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KILL ALL THE LAWYERS!: LAWYERS AND THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN NEW GRANADA, 1809-1820

Simón Bolívar, soon to become an icon of Latin American independence, wrote a celebrated document, dated from Kingston, his place of temporary exile, on September 6, 1815. Bolívar's document, later known as the Jamaica Letter, made prophecies for Latin America's future, appraised its contemporary political conditions, and justified the region's current rebellions against the Spanish crown. Chief among the justifications for rebellion was the exclusion of American-born Spaniards, or creoles, from administration, government, and politics. Wrote Bolívar:

We were cut off and, as it were, virtually removed from the world in relation to the science of government and administration of the state. We were never viceroys or governors, save in the rarest instances; seldom archbishops and bishops; diplomats never; as military men, only subordinates; as nobles, without royal privileges. In brief, we were neither magistrates nor financiers.¹

He went on to criticize the Spanish reduction of creoles to total passivity and serfdom.

Bolívar's Jamaica Letter echoed longstanding claims found in travellers' accounts, bureaucrats' observations and reports, and elites' manifestos and

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¹ Simón Bolívar, "Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of this Island [Jamaica]," in Harold Bierck, ed., *Selected Writings from Bolívar*, 2 vols. (New York: Bolivarian Society of Venezuela, 1951), 1:103-22.

letters, all of which highlighted creoles' animosity toward the Spanish crown and their desire to hold office. These allusions to creole-peninsular tensions went as far back as 1673, became most numerous in the second half of the eighteenth century, and were included in many proclamations issued by Latin American revolutionaries during the 1810s.²

The study of particular creole social groups that might have resented their exclusion from government and administration offers an opportunity to re-examine those creole-peninsular tensions and reevaluate their weight in accounting for Latin America's independence. The legal community of colonial New Granada (which we now call Colombia), much like those of other regions of the Spanish empire, comprised many of the most qualified candidates for, and eager aspirants to, public office, the lawyer-bureaucrat having become a truly central figure of the colonial system.³ Therefore, some lawyers conceivably existed among the discontented creoles excluded from office, and this professional group must have provided substantial support to those who tried to challenge Spain's anticreolism.⁴ Actually, New Granada's legal community, as this article will demonstrate, did supply many leaders of the 1810-1820s movement for independence. Furthermore, its members were particularly targeted for persecution and, because of their revolutionary activities, one-fourth of them ultimately were executed by the Spaniards in the 1810s. Yet it is not totally clear whether political exclusion

² Francisco Núñez de Pineda y Bascuñán, *Cautiverio feliz y razón individual de las guerras dilatadas del Reino de Chile* [c. 1673] (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1973); Jorge Juan de Ulloa and Antonio de Ulloa, *Noticias secretas de América* [1748] (Bogotá: Banco Popular, 1983); Alexander von Humboldt, *Ensayo político sobre el reino de la Nueva España* [1811], 5 vols. (Mexico: Robredo, 1941); Lucas Alamán, *Historia de México desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808, hasta la época presente*, 5 vols. (Mexico: Impr. de J. M. Lara, 1849-1852), 1:58-59; Germán Colmenares, ed., 3 vols. *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada* (Bogotá: Biblioteca de Cultura Popular, 1989); Francisco Silvestre, *Descripción del Nuevo Reino de Santafé de Bogotá* [1789] (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional, 1968); Richard Konezke, "La condición legal de los criollos y las causas de la independencia," *Estudios Americanos* 2:5 (1950), 31-54; Mark A. Burkholder, *Politics of a Colonial Career. José de Baquijano and the Audiencia of Lima* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980), 22, 27, 100, 118, 121. See numerous other references in R. A. Humphreys and John Lynch, eds., *The Origins of Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 243-300; and see also notes 32 and 37.

³ Frank Safford, *The Ideal of the Practical: Colombia's Struggle to Form a Technical Elite* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), 7; Enrique Ruiz Guinazú, *La magistratura indiana* (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1916); Victor M. Uribe, "The Lawyers and New Granada's Late Colonial State," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, forthcoming.

⁴ Little is yet known about lawyers' intervention in Latin America's independence. See Ricardo Levene, "La historia de los abogados en el Río de la Plata y su intervención en la Revolución de Mayo," *Revista Jurídica Argentina La Ley*, 41 (January-March, 1946); Osvaldo Vicente Cutolo, "Los abogados en la Revolución de Mayo," in *Tercer congreso internacional de historia de América* (Buenos Aires, n.p., 1961), 5:199-212.

was the decisive factor that pushed colonial lawyers and other revolutionaries to revolt against the crown and pursue independence, as contemporary actors and later historians have asserted.⁵

This essay does not attempt to provide a full account of the causes of the independence movement. Instead it will draw some inferences concerning the nature and factors of lawyers' decisive role in ultimately achieving independence. It will demonstrate that the presence of lawyers and other members of colonial society's upper segments in the revolutionary juntas supremas organized in New Granada during the 1810s, particularly the one in Bogotá, was a prime indicator that the early movement for independence was an elite revolution intended to expand, to its maximum, creole control over the government.

Based on abundant genealogical information, archival material, printed collections of documents and secondary sources, this article will also demonstrate the social mechanisms that allowed lawyers and other elite individuals to activate and command the early movement. Special reference will be made to the elite's capacity for collective action through notable family networks, connections with intellectual peers, former classmates, or fellow bureaucrats throughout the territory, as well as the elite's influence on the local city councils, or *cabildos*. However excluded they may have been from some upper-level offices, creoles had always been intimately involved with local government. Lawyers had traditionally used these councils as catapults

⁵ For historical assessments of New Granada's independence and its background see José Manuel Restrepo, *Historia de la revolución de la república de Colombia*, 6 vols. (Bogotá: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1942); José María Samper, *Ensayo sobre las revoluciones políticas y la condición social de las repúblicas colombianas* (Paris: E. Thunot, 1861); Rafael Gómez Hoyos, *La revolución granadina. Ideario de una generación y de una época* (Bogotá: Editorial Temis, 1962); Javier Ocampo López, *El proceso ideológico de la emancipación* (Tunja: Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, 1987); Robert Gilmore, "The Imperial Crisis, Rebellion, and the Viceroy: New Granada in 1809," *Hispanic American Historical Review* (hereafter HAHR), 40 (1960), 1-24; Anthony McFarlane, "El colapso de la autoridad española y la génesis de la independencia en la Nueva Granada," *Desarrollo y Soceidad* 7 (1982), 99-120. See also the general comparative works by Richard Graham, *Independence in Latin America: A Comparative Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972); Jorge I. Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983); Idein, ed., *Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826. Old and New World Origins* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994); Timothy E. Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Independence of Latin America* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Jay Kinsbruner, *Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions and Underdevelopment*, 2nd ed., (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), esp. pp. 22-23. One of the most forceful academic works helping to refine the exclusion-from-office thesis is Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977).

for their bureaucratic careers; now the *cabildos* would serve them as key committees for the coordination of revolutionary activities and the capture of the state apparatus. This ultimately contributed to the triumph of independence.

Lawyers and the revolutionary juntas

Lawyers were the most conspicuous leaders of the movement for independence that started with the creation of *juntas supremas*, or cogovernmental committees, in the major cities of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, including Bogotá itself on July 20, 1810.⁶ On August 31, 1810, Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, *oidor*, or judge, of the Royal Audiencia of Bogotá (the highest court of appeals for the Viceroyalty) sent a confidential report to the Spanish *Consejo de Regencia* including the names of the main leaders of the revolution recently started in New Granada. Carrión mentioned José Acevedo *regidor* (councilman) of Bogotá; the *canónigo magistral* Don Andrés Rosillo; Don Baltasar Miñano, *oidor* of the Audiencia of Quito; Manuel Pombo, and all of his relatives of Bogotá and Cartagena; the acting *fiscal del crimen*, Don Frutos Gutiérrez and the two *alcaldes ordinarios* of Bogotá.⁷ Carrión and his colleagues of the audiencia had allegedly received news that patrician merchant Antonio Nariño Alvarez, along with the lawyer and priest Andrés Rosillo, *alcalde ordinario* Luis Caicedo, lawyers Joaquín Camacho and Ignacio Herrera, the treasurer of the Reales Cajas (also a lawyer) Pedro Groot, and “many lawyers who aspire to serve posts of *togado* (*fiscal* and *oidor*) in the Real Audiencia” had been plotting against the colonial authorities since as early as October 1809 (shortly after Quito’s elites had rebelled against local authorities and established their governing *junta*). As a result, some of these men had actually been jailed in late 1809 and early 1810.⁸

The composition of the Bogotá *junta* confirms that the lawyers Carrión mentioned were indeed that city’s leading activists. Of the *junta*’s six different occupational sectors, all representative of the upper social groups, lawyers were the most numerous (table 1). Delegates from the lower classes,

⁶ On the move to create a *junta* in New Granada’s capital and other regions see Lynch, *Spanish American Revolutions*, esp. 238.

⁷ “Informe del Oidor Carrión y Moreno al Consejo de Regencia,” in Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, ed., *Proceso histórico del 20 de julio de 1810. Documentos* (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1960), 199-209. See also “Un español narrador de los sucesos del 20 de julio,” *Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades* (hereafter BHA) 19:222 (1932), 423-35.

⁸ “Oficio del Virrey a la Audiencia, 15 Octubre, 1809,” in *Proceso histórico del 20 de julio*, 1-2; “Declaración del Dr. Pedro Salgar, Noviembre 2, 1809,” in *Ibid.*, 10-13.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION OF THE JUNTA SUPREMA DE SANTA FÉ DE BOGOTÁ,
BY OCCUPATION

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>July 27, 1810</i>	<i>24-25 October, 1810</i>
Lawyers	8	6
Lawyer-priests	2	2
Lawyer-bureaucrats	4	3
Priests	5	4
Bureaucrats	5	3
Military	2	2
Merchants	3	2
Ranchers	2	1
Unknown	4	1
Total	35	24

Sources: Hernández de Alba, *Como nació la república*, 77-80; Gómez *El tribuno*, 277; García de la Guardia, *Kalendario manual*; Abello Salcedo, "La primera república," 423-53.

such as the abundant number of tailors, masons, cobblers, or carpenters that could be found in the city, were conspicuously absent.⁹

Many of these lawyers, and other members of the junta, had not just professional but multiple family ties with members of the legal profession outside of the junta. These connections suggest that the bulk of New Granada's legal community and its family relations backed the early moves that ultimately led to independence. Indeed, about one-sixth of New Granada's 130 to 150 lawyers, was directly or indirectly linked to the Junta Suprema de Bogotá.

In addition, at least a third of the members of the junta had strong family ties with one another. Thus, for example, soon-to-be military officer Antonio Morales and bureaucrat Francisco Morales were father and son; lawyer José Miguel and priest Juan Bautista Pey were brothers; lawyer-bureaucrat Tomás Tenorio was lawyer Camilo Torres' uncle; bureaucrat Manuel Pombo had the same relationship to lawyer Miguel Pombo; and landowner Luis Caicedo and lawyer Joseph Sanz de Santamaría were brothers-in-law.

⁹ For the occupational structure of late colonial Santafé de Bogotá see Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 55; Julián Vargas, *La sociedad de Santafé* (Bogotá: Cinep, 1989).

