

The Independence of International Organizations

CONCEPT AND APPLICATIONS

YORAM Z. HAFTEL

*Department of Political Science
University of Illinois at Chicago*

ALEXANDER THOMPSON

*Department of Political Science
Ohio State University*

Despite its widespread use in studies of domestic political institutions, the concept of “independence” has not been systematically applied to the study of international institutions. Most arguments regarding the ability of international organizations (IOs) to promote cooperation and mitigate conflict rely on the implicit assumption that such institutions possess some independence from states, and yet the field has failed to conceptualize—let alone measure—this institutional characteristic. Extracting insights from the theoretical literatures on both international and domestic institutions, the authors distill several design features that lend independence to political institutions and then generate coding rules for measuring the independence of IOs. Based on an original data set of regional integration arrangements, the authors then use regression analysis to test several propositions for explaining variation in IO independence, shedding light on some important theoretical and empirical puzzles in international relations.

Keywords: international organizations; regional integration; institutional design; independence

Recent international relations (IR) scholarship has become increasingly concerned with issues of institutional variation and design. Theorists have identified several dimensions along which international institutions vary, including their degree of formality (Lipson 1991; Abbott and Snidal 1998), hierarchy (Weber 1997; Lake 1999), legalization (Goldstein et al. 2001), and institutionalization (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 2001; Haftel 2004b).¹ In each case, the literature identifies trade-offs

1. The most comprehensive treatment of institutional variation is Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2004).

AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors are listed in alphabetical order. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2003 annual convention of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon. For valuable comments, we thank Ian Hurd and Jon Pevehouse. Matthew Scherbarth provided research assistance and helpful suggestions. The data and an appendix are available online at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/full/50/2/253/DC1/>.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 50 No. 2, April 2006 253-275

DOI: 10.1177/0022002705285288

© 2006 Sage Publications

associated with creating and working through institutions that vary along these dimensions. Typically, this involves some form of increased transaction costs or constraints as institutions exhibit high values on these dimensions, which are traded off for political benefits such as the ability to credibly commit, signal, fill in incomplete contracts, or gain legitimacy for policies. Understanding how international institutions matter in world politics, as both an independent and a dependent variable, hinges on such questions of variation and design.

The purpose of this article is to conceptualize and measure another dimension of international institutions, their *independence*, and to test several propositions for explaining its variation. The notion of independence subsumes key aspects of the various institutional dimensions listed above and does so in a more politically meaningful way. The independence of an institution largely determines its authority and influence—in short, its ability to shape international politics. Among the most intriguing questions for students of IR is whether international institutions should be treated as actors in their own right rather than as epiphenomenal (the realist position), as simple arenas within which states interact (the traditional neoliberal position), or as social contexts that shape state interests (a typical constructivist position). Evidence is mounting that international organizations (IOs), in particular, should be treated as independent agents that play an active and even strategic role (Snidal and Thompson 2003, 223-4; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006).

IR scholars have focused indirectly on institutional independence and related concepts. International applications of principal-agent theory have investigated the conditions under which states delegate authority to IO agents. In some cases, these agents possess a significant degree of “autonomy” or “discretion” and may engage in actions not anticipated by their state principals (Hawkins et al. 2006; Pollack 2003; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Majone 2001). Others stress the role of IO bureaucracies. To serve their own interests and increase their power, international bureaucracies, like others, strive “to maximise their budget, their staff and their independence” (Vaubel 1996, 195). Borrowing from sociological institutionalism, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004) go farther, arguing that IOs can become autonomous sites of authority because their bureaucracies possess legitimate authority and control over expertise. Nowhere is the stress on supranational actors as drivers of IO influence more pronounced than in studies of the European Union (EU) (Alter 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).

This literature suffers from two important weaknesses. First, scholars tend to focus on a few “usual suspects”—including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, certain United Nations (UN) specialized agencies, and EU institutions—when they address the issue of IOs as independent actors. These institutions are by no means representative of the universe of international organizations; in particular, they have unusually large staffs and substantial resources at their disposal. This promotes an exaggerated sense of the degree and nature of independent behavior as well as a misleading focus on bureaucracies as the main source of IO independence. Second, the theoretical literature on institutional design and independence has tended to overlook issues of measurement.

Indeed, the political science study of IOs seems to have split into two branches, one largely theoretical and the other explicitly empirical with a quantitative focus. Grand theorists tend to focus on conceptualizing institutional design features with little attention to operationalization beyond particular cases.² The quantitative literature, on the other hand, tends to treat IOs as homogeneous black boxes, with insufficient attention to variation among them.³ One of our goals is to bridge these traditions by starting with a variable that is both conceptually rich and theoretically grounded, on one hand, and operationalizable and thus practical for empirical research, on the other.

In the next section, we provide a theoretical discussion of IO independence. Borrowing from IR theory as well as the literature on institutional independence at the domestic level—regarding central banks, judiciaries, and executive agencies—we discuss what independence entails in terms of both the institution’s design features and the structure of the relationship between political actors and the institution. In the third section, we operationalize IO independence. We propose six institutional design features that determine the degree of independence of an IO and present a protocol for coding IOs on the dimension of independence. The coding scheme is applied to a sample of regional integration arrangements (RIAs). The fourth section offers a test of several hypotheses—including the distribution of power among member states, the degree of trade interdependence among them, the duration of the institution, and the number and heterogeneity of members—for explaining variation in IO independence. The final section summarizes our main conclusions, points to some limitations of the study, and offers additional research suggestions.

CONCEPTUALIZING IO INDEPENDENCE

Despite an enormous literature on independence as a characteristic of domestic political institutions, the IR field has largely ignored it. We highlight a handful of notable exceptions that provide a foundation for its informed conceptualization. We also borrow from the literature on institutions at the domestic level for further insight into the qualities that render an institution independent. Our conceptualization highlights three interrelated elements of institutional independence: autonomy, neutrality, and delegation.

Perhaps the most direct effort to address independence in an IR context comes from Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (1998, 9), who define institutional independence as “the authority to act with a degree of autonomy.” This is consistent with Robert Dahl’s (1982, 16) proposition that to be independent “in a political sense is to be not under the control of another,” which he characterizes as a state of “autonomy.” Barnett

2. Some of the best empirical work on international organization (IO) design and independence is in the form of case studies. Our point is that these studies rarely offer a way to measure variables across cases so that findings can be replicated and generalized.

3. This is true, for example, of the quantitative literature on sanctions (L. Martin 1992; Drury 1998) and of the literature on conflict and IOs (Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000). There are some recent efforts to capture institutional variation in large-*n* analysis, including Bearce and Omori (2005); Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004); Haftel (2004b, forthcoming); Koremenos (2005); and Pevehouse and Russett (forthcoming).

and Finnemore (2004) offer a similar conceptualization of autonomy in the context of IOs, which they understand as independence from states. In the most general terms, then, independence for an IO is the ability to operate in a manner that is insulated from the influence of other political actors—especially states. Thus, *autonomy* is a key element of any conceptualization of political independence.

