with host society and its institutions, Islam as a way of life and as an expression of particular meanings and values, began to play an increasingly important role in the lives of migrants, in several recipient countries. The context thus began to

change from migrants being passive workers to an active one, which was a significant factor in the establishment of a new form of 'identity'. The identity and function of the Muslim migrant ceased to be merely an individual matter for the individual migrant; through obtaining access to social services such as education the migrant had entered the wider social sphere where the issue of the Islamic faith became an increasingly important, and more 'public' matter. However this process was to become established only through the creation of a significant number of Muslim organisations.

Muslims in the countries of the European Union have organised themselves in many ways. They have established institutions ranging from mosques, prayer halls, schools, halal butchers, religious radio stations, own language newspapers to representation through political parties. In some cases they have managed to appoint Muslim chaplains in hospitals, prisons, armed forces and successfully lobbied for changes in state policies regarding various issues affecting migrant communities of Muslim origin [2] As a result of such efforts some have managed to create what has been described by sociologists as 'plausibility structure' (Berger 1969: 42) reflected by a network of social relations within which some core religious beliefs and values are articulated.

[2] For example in the UK the Muslim lobby united with other religious groups have managed to convince the government to include the question on religious identification in the census 2001.

The establishment of various Muslim organizations, which are a vital element of a system of 'coping' has enabled the first generation of immigrants, to pass on some of the values of the Islamic faith to their children, born in non-Muslim countries, which is an issue of considerable concern for the first generation of migrants. In recent years however a different kind of Muslim organisations have come to the fore. The marginalization and exclusion experienced by migrants of Muslim origin in most countries, as evidenced by this project had fuelled the desire among migrants of Muslim origin for their own representative organisations. As a result, the issue of representing Muslims in a dialogue with state institutions has been placed very high on the agenda of most Muslim organisations established in Europe. To some extent, this is also a result of the request put to Muslim migrant communities by individual European States, which have requested a 'single voice' of representation to deal with the needs and demands of Muslims communities. As Dilwar Hussain has observed, this request was in itself an illustration of wishful thinking due not only to the diversity of origin, but also because Muslim migrants had generally not been very skilfull at forming representative, coordinating bodies, effectively reflecting diversity by race class and locality (Hussain 2003: 245).

Profiles of Muslim Populations and their Representative Organisations

General remarks

The common problem of most research on Muslim minorities in Europe has been to identify those who would consider themselves Muslims and their socio-economical characteristics. Despite evidence of common features in the growth and development of the Muslim populations in the EU countries, there is no single methodological approach to their quantification. The differences in the way governments have pursued policies of integration have also had direct implications for the way the in which the identity of individuals is represented in official statistics.

European states differ not only in the way in which they represent individual and group identities in statistics, but in the frequency and manner with which they collect data on their populations. The differences in time, locality and definition, applies to the whole population and not to Muslim migrants alone. Early initiatives by the European Parliament to standardise the practice of the decennial census, including the type and form of information collected have not been successful. Some countries have moved towards register based statistics while others have not (Glavanis 1999).

Despite the efforts of Eurostat there is also little standardisation across countries in the dissemination of population statistics, either in format or in their detail. This is one of the reasons why it is most difficult to find data on the characteristics of Muslim migration to Europe on the Eurostat web site.With the exception of Great Britain, which in the 2001 census included the question on religious identification, the official population statistics available for the other countries are simply unable to provide an accurate reconstruction of the emergence and growth of the Muslim population. It is, however clear that without changes in the form of data collection, future estimations of the size of Muslim populations based on the indirect measurements will become less and less accurate. The estimates which rely on some form of demographic projections will also be increasingly problematic, since changes in the European Muslim population cannot be modelled simply as a function of net migration and natural increase (both extremely difficult to foresee); models would also have to include assumptions about movement between non-Muslim and Muslim populations in the form of inter-marriages and conversions (or a decline in practice of faith), and about religious practice among the offspring of such unions. Given the number of uncertainties involved, it seems certain that estimates derived in this way would have to fall within a very wide, margins of error.

Finally, it is important to stress that profiles of Muslims communities presented below show only some of their features, pending upon the availability of data. They can almost certainly be improved upon by a more exhaustive search of sources in the individual countries concerned. The task here however has been only to provide an overview of what may be gleaned about Muslim populations across Europe, utilising data that is relatively freely accessible in the public domain.

Muslim populations in selected European Countries

Country	Estimate	Source
France	4 000 000 – 5 000 000	Buijs, F. and Rath, J. (2002)
	4 155 000	Amiraux V. (2002)
	4 000 000 – 5 000 000	Maréchal, B., coord. (2002)
Germany	3 000 000	Buijs, F. and Rath, J. (2002)
	3 040 000	Maréchal, B.. coord. (2002)
	3 200 000 – 3 500 000	NOCRIME (www.nocrime.org)
Great Britain	1 591 000	Office for National Statistics (2003)
	2 000 000	Choudhury T. (2002)
	1 400 000 – 1 800 000	NOCRIME (2002) (www.nocrime.org)
Netherlands	696 000	Buijs, F. and Rath, J. (2002)
	695 000	Maréchal, B., coord. (2002)
	920 000	Statistics Netherlands (2003)
Belgium	370 000	Buijs, F. and Rath, J. (2002)
	400 000	Bousetta, H. (October 2003)
	350 000	Religious Freedom Report (2002)
Sweden	250 000 – 300 000	Buijs, F. and Rath, J. (2002)
	350 000	Religious Freedom Report (2003)
	350 000	Sander, A. and Larsson, G.(2003)

Figure 3

France

The Muslim population of France account for approximately 4 to 5 million adherents constituting some 7 to 8 percent of the total population. One of the more recent estimates based on the cultural definition of what it means to be Muslim, provides the figure of

4 155 000 (Amiraux 2002:74). However, there is no reliable data on the number of Muslims in the country. The collection of statistics on religious affiliation is not permitted, and the census does not ask questions regarding religion. The fact that a large part of the Muslim community was born in France and holds French nationality further hinders any estimation. Most of the children of Maghrebian immigrants or *beurs (from the slang reconstruction of the word 'Arabe')* and other Muslims who have French citizenship for example, are simply indistinguishable from the non-Muslim majority in existing data based on citizenship or country of birth.

Muslims in France, like the followers of Islam throughout the world, are diverse in terms of cultures, languages and traditions. They come from different countries and belong to different ethnic groups. The most numerous group – almost 3 million - come from the Maghreb. Among these, some 1,550,000 are of Algerian origin; 1,000,000 of Moroccan origin, and 350000 of Tunisian origin. There are also approximately 450 000 *harkis* or Algerian repatriates and their descendents. Other more substantive groups include people who emigrated from Turkey (315 000), the Middle East (100 000), Sub-saharan Africa (250 000) and approximately 100,000 Asians. France also has one of the highest numbers of converts to Islam. Again there is no reliable source for this although the figure of 40 000 is most often quoted (Maréchal 2002:69).

One has also to take into account approximately 350,000 asylum applicants and illegal workers who are of Muslim origin (HCI Report 2001:37–38).

Muslims are settled throughout the country, but there are concentrated communities in the regions of Marseilles, Lyons, Lille and above all, Paris. Within this general situation it is interesting to note that Moroccans are much more widely spread outside these centres, than either Algerians or Tunisians. People of African descent are concentrated in and around the capital, with smaller communities in all areas of industry, especially around Lille. Although the majority of Muslims in France continue to live in big cities, one may also find an increasing number of them, especially those of Turkish origin, in rural areas. Apart from the greater Paris region Turkish people are to be found mainly in the eastern regions centred on Alsace and Lorraine.