TABLE 2

TIES BETWEEN THE BOGOTÁ JUNTA AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

<i>Lawyers in the Junta</i>	<i>Relationship</i>	<i>Other Lawyers in New Granada</i>
Frutos Joaquín Gutiérrez	. . . Brother-in-law Half brother	Nicolas Ballén de Guzmán, <i>teniente corregidor</i> of La Mesa by 1806. Half José María Gutiérrez y Caviedes.
Ignacio Herrera Vergara	. . . Son-in-law First cousin Distant cousin of	Bernabé Antonio Ortega Luis Félix Vergara, Manuel S. Vallecilla.
Luis de Azuola	. . . Uncle	Francisco J. de Ugarte.
Joaquín Camacho	. . . Brother Brother-in-law	Manuel Ignacio Camacho, Antonio Martínez Recamán.
Camilo Torres and Tomás Tenorio Carvajal	. . . Brother . . . Uncle	Jerónimo Torres Tenorio. idem
Manuel Bernardo Alvarez	. . . Father Nephew by marriage	Manuel Bernardo Alvarez Lozano, José Gil Martínez Malo.
Joseph Sanz de Santamaría	. . . Son Brother-in-law	Francisco Sanz de Santamaría, Francisco de Vergara y Caicedo and Francisco González Manrique.
Juan Francisco Pey	. . . Brother-in-law	Manuel de Andrade [lawyer-priest].
<i>Other Nonlawyer Members of the Junta</i>		
Francisco Morales Fernández	. . . Father Brother-in-law	Francisco Morales Galavís Eustaquio Galavís
Antonio Morales	. . . Brother Nephew	Francisco Morales Galavís Eustaquio Galavís
Luis Caicedo y Flórez	. . . Brother-in-law Father-in-law Brother-in-law	Pedro Romero Sarachaga José Antonio Leiva Joseph Sanz de Santamaría
Antonio Baraya	. . . Brother-in-law	Agustín Caicedo Sánchez
José Vicente Ortega	. . . Brother Brother-in-law Uncle by marriage	Bernardo Antonio Ortega José Antonio Ricaurte Rigueiro, Crisanto Valenzuela Ignacio Herrera Vergara

Sources: Restrepo S. and Rivas, *Genealogías de Santa Fé de Bogotá*; Hernández de Alba, "Galería de hijos"; Pardo Umaña, *Haciendas; Plazas, Genealogías de Neiva*; Restrepo Sáenz, "La familia de Nariño; Arboleda, *Diccionario biográfico; Genealogías de Santa Fé de Bogotá [1991]*.

TABLE 3

LAWYERS IN OTHER JUNTAS OF THE VICEROYALTY

	<i>Total Members</i>	<i>Lawyers</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Cali (February 1811)	29	6	20.6
Cartagena (November 1811)	20	9	45.0
Socorro (July 1810)	12	4	33.0
First Royalist Cabildo, Popayán (February 1811)	22	1	4.5

Sources: Zawadzky, *Las ciudades confederadas*, 101, 148; Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia*, 26-27; Posada, *El 20 de Julio*, 257; Lemaitre, *Cartagena colonial*, 126-36.

Therefore, the junta appears to have been a select clique of elite relatives and probably friends.¹⁰

Lawyers and their relatives were also active in the patriotic or revolutionary juntas created in other regions of the viceroyalty (table 3). By contrast, as table 3 also indicates, the presence of lawyers in one of the royalist juntas created to oppose independence was insignificant. Indeed, only one lawyer appeared among the twenty-two members of Popayán's loyalist cabildo.¹¹

The extent and nature of the movement to unseat the colonial authorities was certainly affected by the lawyers' apparent dominance in the several juntas that started it.

The 1810 movement: Independence without the people

The exclusive character of that early independence movement led by New Granadan lawyers was also apparent, making it a true elite revolution. This

¹⁰ José M. Restrepo S. and Raimundo Rivas, *Genealogías de Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá: n.p., 1928); Gustavo Arboleda, *Diccionario biográfico y genealógico del antiguo departamento del Cauca* (Bogotá: Librería Horizontes, 1962); Guillermo Hernández de Alba, *Cómo nació la república* (Bogotá: n.p., 1965).

¹¹ In the case of the Cartagena junta, lawyers Germán Gutiérrez de Piñeres, José María García de Toledo, José María del Castillo, José Antonio Ayos, Eusebio María Canabal, Basilio del Toro de Mendoza, Ramón Ripoll, Ignacio Cavero, and the lawyer-priest Manuel B. Rebollo acted as leading figures. So did Miguel Díaz Granados somewhat later. See Ortega Ricaurte, *Proceso del 20 de Julio*, 257. In Cali the role of the lawyers José María de Cuero y Caicedo, Joaquín de Caicedo y Cuero, José María Alomia, José Antonio Borrero, and the lawyer-priest Fray José Joaquín de Escobar was no less noteworthy. See Zawadzky, *Ciudades confederadas del Valle del Cauca*. Historia, actas, documentos (n.p.: Imprenta Bolivariana, 1943), 111; Victor M. Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins: Lawyers, Political Parties, and the State in New Granada, 1780-1850" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1993), Appendixes A, C.

elitism can be demonstrated by looking at lawyers' social origins, the measures taken by the early revolutionary juntas, and the elites' attitudes toward, and comments about, some popular sectors.

Lawyers, as I have shown elsewhere, were mostly white male creoles who belonged to families of mineowners, landowners, merchants, and incumbent or former high-ranking military officers and bureaucrats. They rarely, if at all, were family members of mestizo or Indians, middle-ranking bureaucrats, or quasi-manual workers, such as *escribanos* (clerks), *plateros* (silversmiths), or *boticarios* (pharmacy owners). The narrowly select character of the profession was guaranteed by the demanding admission standards at either of New Granada's two local *colegios mayores*, and hence to their law schools. Candidates had to undergo a semi-trial or *procesillo* to prove their *pureza de sangre*, or absence of non-white and non-Catholic ancestry, and their *legitimidad*, or legitimate birth.¹²

In addition, after serving generally unpaid positions (*alcaldes mayores*, *síndicos procuradores*, *asesores*) in the elite-controlled cabildos, teaching law, demonstrating a familial tradition of bureaucratic service, and entering into appropriate marriage alliances with the relatives of at least middle-ranking bureaucrats, law graduates not infrequently joined the bureaucracy and could attain high or middle managerial positions.¹³ They thus generally came to represent the interests of the upper echelons of colonial society, and those of the state itself.

More evidence of elitism can be found in the measures adopted by the Suprema Junta de Bogota and others.¹⁴ Shortly after its creation, the Bogotá junta issued repeated calls to the people, asking them to keep out of the streets and avoid any manifestation of "anarchy." Similarly, it requested that recruits brought to Bogotá by parish priests from neighboring towns disperse, return to their home towns, and go back to their routine activities. It even punished some popular leaders who had urged the junta to jail the

¹² Uribe, "The Lawyers and New Granada's Late Colonial State"; *idem*, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A. See also Renán Silva, "Escolares y catedráticos en la sociedad colonial," (Ms., Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1985), 156.

¹³ Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," chap. 2.

¹⁴ A detailed narrative of the events preceding Bogota's July 1810 junta can be found in Gilmore, "Imperial crisis." See also McFarlane, "El colapso de la autoridad." On the creation of Juntas Supremas throughout the American colonies (Caracas in April, Buenos Aires in May, Bogotá in July, and Santiago de Chile in September, 1810) see Lynch, *Spanish American Revolutions*; Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, 152; Michael P. McKinley, *Pre-revolutionary Caracas: Politics, Economy, and Society, 1777-1811* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. 7; María T. Berruazo, *La lucha de Hispano-América por su independencia en Inglaterra 1800-1830* (Madrid: Ediciones de Cultura Hispánica, 1989), 111, 181.

viceroys and his wife. The junta also created a series of institutional channels for the people to voice their complaints so that any sort of popular mobilization could be preempted.¹⁵ In each of Bogotá's neighborhoods, for instance, the parish priest, who ordinarily came from an upper-class local family, along with another member of the local elite (either a lawyer, high bureaucrat, or large landholder), were put in charge of hearing people's complaints, making direct popular action or mobilization superfluous.¹⁶

Containing popular mobilization was also a concern of the juntas created in other regions of New Granada. In the southern city of Cali, near the traditionally loyalist city of Popayán, for instance, members of the junta grew alarmed when black slaves revolted in Raposo, a neighboring mining town. In mid-February 1811, the junta decided "to send a good priest to calm the slave gangs and make them understand that they ought to obey their masters and that if they insist on trying to break from slavery they will face much hardship."¹⁷ On April 8, the junta decided to send two priests to convince the rioting slaves of "the mistake of their illusory freedom, source of infinite private and public disgraces." The junta ordered the priests "to dissuade those miserable people and make them understand that they face ruin if they do not correct their mistakes and go back to discharge their original obligations."¹⁸

Despite these measures and admonitions, the common people were generally far from docile. An eyewitness account of the events in Bogotá during

¹⁵ On September 15, 1810, the junta enacted a comprehensive *bando* (decree) that reiterated previous measures and prescribed that "Será juzgado como Reo de un grave delito, y como traidor a la Patria todo hombre que forme tumultos sediciosos, o conbocare [*sic*] a las gentes del Pueblo inspirandolas ideas perjudiciales al bien público." It went on to express regret that the whole people could not be heard; but, it said, this was impossible, and would impose restrictions on the freedom of action of a sovereign body such as the junta. Therefore, "se previene a todos los habitantes de esta Capital, que eviten las referentes reuniones que pretendan comprimir y quitarle la libertad, sin la cual no puede estar ningún Cuerpo Soberano." See "Documentos de la independencia," *BHA*, 47:543-44 (1960), 98-112; Eduardo Posada, *El 20 de Julio. Capítulos sobre la revolución de 1810* (Bogotá: Imprenta de Arboleda y Valencia, 1914), p. 168-88.

¹⁶ The elite figures appointed by the junta were Ignacio Umaña, in the neighborhood of Las Nieves; lawyer Manuel Ignacio Camacho Rojas, in Santa Barbara; the lawyer-bureaucrat Felipe Vergara, in San Victorino; and the lawyer Domingo Camacho, in La Catedral. See "Bando, 25 julio, 1810," in Posada, *El 20 de Julio*, 181; Camilo Pardo Umaña, *Haciendas de la sabana* (Bogotá: Villegas Editores, 1988), 220; Restrepo S. and Rivas, *Genealogías de Santafé*, 193; Luis Martínez Delgado, *Noticia biográfica del procer don Joaquín Camacho* (Bogotá: Editorial Pax, n.d.), 362; Antonio J. García de la Guardia, *Kalendarario manual y guía de forasteros en Santa Fé de Bogotá capital del Nuevo Reino de Granada para el año de 1806* (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1988); Carlos Cuervo Márquez, *Vida de José Ignacio de Márquez*, 2 vols. (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1917), 1:17.

¹⁷ "Acta de Febrero 14, 1811," in Alfonso Zawadzky, *Las Ciudades confederadas*, 109.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

the last months of 1810 clearly indicated that most members of the “revolutionary” junta only reluctantly agreed to treat some members of the Real Audiencia, as well as the viceroy and his wife as common prisoners, charged with crimes against society because of relatively massive popular demand.¹⁹ Accounts of the events in other regions also referred to the mobilization of the “lower” people in the early days of the movement. For instance, letters written from Cartagena in the early months of 1811 by Antonio Narváez y Latorre, lieutenant general of the royal army and a leading member of the junta suprema formed in that city, indicated the presence of “an infinite multitude of people with machetes, spears, *trabucos*, and rifles” and described with alarm how these people “ran through the streets, forced doors and broke into houses, [and] detained some Europeans.”²⁰ In the northeastern region of Socorro, the convent of the royalist Capuchin monks was assaulted by a crowd of *la plebe*, armed with stones and firearms, who cried “death to the filthy monks!” and insulted them “to the point of threatening them with spears and swords” and “grabbed and pulled out their beards.”²¹

Even with these gestures of popular anger, however, it was apparent that the common people were not willing to die for the revolution. The elite leadership saw that, despite the seemingly spontaneous and somewhat disordered enthusiasm of the masses, the majority of the population (particularly the black slaves, mestizos, *castas*, and Indians) was indifferent or even opposed to independence. Indeed, several Indian groups fought alongside the Spanish armies against the rebels. Such was the case of the Indians in the southern region of Pasto and also in the northern region of Cienaga.²² Although some masters had allegedly offered their slaves freedom if they joined the revolution, many others fought for the crown. Miguel Tacón, governor of the southern province of Popayán and a staunch Spanish loyalist, reported to the Viceroy in May 1812 that “the coast’s blacks and those of the Popayán district have never been in favor of their masters, because they regard them as enemies of the King, and that is why blacks have

¹⁹ José María Caballero, *Diario de la independencia* (Bogotá: Biblioteca Popular, 1974), pp. 70-78.