This notion of insulation from the control of other actors is an important ingredient of independence in domestic polities as well. It is precisely because of their autonomy that independent judiciaries are able to serve as commitment mechanisms, providing “an institutional apparatus that is capable of restraining us from giving in to momentary temptations of lawlessness” (Ferejohn 1999, 374; see also North and Weingast 1989). Similarly, a cross-national study of central banks finds that independence is determined by the extent of executive branch authority to manipulate the careers of bank officials and the ability of the bank to resist government influence in monetary policy making (Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992). Autonomy is thus affected by both *ex ante* influence and *ex post* efforts at control or punishment. For example, executive agencies are least independent when legislators include a legislative veto as part of the statute creating a new agency, thereby reducing its autonomy (E. Martin 1997).

Returning to the IR literature, in his application of principal-agent theory to EU institutions, Giandomenico Majone (2001) notes that the independence of an agent is a function of its autonomy but also of its preferences (see also Thompson 2006). To be truly independent, an agent must have preferences distinct from its principal or principals. As Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter (2000, 459) propose with respect to international courts and tribunals, independence measures “the extent to which adjudication is rendered impartially with respect to concrete state interests.” As a general principle, then, an independent actor has interests that are neutral or impartial with respect to other political actors. The notion of *neutrality* is the second key element on which we build.

The neutrality principle is echoed by scholars of domestic judicial independence as well. For a judiciary to be independent, it must act as a “neutral third” in disputes (Shapiro 1981). In addition to their commitment function, independent central banks also provide information regarding policy choice and their consequences. Their ability to do so depends on their expertise and perceived neutrality, which render the information credible (Bernhard 1998). Daniel Carpenter (2001) makes a similar point in the context of domestic bureaucracies: the most authoritative bureaucracies have interests that are distinct from the powerful politicians that seek to control them. Their role as independent actors depends on this impartiality.

However, even if an actor has autonomy and neutral interests, it may still have very little influence. The issue of *delegation* must also be considered. Delegation of authority to a bureaucracy (to make and implement rules) or to a third-party dispute settlement mechanism (to resolve conflicts) has been identified as a key element of an institution’s degree of legalization (Abbott and Snidal 2000). As institutional properties, independence and delegation are tightly intertwined (Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000). International institutions with significant delegated authority have the power to set agendas and shape policies through the exercise of discretion (Pollack

2003) and to impose “sovereignty costs” on states in certain situations (Abbott and Snidal 2000).

The notion of discretion, in particular, has occupied scholars concerned with domestic institutions. Some executive agencies are tightly constrained by rules defining their authority, while others are granted more discretion and thus influence (Horn 1995). Bureaucracies with “proposal power” have the greatest independence and can constrain the choices available to the executive and legislature (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001, 252). Similarly, a central bank with greater latitude in terms of the policy goals it can pursue has more independence from the government. It should be noted that discretion is partly a function of control mechanisms, which can be used to constrain or punish institutional actors. Thus, the elements of *autonomy* and *delegation* are inextricably linked.

In the next section, we build on these three institutional properties—autonomy, neutrality, and delegation—to identify a set of specific features that lend independence to an international institution. We conclude that variation in IO independence is largely a reflection of institutional design in such areas as decision-making procedures (especially relevant to the issues of autonomy and neutrality), the existence and discretion of supranational bureaucracies (to capture neutrality and delegation), and the existence and legalization of third-party dispute settlement (to capture autonomy, neutrality, and delegation).

OPERATIONALIZING IO INDEPENDENCE

Here we outline the institutional design features we believe are most important for measuring IO independence and develop a scheme for coding international institutions on the independence dimension. For each of three aspects of institutional design—decision making, supranational bureaucracy, and dispute settlement—we propose two indicators for our measure, for a total of six. We use examples from our data set of regional integration arrangements⁴ to illustrate our points. After outlining the coding scheme, we offer some basic descriptive statistics for the data.

DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES

The nature of decision-making and rule creation procedures is a major component of independence insofar as it determines how much control individual states have over IO activities. Just as more decentralized power (i.e., the presence of multiple veto players) lends independence to central banks by making it more difficult to overturn their decisions (Moser 1999), and just as the unilateral power of a government to veto court

4. The online appendix contains basic information for these organizations. They are primarily designed to facilitate economic cooperation, although many also have political and security components. While some are not highly formalized, they all go beyond mere treaties insofar as they have regular meetings and well-specified decision-making procedures. We thus refer to them as “organizations” rather than rely on more general terms such as *institutions* or *regimes*.

decisions undermines judicial independence, IO independence is partly a function of the number of states required to control decision making. The issue of who is making decisions and how closely these decision makers are tied to national interests is also important. Accordingly, we identify two dimensions of decision-making procedures, voting rules and the body that makes major decisions, and explain how they relate to independence.⁵

Voting rules have important implications for the degree of IO independence, especially with respect to the autonomy dimension. A key distinction is between decisions made by consensus, or unanimity, and decisions made by some type of majority rule. As the size of the veto group becomes larger, states increasingly relinquish control. In other words, majority rule forces states to countenance decisions with which they disagree, leading to a loss of control and some pooling of sovereignty (Moravcsik 1998, 67). Rule by consensus, on the other hand, is intended to protect state sovereignty and reign in IO autonomy since no obligation can be imposed without each member's consent (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 772).

Our sample reveals that nearly all RIAs follow a consensus rather than a majority voting rule to preserve national prerogative. "The 'ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] way' of decision-making by consensus," for example, "has served as a rationalization for the unwillingness of member states to transfer any decision-making authority to regional institutions" (Ravenhill 1995, 860). The only exception is the EU. With the Single European Act in 1986, the European Community moved from unanimity to weighted voting, in the form of the qualified majority voting (QMV) formula, in most issue areas.⁶ Although the QMV procedure provides larger states with more voting power, it also ensures that no single state can block the integration process, as France did in the 1960s.⁷ Representing perhaps the ultimate manifestation of independence, in some areas member states would require unanimous support *to oppose* an EU-level policy: European Central Bank policies and European Court of Justice rulings could only be overturned through treaty revisions. Because majority rule is rare among IOs, in our coding scheme, we make a dichotomous distinction between those institutions that have a meaningful majority rule procedure and those that do not (i.e., we do not distinguish a simple majority from versions of super-majority),⁸ assigning the former a point and the latter a zero.