The latest national census in 1999, revealed more than 3 million ‘foreigners’, which constitutes some 5,6 percent of the total population of the country, of 58 million. This proportion increases to more than 15 percent in some underprivileged districts where the majority of ‘foreigners’ are of Muslim origin. These numbers illustrate the extent of social problems experienced by Muslims in the country. The repercussions of these problems might be found in the domains of

employment, health, education, security and others (INSEE www.insee.fr).

Muslims and especially the youth are more strongly represented among the unemployed. One can observe a rise in immigrant entrepreneurship in France as well as in other European countries (Glavanis 1999). Faced with a lack of employment options, self-employment has become a way of avoiding exclusion in the labour market. Immigrant communities and minority groups are skilfully utilising social capital and ethnic niches in the economy in setting up their own businesses.

In terms of insurance cover and medical consultation, 78 percent of French people have complementary insurance, compared to just 57 percent of the migrants reflecting the nature of employment While French people tend to consult a doctor 6 times per year, the Maghrebians consult their doctor 3 times and the Francophone Muslim Africans only twice. One of the consequences of this situation might be much higher infant mortality rate amongst the Maghrebian children (12 per 1000) in comparison with the national average (9 per 1000) (Glavanis 1999:99).

As the EFFNATIS project (2001) has discovered a strong relationship between the level of education of children of immigrants and their gender. Generally, Muslim women are far more likely to have attained higher levels of education than men. The census data show that the

number of unqualified workers among foreigners is twice as high than among the native French.

Muslim associations in the country have formed several federations to identify and represent common interests vis-à-vis the State. The national organizations that have sought recognition as the official representatives of the Muslim community include, among others, the National Federation of the Muslims of France (FNMF), the Paris Mosque, the Union of the Islamic Organisations of France (UOIF), and the Tabligh. These are the main players in the recently established *Conseil Français du Cult Musulman.*

CFCM - Conseil Français du Cult Musulman

This representative board for Muslim worship in France was created in April 2003 after more than a decade of intense discussions between various Muslim organisations and successive Ministers of Interior, ambassadors and scholars. It constitutes an elected national body in charge of issuing principal statements on central religious topics and embodying the partnership with public authorities nationally and locally. The CFCM is made of a general assembly and twenty-five regional agencies called the Conseils Regionaux du Cultu Musulman (CRCM) in charge of the daily management of the Muslim communities' affairs, in particular relations with the French public administration. Among its aims and objectives are: to defend the dignity

and interests of Islam (the Muslim worship) in France, to organise an exchange of services and information between the places of Muslim worship, to encourage dialog between religions and to ensure a space for the Muslim worship within the public space.

UOIF (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France)

The organisation established in 1983 in La Courneuve (Seine-Saint-Denis), is the strongest Muslim federations in the country. It is formed from a mixed ethnic group of Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians and has some 200 organizations as affiliates. Ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian spiritual leader Rachid Ghannouchi, it strives for the space for Islam in the public domain and refuses to limit the role of religion to the private sphere. Among its activities are: looking after mosques, organizing theological seminars and seminars on the inter-faith dialog as well as Islamic summer camps for the youth. It is the French branch of the Union of the Islamic Organisations in Europe. It manages the European Institute of Social Sciences of Saint Léger de Fougeret (Nièvre) for imams and religious educators (opened in 1992). The institute aims “to give Islam stable structures responding to the needs of Muslims while taking into account the specificity of their surroundings.” The Institute has 160 students from France and other European countries. The financial support for these groups is provided by the Arab Gulf States.

FNMF (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France)

The FNMF was established on the basis of the Moroccan networks in 1985 in Paris to counterbalance the Algerian influences in Islam in France. It was inspired by the Muslim World League's Paris office. It aims to meet the religious, cultural, educational, social and humanitarian needs of Muslims. At the moment it has about 70 affiliated organisations and among these are, for example, significant mosques on the outskirts of Paris such as those of Evry Mantes la Jolie and Asnieres.

IMMP - L'Institute Musulman de la Mosquée de Paris

The Paris Mosque (established in 1926) includes more than 500 local associations among its members. Until 1993, it was financed by Saudi Arabia. Today it is funded by the financial contributions of its members (a majority of whom are of Moroccan origin), and is closely affiliated to the Algerian Government. It has always been closely associated with various Government initiatives. Its leader Dalil Boubakeur played an important role in the establishment of the Conseil Français du Cult Musulman.

Tablîgh

The Tabligh – a movement of Pakistani origin – is also a major actor within the Muslim community. The association of "Faith and Practice,"

which belongs to this movement, is especially active in providing assistance and services to the residents of the so-called disadvantaged districts of Paris. The organisation is based in the Ar-Rahma Mosque in Saint-Denis.

Le Comité Musulman des Turcs Français (CMTF)

It is the French equivalent of the German DITIB which closely cooperates with the Turkish DIYANET (The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Prime Minister's Office). It represents about 150 mosques in the country.

Germany

There are approximately 2.8 to 3.2 million Muslims living in Germany (approximately 3.4 percent to 3.9 percent of the population of 82 million). Similarly to France the national statistical office does not gather information about the religious affiliation of the country's inhabitants. Although on the website of the Federal Statistical Office[3] one may find information about the number of Protestants, Catholics and the followers of Judaism in the country, no data on other religious groups is provided. In contrast to France, the majority of Muslims in Germany do not posses a German passport. According to the Religious Studies Media and Information Service (REMID)[4] at the beginning of

[3] www.destatis.de accessed 10.11.2003
[4] www.remid.de accessed 10.11.2003

2000 only 310 000 Muslims (including ethnic Germans who converted to Islam) had German citizenship constituting some ten percent of the total.

Among a diverse Muslim population, the largest group consists of Turks, numbering 1.9 million out of whom some 35 percent was born in Germany. In addition to those of Turkish origin, there are larger numbers of Bosnian (above 150 000), Maghreb (above 120 00) and Afghan (almost 70 000) Muslims (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2003). The majority of German Muslims are Sunnis. There are, however, significant groups of Alawites (340 000) and Shias (140 000)(REMID).

Muslims in Germany usually live in larger cities that are primarily in the Western part of the country. Berlin, with more 180 000 Turkish inhabitants, is the biggest single Turkish community outside of Turkey. Apart from the Turks, there are also many Iranians, Afghans and Palestinians who settle in the capital. Other cities where one may find a large number of members of the above mentioned groups are Cologne, Düsseldorf, Duisburg, Munich and Hamburg. Ex Yugoslavians live mainly in Munich and together with the Turks and North Africans in Frankfurt am Main and Offenbach (Maréchal 2002:77).

Research suggests that there is a widespread perception that poor living and working conditions are accepted as ‘the norm’ for immigrants.

Unemployment represents one of the most serious conditions affecting Muslims in Germany. As Vogel and Cyrus have observed, the gap between foreigners and Germans had widened from 0,7 percent in 1979 to 8,5 percent in 1998. Moreover, whereas only 38 percent of unemployed Germans had no vocational qualifications in 1997, the figure among foreigners was 78 percent. The unemployment rate among 16-21 is estimated to be as high as 50 percent (Vogel and Cyrus, 2001:31) thus reflecting the insecurity and vulnerability among this population.

Unemployment rate of EU and non-EU nationals in 2001

(% of their active population 16 -64)



Figure 4

Source: LFS, Eurostat

As mentioned previously, one of the reasons why foreigners have difficulties in gaining access to the labour market is that they do not have sufficient educational or vocational qualifications. However as children of families that often themselves have had poor access to educational facilities, they lack knowledge, opportunities and access for their children thereby placing them in a cycle of deprivation and condemning them to low waged occupations. In addition, language problems act as a reason for children being sent by teachers to special schools, which additionally restrict their future prospects.

