Tomis Kapitan

Tomis Kapitan
Northern Illinois University · Department of Philosophy

Ph. D.

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51
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566
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August 1991 - May 2014
Northern Illinois University
Position
  • Professor of Philosophy

Publications

Publications (51)
Article
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Some argue that an omniprescient being cannot choose between mutually exclusive actions none of which is known to be uniquely reasonable. The view assumes that faced with such a choice one must believe each alternative to be epistemically possible, thereby precluding foreknowledge of what one will do. E. J. Coffman (2011) has challenged this assump...
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In Part I of Self-Knowing Agents, Lucy O'Brien develops a theory of first-person reference. In what follows, I describe this account and then raise doubts about its success. Since I am not confident that I have understood her properly, I may be setting up and targeting a strawwoman, but I can only hope that what I said about the first-person will b...
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This article addresses the normative role of self-determination in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Contrary to a popular view, it is argued that there are no competing rights of self-determination held by Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs respectively. When properly interpreted, self-determination is a right possessed by the legitimate residents...
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John Searle describes our sense of freedom as an experience of a "gap" between an intentional action and its psychological antecedents, specifically, our reasons.. Since the gap is itself understood as a lack of causation, then no agent can accept the antecedent determination of voluntary action except at the price of "practical inconsistency." I a...
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Self-awareness is commonly expressed by means of indexical expressions, primarily, first- person pronouns like 'I', 'me', 'we', 'my', 'myself', 'mine' and so forth. While not all indexical contents are first-personal, indexical usage suggests a kind of reflexive awareness since its terms always convey information about the speaker. For example, hea...
Chapter
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Terrorism is politically motivated violence directed against non-combatants. It is no doubt as ancient as organized warfare itself, emerging as soon as one society, pitted against another in the quest for land, resources, and dominance, was moved by a desire for vengeance, or found advantages in operations against ‘soft’ targets. While terrorist vi...
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Among the entities that can be mentally or linguistically represented are mental and linguistic representations themselves. That is, we can think and talk about speech and thought. This phenomenon is known as metarepresentation. An example is "Authors believe that people read books." In this book Francois Recanati discusses the structure of metarep...
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This article, from a compatiblist viewpoint, argues that the Consequence Argument fails to prove incompatibilism, and develops criticisms of it that, for the most part, are already in the existing literature. It first reviews various formulations of the Consequence Argument and the criticisms made against it over the past three decades. It then con...
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It is widely agreed that the references of indexical expressions are fixed partly by their relations to contextual parameters such as the author, time, and place of the utterance. Because of this, indexicals are sometimes described as token-reflexive or utterance-reflexive in their semantics. But when we inquire into how indexicals help us to ident...
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Two claims have been prominent in recent discussions of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible (the Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that an awareness of self accompanies all conscious states, at least those through which one refers to something. The latter--here termed the Ubiquity Th...
Chapter
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According to Hector-Neri Castañeda, indexical reference is our most basic means of identifying the objects and events that we experience and think about. Its tokens reveal our own part in the process by denoting what are “referred to as items present in experience” (Castañeda 1981:285-286). If you hear me say, “Take that box over there and set it n...
Chapter
Upon his death, Hector-Neri Castañeda left several file cabinets filled with papers at both his home office and his departmental office. His computer also contained numerous files dealing with a variety of philosophical topics. The papers were taken to the Lilly Library at Indiana University in accordance with his wishes. His son, Kicab Castañeda,...
Chapter
[Editors’ Introduction. The first Festschrift for Hector-Neri Castañeda (Tomberlin 1983: 467—476) contains a bibliography of Castañeda’s publications up to 1982. A list of Castañeda’s publications up to 1986 (Landini 1986) can be found in the second Castañeda Festschrift (Tomberlin 1986). These bibliographies are supplemented by a list of Castañeda...
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I have argued that since (i) intentional agency requires intention-acquisition, (ii) intention-acquisition implies a sense of an open future, and (iii) a sense of an open future is incompatible with complete foreknowledge, then (iv) no agent can be omniscient. Alternatively, an omniscient being is omni-impotent. David Hunt continues to oppose this...
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L'A. developpe la these de l'autoreferentialite (SRT) pour rendre compte du contenu intentionnel de nos actions, fondees sur le principe de l'efficacite supposee (PSE). S'appuyant sur les arguments de l'intention positive etablis par G. Harman, l'A. refute l'argument de la regression en soulignant le caractere immediat de la reference indexicale
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In ‘Omniprescient Agency’ (Religious Studies 28, 1992) David P. Hunt challenges an argument against the possibility of an omniscient agent. The argument – my own in ‘Agency and Omniscience’ (Religious Studies 27, 1991) – assumes that an agent is a being capable of intentional action, where, minimally, an action is intentional only if it is caused,...
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L'A. presente l'oeuvre de R. Double «The Non-Reality of Free Will» qui traite de facon originale des rapports entre volonte libre, responsabilite morale et determinisme et ce, en defiant les doctrines compatibiliste et libertaire contemporaines
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Propositional attitudes are at the interface of several philosophical concerns with thinking, language, and reality. Some philosophers approach them with an interest in semantics, others with a concern about contents, inquiring into the proper objects of cognitive states. For yet others, the attitudes are critical elements of a correct account of a...
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Essential to Peirce's distinction among three kinds of reasoning, deduction, induction and abduction, is the claim that each is correlated to a unique species of validity irreducible to that of the others. In particular, abductive validity cannot be analyzed in either deductive or inductive terms, a consequence of considerable importance for the lo...
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It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know,...
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Everyday reasoning is replete with arguments which, though not logically valid, nonetheless harbor a measure of credibility in their own right. Here the claim that such arguments force us to acknowledge material validity, in addition to logical validity, is advanced, and criteria that attempt to unpack this concept are examined in detail. Of specia...

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In "Der Gedanke", Frege distinguished between two senses associated with a use of the first-person, one which enables a speaker to identify himself or herself, and the other which is designed to enable a hearer to identify the speaker. Frege's distinction can be generalized to all indexicals, and I show how this can be done.