The question of what *decision-making body* holds the power to make decisions has important implications for the functioning of an IO and its independence. Because IOs are composed of governments, the ultimate authority to make decisions lies in the hands of the heads of state, who typically wield the most influence of any national

5. Joseph Nye (1971, 40) provides a related discussion.

6. The Treaty of Nice extended the scope of qualified majority voting (QMV) to include some 90 percent of issues. For more on this and its implications, see Wood and Yeşilada (2002, 111-3). Some sensitive issues still require unanimity.

7. Similarly, Jeffrey Schott (2000) argues that the World Trade Organization's consensus rule is hindering the current negotiating round by allowing small groups of states to hold up the process.

8. Several regional integration arrangements (RIAs), such as the Andean Pact and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, employ majority voting on some procedural issues. We do not count such practices as a meaningful majority rule.

political actor in the context of IOs (Moravcsik 1994). Nevertheless, the degree of involvement of heads of state in an IO varies, and even when their meeting (e.g., the Presidential Council, the Conference of Heads of State, or the like) is the highest authority, this does not necessarily mean that it makes most decisions. In some cases, the main decision-making body is a ministerial council—usually composed of foreign or finance ministers in the case of RIAs.

We argue that IOs in which a ministerial council (or other body of representatives) is the most important decision-making body are more independent than IOs in which heads of state are the key decision makers. In the latter, national interests tend to dominate, and ministers, if they do meet, are constrained in their ability to promote distinct goals of the organization or the member state community. As one observer of African RIAs notes, “The lack of decision-making authority on the part of the Council of Ministers constitutes an institutional sword of Damocles. Because the Council runs the risk of seeing its decisions amended or overturned by the Authority [of heads of state], the Council of Ministers has a natural propensity to avoid new or daring initiatives” (Ntumba 1997, 308-9). In cases where decision-making power is delegated to a ministerial council—for example, the EU, the Andean Pact, and ASEAN—the process benefits from greater flexibility and at least a modicum of neutrality from state interests. In some cases, a minister or other delegate will begin to identify with the IO and the member state community, and while heads of states may delegate more or less discretion to their individual representatives, control over these agents will always be imperfect. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency often defied White House positions during UN climate negotiations, pursuing interests more closely aligned with the EU and environmentalists than with the president (Bodansky 2001, 38).

This distinction has added importance since heads of state often fail to meet on a regular basis. In regional organizations that are managed primarily by heads of state, infrequent meetings can undermine their ability to function. A comparison between two RIAs illustrates this point. In the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Presidential Summit is the sole decision-making organ; as such, cooperation “relies upon the ability of the heads of state to meet regularly in order to build the architecture of a regional organization” (Mortimer 1999, 178). The fact that the summit was convened only six times in nine years (instead of eighteen times, as planned) resulted in an IO that was in “a state of, at best, prolonged hibernation” (Mortimer 1999, 177). In the Andean Pact, on the other hand, although the Presidential Council is formally the institution’s highest authority, most decisions are made by the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission. Like AMU, the Andean Presidential Council did not meet on a regular basis in the early 1990s due to political divisions. Although the lack of summit meetings did hamper the advancement of the Andean Pact, the RIA nevertheless made considerable progress at this time precisely because heads of state were not the primary decision makers (Mendoza 1998).

In sum, we contend that an IO in which a ministerial council (or its equivalent) is the most important decision-making body is more independent than one dominated by heads of state, *ceteris paribus*. We assign one point to the former and zero otherwise.

SUPRANATIONAL BUREAUCRACY

The existence of a supranational bureaucracy, typically embodied in a secretariat or a commission, is an important sign of IO independence. By *supranational bureaucracy*, we refer to a permanent technical and administrative body that manages the operation of the IO on a regular basis (Jacobson 1984, 89). The staff is intended to function as management and technical experts who do not represent individual governments and are insulated from political influence in the performance of their duties. Article 213 of the Treaty of Rome, for example, requires that “the Members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be entirely independent in the performance of their duties.” In other words, bureaucratic interests are neutral with respect to individual national interests.

This independence varies among secretariats, of course, and some IOs do not even possess a separate bureaucracy. These institutional features are an important component of independence, as evidenced by the frequent objection among state leaders that secretariats are too institutionalized or have too much capacity.⁹ We capture variation in supranational bureaucracy independence with two indicators: the existence of a distinct secretariat or its equivalent and the authority of this body to initiate policy. These are intended to capture whether an IO has a neutral bureaucracy and the extent to which this bureaucracy is delegated meaningful discretion.

The *existence of a supranational bureaucracy* that manages the operation of the IO is the most basic requirement for this criterion. When states endow IOs with a secretariat or commission, they are delegating to a centralized authority and generating independence in the process. As Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001, 771) observe, “Centralization is controversial, politically and conceptually, because it touches so directly on national sovereignty.” It is unsurprising, then, that not all IOs have a secretariat. Our survey of existing RIAs reveals several such instances: the administration of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is managed through the Finance Department of South Africa, the Bangkok Agreement lacks a secretariat and is coordinated by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the North American Free Trade Agreement has three separate national secretariats. We assign one point to an IO that has a permanent secretariat or commission and zero otherwise.

When there is a permanent secretariat, the *authority of the supranational bureaucracy* must also be considered. Building on discussions of discretion in the context of central banks and executive agencies, we propose that an important sign of IO independence is the degree of responsibility that the member states delegate to the organization’s bureaucracy. Most secretariats perform informational and operational roles; that is, they prepare meetings and documents, provide technical assistance, and ensure the day-to-day functioning of their organizations.¹⁰ At the same time, some IO bureaucracies are provided with additional and much more active responsibilities. In particu-

9. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments, for example, resisted the creation of a permanent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) secretariat due to fears of lost sovereignty. Some ministers even complained about secretariat officials being connected by e-mail, arguing that it reflected too much “institutionalization” (see Funabashi 1995, 139).

10. This categorization of functions builds on Jacobson (1984).

lar, some secretariats and commissions can initiate and recommend policies and thereby promote the goals of the organization, prerogatives that greatly enhance bureaucratic authority. We focus on the power to initiate and recommend as an important source of independence.

The European Commission represents the ideal type for secretariats with the power to initiate. The commission plays a crucial agenda-setting role and indeed has the sole right of initiative in almost all “first pillar” matters (Majone 2001; Pollack 2003). As Leon Lindberg (1971, 85) points out with respect to the European Commission, “possession of a formal right to initiate most policy proposals, to be present as these are discussed by the governments, and to participate actively in the discussion . . . have also been important resources [of the commission’s strength].” The bureaucracies of the Andean Pact and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) enjoy similar powers. In contrast, as one scholar of African regionalism points out, many secretariats are delegated little authority: “expected only to ensure the smooth functioning of the community machinery on a day-to-day basis, they are severely handicapped in doing anything else by the lack of any real decision-making power” (Ntumba 1997, 313). An observer of the Central American Common Market (CACM) complains that the regional secretariat lacks “the powers to remove obstacles in the path to greater integration” (Bulmer-Thomas 1998, 320). Without the power to initiate, secretariats such as these cannot set agendas and break political logjams that hinder movement toward further cooperation. To capture this variation in secretariat discretion, we assign one point to an IO whose bureaucracy can initiate policies or make recommendations and zero otherwise.