Social exclusion as many studies have shown is not simply a matter of material disadvantage or political marginalisation, it also involves significant cultural processes The report on *Migrant Insertion in the Informal Economy* (Reyneri 1999) for example shows how criminalisation of immigrants operates in the European countries. One of the results of this 'criminalisation' of foreigners is their over-representation in prison. In Germany the rate of imprisonment for natives in 1997 was 66 per 100 000 people, compared with 342 for foreigners among whose the youth of Turkish origin had a large stake. It means that imprisonment rate for foreigners, was five times higher than for natives. The same ratio of foreign to native imprisonment one may find in France, whereas in the Netherlands and Belgium is higher (6 and 8 times higher respectively). The authors of the report point out that

many of the natives in these estimations are naturalised immigrants, so the immigrant/ethnic minority over-representation is actually even higher (Pallida et al., 1999:26). Social exclusion reinforces the overall function of migration labour as a whole, to serve as a low skilled labour force and is reflective of a wider level of exclusion and dispossession rather than being a condition intrinsic to migrant communities. The process of the criminalisation of such communities is one effect of poverty and degradation and operates at multiple levels.

In Germany neither the state nor Muslim groups have succeeded in appointing officials who could act as representative link between the two parties. The traditional relationship between state agencies and the German churches has been used erroneously, as the basis for interpreting the needs of Muslim migrant communities that remain diverse in origin and practice, unlike their German counterparts. The opportunities for contact between Muslims and state institutions are thus diminished and there is as a result, a serious under-representation of Muslims, at national and local level decision -making process including key agencies of the government, the civil service, in public appointments, in the media, among the police, the judiciary, the health service, education service etc. It is evident that a range of representative organisation exists in Germany despite the limitations placed upon civic recognition.

ISLAMRAT BD - Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland

The German Islamic Council was formed in 1986 with the cooperation of the World Muslim Congress, the Nurculuk Movement and the Friends of Islam. Its members are from various ethnic backgrounds, including German converts, although key roles were play by members of *Milli Görüs*, which has around 200 mosques.

ZENTRALRAT MD - Zentralrat für die Muslime in Deutschland

The Central Council of Muslims in Germany was formed in 1994 It currently has around 20 organisations and networks affiliated to it, representing some 700 mosques and communities. It is composed of a broad ethnic mix. Among its aims are: the improvement of the legal and material situation of Muslims in the country and the stimulation of debate among the representatives of the member organisations.

DITIB - Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion

Created by DIYANET (The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Prime Minister's Office) in 1982 it represents the Turkish version of a 'laic' state controlled Islam. Despite its official connection with the Turkish State, the DITIB is of one of few Muslim organizations in Germany, which by public opinion is considered as a legitimate partner for the German authorities. The DITIB brings in religious teachers from

Turkey in an attempt to keep the religious connection with the Turkish state alive. The facilities offered by this organisation, are diverse and ranges from language courses to the provision of Muslim *burial.*

AMGT – Avrupa Milli Görüs Teskilatlari/Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs

This is one of the most influential Turkish-Muslim federations in Germany that was established in 1972. It has a wide range of activities ranging from Quranic classes to social and cultural activities, to political / educational conferences. Having close links with the Turkish Refah Party, the AMGT advances a political vision of Islam. However the organisation remains ideologically diverse with the younger generation of German Muslims, trying to utilise this entity to stake a claim in German society. Although the organisation has never attempted to create a political party or challenge the political establishment it is under close scrutiny of the *Verfassungsschutz* or the intelligence services, which targets groups potentially hostile to the constitutional order of the country. The AMGT has been publishing a journal known as the Milli Gazzete, since 1995.

VIKZ – (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren)

This organisation is closely linked with the Suleymanci movement in Turkey, and was established in 1973. From its purely Mystical origin

the VIKZ have become increasingly political. It tries to achieve its political goals via mobilisation through education. The organisation has built a wide network of educational institutions in the country, and offers services ranging from weekend courses, to the formation of imams (in Cologne). Although its activities have been less publicised than for instance than those of the AMGT', it is also under scrutiny of the security services.

Great Britain

As a result of the lobbying campaign run by a number of religious organisations (among others the Muslim Council of Britain) a question about religious identity was included in the last Census in 2001. The topic was new to the Census in England, Wales and Scotland although the subject had been included in previous Censuses in Northern Ireland. The question which in England and Wales was voluntary was answered by 92 per cent of the population and revealed that Islam was the most common faith in Britain after Christianity (72 per cent) with nearly 3 per cent of the population, that is almost 1,6 million people describing themselves as Muslims (Office of National Statistics).[5]

Islam in Britain has a visible South Asian character. The largest number of Muslims in Britain originates from Pakistan (658 000 of whom some

[5] If not stated otherwise the information in this section come from Office for National Statistics http://www.statistics.gov.uk or General Register Office, Scotland http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk

54.5% were born in the UK), Bangladesh (260 000 of which 46.6% were born in the UK) and India (136 000). All together Muslims of South Asian origin constitute almost three quarters of the adherents of Islam in Britain. There are also sizeable groups from Cyprus, Malaysia and the Arab countries. In the Census data many of them are to be found within the category 'white' which accounts for 11,6 percent of the British Muslims. 6,7 percent of Muslims in Britain are black and many of them comes from such African countries as Somalia. The number of converts to Islam in the UK, is estimated at about 10 000 people.

Muslims are not evenly distributed throughout the country. The active kinship and friendship networks and the process of chain migration have contributed to the concentrations of Muslims in particular regions and cities. They are mostly to be found in the Greater London conurbation, where according to the latest census, some 607 000 inhabitants are of Muslim origin (map 1) as well as some other areas of the South-East, the Midlands, West Yorkshire and South Lancashire. There is also a concentrated Muslims in the central Clyde side region of Scotland.

London Muslim Population 2001



Figure 5

Source: Ordinance Survey Crown Copyright 2003

There are significant differences between various Muslim communities in terms of settlement patterns. For example, while Pakistanis are more dispersed nationally, the Bangladeshis are concentrated in large numbers in fewer areas, particularly in the East End of London in such districts as Tower Hamlets (71 000 - 36% of the population of the district are Muslims) and Newham (59 000 - 24%) which are also the districts with the highest proportion of the Muslim population in the country. Other large Muslim clusters are to be found in Birmingham (140 000 – 14 % of the total city population are Muslims) and Bradford (75 000 - 16 %).

The Muslim population in Britain is very young. 33.8 percent of Muslims are aged 0-15 years (national average is 20.2%) and 18.2% are aged 16-24 (national average is 10.9%). There are also fewer older people. However, at the other end over 50 percent of Muslims are under 25 years of age, compared with only 31 percent of the national average. The fact that there are more Muslim children of school age than in other groups has implications for issues that are relevant to the education of a relatively large number of Muslim children, with concentrations of Muslim populations. It is not uncommon in cities such as Birmingham, Leicester, Manchester or Bradford to find schools where 90 percent of pupils are of South Asian origin.

Pakistani and Bangladeshi households in Britain tend to be larger with 4.7 and 4.2 persons per household respectively, compared with the rest of the population (2.3 persons). Muslims in the country often live in joint and extended families. There are also fewer lone parent families among Muslims than in other groups. According to the recent data 15 percent of Pakistani families are lone parent families while the percentage for the White population amounted to 23 percent and 54 percent amongst the Black Caribbean (White 2002).

Research has shown that when the economic situation deteriorates, the unemployment rate of minorities rises' faster than the rest of society

(Modood 1997). In the UK, even in cities with a relatively small minority population, they account for a disproportionately large number of the unemployed. As the Labour Force Survey (Spring 2000) illustrates, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are two and a half times more likely than the white population, to be unemployed and nearly three times more likely to be in low paid jobs. The proportion of young men from ethnic minorities without jobs is considerably higher than for young men, even with the same levels of education and qualifications among the white population.

