Vincent Oberhauser

Vincent Oberhauser
  • Master of Arts
  • PhD Student at University of Zurich

About

5
Publications
363
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9
Citations
Current institution
University of Zurich
Current position
  • PhD Student

Publications

Publications (5)
Article
Full-text available
Introduction Global challenges like pandemics and climate change are fundamentally cooperation problems, where individual interests often conflict with the collective good. Rising economic inequality and individualism are believed to erode social cohesion and cooperation, exacerbating these tensions. Public goods games (PGGs) are widely used to stu...
Article
Full-text available
Today's modern world is characterized by an increasing shift from human-to-human interaction toward human-computer-interaction (HCI). With the implementation of artificial agents as inspectors, as can be seen in today's airports, supermarkets, or, most recently, within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, our everyday life is progressively shaped...
Article
Full-text available
Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction defectors, classical behavioral experiments suggest that cooperation can take root. Overlooked from standard experime...
Preprint
Full-text available
Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction defectors, classical behavioral experiments suggest that cooperation can take root. Overlooked from standard experime...
Article
Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction defectors, classical behavioral experiments suggest that cooperation can take root. Overlooked from standard experime...

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