THIRD-PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

Dispute settlement reflects an important institutional dimension of IO independence and captures elements of the autonomy, neutrality, and delegation principles. The presence of a centralized mechanism for solving disputes facilitates exchange and cooperation among political and economic actors at the domestic level and among states (North and Weingast 1989; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1997, 134-5). International dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) are potentially constraining, however, because states must delegate important judicial powers to neutral third parties. Typically, these DSMs are designed with substantial autonomy, such that states cannot control or overturn decisions. We propose that the most independent dispute settlement procedure must be automatic (states must not be able to bypass the procedure) and binding (states must not be able to ignore or veto the ruling), and the judges themselves must be drawn from a standing body (so that they cannot be screened and selected on an ad hoc basis, ensuring neutrality). These features correspond to those identified in the IR literature on legalization and dispute settlement (Smith 2000; Goldstein et al. 2001; Posner and Yoo 2005). Few DSMs meet all three criteria—exceptions are the European Court of Justice and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) mechanism—and there is considerable variation.

James McCall Smith (2000) offers a five-point scale for measuring DSMs along a continuum of legalization: none, low, medium, high, and very high. We employ Smith’s

TABLE 1
Coding Rules and Occurrence of Traits in Sample

<i>Coding Rule</i>	<i>Occurrences of Trait</i>
<i>Decision-making procedures</i>	
1. Are decisions made by majority rule?	1
2. Does a council of ministers hold decision-making power?	16
<i>Supranational (regional) bureaucracy</i>	
3. Is there a permanent secretariat?	25
4. Can the secretariat make recommendations or initiate?	4
<i>Dispute settlement mechanism</i>	
5. Is there a binding dispute settlement mechanism?	11
6. Is there a standing tribunal?	7

measurement and data in this article but for simplicity and symmetry collapse his categories into just three: none, low, and high. For our coding purposes, a low level of legalization refers to an instance in which third-party review is automatic and binding but judges are picked from an ad hoc roster, while a high level of legalization entails a standing tribunal as well as automaticity and bindingness.¹¹ Under the category of third-party dispute settlement, then, we assign one point to each level of legalization for a maximum of two points.¹²

INDEPENDENCE ACROSS RIAs: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Having outlined our composite indicator of independence, in this subsection we present several descriptive statistics of our data set of regional integration arrangements with an eye toward demonstrating the variable's validity and usefulness.

Table 1 presents the six indicators and reports the number of times each trait occurs in the thirty RIAs of the sample. As discussed above, the indicators are constructed as "dummies," such that RIAs score one point for trait present and zero for trait absent. Our sample includes all existing RIAs for which information is available and is thus close to the universe. Data for the indicators were collected from several primary and secondary sources,¹³ as well as through direct communication with RIA officials. Cod-

11. Collapsing Smith's (2000) categories does not result in a great deal of information loss for our purposes. One category omitted from our measure is the presence of nonbinding third-party review. Since states are free to ignore such a review, we assume that it adds little to institutional independence. A second omitted category captures whether nonstate actors have legal standing in the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), an issue that does not relate directly to automaticity or bindingness.

12. For coding purposes, we do take into account whether the DSM has actually been implemented. In the case of more than one RIA, including the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Economic Community of Central African States, states have agreed on paper to form regional tribunals but have not done so (Mortimer 1999, 81; Union of International Associations 1999-2000, 565).

13. We relied especially on various years of the Union of International Association's *Yearbook of International Organizations*; the International Monetary Fund's "Directory of Economic, Commodity and Development Organizations" (available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/decdo/contents.htm>); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1996); electronic searches of periodicals through the Lexis-Nexis database; and Web sites of the RIAs.




Figure 1: Distribution of Independence Scores

ing of the indicators regarding dispute settlement mechanisms relies on Smith (2000), as outlined above.

Since these institutions change over time, albeit slowly, we have clustered our measurements in the same year, 1996, for purposes of comparison. Our focus on RIAs serves as a useful first cut at understanding variation in IO independence more generally. Beginning with a fairly unified sample has advantages: the examination of organizations of similar type makes comparisons of institutional features and independence more meaningful by allowing us to control for some factors. Of course, we may not be able to generalize from our sample to all IOs—those with universal memberships and in different issue areas may exhibit different patterns, for example. Comparing independence across types of organizations raises a number of interesting theoretical questions and is precisely the type of empirical research that our variable facilitates, as we discuss in the Conclusion.

Figure 1 reports the distribution of RIAs on our independence scale. A cursory look reveals that considerable variation does exist. The distribution can be described as a right-tailed bell curve; in other words, most RIAs exhibit a low level of independence, and only a few exhibit no independence or a high level of independence.

We can also examine more closely the level of independence of specific RIAs. Figure 2 presents the level of independence of each RIA, differentiating the three major components: decision-making procedures, regional bureaucracy,¹⁴ and dispute settlement mechanism. Looking at the aggregate measures, we observe that the EU is the most independent IO, followed by the Andean Community; the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the Group of 3 (G3), and SACU are the least independent RIAs, each with zero points.

14. For our sample, *regional* bureaucracies are the appropriate subset of *supranational* bureaucracies.




Figure 2: Independence of 30 Regional Integration Arrangements (RIAs)

The independence scores are consistent with qualitative assessments made of these RIAs by observers and practitioners; this congruence offers additional face validity to our measure and its underlying conceptualization. Consider three examples that span the range: the EU (a score of 6), ASEAN (a score of 3), and SACU (a score of zero). The EU is widely regarded as the most important embodiment of delegated authority at the supranational level. In particular, the powers of the commission and the court are well documented (Pollack 2003; Alter 1998). At the other extreme, SACU has languished in a state of weakness, with “no clear and formal decision making formula” (*Business Day*, June 4, 2002) and disagreement among member states over whether it should have a secretariat and, if so, whether such a body should have any power. Its most powerful member, South Africa, has fought efforts to grant even modest independence to the organization (Jenkins 2001, 16). ASEAN exemplifies an intermediate level of independence. The strengthening of the corporate secretariat and the formation of a dispute settlement mechanism in the 1990s provided the organization with some degree of supranational authority. Peter Katzenstein (1997, 32) calls ASEAN “the one regional forum that comes close to giving formal political institutions some measure of importance in Asia’s regional integration.” And yet, with its adherence to unanimous voting and lack of secretariat discretion, the organization continues to reflect the sovereignty and short-term interests of its members (Tay 2001). In sum, the quantitative scores are consistent with observers’ judgments and capture key aspects of these institutions in a reliable manner.