Like in the other countries Muslims are over-represented in the prison population. Almost 10 percent of British prisoners are Muslims. At the same time they are under-represented in the police, the judiciary, the civil service, the media and public appointments. [6] This data can be misleading as it does not differentiate between citizens and foreigners and many of those incarcerated are non-citizens incarcerated for narcotic trafficking.

There is no official Muslim representative organisation in the country. However since the New Labour government came to power in 1997, it has been tacitly supporting the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB-created at the same year) and which strives to establish itself as the voice of Muslims in country.

[6] http://data.webstar.co.uk accessed 11.11.2003

UMO - Union of Muslim Organisations

The Union of Muslim Organisations of UK & Ireland (UMO) was the first national umbrella organisation to be established in Britain in 1970 by representatives of some thirty- eight organisations. The number of its affiliates grew over subsequent years but it was unable to attract the support of the larger organisations that had already become established. It attempted to lobby the national government at a time when most decisions related to Muslims, were taking place at a local level. Its first objective was to "realise" Muslim unity. The other aims of the UMO were to co-ordinate the activities of all Muslim organisations in the UK and Eire and to act as the representative body of British Muslims, in negotiations with the British government as well as other governments and international bodies. For example this organisation offers help to individual Muslims to have the right to practise the tenets of Islam, while at work. The UMO National Muslim Education Council also offers help to teachers, through the provision of guidelines and a syllabus for Islamic Education. The organisation is a member of various inter-faith groups (Religious Education Council).[7]

MCB - Muslim Council of Britain

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is an umbrella organisation, which was inaugurated on November 23 1997 following three years of

[7] Union of Muslim Organisations of UK & Ireland (UMO), *1970-1995: A Record of Achievement, 25 Years Silver Jubilee Magazine* (1995), p. 6.

wide-ranging consultation at Brent Town Hall in Wembley by representatives of more than 250 Muslim organisations from all parts of Britain including Northern Ireland. In recent years' the organisation has been strengthened and is now considered to be one of the most representative organisations of Muslims in the country. There are currently about 350 institutions affiliated to it including mosques, education and charitable institutions, women and youth organisations and professional bodies, both national and regional. The composition of the membership is ethnically mixed. The organisation is opposed to labels such as 'ethnic minority' clearly favouring religious identification. As reflected by its web site the MCB's approach in dealing with civic affairs is one of participation, rather than agitation for demands; while in dealing with the government, it advocates constructive engagement. The MCB strives to deal with problems and influence policies and outcomes through effective participation in the political process.

Among its aims are: to promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK, to encourage and strengthen all existing efforts being made for the benefit of the Muslim community, to work for a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims in wider society, to establish a position for the Muslim community within British society that is fair and based on due rights, to work for the eradication of

disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims and to foster better community relations and work for the good of society as a whole.

MMP - Muslim Parliament

The Muslim Parliament was established in 1992 by the then Director of the Muslim Institute Kalim Siddiqui who had gained notoriety as a vocal supporter of the Iranian 'fatwa' or legal opinion against Rushdie. The organisation published the *'Muslim Manifesto'* in which it called for the establishment of islands of peace, harmony and moral excellence within British society which it considered afflicted with numerous social problems After the death of its founder in 1996, the organisation appears to have lost its dynamic and to decline in disputes over leadership. As a result of these disputes the Parliament's relationship with the Iran state also broke down.

MAB - Muslim Association of Britain

The Muslim Association of Britain was set up in 1997 by a group of Arab Muslims who felt largely left out in a country where representation is dominated by people of South Asian origin. The MAB web site claims that it was 'established as an institution in an attempt to fill the gap in terms of Islamic *dawah* work in Britain, where it feels that the call for a representative Islam that encompasses all aspects of life is

lacking. MAB tries to implement this through wisdom and good preaching'. The organisation which has about one thousand members, co-organised demonstrations with the 'Stop the War' coalition, which in September 2002 and February 2003 brought to the streets of London hundreds of thousands of people. Among its aims and objectives are: to spread the teachings and culture of Islam, install the Islamic principles in the hearts of Muslim community and enhance the good morals within the British society, to assist the Muslim community in maintaining its integrity and foster in them good Islamic conduct like worship of Allah, education and social relation especially ties of kinship. to Make Muslims aware of their duties towards the society, within which they are living, to promote an active role for the Muslim community in helping to solve the different problems of this society (like crime, drugs, unemployment, families' disintegration, etc.).

The Netherlands

According to available statistics, there were nearly 920 000 Muslims in the Netherlands in January 2003. This number is twenty thousand more than the previous year and some 294 thousand more than in 1995. In 2003, Muslims account for 5.7 percent of the total population of the Netherlands, compared with 4.1 percent in 1995. The number of Muslims has increased strongly with the growth of the non-western foreign population (see the graph below). More than 95 percent of

Muslims are of non-western descent. This does not mean, however, that a large majority of non-western foreigners are Muslims. In fact, only about 54 percent of non-western foreigners in the Netherlands are Muslims. 38 percent of non-western Muslims living in the Netherlands belonged to the second generation.[8] As the Dutch statistical office predicts, the population of Muslims in the country is expected reach one million in 2005.

Growth of the Muslim population in the Netherlands



Figure 6

Most Muslims originally came from Turkey (nearly 320 thousand) and Morocco (285 thousand). Together they account for two-thirds of the total Muslim population of the Netherlands. Other smaller groups of

[8] Muslims in the Netherlands are calculated on the basis of an estimate based on the number of foreigners in the Netherlands per country of origin, and the percentage of Muslims in the populations in these countries of origin. For people from Suriname, Morocco and Turkey, however, the percentage of Muslims was taken from the survey on the social position and use of provisions by foreigners in the Netherlands. The survey included a question on the religion of respondents. Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen, (2003) available on www.cbn.nl

Muslims come from Surinam, Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Afghanistan and Egypt. The Majority of the Turks and Moroccans have Dutch nationality.

As with other European countries, Muslims in the Netherlands are concentrated in urban centres. One may find them especially in four of the largest Dutch cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Whereas Muslims of the Turkish and Moroccan origin can be found in all of the above, mentioned cities the Surinamese are mostly concentrated in The Hague.

Members of the ethnic Minorities, on average, are appointed to lower positions and their position is often less secure than those of native Dutch employees with comparable education. They are also more often appointed on a temporary employment contract. Turkish and Moroccan employees in particular perform simple tasks that require little or no education. More recent data (Van Engelen 2003) indicate a slight improvement in the position of ethnic minorities on the labour market (see Table 3). However in 1999, Moroccans and Turks were seven and nine times more likely to be unemployed than native Dutch populations despite a substantial proportion of the former group being from the second generation.

Registered Unemployment in the Netherlands

	1986/8	1992	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
Turks	44	33	36	34	30	27	18
Moroccans	42	31	29	23	22	18	15
Surinamese	27	20	28	31	22	15	12
Antilleans	23	20	28	31	22	15	12
Dutch	13	4	6	5	4	3	2

Figure 7

source: Van Engelen 2003 (National Employment Strategy)

One of the root causes of the poor performance of ethnic minority pupils is over-representation of non-native pupils in the so called 'black schools' or schools where over 70% of the student population belong to an ethnic minority community.

There is a general consensus that a high concentration of ethnic minority students in certain schools is counterproductive to the integration of young people. Moreover, the quality of teaching in such schools also tends to be lower than in schools with a better mix of pupils.

As with the situation in Great Britain there are no Muslim organisation officially recognised by the State, which could represent all Muslims in the country. The attempts to establish a representative body incorporating Muslims from different national backgrounds have been hampered as in many other EU countries by diversity of origin of

migrants along national and ethnic lines; among the current groups, the following ones are supposed to be representative of Muslim migrants to the Netherlands.

NCM - National Council of Mosques

The National Council of Mosques is one of two organisations in the country (beside the *MCN - Muslim Council of the Netherlands)* which claims to represent a large section of the Muslim community. The key player in this group is the Diyanet-controlled Islamic Foundation Netherlands.