²⁰ José M. Restrepo, *Documentos importantes de Nueva Granada, Venezuela y Colombia*, 2 vols. (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1969), 1:20, p. 21.

²¹ A vivid narrative of these events was written in 1818 by one of the monks involved. A copy is reproduced in Horacio Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia del Socorro y la independencia* (Bogotá: Publicaciones Editoriales, 1963), p. 247-65.

²² Gustavo Arboleda, *Historia contemporánea de Colombia. Desde la disolución de la república de ese nombre hasta la época presente*, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Cali: Editorial América, 1933), 1: 47. See also Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, *España y las luchas sociales en el Nuevo Mundo* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1972), p. 283-98.

volunteered to defend the government.”²³ He noted by contrast that the revolutionary leadership was composed of “almost all of the nobles, the clergy, and the middle classes, all of whom by different means dominate the plebe in the volatile areas.”²⁴

In addition, later evaluations of the revolutionary struggles, made by the elites themselves, attributed popular indifference to the prolongation of the revolution, which turned out to last more than a decade. Reports to Congress by lawyer Alejandro Osorio, first minister of war and treasury, lamented in the late 1810s the popular disinterest in the revolution. The soon-to-be minister of the interior, lawyer José Manuel Restrepo, writing to a merchant in late 1819, echoed Osorio’s complaints. He said that in Medellín there was little support for the struggle: “the people are timid, and particularly in this village there is very little opinion in favor of the revolution.” He explained the difficulties in consolidating the revolution during the 1810s by stating, “I believe that the republic failed because of the weakness of the new government, the little or nonexistent opinion in its favor and, above all, because people did not want to support it.”²⁵

Still, other historical evaluations made by the elites’ descendants also referred to the people’s lack of involvement, with contempt—and relief. One relative of elite revolutionary general José María Vergara Lozano, for instance, asserted,

our emancipation was carried out, in general, by the most distinguished families, the most educated, the most respectful of law and true freedom, and that is why, in spite of the excesses and mistakes of all revolutions, the republic

²³ Reproduced in Restrepo, *Documentos importantes*, 1:75. See also John Lynch, *Simón Bolívar and the Age of Revolution* (London: University of London Institute of Latin American Studies, 1983), pp. 18-19; John Lombardi, *The Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela, 1820-1854* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp. 36-46; McKinley, *Pre-revolutionary Caracas*, chap. 7; Guillermo Hernández de Alba comp., *Archivo Nariño*, 6 vols. (Bogotá: Biblioteca Presidencia de la República, 1990), 2:331-332.

²⁴ Restrepo, *Documentos importantes*, 1:73-74. On the participation of *pardos* and blacks in the royalist guerrilla troops recruited by José Tomás Boves in Venezuela, see Stephen Stoa, *Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), pp. 50-58; Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, *Bolívar* (Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra, 1971), pp. 80-90, 179, 190; and Brian Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection and Royalist Reaction: Colombian Regions, 1810-1823,” in *Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, ed. John Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), pp. 292-326, esp. 312.

²⁵ “Cartas inéditas de J. M. Restrepo,” in *Repertorio Histórico* 3:3-4 (December 1919), 97; Alejandro Osorio, “Memoria presentada por el ministro de guerra y hacienda,” *Gazeta de Santa Fé de Bogotá* 25 (January 16, 1820), 26 (January 23, 1820), 27 (January 30, 1820). See Bolívar’s similar opinions in Lievano Aguirre, *Bolívar*, pp. 153-160.

was organized under the law: *something very different would have occurred if emancipation had been headed by the irresponsible and ignorant populacho.*²⁶

The biographies of other key participants in the revolution also emphasized that “the revolution was not carried out by the mass of the people. Just a minority supported the segment of Bogotá’s upper classes who promoted the ‘revolution.’ The majority of the people conformed to and were even happy with the lives they led.”²⁷ To be sure, these were the biased and exaggerated views of aristocratic, non-professional historians writing about their ancestors. Yet these views tend to reflect particularly well the elites’ self-perception of their commanding roles. Most of New Granada’s high-ranking military officers in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period were elites.²⁸ The common people, therefore, apparently did not play a direct role in triggering the revolution, nor did they furnish as much support as the elites would have wished during its course.²⁹

Thus, in a movement led largely by the elite, lawyers provided representative evidence as to the reasons and the means by which elite groups ultimately seized the colonial state apparatus. A review of the motives underlying lawyers’ revolutionary activism will be followed by a discussion of the foundations of their leadership roles and of the ultimate outcomes of their revolutionary behavior.

²⁶ Julio Cesar Vergara y Vergara, *Don Antonio Vergara Azcárate y sus descendientes*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Imprenta J. Pueyo, 1952), vol. 1:272, emphasis added. On this elite historian’s social background see Uribe “Rebellion of the Mandarins.”

²⁷ “José Acevedo Gómez,” *Papel periódico ilustrado* 1:5 (1881), 71. See also Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, *Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia*, 6th ed. (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1974), 297-98.

²⁸ Anthony Maingot, “Civil and Military Relations in a Political Culture of Conflict” (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1967); idem, “Social Structure, Social Status, and Civil Military Conflict in Urban Colombia, 1810-1858,” in Stephan Thernston and Richard Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth-Century Cities: Essays in the New Urban History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 297-355.

²⁹ The revolutionary participation of the lower sectors is, regrettably, still an understudied and certainly a controversial topic. See Pierre Chaunu, “La participación de las clases populares en los movimientos de Independencia de América Latina”, in Karen Spalding and Heraclio Bonilla, eds. *La Independencia en el Perú*, 2nd Ed., (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981); Hermes Tovar Pinzón, “Guerras de opinión y represión en Colombia durante la independencia (1810-1820),” *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* (hereafter ACHSC) 11 (1983), 187-232; Germán Colmenares, ed., *La independencia. Ensayos de historia social* (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura, 1986); Eric Van Young, “The Raw and the Cooked: Elite and Popular Ideology in Mexico, 1800-1821,” in Mark D. Szuchman, ed., *The Middle Period in Latin America: Values and Attitudes in the 17th-19th Centuries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 75-102; Hamnett, “Popular Insurrection”; Frank Safford, “Race, Integration and Progress: Elite Attitudes and the Indian in Colombia” *HAHR*, 71:1 (Feb. 1991), 1-33; Mario Aguilera and Renán Vega Cantor, *Ideal democrático y revuelta popular. Bosquejo histórico de la mentalidad política popular en Colombia* (Bogotá: Ismac, 1991), 65-96; Margarita Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones: Variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1770-1815* (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1993); Richard Warren, “Vagrants and Citizens: Politics and the Poor in Mexico City, 1808-1836,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1994).

Alienation and discontent among some lawyers

Despite the rebel's demand that creole and native-son participation in government be increased, which would have particularly favored lawyers, members of this profession had exhibited conservative attitudes during the Comuneros rebellion, a tax riot in the early 1780s. Then, some of them, along with their relatives, helped to negotiate the surrender of the antitax rebels or joined the royal militias organized to fight them. The same attitude emerged during an antimonarchical plot in 1794-95. The young patrician merchant Antonio Nariño Alvarez, leader of the alleged conspiracy, could not find in Bogotá, where half of New Granada's lawyers lived, a single attorney to represent him. The city's attorneys were unwilling to contradict the colonial state, whose patronage was vital for the survival and advancement of themselves and their families.³⁰ Indeed, the eagerness of New Granada's lawyers and their families to pursue all sorts of state jobs and prebends, their relatively significant presence in middle- and upper-level state positions, and their traditional disposition to support the colonial state were characteristic during the entire colonial period.³¹

After 1810, however, the legal community's role in the revolutionary movement was far from conservative. Indeed, as was suggested above, they led the actions. Ironically, some of the same lawyers who refused to help Nariño during the 1790s (Camilo Torres Tenorio being the most noteworthy) turned out to be among the revolutionary leaders of the 1810s. New circumstances determined the radically different stand lawyers took before the colonial state starting around 1809. They seem to have resented the increasingly limited possibilities of gaining access to, and upward mobility in, the colonial bureaucracy. That is certainly what some of them claimed.

Less than a year before the Bogotá Junta was established, one of its future members, the lawyer Ignacio Herrera y Vergara, wrote an analysis of the political, economic, and social situation of the colonies. Herrera y Vergara, 41-year-old unsuccessful applicant to bureaucratic jobs, was serving as a law professor at a local colegio and *síndico procurador general* of the Bogotá cabildo. In his analysis, he summarized what he defined as the collective feeling of his fellow lawyers, referring specifically to their exclusion from key positions in the colonial bureaucracy.

³⁰ John L. Phelan, *The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Guillermo Hernández de Alba, *El proceso de Nariño a la luz de documentos inéditos* (Bogotá: Editorial A.B.C., 1958); Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," chap. 2.

³¹ Uribe, "The Lawyers and New Granada's Late Colonial State."

Americans cannot easily file their complaints before the crown because of the long distance, and thus the crown's oidores end up becoming sovereign arbiters of the Americans' property, honor and lives. Jobs as delicate as these should be entrusted to capable persons. A royal *cédula* issued under Charles III's fortunate kingdom established that applicants to these positions must not be considered unless they be lawyers with at least ten years of practical experience. This wise legislation has never been followed: in the American *audiencias* we run into many youngsters who have just obtained degrees of *bachiller* at Salamanca, Alcalá or other universities. With no other knowledge than the principles of Roman Law that they learn in the classroom, with no practical training, and without ever having opened the Laws of the Indies, the largest and most valuable region of the monarchy comes to depend on their decisions. When some perceptive individual questions this situation, it is answered that these youngsters will do for America. And the lawyers born in the Indies, who have grown older working in their trade, see their bureaucratic aspirations delayed, and in order to have their *méritos* recognized have to rely on the favor, efforts, and not rarely the financial ruin of their families. The vast territories of the Indies follow the same banners and are vassals of the same sovereign. Why is it, then, that they are not provided with wise judges and are not given the right to choose those who, on the basis of their services, deserve the judicial positions?³²

At roughly the same time, in late 1809, New Granada was preparing to send envoys to participate in the Junta Central y Gubernativa of Spain. This body had recently decreed that Spanish dominions in America were not colonies but an integral part of the Spanish monarchy with rights of representation. The Bogotá *cabildo* prepared a document for the envoys to carry. Drafted by a creole lawyer, who was assessor of the *cabildo*, the document summarized the local reasons for discontent and pointed to the exclusion of Spanish-Americans from the highest jobs as one of the main concerns.³³

Envoys sent by Spain to New Granada also reported that creoles, in particular native sons, felt unjustly excluded from the government. In early 1810 the Consejo de Regencia, the small emergency committee gathered after the dissolution of the Junta Central, sent Captain Antonio Villavicencio as an envoy to New Granada with the mission of obtaining New Granadans' allegiance to the consejo and their material support for Spain's war against the French. Villavicencio, born in Quito in 1775, was the son of a Spanish

³² Reproduced in Ocampo López, *Proceso ideológico*, 552.