We can also examine the relationships among the different indicators to assess the appropriateness of our measure’s composition. To do so, we combine the indicators

into the three categories discussed above—decision making, regional bureaucracy, and dispute settlement. An important issue to consider is the correlation between the different categories: if they are indeed highly correlated, we may be able to employ one category as a surrogate for independence, dispensing with the other two. Our data indicate that this is not the case: the correlations among the three categories are positive but far from perfect.¹⁵ Figure 2 nicely illustrates this. Some RIAs, such as CACM and WAEMU, display a high level of dispute settlement legalization but no delegation of decision-making authority. Other RIAs—for example, the Mano River Union (MRU) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—delegate decision-making authority but have no dispute settlement mechanism at all.

These exercises suggest that each of the three institutional design categories in our coding scheme correlates with independence and yet captures a distinct aspect of it. The substantial variation within the sample and the consistency of our quantitative measure with qualitative characterizations of these organizations further support the viability of our independence variable for measuring and testing.

SOME DETERMINANTS OF IO INDEPENDENCE

The next step is to begin to account for the variation uncovered above. In this section, we discuss some theoretical expectations regarding IO independence and derive three hypotheses—on the distribution of power among IO members, economic interdependence, and path dependence—from the literature. We also elaborate on the definition and measurement of the independent variables that capture these hypotheses. We then discuss the research design and report the empirical results.

HYPOTHESES

The distribution of power. Two alternative explanations emphasize the distribution of power among the group members and offer opposing views. First, according to assumptions of both realism and bargaining theory, powerful states should prefer IOs designed to reflect the distribution of power rather than the rule of law. Because they have viable unilateral and bilateral options, when it comes to creating or working through independent IOs, powerful states face greater opportunity costs than other states. Weaker states, on the other hand, might be expected to favor IOs that are independent to constrain their more powerful counterparts. This tenet is evident in many regional organizations, where hegemony usually resists substantial legalization (Smith 2000). For example, Douglas Zornelo (1995, 11) notes that “the fear that supranational institutions will encroach on sovereignty has resulted in Argentina and Brazil opposing a Uruguayan proposal for a supranational court to rule on trade disputes [between the members of Mercosur].” South Africa and India display similar tendencies

15. The decision-making and regional bureaucracy measures correlate at .28, decision making and dispute settlement at .20, and dispute settlement and regional bureaucracy at .41.

in SACU and SAARC, respectively. Thus, greater power asymmetry between the members of an IO should be associated with lower IO independence.

An alternative argument focuses on the importance of hegemonic power as a *supplier* of regional institutions. This view can be traced to theories of hegemonic stability, which hold that dominant states are willing to pay the costs of supplying public goods such as international economic institutions and stability (Kindleberger 1981; Krasner 1976). More recently, some scholars apply this logic to the regional level, arguing that hegemons bear the costs associated with higher levels of integration (Mattli 1999). As Mattli (1999, 56) contends, "Successful integration requires the presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties." One implication is that a greater power asymmetry among the members of an IO should be associated with greater institutional independence.

We define the *distribution of power* as the power inequalities among IO members. We measure it with the widely used "concentration ratio" (Mansfield 1994; Smith 2000). It calculates power disparities by taking into account both the relative weight of all members and the number of members. The value of this index increases as asymmetry grows and is bounded between 0 and 1. We use gross domestic product (GDP) to measure national power. GDP data from the Penn World Tables are used to calculate this variable (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002), which is labeled CONCENTRATION RATIO and ranges from .18 for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to .91 for SACU.

Economic interdependence. One conventional explanation of institutionalization is the level of economic interdependence. First developed by neofunctionalists, this argument maintains that increasing cross-border economic exchange demands greater regulation of such interaction and thus greater authority delegated to centralized institutions (Caporaso 1998, 344-5). This approach serves as a starting point for several recent explanations for variation among international institutions (see, e.g., Mattli 1999; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Smith 2000), and the logic should translate to the issue of independence.

Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, some recent studies cast doubt on its empirical validity. Miles Kahler (1995, 80), for example, contends that "regional institution building demonstrates a cyclical pattern that belies any simple explanation based on the demands of economic integration" and labels this approach "naïve institutionalism." Similarly, Joseph Grieco (1997, 172) argues that "contrary to functionalist expectations, in some areas of the world there have been increases in intraregional trade without a corresponding increase in institutionalization. . . . Moreover, in some cases we can observe growth of institutionalization, in the absence of increased trade encapsulation."¹⁶ An examination of the effect of economic interdependence on IO independence may shed light on this debate.

The level of *economic interdependence* is usually captured by trade share, which is the intra-IO trade as a percentage of the total trade conducted by the IO members

16. In Grieco's (1997) terminology, institutionalization is composed of three parts, one of which is the level of institutional authority, which closely matches our IO independence (the other two components are the locus of institutionalization and scope of activity).

(Grieco 1997; Page 2000). A greater proportion of intra-IO trade indicates that members trade more among themselves relative to their trade with the rest of the world, which in turn suggests greater commercial interdependence. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD; *Handbook of Statistics*, various years) provides information on trade share for most RIAs, based on their exports.¹⁷ This variable is labeled TRADE SHARE and ranges from .10 for MRU to 71.90 for APEC.

Path dependence. Path dependency and other temporal dynamics may also help explain the degree of independence and institutional design more generally. As Douglass North (1990) has argued, institutions may have built-in, self-reinforcing mechanisms that promote persistence and growth over time. Institutions become “sticky” and tend to accrete new constituents, providing an impetus for expansion (Gruber 2000, 85-6). Historical institutionalists have explored such arguments at length (Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004).

The issue of time touches on important theoretical debates among institutionalists in political science. Rational choice approaches view institutions as equilibrium outcomes designed to address specific cooperation problems (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2004). If the passage of time is indeed an important variable in determining the degree of institutional independence, this calls into the question the degree to which we can understand institutional design by taking “snapshots”—and treating them as equilibrium outcomes—at a given point in time. Historical institutionalists argue that this functionalist logic tells an incomplete story. As Paul Pierson (1996, 127) argues, “The current functioning of an institution cannot be derived from the aspirations of the original designers.” Instead, path-dependent processes evolving over time affect institutional design, and at least in the EU case he examines, these processes tend to transfer control from member states to supranational institutions. We thus have two distinct views on institutions. One treats them as rational, static equilibria, the other as constantly evolving and subject to path-dependent processes. To assess these alternative arguments, we should incorporate the issue of time into our analysis.