IFN - Islamic Foundation Netherlands

The Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands was founded in 1982 and covered 78 member associations in the early 1980s. It continued to grow slowly over the decades and today it is responsible for 140 mosques. It collaborates closely with the Diyanet, which provides the organisation with Imams whom they employ in its own member mosques.

UMMON - Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands

The Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations was founded in 1978 and covers some 100 mosques. Despite the assumed monarchical connections, mosques associated with UMMON, like other Moroccan

mosques, not associated with the umbrella body, have to find and employ their own imams, as they are not supplied by Morocco on the Turkish pattern.

MG - Milli Görüs

This movement of the 'national view' combines an orthodox Islam with Turkish nationalism was established in 1982 as the Netherlands Islamic Federation. It runs various kinds of projects and presides over some 30 mosques as well as 60 youth and women organisations.

Belgium

The number of Muslims in Belgium is estimated at around 400 000 people and constitutes some 4 percent of the total population. As in other countries of the EU, the Muslim population in Belgium is very young. Almost 35 percent of the Turks and Moroccans, who constitute the largest Muslim groups in Belgium are below 18 years old, compared to 18 percent of native Belgians. One of the consequences of this situation is that one-quarter of the population of Brussels is under 20 years old and are of 'Muslim origin' (Bousetta 2003:8).

In the country's multicultural Muslim community the largest groups are made up of Moroccans (230 000) and Turks (130 000). Members of the smaller groups come from Algeria (8 500), Tunisia (4 000) Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Syria and Egypt. According to Maréchal, 113 842 people from the 'Muslim countries' had acquired Belgium citizenship between 1985 and 1997. In addition, every year at least 8 000 Moroccans and 6 000 Turks receive Belgium citizenship. There are also some 6 500 political refugees in Belgium, from the Arab-Islamic world. The number of converts in early 2002 were between 3 000 and 15 000 (Maréchal 2002:21).

The spatial distribution of Muslims across Belgium reflects the nature and process of immigration. The greatest concentration is in Brussels with a significant remainder residing in the industrial areas of the French-speaking south. The Brussels conurbation is home to more than 50 percent of Moroccans in Belgium. They can be also found in Antwerp, Liege, Hainaut in the region of Charleroi and in Limburg. Half of the Turks have settled in Flanders, especially Antwerp, Ghent and Limburg. They live also in certain districts of Brussels (ex. Schaerbeek, Saint-Josse) and in the Walloon area of Belgium in the region of Hainaut and Liege (Bousetta 2003:8).

The 'Muslim Voices' project, found significant differences between the two major Muslim groups in the country. While the Turks still remain a very close-knit community maintaining many of their rural traditions (e.g. choosing spouses from one's parents' villages), the Moroccans

appear to be better integrated not only in the economic but also in the social, cultural and political sphere. They have for example a higher rate of mixed marriages with Belgians. The Turks on the other hand, seem to master the country's language less well than the Moroccans and consequently they also fare worse in school (Glavanis 1999:94).

All groups of non-EU nationals are over-represented among the unemployed. As is illustrated in the graph above (graph 1) they were five times more non-EU nationals being unemployed in Belgium, in 2001.

In a country where Islam has been a legally recognised faith since 1974, there was until recently no representative organisation for people of Muslim origin. Muslim groups were unable to organise themselves and agree upon a representative structure. Besides, strict criteria were required as a precondition for the formation of organisations. This was to ensure that Islamic 'fundamentalists' did not take over and thus created a more complex accreditation process.

EMB - l'Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique (Muslim Executive Council)

The EMB was established in May 1999 and is responsible for the administrative management of Muslim worship in Belgium. It plays the

role of a mediator between the state and Muslim communities in the country. Its responsibilities range from providing religious educations at schools and educational training for imams to the appointment of Muslims chaplainries in hospitals and prisons. The EMB is made up of some17 members, 7 of whom are Moroccans, 4 are Turks, 3 converts and 3 of other nationalities. The EMB has been receiving state subsidies since 2001. In 2002 the State supported the organisation with 420 000 Euros, while the Catholic Church was given 350 million Euros.

ICCB – Islamic Cultural Centre of Belgium

Until the establishment of the EMB the ICCB had been the de facto representative of Muslims in Belgium. Its board of trustees was chaired by the ambassador of Saudi Arabia. The land for the Centre was handed over to King Faisal in 1967, as a gift in exchange for donations he had made to set up the ICCB. The Centre was built with financial support of the Muslim World League.

AEL - Arab European League

The AEL since its inception 3 years ago aimed to defend the civic rights of Arabs in Europe and has attracted a following among the thousands of jobless, frustrated young immigrants who feel excluded by mainstream European society. Its leader, Abou Jahjah often portrayed by the media as Belgium's Malcolm X, is a charismatic debater with an

MA in international politics and fluency in 4 languages. The organisation together with a number of leftist parties set up a party called ‘Resist’, and ran in the elections of 2003. Taking into account the popularity of its leader its elections achievements were relatively poor. However, Abou Jahjah had already announced the creation of a new political party, named as the Muslim Democratic Party, with which he expects to achieve better results in the next national elections as well as the local elections in 2006.The AEL now has expanding branches, both in France and the Netherlands ad is attempting to become a pan European representative force.

MJM - Mouvement des Jeunes Musulmans

Similarly to the AEL the MJM also created a political party. Its Parti de la Citoyenneté et de la Prospérité achieved in the local elections in Brussels in May 2003 surprisingly good results

Sweden

There are approximately 350,000 Muslims in the country out of whom around 150,000 belong and participate in the activities of the ‘recognized’ by the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities, Swedish Muslim congregations. Around one-third of the country’s Muslims were born in Sweden. They belong to the extremely diverse community in which unlike in other European countries there is

no dominant group. Most of the Swedish Muslims are Sunnis. The number of Shias was at the end of the 1990s estimated to slightly over 60 000. The number of converts, mainly women married to Muslim men, is according to Sander and Larson not higher than 5 000 (Sander and Larson 2003:15).

Muslims in Sweden may be divided into seven different sub-groups: the Turks, the Arabs, the Iranians, the Africans, the Pakistanis, Muslims from the Balkans and from the rest of the world. The Turkish Muslims were the first Muslim group of any size to come to Sweden and until the beginning of the 1980 they were by far the largest single Muslim community in the country. However today, they constitute less than ten percent of the total Muslim population. Amongst Arab Muslims originating from almost twenty different countries, the Iraqis (52 000) constitute the largest group of which one third is made up of Kurds. With people from Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Palestine making up roughly one third of Muslims in the country.

The *Iranian group* is the second single largest group of ethnic Muslims in Sweden after the Iraqis with almost 52.000 individuals. The remaining four groups are smaller in size. (Sander and Larson 2003:13-15)

Swedish Muslims live mainly in the major cities such as Stockholm, where one can find them in the South and North-West part of the city, in Gothenburg (mostly in the North, East and South part of the city) and Malmö (in the City centre and South and East of the city). However, there are also some active Muslim communities outside big cities in the urban centres with the population of 30 000 to 90 000. There are virtually no Muslims in the rural areas.

In Sweden visible signs of religious affiliation (e.g. turban, shawl) especially in combination with dark skin colour, seem to be clear obstacles for obtaining work. Research shows that even in well-respected professions such as medicine, engineering and teaching Muslims are facing discrimination and disadvantage, thus affecting their integration in employment and with society at large. The Muslims in Sweden, depending on their origin, have between 4 to 10 times higher unemployment rates than native Swedes (Sander et al. 2001:22). Many Muslims are employed in unskilled jobs in the service sector (restaurants and hotels) and in public institutions.