³³ "America's government officials, especially the ones who occupy the highest posts, have all, or a great majority, come from the metropolis. . . . Spain has believed that the doors to obtaining honors and jobs must be shut down for Americans." Camilo Torres, "Representación del Cabildo de Santafé, Capital del Nuevo Reino de Granada, a la Suprema Junta Central de España, en el año de 1809," in Hernández de Alba, *Como nació la república*, 26, 30. See also Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones*, pp. 93-109.

contador of the Cajas Reales in that city who bore the title *Conde del Real Agrado*. During the early 1770s his father married the daughter of oidor Verástegui of the Bogotá Audiencia, and young Villavicencio was brought up in Bogotá studying at one of its local colegios during the 1780s. There he befriended several of the lawyers who ultimately led the movement of 1810. Having migrated to Spain in pursuit of a military career, and probably because of his connections with these and other members of New Granada's elite, the Spanish regency sent him to mediate with the unhappy native sons of that region.³⁴

Upon his arrival in May 1810, Villavicencio wrote a letter to New Granada's viceroy summarizing the reasons for the *criollos'*, especially the native sons', discontent. After listing a series of complaints presented by the local elites regarding the fiscal and economic policies of the monarchy, he pointed out:

one of the oldest complaints of Spaniards and Americans, which still persists, is the oblivion to which have been relegated many virtuous patricians who have served the fatherland, and who, not having the means to undertake a trip to Spain and lacking patrons, become puppets of the vain hopes with which Spanish business agents [brokers] entertain them, later having to see newly arrived bureaucrats whose youth, inexperience, lack of talents, and other circumstances demonstrate that they were not worthy or appreciated even in Spain whence they came.³⁵

The letter included a list of the frustrated local candidates to public jobs, many of them lawyers from New Granada and some members of the clergy.³⁶ It also listed a number of Spanish officers and bureaucrats who, along with the lawyers and priests, deserved to be appointed to important bureaucratic jobs or promoted from the positions they had held for too long.³⁷

³⁴ A detailed narrative of his mission to New Granada can be found in José Dolores Monsalve, *Antonio de Villavicencio (el protomartir) y la revolución de la independencia*, 2 vols. (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1920), 1:1-9. See also José M. Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios y ministros de la Real Audiencia* (Bogotá: Editorial Cromos, 1952), pp. 357-59.

³⁵ Antonio Villavicencio "Representación del Comisario Regio D. Antonio Villavicencio al Virrey de Bogotá," in Ortega Ricaurte, *Proceso del 20 de julio*, 126-31.

³⁶ The lawyers listed were Joaquín Cabrejo, José Munive y Mozo, Francisco Javier de Vergara, Camilo Torres, Joaquín Camacho, Frutos Gutiérrez, Antonio José de Ajos, Miguel Díaz Granados, José María Real, José María del Castillo y Rada, Germán Gutiérrez de Piñéres, and the lawyer-priest Manuel B. Rebollo. *Ibid.* On the lives and careers of these lawyers see Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendixes A, C. Almost all of those listed actually became leaders of the 1810 movement in the different regions of New Granada, and several were executed by the Spaniards in 1816 (See table 6).

³⁷ Various of the cases referred to bureaucrats; e.g., the *teniente asesor-auditor de guerra* of Panama, Joaquín Cabrejo, and the *agente fiscal de lo civil* at the Bogotá Audiencia, lawyer Francisco Javier de

It should be recalled that oidor Carrión y Moreno's confidential report to the Consejo de Regencia three months later, concerning the revolutionary activities of New Granadans, also referred to the active role played by *doctores*, or "lawyers who aspired to serve in legal jobs" and had received no such appointments. Finally, shortly after oidor Carrión's report, two of these *doctores* themselves wrote a lengthy document justifying the revolt by echoing and elaborating on the foregoing complaints.³⁸

All these contemporary accounts, like most subsequent historical evaluations of the independence movement, refer to the exclusion of the local elites from the state's bureaucracy as a key cause of the revolution. In addition, they seem to suggest that the jobs lawyers frequently held in New Granada were not the most influential, and that upward mobility in the bureaucracy was too slow.³⁹

Elsewhere I have also indicated how tedious it was for the colonial elites to meet one strategic condition required to get a good job; namely, traveling to Spain. Because of this and other obstacles, only 16 of the 47 permanent oidores (i.e., excluding 'supernumerarios' and 'futurarios') appointed to the Bogotá Audiencia from 1689 to 1798 were creoles; and only one native son was appointed oidor in the Audiencia of Bogotá during the entire eighteenth century.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Mark Burkholder and Dewitt S. Chandler have

Vergara, who had remained from thirty to fifty years in the same jobs without a promotion. Ortega Ricaurte, *Proceso del 20 de julio*, p. 126.

³⁸ "Americans have always been deprived of honorific jobs, and completely excluded from the fiscal bureaucracy." Camilo Torres and Frutos Gutiérrez, "Exposición de los motivos que han obligado al Nuevo Reino de Granada a reasumir los derechos de la soberanía, remover las autoridades del antiguo gobierno, e instalar una suprema junta bajo la sola denominación y en nombre de nuestro soberano Fernando VII y con independencia del Consejo de Regencia y de cualquier otra representación" [1810], in *Proceso histórico del 20 de julio. Documentos* (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1960), p. 211.

³⁹ Thus are the documents interpreted by Gómez Hoyos, *La revolución granadina*; Lynch, *Simón Bolívar and the age of revolution*; *idem*, *Spanish American Revolutions*, 7-24; and Ocampo López, *El proceso ideológico*. See also notes 2 and 5. Conspicuous exceptions to the "exclusion from office" thesis are Jaime Eyzaguirre, *Ideario y ruta de la emancipación chilena* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1957); Stoa, *Pablo Morillo*; McKinley, *Pre-revolutionary Caracas*, chap. 7; Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, 243; and Jacques A. Barbier, *Reform and Politics in Bourbon Chile, 1755-1796* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980).

⁴⁰ The sole native-born oidor was Joaquín Mosquera y Figueroa, who joined the audiencia in 1787. He then served in the audiencia of Mexico, and later the Spanish Consejo de Indias. In addition, only three native permanent fiscales were appointed, in 1776, 1779, and 1790, respectively. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, Appendix X, esp., pp. 221-224. The figures mentioned in the text seem to contradict those in a specialized source that lists 41 new oidores from 1654 to 1778, only 7 of whom are alleged to have been creoles. See Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios*. See also Jorge O. Melo, "Francisco Antonio Moreno y Escandón: retrato de un burócrata colonial," in Melo, ed., *Indios y mestizos en la Nueva Granada a finales del siglo XVIII* (Bogotá: Nueva Biblioteca Colombiana de Cultura, 1985), p. 8; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

done extensive comparative research to show that although from the late sixteenth century until 1750, many Americans had been appointed to audiencia positions, later the conditions radically changed. From 1751 to 1775 only 9 out of 68 new officials named to the American courts were creoles, and between 1751 and 1808 only 11 native sons were directly appointed to their home courts. In consequence, many petitions were sent to the crown calling for native-son appointments after 1770.⁴¹ In sum, these data would tend to support the "exclusion from office" hypothesis to account for the independence movement. Other evidence puts these justifications into question, or at least qualifies them.

Lawyers and the late colonial bureaucracy

In spite of the claims made by contemporary lawyers, and the complaints summarized in Villavicencio's letter, a number of lawyers who became prominent revolutionary leaders actually had enjoyed highly successful careers in the colonial bureaucracy, or were closely linked to highly placed administrators and had no further personal ambitions to join the bureaucracy themselves. For example, José María García de Toledo, the most conspicuous leader of the Cartagena Junta, was brother-in-law of Joaquín Mosquera y Figueroa, Audiencia of Bogotá's sole native oidor. García's wife was well connected as a sister-in-law of José de Mesia i Caicedo, oidor of a Real Audiencia until at least 1795.⁴² Given his family background, services to the crown, and his marital alliances, García himself would have had a very high probability of becoming an oidor or fiscal of a Real Audiencia, had he wanted it.⁴³ Apparently he simply did not aspire to it. Indeed, judging by his absence from Villavicencio's letter, García de Toledo, busy with ranching and trade at the time, apparently was not interested in pursuing a bureaucratic career and must have supported the Cartagena Junta out of other concerns.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, Appendix X; Burkholder, *Politics of a Career*, pp. 100, 118; Lynch, *Spanish American Revolutions*, pp. 17-19.

⁴² Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios*, p. 387.

⁴³ See Gabriel Jiménez Molinares, *Linajes cartageneros*, 2 vols. (Cartagena: Imprenta Departamental, 1958), 2:7; Hermes Tovar, "El estado colonial frente al poder local y regional," *Nova Americana*, Torino, 5 (1982); Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios*, 387; "José María García de Toledo," *BHA*, 31:362-362 (1944), 1134-37; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁴⁴ This lawyer's name is not listed in the letter, though Villavicencio, writing from Cartagena, where García de Toledo was at the time the leading social and political figure, could hardly have forgotten him. Villavicencio, "Representación," pp. 126-31.

Another lawyer in the Cartagena Junta with close connections to the colonial bureaucracy was Eusebio María Canabal, acting *administrador principal* of Cartagena's *real renta de aguardientes*. In the mid-1810s, the Spanish colonial authorities promoted Canabal to fiscal de la Real Hacienda, and later to fiscal of the Superior Gobierno. Moreover, in 1816 and as late as 1820 he was applying, with the support of the viceroy, for a "position as oidor in Quito, Guatemala, or Caracas."⁴⁵

Yet another member of the Cartagena junta, Ignacio Cavero, could certainly have been interested in a promotion. Lawyer Cavero, however, had been an insider in the fiscal bureaucracy for more than 20 years, rising from his original modest job of *oficial segundo* (clerk) of the *Secretaría del Virreinato* (which he had held in 1789) to the enviable position of administrador of the Cartagena Customs, which, to the satisfaction of his merchant wife, he still had by 1815.⁴⁶

The presence of lawyer-bureaucrats in other juntas is also revealing. In the Socorro Junta, for instance, the administrador of the *renta de aguardientes, bulas y papel sellado*, Miguel Tadeo Gómez, was a leading member; in Cali, José Antonio Dorronsoro, administrador of the *renta de aguardientes*, was also active.⁴⁷ In addition, relatives of José Antonio Pérez y Valencia Arroyo, contador of the *renta de diezmos* in Popayán, were the active leaders of the Popayán Junta.⁴⁸

It seems unlikely that several of these juntas' activists could have been unhappy about the exclusion of their American-born clan members, or of themselves, from the state's ranks. Even if they did not hold the coveted job of oidor or fiscal, the bureaucratic posts and prebends they did occupy were among the highest available in their native provinces and the source of much prestige and power. Several lawyers in the juntas appeared, in sum, to have been dedicated to the *carrera de oficinas* (bureaucratic career), and followed

⁴⁵ Indeed, he was never labeled as revolutionary for his participation in the Cartagena junta. Sergio E. Ortíz, "Eusebio María Canabal," *BHA*, 58 (1971), 15; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix C.

⁴⁶ His wife, Teresa Legina, owned a store devoted to the sale of imported fabrics from Castile, or "generos de Castilla." Jiménez Molinares, *Linajes cartageneros*, 1:153-168; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁴⁷ García de la Guardia, *Kalendario manual*.

⁴⁸ Restrepo, *Documentos importantes*, 2:75.

TABLE 4

THE BOGOTÁ JUNTA AND THE COLONIAL BUREAUCRACY

<i>Junta Member</i>	<i>Bureaucratic Position</i>
Manuel Bernardo Alvarez	<i>Contador mayor</i> , Tribunal de Cuentas, 1803-1810.
José Sanz de Santamaría	<i>Tesorero</i> , Real Casa de Moneda.
Manuel Pombo	<i>Contador</i> , Real Casa de Moneda.
Luis Eduardo Azuola	<i>Contador de resultas</i> , Tribunal de Cuentas.
Pedro Groot	<i>Tesorero</i> Cajas Reales de Santa Fé, 1806; <i>tesorero</i> Junta de Tribunales, 1809.
José Joaquín Camacho	<i>Corregidor</i> , Pamplona, until 1808; interim <i>corregidor</i> , Socorro, 1809.
José Martín París	<i>Administrador</i> , Renta del Tabaco.
Tomás Tenorio	<i>Fiscal</i> , Subdelegación General de la Renta de Correos.
Francisco Morales Fernández	<i>Contador</i> , Administración Principal de Aguardientes y Naipes.