We capture *path dependence* by looking at the life span of the organization. While this does not do justice to the complexity of path dependence arguments, it allows a basic consideration of temporal dynamics. We count the number of years that passed from the year in which the IO was formed to the year in which we observe its independence (1996). This variable is labeled DURATION and ranges from 1 for the G3 to 38 for the EU.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To evaluate the three hypotheses, we examine the effect of the independent variables on IO independence (as defined above). As explained in the previous section, we use the regional organization as our unit of analysis, and thus our data set has thirty observations.¹⁸ Our estimation technique is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-

17. Trade data for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), East African Community (EAC), and Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are not available.

18. For a more detailed discussion of using the RIA as the unit of analysis, see Haftel (2004a, 2004b).

sion.¹⁹ We begin with bivariate regressions and then combine the three variables into a multivariate regression analysis. To minimize the risk of endogeneity and to smooth possible picks, the independent variables represent lagged five-year averages where appropriate.

We add two additional variables to our multivariate regression, the number of IO members and the similarity of the IO members' interests,²⁰ as robustness checks.²¹ We add these variables because received theory predicts greater cooperation through institutions when the number of actors is smaller (Olson 1965; Oye 1986) and a greater willingness to delegate authority to institutions when the similarity of interests among actors is higher (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999).

RESULTS

Table 2 reports the results of the regression analysis. Both the bivariate and the multivariate regressions indicate that economic interdependence (TRADE SHARE) has a positive and significant effect on IO independence. Substantively, an increase of 10% in the intra-IO trade share will increase the level of IO independence by .3.²² Keeping in mind that IO independence ranges from zero to six, such substantive effects are quite meaningful. These results indicate that deeper commercial integration is frequently accompanied by a more powerful organization. It is consistent with the conventional functionalist logic and defies recent skepticism regarding this hypothesis (Grieco 1997; Kahler 1995).

The relationship between concentration of power (CONCENTRATION RATIO) and IO independence is somewhat ambiguous. The coefficients are always negative, indicating that a skewed distribution of power in an organization results in a less independent organization. These findings are consistent with the notion that for IOs in which the distribution of power is concentrated, dominant members may find it too costly to delegate power to the supranational level (Smith 2000). This result is significant in the bivariate model but not in the multivariate ones. It seems, then, that these findings are only suggestive.

As we discussed above, IR theory offers conflicting expectations with respect to the effect of the distribution of power on institutional independence. It is possible that both

19. Considering the small number of observations, this basic technique is appropriate. An expansion of the data set may allow the use of maximum likelihood techniques that better capture the distribution of the dependent variable.

20. The number of members is a count of the IO members in 1995. We measure the similarity of interests with the "S score" based on globally weighted alliance portfolios (Buono de Mesquita 1981; Signorino and Ritter 1999) obtained through the EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000). Our variable is the average of the S scores of all dyads in an IO. Like our main variables, it is a lagged five-year average. We also examined the effect of interest similarity using an S score based on voting in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (Gartzke and Jo 2002). The results, reported in the online appendix, were not significantly different.

21. We conducted several additional robustness checks. We examined the potential effects of militarized interstate disputes and regime type on IO independence. These variables had no significant effect on our dependent variable and did not change our results in a meaningful way. Also, it is possible that the uniqueness of the European Union (EU) may have undue influence on our results. We thus ran our model without this observation. The results were somewhat weaker but otherwise the same. These additional models are available in the online appendix.

22. Calculations of substantive effects are based on model IV.

TABLE 2
 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Determinants
 of International Organization Independence, 1996

	<i>Model I</i>	<i>Model II</i>	<i>Model III</i>	<i>Model IV</i>	<i>Model V</i>	<i>Model VI</i>
Trade share	0.030* (2.03)			0.030** (2.47)	0.026* (1.99)	0.029* (1.83)
Concentration ratio		-2.880** (2.10)		-0.977 (-0.72)	-0.558 (-0.37)	-1.032 (-0.70)
Duration			0.064*** (2.89)	0.076*** (3.45)	0.078*** (3.48)	0.075*** (3.24)
Number of members					0.036 (0.72)	
Similarity of interests						-0.264 (-0.07)
Constant	1.787*** (5.20)	3.420*** (5.16)	1.073*** (2.46)	0.922 (1.10)	0.469 (0.47)	1.217 (0.43)
Adjusted R^2	0.106	0.104	0.202	0.417	0.405	0.391
<i>n</i>	27	30	30	27	27	27

NOTE: Figures in parentheses are *t* statistics.

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

logics have merit and they simply cancel out each other. A more interesting approach would involve specifying the conditions under which powerful states are interested in more independent IOs. For example, powerful states may be more likely to create and join independent IOs when the voting rules match the distribution of power among the membership (a hypothesis explored in Hawkins et al. 2006). This is a promising avenue for future research.

There is a clear positive relationship between the life span of an institution and its independence. This is apparent in the positive and highly significant estimates of DURATION in the bivariate as well as the multivariate regression models. Substantively, each additional year of existence will increase the independence of the IO by .075. This finding indicates that IOs that exist for a long period of time are usually more independent than younger ones. This is consistent with the hypothesis that IOs become more independent over time and suggests that path dependence and other temporal dynamics are important determinants of IO independence.

Finally, our two control variables—number of members and similarity of interests—have no significant effect on IO independence. It is possible that a smaller number of actors with more homogeneous interests will simply find it unnecessary to rely heavily on institutions to guide their relationship. The underlying theoretical expectations may also be misleading when applied to IR. With regard to the large numbers variable, some have argued that its effect on international cooperation is not as straightforward as the logic of collective action suggests (Kahler 1992). And heterogeneity among actors may open up bargaining space for issue linkage and side payments, making cooperation and institutionalization even more possible than it is among actors with similar interests (L. Martin 1994). While these were included as control variables, their failure to produce results presents interesting theoretical implications.

Overall, our results indicate that while institutions do evolve over time, they seem to do so in a way that matches functional needs. The strong correlation between economic interdependence and the independence of regional organizations is consistent with the functionalist logic of some integration theorists and of standard regime theory (Keohane 1984). And yet the institution's design shifts as circumstances change, implying that an institutional "outcome" at any point in time tells an incomplete story. This process, what we might think of as *rational evolution*, suggests that the dividing line between rational choice institutionalism and its critics who focus on time-dependent processes might be overdrawn (see Greif and Laitin 2004; Thompson 2005). On a more practical level, given the proliferation of regional economic institutions and their tendency to grow in independence over time, we may see political authority shift increasingly to the regional level as globalization promotes interdependence across the globe.