A high percentage of Muslims in the country live in socially disadvantaged areas. Their living conditions are lower than non-Muslim citizen. Their children attend schools struggling with a series of social,

financial and other problems. At least partly due to this situation, Muslim children tend to perform relatively poorly in school, with greater problems of conduct and higher dropouts rates. The education system is seen by Muslims, as failing their own children.

In a country neither the state nor the Muslims groups have managed to appoint officials who would act as link between them. One of the biggest obstacles on the way of building a representative structure is the heterogeneity of Muslim population. The reluctance of the state to deal with questions raised by Muslims, concerning various cultural issues (e.g. food, education, clothing) has been yet another obstacle preventing dialogue. However there are in the country three organisations 'recognised' by the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (established in 1980 and earlier from 1972 operated as Council of Swedish Free Churches). They are not clearly divided along the ethnic or religious lines. However IKUS is strictly Sunni. All 3 of them cover 75 percent of all Muslim communities in Sweden. The three State subsidised organisations are described below FIFS, SMUF and IKUS.

FIFS – Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige (United Islamic Communities in Sweden)

The organisation was created in 1973 to fill a need among the Muslim communities for an umbrella organisation. In 1977 it organized eight local groups or "congregations". Especially at the beginning of its activities, the FIFS engaged with a variety of Muslim communities, including Shias, Sunni and communities of different ethnic backgrounds. By 2001, the FIFS claimed to have organized some 41 local congregations.

SMuF - Sveriges Muslimska Ungdomsförbund (Union of Muslim Communities of Sweden)

This Group was established in 1982 as a second national federation after a split within FIFS. At the time they claimed to have jointly organized 23 local congregations and had some 22,000 registered members. The majority of these were Sunnis of an Arabic speaking background, but also included some Shiite communities. Today the SMuF claims to organise 48 congregations.

IKUS - Islamiska Klturcenterunionen (Union of Islamic Centres of Culture)

This group was created in 1984 following a split within the FIFS when the organisation became eligible for state grants in 1987. IKUS has a leaning towards the Suleymanci movement O of Turkey) but it is also

looks after the welfare of some Somali communities and currently coordinates some 28 congregations.

SMR – Sveriges Muslimska Råd (Muslim Council of Sweden)

The council was formed by FIFS and SMUF in 1990 by FIFS and SMuF to concentrate and centralize power and to demonstrate a more united front. The most active person in SMR is Mahmoud Aldebe who also led SMuF for some time. To some extent the SMR can be seen as his project. Among the aims of SMR are" to create mosques and Islamic Schools, to create information material about Islam directed towards the non-Muslims in Sweden and to take an active part in the public debate in society.

Concluding Remarks

It is clear that Muslims in the countries covered by this book originate from very diverse social, political and cultural backgrounds that, makes it problematic to create any form of in-country representations. Demographically however, migrants of Muslim origin are a youthful population which is potentially invaluable to the European labour market where fertility is generally below replacement level raising concerns over supporting a rapidly ageing population in terms of health and social care and pensions. Hence, migration from countries where Islam is the major faith has been important to the labour market of the

major European countries (Britain, Germany and France and the Netherlands in particular).

The young generation of Muslims born in European countries usually posses not only the formal citizenship rights but also a range of forms of tacit knowledge, competences and taken –for-granted assumptions which allow them to engage constructively in citizenship activities As research shows citizenship (beside religion) is often central to their self understanding and assertions of who they are (Cesari 2003, Lathion 2003). With its help they have been seeking the recognition of their heritage and values in the public and private spheres. Thus, they have been following earlier groups (e.g. ethnic minorities or women's groups) that have been mobilising around a particular identity for several decades.

The focus on religious rights as the primary right in relation to the allocation of civil liberties is an issue that requires further exploration in all the countries in question. What is evident is that as political pressure on Muslim communities increases, there is a force, which forces people back into faith led activity, as the only form of civil rights to be defended rather than for better access to social and welfare services (education, employment and housing for example). The leaning towards faith led activity appears however to be a global phenomenon in the face

of the retreat of welfare states, rather than one that is restricted to migrants of Muslim origin alone.

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Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (SBD) www.destatis.de
Office for National Statistics (ONS) http://www.statistics.gov.uk
General Register Office, Scotland http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk
Statistics Netherlands (CBN) www.cbn.nl
Statistica Centralbyrån (SCS) www.scb.se

Websites of Muslim Organisations

France:

UOIF - www.uoif-online.com
IMMP - www.mosquee-de-paris.org
CMTF - www.diyanet.go.tr

Germany:

ISLAMRAT BD - www.islamrat.de
ZENTRALRAT MD - www.islam.de/?tree=zmd
AMGT - www.igmg.de
VIKZ - www.vikz.de

Great Britain:

MCB - www.mcb.org.uk
UMO - www.theredirectory.org.uk/orgs/umouk.html
MAB - www.mabonline.net

Netherlands:

UMMON - www.emim.be/assoc.php
MG - www.milligorus.nl

Belgium:

EMB - www.embnet.be
AEL - www.arabeuropean.org
MJM - www.mvjm.be
PCP - www.particp.be

Sweden:
SMuF - www.smuf.se

2

ORIENTALISM AND OTHERNESS

Bryan Turner

Historical factors: religion and orientalism

From a very early period, Islam was seen as a distinct threat to Christendom. John of Damascus treated Muhammad as a false prophet who in the time of Heraclius plagiarised the Old and New Testaments to form his own sect. In the ninth century, Theophanes Confessor produced a derogatory biographical commentary on the Prophet that attempted to explain the success of Islam in terms of the gullibility of its followers and the cunning of Muhammad. These prejudicial stereotypes of Islam were reproduced through the Middle Ages by Christian writers, and became taken-for-granted assumptions of western criticism (Grunebaum, 1953, p. 43). The ideological threat of Islam was particularly acute in the seventeenth century during the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, when translations of the Qu'ran were seen to add yet more fuel to the conflagration of religious persuasions (Matar, 1998).

There has subsequently been an extensive debate in western scholarship about the negative conceptual framework within which Islam has often

been understood and analysed by Western humanities and social sciences. While the contemporary discussion about western views of the Orient was unquestionably stimulated by Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), the controversy about the character of other cultures should be seen as one dimension of the more general problem of 'other religions', and thus to the ancient encounter between Christian protagonists and heretical antagonists. The basic dilemma is that Islam, Christianity and Judaism are variations of a generic monotheistic religion, but political processes that have constructed separate religious systems differentiate them. This division was sustained historically by the notion of Islam as a heretical sect and of Judaism as a betrayal of Christianity.

Within the orientalist paradigm, the Orient appears in western imagination as the forbidden ‘other’, which is both repulsive and seductive. Like the Muslim veil, the Orient is simultaneously hidden and inviting (Yegenoglu, 1998). It thus exists within a literary and visual tradition that is fantastic (Sweetman, 1988). The basic argument is that the Orient was constructed in western perspectives as a permanent and enduring object of knowledge in opposition to the Occident as its negative counter point. This western image of Islam and the East has proved to be remarkably enduring and consistent. Orientalism generates a concept of Oriental societies as stationary and, through the sedimentation of the divergent cultural phenomena of Oriental societies,

orientalism converts the diversity of Oriental traditions into a unitary, integrated and coherent object of western science. While the Occident is seen to develop through historical stages in terms of a series of modernising, violent revolutions, the unhistorical and stationary Orient exists outside of history.

In this view, however, any simple dichotomy of West and East involves an attempt to impose a false homogeneity or unity on cultures which are necessarily heterogeneous and hybrid. They are in reality recalcitrant to simple classification because there is no authentic, original culture. There is only historically difference. We may call this issue, in an obvious reference to the notion of 'the imaginary', the problem of 'the originary', namely the legitimising quest for authentic origins in a context of obdurate differences (Turner, 2001). These originary dichotomies encourage us politically to take sides, and thus to hand out praise, and blame for historical development.