Sources: García de la Guardia, *Kalendario manual*; Restrepo and Rivas, *Genealogías de Santa Fé*; Hernández de Alba, *Como nació la República*, 50, 77-80.

the long tradition of *pretendientes* (applicants) to higher bureaucratic appointments.⁴⁹

Several members of the Bogotá Junta, to give yet a more graphic example, were themselves high officials of the fiscal bureaucracy, a particularly important segment of the colonial state that employed numerous creoles and native sons (see table 4).⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Uribe, "The Lawyers and New Granada's Late Colonial State"; *idem*, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁵⁰ Some data can be found in José María Ots y Capdequí, *Las instituciones del Nuevo Reino de Granada al tiempo de la independencia* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1958); Vergara y Vergara, *Don Antonio Vergara Azcárate*; Linda Arnold, *Bureaucracy and Bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988); Susan M. Socolow, *Bureaucrats of Buenos Aires, 1796-1810: Amor al Real Servicio* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); Susan Deans-Smith, *Bureaucrats, Planters, and Workers: The Making of the Tobacco Monopoly in Bourbon Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).

TABLE 5

NEW GRANADAN LAWYERS IN THE STATE BUREAUCRACY, 1806,
BY RANK.

Type of Position	Rank of Post		
	High-level	Medium-level	Undetermined
Political	5	4	—
Fiscal	7	16	—
Judicial	5	—	—
Clerical	3	2	—
Other	—	—	4
TOTAL	20	22	4

* High political jobs consist of governors, *corregidores*, and *tenientes letrados*; medium political jobs include *tenientes asesores*; high fiscal jobs include *contadores* and *tesoreros* of the Tribunal de Cuentas and the Casa de la Moneda; medium fiscal jobs consist of *administradores*, *fiscales* and *asesores* of the Rentas de Tabaco, Aguadientes, Correos, Bulas, etc.; high judicial jobs include *agentes fiscales* and *relatores* of the Audiencia; high clerical jobs include *escribanos* of the Real Audiencia and the Tribunal de Cuentas; medium clerical jobs consist of *oficiales* of the Contadurías of the Tribunal Mayor de Cuentas; and undetermined jobs were those of *meritorios*, *agregados*, and *padres de menores*.

Source: García de la Guardia, *Kalendarario manual*.

Furthermore, four years before the formation of the revolutionary juntas (and presumably still by the time they were created), about one-third of the lawyers in the district of the Audiencia of Bogotá were employed by the colonial state (table 5). At least seven more lawyers of New Granada held high judicial positions in audiencias outside the viceroyalty.⁵¹

The participation of native sons in New Granada's political and fiscal bureaucracy, and the various examples of local lawyers who by the late 1790s and early 1800s were occupying positions as oidores and fiscales in other regional audiencias, may have been insufficient in the eyes of some, but it gave hope to the less successful applicants. Even if discontented or dismayed as to the difficulties they would face in joining and climbing the

⁵¹ One of them, Nicolás Mesía Caicedo, was *oidor* in Manila; two more, Joaquín Mosquera y Figueroa and Manuel del Campo y Rivas, in Mexico; another, Luis de Robledo y Alvarez, Fiscal del crimen in Mexico; and three more, Francisco Xavier Moreno y Escandón, Ignacio Tenorio, and Andrés José de Iriarte y Rojas, were *oidores*, and *fiscal*, respectively, in Quito. García de la Guardia, *Kalendarario manual*; Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*; Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios*; Arboleda, *Diccionario biográfico*, 426; José Antonio Torres Peña, *Memorias sobre la independencia* (Bogotá: Editorial Kelly, 1960); Guillermo Lohman Villena, *Los ministros de la Audiencia de Lima en el reinado de los Borbones (1700-1821)* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1974); Stoan, *Pablo Morillo*; Ali López Bohórquez, *Los ministros de la Real Audiencia de Caracas, 1786-1810* (Caracas: Academia Nacional de Historia, 1984).

bureaucratic ladder, most lawyers showed a willingness to try accumulating *méritos* for a future job in the high bureaucracy by serving as *abogados de pobres*; accepting honorific jobs in the local city councils as *alcaldes ordinarios*, *asesores*, *síndicos procuradores*; looking for teaching positions; or holding low-paying jobs as *asesores* or *tenientes* of governors, *corregidores* in small villages, or *oficiales* in the fiscal bureaucracy, all of which was a colonial tradition.⁵²

That this was a common attitude is suggested by the numerous examples such as José Félix Restrepo, Tomás Tenorio, Francisco Vergara Caicedo and the above-mentioned Eusebio M. Canabal, all of whom had been pursuing bureaucratic careers since the late 1780s and early 1790s and would continue to do so without dismay until the mid- and late-1810s, respectively. These and similar cases tend to indicate that patience had always been an essential asset for bureaucratic job seekers. More important, the aspirants' patience was rooted in some degree of hope derived from historical experience that saw creole friends and relatives turn into high-ranking officials after some years of waiting.⁵³

In the meantime these middle-level lawyer-bureaucrats and other lawyers outside the bureaucracy showed their reluctance to confront the crown and went about their business as usual. Some made a living through ranching, mining, trade, or the priesthood; and many others continued to polish and send *relaciones de mérito* (résumés) to the metropolitan authorities. Never—some not even amid the revolution—did they seem to give up hope that they could eventually win the major prize (*oidor*) in the kind of bureaucratic lottery they were used to playing.⁵⁴ Moreover, it has been shown that up to the early months of 1809 “the first instinct of leading creoles was to remain loyal to Spain and to await a political accommodation with the metropolis.” Many lawyers thus campaigned to be elected delegates to Spain's *Junta*

⁵² Documentos de la Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia (hereafter DBNC), F. Pineda, 1066; Mark A. Burkholder, “Relaciones de Méritos y Servicios: a Source for Spanish-American Group Biography in the Eighteenth Century,” *Manuscripta* 19 (1977), 97-104; Socolow, *Bureaucrats of Buenos Aires*, chap. 4 and 5; Uribe, “The Lawyers and New Granada's Late Colonial State.”

⁵³ Guillermo Hernández de Alba, *Vida y escritos del Dr. José Félix Restrepo* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1935); “Grados, ejercicios literarios, méritos y servicios del Doctor Tomás Tenorio Carvajal” [c. 1817] DBNC, F. Pineda, 1066. For other cases see Uribe, “Rebellion of the Mandarins,” Appendix A. The well documented case of the Peruvian José de Baquijano, who pursued the job of *oidor* for about twenty five years until he captured it in 1797, offers further evidence. See Burkholder, *Politics of a Career*.

⁵⁴ See especially the memoir of the New Granada's contemporary creole lawyer and priest José Antonio Torres Peña, pointing the significant presence of creoles in the colonial bureaucracy. Torres Peña, *Memorias sobre la independencia*, 46-47. That New Granada was an “infertile ground for revolution from the 1790s to the 1810s” is shown by McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, p. 291.

Central y Gubernativa that year.⁵⁵ Thus whatever was the primary motivation for lawyers' ultimately revolutionary actions, it evidently stemmed from more compelling motives than their exclusion from government.

Reconsideration of lawyers' grievances

Other more urgent factors should have been present to push this ordinarily conservative group to oppose the authorities. Moreover, the cause can be readily found by consulting some traditional sources and following closely the chronology of events leading to their "rebellion." Lawyers within the Bogotá cabildo wrote, in November 1809, and September 1810, two of the main expositions as to why they and other elite figures saw it necessary to create governing juntas in the colonies.⁵⁶

To be sure, the first document, later known and revered as the "Memorial de agravios," alluded to discrimination against creoles, but its central complaint concerned the number of *vocales*, or representatives, the American colonies had been invited to send to the Junta Central in Spain—namely, nine delegates as opposed to the thirty-six that the provinces within Spain were sending. The document argued that given the size of their territory, population, and wealth, the American colonies deserved a number of *vocales* similar to that of the Spanish provinces. It offered a formula to provide the twenty-seven representatives the Americans were said to be lacking, and it proposed a substantial salary of between 10,000 and 12,000 pesos (twice the annual pay of a Buenos Aires oidor) per individual. The document concluded that if sending the additional representatives to Spain was too expensive, *cortes generales* (parliaments) could be installed in America itself, parallel and juridically equal to the Spanish cortes, the traditional but long dormant parliamentary assembly convened in 1809. The manifesto also insisted on the necessity of allowing the American colonies, as Quito had just done independently, to create *juntas provinciales* much like the Spanish ones established since 1808; and expressed regret for the "sad consequences of the Quito crisis," where several elite figures had recently been jailed (and would later be killed).⁵⁷ Finally, it argued that the juntas were needed as a

⁵⁵ McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, 328-29; Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones*, pp. 93-100.

⁵⁶ The first, attributed to lawyer Camilo Torres, was the "Representación del Cabildo de Santafé a la Suprema Junta Central de España." The second, written by Torres and lawyer Frutos J. Gutiérrez, was the "Exposición de los motivos." They are reproduced in their entirety in Hernández de Alba, *Cómo nació la república*, pp. 13-39; and *Proceso histórico del 20 de julio*, pp. 85-108, 210-49. See notes 33 and 38.

⁵⁷ On the August 1809 jailing of several members of the elite who organized a junta in Quito, and New

means for local society to participate in the government of the “kingless” empire and its colonies and prevent the usurpation of authority by a foreign power; namely, France.⁵⁸

The “Memorial de agravios” was to be sent with Lieutenant General Antonio Narváez de Latorre, prominent native of Cartagena, who was elected New Granada’s only delegate to join the Junta Central y Gubernativa after fierce competition with other eager candidates, several lawyers among them.⁵⁹ Narváez’s departure was postponed for more than eight months because of the increasing French occupation of Spain. During those months political bargaining between government and elites failed; various local lawyers, priests, and bureaucrats in New Granada, suspected of wanting to create governmental juntas, were accused of sedition and arrested; and three rebellious young men were summarily executed in late April.⁶⁰ Notwithstanding the arrival of mediator Villavicencio, in early May, the crisis worsened. In mid-June local elites deposed the governor of Cartagena, and cabildo-led revolts against local officials followed in the southern region of Cali on July 3, and the northeastern one of Pamplona on July 4. On July 10, 1810, members of the elite in the northeastern province of Socorro, claiming that they were about to be “preemptively assassinated” like the many elite figures ultimately killed in Quito, jailed the recently arrived Spanish governor and expanded the movement to create juntas, which soon spread throughout the territory.⁶¹

The September 1810 document, written after several juntas had been organized, offered a detailed chronology of the events in the metropolis and the colonies since the Spanish juntas and the late Consejo de Regencia were created. It questions the legitimacy of these governing bodies and expresses rage at the idea that both Spain’s and New Granada’s royal officials should appear willing to “subject themselves to the domination of whosoever came

Granadans’ reaction, see Pedro Fermín Cevallos, *Resumen de la historia del Ecuador desde su origen hasta 1845*, 4 vols. (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1870), 3:51-70; Monsalve, *Antonio de Villavicencio*; Gilmore, “Imperial Crisis”; Lynch, *Spanish American Revolutions*, pp. 235-37.

⁵⁸ The document also reminded the Spanish Junta Central y Gubernativa that had Great Britain been more liberal, it would not have lost its North American colony. See Torres, “Representación del cabildo,” p. 38.

⁵⁹ McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, pp. 327-28; Eduardo Rodríguez de Piñérez, *La vida de Castillo y Rada* (Bogotá: Academia de Historia, 1949); Restrepo, *Documentos importantes*, 2:15-19; Uribe, “Rebellion of the Mandarins,” Appendix C; Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones*, pp. 93-100.

⁶⁰ Hernández de Alba, *Archivo Nariño*, 2:331-61; McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, pp. 334-37; Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, pp. 246, 248, 254-55; Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones*, p. 105.