CONCLUSION

The goals of this article are to develop the concept of IO independence as a useful variable for the study of IR and to test theoretically informed hypotheses regarding variation in independence. Building from conceptual work on international and domestic institutions, we offer a protocol for measuring the independence of international organizations as a function of decision-making procedures, the existence and authority of supranational bureaucracy, and the existence and design of dispute settlement mechanisms. Using an original data set of regional integration arrangements, we test several hypotheses on the sources of IO independence. We find that economic interdependence and the passage of time are important explanatory variables for predicting independence, implying that institutions are both functional and evolving. By contrast, the concentration of power within a region and the number and heterogeneity of member states do not provide much explanatory leverage, defying prominent theoretical arguments in the literature.

These empirical findings are of course only a first step in understanding the determinants of IO independence. The burgeoning principal-agent literature in IR, which contains various hypotheses on why states delegate authority to IOs, could benefit from a theoretically informed variable to capture independence across institutions. In addition, since states often externalize their domestic political norms (Maoz and Russett 1993), it may be that states with independent central banks and judiciaries, or with separation of powers, are more likely to create or join independent international institutions. Institutional independence is also a potentially important explanatory variable. More or less independent institutions may be more or less effective at promoting various objectives, such as reducing conflict or facilitating trade.²³ Independ-

23. The relationship between independence and effectiveness is not necessarily obvious. Eric Posner and John Yoo (2005) find that independent international tribunals are less effective adjudicators than dependent ones since states are unlikely to rely on institutions they cannot control.

ence may also be related to more generic functions attributed to international institutions, such as their ability to establish credible commitments, to facilitate costly signaling, or to legitimate state policies. All of these propositions suggest testable hypotheses that would help us understand the precise role of institutions and their relationship to states in the international arena.

Our sample is confined to regional IOs in a single issue area. While this limited scope has certain advantages as a first cut, the project will benefit from expanding the data set to include other sets of IOs, such as universal IOs and those in other issue areas—security, human rights, environment, and so on. By creating additional variation in factors such as technical complexity, membership size, and the strategic properties of cooperation problems, this would allow us to test a wider range of hypotheses. Our efforts are also limited insofar as we can only capture independence as a function of formal design. Some institutions develop informal sources of influence and can expand their powers beyond what states intend (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Alter 1998). In general, informal or unintended authority is best captured through detailed analysis of particular institutions, but our measure can serve the valuable purpose of identifying interesting cases for such analysis (e.g., if an obviously influential IO scores low on the independence score). Ultimately, our large-*n* approach must be complemented by qualitative studies of institutions—their design, their operation, and their complicated relationships with member states—to provide a more nuanced understanding of independence.

Given the relative complexity of our coding scheme and the demands it places on a researcher, we suggest that our variable is most practical for studies that engage in cross-sectional comparisons of IOs at roughly the same point in time (within five-year spans) or studies that analyze the same IO or a small set of IOs over time. A streamlined version of our variable, or an alternative but more superficial measure of independence, would be better suited to creating data sets containing large numbers of observations across time.²⁴ Our variable, as well as the insights underpinning it, should also be very useful for those conducting case study research on the causes and effects of IO independence. For example, while case studies of regional IOs have found a pacific effect (Bearce 2003), increased attention to specific institutional features could help isolate the precise causal mechanisms at work. Our conceptualization and measurement scheme could help focus such qualitative studies and facilitate comparisons across institutions.

The IO literature tends to separate theoretical developments concerning institutional variation from empirical work that takes operationalization seriously. These two endeavors should be speaking to each other more directly, especially given the substantial advancements on both prongs. In outlining our IO independence variable, we have taken both tasks—conceptualization and operationalization—seriously in an effort to contribute to both the theoretical and empirical development of the field.

24. For efforts in this direction, see Bearce and Omori (2005) and Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004).

REFERENCES

- Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42:3-32.
- . 2000. Hard and soft law in international governance. *International Organization* 54:421-56.
- Alter, Karen J. 1998. Who are the “masters of the treaty”? European governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization* 52:121-47.
- Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. *Rules for the world*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bearce, David H. 2003. Grasping the commercial institutional peace. *International Studies Quarterly* 47:347-70.
- Bearce, David H., and Sawa Omori. 2005. How do commercial institutions promote peace? *Journal of Peace Research* 42:659-78.
- Bendor, J., A. Glazer, and T. Hammond. 2001. Theories of delegation. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:235-69.
- Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan Stam. 2000. *EUGene: A conceptual manual*. *International Interactions* 26:179-204.
- Bernhard, William. 1998. A political explanation of variation in central bank independence. *American Political Science Review* 92:311-27.
- Bodansky, Daniel. 2001. The history of the global climate change regime. In *International relations and global climate change*, edited by U. Luterbacher and D. Sprinz, 23-40. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics* 57:1-38.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The war trap*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. 1998. The Central American common market: From closed to open regionalism. *World Development* 26:313-22.
- Caporaso, James A. 1998. Regional integration theory: Understanding our past and anticipating the future. In *European integration and supranational governance*, edited by W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet, 334-51. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carpenter, Daniel. 2001. *The forging of bureaucratic autonomy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cukierman, Alex, Steven Webb, and Bilin Neyapti. 1992. Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes. *World Bank Economic Review* 6:353-98.
- Dahl, Robert. 1982. *Dilemmas of pluralist democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Drury, A. Cooper. 1998. Revisiting *Economic sanctions reconsidered*. *Journal of Peace Research* 35:497-509.
- Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating powers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferejohn, John. 1999. Independent judges, dependent judiciary: Explaining judicial independence. *Southern California Law Review* 72:353-84.
- Funabashi, Yoichi. 1995. *Asia Pacific fusion: Japan's role in APEC*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Dong-Joon Jo. 2002. *The affinity of nations index, 1946-1996*. Version 3.0. <http://www.columbia.edu/~cg589/datasets.html>.
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds. 2001. *Legalization and world politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Greif, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. A theory of endogenous institutional change. *American Political Science Review* 98:633-52.
- Grieco, Joseph M. 1997. Systemic sources of variation in regional institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas. In *The political economy of regionalism*, edited by E. Mansfield and H. Milner, 164-87. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the world: Power politics and the rise of supranational institutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Haftel, Yoram Z. 2004a. From the outside looking in: The effect of trading blocs on trade disputes in the GATT/WTO. *International Studies Quarterly* 48:121-42.