The current debate about globalisation inevitably raises questions about the interrelationships between the world religions in a shrinking globe. If there is the possibility of creating a form of global governance, then there are important questions about the co-existence of different world religions and different assumptions about citizenship within the 'global village'. In the mediaeval period, Islam developed as a world religion,

but, given the limitations of technology, transport and literacy, it could not exercise world hegemony (Grunebaum, 1953). Islamdom was constituted as an ideal that could never be fully realised in practice. With the globalisation of communication systems and with the collapse of communism, Islam can in principle function as a genuinely global religion and the pilgrimage to Mecca has served as an important factor of cultural integration in modern Islam. These global processes have increased conflict between western political systems and Islam, creating in turn conditions for the growth of militant Islamic movements (Tibi, 1998).

Perhaps the principal consequence of global modernisation is the constitution of 'religion' as a separate, differentiated and specialised sector of modern society – a cultural sector that is often thought to refer to, and assumed to manage, the private world of subjectivity and meaning. Religion in the modern world has been transformed into an institution that manages the problems that trouble individuals, namely what they think is of ultimate concern. Globalisation and modernisation have promoted the sovereignty of the individual (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1986) and in turn individualism has converted religion into an activity within the private sphere.

Secularisation and modernisation made ‘religion’ in this sense a special ‘problem of modernity’, and thereby placed the question of ‘religion’ more explicitly in public discourse (Robertson, 1970). The effect of globalisation is to export this western pattern of religiosity as a general cultural theme of the world order. The Westphalian political settlement produced a world system of nation states, and this political system was based on the notion that the Wars of Religion (1550-1630) were an inevitable outcome of the persistence of religion in public life. Intolerance and violence were to be contained by confining religion to the private sphere (Thomas, 2000). This process of exporting an individualistic version of Latin Christianity, and global reactions to it, has been described as ‘globalatinization’, namely the alliance between Christianity, technology and capitalism (Derrida, 1998, p. 13). Fundamentalism attempts to ensure the dominance of religion in the public spheres of law, economy and government, and is thus a response to Weber’s tragic vision of the separation of the value spheres. In the religious conflicts of the twentieth century, the western model of denominational pluralism was increasingly adopted as the model of religious (and hence political) tolerance.

Islamism and fundamentalism (perpetuation of Otherness)

Fundamentalism can be seen as a religious process that attempts to resist the melting-pot model of secularism, political tolerance and religious

pluralism. In particular, fundamentalism resists the separation of religion and politics, whereby religion is confined to the private sphere. If we regard modernisation from a sociological point of view as the differentiation of the various spheres of society (economy, politics, law and religion) into separate domains, then fundamentalism must be defined as the 'de-differentiation' of such separate fields of activity (Parsons, 1999). In this sense, fundamentalism is anti-modernisation (Lechner, 2000). The growth of fundamentalist movements in Islam, Christianity and Judaism is often interpreted as a response to the disruptions of traditional life and values that result from globalisation. Fundamentalism is seen to be a movement that preserves tradition against the cultural melting pot that follows global migration, tourism and mass consumerism. While Islamic fundamentalism has come to the attention of the western media, fundamentalism has also been increasingly characteristic of the religions of Asia, especially Hinduism. Fundamentalism has become the target of western criticism because it is seen to be incompatible with a liberal democracy that attempts to create an open and diverse public sphere (Tourraine, 2000). The further implication of this argument is that, since Islamic fundamentalism is anti-modern, it must be also anti-western. These assumptions about Islam and religious fundamentalism have dominated recent political discussion, especially about the alleged 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1997).

For Samuel Huntington, the clash is inevitable and deeply embedded in two different cultures, one that separates religion and politics, and the other that keeps them together. In more sociological terms, Huntington describes four causes of the contemporary growth of Islamic radicalism. The first is that there has been a significant and widespread Islamic resurgence in response to social and cultural modernisation. These Islamic movements have provided a new consciousness at one level, but they have also offered welfare support to their followers, where governments have failed their local populations. A good illustration would be the 'Justice and Charity Movement' in Morocco, which offers educational and welfare support for marginal and deprived groups. Secondly, Islamic movements have mobilised and thrived on grievances, not only against the USA and its political allies, but also against national governments that have failed. There is a general sense of alienation from government, given the failure of both nationalist and communist movements to deliver sustained social development with egalitarian consequences. Muslim grievances against the West have been exacerbated by the territorial expansion of Israel and by overt western support for Zionism. Such support for Israel must necessarily appear hypocritical, given the West's support of human rights legislation and aspirations in other areas, such as South Africa and East Timor (Ignatieff, 2001).

Thirdly, Islamic militancy has been further sustained by conflicts within Islam (for example, between Iraq and Iran) and by ethnic divisions within Islamic societies (for example, Afghanistan). However, the final causal argument is perhaps the most important component of Huntington's position, namely that the demographic growth of Islam has produced large numbers of mobile, unemployed and disaffected young men in the 16 to 30 age group who are ideal recruits to Islamic fundamentalism. In this context, the Islamic resurgence has given hope and inspiration to a variety of social movements, especially against the economic and military spread of western societies. The fall of communism opened up a space for Islamic militancy, and the end of the cold war has intensified the historical division between the civilisations of the West and the Islamic world.

This characterisation of fundamentalist Islam as anti-modern is problematic, not least because it makes it impossible to distinguish religious fundamentalism from political Islamism on the one hand, and from traditionalist Islam on the other. Fundamentalism rejects traditional Islam, because traditional Islam is seen as a compromised form of religious belief and practice that was subordinate to the western secular influence. Because fundamentalism rejects both Sufism and traditional Islam, it would in many respects make more sense to regard

modern fundamentalism as the modern heir of previous reform movements that sought to modernise Islam from within in opposition to the west, namely the Wahhabi movement of Arabia and the Salafiyyah movement that reasserted Shari'ah-minded Islamic orthodoxy against traditionalism and Sufi mysticism. We might reasonably define Islamic fundamentalism as a reformist movement in religion that has attempted to modernise and radicalise Islam in the name of its fundamental roots. There are clear parallels between western Puritanism that developed a radical politics against the corruption of this world through a return to its religious roots.

The real struggle against the West is not about modernity and anti-modernity as such but a struggle against postmodern consumerism that threatens to undermine any religious authenticity by offering many experimental lifestyles that undercut religion as, in Durkheim's terms, the 'serious life'. Modernist consumerism offered to satisfy the basic needs of a mass market through Taylorist and Fordist methods of production, distribution and consumption. The classic joke of the modernist period of consumerism was that everybody could choose their own model of Ford car, provided it was black. More technology has transformed production and consumption into smaller niche markets, developed methods of creating tastes rather than satisfying needs, and created commodities that shape the self through a consumerist fantasy.

Postmodernity is the consequence of the fragmentation and differentiation of consumption, which has produced the commodified self and the consumer lifestyle (Featherstone, 1991). One characteristic feature of the postmodern economy is the manufacturing of celebrity as a mechanism for selling lifestyles as the mechanism for selling commodities (Rojek, 2001). The self becomes malleable because it is also the subject of fashion. Perhaps one remarkable feature of postmodern capitalism is that literally everything can be transformed into a commodity, a fact that was illustrated by the popularity of Osama bin Laden T-shirts in northern British cities that emerged after the American military activity against the Taliban. Through the emergence of niche markets, leaders of Islamism can achieve celebrity status and offer a lifestyle choice. The real challenge to Islam is not modernity but the postmodern fashioning of alternative selves and lifestyles that directly challenge the Shari'ah-minded puritanism of religious fundamentalism.