⁶¹ Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, p. 342; Lynch, *Spanish American Revolutions*, 238; Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia del Socorro*; Monsalve, *Antonio Villavicencio*, 1:54-67.

to rule," an allusion to the French.⁶² It describes the repressive measures taken by the audiencia and the viceroy during late 1809 and early 1810: removal of Spanish Americans from *corregimiento* jobs; patrol of the cities day and night; jailing and execution of local citizens; removal of rightful cabildo members or *regidores* from their seats; and staffing of the city councils with followers of the viceroy. Finally, it attacks the actions of the Quito authorities against local citizens in late 1809 and questions the nature and activities of the early 1810 Spanish Consejo de Regencia.⁶³ The Consejo's clearly opportunistic use of American-born envoys like Villavicencio to appease the colonies, as well as its acknowledgment of the "freedom" and "equality" of the American-born Spanish, and its confiscatory measures to support the war against the French, were especially abhorred (particularly the Consejo's April 28, 1810, measure imposing on Cádiz's property owners a 20 percent real estate tax, which creoles feared would soon be introduced in the colonies).⁶⁴ All these factors, the document concluded, had forced Spanish Americans to withdraw their recognition of the Consejo de Regencia and to take into their own hands the apparatus of colonial government on behalf of the king.⁶⁵

The political crisis in the Spanish peninsula therefore unleashed conditions appropriate for the "revolution from above" that the lawyers ultimately led.⁶⁶ These men had traditionally been unwilling to oppose the colonial state and risk both their immediate freedom and future bureaucratic careers. The Comunero rebellion, and both the political upheaval and prosecution of Antonio Nariño Alvarez in 1795, had made that evident.⁶⁷ If during the 1810s lawyers became willing to participate in the seizure of the state apparatus, they changed only in response to a crisis in the metropolis that created chaos in New Granada. The lawyers became convinced that the

⁶² For an account of peninsular Spaniards' sympathies toward the French and the opposite reaction by creoles in Caracas, see Pedro Arcaya, *El cabildo de Caracas* (Caracas: Ediciones Librería Historia, 1968), pp. 117-19. An interpretation that stresses Spanish Americans' fear of French domination as a key cause of independence can be found in Enrique Gandía, "Los orígenes de la independencia americana según el General Daniel Florencio O'Leary." *Revista de Indias* 67 (1967), 59-86.

⁶³ McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, 328-46; On the events in Quito see Cevallos, *Resumen de la historia del Ecuador*, 3:71-77; Monsalve, *Antonio Villavicencio*; Gilmore, "The Imperial Crisis."

⁶⁴ See Torres and Gutiérrez, "Exposición de los motivos," p. 238.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*; Gómez Hoyos, *La revolución granadina*; and McFarlane, "El colapso de la autoridad española."

⁶⁶ Structural analysis of the revolution can be found in George Reid Andrews, "Spanish American Independence: A Structural Analysis," *Latin American Perspectives* 12:1 (1985), 105-132; and Nicole Bousquet, "The Decolonization of Spanish America in the Early Nineteenth Century: A World Systems Approach," *Review*, 9:4 (1988), 497-531.

⁶⁷ Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins."

government, in spite of the extraordinary situation facing the empire and the colonies, was unwilling to bargain, reach compromises, or form wider governing coalitions, preferring instead to persecute and repress them. They also believed that amidst the Spanish crisis their behavior was lawful, which, legalistic as they were, was also important.⁶⁸

Lawyers and collective action

As Charles Tilly has demonstrated, no matter how discontented a segment of society may become, it cannot engage in collective political action unless its members are part of at least minimally organized groups with access to some resources.⁶⁹ New Granada's lawyers certainly had the power, organization, and resources needed to promote such action. They occupied a social position that particularly enabled them to mobilize elites and their subordinates, and they had the intellectual and institutional capacity to articulate a populist ideology that could attract wide segments of the population, even the popular sectors if need be.

Lawyers' strategic social position included their tight and influential family networks; the connections established among lawyers from different regions while studying at Bogotá law schools, participating in natural science study groups created there after the 1780s, or serving together as bureaucrats in the same village or state agency; and the capacity of local cabildos—of which lawyers and their families had traditionally been conspicuous members—to mobilize the lower social groups of their localities and coordinate operations with other cabildos from distant regions. Several examples of lawyers active in the juntas of the key regions of Cali, Popayán, Cartagena, Socorro, Antioquia, and Bogotá illustrate some of these favorable conditions.

Lawyers Manuel Santiago Vallecilla and Ignacio Herrera y Vergara became the most visible and active links between the southern cabildos and juntas of Cali and its neighboring cities, and the Bogotá junta.⁷⁰ Vallecilla

⁶⁸ On the significance of the failure of political bargaining and coalition building see Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*; on legalism as a reason to act see letter of Camilo Torres to his uncle, oidor Ignacio Tenorio, in early 1810, in *Proceso del 20 de Julio*, pp. 54-68. See also Gómez Hoyos, *La revolución granadina*.

⁶⁹ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Collective Action* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

⁷⁰ During the period of revolutionary turmoil they maintained continuous correspondence, reproduced in Vásquez, *Hilvanes históricos*; see also Zawadzky, *Ciudades confederadas*.

belonged to the core of the *nobleza* in the city of Cali.⁷¹ He was linked to the Caicedo clan, which along with the Borrero, Barona, Vergara, Ulloa, and Escobar networks were the leading upper-class families who were influential in the junta suprema, ultimately created in Cali.⁷² Most of them were large landholders, mineowners, members of the high clergy, and major merchants. Together they controlled the Cali cabildo.⁷³ Herrera y Vergara, Vallecilla's contemporary and relative, was *síndico procurador* of the Bogotá cabildo in 1810, and was married into the influential Ortega Sanz de Santamaría family, an elite local clan.⁷⁴ Herrera led a creole faction within the Bogotá cabildo, involved in disputes with Bogotá's local authorities concerning the attempts by the local viceroy to staff the *cabildo* with his Spanish friends and followers. Herrera was also serving as Vallecilla's lawyer in heated disputes, pending before the local audiencia, between Vallecilla and his allegedly corrupt and arbitrary boss the Spanish Miguel Tacón, governor of Popayán.⁷⁵

Lawyers Jerónimo and Camilo Torres, and their colleague Santiago Pérez de Valencia y Arroyo, offered solid links for coordinating the actions of the Bogotá and Popayán elites and cabildos. The Pérez de Valencia y Arroyo clan comprised Manuel Antonio, a mineowner; Andrés Marcelino, a priest who was currently part of the local cathedral's hierarchy; José Antonio, *contador real de diezmos* (royal accountant of tithes); and the above-mentioned Santiago. This family was typical of the top clans of Popayán—namely, the Mosqueras, Torres, Valencias, Hurtados, and Arboledas—large family groups of mineowners, landowners, merchants, priests, and lawyers who controlled the local cabildo.⁷⁶ They had links to Bogotá's elites. Lawyer Santiago Pérez, in particular, was a close colleague of his former classmate Jerónimo Torres. Important among the members of the mineowning

⁷¹ Vallecilla's father, *regidor* of the Cali cabildo, and various of Vallecilla's brothers and sisters married into different branches of the influential Caicedo clan: the Caicedo Tenorio, the Caicedo y Cuero, and the Caicedo de la Llera families. See Arboleda, *Diccionario biográfico*; José Escorcía, *Desarrollo social, político y económico, 1800-1854* [Valle del Cauca] (Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1983); Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁷² Zawadzky, *Ciudades confederadas*, 101; Arboleda, *Diccionario biográfico*; McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, pp. 243-44.

⁷³ Escorcía, *Desarrollo social, político y económico*.

⁷⁴ On Herrera's unsuccessful bureaucratic aspirations see Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁷⁵ On Herrera y Vergara's disputes with the local authorities see Ortega Ricaurte, *Proceso histórico del 20 de Julio*, pp. 26-28; on Vallecilla's disputes with Tacón see Zawadzky, *Ciudades confederadas*.

⁷⁶ Germán Colmenares, *Cali: terratenientes, mineros y comerciantes. Siglo XVIII* (Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1983), pp. 143-54; José Escorcía, *Desarrollo político, social y económico*, pp. 45-61, 97-116; Peter Marzahl, "Creoles and Government: The Cabildo of Popayán," *HAHR* 54:3 (1974), 636-56; McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, pp. 136, 243-44.

Torres family was Jerónimo's brother Camilo, also a lawyer, assessor of the Bogotá cabildo, and active member of the Bogotá junta.⁷⁷

Finally, several lawyers who resided in Bogotá, and belonged to or had strong connections with families of merchants affected by the Spanish trading policies, supplied the links between the Bogotá cabildo and the influential cabildos of Socorro and its neighboring regions, Cartagena, and Antioquia. These included lawyer Joaquín Camacho y Lago, asesor of the Bogotá cabildo and former bureaucrat in the northeastern regions of Pamplona and Socorro, and his former classmate, good friend, and legal adviser, the merchant Miguel Tadeo Gómez Durán, a key bureaucrat from these regions.⁷⁸ Gómez Durán, administrator of a royal monopoly in Socorro in 1810, was in turn the cousin and trading partner of the Spaniard José Acevedo y Gómez, a rebellious merchant based in Bogotá.⁷⁹ Both the lawyer Camacho y Lago, recently removed from his bureaucratic job, and the merchant Acevedo y Gómez, bitter about the loss of merchandise blockaded by the Spanish authorities, provided the contacts between the Bogotá elites and the cabildos of the northeast.⁸⁰ Such cabildos were controlled by local elite clans like the Platas, Ardilas, Estévez, Duráns and Valenzuelas. These family groups were apparently led by Gómez Durán, who could recruit a large number of men to fight for the revolution if need be.⁸¹ Young lawyer Miguel Pombo, active in the Bogotá junta of 1810, helped to link the Bogotá and Cartagena elites along with his influential uncles Manuel, contador of

⁷⁷ See "Torres y Tenorio, Jerónimo," *BHA* 2:15 (1903), 144-46; "Carta de Jerónimo Torres a su Hermano Camilo. Popayán, octubre 10, 1807," *Repertorio Colombiano* 20:3 (1899). Camilo, for his part, married into the elite Bogotano clan Prieto Ricaurte. See Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁷⁸ See Martínez Delgado, *Noticia biográfica*, pp. 106-7, 123.

⁷⁹ Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia del Socorro*, pp. 173-175; Martínez Delgado, *Noticia biográfica*, 263-294; Adolfo L. Gómez, *El tribuno de 1810* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1810), p. 223.

⁸⁰ See Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia del Socorro*, 190; José Acevedo y Gómez to Antonio Villavicencio, Santa Fé de Bogotá, July 19, 1810, in Gómez, *El tribuno*, pp. 221-25; McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, With Special Reference to Overseas Trade, 1739-1810," (Ph.D. diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 1977), p. 304.