- . 2004b. Violent conflict and regional institutionalization: A virtuous circle? Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, Columbus.
- . Forthcoming. Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements, institutional variation, and militarized inter-state disputes. *International Organization*.
- Hawkins, Darren, and Wade Jacoby. 2006. How agents matter. In *Delegation and agency in international organizations*, edited by D. Hawkins, D. Lake, D. Nielson, and M. Tierney. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, eds. 2006. *Delegation and agency in international organizations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2002. *Penn world table version 6.1*. Philadelphia: Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania.
- Horn, Murray. 1995. *The political economy of public administration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jacobson, Harold K. 1984. *Networks of interdependence: International organizations and the global political system*. 2nd ed. New York: Knopf.
- Jenkins, Carolyn. 2001. New forms of co-operation and integration in emerging Africa: Integration and co-operation in Southern Africa. Technical Paper No. 172, OECD Development Centre, Paris.
- Kahler, Miles. 1992. Multilateralism with small and large numbers. *International Organization* 46:681-708.
- . 1995. *International institutions and the political economy of integration*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. 1997. Introduction: Asian regionalism in comparative perspective. In *Network power: Japan and Asia*, edited by P. J. Katzenstein and T. Shiraishi, 1-44. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After hegemony*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. Legalized dispute resolution: Interstate and transnational. *International Organization* 54:457-88.
- Kindleberger, Charles. 1981. Dominance and leadership in the international economy. *International Studies Quarterly* 25:242-54.
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. Contracting around uncertainty. *American Political Science Review* 99:549-65.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55:761-80.
- , eds. 2004. *The rational design of international institutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State power and the structure of international trade. *World Politics* 28:317-47.
- Lake, David. 1999. *Entangling relations: American foreign policy in its century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lindberg, Leon N. 1971. Political integration as a multidimensional phenomenon requiring multivariate measurement. In *Regional integration: Theory and research*, edited by L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, 45-127. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lipson, Charles. 1991. Why are some international agreements informal? *International Organization* 45:495-538.
- Majone, Giandomenico. 2001. Two logics of delegation: Agency and fiduciary relations in EU governance. *European Union Politics* 2:103-21.
- Mansfield, Edward D. 1994. *Power, trade, and war*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2000. Trade blocs, trade flows, and international conflict. *International Organization* 54:775-808.
- Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review* 87:624-38.
- Martin, Elizabeth. 1997. An informational theory of legislative veto. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 13:319-43.
- Martin, Lisa. 1992. *Coercive cooperation: Explaining multilateral economic sanctions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 1994. Heterogeneity, linkage, and commons problems. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:475-95.
- Mattli, Walter. 1999. *The logic of regional integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Mendoza, Miguel R. 1998. The Andean Group integration strategy. In *Economic reform in Latin America*, edited by H. Costin and H. Vanlli, 317-34. Fort Worth, TX: Dryden.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1994. Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domestic politics and international institutions. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series 52, Center for European Studies, Cambridge, MA.
- . 1998. *The choice for Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mortimer, Robert A. 1999. The Arab Maghreb Union: Myth and reality. In *State, society, and economic transformation in the 1990s*, edited by Y. Zoubir, 177-91. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Moser, Peter. 1999. Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence. *European Economic Review* 43:1569-93.
- Nielson, Daniel, and Michael Tierney. 2003. Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. *International Organization* 57:241-76.
- North, Douglass. 1990. *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in 17th-century England. *Journal of Economic History* 49:803-32.
- Ntumba, Luaba Lumu. 1997. Institutional similarities and differences: ECOWAS, ECCAS, and PTA. In *Regional integration and cooperation in West Africa: A multidimensional perspective*, edited by R. Lavergne, 303-20. Ottawa, Canada: Africa World Press and IDRC.
- Nye, Joseph S. 1971. *Peace in parts: Integration and conflict in regional organization*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The logic of collective action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Oye, Kenneth, ed. 1986. *Cooperation under anarchy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Page, Sheila. 2000. *Regionalism among developing countries*. London: Macmillan.
- Pevehouse, Jon, and Bruce Russett. Forthcoming. Democratic IGOs promote peace. *International Organization* 60.
- Pierson, Paul. 1996. The path to European integration: A historical institutionalist analysis. *Comparative Political Studies* 29:123-63.
- . 2004. *Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Pollack, Mark. 2003. *The engines of European integration*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Posner, Eric, and John Yoo. 2005. Judicial independence in international tribunals. *California Law Review* 93:1-74.
- Ravenhill, John. 1995. Economic cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing incentives. *Asian Survey* 35:850-66.
- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating peace: Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations*. New York: Norton.
- Russett, Bruce, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis. 1998. The third leg of the Kantian tripod for peace: International organizations and militarized disputes, 1950-85. *International Organization* 52:441-67.
- Sandholtz, Wayne, and Alec Stone Sweet, eds. 1998. *European integration and supranational governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schott, Jeffrey. 2000. The WTO after Seattle. In *The WTO after Seattle*, edited by J. Schott, 3-40. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Shapiro, Martin. 1981. *Courts: A comparative and political analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Signorino, Curtis S., and Jeffrey M. Ritter. 1999. Tau-b or not tau-b: Measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions. *International Studies Quarterly* 43:115-44.
- Smith, James McCall. 2000. The politics of dispute settlement design: Explaining legalism in regional trade pacts. *International Organization* 54:137-80.
- Snidal, Duncan, and Alexander Thompson. 2003. International commitments and domestic politics: Institutions and actors at two levels. In *Locating the proper authorities*, edited by D. Drezner, 197-230. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Stone Sweet, Alec, Wayne Sandholtz, and Neil Fligstein, eds. 2001. *The institutionalization of Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Tay, Simon S. C. 2001. Institutions and processes: Dilemmas and possibilities. In *Reinventing ASEAN*, edited by S. Tay, J. Estanislao, and H. Soesastro, 243-72. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:369-404.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2005. The rational *choice* of international institutions: Uncertainty and flexibility in the climate regime. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, Washington, D.C.
- . 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the logic of information transmission. *International Organization* 61:1-34.
- UNCTAD. 1996. *Handbook of economic integration and cooperation groupings of developing countries: Volume I. Regional and subregional economic integration groupings*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations.
- Union of International Associations. 1999-2000. *Yearbook of international organizations*. Edition 36. Munich: K. G. Saur Verlag.
- Vaubel, Roland. 1996. Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank: A comparison of the evidence. *The World Economy* 19:185-210.
- Weber, Katja. 1997. Hierarchy amidst anarchy: A transaction costs approach to international security cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly* 41:321-40.
- Wood, David, and Birol Yeşilada. 2002. *The emerging European Union*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman.
- Yarbrough, Beth, and Robert Yarbrough. 1997. Dispute settlement in international trade: Regionalism and procedural coordination. In *The political economy of regionalism*, edited by E. Mansfield and H. Milner, 134-63. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Zormelo, Douglas. 1995. Regional integration in Latin America: Is MERCOSUR a new approach? ODI Working Paper No. 84, Overseas Development Institute, London.