This challenge to religion through the seduction of Muslim youth by the fantasy world of cultural production, individualism and consumerist narcissism was perceptively analysed in *Postmodernism and Islam* (Ahmed, 1992), and more recently explored in *Jihad vs McWorld* (Barber, 2001). Barber's theme is the clash between the universal consumer world (McWorld) and the tribal world of identity politics and

particularities (jihad). The ‘essential jihad’ is the fundamentalist movement of Islam, and the essence of McWorld is McDonalds. These two realities produce two radically different forms of politics. ‘Jihad pursues a bloody politics of identity, McWorld a bloodless economics of politics’ (Barber, 2001). Although in his ‘Afterword’, Barber retreats somewhat from an exclusive identification of jihad with Islamic fundamentalism, the Islamic world does provide Barber with his most striking illustration of a committed politics. Whereas fundamentalist certainty results necessarily in antagonistic politics, McWorld is not a place for hot political emotions, but for pragmatic adjustment to contingencies.

The terrorist attack on New York can be taken as an unnerving illustration of the truth of Barber’s dichotomy of politics in *Jihad vs McWorld*, because symbolically the World Trade Centre towers perfectly embodied the cool systems of exchange that advanced capitalism had promoted against the hot politics of diasporic people and their cultures. It would be wrong however to assume that Barber’s typology is merely a reproduction of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ in which again Islam is chosen as a compelling illustration of an inevitable conflict between the West and the rest, or Fukuyama’s version of the end-of-ideology thesis. Barber’s analysis is in fact more complex and more interesting than Huntington’s dichotomous model of

endless conflict or Fukuyama's model of inevitable evolution towards liberal capitalism. For Barber, jihad and McWorld stand in a dialectical relationship of mutual reinforcement. McWorld needs jihad as its negative other, while jihad requires capitalism or more specifically the USA as its contrast case. The cool universalism of McDonalds stands in a productive dialectic with the hot politics of Islamic jihad, and yet at times they also interpenetrate each other. Jihad employs global technologies for its communication requirements and broadcasts its global message through modern media. Furthermore, Barber recognises that American culture also produces jihadic politics in the form of radical Christian fundamentalism and militiamen. McWorld and jihad constantly intermingle and fuse with each other. He notes for example that Japan, in which national identity and national politics have been deeply preserved and fostered in the postwar period, has also embraced many components of western consumerism. In 1992, the number one restaurant in Japan as measured by the volume of consumers was McDonalds. Finally, his argument is a defence of democratic politics against both McWorld and jihad. McDonalds undermines community and social capital, and thus erodes and corrodes the trust and communal membership that are essential foundations of secular democracy. The particularistic tribal mentality of jihad is difficult to reconcile with democratic politics that requires compromise and co-operation between

groups and communities that do not share the same ethnic identities. It is important therefore to go beyond both McWorld and jihad.

Although Barber's analysis of fundamentalism has some merit in providing an understanding of the impact of McDonald culture in international relations, it is misleading to regard Islamic fundamentalism as mere tribalism. Islamic fundamentalism strives for universalism, and is thus a modern social movement. Barber's thesis is useful, however, because it provides an account of how McDonalds is a cultural threat to Islamic authenticity. The postmodern consumer world has, however, a corrosive impact on every monotheistic religion in which a saviour God calls the guilty soul out of ignorance and damnation. The very notion of a salvation event is alien to the consumer world of the simulated self where many manifestations of subjectivity are possible. It is possible that this consumer self is the unintended consequence of Christian individualism, but the results are inevitably destructive of religious identities. The separation of these worlds is perhaps graphically illustrated by the fact that the western press regarded the emancipation of the women of Kabul from the patriarchal oppression of the Taliban movement as illustrated decisively by the fact that Muslim women would be able to abandon their burkas, wear make-up, and purchase the latest fashions. In the meantime, their men could visit the local barber's shop to have their beards cut. Emancipation from the discipline of the

Taliban was marked by the early construction of the new Islamic identity, the consuming, post-jihadic Muslim.

Conclusion

The political and economic world order has passed through a neo-liberal revolution between 1979 and 2001. We need to understand Islam and the Third World in the context of this neo-liberal global experiment, because it is this social and political revolution that has transformed modern Islam and created the foundation for Islamism and fundamentalism. The neo-liberal revolution was produced by the OPEC oil crisis when the cost of crude oil on world markets began to undermine the industrial economies, and made the funding of the welfare state impossible without increasing taxes. The Reagan and Thatcher years can be seen as attempts to revive the profitability of the western economies by reducing personal taxation, cutting back state expenditure on health and welfare, reducing interest rates, and allowing currency exchange rates to float on a global market. It is possible to argue that the neo-liberal reforms did salvage the US and British economies, but the impact on Third World and developing economies was often catastrophic as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank imposed neo-liberal economic arrangements. Islamicate countries in Africa and Asia experienced massive social trauma as a consequence of economic restructuring.

Western economists argue that the Islamicate societies, with the exception of the oil-rich Gulf states, Turkey and Malaysia, have failed to enter the economically developed world. If we take the average income of the advanced societies as a basic measure of economic success, the results show that the Islamicate societies are economically backward. In 2000, World Bank figures show that the average income in the advanced societies was $27 450 with the US on $34 260. By contrast, in the Islamicate countries from Morocco to Bangladesh the average was $3 700 and, excluding the Gulf States, no Islamicate society achieved incomes above the world average of $7 350. In terms of neo-liberal theory, economic liberalisation is a cause of wealth creation, but it is also closely associated with political democratisation. Political data on liberal freedoms also show that the Islamicate societies are politically restrictive. The World Audit on economic controls showed that societies like Kuwait and Morocco were the most restrictive in the world. The Freedom House evaluation showed that Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Libya and Saudi Arabia were amongst the most politically repressive societies in the world.

Western imperialism can explain many aspects of this economic failure, but other societies that suffered from economic imperialism and political colonialism such as South Korea and India have in fact

achieved remarkable economic growth. In terms of per capita incomes, the living standard in India is significantly higher than Pakistan. Whereas Egypt and South Korea had a similar standard of living in 1950, South Korea's standard is almost five times as high today. The principal attempts to reform the economies of Egypt and Syria were undertaken by socialist regimes, but those modernisation experiments failed. Fundamentalism as we have seen has flourished in the political vacuum left by nationalist and socialist regimes.

With the end of the cold war and the collapse of organised communism, the second half of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century has been a period of increasing political tension between Islam and the West. This cultural and economic competition has often produced violent conflict in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf, and political leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Chairman Arafat, Colonel Gaddafi and Ayatollah Khomeini have been characterised by the western press as evil figures. In 1998, the US Government offered $5 million for the capture of Osama bin Laden who was accused of embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2001, he was regarded as the evil figure who had orchestrated and partly financed the attack on the World Trade Organisation building in New York. In former Yugoslavia, the ancient conflict between Christian Serbs and Muslims resulted in 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo and Bosnia (Sonyel, 1994). In

the former Soviet Union, Muslims in Chechnya have become involved in a violent struggle for independence. As a result, Islamic culture came to be regarded as incompatible with western values and perceived as a major political threat to the West.

These negative images of Islam can be interpreted as continuing aspects of classical orientalism in which the Islamic world is defined by its otherness, but the paradox of these negative images is that, as a result of expulsion, migration and globalisation, Muslim communities have settled and evolved in most western industrial societies, where they constitute an important element of the labour force. It is estimated that there are over 16 million Muslims in Europe, and as a faith, Islam is also well established in the USA (Smith, 1999). Western commentaries on fundamentalist Islam typically fail to consider the heterogeneity of contemporary Islamic belief and practice. For example, the apparent triumph of fundamentalism has been challenged by a number of prominent liberal intellectuals in Islam, and there is considerable opposition from radical Muslim women who reject the traditional seclusion of women, veiling and arranged marriages (Othman, 1999). The strength of democratic movements in contemporary Iran and Indonesia illustrate the resilience of intermediate associations and social movements within Islamic civil society.

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