⁸¹ In a "muy reservada" communication written in October 1809, Viceroy Amar y Borbón noted that the elites of Bogotá had the support of "fifteen hundred [men] from Socorro who will be gathered by the administrador de aguardientes, Don Miguel Tadeo Gómez, who is in continuous communication with Bogotá cabildo member José Acevedo." See Ortego Ricaurte, *Proceso Histórico del 20 de julio*, p. 1; Rodríguez Plata, *La antigua provincia del Socorro*; Hernández de Alba, *Archivo Nariño*, 2:332. On the Valenzuela group see Joaquín Camacho, "Relación territorial de la provincia de Pamplona," [1809] in *Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada*, 3 vols. (Bogotá: Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, 1942), 2:1-21; Eduardo Posada, *El precursor* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1903), p. 134; Martínez Delgado, *Noticia biográfica*, 297-308; Bernardo Ortega Lafaurie, "Don Crisanto Valenzuela," *BHA*, 24:273 (1937), 406-417; José M. Restrepo S., "La familia de Nariño," *BHA* 41:473-474 (1954), 247; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

Bogotá's Casa de la Moneda (mint), and José Ignacio Pombo, member Cartagena's *consulado*. The juntas of Cartagena and Bogotá were further connected through lawyer José María García de Toledo, the prominent rancher and trader who was José Ignacio's colleague in the Cartagena *consulado*, and Jose María del Castillo y Rada linked to the Narváez Latorre, and Rivas families, key clans of these two cities.⁸² Finally, lawyer and bureaucrat Pedro Groot formed a bridge between the Bogotá cabildo and the merchant elite of Antioquia. Groot was Bogotá's acting *tesorero* of the royal Board of [fiscal] Tribunals, and was a trading partner of Antioquia's merchant families Pérez de Rublas (Arrublas) and Corral. These families, whose sons Groot had also sponsored while they came to study in Bogotá, led the juntas created in Antioquia.⁸³ Some other Antioqueño lawyers and merchants later active in the revolution, particularly José Manuel Restrepo, had also developed extensive contacts in Bogotá while joining natural science study groups established during their school years. The members of these tightly knit groups of elite intellectuals returned to their native regions and, spread throughout New Granada as they were, eventually assisted in the communication between the different cabildos and juntas.⁸⁴

In sum, the movement toward independence was facilitated by a tight network of bureaucrats, merchants, and lawyers from the upper social groups, closely linked through friendship, business, family, bureaucratic, and intellectual ties. They controlled the cabildos, and thereby could promote and coordinate collective action throughout the territory.

The cabildos had struggled to maintain their relative economic independence and to become active regulatory bodies of local life. Not infrequently did they dispute with colonial bureaucrats about the right to police the local economy and society. These city councils certainly had enormous influence

⁸² See García de la Guardia, *Kalendarario manual*, 76; Jiménez Molinarez, *Linajes cartageneros*, 2:7. On Castillo y Rada see José J. Guerra, "José Nicolas de Rivas," *BHA*, 3:30 (1905), 343-66; Restrepo S. And Rivas, *Genealogías de Santafé*, p. 242; Rodríguez de Piñéz, *La vida de Castillo y Rada*; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix C.

⁸³ Beatriz Patiño Millán, "Factores de unidad en el Nuevo Reino de Granada y la posterior formación del estado nacional," in *Estudios Sociales*, Fundación Antioqueña para los Estudios Sociales (FAES) (1988), 105; *idem*, *Criminalidad, ley penal y estructural social en la Provincia de Antioquia, 1750-1820* (Medellín: Instituto para el Desarrollo de Antioquia, 1994), pp. 154-164; María T. Uribe and Jesús M. Alvarez, "El parentesco y la formación de las elites en la provincia de Antioquia," *Estudios Sociales*, FAES, 3, (1988), 92; José M. Restrepo, *Autobiografía: Apuntamientos sobre emigración de 1816, e índices del 'Diario Político' [1816-1818]* (Bogotá: Empresa Nacional de Publicaciones, 1957); Ann Twinam, *Miners, Merchants, and Farmers in Colonial Colombia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); McFarlane, "Economic and Political Change," pp. 329-330; José M. Restrepo Sáenz, *Gobernadores de Antioquia* (Bogotá: Iprenta Nacional, 1944).

⁸⁴ Thomas Glick, "Science and Independence in Latin America (with special references to New Granada)," *HAHR* 71:2 (May 1991), 307-34; Garrido, *Reclamos y representaciones*, chap. 1.

over the popular sectors (economically dependent on the cabildo's members and the cabildo itself), whom, with the help of local parish priests, they could convoke—and hopefully control—with relative facility.⁸⁵ That popular influence also was made possible by the cabildo leaders' appeal to the populist ideology of creolism. The idea of their common membership to a "creole society" was a unifying abstraction (perhaps the only one) that could bring together, on the one hand, the leaders of the independence movement, namely the rich landowners, merchants, mineowners, different sectors of the clergy, and incumbent bureaucrats; and on the other, the popular sectors, composed of the much-feared blacks, mestizos, and Indians. To the elites it seemed not to matter much that some of their close relatives and ancestors were European-born Spaniards.⁸⁶ In the midst of a serious political crisis in the metropolis, the elites appeared ultimately willing to create a common front against the inflexible local viceroy and his followers by appealing to the slowly growing feeling of "creolism." This allowed the opportunistic elites to magnify their protest against the undeniable majority presence of recently arrived Spaniards in many of the top positions, a situation that was not new.⁸⁷ It also allowed the local oligarchy to appeal to the lower sectors with promises of popular sovereignty, "mass political participation" in the election of representatives to juntas provinciales, and opportunities for the development of economic activities (distilling aguardiente and processing tobacco) that up to then the Spanish monopolies had prohibited. The abolition of slavery and selected taxes—later much regretted, on both counts—was also aimed at eventually enlisting the lower social sectors in the swelling republican armies.

⁸⁵ On the cabildos as judicial, political, and legislative institutions and their control by elite families, see Julián Vargas, "El muy ilustre Cabildo de Santafé de Bogotá. Finanzas y administración económica," in Vargas, *La sociedad de Santafé Colonial* (Bogotá: Cinep, 1989), pp. 189-257; Luis Navarro García, "El privilegio de los regidores en el abasto de Cartagena de Indias," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 38 (1981), pp. 174-214; Reinhard Liehr, *Ayuntamiento y oligarquía en Puebla, 1787-1810* (Mexico: Sepsetentas, 1976); Arcaya, *El cabildo de Caracas*, p. 121; John Preston Moore, *The Cabildo in Peru Under the Hapsburgs* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1954); *idem*, *The Cabildo in Peru Under the Bourbons* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966); Juan Agustín García, *La ciudad indiana* (Buenos Aires: Angel Estrada y Cia, 1909), chap. 8; Emilio Robledo, *Bosquejo biográfico del Señor Oidor Juan Antonio Mon y Velarde. Visitador de Antioquia, 1785-1788*, 2 vols. (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1954); Twinam, *Miners, Merchants*; Rafael Uribe Uribe, "Orígenes del poder municipal," *BHA* 5:63 (1910), 189-202; 64 (1910), 209-41; José M. Ots y Capdequí, *Historia del derecho español en América y del derecho indiano* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1968); Julio Alemparte R., *El cabildo en Chile colonial (orígenes municipales de las repúblicas hispanoamericanas)* (Santiago: University of Chile, 1940); Constantino Bayle, *Los cabildos seculares de América española* (Madrid: Sapiencia, 1952); McFarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, pp. 238, 243-44, 328-40.

⁸⁶ David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Restrepo S. and Rivas, *Genealogías de Santafé*.

⁸⁷ Silvestre, *Descripción del Reyno de Santafé*; John L. Phelan, *The People and the King*.

The *cabildos*, therefore, served well the interests of the leaders of the 1810 “revolution from above.” That revolution, however, did not follow the smooth course of an affair among friends and family but soon degenerated into a bloody anticolonial war.

Expansion of the movement

During the 1810s and part of the 1820s, all of New Granada became a military battleground. The revolutionary leaders radicalized their demands. If initially they had declared their desire to govern on behalf of the absent Spanish king, later, starting with Cartagena in November 1811, region after region openly fought for complete autonomy from the home country. The Spanish monarchy, restored in 1814, in its turn stubbornly tried to hold on to power, ultimately taking a hard line.

The crown first offered a combination of rewards to cities or individuals who appeared loyal to the king, but it probably deemed it more persuasive to make use of severe repressive measures.⁸⁸ Large armies were brought from overseas, and a serious military campaign was launched during the second half of the 1810s.⁸⁹ This campaign made possible the return to Bogotá, six years after its expulsion, of the Royal Audiencia, which had functioned in Cartagena and Panama from March 1812 until late 1816.⁹⁰ It also determined the execution of a large number of lawyers. While military combat continued, not just against the Spaniards but also amongst themselves, many of these lawyers contributed to the introduction of numerous institutional reforms, which seriously disrupted Spanish administration and control of New Granada turning them into deadly enemies of the crown’s armies.

⁸⁸ It started, in November, 1812, by downgrading New Granada from a viceroyalty to a captaincy general, which lasted until April 1816. Amnesties and pardons were granted to the revolutionaries in December 1812, May 1816, December 1817, and March 1819. These measures and their meaning are studied in José María Ots y Capdequí, “The Impact of the Wars of Independence on the Institutional Life of the New Kingdom of Granada,” *The Americas*, 17:2 (1960), 111-98. See Also Michael P. Costeloe, *Response to Revolution. Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁸⁹ Ots y Capdequí, “Impact of the Wars”; Stoan, *Pablo Morillo*; Costeloe, *Response to Revolution*, chaps. 3-4.

⁹⁰ See Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios*, pp. 423-26; Caballero, *Diario de la independencia*, pp. 218-19. Other institutions, like the Tribunal or Junta Superior de Hacienda, had also been moved to Panama. A detailed discussion of the institutional arrangements before and after the “reconquest” is offered by Ots y Capdequí, “Impact of the Wars.”

After their 1816 arrival in Bogotá, the Spanish military commanders, headed by General Pablo Morillo, established war tribunals to screen the recent activities of the members of local society. Lawyers were a favorite target of these trial-like processes, following which many of the guilty were summarily executed. Indeed, at least twenty eight of the numerous individuals executed by the Spaniards in the 1810s were lawyers; that is to say, close to one-fourth of the entire legal community at the time (table 6). The executed belonged to some of the key elite families in diverse regions throughout New Granada. Of the lawyers executed, Manuel Bernardo Alvarez y Casal, 73, was the oldest, and José León Armero, 30, the youngest. José María Lombana, 28, died in prison, supposedly from ill treatment. The executed were evenly distributed by region, although Cartagena, Tunja, and Bogotá, each with four, lost the most; followed by Popayán and Cúcuta, each of which lost three. Most of these lawyers had graduated in the 1780s and 1790s. The newest members of the profession had graduated in 1807, 1808, and 1809. None of those executed had graduated after 1810.

It was evident that lawyers became particularly favorite targets of the Spanish repression. Thirty-three-year-old lawyer Benedicto Domínguez, who had entered the profession in 1809, remembered that when he was interrogated by Commander Pablo Morillo, he lied about his being a lawyer, knowing that Morillo was especially harsh with the members of this profession, to whom he attributed the responsibility for the revolution.⁹¹ Indeed, in March 1816, General Morillo had reported to the Spanish Ministry of War that in order to contain the ongoing revolutionary avalanche, Spanish lawyers must be sent to New Granada to substitute for the local ones.⁹³ Meanwhile Morillo created a *Junta de secuestros* and the so called *Consejo de purificación* to try the suspected revolutionaries and confiscate

⁹¹ See García de la Guardia, *Kalendario manual*; Luis Páez Courvel, "Precursos, martires y proceres santandereanos de la independencia colombiana," *BHA*, 34:393-95 (1947), 176-94; Morillo, "Relación de las principales cabezas de la rebelión en este Nuevo Reino de Granada, que Después de formados sus procesos y vistos detenidamente en el Consejo de Guerra Permanente, han sufrido por sus delitos la pena capital en la forma que se expresa [1816]," *BHA* 19:222 (1932), 435-70. On these individuals' social background see Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁹² Pedro M. Ibáñez, "José Marí Salazar," *Papel periódico ilustrado* 5:166 (1886), 146. The Royal Audiencia, meeting in Cartagena in August 1816, decided to form a list of all the lawyers in public service there, who would have to present their títulos and proof that they had been pardoned. Ots y Capdequí, "Impact of the Wars," p. 133.

⁹³ "Ya he expresado mis deseos a V.E. de mandar Misioneros, ahora añado la necesidad de mandar igualmente *telogos y abogados de España*. Si el Rey quiere subyugar a estas provincias, LAS MISMAS MEDIDAS SE DEBEN TOMAR QUE AL PRINCIPIO DE LA CONQUISTA. . . ." See Pablo Morillo, "Oficio," *Gaceta de la Ciudad de Bogotá* April 2, 1820, p. 136, emphasis and capital letters in the original.

TABLE 6

LAWYERS EXECUTED DURING THE SPANISH
ANTIREVOLUTIONARY "TERROR"

	<i>Birthplace</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Admitted to Bar</i>	<i>Executed</i>
1. Alvarez y Casal, Manuel Bernardo	Bogotá,	1743	1769	1816
2. Ardila, Antonio	Socorro, ?		?	1816
3. Armero, José León	Mariquita,	1786.	?	1816
4. Ayos, Antonio José	Cartagena,	1764 (?)	1789	1816
5. Benítez Plata, Emigdio	Socorro,	1766	1793	1816
6. Caicedo de la Llera, Francisco A.	Cali,	1765	1790	1816
7. Caicedo y Cuero, Felipe Joaquín	Cali,	1773	1798	1813
8. Camacho Rodríguez, José Joaquín	Tunja,	1766	1787	1816
9. Castillo, Manuel	Cartagena,	1781	1804	1816
10. Cañete, Manuel	Cúcuta, ?		?	1815
11. Dávila, José María	Rionegro (Antioquia)?		1807	1816
12. Díaz Granados, Miguel	Cartagena,	1772	1794	1816
13. García de Toledo, Jose María	Cartagena,	1769	1792	1816
14. García Rovira, Custodio	Bucaramanga,	1780	1809	1816
15. Gutiérrez, Frutos Joaquín	Cúcuta,	1770	1796	1816
16. Gutiérrez Moreno, José Gregorio	Bogotá,	1781	1804	1816
17. Hoyos, Joaquín de	Antioquia,	1773?	1798	1816
18. Lombana Cuervo, José María	Bogotá,	1781	1804	1816*
19. López de Tagle, Juan Elías	Cartagena,	1777	1804	1819
20. Matey de Piedri, Juan Nepomuceno	Cúcuta,	1766	1806	1816
21. Niño, Juan Nepomuceno	Tunja,	?	?	1816
22. Peña y Valencia, José Gabriel	Pamplona,	?	?	1816
23. Pombo Pombo, Miguel	Popayán,	1779	1805	1816
24. Torres Tenorio, Camilo	Popayán,	1766	1794	1816
25. Umaña López, Joaquín	Tunja,	1768	1793?	1816
26. Ulloa Campo, Francisco Antonio	Popayán,	1766	1808	1816
27. Vargas, Ignacio de	Charalá,	1771	1794	1816
28. Vásquez, José Cayetano	Tunja,	?	?	1816

* Died in jail.

Sources: García de la Guardia 1806, 57-72; Restrepo S. and Rivas 1928; Hernández de Alba 1928; Páez Courvel 1947, 476-94; Jiménez Molinares 1951; Arboleda 1962; Plazas 1985; García Samudio 1916.

their properties.⁹⁴ In addition, as the data in table 6 indicates, he tried to get rid of as many lawyers as possible.

It was not uncommon, however, to replace severe physical punishment, even death sentences, with fines. The most likely candidates to benefit from this treatment were, of course, those able to pay. Although General Morillo vehemently defended himself against such charges, it was also said that bribes played a major role in sparing punishment to some of the revolutionaries.⁹⁵

Social connections and friendship were also useful in obtaining pardon.⁹⁶ On the other hand, many of the lawyers who were neither pardoned nor killed were punished in other ways: jailed, conscripted into the royal army, banned from the profession, and/or their properties confiscated.⁹⁷ A few others, however, took advantage of the situation by displaying loyalty to obtain bureaucratic jobs and promotions. Some even took positions in the counterrevolutionary *Consejo de purificación* and the *Junta de secuestros*, the two tribunals that prosecuted their colleagues.⁹⁸ Some pardons and deals

⁹⁴ See Carlos Cortés Vargas, "De la época del terror," *BHA* 29:327 (1942), 85-103; Morillo, *Manifiesto a la nación española*, 25-27; Julio C. Vergara y Vergara, *Vida de Estanislao Vergara, 1790-1855* (Bogotá: Editorial Iqueima, 1951), p. 19.

⁹⁵ Pablo Morillo, *Manifiesto que hace a la nación española el teniente general Don Pablo Morillo . . . con motivo de las calumnias e imputaciones atroces y falsas publicadas contra su persona en 21 y 28 del mes de abril último en Gaceta de la Isla de León* (Madrid: Imprenta de la Calle Greda, 1821), pp. 45, 50, 54.

⁹⁶ That was apparently the case of lawyer Enrique Umaña Barragán, who, after having supposedly received a death sentence, was absolved by Morillo. Umaña's wife told Morillo that she was the daughter of a former friend and protector of his, Captain Gregorio Sánchez Manzaneque. See Pardo Umaña, *Haciendas*, 234; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A. Intriguing cases of pardon include lawyers José María del Castillo, Alejandro Osorio and Eusebio María Canabal. See Jose María del Castillo y Rada, "Memorias," *Lecturas Populares*, Suplemento Literario de *El Tiempo*, Bogotá, 40-41 (1914?), 489. On Osorio, see Venancio Ortíz, "Alejandro Osorio," *Colombia Ilustrada*, 4-5 (1889), 59. On Juan Jurado, his protector, see Restrepo Sáenz, "Juan Jurado," *BHA* 13:149 (1920), 271-300. On Canabal see Sergio E. Ortíz, "Eusebio María Canabal," *BHA* 58 (1971), 13-23.

⁹⁷ "Recuerdos. . ." 1935., 512-28; José M. Restrepo, *Gobernadores y proceres de Neiva* (Bogotá: Editorial A.B.C., 1941), 486-89; Gandía, "Orígenes de la independencia," 62. Several lawyers, including Joaquín Ortíz Nagle, Ignacio Herrera, Luis E. Azuola, Dionisio Gamba, José María del Castillo, Jose Sáenz de Santamaría and the lawyer-priest Andrés M. Rosillo, were sent to prisons and held for several years. See Juan F. Ortíz, *Reminiscencias de D. Juan Francisco Ortíz (opusculo autobiográfico 1808-1861)* (Bogotá: Librería Americana, 1907), pp. 36-43.

⁹⁸ Just a few of the most notable cases: 52-year-old Tomás Tenorio y Carvajal, a lawyer since 1786, rose from *fiscal de la renta de correos* to member of the counterrevolutionary Consejo de Purificación and Junta de Secuestros and *fiscal interino* of the Royal Audiencia. José Ignacio San Miguel, a lawyer for about 30 years, removed by the crown from a governorship in 1809, in 1817 was given the job of *teniente letrado y corregidor* of La Mesa. Francisco José de Aguilar, 46, lawyer with 21 years in the profession, former *escribano de cámara* of the Royal Audiencia, was appointed member of the Consejo de Purificación and Junta de Secuestros. Young Eusebio María Canabal, an 1807 law graduate, rose

notwithstanding, Spain's repressive treatment of lawyers ultimately incurred a high cost. It made the surviving members of the elite all the more determined to continue and expand the revolution until it succeeded. It also contributed to a high degree of revolutionary unity, which had been more elusive in the previous years, when internal disputes had consumed much of the revolutionaries' time. Given the need to respond to the Spanish military campaign, those intra-elite quarrels were left behind, and local elites at the head of large armies finally defeated the Spanish military in the early 1820s.⁹⁹

Conclusions

The reality both of creole, particularly native-son, exclusion from government and reasons to participate in the revolutions for independence seems to have been somewhat more complex than contemporary actors and later historians asserted. Creole lawyers' and other elite individuals' intense active participation in the revolution was not motivated primarily by their exclusion from the colonial bureaucracy or by their difficulties in gaining access to it. Their revolutionary mobilization was instead a response to the overwhelming political crisis in Spain and the unwillingness of New Granada's government to bargain or to establish a wider interim governing coalition. Those two conditions offered the opportunity for the somewhat hyperbolic expression of longstanding grievances by individual members of the upper social groups; grievances that under ordinary circumstances were not, and would not have been, enough to cause revolutionary collective action. Amid the crisis, these complaints turned into suitable and timely justifications for a movement to overthrow the highest crown officials.

This movement started as a "revolution from above." It was led by precisely the upper social groups to which lawyers belonged and by some members of the high state bureaucracy itself. Lawyers and other members of the top echelons of colonial society had traditionally developed a symbiotic relationship with the colonial state. They had benefitted, to a greater or lesser extent, from either bureaucratic jobs or prebends, particularly fiscal

from administrador of the renta de aguardientes in Cartagena to fiscal of the Real Hacienda and later fiscal of the Superior Gobierno de Cartagena, and was also supported by ex-viceoy Amar y Borbón in his pursuit of an audiencia position in 1818. Tomás Barriga, a 37-year-old lawyer with just 9 years in the profession, was appointed *relator* of the Real Audiencia. See Restrepo, *Biografías de los mandatarios*, 282; Arboleda, *Diccionario biográfico*, 427; Restrepo and Rivas, *Genealogías de Santafé*, 14, 98-99; Ortíz, "Eusebio María Canabal," 15; Gerardo Arrubla, "Viejos papeles," *BHA* 5:54 (1908), 342-54; Tovar Pinzón, "Guerras de opinión"; Uribe, "Rebellion of the Mandarins," Appendix A.

⁹⁹ Lievano Aguiere, *Bolívar*, 153-62; Maingot, "Social Structure and Civil Military Conflict"; Mcfarlane, *Colombia Before Independence*, chap. 12, epilogue.

posts and tax-farming positions. As long as the Spanish state was strong and stable, they would take no action against it. But when that state collapsed, creole lawyers and administrators were ready and able to engage in revolutionary maneuvers in hope of achieving further control over it. Indeed, it became all the more important to take charge of the colonial state to prevent new arrivals from Europe, either French or Spanish, from taking over. Once in power such newcomers could ultimately break up the kinship and patronage networks nestled in those segments of the bureaucracy, especially the fiscal ones, that had been for decades under local elites' control.

Lawyers' leadership in unleashing revolutionary collective action was facilitated by the dominant role that they and their families had traditionally had over city councils. The *cabildos* helped them mobilize both elite and popular sectors; they were also the vehicle through which the elites articulated the revolutionary ideology of "creolism." Consisting of the rejection by Spanish Americans of continental Spaniards' allegedly exclusive right to rule, "creolism" was opportune, expedient, and populist. Under the close supervision of the elites, all ethnic and social groups were expected to add their individual grievances and dissatisfactions to this broad ideological "melting pot" of American complaints. Lawyers contributed their bureaucratic frustrations, which alone were not new or sufficient enough to cause a revolt. They then proceeded to lead the elite capture of the high state jobs. The coup they intended to carry out, however, turned into a bloody and protracted anti-colonial war in which dozens of lawyers were executed. Rather than helping the Spanish to regain control of the colonies, the execution of so many lawyers, as well as various other elite figures, made the remaining elites firm in their resolve to carry the revolution to completion.

In the following years, chronic intra-elite quarrels returned. Some of them related closely to the way the independence movement had started and evolved. For example, many conflicts sprang from attempts by traditional lawyers and their families—who had unleashed the original movement and considered themselves rightful heirs of the state apparatus—to push aside numerous middle provincial sectors, who had also contributed to independence and had achieved some leading government positions. When these upwardly mobile sectors demanded equal participation in politics and society, clashes were bound to occur.

Lawyers, key among the different social groups likely to have engaged in revolutionary actions in the late colonial period, are a promising source of information to review the traditional explanations of Latin America's independence movements. This essay shows that investigation of the background and activities of members of the legal community may expand our

knowledge of the composition and nature of the pre-revolutionary state bureaucracies, while also indicating strategic links between the state, diverse elite families, and other social groups active during independence. Furthermore, historical research centered on the legal community will not only increase our understanding both of state and society before and during the independence movements, but also will lead to a better understanding of the nature of, and conflicts within, the region's early post-revolutionary societies.

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